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**The Problematic of the War on Terrorism through
American Unilateralism and European Multilateralism
In the Middle East**

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To My Loving Parents

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ABSTRACT

Globalization and terrorism are key issues in today's international affairs. Interdependence used to be among major powers and their respective colonies. The world continues to remain interdependent, yet, in a different form. Indeed, international relations almost always involve violence and war, nevertheless, they are also centered on economic interests and trade. Wars would most of the time have territorial purposes. Today, the United States is leading a war against trans-national terrorism, a phenomenon that has evolved throughout globalization, particularly with the advancement of technology and its relatively simple access. September 11 bluntly illustrated the use of a global means, the airplane, and a plot accurately masterminded in different parts of the world.

Terrorism, in addition, acquired different aspects. In the past, it would be addressed against specific statesmen, related to a defined political cause. More recently, it remained a method with political objectives. Yet, it now targets innocent civilians, little involved in state policies. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the trans-national terrorists, no one is innocent. On the contrary, every person actually symbolizes the policies of the targeted state.

Furthermore, the United States decided to launch a global war, a battle usually involving states, rather non-state actors. Such a position greatly affected the United States' relations with its allies, namely the European countries. The latter indeed have similar objectives in preventing and countering trans-national terrorism, particularly after having been subject to large-scale terrorist attacks at home. Yet, as opposed to American unilateralism, most European countries united in a multilateral perspective, strengthening intelligence and police measures among one another. In addition to the military approach, the United States left no choice to the other countries, which would either be with the United States, or automatically with the enemy. As a matter of fact, the source of trans-national terrorism has increasingly been located in the Middle East. In the American view, the Middle East mostly hosts repressive, authoritarian, Islamic anti-American regimes which breed terrorism as a means of expression and which therefore ought to be replaced by democratic systems. The United States aims at doing so militarily.

In the European view, the large immigrant population at home is composed of those who had fled countries either in conflict, or undergoing harsh political and economic crises. Following September 11, the Madrid and London attacks, immigrants with Muslim and Arab origins increasingly became associated with terrorism. As a result, Europe aimed at regulating and controlling migration, yet, with respect to human rights and refugees asylum. It therefore carefully analyzed the reason of migration and aims at promoting development in the immigrants' respective countries of origin. As such, Europe witnessed internal divisions with regard to foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States on the one hand, and global terrorism on the other. The United Kingdom was the first to join the United States on such an initiative, while other European countries opted for policies established within a multilateral framework.

This thesis brings together two different perspectives on a common inescapable reality. Both the American and European sides are aware that trans-national terrorism is implanted worldwide threatening virtually, yet, with very concrete consequences on the international order.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	6
I. Introduction	8
II. Globalization and Violence	15
1. The Impact of Globalization on Security	15
2. Globalizing Democracy as a Solution to the September 11 Setback in Global Security.....	23
3. The Global War against Terrorism through different Viewpoints	25
III. The American Perspective: Unilateralism and Strategic Interests	32
1. American Super Power and Unilateralism	32
2. The Dangers of Unilateralism.....	40
3. The Middle East as a Strategic Interest	42
3.1 Nuclear Iran as a Terrorist Threat.....	42
3.2 The United States Standpoint towards the Israel – Palestine conflict	44
3.3 Israel Lobby and United States foreign policy	46
3.4 Democracy in the Middle East	50
IV. The European Perspective	56
1. Terrorism in Modern Europe.....	57
2. The Issue of Immigration	62
3. Europe, the Global Security Agenda and Strategic Interests in the Middle East	66
V. Conclusion	79
BIBLIOGRAPHY	87
Online Articles.....	90

I. Introduction

In the aftermath of a bi-polar world, the Berlin Wall marked the entry of the Europeans into a new uni-polar world. Yet, September 11 signalled the emergence of a new threat to the United States, a threat through which trans-national terrorism challenged uni-polarity. From the American perspective, September 11 marked the beginning of a dangerous world. The United States was hit for the first time since Pearl Harbour. Nevertheless, the new threat turned out to be asymmetrical. In fact, while the United States decided to launch a war against terrorism, the Europeans did not feel at war, despite the Madrid and London explosions.

Terrorism is not new. Yet, its harmfulness, its power as well as its complexity are innovative and increasingly difficult to fight and prevent. In addition, the media serves to dramatize the attacks even more, hence the second airplane that hit the Twin Towers live on international broadcasting networks. Furthermore, the American response to Al Qaeda's attacks was exactly what the latter was aiming at, i.e., terrify the people and toughen the confrontation.¹

In particular, trans-national terrorism is practiced by non-state actors, who transcend borders and have no specific geographic location. It rather operates through broad networks. Therefore, the presumed base of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan might not be necessarily true. In fact, attributing a base to such decentralized actors is misleading. As such, terrorism is no longer about changing the political, economic or social order

¹ Hans Stark, Stark, Hans, « Le Terrorisme », *Compte Rendu Pierre Hubert Bouillon*, www.geostrategie.ens.fr/international/CR-2005/compte-rendu_Bouillon.pdf, Accessed May 28, 2007

of a country. It is rather about radically altering the international order and eradicating worldwide Western influence.

