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The Sources of Success in Hizbullah's Recruitment Strategy

By

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To My Family

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Abstract

9/11 refocused world attention on radical Islamist movements. One such movement is Lebanon's Hizbullah, which was identified by Washington as a terrorist organization. This study examines the case of Hizbullah as an example of a successful guerrilla movement. It does so by looking at a number of explanatory variables that help explain Hizbullah's success as a guerrilla movement. These variables include Hizbullah's recruitment strategy, its hierarchal structure, its historical background, and the services and support (military and financially) it offers its members and their families. Research for this thesis is based on a number of sources. I have used a number of personal interviews with anonymous members of Hizbullah's security organs to reconstruct Hizbullah's secretive recruitment strategy. The secondary literature on guerrilla movements has also helped me situate Hizbullah in comparative perspective. I have also looked at the available primary and secondary literature on Hizbullah. The thesis closes with some observations pertaining to prospects for Hizbullah's future demobilization and re-integration into civilian life.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Throughout the years the idea of guerrilla movements was related to small groups resisting occupation or foreign invaders. Guerrilla movements' history goes back to Europe during the second Punic war between the Roman Republic and Hannibal.¹ In the 20th century, the first successful guerrilla warfare was the Irish Republican Army war against the British Empire, which ended in 1923 then erupted again in the 1960s in Northern Ireland until the signing of the Friday Agreement in 1998. Another guerrilla war was against German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918. The creation of the state of Israel led to the emergence of different Arab resistance groups. Israelis invasion of Arab lands created new resistance groups outside Palestine. One such group is Hizbullah.

Guerrilla movements had a definition marked as resistance group throughout these years, even if it included religious motives. However, after the September 11th attack against the twin towers, the definition of guerrilla movements assumed a different path. A new perspective on any resistance army was taken into consideration. Islamic movements became targeted and labeled as terrorist groups. A new Era of radical movements emerged as a reaction to the 'war against terror' that was launched by the U.S and Britain in Afghanistan and

¹ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare.

Iraq. Islamic movements were then targeted all over the world, and wars were carried against these movements as a mean to end terrorism. A division took place between the Middle East and western countries after the 9/11 attack. The media war was also carried against Islamic movements and their extremist culture. The U.S. government listed many Islamic movements as terrorist groups, among them Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hizbullah. Since Israel is an ally to the U.S. and Hizbullah is Israeli's first enemy, efforts were put on gaining the world's opinion to label Hizbullah as a terrorist group through media propaganda which will help destroying Hizbullah financially and militarily. Furthermore, efforts were put from the Lebanese government to exclude Hizbullah from the terrorist list and to mark Hizbullah as a resistance group. With the help of France and other European friends to Lebanon, labeling Hizbullah as a resistance group succeeded.

1.1: Case Selection

I selected my topic to study the variables, strategy and recruitment policies that make a successful guerrilla movement, with Hizbullah in Lebanon as a case study. One of the main reasons that mark Hizbullah as a unique case among Guerrilla movements is the fact that till now efforts failed to mark Hizbullah as a terrorist group even though it is an Islamic movement and

supported by Islamic doctrines. Throughout Hizbullah's mission, they have gained more support from different Lebanese and foreign regions. Furthermore, the 2000 withdrawal of Israel forces represented a shift in the world's view of guerrilla movements or resistance groups. It was the first time that the Israeli army withdrew from Arab lands without a peace treaty. Even after the victory, Hizbullah's mission remained and continued. The party is part of the Lebanese political system, and continues to function both as a political party and a resistance movement. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, stated during the 2000 victory festival in southern Lebanon: "this achievement and this victory have to be protected, bolstered, and strengthened; this requires more effort and sacrifice, as well as a great deal of humility on everyone's part."²

Hizbullah is thus not just a guerrilla movement that succeeded in defeating the invader. Rather, Hizbullah represents a new case for the study of guerrilla movements and their future.

1.2: Research Question

The research question of my thesis study is why some resistance groups/ guerrilla movements succeed in their recruitment strategies while others fail?

² Nicolas Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah* (U.K.: Verso Publications, 2007), p. 237.

What are the variables that explain successful recruitment strategies? Motivation symbolizes a key element for the recruitment strategy of guerrilla movements; a mission represents a drive and an edge for members to join. Other than motivation, religion is also one of the variables for successful recruitment; in addition to recruitment tools used for violent or voluntary means. The strategy implemented by guerrilla movements also affects its recruitment strategy. If the guerrilla movement uses violent acts, this would affect the popularity of the movement and thus its recruitment strategy.

1.3: Methodology

The methodology used in the thesis study is research from books and journal articles that studied guerrilla movements and their recruitment strategy. Nevertheless, and given the secretive nature of Hizbullah, I have based my study of their recruitment strategy on personal interviews conducted between May and June 2006. The interviews were with important members of the military and non-military divisions of Hizbullah. However due to the sensitivity of the topic and to security reasons the names of the interviewees were kept anonymous.

1.4: Map of the Thesis

The thesis examines guerrilla movements, what is a guerrilla movement (the definition of guerrilla movement), strategy, tactics, strategy implementation, weaponry, tactics, operations, motivations and recruitment. These variables will be examined in the first chapter. This chapter looks at the literature of guerrilla movements and variables advanced to explain successful guerrilla recruitment. Moreover, after reviewing the literature and the theory of guerrilla movements, a comparative analysis sets Hizbullah in the context of this literature. The comparative section will compare the success of Hizbullah to the identified variables. The next chapter studies the case of Hizbullah. It looks at Hizbullah's origins, ideology, and recognition of Welayet el Faqih, its participation in Lebanese politics, Hizbullah's hierarchical structure and political orientation. This chapter closes with Hizbullah's perspective on martyrdom, how it is applied in their case, and their social services network. After studying Hizbullah's case in depth, the next chapter goes through the recruitment strategy of Hizbullah to see how the recruitment process takes place. Recruitment represents a key variable for the success of guerrilla movements. This chapter is based on extensive personal interviews with Hizbullah cadres.

Chapter five considers possible ways for the 'end' of Hizbullah. How do guerrilla movements end and what variables explain their end. In this chapter

Hizbullah's case will be studied according to the different variables presented by the literature on guerrilla movement demobilization. This analysis tries to profile the future of Hizbullah and the possible ways it could be demobilized.

Hizbullah represents a unique case for me as a Lebanese and as a student. It is a challenge to study the secret of this successful and popular guerrilla movement that has existed for over 20 years and still captures the recognition of foreign and local sects. The exceptional story of this Islamic group in a non-Islamic democratic country that has 17 sects represented in a confessional political system makes the study of Hizbullah a must for students of both Lebanese and Middle East politics.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Arguments

2.1: Introduction

This study examines the success of a guerrilla movement's recruitment strategy using Lebanon's Hizbullah as a case study. To do so, it deploys the following explanatory variables: ideology, political orientation, and domestic/international support. This chapter introduces these variables by shedding lights on Hizbullah's case in Lebanon. An examination of the theoretical literature on guerrilla movements and their recruitment strategies also allows for a comparison between Hizbullah and other guerrilla movements. Hizbullah represents a unique case among guerrilla movements because it has been successful in achieving its objectives.

