Durable Solutions’ Dilemma In The International Refugee Regime

Abstract

The International Refugee Regime (IRR) offers three durable solutions for the plight of refugees: (1) local integration in the first country of asylum, (2) voluntary repatriation, and (3) resettlement in third party-states. Despite these devised solutions, in most refugee crises no durable solutions demand is met (Stein, 1986). This is the case for millions of Syrian refugees, who have faced extreme hardship and difficulty since fleeing Syria following the start of the civil war in 2011. Ten years into the crisis, nearly 6.6 million Syrian refugees are displaced across 126 countries, of whom 5.7 million are seeking refuge in five countries neighboring Syria (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey) (UNHCR, 2019). Lebanon, a fragmented state, remains the host with the largest number of refugees per capita worldwide. This dissertation draws international relations theory to explain how and why the IRR failed to ensure durable solutions for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. It argues that, given the anarchical international system in which the IRR operates, responsibility sharing and attaining durable solutions for Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon will remain unlikely as long as the IRR remains unable to exert policy decisions on states. This thesis demonstrates the ways in which states draw on securitization discourse to justify their non-compliance with and rejection of the durable solutions put forward by the IRR and in turn (re)producing their sovereignty. By analyzing these elements within the specific context of Lebanon, the dissertation attempts to highlight the repercussions of lacking durable solutions for Syrian refugees and provides recommendations for achieving the durable solutions and improving the workings of the IRR.