Why do acquiring firms pay high premiums to takeover target shareholders

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dc.contributor.author Raad, Elias
dc.date.accessioned 2016-10-27T08:34:42Z
dc.date.available 2016-10-27T08:34:42Z
dc.date.copyright 2012 en_US
dc.date.issued 2016-10-27
dc.identifier.issn 0892-7626 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/4704 en_US
dc.description.abstract The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reported in the literature to affect the premium received by takeover target shareholders. Using a sample of 190 successful takeovers during the period 1995-2005, our results suggest that high leveraged target firms' shareholders receive, on average, 13.34 percent more premium than stockholders of low leveraged target firms. Controlling for leverage, target firms which have high leverage and oppose the takeover receive significantly larger premiums than those with high leverage but do not oppose the takeover. Moreover, controlling for the size of managerial ownership in target firms, the association between leverage and premiums becomes more significant when managerial ownership is high and less significant when it is low. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Why do acquiring firms pay high premiums to takeover target shareholders en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.description.version Published en_US
dc.title.subtitle an empirical study en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 199590190 en_US
dc.author.department Department of Finance and Accounting (FINA) en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) en_US
dc.journal.volume 28 en_US
dc.journal.issue 4 en_US
dc.article.pages 725-734 en_US
dc.keywords Takeover Target Shareholders en_US
dc.keywords Target Firm Leverage en_US
dc.keywords Acquiring Firm Premiums en_US
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7055 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Raad, E. (2012). Why Do Acquiring Firms Pay High Premiums To Takeover Target Shareholders: An Empirical Study. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 28(4), 725-734. en_US
dc.author.email eraad@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/JABR/article/view/7055 en_US

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