Abstract:
The Lebanese state has seldom played a role in the modernization of Lebanon. The study
attempts to address the problem of structural inertia in the Lebanese polity despite the
obvious need for systemic change. Whichever way 'modernization' may lead the
Lebanese polity, this study aims to understand the structural limitations of the current
system to any such attempts- the structural limitations to any move away from the
long-standing status quo. Throughout this exploration, the term structure refers to
institutions and groups, interaction patterns that have been sustained over time,
constitutive rules and norms, and the relationships that link institutions to each other.
These structures are classified into four categories: social, economic, political, and
regional structures. Fouad Chehab offered the option of an expanded welfare state while Rafiq al-Hariri
sought a minimal and non-interventionist state. Seemingly the Lebanese, through their
political elites, rejected both. Despite intermittent political crises, a sustained civil-war, a
highly unstable regional environment, and massive emigration; there remain three
constants: Lebanon's consociational democracy, its liberal economy, and its ruling elite.
These constants must rest their legitimacy on more solid pillars than the manipulation of
the few. This study is committed to understanding systemic resistance to reform and
modernization in Lebanon by exploring the limitations that the social, economic,
political, and regional structures manifested against the Chehabist and Hariri attempts at
state modernization.
