The Political Economy of Patronage in Lebanon - The Case of the Council of Development and Reconstruction

Abstract

The Council for Development and Reconstruction has been formed as an alternative to the ministry of general planning. The main purpose of its formation was avoiding bureaucratic ineffiencies and developing a rigid infrastructure in Lebanon. Hence, the CDR has been granted the autonomy that exempted it from any supervision and regulation. This paper argues that in the postwar period, the CDR has been transformed from a state-building institution to an income generator for the political and economic elites. In order to prove this hypothesis, this paper will look at the political affiliations of the members of the CDR and the owners of the contracting companies that monopolize the construction of the projects. Furthermore, it will tackle two specific projects initiated by the CDR which are the waste management process in Beirut, and the Bisri dam. This paper concludes that the CDR is an institutional manifestation of the clientelistic political system in Lebanon and is a network that fortifies the alliance between the political and economic elites in Lebanon.