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Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem

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dc.contributor.author Boumosleh, Anwar
dc.contributor.author Reeb, David M.
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-17T08:59:10Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-17T08:59:10Z
dc.date.copyright 2009 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/5921 en_US
dc.description.abstract We posit that placing insiders on the board facilitates information flows to outside directors, mitigates the CEO's role as information gatekeeper, and allows managers to be more independent of the CEO. We find that inside directors are more prevalent in environments of greater information asymmetry. Further tests indicate that the percentage of insiders is associated with lower CEO pay, lower CEO influence, and higher use of accounting-based performance measures. However, these counterbalancing effects are diminishing in the number of insiders on the board. We conclude that insiders improve information flow to the board, foster managerial competition, and enhance board power. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem en_US
dc.type Conference Paper / Proceeding en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200501018 en_US
dc.author.department Department of Finance and Accounting (FINA) en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.keywords Internal Disclosure en_US
dc.keywords Managerial Compensation en_US
dc.keywords Accounting Performance en_US
dc.keywords Analysts' Forecasts en_US
dc.keywords Asymmetric Information en_US
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.674082 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Boumosleh, A. S., & Reeb, D. M. (2009). Inside directors, managerial competition, and the asymmetric information problem. en_US
dc.author.email anwar.boumosleh@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.conference.pages 30 p. en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=674082 en_US
dc.author.affiliation Lebanese American University en_US


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