The innumerable definitions of terrorism share a common pejorative and reproachful characteristic. In fact, few people ever claimed to be terrorists. It is rather an accusation thrown at the other. It constitutes a label which bears a legal weight. Yet, a terrorist for some is also an avenger for others. According to Didier Bigo, a terrorist and a counter-terrorist are therefore the same.² In addition, terrorism is not independent of a context. Unlike its connotation, Bigo and Hermant observed that terrorism did not terrorize.³ It was rather a spectacular form of violence which relied on beliefs, values and emotions and which fascinated people in the speed at which it would spread fear, anxiety and insecurity, especially vis-à-vis issues that were hard to handle, such as conflicts or nuclear weapons. Bigo and Hermant therefore concluded that counter-terrorism did not fight terrorism.⁴ It rather defined it and legitimized it. In particular, in today's information age, the media has helped dramatize terrorism and has turned it into a challenge for the state. As such, statesmen in power were compelled to condemn, communicate and reassure the people. Bigo also noted that counter-terrorism, particularly the one condemning Islamic terrorism, was in fact an American influence which highlighted the imminent role of Western powers.⁵

² See Daniel Hermant et Didier Bigo, « *Les Politiques de Lutte Contre le Terrorisme: Enjeux Français* », in *European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation*, edited by Fernando Reinares, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2000. Pp 75-98.

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

Through the same outlook, Adam Roberts observed that it was more compelling to condemn terrorism than to define it ⁶. According to him, terrorism has always existed, during every epoch and in different forms. Like Bigo, Roberts found that terrorism was in fact a label accusing specific groups or political opponents of lacking responsibility or unable to meet particular expectations. While Bigo concluded that such a labeling had become a reflex and legitimized terrorism itself, Roberts rather found that the accusers tended to gain their own legitimacy over others. Nevertheless, Roberts agreed with his French counterpart on the fact that loads of definitions of the term existed. ⁷ The United Nations had its own, and every single institution as well. There was a collection of definitions at the beginning of every research. The term “terrorism” was obviously difficult to define since there was no generic definition, independent of the context and applicable everywhere. On account of such a difficulty, it was therefore not necessary to find a universal definition. Roberts specifically cited Alexis De Tocqueville, according to whom “terrorism” was abstract, and that abstract terms could bear many definitions, all valid but none universal. ⁸

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, solidarity was highly expressed by European countries towards the United States. Yet, such a compassionate attitude was quickly affected by the Iraq occupation divide. Despite the number of years which have passed since then, the United States kept acting unpredictably vis-à-vis its old friends. For instance, it threatened Germany that it would move American military

⁶ Adam Roberts, “Can We Define Terrorism?”, Oxford Today, The University Magazine, Volume 14, Number 2, Hilary 2002, <http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/2001-02/v14n2/04.shtml>, Accessed May 28, 2007

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

bases to Germany's neighbouring East European countries.⁹ September 11 had, as such, highlighted the immeasurable scale of the United States' power and political influence worldwide. In fact, it had given the United States a much stronger motivation towards hegemonic aspirations. Therefore, trans-Atlantic crisis that ensued was not about American values. It was rather over American power and American hegemony.

Historically, the United States intervened in the two world wars to prevent German, and later, Soviet power, from rising. In addition, with the enlargement of the European Union, the United States particularly focused on keeping NATO in a post –Soviet world in order to preserve American interests. As such, the United States aimed at preventing European countries from forming any independent military security coalition. Moreover, the United States saw in the European Union its own economic interests. It would only have to compete against one integrated European market, instead of multiple nationalist European rivals. The United States therefore aimed at moving away former world war security dilemmas, and ensuring West European security. Otherwise, it would have been confronted to a multi-polar Europe, a much unwanted situation to American geopolitical interests.

