The Dilemma of Anti-Corruption Policies in a Power Sharing System

Abstract

Given the alarming concerns about corruption in Lebanon, this research delves into the issue of corruption in the public sector over the past decade to demonstrate whether power sharing system is directly responsible for its proliferation. The research examines the correlations between anti-corruption strategies adopted in the past decade and its attainability given the consociational requirements. For that purpose, a comparative power sharing analysis with Belgium is utilized to demonstrate successes and failures in the implementation of anti corruption strategies. The study relies on existing reports of public cases where anti corruption strategies are implemented amid consensual politics as to analyze the relationship between consociationalism and corruption in the public sector. The findings demonstrate that power sharing system is not a sufficient and necessary variable responsible for high levels of corruption. Instead, relevant and related institutional factors are also to blame, such as the lack of independent judiciary, the absence of a viable opposition, and deficient checks and balances mechanisms. Chronic situation of instabilities and foreign meddling may equally be as responsible for sustaining a weak state and lacking public oversight.