Abstract:
First deployed to southern Lebanon in 1978 to observe the pullout of Israeli invasion, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been a heavily criticized peacekeeping organization. Its goals have changed from observational duties, to acting as a mediator, to acting as a group bent on confiscating the weapons of local parties on the ground. As a peacekeeping organization, a certain level of peace was hoped to be restored by UNIFIL in the areas under its jurisdiction. However, wars have continued and violent actors and activities have at times gone unabated. UNIFIL’s main operational area being also home to competing organizations and levels of multi-polarity confused even the most astute observers. Due to what some analysts and observers have viewed as inaction and lack of measurable success, UNIFIL has been branded as a failure and/or considered superfluous. Yet, despite these negative views, UNIFIL has demonstrated its own modicum of success.
The purpose of this thesis is to prove that UNIFIL has been relatively successful contrarily to what some other observers have thought of. Theories of realism and liberal internationalism are applied to prove that UNIFIL was relatively more successful in its peacekeeping operations than other similar organizations created under the same UN mandate, and according to the assessment of different critiques of the group. Using UNIFIL’s foundational United Nations Security Council resolutions, the organization can be viewed as successful in its accomplishments while fulfilling its mandate that was adjusted many times due to the developments from 1982 till 2006.