While it has become very hard to compete with the American superpower, France, Germany and other countries feared for their own safety and interests.¹⁰ In fact, states sought to survive and increase their power by ensuring their own security. It was therefore a reflex to form counter-hegemonic alliances. Yet, it was also natural for a

⁹ Christopher Layne, *"Old Europe" and the End of the US Hegemony*, in *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic relations*, edited by Christina V. Balis and Simon Serfaty, Washington, D.C., CSIS Press, c2004 Pp 47-65

¹⁰ Ibid

hegemon to take advantage of the lack of opposing forces and expand the scope of its own geopolitical interests. It was therefore of utmost importance for the United States to avoid the fate of the hegemon, i.e., the same one once experienced by Britain and which the British military Spencer Wilkenson illustrated in his remark “we have no friends, and no nations love us”.¹¹ The United States could not remain convinced that it was a benign hegemon, because there was “no such animal in international politics”.¹²

The problematic of the global war on terrorism therefore entails considerable issues. As bold and straightforward as it appears, the war on terrorism is a *fait accompli* that affects many global concerns, over which the United States and Europe have had convergent and divergent perspectives. Terrorism is indeed a weapon used among all adversaries in their political battle. Yet, trans-national terrorism acquired a particular weight, obstructing state frontiers and political principles. An objective definition of terrorism is therefore harder to determine. Furthermore, the response against unprecedented terrorist acts differed according to the perspectives of the countries in which the acts occurred. Therefore, the global war on terror, initially launched to eradicate terrorism worldwide, had serious repercussions on international relations. This thesis focuses on the impact of recent developments in the international system on global security. It analyses the extent to which the on-going war on trans-national terrorism affected trans-Atlantic relations. In particular, it compares the American unilateral approach to a European approach which seeks similar achievements, yet, through multilateral means.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid. Page 65

First, trans-national terrorism is analyzed as a derivative of the more common phenomenon of globalization (Chapter One). Indeed, the latter is not new, yet, it continues to develop along unprecedented stages. After introducing globalization in a historical context, this thesis studies the link between globalization, democracy and terrorism. It focuses on the security dimension of globalization and the particular American and European responses to the global threats.

As such, the thesis transits to the second part, (Chapter Two), which considers the American perspective on the war on terror and its impact on American foreign policy in the Middle East, the region at the centre of the war. It argues that the global war on terror is a new way of defining American strategic interests in the Middle East. The United States aims at eradicating a global cause while remaining the only champion. In international conflicts, states could opt to remain neutral. In this specific war, the United States prohibits such an alternative. To another extent, this part studies the impact of the Israel lobby in American domestic politics, from which foreign policy derived. The study does not intend to either defend or blame the lobby's influence on the global war on terrorism. It rather aims at analyzing the link between counter-terrorism and Israel's security in the Middle East, a delicate, yet, crucial matter in American foreign policy. In addition, it analyzes the role of public opinion in the Middle East, a key element of the democratic system that the United States aims at establishing in the region, by itself and in its own way.

After carefully stating the impact of American actions on trans-Atlantic relations, the third part, (Chapter Three), turns to the opposite side of the Atlantic, Europe, the perspective of which is complex and incorporates many insights. In particular,

terrorism in Europe has been experienced differently by the different countries and has been increasingly associated with the question of immigration, particularly with Arab and Muslim origins. European interests in the Middle East are as important as they are for the United States. Yet, Europe seems cautious about intertwining the terrorist attacks at home and the Middle East ever-lasting conflicting situation. Europe seeks to preserve close ties with the Middle East rather than crush reciprocal historical relations. In particular, Europe focuses on multilateral efforts within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, through which it intends to solve both issues of migration and terrorism.

Finally, the last part, (Chapter Four), concludes with a review of the issues at stake in all of the United States, Europe and the Middle East, reiterating that trans-national terrorism can neither be countered nor prevented in unilateral military achievements. In fact, the military response against Al Qaeda or any other similar actor is insufficient. The neutralization of a group does not lead to the destruction of its structure, let alone the extensively spread network.

II. Globalization and Violence

Globalization almost always denotes growing economic interdependence. Indeed, at all times, trade has connected most parts of the world together. In addition, historical sea expeditions broadened geographic and cultural horizons. In particular, unprecedented communication and technological advancements universalized information access. Yet, in parallel, globalization has been denounced as spreading specific political, economic and socio-cultural values, alienating those who sought to assert independent identities and ways of life. Moreover, it has often been observed that integration into the global economy was not global itself. As such, globalization had rather widened the gap between wealth and poverty. Therefore, an immediate action towards global inequality and economic deprivation took the form of transnational terrorism, strongly shaking global security and primarily targeting American hegemony and Western values worldwide.

1. The Impact of Globalization on Security

Globalization acquired different dimensions throughout history. From maritime trade to land discoveries, the different parts of the world were linked through commercial or travel purposes. The ancient and most famous routes, the Silk and Spice Roads, already connected several empires from Arabia and the Mediterranean to Eastern Asia.

Later on, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution transformed the means of transport and manufacturing, particularly locomotives, steam engines and water frames, the wheels turned by running water. As such, both production and

transportation became faster. New inventions then carried on in communication and information. While the first half of the twentieth century was highlighted by the development of electrical home and work appliances, the second half was particularly highlighted by the television, the personal computer and the satellite, attributing to globalization an unprecedented characteristic. In particular, the letters once written on paper and sent in sealed envelopes became electronic messages delivered within seconds worldwide.