2.2: Guerrilla Movements and Strategy Implementation

A Guerrilla movement is an irregular band of armed men, carrying on an irregular war and unable to carry on a regular one. Guerrilla tactics are based on ambush and sabotage, and their ultimate objective is usually to de-stabilize an

authority through long, low-intensity confrontation.³ A Guerrilla movement has seven basic structural elements:

- 1- Headquarters: where the locus of formal power is concentrated
- 2- Intelligence
- 3- Communication
- 4- Propaganda
- 5- Cadres in reserve and training
- 6- Logistics
- 7- Fighting arms⁴

Guerrilla movements are organized not by frustrated mobs but by leaders, who build a network of communications, initiate interaction, assign responsibilities, and define awards. The emergence of the guerrilla movement signals the birth of the organization. One of the most important functions of the leaders with regards to establishing an organization using violence is to provide an excuse for the conduct of violent acts. Most individuals appear hesitant to engage in violence without moral justifications. Other than the justification act of violence, a guerrilla movement cannot succeed without a strategy or a tactical plan to

³ James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

execute its actions. No other form of warfare demands assessment of capabilities in strategic planning.

Conventional forces follow the following order of procedures: strategy, tactics and weapons. With guerrillas, the procedure is practically reversed: the strategy deployed depends on weapon availability. Among the most important considerations are: strength of the group, attitude of the indigenous population, strength of the enemy, terrain and climate, and finally potential allies.⁵ Upon the assessment of these categories, three major decisions have to be made by the leaders: Should strategy be based upon activities covering the whole territory, or upon activities in limited areas only? Under which conditions will action occur, under whose orders, and coordinated by whom? The third decision concerns the priority of strategic objectives. In this latter respect, attention must be given to the cultural values of the groups in conflict because these values, as much as the capabilities, often affect the choice of strategy.⁶

Guerrillas have four strategic objectives: enhancing the solidarity of the in-group, undermining the strength of the enemy, creating a general uprising and winning control of the territory.⁷ Each of these objectives calls for different kinds

⁵ Jeremy Weinstein, "Resources and Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6, 1, (August 2005), p. 30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷ Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 55.

of activities by guerrillas and for the assignment of different types of operational targets.

2.3: Guerrilla Weaponry and Operations

Guerrillas have four sources of weaponry: those gathered in the community, homemade weapons, those captured from the enemy, and supplies from allies. Guerrillas prefer conventional weapons captured from the enemy since this helps them learn more about the enemy's military capabilities.⁸ The effectiveness of a guerrilla movement can be measured in two specific areas: its effect on the enemy and on the population on whose behalf it presumes to act. In this case, the physical destruction of the enemy resources, its soldiers, and administration ought to be considered, but also the guerrillas' ability to tie up the enemy forces in a given territory.⁹ Furthermore, guerrillas quite often can become effective against their own leadership. This is particularly conspicuous when the objective of political power has been achieved.

Guerrilla operations include small groups, using camouflage, putting pressure on its opponent, and diminish its numbers. Guerrilla attacks comprise military and political aims to change the system. The act of surprise is often used

⁸ J.K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, Escalations", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 341, Unconventional Warfare (May, 1962), p.13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

by guerrilla members; if an operation has been betrayed or compromised it is canceled.

2.4: Motivation and Recruitment

Guerrilla units have a life of hardship since speed and concealment are two very important assets. Guerrillas have to be prepared to move in terrain at any time in any season regardless of the state of the weather. Lack of security and identity, bad food, and fear of being wounded, with the realization of improper medical attention, are the most basic problems that guerrilla members face.¹⁰ Such bad conditions might push the group members to leave. In any underground movement participants tend to be volunteers. Since there is now legal machinery enforcing their membership; however, members expect rewards from joining a guerrilla movement, such as money, wealth, power, public support and control. Auro Rosselli, a former Italian partisan of guerrilla movements, catalogues an individual's integration into a guerrilla organization and the developmental stages, of guerrilla units as follows: first, a potential member announces his readiness to join the unit and waits for feedback, and then upon approval a member gains his standard identity.¹¹

¹⁰ Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, p. 44.

¹¹ Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, Escalations," p. 17.

There are two players in the recruitment game: a guerrilla organization and potential recruits. Potential recruits choose to participate or abstain. Accordingly, in the recruitment process, groups also take strategic actions to reduce their breakdown. The key to any such strategy is its selectivity. Guerrilla organizations develop recruitment methods that attempt to identify and exclude potential recruits that might be joining with little interest in the groups' overall objective.¹² Guerrilla groups actively gather information about the past behavior of interested individuals. To gather such information, guerrilla groups must establish links within the communities in which they operate that enable them to collect information about potential members. Those recruits with an incapacity for honesty and commit bad behavior will not be accepted. The second strategy relies on the credibility and commitment of current members, this screening mechanism is called "Vouching", where current Guerrilla members invite potential members¹³ and the final method is called costly induction, two key examples of "costly induction" demonstrates how it works¹⁴. The first is a required period of political indoctrination for new recruits to the movement. This process might include the sustained study of the ideology and political messages

¹² Weinstein, "Resources and Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment", p. 32.

¹³ Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

of the rebel group and the second stage is oral and written examinations testing the individual's ability to adjust to it.

2.5: Hizbullah in Comparative Perspective

In the case of Hizbullah a powerful justification for the use of violence is readily available: to resist occupation and liberate one's own land. Moreover, Hizbullah's case was framed in Islamic doctrines. The Qura'n reads "those who die fighting for God shall be rewarded with eternal happiness in Heaven"¹⁵; moreover, the services that Hizbullah offers to the martyr's families, from monthly allowances to free children education, helped bind cadres to the party. A member thus finds himself rewarded with services that he could not afford outside Hizbullah's cadre and support.¹⁶ The charismatic appearance of Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, affected Hizbullah's popularity among Lebanon's Shia because people looked up to him as a role model and a religious reference. Nasrallah's popularity soared when his son Hadi Nasrallah died fighting Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon in 1995. He was the first politician to lose siblings in the war against Israel.

¹⁵ Holy Book of Qura'n, Al- Hadid chapter- encloses 18, p.540.

¹⁶ Interview with member of military branch of Hizbullah, Initials: A. M. Beirut, 14 June 2006 (Hizbullah Media Center).

Israel declared Hizbullah its dangerous enemy, and that it underestimated Hizbullah's power and commitment. This underscores Hizbullah's impact on the Israeli State. Israel cannot risk sudden attacks against Lebanese territory without expecting a counter attack from Hizbullah. This ability to counter attack gave people living in the southern areas a sense of protection. Hizbullah demonstrated that it could resist and protect the inhabitants in those areas.

Solidarity of the in-group comes from the ideological pattern of fighting Israel, the quest to free Islamic lands, and from Islamic doctrines in the Qura'n and the Welayet el Faqih. Religious solidarity represents the core of Hizbullah's ideology. For guerrilla movements, weapons are homemade, supplied or captured by the enemy; however, Hizbullah receives its weapons from Iran and Syria, its main allies in the region, as well as from weapons captured from Israeli forces.¹⁷

In the case of Hizbullah its members require less motivation tools to join since their struggle is framed in Islamic doctrines and declarations. From a religious perspective, Hizbullah's financial support to families of the martyrs also plays a role in motivating its cadres. Members know that if killed in combat operations their families will not be left to suffer socio-economic deprivations. Furthermore,

¹⁷ Amal Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion* (Sagesse University: Lebanon, 2003), p. 58.

Hizbullah officials stated in interviews the author conducted with them that they do not know of cases of exit or abandonment by party members.

The recruitment process in the case of Hizbullah is the same as the theoretical argument suggests. However there are greater evaluative and supervisory roles for the party. The party knows every detail about the participant's intentions and how committed he is, there are also rules for a person to join Hizbullah. For example to have good behavior, deals graciously with people, be extremely religious and acknowledge Welayet el-Faqih doctrine.¹⁸ The participant also undertakes many educational and military courses.

