Applying economic methodology to the war on terrorism

Abstract

The application of economic methodology to the problem of terrorism is discussed. Theoretical and empirical results are discussed with particular focus on the September 11 attack and the retaliatory response by the United States. Economists have relied on the rational agent model to derive testable hypotheses regarding the behavior of terrorists. The rational agent model postulates that terrorists respond to incentives, including media publicity, and the model predicts that when the net marginal benefit from one type of terrorist activity is diminished, terrorists will substitute into alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical results demonstrating that such substitutions indeed occur are discussed. Therefore, policy designed to reduce a particular form of terrorism, such as increased airport security to prevent airplane hijackings, may simply result in terrorists choosing alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical evidence demonstrating that terrorism is cyclical in nature is also discussed. Evidence on substitution and cycles suggests that following temporary reduction in terrorist activity after retaliation against terrorists and their infrastructure, terrorists are able to successfully regroup and attack using alternative means. Therefore, the current US focus on fighting terrorism on all fronts and over the long haul is the correct approach.