Board composition, CEO turnover and firm value

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dc.contributor.author Dah, Mustafa A.
dc.contributor.author Hurst, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned 2017-02-28T13:35:18Z
dc.date.available 2017-02-28T13:35:18Z
dc.date.copyright 2016 en_US
dc.date.issued 2017-02-28
dc.identifier.issn 1460-6712 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/5288 en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a significant reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO owing to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. Contrary to the legislators' objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brings about inefficient monitoring and promotes an unfavourable trade-off between independent directors and insiders. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Board composition, CEO turnover and firm value en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.description.version Published en_US
dc.title.subtitle the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200104725 en_US
dc.author.department Department of Finance and Accounting (FINA) en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.relation.journal International Journal of Financial Services Management en_US
dc.journal.volume 8 en_US
dc.journal.issue 3 en_US
dc.article.pages 217-239 en_US
dc.keywords Board independence en_US
dc.keywords Managerial turnover en_US
dc.keywords Firm performance en_US
dc.keywords Sarbanes-Oxley Act en_US
dc.keywords Board composition en_US
dc.keywords CEO turnover en_US
dc.keywords Firm value en_US
dc.keywords SOX en_US
dc.keywords Corporate boards en_US
dc.keywords Monitoring en_US
dc.keywords Independent directors en_US
dc.keywords Insiders en_US
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJFSM.2016.080118 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Dah, M. A., & Hurst, M. (2016). Board composition, CEO turnover and firm value: the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. International Journal of Financial Services Management, 8(3), 217-239. en_US
dc.author.email mustafa.dah@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url http://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJFSM.2016.080118 en_US
dc.author.affiliation Lebanese American University en_US

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