Unlike guerrilla movements that experienced robbery, kidnapping, and other disorganized activities that ruined their reputation, Hizbullah remained aloof of such activities. On the contrary, as a Hizbullah member explained, "it is unacceptable as a rule by Hizbullah for any member of Hizbullah to get involved in any disorganized action like local fighting or robbing, otherwise this member will be dismissed from the organization."¹⁹

After the defeat of the Israeli army in May 2000, efforts were made to destroy Hizbullah from within. However, these efforts failed because of the secrecy of the organization. As a member of Hizbullah stated to the author, there

¹⁸ Interview with member of military branch of Hizbullah, Initials: A. M. Beirut, 14 June 2006 (Hizbullah Media Center).

¹⁹ Interview with member of military branch of Hizbullah, Initials: A. M. Beirut, 14 June 2006 (Hizbullah Media Center).

is a strict supervisory system to detect any strange behavior from all members.²⁰ This has made it hard for Israel to collect secret information about Hizbullah. It is a Hizbullah rule that all members do not disclose their party identity. A Hizbullah member is not allowed to tell anyone of his political participation, not even his family.

2.6: Conclusion

The recruitment profile of a rebel group is likely to shape how it behaves. As Jeremy Weinstein notes, rebel leaders often use violence to maintain civilian support and to prevent defection.²¹ Violence can be an effective strategy because it is both persuasive, sufficiently raising the cost of defection, and selective, providing a credible signal of the costs of defection. But the strategic use of violence requires effective organization where rebel leaders employ systems of command and control. What makes Hizbullah a successful case in comparison to other guerrilla movements is its secretive and organizational structure with a vertical hierarchy supported by Islamic rules and regulations. The division in Hizbullah's structure allows its rules to be formulated in a way that there are

²⁰ Interview with member of military branch of Hizbullah, Initials: A. M. Beirut, 14 June 2006 (Hizbullah Media Center).

²¹ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, p. 60.

written documents about each member and his life.

Hizbullah represents a unique case among guerrilla movements, in terms of organization, secrecy and operation. This chapter discussed the theoretical approach to guerrilla movements and studied the variables that caused their failure or success; in addition to recruitment motivations and weaponry. In summary, the main variables that cause the failure of guerrilla movements are the disorganized methods used such as robbing and kidnapping, which can lead to a low level of popularity and support. To highlight the success of Hizbullah's case, I will discuss this case in detail in the next chapter. The next chapter also examines Hizbullah's origins, structure and ideology.

Chapter 3: Hizbullah Examined

3.1: Introduction

The history of Hizbullah begins with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israel had re-invaded the country in an effort to control members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) who had settled in Lebanon and were carrying out attacks against Israel. The creation of Hizbullah came as a reaction to this invasion. This chapter unpacks the variables that help explain Hizbullah's success as a guerrilla movement. The discussion opens with a description of Hizbullah's ideology, drawing attention to its recognition of Welayet el- Faqih. The chapter then examines Hizbullah's participation in Lebanese politics, its hierarchical structure, cult of martyrdom, political orientations and finally social services.

3.2: Ideology of Hizbullah and its Recognition of Welayet el-Faqih

The creation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in February 1979 and its policy of exporting revolution adopted shortly thereafter by the new regime have been, from all available evidence, the main catalyst in the development of radical Islam in Lebanon. When Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Tehran, some radical Shi'a

groups were already active in Lebanon but on a small scale. There was the *Committee of Bekaa Ulema*, "Islamic Committees", and the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Shi'a *Al-Dawa Party*- for which Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was the standard-bearer in Lebanon.

Given the scale of the 1982 Israeli invasion, and that its impact on the Shi'a community exceeded that on any other community because of the concentration of the Shi'a population in southern Lebanon, the leaders of the Shi'a groups became aware of the need to put together a well-organized partisan structure. Furthermore, they decided that the structure would follow the following guiding principles and strategy: that Islam constitutes an overall plan of action striving for a better life. It represents a foundation that is ideological, practical, thoughtful and religious upon which a new political party would be built. The resistance against the Israeli occupation would be a priority. It was consequently necessary to create an adequate structure for resistance. Command would default to the Supreme Guide (Ayatollah Khomeini at the time) as the inheritor of the Prophet and his Imams. It is his duty to set out the plan of action within the (Islamic) nation and his decisions are binding.²²

Given these three founding principles, the leaders of the Shi'a groups multiplied their meetings and internal debates in order to set the basis of a new,

²² Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within* (London: Saqi 2005), p. 25.

embryonic political organization. These debates led to the drafting of a founding document. A committee of nine- three representatives of the *Committee of Ulema of the Bekaa*, three from the Islamic Committees and three from *Islamic Amal*- were responsible for submitting the document for approval by the Supreme Guide. After receiving the blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, "the different cells dissolved to form a single federating party that took the name Hizbullah"²³. This process of fusion was initiated during the summer of 1982; however it was not until 1983 that Hizbullah formally saw the light and matured only at the beginning of 1985, when Hizbullah announced its political program. The new movement quickly acquired political, logistical and military support from Iran through the dispatch via Syria of organizers and "experts from the *Guardians of the Revolution*, who set up training military camps in the Bekaa Valley to train Hizbullah militants."²⁴

Hizbullah's ideology is based on the recognition of Welayet el-Faqih doctrines. It declares that Hizbullah seeks to set up an Islamic government in Lebanon, modeled after the one in Iran.²⁵ The following excerpt is taken from the group's political platform, first published in 1985:

"The solution to Lebanon's problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon's citizens. The Hizbullah organization views as an

²³ Ibid., p. 30.

²⁴ Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* (N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 44.

²⁵ Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (open letter by Hizbullah)*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 40.

important goal the fight against 'western imperialism' and its eradication from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions."²⁶

The recognition of the absolute and supranational political and religious authority of the Supreme Guide, the Wali el-Faqih constitutes one of the main characteristics of Hizbullah. An understanding of the Welayet el-Faqih system is indispensable to explain Hizbullah's behavior in matters pertaining to strategic issues.

Before the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, the notion of Wali el-Faqih did not acquire the importance it has taken on after the Islamic revolution in Iran. Historically, religious leaders in Iran and elsewhere in the Shi'a world were not engaged in any political role. Before the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, no religious leader was recognized by the majority of Shi'a Muslims as Supreme Guide. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a turning point in the full sense of the word. In laying down the Constitutional basis of the Islamic Republic in his work 'The Orientations of Islamic Revolution'²⁷, Ayatollah Khomeini established religion and politics as cornerstones of power: "In understanding the concept of religion in our Islamic culture, it is clear that no contradiction exists between

²⁶ Rola Hatem, *Hizbullah Exposed* (Thesis Study: Sagesse University, 2003), p. 13.

²⁷ Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within*, p. 30.

religious and political authority. Political struggle is an integral part of the mission and duties of a cleric."²⁸

The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran has had the effect of completing, for the first time in history and under the impulse of Khomeini, the full extent of the meaning of Wali el-Faqih.²⁹ The Wali el-Faqih is elected by a 72 member committee. Moreover, his arbitration and consent are required, not only in religious and doctrinal matters, but also in political matters with a strategic implication. In his book on Hizbullah, Sheikh Naim Qassem underscores that "The Wali el-Faqih has the prerogative to monitor the proper construal of the Islamic law, to make important political decisions affecting the nation (Umma), to decide on war or peace, to safeguard the security of the nation and its financial interests, to ensure the redistribution of money collected by the religious authorities and to define the contours of the Islamic State."³⁰

In his book on Islamic government, Ayatollah Khomeini underscores that it is mistaken to think that the prerogatives of the Prophet supersede those of the Wali el-Faqih: "The powers which the Almighty has upon the Prophet and imams with the authority to raise his armies were the appointment of governors, the collection of taxes and the redistribution of this revenue in the service of

²⁸ Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and Islamic Revolution* (University of Michigan, 2006), p. 67.

