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THE DIPLOMACY OF HEZBOLLAH

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Chapter One

Introduction

Visualizing Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and their many advisors sitting around a large table with carefully placed flags and water jugs is how many individuals think of diplomacy. The tired face of Terry Anderson and the shattered remains of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut Lebanon are how many people think of Hezbollah. This is a study that is designed to challenge common thinking. It tests the boundaries of diplomacy and Hezbollah. If it causes one to question, it causes one to think and consider the issues presented in this thesis. This will, hopefully, draw more study of this subject and thus fulfill part of the reason for this study. The mention of Hezbollah invariably provokes a strong reaction by many. Many either hate "those terrorists" or love "those defenders of Lebanese sovereignty". The following is intended to begin a process of study that will show Hezbollah as much more than a combat organ. It will examine the reasons behind action that the party conducts in order to show Hezbollah as a well-organized group that interacts with many different international actors. Viewing Hezbollah as a military organization haphazardly conducting a guerrilla war against Israel is an elementary view of the Party at best. This study will show Hezbollah as a very important player in the regional politics of the Middle East.

The application of diplomacy to Hezbollah will be done in four chapters. In each of these chapters a different form of diplomacy will be seen. To begin with Hezbollah, the party itself, will be studied. In Chapter Two the goals of the party will be introduced. Also in Chapter Two, the structure of Hezbollah will be presented to help gain an understanding of the party.

In Chapter Three the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah will be analyzed. At this level diplomacy via personal relationships will play a great role. Here it will be seen that personal relationships and the ideological positioning of the Party’s leaders are vital
components to Hezbollah's conducting of relations with Iran. As will be seen, if the leadership in Iran changes it will also impact Hezbollah.

In Chapter Four the relations between Hezbollah and Syria are evaluated as a struggle for supplies. Syria's control of the flow of supplies from Iran to Hezbollah allow Syria significant control over the party's activities. Never the less it does not give Syria total control as it has interests in Lebanon that Hezbollah serves. Hezbollah's war with Israel helps to put pressure on Israel over the return of southern Lebanon and the Golan heights.

Chapter Five titled, "Big carrots and a small stick" deals with Hezbollah's place within Lebanon's politics and society. Here major emphasis is placed on programs and activities that increase Hezbollah's influence via peaceful promotional activities. At this level Hezbollah advances its goals via social work as well as influence in the political and legal scene.

The sixth chapter, "A big stick and a small carrot" studies Hezbollah's relations with Israel. This chapter focuses on unconventional diplomacy such as direct combat, covert operations, assassination as well as discussions over prisoners of war (POW's). This is a controversial view of diplomacy; yet it is also a major aspect of how Hezbollah conducts its relations and thus warrants study.

In Chapter Seven many questions that relate to the future of Hezbollah are introduced and discussed. A possible scenario of events for the future is presented in relation to Hezbollah, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Israel. However, prior to embarking on the study of how Hezbollah relates to other actors, it is necessary to get a solid working understanding of the definition of diplomacy as applied in this study.

The final chapter will address the problems that come with doing a thesis like this. Not only the problems faced in the subject alone but the process as a foreigner as well.
What is diplomacy?

Hedley Bull describes diplomacy as having three different aspects. First, is the peaceful conduct between states and other entities with standings in world politics. Second, relations are conducted by professional diplomats. Lastly, behavior is conducted in a manner that is tactful. (1) This is a very stereotypical image of diplomacy that is not accurate. The nature of diplomacy today is changing. The above view captures a part of diplomacy yet not the whole. As will be seen not all methods of diplomacy are peaceful, respectful and conducted by professionals. Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr understand this and give a much better definition of diplomacy than does bull; "diplomacy involves direct, government-to-government interactions, acting upon the people in other governments who are able to do the things we want their states to do." (2) Russet and Starr go on to describe how this definition does not limit the state to only peaceful means but also opens military intervention as a means of diplomacy (3). Yet even this definition is flawed as there are non-state actors (such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Red Brigades that are able to effectively conduct aspects of diplomacy. One can adopt a more modern definition of diplomacy viewing it as the process used by one group to attain desired results from another group. The study that follows will look at the means that are implemented in Hezbollah's relations to Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, be they peaceful or otherwise.

Methodological Approach

With an organization as large as Hezbollah to dwell on every action that it undertakes would border on the impossible as well as the ridiculously unnecessary. It is a grave waste of time to explore actions that are not directly related to the accomplishment of
the objectives of the Party. Thus, it is necessary to focus primarily on events that can be associated with its diplomacy as related to its objectives.

Hezbollah is a group that has been widely written on by great journalists like Robert Fisk, Ross Dunn and Charles Fenyvesi. Yet, few people have studied the Party from an academic point of view. Arguably, the leading academic authority on Hezbollah is Nizar Hamzeh of the American University of Beirut (AUB). Although very versed on the subject of Hezbollah he has yet to attempt to study the party in relation to its diplomacy. Another leading academic on the subject of Hezbollah is Magnus Ranstorp from the University of St. Andrews, in Scotland. Although he has extensively researched Hezbollah he misses an understanding of the party that is gained by the close personal contact to Hezbollah that gives Hamzeh such authority. Moreover Ranstorp's area of expertise is in the hostage crisis of the 80's. Significant contact with top university professors in the U.S., Lebanon and Turkey failed to surface any other academics working on this subject.

In studying Hezbollah's diplomacy a great deal of information was acquired from the above mentioned writers as well as a variety of other writers. Information was also gathered from official and unofficial Party sources. Extensive time was spent with former and current members of Hezbollah, some former and active Hezbollah military elements and some active political elements, in order to gain as objective and complete a view as possible. With such a limited amount of academic study on Hezbollah, and near total absence of study on their diplomacy, it is vital to include the study of controversial methods that are implemented by the party to advance their objectives. Thus vast ranges of methods, from personal relations with foreign leaders to covert military operations, are studied. However, prior to embarking on the study of Hezbollah's diplomacy it is vital to gain some understanding of the party itself. This is what the next chapter attempts to do.
Chapter Two
Who is Hezbollah?

The German Kaiser's grave misunderstanding of the intentions of Austria/Hungry towards Serbia led to Germany's wholehearted backing of Austria/Hungry, which constituted a major step towards World War one. French and English misperception of Hitler led them to the policy of appeasement and further steps down the road to World War two. (5) Thus, not understanding others and their positions can lead to misperceptions and poor decisions that can in turn lead to greater tensions in certain given arenas. With the heightened tensions in the Middle East it is important to understand as much as possible about the politics, philosophies and personalities of different actors.

Hezbollah is considered even by Israel to be a very well established and effective force in the Middle East. (6) Understanding Hezbollah is a vital step to understanding the prospects of the Middle East peace process.

First, it is useful to understand what Hezbollah is in the international system. Hezbollah functions as a nonstate actor in the international system. A nonstate actor as defined by Russett and Starr, is any organized unit that commands the identification, interests, and loyalty of individuals and thus able to affect interstate relations. Weather or not this puts the organization above the state or not is unimportant, but this does notably open the organization up to criticism and allow it to be easily categorized as a terrorist organization.

It is claimed by some Hezbollah sources that the Party is as old as Islam itself. There has always been "The keeper of the Revolution", a radical group dedicated to the spreading of the Islamic message, but it now operates under a new name, Hezbollah. (7) The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was the catalyst for the official formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. "Hezbollah was the inevitable result of the Jewish state's occupation of Arab land" (8)
Hezbollah's inception was aided greatly by not only Iranian financial support, which was estimated at $100 million in 1983 alone (9), but also by 2,000 troops and advisors from the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. (10) This gave a great push to enable Hezbollah to start to have the immediate and lasting impact it has had.

Goals of the party

Liberating Southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation is the primary objective of Hezbollah yet not the only objective. There are nine objectives in total that Hezbollah desires to accomplish.

1) Liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation; 2) inform the public of the continued Israeli aggression in Lebanon and of the Israeli army's killing of civilians; 3) educate the public on the miserable living conditions of the Lebanese people living under Israeli occupation; 4) improve the living condition of the Lebanese people under Israeli occupation; 5) provide assistance to families who lost their sources of income due to Israeli army and assassinations; 6) resist the action of the Israeli-Sponsored South Lebanese Army (SLA); 7) provide housing to individuals whose homes were bombed by the Israeli army; 8) provide low-cost medical care and educational assistance to families in need. (11) It is interesting to note that seven of these eight goals deal with Israeli occupation. The question of what will become of Hezbollah if Israeli occupation is to end is discussed in Chapter seven.
Structure

Until recently, the structure of Hezbollah has remained relatively unknown. A Supreme Shura Council, as seen in Figure 1 leads the party. This 17-member council is made up mostly of clergy as well as a few paramilitary leaders. Many of these paramilitary leaders have been Iranian, such as Muhammad Hasan al-Askari and Ahmad Sadiqi. However, it is mostly the clergy that make the final decisions. (12) There is no higher authority in the party than the Supreme Shura Council who oversee the judicial, legislation, executive, political and military affairs of the party (see figures 1 & 2). If a deadlock is ever reached over a specific decision at this level the issue is referred directly to Iran. (13)

As for the judicial role of Hezbollah it very much mirrors the structure of the U.S. Government’s judicial system. The ability to appeal up a ladder of courts to a supreme body exists in both systems. A major difference lies in that in Hezbollah’s cases the court decisions are made with Islamic law as the standard. The lowest court only handles small cases such as minor traffic accidents, landlord-tenant disagreements and misdemeanors. Other cases are passed up to the Regional courts. Cases can then be appealed up to the High Court if need be. (See figure 2) This is the highest court in Hezbollah’s court system, only to be superseded by the Supreme Shura council.

