Separation as a solution to ethnic conflicts. (c2011)

Abstract

Ethnic conflicts have attracted the attention of scholars and diplomats in the last few decades. Many theorists have come up with cogent and complex institutional engineering schemes - such as federalism, confederalism, consociationalism and others - as solutions capable of bringing peaceful ends to these conflicts. A vast array of these schemes has been considered for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which has continued for more than fifteen years now. Yet, the conflict remains unresolved. Despite the continuous failures to reach an agreement on one of these schemes, secession has remained ―off the table. Nagorno-Karabakh, the mostly Armenian-populated autonomous region landlocked in the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, was one of the first regions to exploit the pledges of Mikhail Gorbachev‘s perestroika and glasnost, and to voice its demand for unification with its neighbouring Armenia. This struggle, which quickly turned into violent confrontation, is analyzed in this thesis with the aim of demonstrating the undeniable virtues of secessions in resolving ethnic conflicts. This study examines the legitimate claims of secessionist scholars to offer secession a fair and equal chance similar to the other schemes as a mean to resolve the ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The question investigated here is whether or not secession offers a viable solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and potentially for other ethnic conflicts as well.