²⁹ Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within*, p. 34.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.40.

Muslims".³¹ In this regard, his authority extends beyond frontiers to all Shi'a Muslims. Sheikh Naim Qassem also affirms that within the scope of exercising his power, the Wali el-Faqih must constantly bear in mind the realities and the specific situation of each country or community that depends on his decisions.³²

As to the specific case of Hizbullah, Sheikh Naim Qassem underscores in his book that Hizbullah is a "Lebanese political party in which all leaders, officers and members are Lebanese."³³ Hizbullah recognizes the authority of the Faqih in making major political and doctrinal matters. However, the "detailed follow-up, resolution of disputes, daily disposition of political, societal and cultural matters including resistance to the Israeli occupation defaults to the party's command structure,"³⁴ which in turn is elected by the party base in accordance with internal statutes based on the Shura Council presided by the Secretary-General who draws his legitimacy from Wali el-Faqih.

3.3: Political Orientation

In February 1985, Hizbullah made public its political agenda in the form of an "Appeal to the Disinherited". This document defines the party's major

³¹ Ibid., p.54.

³² Ibid., p.56.

³³ Ibid., p.60.

³⁴ Ibid., p.62.

policy orientations, both at an ideological and doctrinal level concerning the Lebanese political situation and its position vis-à-vis Israel and the United States.³⁵ The current leaders of Hizbullah emphasize that this text is out-of-date and obsolete due to the fact that it was drafted to correspond to different times. It is doubtlessly certain that both the doctrinal and ideological nature of the 1985 document includes discussions of the question of the establishment of an Islamic state, but the text clearly distinguishes between doctrinal position and practical aims. In principle, Hizbullah is in favor of the establishment of an Islamic state, however it is swift to underscore that in practice such a project can not be implemented solely on the basis of freedom of choice.³⁶

This option is taken up again in a far more determined manner by the current party leadership, which affirms that it is in no way the intention of Hizbullah to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, even if it remains attached to Islam as the basis of its inspiration and action. The document maintains that, taking the Lebanese reality into account, its goal is to arrive at a multi-confessional leadership that would guarantee equal participation of all communities in managing the state.³⁷

³⁵ Norton, *Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (open letter by Hizbullah)*, p.55.

³⁶ Ali Shawkat, *Dimension and Dilemmas of Islamist Movements* (Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-meel Publications: 1998), p.45.

³⁷ *Ibid.* , p.49.

Party leaders wish to keep the current political system as it is, with all communities sharing power. This is why Hizbullah has agreed to take part in legislative elections and to accept to be a part of the Lebanese political system. Hizbullah officials argue that their support in principle for a pluralist power structure based on their desire to present the Lebanese model as an example of successful cohabitation of disparate religious communities is the antithesis of the Zionist formula to build a state to serve a single ethnic or religious community.³⁸

3.4: Hizbullah's Participation in Lebanese Politics

As a concrete example, Hizbullah's decision to participate in the 1992 elections was taken by a 12 member committee. The parliamentary committee determined whether or not the participation of Hizbullah in the elections was in compliance with Shi'a religious doctrine. By a majority of ten to two, the committee finally adopted a 'resolution' recommending participation in the elections. This decision was later submitted and approved by the Wali el-Faqih Imam Khomeini. In this regard, Nawwaf Mussawi, a former Hizbullah foreign affairs minister, declared that this demarche vis-à-vis the Wali was not of a political character, but rather to ensure that the political decision was compliant

³⁸ Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within*, pp.40-45.

with the doctrine of the faith.³⁹ It remains that the boundary between the essentially political character of the decision taken by the Wali el-Faqih relating to the Lebanese problem and his imprimatur on the conformity of the doctrine of the faith adopted in Beirut by Hizbullah is rather fluid. In any case, writings on Hizbullah and, in particular, that of Sheikh Qassem, unmistakably declare that major political decisions, especially on war and peace, default to the sole authority of the Wali el-Faqih.⁴⁰ However it remains unclear where major decisions are made, how, and by whom.

3.5: The Hierarchical Structure of Hizbullah

Hizbullah's organizational structure is shaped like a hierarchical pyramid whose base coincides with the three predominantly Shi'a territorial divisions of Lebanon's governorates: Beirut, Bekaa and South Lebanon. Shi'a clerics comprise the majority of the leadership apparatus of Hizbullah (the Shura Council) due to the notion that clerics are "more knowledgeable about God's Law and closer to the mood of Islam than the average Muslim."⁴¹ The present secretary general of the Shura Council is currently Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who has held the position since first being elected in 1992 and re-elected again in 1995. notes that

³⁹ Ibid., p.59.

⁴⁰ Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, p.44.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.45.

the party's electoral rules do not allow for a third term, the election of Nasrallah would not have happened had the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khomeini, not allowed Nasrallah to be elected for a third term in 1998 and a fourth term in 2001.⁴² Hizbullah leaders are secure only to the degree that the military and security apparatus keeps them free from harm. To make sure that the following occurs, the military and security organs are under direct control of the ruling Hizbullah clerics, specifically Secretary-General Nasrallah.⁴³ Hamzeh notes that Hizbullah's organizational structure is "extremely disciplined" and flexible as "reflected clearly in the ability of the party to move between the military and the political apparatus, depending on the circumstances."⁴⁴

The military and security apparatus of Hizbullah is largely invisible so as to make it difficult for enemy penetration. What is known is that the two main organs comprise the: Islamic Resistance; and the Security Organ. Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance consists of two sections: 1) the enforcement and recruitment section; and 2) the combat section.

The enforcement and recruitment section recruits members and then submits them to "ideological indoctrination that reinforces the party's beliefs in

⁴² Ibid., p.50.

⁴³ Ibid., p.60.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.78-79.

Welayet al-Faqih and the religious command to fight the enemies"⁴⁵. The combat section provides training in martial arts, marksmanship, medical support, and weaponry. The outcome of the training determines one's position in one of the four organs of Hizbullah's combat section. These are:

a) Martyrs organ/ or individuals who are willing to lead a suicide operation even when they are convinced that chances of escaping death are at zero percent; b) Commandos or Special Forces organ: Elite warriors who have distinguished themselves in guerrilla warfare are to be trained in Islamic revolutionary training camps in Iran; c) Rocket launchers and fighters' organ: Individuals with experience in operating all kinds of weaponry, in particular, surface-to-surface or surface-to-air rockets and mortars; and finally d) Regular fighters' organ/ or individuals who have sufficient skills to lead attacks but who are mainly in charge of surveillance, logistics and medical support. ⁴⁶

These groups operate throughout the main three Shi'a regions of Lebanon. These groups do not communicate with one another. They communicate only upward through the hierarchy to the military operational headquarters, which is under the control of the party's secretary general (Hassan Nasrallah). Consequently, if the enemy compromises one cell, Hizbullah's military organization remains secretive and intact. Hamzeh writes: "Reportedly,

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.90.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.99.