The General Secretary and his deputy are the ones who are entrusted with the actual operation of the party. They are appointed by the Supreme Shura Council and are usually members of it. (14) The General Secretary is also the ex-officio chairman of the Executive Committee. (15)

The Executive Committee is made up of the heads of four districts plus five at large members appointed by the Supreme Shura Council. Each of the districts (Beirut, the Southern Suburbs, the South, and the Bqa) has a Regional Shura Council that is directly linked to the Supreme Shura Council by one of its members. The main duties of the
Regional Shura Councils are to follow up on the day-to-day activities and needs of the district. (16)

The Politburo is a 15-member supervising apparatus that is also appointed by the Supreme Shura Council. It oversees the operations of three major organs: the Security Organ, the Holy Reconstruction Organ, and the Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda Organ. (17)

The Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda Organ guides three sections. These sections are the main tools used to promote to the public the activities of the party in the hope of increasing awareness and support. The first section, the Mosque Preachers, hold the vital role of maintaining Hezbollah’s doctrine. The Circles of Learning perform the foundation of Hezbollah’s recruitment. These are learning centers such as, the Religious Hawzat of Siddikin in South Lebanon; the Center for Youth Education in Jibsheat, and also in South Lebanon, and the Iranian Religious center in Tyre to name a few. The third section is the Mass Media section. This section is in charge of radio and television stations as well as two publications: al-Ahed (the party’s main mouthpiece), which is weekly and al-Bilad, which appears monthly. (18)

The second organ is the Holy Reconstruction Organ (Jihad al-bina’) which is divided into eight committees. These committees focus on the social work of Hezbollah. The Islamic Health Committee focuses on the health needs of the population in the geographic sector of the party by building hospitals, pharmacies and the like (see Table 3). Aid to people who have been wounded in fighting or the dependents of martyr’s is given by the Financial Aid Committee. The Reconstruction Committee repairs homes damaged by Israel and the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). The Water and Power Resources Committee works on water and power stations for the population in the party’s population reservoirs. The Environmental Committee studies and surveys polluted areas, while the Agricultural Committee has concentrated on providing many services for farmer’s supplies and technical knowledge. All the work done by these committees is guided by the Technical and
Administrative committee, which also conducts research to learn about and meet the needs of the population in the geographic sectors of the party. (19)

A third organ of Hezbollah is the Security Organ, which is divided into three sections. The Party Security section oversees the security of the party leaders and members. The Central Security section is in charge of surveillance and intelligence gathering in and outside the Lebanon as seen in Chapter Six. Lastly, the Operational Security section conducts the operations of the Security Organ against enemies of Hezbollah. Since the release of all the Western hostages the activity of this organ is mainly the protection of party leaders. (20)

The final organ in the organization of Hezbollah is its Combat Organ, which is broken into two sections. The first is the Islamic Resistance (al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah) which is made up of people who show up only in times of need to conduct mostly suicide missions. The other section is the Islamic Holy War (al-Jihad al-Islami). This is the part of Hezbollah that gets the most international press as it is the section that conducts the conventional guerrilla warfare against forces in the south. (21) This will be studied in depth in Chapter Six.
Figure 1

General Structure of Hezbollah Source: Based on the various activities that were reported by Al-Ahed between 1988 and 1992
Source: The role of Hezbollah in conflict management within Lebanon's Shia community. by Nizar Hamzeh
Chapter Three
Personal relations
and ideological positioning
IRAN

In looking at the four different nations that are addressed in this study, Hezbollah's relations with Iran are by far the closest. This relationship is a necessity for the survival of Hezbollah as will be seen. The diplomacy that has developed between the two actors is a very personal one involving individuals who share many ideological beliefs. These shared beliefs and the development of close personal relationships is the type of diplomacy that is conducted between Iran and Hezbollah. This relationship is intact from the top leadership down to the ground troops. When the people in power, and thus philosophies, change in Iran, this often manifests itself into diplomatic repositioning by Hezbollah. In order to understand the current relationships one needs to examine the history of Iran and its involvement in the inception of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The establishment of an Islamic state

In 1979, worldwide headlines were made when Iran established an Islamic state. This was done as militia forces, with a great deal of popular support, overthrew the Shah and instated Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader of the nation of Iran. A simplified view of the situation would state that Iran became an Islamic pyramid made up of the people at the bottom, then the militias, the clerics, and Khomeini at the top as their leader. Iran became an Islamic state with the intent to export its ideas to the world. (22)

The exportation of the revolution is merely an extension of the original 1979 revolution in Iran. Ayatola Khomeini had a "vision of a revived Islamic Ummah (unified Islamic nation), headquartered in Tehran and led by Khomeini". (23) As commonly stated: "Neither East nor West only Islam," which refers to the idea that Islam will transcend all
national borders to unite the world. Khomeini himself stated, "We say we want to export our revolution to all Islamic countries as well as the oppressed countries". (24)

One of the more pronounced spearheads of this exportation of the revolution is the Revolutionary Guard of Iran. The Guard is a conglomerate of predominantly militia fighters, who were the strongmen of the revolution that helped to put Khomeini in power and keep him there. They were the military and social authority enforcing the will of Khomeini. They were behind the instigation of the uprising in Saudi Arabia during the July 1987 pilgrimage and made up most of the force that was deployed in Lebanon. (25) The revolutionary guard was a major, if not the largest, implementation force in the exportation of the revolution to Lebanon. More than just wanting to expand the revolution Iran wanted to have a say in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many of the more influential players in the Middle East, like Egypt and Syria, have one thing in common. They each have a big stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran, wanted to become a major power in the Middle East and needed to get into the Arab-Israeli conflict. "Ayatollah Khomeini had warned that he intended to send units to Lebanon... Eventually a group of several hundred Iranians did cross Syria into Lebanon. They got as far as Bhamdoun when Israel attacked". (26) Iran was thus involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and with Hezbollah continuing to be a force today Iran remains an important player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran propelled itself from being a distant observer of the Arab-Israeli conflict to being an actor in that conflict and thus a player in the Arab world. (27)

Common adherence to Shia Islam and animosity towards Israel were the building blocks of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. As will be seen, people also play a very important role in the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. In terms of diplomacy most of the power lies with Iran, as it was Iran who gave birth to Hezbollah. Much of the diplomacy that is conducted is on the level of personal relations. It is the personal relationships between individuals from Iran and individuals from Hezbollah that determine
much of the diplomacy between the two actors. How much weight does personal relationships hold in diplomacy? Much indeed.

The personal element

The use of personal relationships as the backbone to the way that Iranians conduct relations is not just part of the top leadership but as well Iranian society as a whole. "The Iranian political and social system decree that one deal with personalities and not with institutions, the personal relationship to this day transcends any formal or institutionalized relationship" (28) In approaching Iran diplomatically if one does not put great weight on building personal relationships his diplomacy will suffer.

Personal relations between different individuals of the principal actors involved have often played an important role in the course of relations. At the troop level in Hezbollah in Lebanon the Iranian influence is very present. Personal relationships being important in Iranian society are also very present in the strong relationships that have been forged between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah troops, as will be seen. Personal relations, as a tool for diplomacy between Iran and Hezbollah, are conducted extensively at the top level of leadership as well. As will be seen, the top leadership of Hezbollah has continually had strong personal ties back to individuals in Iran. These relationships have, at times, determined the success or failure of Hezbollah leadership.

"From the days of Musa Sadr, The Iranian-Lebanese Shia connection has been built on a network of personal contacts and relationships. Hezbollah as an 'organization', Iran as a 'state', and the 'association' between them have been, and still are, impenetrable and unfathomable: knowing what they are depends on knowing who the key personalities are within them, and how these key players relate to one another." (29)
The leadership

Going back to earlier Lebanese history we can see that many of Iran's leaders were in Lebanon long before Hezbollah was established as they trained with the PLO. (30) Charismatic leaders of Iranian origin such as Imam Musa al-Sadr had a big stake in Lebanon. Imam Musa al-Sadr, of Iranian background, gained large followings in the early 1970s. In 1975 he founded Amal (Afwaj al-Mahrumin), also influenced by Syria, which later on became Hezbollah's main rival within the Shia community, predominately in the south. Amal had a vast influence as it was established prior to Hezbollah. (31) This can be very clearly seen even today as the Speaker of the House in Lebanon, Nabir Berri, is also the head of Amal. His predecessor, Hussein Husseini, was also the leader of Amal for a brief period in the early 1980's.

The formation and initial guidance of Hezbollah was greatly influenced by former Iranian leader Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. He was the Iranian Ambassador to Syria beginning in 1982 and was then promoted to Interior Minister of Iran in 1986. Being a major Iranian force in Hezbollah, it was a necessity for the leadership of Hezbollah to have good relations with him. (32) Mohtashemi was considered a radical who had a great deal of support in Hezbollah in the 1980's, most notably from Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and Sheikh Sayed Hassan Nasserallah. (33) Tufayli's relationship with Mohtashemi allowed Tufayli to occupy the top position in Hezbollah as Secretary General, which he held until May, 1991.

The late 1980's brought a new and powerful figure to Iranian politics, President Hashemi Rafsanjani, a more pragmatic leader who had a much different desire for the leadership of Hezbollah. Rafsanjani's choice for the leadership of Hezbollah was Sheikh Abbas Musawi. Again the personal relationship was very close between Musawi and Rafsanjani. "Musawi had been loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini since he studied at Najaf, a holy Shia city in Iraq. But he was a personal friend of Iran's President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and became influenced by the president's more pragmatic way of thought." (34)
With the February 16, 1992, assassination of Musawi it seems odd that a radical supporter of Mohtashemi like Nasserallah would come to power under the government of Rafsanjani. Yet it is understandable as Nasserallah had become much more pragmatic even to the point of removing himself from the inner circle of loyal Mohtashemi supporters and skillfully steering himself between the leadership of Iran and Syria. (35) This pragmatism can be seen by his controversial decision to have Hezbollah participate in the political elections of Lebanon.

Currently in Iran this struggle has begun again with the rise to power of Sayed Mohanned Khatami. In May 1997, Khatami was elected president by a 70 percent popular vote in an election that saw an unprecedented 90 percent voter turnout. (36) He has “acquired a reputation for tolerance and general opposition to censorship, and he encouraged the publication of newspapers, journals, and books expressing a diversity of opinions.” (37) This policy of “alternative thought” (andishih-e digar) saw the publication of two controversial magazines, Kiyan and Zanan. Kiyan is a magazine where philosopher Abdolkarim Sorouh often expresses his ideas on the need for political pluralism where Zanan is a feminist magazine that addresses the issues of equal rights and pay for women. (38) Hezbollah in Iran has not taken these changes lightly. They have frequently disrupted speeches by Sorouh and ransacked the offices of his publications. Moreover in the summer in 1998 Hezbollah members assaulted ministers of Khatami’s cabinet members. (39)

The diplomacy that is implemented by the leadership of Hezbollah is one of keeping strong personal relationships with the leadership in Iran. Nasserallah is a masterful example of this diplomacy as he has been able to continually build and maintain good relationships with the leadership in Iran as demonstrated by his shift from Mohtashemi’s inner circle to Rafsanjani’s. He was able to accomplish this even when that leadership changed drastically in orientation. This diplomacy is not exclusive to the top leadership of Hezbollah but applies to the troops as well. This can also be seen in the relationship between Hezbollah fighters and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
The Iranian troops

The initial deployment of about 2,000 Revolutionary Guards from Iran to Lebanon was done with significant sacrifice as these troops were desperately needed in Iran's war with Iraq. Not only were they desperately needed in Iran for the war, but they were also the ones who carried out the revolution. They were the most hard line ideological supporters of the revolution, the most highly trained and most experienced of all Iranian troops. Sending them to Lebanon would hopefully ensure that Hezbollah would carry the same passion and military capability as those who overthrew the Shah. Thus, as the Guard trained the local Hezbollah fighters they would not only pass on military information but as well passion and loyalty to a unified faith that was neither east nor west but devoted to Iran. (40) The Revolutionary Guard was Iran's diplomats to the common Shia people of Lebanon that constituted the ranks of Hezbollah. Moreover these troops can still be seen in Lebanon today. When talking about the increased effectiveness of Hezbollah, "some Beirut-based diplomats and other experts say that much of the responsibility belongs to Iran, whose Revolutionary Guards continue to train Hezbollah forces in the Bqaa region in Lebanon." (41) This obviously gives Hezbollah the training and a resource it needs to continue its war against Israel and, in turn, allows Iran to keep a guiding hand over Hezbollah.

