Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation

Abstract

The addition of an external communication layer to the power system has left it vulnerable to cyberattacks. False data injection (FDI) can be used to manipulate measurements that are used to estimate the state of the power system. Decisions made based on a false evaluation can result in major disturbances in its operation. Recent studies show how, with full knowledge about the system, these types of attacks can be mounted without being detected. This paper shows how, with knowledge limited only to a specific section of the power system, it is still possible to carry out an undetectable attack. The process of performing the attack and a proof of its undetectability is explained in detail and then illustrated through a case study on the widely adopted IEEE 14 bus system. Last but not least, the paper proposes a method to identify a subset of available measurements to be considered for protection against cyberattacks. This would render the entire network or specific parts of it immune to these attacks.