Abstract:
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and the gradual growth in significance of the South Caucasus region economically and geopolitically, Armenia and Georgia have found themselves struggling to safeguard their national sovereignty and develop their weak economies. They have been forced to adhere to waves of expansion by both Russia and the European Union and NATO. They have also been obliged to choose one sphere of influence over the other, with serious consequences for national sovereignty and foreign policy considerations. This thesis examines the reasons behind Armenia’s and Georgia’s regional alignment choices. Georgia’s national Western identity, and history of Russian occupation and aggression on its territorial sovereignty, has led it to align with the Western bloc, especially after the 2003 Rose Revolution and the 2008 Russian-Georgian war that led to the de-facto secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. On the other hand, Armenia’s economic and military dependence on Moscow, and the struggle over Nagorno-Karabagh and its ensuing security climate, has pushed it to align with Russia at the expense of its own economic relations and geopolitical position. The thesis tests the alignment choices of the two Transcaucasian states against neorealist predictions. Whereas neorealism offers a robust explanation with regards to Armenia’s alignment choice, it fails to offer a compelling explanation for Georgia’s integration into Western structures. The latter’s foreign policy orientation towards the West can be better understood through constructivist approaches that consider Georgia’s post-revolution policy-makers’ immaterial identity preferences and perceptions of state purpose, both of which have been staunchly pro-European.