This close working condition has created a dynamic bond between the troops of Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard that, at times, even superseded their loyalty to Iran. The two most shocking examples of this were, first, during the Palestinian camp wars (over the disarmament of the Palestinian fighters in the refugee camps in Beirut) between Amal and Hezbollah and second, the Lebanese foreign hostage situation. (42)

The rift that was created between Hezbollah and Iran due to the future of western hostages in Lebanon caused a problem for the Revolutionary Guard. The Guard had to decide between loyalty to Iran or loyalty to Hezbollah as the debate between the two grew.
Under the leadership of Guard commander Hosein Deqan, the troops decided to stand beside Hezbollah in opposition to Rafsanjani’s desire to release western hostages. (43) This decision led to Rafsanjani assigning more loyal Guard troops in Lebanon in 1989. (44)

The hostage situation in Lebanon was not an isolated incident demonstrating the pressure that Hezbollah’s relationships with the Guard could put on Iran. During the Camp Wars between Amal and Hezbollah the Revolutionary Guard remained strong allies of Hezbollah. They did so against remarkable opposition from Iran, who wanted to have them withdraw from Lebanon and to be replaced by units more loyal to Iran. (45)

Hezbollah’s and Guard’s resistance to the release of Western hostages, and their resistance to a halt to fighting with Amal were directly related to two Hezbollah interests: the release of 15 prisoners from a Kuwaiti prison who had close ties to Hezbollah members (46); and concerns over the Ta’if accord which limited Hezbollah’s ability to maneuver as an armed resistance movement. (47)

The 15 prisoners held in Kuwait were among some 1,300 other prisoners who escaped during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some of these obtained documents from Iranian embassies and were transferred from Iraq to Iran and then back to Lebanon. (48) While the release of the prisoners met one Hezbollah interest, the other was met at the signing of an agreement on April 21, 1991. (49) This agreement assured that Hezbollah would be allowed to remain an armed resistance movement. The last western hostage was released December 4, 1991, hence closing a file that, at least in the latter years, had complicated Hezbollah’s relations with Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese authorities. (50)
Conclusion

Thus it is the leadership in Iran and their relations to Hezbollah that dictate many of the policies of Hezbollah. The diplomatic imperative that comes to play for Hezbollah is to be sure to align themselves with the leadership that is in power in Iran. As that leadership changes, either in policy or people, the leadership of Hezbollah must follow suit or risk being replaced by those who will follow new, revised Iranian policy. "The transformation of Hezbollah merely reflects the changes in Tehran. After Khomeini's death, Mohtashami's influence declined and power passed to younger and more tolerant religious leadership" (51) This clearly reinforces the direct link between the events in Iran and their development in Hezbollah. At the end of the 1980's and the change in leadership in Iran, came the end to the benefit of close ties with Mohtashemi. Rafsanjani, the younger more tolerant leader mentioned above, came to power and was the one that needed to be focused on. Even though there has been some resistance to Iran at times, for the most part Hezbollah has been very much in adherence with Iranian policies.

This leads to some interesting questions about the near future of Hezbollah. With a relatively large change in leadership in Iran that has the nation itself searching to come to a unified conclusion on its new political policy direction, how will the face of Hezbollah change? Will it divide as Iran seems to be divided over what is best for the Iran today? Or will it stay its present course? From where the power is held in Iran so will the relationships be strengthened with the top leaders in Hezbollah. From those relationships will also flow much of Hezbollah's policies. The diplomacy that is thus portrayed in the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is one of keeping in step with whoever is in power in Iran. Hezbollah does have some bargaining ability in this relationship as they are in charge of implementing Iranian policies in Lebanon. But Iran is the father who gave birth to Hezbollah and thus holds almost all the power. So as the leadership and leadership philosophies change in Iran it is necessary for Hezbollah to change as well.
Chapter four
The Struggle for Supplies
Syria

One commonality in all wars is that they are costly. In order to conduct and maintain them one needs many supplies. This also holds true for Hezbollah. Hezbollah's war with Israel, and its collaborators, has been very costly in terms of its human, economical, and munitions requirements. In order to maintain continuous operations Hezbollah needs a steady flow of costly supplies. Without this support they will be unable to function. Therein lies the foundation for Hezbollah's relations with Syria. Hezbollah's supplies are filtered to them via Syria. Syria's ability to control those supplies gives it a powerful tool in its relations with Hezbollah. Why would Syria be interested in Hezbollah? The answer to that begins way back in the common history between Syria and Lebanon.

Syria's Historical draw to Lebanon

Syria has historically had two major interests in Lebanon. The first is that of security and the second is a desire to increase its hegemony over Lebanon. As for security, "Syria, like Israel, had a legitimate security concern in Lebanon." (52) The Bqaa Valley was a natural corridor that had been used in the past by Israel to launch air attacks on Damascus. Tank mobility is also very easy in this corridor. (53) Thus, the military factor is very important to the understanding of Syria's interest in Lebanon and as well Hezbollah. Also of importance is the desire of Syria to gain increasing means of influence over Lebanon.

Syria had had a rich historical draw to Lebanon. Syria feels that Lebanon was stolen from them by France during the League of Nations Mandate at the end of WWI. Syria was not necessarily interested in annexing Lebanon but wanted control over it governmentally.
"Assad therefore wanted a Lebanese regime with 'clipped wings and no other foreign option'--one in which competing factions would go individually to Syria to seek his blessing and support against their enemies." (54) One part of these competing factions is obviously Hezbollah.

Syria's attitude and desires with regard to Lebanon can also be attributed to Hezbollah as well. If you can control supplies, you are able to control Hezbollah and in turn clip its wings. "All of the weapons that Iran provides to Hezbollah now pass through Damascus, a route on which Syria and Lebanon have insisted so that Syria can control what flows into southern Lebanon, and when." (55) Syria desires not only a Lebanon with clipped wings that is dependent on Syria but a Hezbollah that is dependent on Syria as well. Syria has over time been able to gain control over the supplies that flow from Iran to Hezbollah. This in turn grants Syria a great deal of control over Hezbollah. Thus Hezbollah needs to conduct a line of diplomacy that will keep Syrian interests alive and in turn gain its support.

Cooperation and conflict

Although Assad did not create Hezbollah "there could certainly be no Hezbollah if Assad ordered his 32,000-man Lebanese forces to suppress it." (56) There is a Hezbollah and it is certainly allowed and used by Assad. "Israeli Government believes Syria is better able to bring the militant Islamic group under control." (57) Thus Israel is under the belief that the only real way to stop Hezbollah is to do so in Syria. During April, 1996, Israel and Hezbollah were involved in a major conflict, known as the Grapes of Wrath, as can be seen in Table 6. For days the escalation increased on both sides. As the fighting got worse Israel adopted a policy of increased threat to Syrian troops and areas of influence. As one Middle Eastern analysts believes, "If the fighting remains only in southern Lebanon, [Syrian president] Assad couldn't care less," says Yossi Olmert, an expert on Syria and Lebanon.
"Only when the battle zone expands to areas in Lebanon where Syria is in control and they fear that their control might be undermined will they be convinced to step in and stop Hezbollah." (58) It may have been attacks in Syrian controlled areas or the death of a Syrian officer that convinced Assad to call off the April Hezbollah bombardment of Israel. (59) (See Appendix 1 for text of the April 26 1996 cease fire understanding) As Hezbollah conducted operations that were being effective and supporting Syrian interests, Hezbollah continued to receive the support of Syria. Once Syrian interests were being affected Hezbollah was brought into line with Syrian concerns and the fighting subsided. In turn Hezbollah was rewarded thus encouraging future compliance. The rewards came in the form of allowing greater quality and quantity of weapons to be sent to Hezbollah. These weapons were coming in at what seems to be a vast rate. According to David Levy, the Israeli Foreign minister, 30 planeloads of arms were shipped to Hezbollah via Syria over the 10 months from April, 1996 to February, 1997. (60) Syria is more than happy with continuing to supply Hezbollah in its war against Israel as this also supports Syrian interests.

This method of reward is also seen in a 1987 meeting between Tufayli and Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad. In this meeting Assad promised support and to supply weapons, while Tufayli agreed that all Hezbollah military operations would be coordinated with the Syrian headquarters in Lebanon. (61) With the increase in the number of Hezbollah operations (refer to tables 5,6,7 in chapter 4) it seems unlikely that Syria would oversee every individual operation. The relationship is more likely one where Syria is involved in the general pace of operations and intervenes only when that pace needs to be increased or decreased.

These weapons shipments have constituted a vast upgrading of the weaponry that Hezbollah has been using with great effectiveness against Israel, (see chapter 4). Among these weapons were truck-mounted Fajr-3 240mm rockets (with a range of 26-27 miles), highly lethal Soviet designed FAGOT ATGM'S (anti-tank missiles), 35mm Swiss Oerlikon automatic guns (good against helicopters and surface objects). (62)
Any failure by Hezbollah to comply with Syrian interests has met with stiff penalties. For example, in 1985 Syria warned Hezbollah about its overt activity in establishing an Islamic Republic by threatening to kill Sheikh Fadlallah unless the activity was ceased. Another such example is Hezbollah's abduction of Western foreigners that led to Syrian intervention and the eventual abduction of 14 Syrian soldiers. This in turn resulted in the February, 1987, killing of 23 members of Hezbollah by Syria. The relationship between Hezbollah and Syria has not always been peaceful, but overall the diplomatic maneuvering here is one of aiding each other's individual interests. Syria meets Hezbollah's need for supplies and in turn Hezbollah continues fighting Israel, which is of great interest to Syria.

Hezbollah's value to Syria

As stated earlier, Syria has security concerns in Lebanon. Syria needs to stay in Lebanon at least as long as Israel can use Lebanon to stage attacks against Syria. Hezbollah is of use to Syria as it is a very active force in attempting to remove Israel from Lebanon. In a conversation between Elie Salem, former foreign minister of Lebanon, and Abdel Halim Khaddam, former foreign minister of Syria, a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was discussed. Khaddam states, "We are in Lebanon to help you; use us as a means to pressure Israel. When you reach an agreement free of concessions with Israel, come to Damascus, and in half an hour we will agree on the withdrawal of our forces from Lebanon. The Americans keep asking about withdrawal. They are forcing us to play a tape for them--fine, we will play it. We will withdraw, we will withdraw, we will withdraw!" Although Syria desires to have continued control over Hezbollah operations in Lebanon, Syria does not necessarily desire to maintain a large troop presence in Lebanon. More importantly Hezbollah's pressure on Israel will also bring to light greater Syrian concerns for the return of the Golan.
Syria desires to have an Israel withdrawal from southern Lebanon but is more concerned with an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. "Hezbollah's value to Syria and Iran lies in Israel's continuing occupation of south Lebanon. The harrying of Israeli forces provokes Israeli reprisals, which draws in U.S. and European mediators who are then forced to examine Syrian and, to a lesser extent, Iranian demands." (67) What tops the Syrian agenda is that Israel leaves the Golan Heights.

