International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty

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dc.contributor.author Nkuiya, Bruno en_US
dc.contributor.author Marrouch, Walid en_US
dc.contributor.author Bahel, Eric en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2016-01-28T11:59:15Z en_US
dc.date.available 2016-01-28T11:59:15Z en_US
dc.date.copyright 2014 en_US
dc.date.issued 2016-01-28
dc.identifier.issn 1097-3923 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2969 en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.description.version Published en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200200185 en_US
dc.author.woa N/A en_US
dc.author.department Department of Economics (ECON) en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Public Economic Theory en_US
dc.journal.volume 17 en_US
dc.journal.issue 5 en_US
dc.article.pages 752-772 en_US
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12108 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Nkuiya, B., Marrouch, W., & Bahel, E. (2014). International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17 (5), 752-772. en_US
dc.author.email walid.marrouch@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.identifier.url https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.12108 en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8488-6555 en_US

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