The Lebanese conflict and the Taif Accord. (c2005)

Abstract

Lebanon is now ruled by a system which has been outlined at Taif which supposedly brought an end to the war. In this thesis an attempt is made to determine the roots of the measures which were established at Taif to terminate the war. The modern history of Lebanon in the 19th and early 20th century has been reviewed with the intent to examine the roots of sectarianism and the struggle for sovereignty with outsiders afar or near. Syria or as it was known under the Ottomans, the vilayat of Damascus, has been no stranger to the struggle for Lebanese sovereignty. During the war of 1975-89 various attempts for mediation, reconciliation and settlement were reviewed as perhaps the forerunners of Taif with each attempt yielding one or another of the features of Taif. In Chapter IV, the making of the grand settlement at Taif was examined. The power factors on the international and domestic level which contributed to the making of Taif were considered and examined in as much as they determined the major features of Taif. Taif cannot be understood without reference to the conflict in Lebanon and thus in this regard they have been studied jointly. In Chapter V, the Taif Accord has been analyzed fully in theory and practice. It revealed that the Syrian hegemony is still persistent and that this hegemony has been belatedly challenged by a seemingly developing Christian-Muslim front. The recent joining of Walid Jumblat, the prominent Druze leader, and the hovering of Hariri over the wings of the opposition have both given the opposition to Syria a national character: A feature which proved effective in Lebanese history against outsiders. Taif like its predecessor, the National Pact of 1943, turned out to be a confessionally consociational built Pact. Considering the confessional nature of the Lebanese society and its mosaics no other system seems to be viable. Some adjustments in the balance and internal equilibrium between sects have been achieved at Taif to reflect the changing demographic features in the country. This change is certainly due and is acknowledged in principal by the Christians whose role in the system has been modified. But the cry is that under the hegemony of Syria and Arab auspices the Christians have been marginalized. Recently, in the interest of solidarity with other Muslim wings in the opposition, the Christians have temporarily grossed over some of their complaints of Taif. The question is would such complaints surface again after the recapturing of sovereignty? The chances are they probably would in a modest manner. This is not, however, to discredit Taif which apparently is a viable formula for the system of Lebanon. An association by fiat is not everlasting, an association in freedom lasts but in a changing manner. This is in anticipation the destiny of Taif in Lebanon. Externally Syrian influence may be maintained if it is based on association in freedom; Syrian occupation, however, is less likely to last.