Such a novelty mainly affected the economic aspect of globalization. Indeed, historical and continuous international trade rendered the countries more interdependent. Nevertheless, the pace at which communication tools evolved turned the world into financial bubbles where wealth was measured electronically. In addition, products were no longer fully manufactured locally. In fact, production firms had started to reach for manufacturers abroad, mainly in Eastern Asia, where labour would be much cheaper than home. Large firms then became multinational and were implanted everywhere. Such a core-periphery workforce was considered as a boost to the economy in the periphery, since it would expand the use of local currency, decrease unemployment rate and increase purchasing power. Yet, this was not necessarily the case. Currency fluctuations often resulted in inflation. In parallel, the prices varied according to the principle of supply and demand.

In developing countries, most people strongly view globalization with contempt. In fact, they feel utterly disappointed to discover that globalization did not provide to them what the industrial revolution had achieved in the North. Vis-à-vis agriculture for instance, industrialization today has rather resulted in “landlessness, over-

urbanization, environment deterioration and the impoverishment of large portions of the urban and rural populations".¹³ Such consequences were mainly due to the fact that new nation-states did not develop gradually. They rather accommodated themselves within the global economy. Critics of globalization also noted that privatization and foreign investments reduced state influence and made the state less likely to intervene in domestic economy. In parallel, the state would not respond repressively either, in order not to push foreign investments away. Furthermore, from a social point of view, globalization gave room for collective social actions. Ideally, the voices of individuals living in developing countries would be heard abroad, and attract supporters and sympathizers in the North. Nevertheless, while their counterparts in the North would seek long-term global action and integration, activists in developing countries would be rather interested in an immediate response solving their daily issues. Integration in the global economy would therefore have a much lower priority.

To another extent, mainly influenced by cultural and fashionable trends, globalization has increasingly oriented societies toward the consumption of common goods, typical of the American way of life. As a result, specific genres of music, movies, television series, coffee shops and clothing have been acquired worldwide. For instance, on May 5, 2007, CNN was broadcasting a program celebrating fifty years of American pop culture. However, such a unidirectional flow was undermined by many people, who then aimed at reaffirming their respective individual identities in adhering to modernity, while at the same time, keeping their own values, traditions and customs.

A striking example would be Saudi Arabia, where inexhaustible wealth has provided

¹³ T. David Mason, Globalization, "*Democratization and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium*", in *Globalization and Violence*, Volume 3, edited by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, Sage Publications, London, 2006, Page 338

the most sophisticated technologies and the replica of worldwide architecture for business centres. However, by contrast, Saudi Arabia hosts, to date, several forms of extremism, intolerant of non-Wahabi ideologies. It is true that non-American tendencies have not become global. Yet, the Saudi example made it worth observing that adhering to globalization did not necessarily contradict with local culture. However, anti-globalist responses have often been violent, blaming Western neo-imperialism for turning all aspects of globalization to the West's unbeatable economic and military advantages. The latter has often been denounced as a corollary of the former, particularly supporting Israel's terrorist policies in the Middle East. Therefore, violent opposition to globalization in general and Americanization in particular, kept reviving unlimited tensions among supporters of the Arab Palestinian cause against pro-Israeli governments and people. Above all, Afghan Muslim militants who had once been trained by the West to fight Communist regimes now turned against their own trainers.

Whether September 11 was a conspiracy prepared, among others, by America itself, it definitely illustrated the utilization of globalized tools at the highest level. Needless to say, it once again put the most vulnerable aspect of globalization, i.e., security, at stake. The latter had already been crucial with the rise of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction since World War II and throughout the Cold War. Obviously, military wars never stopped. Military means have even become more destructive. In different studies on the causal factors of war, analysts observed that even with no arms, men would still make wars with their hands. The relationship between globalization and international security is difficult to measure. It can

nevertheless be said that security globalization, like economic and cultural globalization, has occurred and its effect and causal relationships need to be understood. Globalization “is the means through which international interactions are exercised, combined with an increase in the number and types of actors”.¹⁴ Globalization is neither independent nor a causal phenomenon.¹⁵ According to Realists, the nation-state serves as a barrier between the international system and the domestic sphere of politics. Globalization reflects the hegemonic influence of the major powers in international politics.¹⁶ However, Sean Kay observed that defining globalization was more complicated than that. He found that it was rather the acceleration of “trans-boundary communication, international networks, the diffusion of power, reciprocity and mutual independence”¹⁷, in addition to the proliferation of non-state actors. To another extent, Constructivists observed that international relations were the by-product of social interaction. In their view, the state reflected the social structures around which the citizens united. Domestic politics and cultures shaped the identity of the nation-state. Similarly, the nation-state shaped the international environment.¹⁸ Kay therefore emphasized that the most fundamental challenge in international relations was to understand the new means of exercising power via globalization.¹⁹ Similarly to Joseph Nye, Kay defined power as the ability to

