Nuclear Iran. (c2006)

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dc.contributor.author Abi Rached, Cynthia M.
dc.date.accessioned 2011-09-30T07:39:36Z
dc.date.available 2011-09-30T07:39:36Z
dc.date.copyright 2006 en_US
dc.date.issued 2011-09-30
dc.date.submitted 2006-05-22
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/669
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-130). en_US
dc.description.abstract In trying to solve Iran's alleged development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the "EU-3"- France, Germany, and England- accompanied by the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),l initially adopted persuasive diplomacy that was later on transformed to coercive diplomacy. The complexity of Iran's nuclear issue fmds its roots not only in Iran's on-off cooperation, but also in the very nature of the EU-Iran and US-Iran relationships coupled with the US's aggressive agenda and lack of clear strategy. For years, the international community has been suspicious of the aspirations of the Iranian Republic to have its own nuclear technology, but no one really knew the sophistication of the program. Indeed, the peak of the Iranian nuclear capabilities issue regained strength in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran, (an exiled front group for the Mujahidin el- Khalel') publicly presented evidence of two undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak. Since then, the European Union represented by the "EU-3" and the IAEA have been actively involved in negotiations and talks with Iran in order to persuade the latter to collaborate and act in a more transparent manner. At a later stage of the conflict, Russia and China, who have major economic interests in Iran and hold the veto power in the UNSC, opted as well for an engagement policy vis-a-vis Tehran. However, unlike the latter parties who engaged Iran in an attempt to solve the nuclear case, the US adopted a radical, coercive approach from the beginning. Even thought several agreements have been signed between Iran and the European troika, the ink on paper failed to concretize, paved the way for mistrust, and reinforced the game of throwing the ball into the other's court. Indeed, Iran's recurrent attempts to save its head from the UNSC fell short on February 4, 2006. With a coercive diplomacy that has so far faltered coupled with a costly war option that could comprise dangerous consequences, the international community is in a race against time. Indeed, in their attempt to resolve the so called "Persian Puzzle", the world powers must consider more creative and realistic options that would satisty Iran's needs as well as international concerns. Thus, rather than being an alternative to war and a means to resolve conflicts peacefully, is diplomacy experiencing a change in its role in the age of terrorism and global threat? Will diplomacy's function diminish in favor of forceful means in order to satisty the priorities of our time or is it still a paramount instrument of containing dangerous spillovers? en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.subject Nuclear weapons -- Iran en_US
dc.subject Security, International en_US
dc.subject Iran -- Military policy en_US
dc.title Nuclear Iran. (c2006) en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.title.subtitle A double-edged sword diplomacy en_US
dc.term.submitted Spring en_US
dc.author.degree MA in International Affairs en_US
dc.author.school Arts and Sciences en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200101508 en_US
dc.author.commembers Dr. Marwan Rowayheb
dc.author.commembers Dr. Latif Abul Husn
dc.author.woa OA en_US
dc.description.physdesc 1 bound copy: 130 leaves; 31 cm. available at RNL. en_US
dc.author.division International Affairs en_US
dc.author.advisor Dr. Walid Moubarak
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2006.31 en_US
dc.publisher.institution Lebanese American University en_US

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