Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation

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dc.contributor.author Margossian, Harag
dc.contributor.author Al Sayed, Mohammad
dc.contributor.author Fawaz, Wissam
dc.contributor.author Nakad, Zahi
dc.date.accessioned 2019-10-02T13:00:23Z
dc.date.available 2019-10-02T13:00:23Z
dc.date.copyright 2019 en_US
dc.date.issued 2019-10-02
dc.identifier.issn 0142-0615 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10725/11363
dc.description.abstract The addition of an external communication layer to the power system has left it vulnerable to cyberattacks. False data injection (FDI) can be used to manipulate measurements that are used to estimate the state of the power system. Decisions made based on a false evaluation can result in major disturbances in its operation. Recent studies show how, with full knowledge about the system, these types of attacks can be mounted without being detected. This paper shows how, with knowledge limited only to a specific section of the power system, it is still possible to carry out an undetectable attack. The process of performing the attack and a proof of its undetectability is explained in detail and then illustrated through a case study on the widely adopted IEEE 14 bus system. Last but not least, the paper proposes a method to identify a subset of available measurements to be considered for protection against cyberattacks. This would render the entire network or specific parts of it immune to these attacks. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.description.version Published en_US
dc.author.school SOE en_US
dc.author.idnumber 201509049 en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200402165 en_US
dc.author.idnumber 200602957 en_US
dc.author.department Electrical And Computer Engineering en_US
dc.description.embargo N/A en_US
dc.relation.journal International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems en_US
dc.journal.volume 110 en_US
dc.article.pages 623-629 en_US
dc.keywords State estimation en_US
dc.keywords False data injection attacks en_US
dc.keywords Power systems en_US
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.03.039 en_US
dc.identifier.ctation Margossian, H., Sayed, M. A., Fawaz, W., & Nakad, Z. (2019). Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 110, 623-629. en_US
dc.author.email harag.margossian@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.author.email zahi.nakad@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.author.email wissam.fawaz@lau.edu.lb en_US
dc.identifier.tou http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php en_US
dc.identifier.url https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014206151831915X en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2057-6325 en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5714-6487 en_US
dc.orcid.id https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8012-1157 en_US
dc.author.affiliation Lebanese American University en_US

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