¹⁴ Sean Kay, “*Globalization, Power, and Security*”, in *Globalization and Violence*, Volume 3, *Globalizing War and Intervention*, edited by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, London, Sage Publications, 2006, Page 322

¹⁵ Ibid. Page 323

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid. Page 324

¹⁹ Ibid. page 325

make others do what they otherwise would not do.²⁰ There were three changes in the nature of power within the framework of globalization. On the one hand, power was asymmetric. The largest powers competed against those seeking to promote change in the distribution of power. On the other hand, there was the question of state power. Globalization did not change state power. It rather provided additional channels for its expression and accelerated its application. In fact, advanced technology, such as weapons of mass destruction and nuclear capability, was a key source of security competition. Furthermore, in the age of information and democracy, the media strongly increased the role of the people, who shaped the perspectives on international politics. In addition, global fear and destruction were exactly what the terrorists sought. The globalization of terror therefore strengthened the nation-state and accelerated the reinforcement of homeland security. As such, globalization did not guarantee peace. It rather provided the means through which peace could be exercised. Terrorism is widely believed to be a result of globalization, on the grounds that, violence outbreaks from the gap between expectations of globalization and achievements.²¹ In addition, the problem of defining terrorism is emphasized in the fact that terrorism is not called so by the perpetrators, who act for a specific cause, including liberation and independence. Nevertheless, no expectation can ever justify terrorism and one cannot fight evil by committing evil. Moreover, colonialism was considered as a combination of globalization and terrorism. Today, as the global leader, the United States could be compared to the captain of a ship, sitting in a

²⁰ See Joseph Nye, *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed., New York : Public Affairs, c2004

²¹ Jamal R. Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism : the Migration of Dreams and Nightmares*, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, c2005, Page 14

luxurious cabin. As such, the captain ought to take responsibility for the rest of the ship, which would otherwise sink. Terrorism and globalization therefore appear as parallel phenomenon that need to be analyzed together. Warfare throughout the twentieth century became global. Yet, September 11 entered the world into a new phase, i.e., the uni-focal American perspective on terrorism.²²

Further studies found that September 11 led to three reflections on global strategic security. On the one hand, there was the reflexive security dilemma. Two states felt reciprocally threatened, therefore increasing their respective security. Yet, their acts intending to increase security actually reduced it, since the other party would feel threatened by the acts in question.²³ On the other hand, there was the parallel globalization of terror through which the enemies of the West showed what they were actually capable of. Finally, there was ontological security, i.e., the abstract knowledge of what one might expect as a corollary of reflexive security. This was further reinforced by the power of globalization.²⁴ Ontological security asserts that, in international relations, states need to reaffirm their identity in order to feel secure. In the case of the United States, the latter reaffirms its identity in deploying its military, political and economic power over other states.

To another extent, proliferation and networking were supposedly the reason states were losing control.²⁵ Globalization provided a way to understand why the US had been attacked. In fact, September 11 was theoretically considered as a combination of

²² Ibid. Pp 15-31

²³ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "*A Parallel Globalization of Terror; 9/11, Security and Globalization*", in *Globalization and Violence, Volume 1, Globalizing Empires: Old and New*, edited by Paul James and Tom Nairn, London, Sage Publications, 2001, Page 192

²⁴ Ibid. Page 194

²⁵ Ibid. Page 197

globality, globalization and globalism. While the first notion meant global social structure, the second referred to the process transcending previous natural structures in favor of the new global one. The third notion constituted the actual political action of globalization.²⁶

In addition to the multiple definitions of terrorism worldwide, the definitions and wordings varied in governmental institutions within the same state. Therefore, terrorism needs to be defined within a specific context, since it is influenced by many factors including historical, social, economic, ethnic and psychological. In addition, terrorism differed from one context to another in thought, behavior and action. Although it was difficult to define in a definitive way, in it was nevertheless “fundamentally and inherently political.”²⁷ In addition, it was undoubtedly about the pursuit, acquisition and use of power in an aim to achieve political change. “Terrorism is thus violence, or equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, political aim.”²⁸ Terrorism had far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target. It was conducted by an organization with an unidentifiable chain. Most importantly, it was perpetrated by a non-state entity.

