A trade-environment coalition game

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dc.contributor.author Marrouch, Walid
dc.contributor.author Sbargia, Lucia
dc.date.accessioned 2018-04-03T12:08:30Z
dc.date.available 2018-04-03T12:08:30Z
dc.date.copyright 2009 en_US
dc.date.issued 2018-04-03
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/7317 en_US
dc.description.abstract We identify several interconnections between international environmental problems and trade issues. Inspired by the work of Barrett (1997), we propose a model that links the problem of forming International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) with International Trade Agreements. We broaden Barrett's model by considering a more general form of trade coalition with trade sanctions in the form of differential tariff treatment instead of complete trade-bans. Such scenario is currently under discussion as a potential post-Kyoto framework after the year 2012. We introduce a meta-game with two stages. The first one is an environmental coalition formation game. The second one is a trade-production game. We compute the stability function of the IEA, and we find that the existence of positive spillovers (public good effect) when IEAs are formed exacerbates free riding incentives and leads to less cooperation. However, since countries are linked via trade, tying-in environmental and trade agreements generates negative spillovers over defectors. We find that these negative spillovers can potentially neutralize the perverse free riding incentives and as such sustain larger environmental coalitions. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher CIREQ en_US
dc.title A trade-environment coalition game en_US
dc.type Conference Paper / Proceeding en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200200185 en_US
dc.author.department Department of Economics (ECON) en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.keywords Trade coalitions en_US
dc.keywords Issue linkages en_US
dc.keywords International environmental agreements en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Marrouch, W., & Sbragia, L. (2009). A Trade-Environment Coalition Game. In Cinquième colloque CIREQ des étudiants de doctorat. en_US
dc.author.email walid.marrouch@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.conference.date 26 May, 2009 en_US
dc.conference.place Montreal, Canada en_US
dc.conference.title Cinquième colloque CIREQ des étudiants de doctorat en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url http://www.cireqmontreal.com/en/view/3301/3301 en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8488-6555 en_US
dc.author.affiliation Lebanese American University en_US

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