Another side concern for Syria and its desire to aid Hezbollah in its quest to oppose Israel could be financial. Beirut is in the middle of millions of dollars of reconstruction. Much of the money is coming from outside investors. As the Economist states, the April, 1996, conflict could also "have been designed to frighten away the investors now creating a new Lebanon." (68) This also seems to be a very important reason for Assad to halt Hezbollah's April, 1996, war with Israel. Although "Assad cares not a jot for Lebanese casualties or Lebanese refugees, he has a big stake in Lebanon's reconstruction." (69) If Hezbollah's war with Israel hinders Syrian interests, be them financially, security or otherwise, Syria will clamp down on Hezbollah.

Conclusion

The diplomacy that exists between Syria and Hezbollah is focused on Hezbollah's need for supplies. In order for Hezbollah to conduct its operations against Israel it is in need of supplies routed through Syria. Syria has many interests that Hezbollah is able to meet and uses its control of Hezbollah's supplies to attain them. Hezbollah obviously has some say in this relationship, yet control of the relationship is predominately in the hands of Syria as they are more powerful and are able to survive without Hezbollah. Hezbollah's discontent with Syria has proved to meet with swift clear consequences as in the case of Hezbollah's abduction of Syrian soldiers. Ultimately, sustaining its existence without the aid of Syria would prove to be a very formidable task.
Chapter five
Big Carrots and a Small Stick
Lebanon

Hezbollah has often been characterized as terrorists, or at best freedom fighters. (70) This is understandable in that most of the press coverage that Hezbollah receives lies in its military operations, (71) but as will be seen this is at best an antiquated and elementary understanding of what Hezbollah is and how they conduct relations.

In Lebanon, the strategy that is employed by Hezbollah is one of winning the hearts and support of the people of Lebanon. The party's focus is predominately on the Shia people. Some of the avenues that Hezbollah uses to reach the people are large-scale social programs, mediation of legal disputes, as well as military and political activity. The process of winning the hearts of the people of Lebanon also meets many of the goals of Hezbollah listed above. These goals are to inform the public of Israeli aggression in Lebanon and to educate the public about the living conditions of the Lebanese people living under Israeli occupation. Hezbollah also wants to improve the living condition of the Lebanese people suffering under Israeli occupation and assist families who lost their sources of income due to Israeli army and assassinations. Another goal is to resist the action of the Israeli-Sponsored South Lebanese Army (SLA). In a conversation with Hezbollah's press secretary, Ibrahim Mouram, about the recent success in local elections he directly attributed this success to this resistance and the blood of many martyrs. (72) Hezbollah also desires to provide housing, low cost medical care and educational assistance to families in need. Lastly, Hezbollah has a deep-rooted desire to see the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hezbollah uses many carrots to win the hearts of the Shia people of Lebanon.

This winning of the hearts is discussed as a diplomatic tool that is used by Hezbollah. The attachment of this term to the party's actions in relation to the people of Lebanon seems odd. The Revolutionary Guard from Iran, as stated above, originally conducted the
establishment of Hezbollah. The Guard's action in relations to the Lebanese people can clearly be considered under the definition of diplomacy. Although Hezbollah is a Lebanese party, it still has Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops aiding it. Hezbollah also has the special privilege to maintain arms in contradiction to the spirit of the Ta'if agreement, which was meant to end the civil war in Lebanon through the disarmament and dissolution of militias. (73) Moreover Syria allows Iranian guard troops to be with Hezbollah contrary to the Ta'if agreement. (74) Although Hezbollah is a Lebanese party it also is allowed to act with a limited amount of autonomy within the Lebanese system. For the above reasons and for the uniformity of this study, new terms for Hezbollah's relations with Lebanon will not be introduced; but rather the current term of diplomacy will be retained.

The 1989 Transformation

As stated above Hezbollah follows closely the state of Iran. This being true Hezbollah needs to be studied under two different time frames: before 1989 and after 1989. In the pre-1989 stage of Hezbollah in Lebanon the party was much more radical and idealistic. When the leadership in Iran changed in 1989 Hezbollah also underwent a transformation to a more pragmatic and conservative platform. This had a significant effect on Hezbollah's military and political activity.

Much of the vision that outsiders have of Hezbollah is that of their combat organs (Islamic Resistance and Islamic Holy War). This is understandable as much of the initial reasoning behind their creation was that of a resistance organization. Moreover, much of the publicity of the party is focused on their combat functions, as in southern Lebanon. "Yet when Hezbollah took its decision to participate (in parliamentary elections), it was clearly admitting not only the realities of the Lebanese system but also that the road to Islamic state could be a model of participation in elections rather than the revolutionary approach. Thus an evolutionary and not revolutionary approach has become the main feature of Hezbollah's
new policy." (75) The view is that the party is moving to a more conventionally political avenue of reform. It was the change in leadership in 1989 that led to this new avenue of diplomacy for Hezbollah. Prior to this time there was little substantial political activity to speak of. Hezbollah's political accomplishments will be discussed later. Prior to the substantial political gains of Hezbollah the fundamental means of reaching the populace was via their social programs.

Pre-1989 social programs

One very important factor that contributed to the success of Hezbollah is its popular support derived from its social programs. "In the 1992 elections Hezbollah won eight seats. Its popular support seems to have grown since, thanks not just to its fight against Israel but to the social services that it runs in the poor (and mainly Shia) regions in the Bqaa Valley and southern Lebanon." (76) The social programs of Hezbollah are among the main diplomatic means used to win the support of the Shia people of Lebanon. This has been a very effective diplomatic tool as it can be used to promote the party's fund raising, recruitment and political aims. One reason that Hezbollah has been so effective in the work and services they provide for the community is the huge vacuum of social services that exists in Lebanon which was compounded by the civil war. Even today there still exist a great deal of social service need in the community that has not been met. Hezbollah's "Islamic Health Community" has made great contributions to the society since the early 80's. Many of these are medical facilities dedicated to the health of the community, as listed below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Name</th>
<th>Location/area of service</th>
<th>Date of establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Khomeini Hospital</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Biqa'a</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dar al-Hawra' for women and children</td>
<td>Beirut-southern suburbs</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirmaries (mustawsaf)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. al-Imam al-Rida</td>
<td>Madi str.</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. al-Imam al-Hasan</td>
<td>Farhat str.</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. al-Imam al-Husayn</td>
<td>al-karamah str.</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. al-Imam al-Sakik</td>
<td>Beir Hasan</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sayyid al-Shuhada</td>
<td>Burh al-Barajnah</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. al-Imam Ali</td>
<td>Laylaki str.</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. al-Imam al Khui</td>
<td>Kahldah Blvd.</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. al-Sayyidah Zaynab</td>
<td>al-Jinah</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirmaries (Mustawsaf)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. al-Imam Hasan Bin Ali</td>
<td>Tayrdabbah</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. al-Imam Hasan Bin Ali</td>
<td>Ayteet</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. al-Imam al-Mahdi</td>
<td>al-Ghaziyyah</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. al-Imam al-Hadi</td>
<td>Khurbat Sulum</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. al-Imam al-Rida</td>
<td>Ayn Buswar</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mobile Infirmaries</td>
<td>Service 12 villages next to the Israeli security belt zone</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirmaries (Mustawsaf)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mustawsaf Mashghara</td>
<td>Mashghara</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mustawsaf Suhmur</td>
<td>Suhmur</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. al-Ghubairi Clinic</td>
<td>Al-Ghubairi Main str.</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Harat Hurayk Clinic</td>
<td>Harat hurayk Main str.</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. al-shaheed (the Martyr) 1</td>
<td>Beirut-Burj Abu Haydar</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. al-Shaheed 2</td>
<td>Southern Suburbs</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. al-Shaheed 3</td>
<td>Southern Suburbs</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense Centers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Main Headquarters</td>
<td>Southern Suburbs-Beir al-Abed</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Branch 1</td>
<td>Southern Suburbs-al-Sheyah</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Branch 3</td>
<td>South Lebanon-Ayn Buswar</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Branch 4</td>
<td>South Lebanon-Khurbat Sulum</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reports about Hezbollah's Islamic Health Committee published by al-Ahed (Beirut) 1 August 1989, pg. 12-13

With a significant amount of work socially, in the predominately poor Shia community, Hezbollah has been able to gain a very consequential following. Although the health sector was not the only sector that Hezbollah was involved in, it is one of the most
significant. This involvement in society is in many more different areas. Hezbollah is known to go to people who are economically challenged and provide for their needs. (77) As in legal cases, they have been known to provide confidential funding for underprivileged people who need to give financial compensation in legal cases. "Hezbollah contributes money to settle the payment of diya. Without specifying the amount paid by Hezbollah, Al-Sayyid notes that, 'out of ten diya cases, Hezbollah contributes money to six of them" (78)

There has been many ways that Hezbollah has been able to benefit the needy of Lebanon prior to 1989. The civil war in Lebanon left huge gaps in the amount of aid given to the people of Lebanon. Hezbollah was one group that rose up to fill this gap. Another aid agency that has a significant impact on the Shia community is the Imam al-Sadr foundation. Hezbollah rose up and filled these gaps be they medical, legal, or other, thus earning them a reputation for being as much a social organization as a militaristic one, if not more. In so doing the Party promoted its cause and gained a very loyal following.

Hezbollah's legal intervention

As stated, Hezbollah has been involved in filling in the legal gap that was left due to the collapse of the government during the war. With the country at war there was little attention paid to the legal system of the nation. This was especially prevalent in disputes between different clans of Lebanon. "The Lebanese Penal Code specifically and the Lebanese legal system in general failed to have any practical effect with regard to clan feuds." (79) Even now when a decision is handed down by the courts it is rare that the families involved in the conflict will accept the decision, according to Sayyid Al-Sayyid. (80) With the focus on the war, the Government could not spare the manpower to enforce those rulings. When Hezbollah arrived in Lebanon it came into a legal black hole. There was, and to a degree still is, a lack of respect for the government and its means of dealing with society. Due to this Hezbollah has been able to set itself up as a major actor between
different clans, and thus a major piece of the fabric that holds the Shia community together. They are so respected that they have been called to mediate over two hundred clan conflicts of murder cases, two-thirds of which were reported by its leaders as resolved. (81) The decision handed down in some of these cases has had violent outcomes that have been able to supersede both the state's and the clan's authority. Some of Hezbollah's legal verdicts have been carried out when the state of Lebanon has desired a different outcome; even till the recent past, as in the adjudication of a March 30, 1994 murder.