Hizbullah's military operational headquarters includes top-ranking officers of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Although the guards withdrew in the early 1990s, Secretary-General Nasrallah has made reference to their continued stay in some parts of Lebanon."⁴⁷

The Hizbullah Security Organ is the most confidential of all of structural units and is headed by a member who is experienced in security and intelligence matters whose loyalty to the secretary-general and the Shura Council is unquestionable. Two sections comprise the Security Organ: 1) Party Security; and 2) External Security.

Party Security is "charged with internal security matters within the party and society at large, including preventing Hizbullah's enemies from penetrating the party's organization and to check any disagreement among party members."⁴⁸ This organ keeps files on all party members and anybody who approaches the group from the outside. Nasrallah stated, "Israel and the United States have made great efforts to penetrate our organizational structure through recruiting party members, promising them money, women, glory, and power positions."⁴⁹ But they (Israel and the United States) were always confronted with rejection because, for Hizbullah's members, there is a self-immunity resulting

⁴⁷ Ibid. , p.100.

⁴⁸ Ibid. , p.105.

⁴⁹ Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within*, p. 70.

from faith, religion, and ideological commitment. Hizbullah is a group seeking the heavenly world, martyrdom and death, so the members cannot be easily drafted by the enemies."⁵⁰

External Security (also called Encounter Security) functions to "counter intelligence attempts by the party's internal and external enemies who aim at penetrating the party's structure."⁵¹ Since Hizbullah has supportive cells outside the Middle East, this security section serves to protect the party from external threats.⁵²

3.6: The Cult of Martyrdom

Between 1982 and 1985, Hizbullah gave top priority to the resistance operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon- Tsahal. It succeeded in attacking several Israeli targets, most of them through martyr operations. This success against the Israeli troops can be explained by the importance of martyrdom in the Shi'a beliefs after the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala (680 C.E.) which for Shi'a Muslims represents a heroic narrative and an example

⁵⁰ Ibid. , p.75.

⁵¹ Ibid. , p.78.

⁵² Ibid. , p.90.

worthy of emulation. Sheikh Naim Qassem underscores this in his book: "Dying as a martyr in the service of the God's teachings is a supreme honor for all young Shi'as. And the objective on this plane is not so much to score a direct and immediate military victory, but rather, to have had the privilege of martyrdom, to have sacrificed oneself to God Almighty and a reward of happiness in eternal life in heaven."⁵³ The resistance carried out by young members of Hizbullah, has for its driving force a socio-cultural engine that corresponds to popular Shi'a consciousness which explains the success of the resistance pursued by Hizbullah.

3.7: The Social Services Network

Hizbullah provides services to its constituency, especially in southern Lebanon, Beirut suburbs (Dahye), Bekaa and Baalbek. This has played an important role in the party's popularity. The party established new schools and volunteer humanitarian professions that care for the injured and martyrs, these include:

1- Jihad for construction (*Jihad al-Bina'*) established in 1988, which includes more than 1,000 engineers, technicians and workers. It specializes in digging wells and

⁵³ Qassem, *Hizbullah: the Story from Within*, p. 99.

preparing educational courses in agriculture and veterinary work.⁵⁴

Opportunities such as agriculture and construction work are given to the unemployed or the unprivileged.

2- The Islamic Health authority, which offers health services to those who cannot afford it (low cost hospitalization and medical care). It has 47 branches throughout the country.⁵⁵

3- The non-interest loan society was founded in 1982 to provide the needy with loans without interests.⁵⁶

4- Islamic beneficiary support society was founded in 1987, to help achieve self-sufficiency for families, and caring the orphans, disabled, and widows.⁵⁷

5- The Martyr Association to care and provide education to the families of the martyrs.⁵⁸

6- The Islamic Institution for Education was founded in 1993 to build new schools in different locations in Lebanon. Enrollment priority is given to the children of the martyrs.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Hizbullah Center of Media for Statistical support- Beirut. May, 2006.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Beirut. May, 2006.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Beirut. May, 2006.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Beirut. May, 2006.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Beirut. May, 2006.

⁵⁹ Hatem, *Hizbullah Exposed*, p. 30.

Moreover, the party has important sports, cultural, and informational institutions, such as the Imam Khomeini Center, Al'hd magazine, and the Al-Manar TV channel, which is a part of the party's information network.

3.8: Conclusion

This chapter has examined the origins, ideology and structure of Hizbullah. Its organizational structure and secretive strategy plays important roles in the success of its mission. Hizbullah has been successful in its strategy and organizational structure in comparison to other guerrilla movements. What has added to the success and popularity of Hizbullah is its social services that supports large sectors of the shi'a sect in Lebanon with financial and humanitarian support. The next chapter presents the complete recruitment strategy and implementation of Hizbullah and how this has helped the part succeed as a guerrilla movement.

Chapter 4: Hizbullah's Recruitment and Training Procedures

4.1: Introduction

After studying the origins, history and ideology of Hizbullah and how it framed its success compared to other guerrilla movements, this chapter examines the recruitment profile of Hizbullah. It discusses the stages and requirements of an individual joining Hizbullah. The sources for this chapter are all based on interviews I have undertaken with Hizbullah party members (military and civil members). Because of the sensitive nature of this topic, the names of my interviewees are not disclosed. In addition to Hizbullah members, I also interviewed for this chapter a former member who participated in the battles with Israeli soldiers during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, particularly during the 1996-2000 period.

4.2: The Recruitment Process

The success of the Islamic Resistance Group, as it was labeled in the 1980's, in several attacks against Israeli soldiers gave it a clear edge over other parties, helping it attract talent. Recruitment was also sought by monitoring certain

individuals and convincing them to join the group. This took place in the 1990's, when the Islamic resistance group became an organized political group identified as "Hizbullah". Hizbullah gained its reputation and credibility and soon took control over the majority of the Shi'a areas in southern Lebanon, the Beirut suburbs, and in addition to areas in Baalbeck and the Bekaa.

The process of recruitment begins when a young man has a friend or a group of friends who are members in Hizbullah, and share religious observations, views, and pay visits to mosques. One Hizbullah member informed the author that Hizbullah has a presence in several areas in Lebanon, specifically in mosques; however, it remains a secret where these cities are located. When an unknown individual starts visiting the Friday Islamic lecture/prayer and mingles with others, a representative from Hizbullah will ask about this individual and begins to "spy" gradually on him until they uncover his life story. If they sense that he is a good candidate and has the potential to be a Hizbullah member, the "spy" gives him more attention. However, if the man does not fulfill certain moral and political requirements, the representative simply ignores him, considering him one of the many who are not meant to join the group.

