Why Intelligence Fails: Intelligence before the Invasion of Iraq in 2003

Abstract

This Senior Study questions the credibility and function of the national intelligence and examines how failures occur inside these communities. It stresses the work of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its relationship with the Executive branch and the interference and role of policymakers in and with different intelligence units. The analysis will examine the period before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S., under President Bush, decided to attack Iraq suspecting it to have Weapons of Mass Destruction which threaten world peace and security; however, in retrospect, these weapons were nowhere to be found. Therefore, this study will tackle the reasons of such suspicion and commonly known U.S. intelligence failure prior to the invasion in the U.S. government. It will delve into the actions and relationships between the Intelligence Community and the Bush administration. As an outcome, this study shows that the Bush administration pressured the U.S. intelligence community to come up with the results that primarily supported and justified the decision to invade. Policymaker pressure, as a form of politicization of intelligence, on intelligence officials led them to tone down and soften some conclusions from the information that they gathered and analyzed, especially when such intelligence assessments clashed with decision-maker views.