The victim's clan (Al-Nasreddine) demanded that the case be mediated with the murder's clan (al-Awadah). Hezbollah decided that the murderer should be executed by hanging. The al-Awadah clan handed the murderer over for execution while the Lebanese local police and the sub-district officer were present and did not object to the decision until after the sentence was administered. (82) This shows how much respect Hezbollah's diplomacy had accomplished.

Pre-1989 military activity

The above were some of the many carrots that were used by Hezbollah to promote their cause in Lebanon. Among the carrots that were used there was also a stick that was employed from time to time. This stick was Hezbollah's military aspect. As will be seen this was a very powerful diplomatic tool and it was used very effectively.

One example of the party's use of the stick is Hezbollah's targeting westerners. Hezbollah made international headlines with its attacks on US installations in the early 1980's. (83) Sheikh Abbas Moussawi, who would take over the movement in the late 1980's, conceded that Hezbollah had indeed attacked the American forces. He said, "The great achievement of Hezbollah in this period was that, by way of two martyrdom operations against the U.S. marines and French paratroopers, it evicted America and the Multinational forces from Lebanon." (84) Although for current political reasons Hezbollah has desired to
distance themselves from the ordeal, it is undeniable that the withdraw of U.S. and French troops from Lebanon was a great victory for Hezbollah. It propelled them into international headlines and greatly increased their credibility locally.

More conventional military activity conducted by Hezbollah prior to 1989 was on a much different track than it is in current history. The average number of military operations that are conducted per year by Hezbollah did not break 100 till the early 90's. This number is much higher in recent years, (refer to tables 5-7). (85)

The major military success of Hezbollah came in the form of kidnappings and suicide operations. The range of targets varied extensively. The United States, France, Israel, and many other western nations fell victim to kidnappings or suicide missions in Lebanon. Many speculate that the bombing of the of the U.S. Embassy and Marine base, killing hundreds of U.S. personal, was the primary motivation for U.S. withdrawing from Lebanon. Similar attacks had a parallel effect on Israeli occupation of Beirut, "Hezbollah is today the only Arab force to break the occupation of the most powerful nation in the Middle East (Israel)" (86)

Although Hezbollah's military actions were much less conventional before 1989 they were still very effective. The impact of kidnapping played a vital role in accomplishing their objectives as will be seen in chapter 6. Thus, although there has been substantial changes in the way military operations are conducted from the pre-1989 time to the post-1989 period that by no means discounts the effectiveness of this diplomatic tool.

The Post-1989 Stage of Hezbollah

The post-1989 stage introduced a much more pragmatic view to how Hezbollah accomplishes its objectives. With the change in Leadership in Iran that favored a cooling of tensions with the West, Hezbollah also came to see the importance no longer aggravating
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
<th>Electoral district</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Voters turnout</th>
<th>Votes received</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid (Shia)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>46,069</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Taha (Shia)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>38,310</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Hasan Yaghi (Shia)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>35,951</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khodr Tlays (Shia)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>34,939</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Bayan (Sunni)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>36,375</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munir al-Hujayri (Sunni)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>35,845</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabih Kayrouz (Maronite)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>33,457</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saoud Rufayl (Greek Orthodox)</td>
<td>Ba'albek-Hermil</td>
<td>175,377</td>
<td>61,381</td>
<td>38,342</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Finaysh (Shia)</td>
<td>The South</td>
<td>505,022</td>
<td>186,858</td>
<td>117,753</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ra'ad (Shia)</td>
<td>The South</td>
<td>505,022</td>
<td>186,858</td>
<td>116,646</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ahmad Berjawi (Shia)</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>343,462</td>
<td>44,650</td>
<td>12,666</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Fadl Ammar (Shia)</td>
<td>Ba'abda</td>
<td>118,951</td>
<td>14,274</td>
<td>13,740</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures obtained from the Lebanese Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the 1996 parliamentary elections Hezbollah again made a significant showing. The political situation in Lebanon has developed into seven different political groupings. Each of these groupings is made up of multiple numbers of deputies in order to more effectively divide up the Lebanese political pie. The major grouping is roughly as follows:
Table 3
1996 Election Groupings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Grouping</th>
<th>Number of deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hariri</td>
<td>30-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birri</td>
<td>20-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern part 1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern part 2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumblat</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harawi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Lebanon Report, The Lebanese Center For Policy Studies No.3 Fall 1996 pg.22

As can be seen Hezbollah has been able to capture a significant number of seats in parliament. In a relatively short time Hezbollah has captured control of a significant slice of the Lebanese political pie. Surpassing the number of deputies in the Druze (Jumblat), Armenian, SSNP and Harawi groupings, to become the fourth largest grouping in parliament, refer to (table 3). This continuing political growth is the newest powerful diplomatic tool that Hezbollah can implement to pressure the government to support Hezbollah's cause. The current grouping, by district is represented in Table 4.
Table 4

The nine deputy grouping for Hezbollah is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Confessional Group</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Qassir</td>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>131,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ra'd</td>
<td>Nabatiyyeh</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>130,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazih Mansour</td>
<td>Marh'youn-Hasbayya</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>159,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Fnaish</td>
<td>Bint-Jubayl</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>134,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid</td>
<td>Ba'labek-Hermel</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>93,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein al-Haj Hasan</td>
<td>Ba'labek-Hermel</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>86,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammar al-Moussawi</td>
<td>Ba'labek-Hermel</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>85,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Bayan</td>
<td>Ba'labek-Hermel</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>41,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabia Keyrouz</td>
<td>Ba'labek-Hermel</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>66,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Lebanon Report, The Lebanese Center For Policy Studies No.3 Fall 1996 pgs56-59

With such success in only their second parliamentary election it is very impressive to see the progress of such a young party. Hezbollah has even been able to cross religious boundaries in both the 1992 and 1996 elections to gain support from non-Shia representatives. Continuing at this rate will make Hezbollah a formidable political force as time passes.

Post-1989 social activity

Hezbollah’s social programs have not only continued over the years but have greatly expanded. Due to their success they have also increased in scope and depth. As will be seen these programs are not haphazard events thrown together by a bunch of terrorists but quite the contrary, they are well organized with extensive programs that reach much of the nation including many areas that other agencies won’t go to. Thus showing a face of Hezbollah that much of the world does not know. As stated by Paul Salem, a Lebanese social scientist, "Hezbollah is seen primarily as a social movement, a defender of the poor." (88) This shows the number and magnitude of impact that these programs carry. Greater
impact can be directly transferred into greater support for the party. The social programs of Hezbollah are one of the greatest diplomatic tools they have to reach the widest scope of people.

Hezbollah places an emphasis on education. They educate both spiritually and secularity. Hezbollah members are known to meet daily for instruction and strict adherence to the Koran, the Imam (89) and the party's current leaders. Deviation from these teachings has been known to have stringent penalties even to the point of costing the life of the offending individual. (90) Yet, overall the party has made a significant spiritual influence, in the Shia community especially, getting the populous back to the vital religious teachings that are so valued in the Middle East. (91)

Secular education is also highly encouraged as respondent 1 tells how Hezbollah has persuaded some of his friends to go back to school for further education. Loyal members may be given opportunities to go to Iran to continue their education. Some outstanding members are given the chance to travel to North and South America as teachers to help educate locals in the teachings of Islam. (92)

Hezbollah via the Jehad Al Benaa Developmental Association (JBDA) also provides some special education. This education focused on the agricultural sector. With 30% of the Lebanese people living in poverty and 60% of them working mainly in agricultural jobs this is very needed. Over the past seven years JBDA has held over 70 lectures all over Lebanon focusing on agriculture. JBDA also held a number of general meetings on agricultural practices that were able to reach 3,250 different farmers. JBDA has also built or reconstructed 34 schools, 15,000 buildings, 7 social centers, 25 water wells, 33 electrical projects and many other projects. (93)

These are but a few of Hezbollah’s many projects. Other projects and businesses that Hezbollah is involved in are a discount supermarket, a perfume business, and a flower-arranging class. The proceeds from these businesses go to the families of the martyrs. (94)
Hezbollah is dedicated to the care of family member(s) whose provider has lost their life while with the Party. (95)

Hezbollah has more than large long-term projects, it also meets special needs as they arise. On July 31, 1997, Hezbollah met an immediate need that arose in Beirut's southern suburbs. Due to a dispute over land fills trash had piled up in the streets of Beirut. In order to prevent health problems and reduce the foul smell Hezbollah sprayed the streets with chemicals to fight these problems. (96)

Another recent example of efforts by Hezbollah to help the community was sited in The Financial Times; "Jihad al-Bina'a (Holy War Construction), Hezbollah's construction company, was the first on the scene in southern Lebanon and south Beirut after the April onslaught." (97)

Moreover, Hezbollah has provided people who wish to join the fight against Israel the financial means to do so. In a nation where the minimum monthly wage is only $157 money is very valuable. (98) Thus the monthly wage of $350 for a Hezbollah fighter can be very attractive. (99)

Post-1989 military activity

Direct fighting is probably the most publicized part of Hezbollah's work. As stated, since 1989 Hezbollah has changed their military tactics and the weapons used to conduct them. With more advanced weapons Hezbollah has become a much more effective fighting force. Referring to tables 5-7 one can see that the number of Israeli casualties has been increasing while the number of casualties among Hezbollah fighters has been decreasing. In looking at the number of operations until September, 1997, and comparing it to the number of operations until September in both the previous years the number of operations in 1997 is lower. The number of Israeli wounded in that same time is also lower which may lead one to believe that Hezbollah is not as active as in the past. This is a grave misconception about
Hezbollah, as examining the number of Israeli personnel killed in the same time frame there were more than twice as many killed in 1997 than 1995 and greater than a third more killed than in 1996. Hezbollah's kill ratio per operation has increased significantly in 1997. Many in Lebanon may not agree with much of what Hezbollah believes in, but there are far fewer that will not openly support the fact that Hezbollah lay down their lives in order to liberate Lebanese land from Israel. As stated above, the "blood of many martyrs" (100) was a huge support to Hezbollah's in gaining election votes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Operations</th>
<th>Israeli Casualties</th>
<th>Collaborators Casualties</th>
<th>Killed of the resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>August</td>
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<td>September</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Operations</th>
<th>Israeli Casualties</th>
<th>Collaborators Casualties</th>
<th>Killed of the resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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<td>August</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

1997

Total Casualties of Israeli & Its Collaborators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Operations</th>
<th>Israeli Casualties</th>
<th>Collaborators Casualties</th>
<th>Killed of the resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>January</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Daily the operations that are conducted by Hezbollah use a variety of methods to accomplish their objectives. Daily operations are broken down between many different groups in Hezbollah. (See Appendix 2) The various groups can use different weapons and means of attack. This shows the high degree of organization that accompanies the military wing of Hezbollah. Military operations are not haphazardly thrown together but carefully planned and conducted by multiple military cells.
Conclusion

Since the inception of Hezbollah in Lebanon the Party has been struggling for the hearts of the people therein. Hezbollah arrived in Lebanon at a time that the government was unable to meet many of the needs of the people. Hezbollah rose up and addressed many needs that the people of Lebanon had. Those needs may have been medical, legal or the desire for freedom from Israeli rule. Since then Hezbollah has used this popularity to introduce itself into the domestic political scene of Lebanon. Although many may disagree with the ideology of the Party none can deny the fact that they have had a made a major impact on Lebanon and are now becoming a political force to be taken notice of.
Chapter Six  
A Big Stick and a Small Carrot  
Israel  

Hezbollah and Israel have been at odds since the inception of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The relationship between the two involves a very different form of diplomacy. At times it is tactfully conducted via third parties and at other times it has been just the opposite. Hezbollah can be seen having peaceful contact with Israel via the Red Cross or other third parties over POW trades as well as violent declarations being made on the battlefield.