Once a potential recruit is identified, then the Hizbullah official may suggest to the individual to attend religious courses usually held once a week. When the

candidate voluntarily requests to join the group he will then be asked to visit the center of registration, whose exact location is unknown for security reasons. The choice is left to the individual to volunteer joining the group. The candidate then fills an application for almost 4-6 hours. This application includes questions related to his life, youth, relatives, favorite colors, food, problems in his family, address, education, personal life, in addition to a complete portrait of him. This application represents a profile for each candidate. After filling the application the candidate will be monitored. Also, the candidate is asked to present two recommendation letters from people who are already members in Hizbullah. As he is being monitored, a committee called the "human resource committee" studies the application form and decides on whether to accept or reject the candidate. Consequently, the spy group or "*Jihaz el Morakaba al Dakhili*" will study his application.⁶⁰ The candidate has to also meet a number of conditions including: decent behavior, strong religious convictions, approves to the doctrine of "Welayet El-Faqih", abstains from drinking, commitment to the mission, loyalty, secrecy, and disciplined attitude. Upon observations and reports taken from the three divisions, the application will either be refused or approved depending on the qualifications mentioned above. If a candidate does not fulfill the above conditions, his application will then be refused. On the other hand, if

⁶⁰ Interview with member of military branch of Hizbullah, Initials: A. M. Beirut, 14 June 2006 (Hizbullah Media Center).

the application does get approved, the candidate will have to wait approximately four months for his enrollment to become effective.⁶¹

There are two types of enrollment in Hizbullah:

- 1- "On payroll"⁶²: This includes full time employees with Hizbullah, working at any service sector, who are paid by the organization. However Hizbullah's wages tend to be very low. The work is divided into one of the following fields: Resistance army, media, social sector, educational sector and health sector. The other type of enrollment is:
- 2- "Not on payroll":⁶³ where a member attends a few social meetings and gatherings in addition to occasional voluntarily work. In this case, the member can have a side job designated by the party enrollment committee, but is instructed to keep secret his part time enrollment. In case of misbehavior by any member in the group, certain procedures take place where the candidate will be given a warning and a freeze of services for six consecutive months. Consequently, the member is forbidden from continuing his duties or attending his usual courses. If the misbehavior persists, he will then be sent a letter of rejection or termination letter from the organization. An appeal might be raised but not before a period of one year has passed. During this period, the

⁶¹ All of the above is based on an interview with a Hizbullah civil member, A.A., Beirut, May 2006.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

organization will still spy on the candidate to ensure that the latter does not break its confidentiality code.

4.3: The Training Process

The potential candidates go through a procedure after the first approval has been granted. This procedure is as follows:

A- Preparation Period 1: Cultural courses and military courses. The candidate resides in a center for education (whose position is kept secret) for two and half months with a three to four hours daily session. Discussions vary from ethical behavior to advanced religious teachings. By the end of the course discussions focus on "Jihad" coupled with a week's teachings of ethics.

The second period of courses begins after a period of six months.

B-Preparation Period 2: or "Ansar Course".⁶⁴ Phase two extends over two and a half months. It involves comprehensive education in Islam, with special emphasis on the doctrine of Jihad. After the end of each session, candidates sit for evaluation exams where the officials decide whether or not the candidate should be promoted. Upon approval, the candidate is then allowed to attend secret stage two meetings attended by Hizbullah members. These meetings are prohibited to non-members of the party. By this, the candidate is officially

⁶⁴ Ibid.

declared a social member of the party. After attending social and military lessons he will be sent for an internship period at a social services institution for a period of nine months. Subsequently, the candidate will have the choice of enrolling in civil duties or military duties. Throughout the military service, there will be training sessions for a period of one month; these are called Mojahed One and Mojahed Two sessions.

At the military academy, they teach the candidate about all kinds of weapons, how to use, break, gather arms, in addition to a two hour daily session on cultural and religious studies.⁶⁵ Each soldier is appointed to specific tasks that fit his qualifications. On the battlefield there are two kinds of fighting units: "front lines and back lines".⁶⁶ The training areas are often located in Iran, Southern Lebanon, Bekaa or Baalbeck and their whereabouts are highly confidential for security reasons. It is extremely imperative in Hizbullah's code of ethics that every member of the party should experience border training, from the youngest member to even the secretary general himself, Hassan Nasrallah. This is done to ensure that the code of ethics is embedded in every member and that all members share Hizbullah's fighting experience. It is important to mention that not any one can join the resistance units stationed at the border.

⁶⁵ All of the above narrative is based on an interview with a Hizbullah civil member, A.A., Beirut, May 2006.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Only experienced soldiers are allowed to fight at the border areas. During the military training sessions, which take approximately six months up to a one year period, candidates stay at the training center for a consecutive period of several months without any parental visits (In several cases, the candidate might be able to have a day's rest outside the camp but eventually will have to return). Consequently, the candidate is completely isolated from any outside interruptions, either by family, friends or social obligations. During this period, soldiers learn to use real weapons and missiles, strategies and attack tactics in addition to defensive plans, how to kidnap, escape, night walk, change location during day and night, explosives training, physical training and creating traps. In addition, they study military strategies related to different wars that have transpired in the past. This is done to familiarize themselves with other experiences and learn from past mistakes. During the training period, soldiers face very hard and dangerous tasks. When the time arrives to engage in battle, they are fully prepared for any adverse situations. Some Hizbullah cadres suggest that the training centers are often more demanding than actual combat against Israeli forces. This prepares Hizbullah fighters to undertake their mission against Israeli troops.

In the battlefield, soldiers carry with them a copy of the Qur'an, which they believe is essential because God is their protector and guider. Moreover, they

seldom travel without a bottle of water to be used for drinking but not for other purposes such as ablution. In such situations, sand can be used as a form of cleansing for prayer. The food supply per combatant is as follows: chocolate, non-salted peanuts, pineapple slices, hommos cans, tuna cans, sliced turkey, cream cheese and other light materials. These supplies are meant to help them survive long periods of military engagement.

The following table includes the profile of my interviewees from Hizbullah: (I have used pseudonyms for obvious security reasons)

Name	Age	Role	Years of participation	Religion	Social Status
Abu Mahdi	41	Responsible for the training of the martyr division of the combat section	20 years	Muslim-shi'a	poor
Abu Ali	35	member of the Media Department	Participated in the combat section from 1984 to 1992. then transferred to media department	Muslim-shi'a	Middle-class
Abu Mustapha	24	member of the resistance army (rocket launcher)	9 years	Muslim-shi'a	Middle to wealthy (educated)
Mohamad	25	member of the resistance army (Martyr section)	10 years	Muslim-shi'a	Poor

Ali	30	member of the resistance army (commados)	9 years	Muslim-shi'a	poor
Abbas	45	Recruitment monitor	20 years	Muslim-shi'a	Middle to Poor
Ibrahim	50	Information Center	20 years	Muslim-shi'a	Middle to Poor

Specific information or recruitment numbers are not available, however. None of the members interviewed for this research gave any specific numbers for Hizbullah's current or potential membership. As for female recruitment, the procedure is similar to the one mentioned above for male members but the monitors are females. Moreover, and as the head of a training camp mentioned, women are prohibited from joining the combat section. Women's role in Hizbullah is basically in the media, health and civil activities.

4.4: Conclusion

Guerrilla movements tend to have political or religious motives to attract people. However, the strategy these guerrilla movements use plays a vital role in gluing members to them. One of these strategies is recruitment. Many guerrilla movements recruit their members in a violent way and people join involuntarily; consequently, people find themselves obliged and threatened to join. Many such guerrilla movements threaten members with their families. Furthermore,

Hizbullah's case differs since their successful recruitment strategy gives the member or the candidate the freedom to join their movement. Hizbullah does not use coercive modes of recruitment. Moreover, Hizbullah has religious ideology as a ready-made recruitment tool to attract and mobilize followers.

Hizbullah's participation in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections allowed it to become part of the Lebanese political system. This guarantees Hizbullah a future political role even after the party ceases to exist as a resistance movement. They will remain s the main representative of the Shi'a sect. Hizbullah's further integration into the political process has motivated potential members to join the party as it is now perceived as a legitimate political party in Lebanon.

