Board monitoring and audit fees

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dc.contributor.author Jizi, Mohammad
dc.contributor.author Nehme, Rabih
dc.date.accessioned 2020-12-03T09:11:07Z
dc.date.available 2020-12-03T09:11:07Z
dc.date.copyright 2018 en_US
dc.date.issued 2020-12-03
dc.identifier.issn 0268-6902 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/12337 en_US
dc.description.abstract Purpose This paper aims to examine whether CEO/chair dual roles influence board monitoring-audit fees nexus. The impact of corporate governance on audit fees literature is lacking in the banking sector, which is subject to different regulations and reporting requirements to other sectors. The level and quality of external audit services are important not only to shareholders and customers but also for regulators’ reputations and public confidence. Design/methodology/approach Examining a sample of the US national commercial banks, this study fills the gap by empirically examining whether the attributes of internal corporate governance mechanisms, proxied by boards of directors and audit committee characteristics, are related to audit fees. We introduce two interaction variables to understand whether chief executive officer (CEO)/chair dual roles influence the relationships between board independence and audit fees on the one hand and between the audit committee and audit fees on the other hand. Findings We find that audit fees are positively associated with board independence, board size, CEO/chair dual role and audit committee financial experts. The results of the interaction variables indicate that boards with higher independence and more effective audit committees tend to demand higher audit quality, and consequently, pay higher audit fees to protect shareholders’ interests from potential power abuse by CEOs who also chair boards. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature by providing extensive understanding of the influence on audit fees of the independence of the board of directors and the effectiveness of the audit committees. The authors first examine the impact of each individual governance variable separately and then introduce two interaction variables. This study provides policymakers with insights into the existing relationships between audit fees and the banking sector governance structure. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Board monitoring and audit fees en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.description.version Published en_US
dc.title.subtitle the moderating role of CEO/chair dual roles en_US
dc.author.school SOB en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200201121 en_US
dc.author.idnumber 199710210 en_US
dc.author.department Hospitality Management And Marketing en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.relation.journal Managerial Auditing Journal en_US
dc.journal.volume 33 en_US
dc.journal.issue 2 en_US
dc.article.pages 217-243 en_US
dc.keywords Audit fee en_US
dc.keywords Board of directors en_US
dc.keywords US banks en_US
dc.keywords CEO dual role en_US
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-10-2016-1464 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Jizi, M., & Nehme, R. (2018). Board monitoring and audit fees: the moderating role of CEO/chair dual roles. Managerial Auditing Journal, 33(2), 217-243 en_US
dc.author.email mohammad.jizi@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.author.email rabih.nehme@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MAJ-10-2016-1464/full/html en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1911-8215 en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1028-6001 en_US
dc.author.affiliation Lebanese American University en_US

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