At the peaceful diplomatic level there has been much done between Hezbollah and Israel. This diplomacy has been via a third party and has been conducted seriously without any violence. In Lebanon, as in most any other war zone, hostages are taken and bodies laid at rest in the territory controlled by the other side. This raises the desire to have these people returned, be they prisoners or casualties of war. Thus the door for vast diplomacy is opened.

The exchange of hostages and remains  

Due the pre-1989 philosophy of Hezbollah many western hostages were taken as part of the war against Israel and those that supported it. With the arrival of Rafsanjani as president of Iran views stared to change. The hostages were to be released to improve relations with the west. "In an apparent effort to improve relations with the west by speeding the hostage releases, the Iranians are moving to decouple the Westerners' freedom from the release of Arabs held in Israeli prisons." (101) Deals like these tend to be numerous and smaller rather than fewer and more comprehensive. It is much harder to work out a large deal so releasing people bit by bit seems to be the diplomatic tactic that is used. This is affirmed by Israeli military commander Ron Ben-Yishai, "Grand deals are too
complicated to engineer. For a grand deal you would need the Germans to release the Hamadi brothers [two Lebanese, one of whom was involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847], the U.S. to release billions of Iranian assets and the Israelis to release the Shias. We are talking about a minuets of unilateral gestures that could become reciprocal." (102) Deals of this sort are far too difficult as they require the involvement too many different actors. The arrangements that are reached are much more on the scale of that which was conducted on September 11th, 1991. In this deal Israel freed 51 Lebanese prisoners and returned the bodies of nine Lebanese guerrillas. In return Israel received the body of one of its soldiers and evidence that a second was dead. Moreover this arrangement secured the release of Jack Mann, an Englishman who had spent 28 months in captivity. (103)

These exchanges, which can be considered the carrots between Israel and Hezbollah, are not conducted by direct contact between Hezbollah and Israel but are usually done via a third party as in the 1985 release of over a thousand Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. These third party mediators could be nations like Germany, international groups like the Red Cross, or even leaders of other groups that are fighting Israel as in this case. Ahmed Jibril, a leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who is believed to be responsible for blowing up Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, mediated the release of three Israeli prisoners of war in exchange for 1,150 Lebanese and Palestinians then confined in Israeli prisons. (104) In more recent times this kind of negotiation continues with the help of German negotiators. In late July of 1996 there was a large prisoner exchange that involved the return the remains of Yossi Fink and Rahamin Alsheikh, 20 year old soldiers that died in the mid eighties. In exchange Hezbollah freed 17 Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) prisoners. In turn Israel returned the bodies of 123 Arab guerrillas. The SLA returned the remains of 18 Hezbollah guerrillas as well as freed 40 Hezbollah prisoners. (105) Negotiations are continuing for further exchanges (106). On the list of key prisoners are Ron Arad, an Israeli airman allegedly captured in 1986, and Hezbollah cleric Sheikh Abdel Karim Obeid.
An interesting note in these exchanges is how lopsided they are. Hezbollah consistently gains much more than they give up in these exchanges. One reason could be that Hezbollah is not able to capture as many prisoners as Israel is able to. Applying the law of supply and demand would draw one to the conclusion that Lebanese prisoners are not very important to Israel as they tend to be acquired relatively frequently. This makes it easier to give them up. The opposite is true for Hezbollah. It is rare for Hezbollah to acquire the remains of Israeli personal let alone living soldiers. Another reason could be religion. Many Jews considers every part of the body holy and thus needs to be collected where Hezbollah's religious beliefs consider it an honor to sacrifice ones body for the "struggle against Israel" (107)

Direct fighting

A much more prevalent form of diplomacy that is conducted between Hezbollah and Israel does not use a third party to communicate but rather guns, car bombs and shells, the sticks. Over the years there has been many acts of violence used to try and influence the other side.

There is a cycle of violence in the south of Lebanon that has its ups and downs but seemingly no end under current policy. An inherent problem lies in that both Hezbollah and Israel believe that it is the responsibility of the other side to halt the fighting. It is known that Israel recently "undertook to open discussions on withdrawal from the buffer zone if Lebanon managed to provide security for nine months and took steps toward reviving peace negotiations with Syria and Lebanon." (108) This was taken a step further when the inner Israeli cabinet, which deals with security issues, unanimously endorsed United Nations resolution 425 provided that Lebanon gave Israel security guarantees. United Nations resolution 425 calls for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. (109) On the other side of the argument is Hezbollah who has stated that "war against Israel in southern
Lebanon will end as soon as the last Israeli soldier withdraws from the country." (110) With this stalemate the fighting rages on in Lebanon.

In the Month of July, 1997, the number of Israeli operations against Lebanon reached 120. This was 20 operations less than the number that were conducted one month earlier. (111) On the other side the number of Hezbollah operations in South Lebanon and the West Biqaa reached 85. This was about 10 more than the month before. (112) As can be seen both sides average multiple operations a day in a tit-for-tat attempt to pressure the other side. In fact the number of operations that Hezbollah has conducted has been on a steady rise for many years. In 1990 the number of Hezbollah operations was less than 100; in 1993 the number of operations was more than 400; and in 1996 the total number of operations was 763. Of even more notable interest is that in July, 1993, and April, 1996, there were major Israeli operations to crush Hezbollah and, as can be seen, fighting has only increased. (113) This, on the surface, may seem to have little value for Hezbollah in influencing Israel but in fact it is has had significant impact. One large offensive may make news headlines for a week or so but consistent daily operations over a few years makes news continuously. This causes people to question and debate the need for Israeli troops in Lebanon and thus has proven to take its toll on Israel.

Major General Amiram Levine, chief of the Israeli Armies Northern Command, acknowledged that the public debate about the security zone in Lebanon was affecting the morale of his soldiers. "If the public discussion of sensitive military issues goes beyond what is necessary, it certainly has an effect on morale and on the feeling and decision not only of the Israel Defense Forces, but also of the other side." (114) The long drawn out war in the south of Lebanon has worked in favor of Hezbollah to hurt the drive of Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon. As Hezbollah continues to have success against the Israeli army, Israeli troop morale will continue to drop as will public opinion in Israel itself. This drop in public opinion can be seen in a statement by Gideon Samet a writer for Ha'atetz in Tel Aviv; "The aim is for Israel to get out as quickly as possible. We created Hezbollah in the south.
Before Israel created the 'security zone' in Lebanon, the population in the south was moderate toward Israel." (115) The longer Israel stays in Southern Lebanon the harder it will be for them. As Israeli soldiers continue to die public opinion will continue to grow stronger in opposition to Israel being in southern Lebanon. It might seem reasonable that this may also hold true for Hezbollah fighters and the public option in Lebanon, but in fact it is just the opposite. As civilian death toll rises popular opinion turns in support of Hezbollah. "TV film footage on Hezbollah volunteers transporting Russian-made rockets on mules has bolstered the group's underdog appeal in its contest against Israel's sophisticated military." (116) Hezbollah is able to enjoy an increase in public support for what they are doing while just the opposite is happening in Israel. Israel is being divided over their existence in southern Lebanon hurting the very troops they desire to help.

Hostage taking

Another way that violence is used between the two parties is in the form of hostage taking. This has been used by both sides effectively to gain advantages and desired results from the other side. The people who are targeted in these attacks are both military and civilian. In early 1994 Israel abducted Mustafa Dirani, a Hezbollah operative, who is considered the most likely source of information which led to the successful attack on a Hezbollah camp killing about four dozen youth training to become guerrillas. (117) The prize abduction by Israel is definitely Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid. He was believed to be responsible for the abduction of two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon in February, 1986, and to know the whereabouts of Ron Arad, the navigator of an Israeli jet shot down over Sidon in 1986. He is also suspected of playing a key role in the February, 1988, kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins. Obeid is still in Israeli custody and is being used to try and pressure Hezbollah for the exchange of Ron Arad who many question his whereabouts and condition. This was confirmed during the Bush administration in the
United States when President Bush had "given a sly green light to Israel that it can swap Obeid for the release of Western and Israeli Hostages." (118)

Hezbollah is by no means a stranger to taking hostages. As stated earlier Hezbollah has often used hostages to trade for its own fighters held by the other side. One notable and very successful joint operation with Amal was the June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA flight 847. After a few trips between Algiers and Lebanon the flight came to rest in Beirut where the hostages were sequestered in various groups around the city. Hezbollah demanded the release of some 700 Shia prisoners and for United States war ships to leave Lebanese waters. Israel in the matter of a few weeks released over 700 Shia prisoners but denied that this action related to the highjacking. (119)

Iran received another benefit attained from hostage taking. This is important as most of Hezbollah's funding comes from Iran. After British hostage Brian Keenan's release in August, 1990, the European Community started to do business with Iran on a non-political but "technical" basis. In a more direct gain, soon after the last three American hostages were released by Hezbollah, Iran received a check for 260 million dollars for weapons purchased by Iran and impounded by America. (120)

Cross border special operations

Although Hezbollah denies the validity of it, many sources report that Hezbollah carries out operations outside Lebanon to further its aims to effect the Jewish State. In the summer of 1997 in a conversation that the author had with Ibrahim Moumari, Hezbollah's press secretary, the author was told that Hezbollah is in Lebanon and that they were not affiliated with any other group outside Lebanon that operates under that name. Just a few weeks later the author was in a conversation with a former Hezbollah member who for this paper goes by the name Respondent 1. In that conversation the author was asked if he would like to meet Respondent 1's relative who was the leader of Hezbollah in Los Angeles,
California. The author respectfully declined the offer and that individual is now back in Los Angeles leading a Hezbollah group there. Similar information was reported in the U.S. News & World Report of April 3, 1989, when two senior Hezbollah officials went to Tulsa Oklahoma in the United States and addressed a crowd upwards of 2,000 individuals. Mufti Ahmad al-Zain was also seen in December of 1988 addressing various Muslim extremist groups in the U.S. (121) If we can assume by these occurrences that Hezbollah does have contacts abroad it is logical to conclude that it is very possible to conduct operations abroad as well.