In an attempt to generically define terrorism, David Whittaker considered it “a deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”²⁹ It was also “intended to create power where there

²⁶ Ibid. Page 208

²⁷ David J. Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader*, edited, London, Sage Publications, 2001, Page 5

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid. Page 10

is none or to consolidate power where there is very little.”³⁰ Terrorism was far from being objective since its political aim affected the perceptions of the protagonists. In this case, the concept of terrorism followed the politics. The political value it had acquired could outlast strategic failures.³¹

2. Globalizing Democracy as a Solution to the September 11 Setback in Global Security

Whether the underlying explanation of conflicts was justified, today’s aspect of globalization did not make wars cease. It is therefore difficult to argue that globalization advocates peace. Globalization rather facilitates the means through which peace could be established. It has been argued that part of the solution to conflict resolution would be the globalization of liberal democracies. In fact, Russett and Starr observed that, in comparing pairs of countries, democracies did not go to war against one another.³² In a democratic regime, the once repressed minorities, especially the ethnic minorities, could then openly express their differences without resorting to violence. In addition, economic globalization now made it harder for states to control their respective local economies. Investment capital was moving too rapidly and trade relations had become too competitive.³³

Nevertheless, today’s exemplary democratic states, which promote and protect human rights, are a result of hundreds of years of work. In fact, most evolved from monarchies to republics, or constitutional monarchies, where the monarch has a

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid. Page 13

³² Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, *World Politics: The Menu of Choice*, 6th ed., Boston, Bedford, St. Martin’s, 2000. Page 288

³³ Ibid

symbolic role and where power is in the hands of elected people. Democracy was therefore not imposed at once through a global policy. It was often the result of revolutions and heresies which aimed at overthrowing ruling empires. Most importantly, it was a choice made by the people from inside the country, not outside. Since then, the actors linked in international relations have been referred to as nation-states. The latter consisted in sovereign entities, mastering their own laws and protecting their respective citizens.

By contrast, today's global policy aims at establishing democracy in non-democratic countries overnight. As such, democracy is considered an obligation, rather than an achievement. While it is argued that democracy would turn violent reactions of the oppressed into peaceful and lawful voices, it is rather violence that is being used to set democracy up and replace dictatorial regimes. By definition, democracy cannot be imposed. Furthermore, whether it is democracy or any other political structure, the fact that it is being inflicted through military means is itself a terrorist action and has proliferated violence, and particularly terrorism, worldwide. On the one hand, terrorist responses are constantly perpetrated worldwide against any entity considered as Occidental, whether it is a group of citizens, governmental agencies or non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, violent disputes and terrorist attacks anonymously prepared have been taking place among the people living in and belonging to the same country.

Overall, such terrorist realities cannot simply be by-passed in democratizing a whole world. If anything, since the beginning of the global war on terror, terrorism has only been escalating.

3. The Global War against Terrorism through different Viewpoints

It is widely understood today that the anti-thesis of terrorism is the instauration of democracy in non-democratic states. The latter refer mostly to the developing countries. However, within the context of the global war on terror, democracy is not to be defined in terms of people's sovereignty. It is rather literally considered as a dichotomy between evil and good, through which "bombing for peace becomes the principal strategy".³⁴ It is therefore important to be aware of both terms "global" and "war", and to identify them within their specific context. It is necessary to determine the reasons which rendered the war global. In this case, the war on terror was referred to as global because it was claimed to fight for a cause involving every state. It was based on the assumption of pre-existing terrorist groups in non-democratic countries. Consequently, the relation between democracy and terrorism ought to be analyzed carefully.

Trans-national terrorism has been defined as an alternative form of cross-border conflict.³⁵ Yet, unlike war, it did not oppose two states. However, it had features common to conflicts, including threatening people in order to obtain political,

³⁴ Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, *Globalization and Violence, Volume 3*, London, Sage Publications, 2006, Page xiii

³⁵ S. Brock Blomberg and B. Peter Rosenberg, A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization, Research Paper No. C06-6, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904204

religious or ideological goals, with significant political and economic consequences. In fact, like trade, trans-national terrorism has also been defined as another flow across international borders. Since trade was the initial characteristic of globalization, it developed today's popular view that globalization influenced terrorism. The same discourse was repeated in several papers asserting that democratic institutions in addition to international integration influenced non-state economic actors.³⁶ Conflicts and terrorism automatically decreased trade, hence affecting the economy. In fact, the effect of violence has often been compared to that of tariffs and taxes on trade.

In parallel, it was observed that within the international terrorism framework, countries were categorized into either a source or a target. Researchers defined a source country as the one of origin of terrorists and the target country as the one in which a terrorist attack occurred. It is worth mentioning that the nationality of the perpetrators implied the state, and terrorists were non-state actors. In addition, the national of the presumed source country would certainly not represent the view of the entire country. Furthermore, more than one nationality would be involved in a terrorist organization. In addition, it was observed that factors including income, democracy and openness made countries more prone to terrorist attacks.