After examining their success in recruitment, ideology and strategy implementation, the next chapter turns to address Hizbullah's future. How will this guerrilla movement end and what variables will cause its end. Also, how will the demobilization of their members take place? These questions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: the Future of Hizbullah

5.1: Introduction

All guerilla movements come to an end. However, each case has a different ending shaped according to its mission and accomplishments. As guerrilla movements emerged in Lebanon in different situations, each movement ended according to the strategy implemented by them. An example of a Lebanese guerrilla movement that was ceased by the Lebanese government is the Lebanese forces party that was condemned by several violent attacks against civilians during the Lebanese civil war. To study how the case of Hizbullah might end as a guerilla movement I will first present several variables that help explain the ending of other guerilla movements, and try to match these variables with Hizbullah's case.

5.2: Explaining Hizbullah's Demobilization in Comparative Perspective

A number of variables have shaped the demobilization of guerilla movements. These may be catalogued as follows:

The Capture or Killing of the Leader: Recent examples of groups that were either destroyed or weakened by the capture of a charismatic leader include Peru's

shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo. Shining Path's former leader, Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman Reynoso (a.k.a. Guzman), was captured on September 12, 1992. Images of the former leader behind bars recanting and asking his followers to lay down their arms, dealt the group a crushing blow.⁶⁷ The Kurdistan Workers Party also suffered from the capture of its charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan was first sentenced to death. The sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, with Ocalan advising to refrain from violence.⁶⁸ In March 2001, British authorities arrested the leader Of the Real Irish Republican Army, Michael Mckeivitt. Mckeivitt declared from an Irish prison that further armed resistance was unsuccessful and that the RIRA has ceased to exist.⁶⁹ Aum Shinrikyo was arrested in May 1995 and sentenced to death in February 2004. The group shrunk from approximately 45,000 members worldwide in 1995 to fewer than 1,000, many of whom live in Russia.⁷⁰ Other examples include the arrest of leaders in groups as diverse as France's Direct Action and El-Salvador People's Liberation Forces.

The killing of a leader may backfire by creating increased publicity for the group's cause and perhaps making the leader a martyr, thus attracting new

⁶⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups", *International Security*, 31, 1, (2006), p. 4 .

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.9.

members to the organization. Che Guevara is the most famous example of this phenomenon. There is reason to believe that arresting a leader is more effective in damaging a group than is killing or assassinating him. But even a humiliating arrest can backfire if the leader continues to communicate with his group. In other cases, incarcerated leaders may cause further violence by group members trying to free them. This was the case with the Baader Meinhof group. Thus, if a leader is captured and jailed, undermining his credibility and cutting off inflammatory communication are critical to demoralizing his followers.⁷¹

In the case of Hizbullah, the possibility that the group will end upon the arrest of Hassan Nasrallah is low because the group's organization allows for the election of a successor by the party's council. In addition, Hizbullah is bonded by ideology and religion. This represents a bond more important than the role of the leader. However, we cannot disregard the possibility of Hizbullah becoming weaker if Nasrallah is assassinated or captured by Israel. But if Nasrallah were to be assassinated one should not overlook the repercussion of such an act in Lebanese society. A joke about Nasrallah broadcasted in a program on a Lebanese Broadcasting Station (LBCI) resulted in mass disturbances. People who supported Nasrallah closed the roads and engaged in violent acts. After all, Nasrallah's charismatic personality has added to Hizbullah's popular support

⁷¹ Moghadan Assaf, *Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivation and Organizational Aspects*, (Tufts University Press: 2003), p.3.

especially since his son's death in the battle field against Israel. Hizbullah's supporters consider Nasrallah as a man of action and a protector of their rights.

Inability to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation: The Red Brigades, the second of June Movement, the Japanese Red Army, the weather Underground Organization/Weathermen, the Symbanese Liberation Army, and the Baader Meinhof group are all examples of extremely dangerous, violent groups in which a leftist/ anarchist ideology became bankrupt, leaving no possibility to transition to a second generation.⁷² To support their activities, some right-wing groups engage in criminal behavior such as the robbing of banks and armored cars, as well as counter feting.⁷³ The transition from the first to second generation terrorist leaders is very sensitive. Failure to pass the legacy to a new generation is a common historical explanation for a guerrilla movement's decline or end. Hizbullah's doctrines are religious therefore their struggle against Israel is theoretically open-ended. Holy doctrines allow the struggle to be carried to the next generation operationally, and since Hizbullah uses secret recruitment, the possibility to carry this cause to the second generation is ensured even if the group ended as a political organization. Moreover, one could argue that

⁷² James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, (Boulder: Westview press, 1996), p. 30.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Hizbullah's slogans are shaped by religious language which makes it attractive to ordinary people, using moral and spiritual catchphrases as a mean of mobilization.

Achievement of the Cause: Two examples are the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization, also known either by its Hebrew acronym ETZEL or simply as Irgun), founded in 1931 to protect Jews with force and to advance the cause of an independent Jewish state, and the African National Congress (ANC). Irgun disbanded with the creation of the state of Israel, when its members transitioned to participation in the new government.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for terrorist acts from 1964 to 1990, was elected South Africa's first president following the end of apartheid. The last ANC attack occurred in 1989, and the organization became a legal political actor in 1990, having achieved its objective of ending the apartheid regime.⁷⁵

In the case of Hizbullah, the achievement of their cause begins with the end of Israeli occupation of all Lebanese land. One Hizbullah civil member mentioned to this author that after the complete liberation of the occupied land

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷⁵ Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield: 2004), p. 25.

Hizbullah will turn to improving the civil services it offers to the people it represents.⁷⁶

Diminishing of Popular Support: Popular support can be lost through the following: People who are not interested in the political objectives may fear government counteraction, especially if the government engages in strong repressive measures and people become exhausted. Alternatively, the government may offer supporters of the guerrilla movement a better alternative. Or populations may become uninterested in the ideology or objectives of a guerrilla movement. Events can evolve independently such that the group's aims become outdated or irrelevant.⁷⁷

In the case of Hizbullah, popular support can be lost if the party engages in domestic violent attacks against Lebanese. However, Hizbullah's ideology states that they are a resistance group and a resistance against Israel only. The group repeatedly states that it does not have any interest in replacing the Lebanese political system with an Islamic state. Only if Hizbullah engages in domestic violence does it risk losing popular support.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the government is not offering another alternative to Hizbullah's supporters who are

⁷⁶ Interview with Hizbullah Civil member, Initials: A. A. Beirut, May 2006.

⁷⁷ Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, pp. 60-71.

⁷⁸ Mannes, *Profiles in Terror*, pp.40-47.

the least privileged in the Lebanese society. Hizbullah supports them through civil services (health, education, and financial support), a duty that should be undertaken by the Lebanese government. In fact, in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Shi'a community, Hizbullah towers over all other political actors, even from within this community.

Using Military Forces to Repress Guerilla Movements: The use of force against guerilla movements works best in situations where members of the organization can be separated from the general population. Distinguishing members from non-members, always a sensitive issue, particularly when the only available means of discrimination relate to how members are defined rather than to what they do. It is very hard to distinguish Hizbullah members from non-members since the key element of their recruitment is secrecy; even their own families are not allowed to know about their participation. For the government to target them, substantial intelligence is required. Hizbullah is successful because of the remarkable organizational capabilities and the secrecy it possesses. This exceptional organization structure has made it impossible for an intruder to penetrate the party, a theme reiterated by many members of Hizbullah. Nor can the government use military force against Hizbullah given the latter's superior military capabilities.