In order to influence Israel the author believes that Hezbollah conducts operations against Jewish targets outside Lebanon. One such example is that of Argentina. In March of 1992, 220 pounds of high explosives was driven into the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. (122) The blast killed 29 people and wounded more than 250. Islamic Jihad, a nom du guerre used by Hezbollah, issued a statement in Beirut stating that the blast was in retaliation for the February 16th Israeli assignment of the then party leader Sheik Abbas Musawi, his wife and 6-year-old son. (123) On July 18, 1994, another large bomb exploded in Buenos Aires. This one was a bit different in as much as its target was not an Israeli target but a Jewish one. The building that was targeted housed the "Association Mutual Israelita Argentina" (AMIA), the main organizational body of the Buenos Aires Jewish Community, and the "Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas" (DAIA), the organizational umbrella of Argentina Jewry. (124) This seems a rather unlikely target for Hezbollah in the post-1989 period as they tend to focus military operations on Israeli targets. Looking at the events of 1994 will show that it was very reasonable for Hezbollah to be behind this operation. As previously stated, in early 1994 Sheikh Mustafa Dirani was abducted by Israel. This abduction was the most likely source of information that led to the bombing of a Hezbollah training camp that killed some 30 people. Hezbollah training camps are set up as small villages, communities complete with houses, shops and mosques. (125) Thus, a logical reprisal would not rule out a community target. Moreover the prisoners that were
arrested in connection with the bombing were caught with contact numbers of Hezbollah members in Lebanon. (126) These lead to strong implications that Hezbollah is more than just a local organization but will cross international boundaries in order to accomplish its goals and objectives regarding Israel.

Crossing national boundaries to conduct operations on smaller scales is also used to influence each other. Both Israel and Hezbollah conduct operations in the forms of kidnappings and assassinations in attempt to manipulate the other party.

At 5:45 a.m. on September 21, 1996, Ahmad Hallaq was executed in Beirut's Rumiye prison for planting a car bomb that killed an Islamic militant and two bystanders in South Beirut in 1994. (127) Prior to his execution he was offered one last wish. He asked that his wife be allowed to travel to Israel and collect $100,000 he said that Israel promised him for the bombing. Since his wife is serving a 15-year sentence as an accomplice, the request was denied. (128)

Hallaq's report that he worked for the Israeli government has neither been confirmed nor denied by Israel, although intelligence analysts in Israel suspect that he did. Hallaq claimed to be trained in Israel and Cyprus, was paid several thousand dollars and promised $100,000 for his work. Whether or not Hallaq worked for Israel they acknowledge that in a deteriorating security environment methods such as these could play a more prominent role. (129)

Hallaq's target was Fuad Mugniyeh a mid-level Hezbollah cadre, but more importantly the brother of Imad Mugniyeh. It seems that Fuad was recruited by Israel in order to get to his brother Imad. Imad, a founder and one of the most dangerous military operatives of Hezbollah, is said to have masterminded various hostage taking operations in the 1980's and planned the bombings on the U.S. Marine base and embassy installations in Beirut. Fuad Mugniyeh's assassination could have been due to the fact that he double-crossed Israel or just that he would not cooperate. Either way it is sure that Israel meant to send a message to his brother. (130)
Israel is not alone in the use of tactics aimed at influencing the other side on their own land. Hezbollah has had similar agents such as Hussein Mikdad a 33-year-old Lebanese accountant. He was recruited by Hezbollah for his western appearance and foreign language skills. Mikdad and six other Lebanese were in a 10-week course that trained them in the use of explosives and firearms as well as in communication and stalking techniques. Mikdad was trained in the Bqaa valley and traveled to Tel Aviv through Syria, Austria and Switzerland with the help of two false passports and a handler. Mikdad was not on a suicide mission but it almost turned out that way when his sophisticated clock radio bomb accidentally detonated prematurely leaving him left legless, one armed and blind. The other six people in training with him are still at large. (131)

Arguably the greatest prize in cross border assassinations was Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah's former secretary general. Appointed to his position in 1991 he increased the number of attacks in Israel's security zone by a factor of ten. He was leaving Jibshit with his wife and child after addressing a rally held there when Israeli helicopter gunships destroyed his motorcade. This was a large blow against Hezbollah but did not prove to be a fatal one as some had hoped. (132)

**Conclusion**

The relationship between Hezbollah and Israel follows two different tracks, one peaceful and one not. The peaceful dealings of POWs and remains, shows the ability of each side to conduct tactful relations. Yet these are relatively rare. The predominant form of communication between Hezbollah and Israel has been violent. This communication can be in the form of bombardments, kidnappings or assassinations. The common means to get a desired result from the others side tends to be very violent. While this is a controversial form of diplomacy it is the main form used between Hezbollah and Israel. Some states may attempt to use a table as the meeting place for diplomacy. Israel and Hezbollah have chosen the battlefield to meet for diplomacy. Often states may choose harsh rhetoric to
communicate to others. Hezbollah and Israel use harsh acts to communicate with each other. Some states use their foreign ministers to conduct diplomacy. Hezbollah and Israel use military generals to communicate with each other. Although the methods implemented by Israel and Hezbollah may be different than the paths that some would prefer they are attempting to accomplish much the same result as any other actor, its interests.
Chapter Seven
Asking the Crystal Ball
Questions About
The Future

In such an interdependent web of relations many complicated questions about the future of the different actors arise. How will peace or the continued lack of it change the current relations? Prior to asking that one must wonder whether or not the parties involved really want peace? This seems on the surface a rhetorical question but not necessarily.

As stated, Iran's involvement allows it to enjoy a very comfortable position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Would Iran be willing to risk this cherished position for peace in the Middle East? Questions also arise with regard to whether the Syrian economy is at a point that it could handle peace and the integration into larger more prosperous economies. Hezbollah over the years has been absorbed more and more into the Lebanese State via things like their political activity. This may be in anticipation to a possible peace and a change in their role in the Middle East. But, is Hezbollah willing to fade from international attention and become another one of many Lebanese political groups? Moreover is Hezbollah willing to give up the millions of dollars in military support that they receive form Iran every year for a lasting peace?

Israel may seem on the surface to be the one with the most to gain from a lasting peace, yet it might be the one with the most to lose. There is a well-known water scarcity problem in Israel. Although Israel may be willing to give back land, the water therein is a different story. (133) A study of the Palestinian-Israeli accords will demonstrate this point as Israel has given back land yet not so its water resources. The Golan and southern Lebanon are both very rich in water. (134) Some believe that Israel has a great deal of interest in those water supplies. Moreover looking into the domestic situation in Israel one can easily see a nation divided. Some scholars have suggested that external strife with Arab
people is helping to unite Israeli people thus diverting their internal problems externally. For example, both sides of the political spectrum in Israel can agree that a suicide bombing in Israel is wrong, it hurts the nation and something needs to be done about it. Theories on what should be done may differ but that discussion is much less controversial than other volatile subjects. Issues like who are "real" Jews and who should be allowed to perform conversions to Judaism are volatile issues that have the potential to tear Israel apart. The people of Israel can thus divert their attention from dealing with these sensitive international subjects by discussing how to protect themselves from "Arab terrorists". If peace were to come, the Israeli people would need to address these very substantial internal problems that have striking similarities to some of the religious and societal problems that helped fuel the Lebanese civil war. Will the Middle East even ready for peace? Many say yes but just as many could say no. The Middle East may need to continue in the state that it is in now for some time in order to prepare itself for the vast changes that will occur when peace does come.

The possible scenarios for the above five actors if peace comes are as vast and diverse as the Middle East itself. If peace does come Iran will need to find a new avenue into the Arab world; as a non-Arab nation this will take some work. Thus will Iran allow Hezbollah to halt attacks against Israel even if Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon? By that time will Hezbollah have been able to establish enough local support to be able to break free of the need for Iran? Other obvious pressures that would come into play would be how the Lebanese and Syrian states will react to Hezbollah when peace has come? Will Lebanon allow Hezbollah to continue attacks on Israel after a withdrawal, risking a new and possibly more violent Israeli invasion? Possibly the determining factor in Lebanon's decision over Hezbollah would be Syria. Will Syria continue to supply Hezbollah after an Israeli withdraw? Much of that decision may rest on whether or not Israel also returned the Golan to Syria. Moreover how would this effect relations between Syria, Lebanon and Iran? Could Hezbollah be forced to make a decision between the three different nations?
In the writer's option the most plausible scenario could be as follows. As much as there is to be lost if peace arrives there is also much that could be attained. The international pressure and the ability to build rather than tear down nations are great motivators. Lebanese and Syrian relations with other nations have moved in a very positive direction in the last few years. The U.S. travel ban on Lebanon was lifted opening the door for much more U.S. investment into Lebanon thus increasing U.S. interest in Lebanon again. The U.S. embassy in Lebanon continues to grow becoming one of the largest and most important of U.S. embassies worldwide. (135) Since the 1990 Gulf war U.S. Syrian relations has also been on a bumpy but generally positive track. Recently many positive gestures have been mutually made between Iran and the U.S. The U.S. improvement of relations with Iran and Arab nations is not exclusive to the U.S. Many of the great world players are becoming more involved with Iran and Arab nations; notably the U.K, Russia and especially France. These interests by western states have increasingly been turned into more intense pressure on Israel to give more to negotiations. Moreover the author believes that such factors as: the moves by Iran to become a greater part of the international scene; Hezbollah's move into politics; increasing calls in Israel for early elections and the expansion of Jerusalem to appease both sides of Israeli people; massive Lebanese reconstruction and international investment; and increased Syrian economic ties to Lebanon are all moves in preparation for peace.

In the writer's option peace negotiations will bring Israel (presumably under a new government) back to their internationally recognized borders, quite possibly on the other side of a short war. With this should come a halt to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah will join the ranks of other Lebanese parties while, initially, continuing to maintain strong ties to Iran. Funding from Iran to Hezbollah will steadily drop off as Iran turns its attention to a more international position. Hezbollah will slowly become more and more independent from Iran while becoming more interdependent with Lebanon. In the initial stages Iran will still want a big say into Hezbollah and Lebanon which may cause tension.
between Iran and Syria. Syria will keep a tight hold on Lebanon, riding its economic growth yet hindering it at the same time by acquisition of Lebanese funds. Syrian-Hezbollah relations will become minimal and insignificant.

With so many factors that contribute to the current conflict in the Middle East it is very hard to be sure of the outcome of events. One thing that can be counted on is that peace may be but around the corner, but it will only be a halt to fighting; the deep-rooted hatred between Israeli and Arab people will take many years to heal.