Another widespread analysis examined the link between terrorism and democracy. On the one hand, democracy was defined as a political structure facilitating peaceful resolution of political conflicts through a set of rules. Democracy therefore made political action cheaper, and, consequently, illegal activities more expensive.

³⁶ S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess, *The Lexus and The Olive Branch: Globalization, Democratization and Terrorism*, November 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904024

However, on the other hand, democracy facilitated the recruitment of members in terrorist organizations since the public was free to choose and join the movements of its choice, as well as enjoy free speech and press, strongly influencing considerable segments of society. Nevertheless, to date, researchers concluded that the overall effects of democracy on terrorism were still not clear.

To another extent, in a source country, the objective of terrorists was not to have democracy at home. It was rather to remove foreign military occupation and obtain self-determination. Moreover, unwanted military occupation was rather the anti-thesis of democracy. Should they become democratic regimes, the states would no longer accept American occupation and military bases on their territory. In addition, Rashid Khalidi pointed to the fact that some countries already had a sense of democratic tradition and that the deplored democratic deficit had nothing to do with the religion of Islam.³⁷ The artificial and externally imposed borders of Arab states often hosted ethnic heterogeneity which resulted in ethnic conflicts. However, over time, Khalidi noted that people had developed a sense of national identity strong enough to reject foreign military occupation and intervention.³⁸

In addition, violent actions appeared to be more likely in non-democracies. Nevertheless, increased domestic terrorism did not necessarily mean that the same country was a source of terrorism. There could be a greater impact on foreign relations since the terrorists might aim at targeting the foreign allies of their own government, or the government they are trying to expel, hence the link that non-democracy at home would increase terrorism abroad.

³⁷ See Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western footprints and America's perilous path in the Middle East*, 1st cloth ed, Boston : Beacon Press, c2004

³⁸ Ibid

Researchers observed that trans-national terrorism was dyadic in nature. It involved two entities, hence the need to understand the characteristics of both the source and the target countries. Researchers therefore recommended to reconsider the views that globalization engendered internationalization of terrorism. In fact, some have asserted that terrorism had taken the form of a series of civil wars representing a unified reaction to American power. Despite the uncertainties around these hypotheses, it is obvious that neither freedom can be reduced, nor can the process of globalization be slowed down.

Some researchers advocated that the war on terror acquired a global attribute because it was launched by the world's superpower. Yet, others disagreed. James and Friedman also observed that war today was different from the past in several aspects. War was no longer interstate.³⁹ It was rather taking place in the form of armed conflicts. As such, non-state violence was mounting and taking place in areas previously under colonial rule. In addition, military techniques had become globalized. Most importantly, local and regional conflicts now had more impact on regions beyond the scope of the conflicts. There were now international rather than regional consequences.⁴⁰

From a different perspective, Victor Cha considered that the twenty-first century was drawn along two spheres, namely, globalization and national identity.⁴¹ In his view, globalization was both boundary-broadening and boundary-weakening.⁴² In fact, the

³⁹ Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, *Globalization and Violence, Volume 3*, London, Sage Publications, 2006, Page xix

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Victor Cha, "Globalization and the Study of International Security" in *Globalization and Violence, Volume 3*, edited by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, London, Sage Publications, 2006, Page 78

⁴² Ibid

nation-state was less in control. Whereas interdependence mostly affected external sovereignty, globalization had a more infiltrating effect. In addition to the movement of capital and goods, globalization influenced the people and their ideas. As such, national identity had become a source of conflict.⁴³ The aspect which was therefore mostly at stake was security. Unlike economics, which could be characterized by capital flows for instance, security would be harder to measure. Moreover, the unprecedented developments in information exchange, technology, communication and transportation “empowered dangerous groups in ways unimagined before”.⁴⁴ In particular, state barriers had been lowered as a result of the contemporary access to information. In addition, information detection had become very high. On the one hand, technology was primarily developed in private sectors. On the other hand, it became harder to manage and handle the growing volume of information. In Cha’s words, information and technology formed “the currency to non-physical security”.⁴⁵ Security was to be found on the continuum between globalization on one extreme and national identity on the other. Both ends require a deeper understanding of economic, social and political developments in Southern countries, and their relation with violence.

