Israeli coalition governments. (c2017)

Abstract

The period between 1992 and 2015 witnessed a new change in the framework of Israeli elections directly impacting its coalition politics. In 1992 Israel adopted new election law where the Prime Minister is directly elected. It was expected that the law favors large parties and stabilizes government coalitions. The 1999 elections result, however, shrunk the shares of traditional large Knesset parties. This thesis identifies key aspects that have contributed to the formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments since 1999. The aim is to provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration analyses relevant to electoral structure and political pressure. Quantitative and qualitative analyses show that a coalition gov-ernment’s structural formation is a primary determinant of duration with special consid-eration given to the role of large and dominant parties. The findings asserts that the coa-lition structure remains the primary variable determining government performance.