Abstract:
For most of the last five decades, the United States has relied on the autocratic leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to help protect its vital interests in the neighborhood. However, on the morning of September 11, 2001, U.S. priorities in the Middle East changed and the call for reform and democratization in the region became a central goal in U.S. foreign policy. Washington perceived the rise of liberal democratic political systems in the Arab world as a basic feature of U.S. national security policy. As they were building their new strategy, U:S. leaders sought to revive their alliance with Europe in order to contain Islamic Fundamentalism in which they saw a
new enemy. Therefore, in a joint venture, they launched the Greater Middle East Initiative which aimed at assisting and helping Arab civil societies to reform and develop their countries. Arabs from different factions were skeptical about President Bush's new plan due to the failure of his past commitments in the region. To date, no serious reforms have occurred in the Middle East except for a few cosmetic changes in some countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan and to a lesser extent Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; however, pressure by Arab societies calling for change has obviously increased, leading to some instability in the region. After providing a background of the American foreign policy in the Middle East, this study tackled the Greater Middle East Initiative trying to assess the real motives behind it, the obstacles it could face, along with Arab and European reactions.
Furthermore, it presented the different setbacks of the Initiative along with some analysis based on different opinions.