5.3: Conclusion

Hizbullah's future still remains uncertain though it may be framed within one of the variables presented in this chapter. There are many questions pertaining to peoples' reaction to the organization, what will happen if its military capabilities vanish when an order of demobilization comes, and whether Hizbullah will declare war or a revolution against any threat it faces. However, this study suggests that Hizbullah remained successful for almost 10 years and it has proved that it can be part of Lebanese politics. As for the members of Hizbullah, they will remain ideologically bonded to Hizbullah even if it ended as a guerilla movement. However, Hizbullah's demobilization will be the result of a lack of support from its allies (financial and military). Hizbullah maintains popular support through the services it provides and its religious slogans. However, religious slogans alone cannot maintain the organization's popularity as many guerilla movements could not survive because of religious reasons alone. Once the financial support is lost, Hizbullah's popularity among Shi'a Lebanese will start to decline.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1: Why was Hizbullah Successful?

Hizbullah is an Islamic guerilla movement, framed by Islamic social and political ideology. The formation of Hizbullah came as a result of the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982, and the conflict continued until the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Hizbullah was soon able to find a role within Lebanese society and state. It established a dynamic social program, funded by sources of zakat (Islamic alms), financial support from Iran, and donations from wealthy Lebanese abroad, through which it manages a nationwide network of social, educational and charitable programs. These efforts in addition to the long struggle against Israel have helped Hizbullah

gain the support of a wide sect of Lebanese population specifically shi'a sect. This was clear in the results of Lebanon's parliamentary elections and confirms the popularity of Hizbullah despite the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, which some had predicted would lessen the organisation's influence. Since Syria is an ally to Hizbullah and during the Lebanese division after Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination in 2005; accusing Syrian government of the assassination, Hizbullah refused to take side in this conflict.

The solidarity and commitment of the in- group found in Hizbullah is supported with Islamic doctrines to end Israeli occupation to Arab lands. Faithfulness for the mission helped the formation of Hizbullah grow stronger as it represented key constituent in the motivation and recruitment strategy. Hizbullah doesn't need manipulation tools to attract members since the target and the mission are included in Islam principles. Also, the recruitment strategy Hizbullah uses does not involve involuntary means like violence or threatening methods to oblige members for joining. Hizbullah's recruitment strategy allows members to join voluntarily since they use Islamic reference for "Jihad" and Islamic war heroes to follow their path.

The May 2000 victory helped Hizbullah gain support from local and foreign supporters since it represented the first success for guerrilla movements' mission and the first Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories because of non-

governmental army or resistance group. This victory raised the expectations of many inhabitants and gave them an edge of struggle and support; one of the main groups affected by this victory was the Palestinians during the Intifada, by which several successful attacks were launched against Israel state that took the Palestinian- Israeli conflict into a new approach.

Other than victory, as the literature of guerrilla movements states, guerrilla movements tend to over rule the state system after they achieve their goal. However, Hizbullah's case denies this fact through several Hizbullah official speeches refusing the fact that they intend to over rule the system in Lebanon and transform it into an Islamic state following the Iranian one. Consequently, this issue is the main oppositions' argument against Hizbullah's existence within Lebanese politics and suspecting their military support after Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Hizbullah's struggle against these oppositions remains under negotiations until these days, and international efforts are put against Hizbullah's military assets through UN resolution 1595 which declares the suspension of all non-governmental military resources. Hizbullah still refuses to turn its weapons because their mission is not completed yet, there's still Chebaa farms and Ghajar town which are considered Lebanese territories under Israeli occupation. International debates are still trying to solve this issue of these areas if Syrian or Lebanese; by which it will conclude the

completion of Hizbullah's mission that is liberating Lebanese territories from Israeli occupation and consequently will conclude the issue of Hizbullah's weaponry.

Civil services, an Islamic doctrine and an ideology that supports the well being of its supporters are the main explanatory variables to the success of Hizbullah. What Hizbullah offers as social services is perhaps the main variable explaining the success of the movement. As a member of Hizbullah answered when the author asked about people's alternative to Hizbullah, the member answered: "in Lebanon if you are not with Hizbullah you would miss out on a lot of public and social services, such as war compensation and other civil services."⁷⁹

Consequently, Hizbullah has been able to monopolize the ability to distribute social services to the Shi'a sect in Lebanon as a mean to gain people's trust and support. This has also served as a motivation tool for their recruitment strategy. The Lebanese government's role in this respect is also important. Isolating the Shi'a sect in the southern suburbs of Beirut, in addition to Bekaa and Baalbeck, made it easier for Hizbullah to bond together this population and control it through distributive policies. This isolation was also due to the international situation regarding the the Shi'a presence in the Arab countries.

⁷⁹ Interview with Hizbullah Civil member, Initials: A. A. Beirut, January 2008.

Hizbullah emerged as the representative of this population, and successfully gained their support.

As observed through the interviews conducted for this research, Hizbullah supporters tend to be from the middle to poor social classes in Lebanon. Members of the resistance army tend to come from lower class than members in the civil services section. The cult of martyrdom plays an important symbolic role among these classes. Hizbullah martyrs are idealized – as witnessed in some of Beirut southern suburb and other areas where a number of streets were named after Hizbullah martyrs. Their families receive generous allowances. Members of Hizbullah are also held in high esteem by their own community. These are all added privileges of membership that play a significant role in the collective identity of Hizbullah members, especially hailing from poor backgrounds.

6.2: The Future of Hizbullah's Recruitment Strategy

Hizbullah's recruitment strategy has been taken a form of secrecy. During the 1980's the recruitment was simpler since the country was at war and everyone joined; nevertheless, Hizbullah chose the right people that had the will and the complete understanding of the mission (in addition to the

acknowledgment of Welayet el Faqih). After Hizbullah declared its existence as a political party with a proper structure, the recruitment strategy started to take a different shape and became secretive as the threat against Hizbullah members increased. Seemingly, this recruitment structure helped the success and survival of Hizbullah which will remain even if Hizbullah ended as a guerrilla movement. Hizbullah became a political party and a part of the parliamentary and social division of the Lebanese society; however, the recruitment is still processing. Hizbullah is always prepared for any threat against them; they own a backup military and human resources system for any sudden attack.

If Hizbullah ceased to exist, its recruitment strategy will remain secretive as they try to sustain a backup army; for which they can fight if any attack was launched. However, Hizbullah's former military members will be part of the civil society following Hizbullah's ideology through their wide social network and civil services.

6.3: Future Research Questions

By this the issue of Hizbullah's future remains vague; however as supported in chapter 5 different variables may end Hizbullah's existence. But even if Hizbullah ends as a guerrilla movement, it will still have public support

seemingly from the strategy they have employed for over 20 years of their existence. Hizbullah represents a new approach of guerrilla movements and resistance groups. It symbolizes a unique case different from the literature of guerrilla movements reviewed in this research; a case of martial victory, public support, political role, organization, and recruitment. The theme that drove researchers' interest to study the existence and structure of Hizbullah and other Islamic movements, will continue to try to study a future for Hizbullah. With all the disagreements and refusal of their existence in a world that marks Islamic movements as radical extremist movements. Hizbullah's case situated a different study of guerrilla movements despite the fact that it is framed by religious motives. Hizbullah's case added a new chapter to the literature of guerrilla movements, the usual weapon used by guerrilla warfare is not heavy but Hizbullah used heavy weaponry especially during July war. It was the first time for a guerrilla movement to use missiles in their attacks.

The question of the survival of Hizbullah is still debatable, their future, their continuous financial support in the face of U.S. efforts to stop it and the U.S. – Iranian conflict. Also, the questions of the success of the future guerrilla movements after taking Hizbullah's case a successful reference. Hizbullah opened the debate of successful guerrilla movements that transformed into a political party in a states' political system and maybe into a state by itself.

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