Conclusion

With such an uncertain future in the Middle East it is important to know as much about the different actors involved as possible. This is important in order to know how to proceed on the road to peace. Understanding Hezbollah as just a military force in the hands of Iran and Syria will prove to be a misconception that will not allow one to effectively communicate with the Party. Hezbollah has shown the ability, all be it rare, to conduct diplomacy independent of Iran and Syria. Moreover the Party has implemented many diplomatic tactics that do not involve military activity; for example vast social programs, involvement in the Lebanese political system, close personal relationships with Iran and POW negotiations. Failure to understand Hezbollah and its many different forms of accomplishing its objectives will result in a grave misunderstanding of the Party, ineffective policies towards the Party and diplomatic failure with the Party. Hopefully this study will aid in the understanding of Hezbollah and how the party operates, thus advancing the prospects of peace.
Chapter Eight
Problems faced during research

One of the greatest difficulties in writing on an original subject is finding research. This is a common problem but for the author it was compounded by linguistic limitations. Moreover, there was the challenge of attempting to address the problem with as much objectivity as possible. The author, being educated in the states, needed to put prefabricated notions aside in lieu of the desire to have an objective work. Thus, in addition to the normal difficulties faced by a researcher, the author had internal misconceptions and external linguistic limitations to overcome.

Being educated in the states the author’s image of Hezbollah was limited to the press attention that was given to the Party. This press attention focused mainly on the hostage crisis as well as the Marine barracks and embassy bombings. The result of this press was an image in the author’s mind of a group of fighters against the West. This created in the author an apprehension in dealing with the Party. After spending time with members of Hezbollah as well as extensive reading on the Party this prejudice eased and the author was able to open himself to new ideas about Hezbollah. Realizing the gap that exists between Western understanding of Hezbollah and realities about the Party was part of the motivation for writing this work.

The gathering of information took different forms. The primary way for attaining information was via books and articles. As stated in the above the two primary scholars working in the field are Nizar Hamzeh of the American University of Beirut (aub) Magnus Ranstorp from the University of St. Andrews, in Scotland. Although slanted, Ranstrop’s book has a very useful compilation of references on Hezbollah. This book was effective in
leading to other sources. By far the greatest initial assistance given to this project was by Dr. Hamzeh. Not only are his writings an invaluable source of information but personal meetings with him opened the author’s eyes to the best way to undertake this project. Other sources found in research centers and libraries are noted.

In working on a subject the author believes it is imperative to have first-hand experience with the topic group. This is one of the major failures that reduced Ranstrop’s book to an organized collection of writings (predominantly Western) on Hezbollah as opposed to a work on the Party itself. Ranstrop failed to have any significant contact with the group and thus was not able to unbiased himself from Western thinking on Hezbollah. The author went about creating and building relationships with military and non-military elements in Hezbollah. Another attempt at obtaining more objectivity led the author to a relationship with a former member of Hezbollah that removed themselves from the party. This added a very unique perspective to that party that few have explored. In addition U.S. government personnel were consulted and interviewed. One admitted gap in research that the author desires to address is of personal contact with people in Iran, Syria and Israel. Adding the perspectives of individuals dealing with this topic in these areas would be of tremendous value in adding validity to this work.
Appendix 1

The Understanding
The United States understands that discussions with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon, and in consultation with Syria, Lebanon and Israel will ensure the following:

1) Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by any kind of weapon into Israel.

2) Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon.

3) Beyond this, the two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.

4) Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defense.

A Monitoring Group is established consisting of the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Its task will be to monitor the application of the understanding stated above. Complaints will be submitted to the Monitoring Group. In the event of a claimed violation of the understanding, the party submitting the complaint will do so within 24 hours. Procedures for dealing with the complaints will be set by the Monitoring Group.

The United States will also organize a Consultative Group, to consist of France, the European Union, Russia and other interested parties, for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction needs of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the understanding to bring the current crisis between Lebanon and Israel to an end cannot substitute for a permanent solution. The United States understands the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region. Toward this end, the United States proposes the resumption of negotiations between Syria and Israel and between Lebanon and Israel at a time to be agreed upon, with the objective of reaching comprehensive peace. The United States understands that it is desirable that these negotiations be conducted in a climate of stability and tranquility.

This understanding will be announced simultaneously at 1800 hours, April 26 1996, in all countries concerned. The set for implementation is 0400 hours, April 27, 1996.

Source: Internet: www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/426thetext.html

Appendix 2

May 24 1997
00:30 On the occasion of Moharram month, the Islamic Resistance group of Mohammad Haidar Al-Jawhari attacked a Zionist infantry force, located at the
surrounding of Mashaaroun position, with the fit weapons causing definite casualties.

1:00 A Zionist force tried to move forward to surrounding of Zibqeen village, but the Islamic Resistance repelled it with various kinds of weapons forcing the aggressive force to retreat.

12:50 The Islamic Resistance observed a Zionist force Fortifying Al-Ahmadiah position. Then, the Islamic Resistance Artillery Unit Group of two Martyrs Mahdi Shamas and Ahmad Al-mousawi shelled, heavily, the above mentioned position casing definite casualties among the Zionist force in addition to burning Proclaim vehicle

14:00 The Islamic Resistance Group of Martyr Hussein Massarallah attacked Bir Al-Kallab position with machine guns and propelled rockets. At the same time, Group of Martyr Massallah Daher attacked Sojod position with machine guns and propelled rockets causing definite casualties.

May 25 1997
18:05 The Islamic Resistance Group of Martyr Mohammad Atwi attacked Bir Al-Kallab position with machine guns and propelled rockets.

At the same time, the Group of Martyr Ramzi Daifallah attacked Sojod position with machine guns and propelld rockets causing direct casualties.

16:25 The Islamic Resistance Group of two Martyrs Ahmad Al-Mousswi and Mahdi Shamas blew up a bomb against a half-track on the road between Jezzine and Ain Majdal. As a result, all of its elements were either killed or wounded. After that, Artillery Unit Group of Martyr Ahmad Al-Mukh shelled Toumat Niha Position with proper weapons causing direct casualties.

Endnotes

(1) Hedley Bull *The Anarchical Society* pp 162-163

(2) Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr *World Politics the Menu for Choice* W. H. Freeman and Co. 1992 p 152

(3) Ibid p 152-53

(4) Ibid p 130


(7) Respondent 1 December 26, 1995


(11) Unofficial Hezbollah Website, [http://www.hezbollah.org/goals.htm](http://www.hezbollah.org/goals.htm)

(12) A Nizar Hamzeh *Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation* Third World Quarterly; Volume 14 number 2 1993

(13) Ibid

(14) Note: Sayed Hassan Nasserrallah was elected to a third term as Secretary General of Hezbollah in June 1998. The constitution of the party was changed in order to facilitate this action. Much speculation to the changes can be followed in the local news papers of Lebanon in from July 7 to August 6. As in The Daily Star, August 6 1998 number 9649. p 2

(15) A Nizar Hamzeh *Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation* Third World Quarterly; Volume 14 number 2 1993

(16) Ibid

(17) Ibid


(20) A Nizar Hamzeh *Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation* Third World Quarterly; Volume 14 number 2 1993

(21) See *Al-Masira*, 28 September 1992, p11


(23) Kenneth Katzman *The Warriors of Islam; Iran's Revolutionary Guard* Westview Press, Inc. 1993 pg. 95

(24) Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski *Neither East Nor West* Vail-Ballou Press 1990 pp. 13-14


(27) Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), 1993 p186


(29) John Calabrese, "Iran II: The Damascus Connection", World Today, October 1990: p 189


(31) A Nizar Hamzeh and R Hrair Dekmejian *The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics* Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Volume XVI, Number 3 Spring 1993 p 36

(33) See *Voice of the people* in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 February 92-


(36) Current History “Khatami’s Iran” February 1999 pp 59-64

(37) Ibid

(38) Ibid

(39) Ibid

(40) Martius Deeb, 1988 op. cit.: pg. 694; US News and world report, Vol. 120 Issue 18 p 49

(41) New York Times, 26 February 1997 Issue 50715, pA4


(44) Washington post, 8 January 1990; The Echo of Iran, no.26 February 1990: p 12


(47) Foreign report, 13 May 1993


(49) Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 30 apr 91-BBC/SWB/ME/1061, 2 May 1991


(53) Ibid

(54) Ibid pp 4-5


(58) Ibid


(60) New York Times, 26 February 1997 Issue 50715, pA4

(61) al-Shira, 14 June 1987; and Ma'aretz, 15 June 1987.


(63) Ma'aretz, 10 March 1985; Ma'aretz, 19 March 1985

(64) Magnus Ranstorp "Hizb' Allah in Lebanon" St. Martin's Press, New York 1997 p 121

(65) Ibid p 100


(69) Ibid


(72) Interview with Ibrahim Mounari, Hezbollah's press secretary, May 1998


(75) A Nizar Hamzeh Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation Third World Quarterly; Volume 14 number 2 1993 p 325

(76) The Economist, Sep. 7, 1996

(77) Respondent 1 December 26, 1995

(78) A. Nizar Hamzeh, Clan Conflict, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies; Volume 19 Number 4, Winter 1994 p 442

(79) Ibid p 438

(80) Ibid p 441

(81) Ibid

(82) Ibid

(83) Time, March 20 1989, p 42

(84) World Press review, July 1996 v43 n7 p9 Robert Fisk, Nassib El-Husseini and Gideon Samet


(87) A Nizar Hamzeh Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation Third World Quarterly; Volume 14 number 2 1993 pp 329-30

(88) The Economist, Sep. 7, 1996

(89) For more information on the impact of an Imam on Lebaon see: "The Imam Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shiite Resurgence in Lebanon", Jerusalem Quaterly, No. 44, Fall 1987, pp 121-44; Middle East insight, June-July 1985; Monday Morning, 16 December 1985

(90) Respondent 1 December 26, 1995

(91) Ibid
(92) Ibid

(93) Hezbollah Press Office, Jehad Al Benaa Developmental Association (JBDA) paper

(94) New Republic, September 7, 1992

(95) Respondent 1 December 26, 1995

(96) The Daily Star July 31, 1997

(97) The Financial Times, *Hezbollah re-invents itself as a political force* 15 August 1996

(98) The Middle East, May 1996 n256


(100) Interview with Ibrahim Mounari, Hezbollah's press secretary, May 1998


(105) CNN interactive 7/21/96 *Israel and Hezbollah swap remains and prisoners*

(106) An agreement for the release of 60 Lebanese POW's in return for the remains of an Israeli soldier was reached in June 1998. See internet sights:
www.arabia.com/content/news/6_98/deal_11.6.98.shtml ; for pictures: www.almanar.com.lb

(107) Respondent 1 December 26, 1995


(109) Internet sight:
Http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_72000/72387.stm See also
internet sight: www.smh.com.au/daily/content/980326/world/world5.html See also:


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(119) Lebanon, *The Hostage Crisis* http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ib0187)


(121) US News & World Report 3 April 1989 p 16

(122) Commentary, October 1994, Vol. 98 Issue 4 p 38


(124) Commentary, October 1994, Vol. 98 Issue 4 p 38

(125) The Associated Press News Service *Iran holds Bomb Camps*, August 2, 1996, record number 00802*19960802*04484


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(129) Ibid

(130) Ibid

(131) Ibid

(133) Middle Eastern Studies "Contested waters and the prospects for Arab-Israeli Peace" Vol.70, No. 2 April 1994 pp 281-303

(134) Ibid

(135) Conversations with Ron Schlicher then acting US ambassador to Lebanon