Abstract:
This is a study on Egypt’s brief interlude of civilian rule that lasted for just over a year between June 2012 and July 2013. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ascended to the presidency in what was hitherto Egypt’s most democratic election. Morsi, the first civilian to hold the highest office in the state, was ousted from power in July 2013 in a military coup that was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This study seeks to explain the downfall of the Morsi regime, through emphasizing the dynamic interplay of three factors: 1) the regime’s mismanagement of relations with powerful and autonomous state institutions (particularly the military) and with broad segments of Egyptian society; 2) its inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt’s economic performance; and 3) its mishandling of Egypt’s external relations with powerful regional and international players. The thesis contends that while none of the aforementioned factors singlehandedly explains why Egypt’s democratic experiment under Morsi (imperfect as it was) fumbled, their complex interplay created a powerful platform that the military, and its allies within the state and society, exploited to bring down Morsi and the MB. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on the domestic and international conditions that can often lead to the faltering of democratic transitions.
Keywords: Egypt,