In parallel, T. David Mason found that the people would revert to violence depending on the state’s response to their protests on economic inequalities.⁴⁶ It is often taken for granted that democracies do not experience civil war because the economic or

⁴³ Ibid. Page 71

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid. Page 72

⁴⁶ See T. David Mason, “Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millenium”, in *Globalization and Violence*, Volume 3, edited by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, London, Sage Publications, 2006. Pp. 337-355

social frustrations of the people are expressed through their electoral will. Mason considered that on a continuum ranging from democratic states on one end to dictatorships on the other, violent and revolutionary movements would most likely appear in weak authoritarian regimes.⁴⁷ On the first end, issues would be solved through peaceful negotiations. On the second end, any means of expression right away would be immediately repressed. However, there are several nuances regarding democratization. In fact, transition towards democracy has often been violent and subject to terrorist events. Democracy does therefore not eliminate already existent terrorist movements. In addition, new democracies often bring into office a despotic ruler who would oppress minorities and arrest opponents. In this case, reverting to undemocratic stages as a means to liberate the state from a tyrannical leader was likely. Moreover, unlike civic democracies, ethnic democracies would also be subject to violence. In ethnic nations, minorities would often challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party and the government and would acquire “a permanent opposition status”.⁴⁸ They would also resort to violent demonstrations to express their political, economic or social rights. Finally, the ability of the leader to solve economic problems also largely affected his legitimacy. A coup d'état would be a quick alternative because significant segments of either the rural or urban population would not feel integrated as long as the same leader remained in power.

From a broader perspective, terrorism is furthest from being new. It had existed much before the September 11 attacks. It has been continuous, and past events ought to be taken into consideration. In addition, it has often been argued that what America went

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Ibid. Page 349

through on September 11, 2001 was very light compared to the terrorist attitude it had constantly adopted vis-à-vis other states. The United States has often been accused of being itself the instigator of terrorist ideologies that were once turned against Communist regimes. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the same terrorist groups then turned back against the United States. In the same discourse, it has often been claimed that, through September 11, the terrorists were logically reacting to the oppressing American global hegemony. Nevertheless, Friedman argued that the American hegemony was declining and that it had started to do so long ago.⁴⁹ Such a decline was mainly due to economic weakening and decentralization of capital accumulation. It was also an illustration of the world order's disintegration, as a result of mounting fear coordinated by terrorist networks.⁵⁰ While there are many disagreements around the strategies of the global war on terror, there is nevertheless a common conclusion that it has become more destructive than ever before.

⁴⁹ Jonathan Friedman, "Violence and Systematic Pattern of Declining Global Hegemony" in *Globalization and Violence*, edited by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman, Volume 3, London, Sage Publication, 2006, Pp 307-308

⁵⁰ Ibid

III. The American Perspective: Unilateralism and Strategic Interests

American unilateralism is indeed difficult to deny. As a sole economic and military power, it is hardly thinkable to compete against the US. As opposed to a formerly multi-polar world, the United States finds itself today in a uni-polar world that only it can lead. Yet, in fighting trans-national terrorism, an unbeatable power can nevertheless find limitations. On the one hand, a unilateral approach isolates the United States from its allies. On the other hand, a military approach has significant consequences on American strategic interests. In the context of the global war on terrorism, American unilateralism is expressed in its hegemonic monopoly of power vis-à-vis the world, resulting in a polarity of ideas. The other states are either on the American side or with the terrorists. In this case, unilateralism is expressed outside the United States' territorial borders, since it refers to a specific international relation.

1. American Super Power and Unilateralism

The American perspective considers the global war on terror as a mission of liberty and freedom. It aims at freeing the people who are hostages of their respective tyrannical ruling parties. Therefore, fighting transnational terrorism is not just about going to war. It has a philosophical and philanthropic end-goal. The United States

now feels in charge of providing the world with peace, justice and democracy. It is “the greatest of all great powers”⁵¹ which incarnates the hope for radical changes in the most repressive and cruel regimes. The latter, in fact, eagerly reject liberal political, social and economic values which they tend to associate with American global hegemony. As such, authoritarian and extremist rulers sponsor or support directly anti-American terrorist attacks, in an attempt to prove that American power can be taken aback.

Furthest from being over, the war on terrorism would be “long and difficult and expensive”.⁵² Terrorist plots are still being planned and aids to terrorist organizations are still flowing around the world.⁵³ Therefore, terrorism in all its forms, finances and support needs to be seriously dealt with. It constitutes “the great evil of our time”.

⁵⁴ There is no intermediary option. It is either “victory or holocaust”.⁵⁵ The war on terrorism would thus require banning to the terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons, as well as destroying regimes implicated in anti-American terrorism. Furthermore, extremist Islamic ideology that supports terrorism must be defeated.⁵⁶ There will be more room for democracy only with the aid of the world’s super power, the American Might that is ready to free the oppressed abroad. Otherwise, democracy from inside would not have a chance.⁵⁷ The United States aims at “implementing a comprehensive and visionary foreign policy against

⁵¹ Richard Perle and David Frum, *An End to Evil: How to win the War on Terror*, 1st edition, New York: Random house, 2003. Page 275

⁵² Ibid. Page 4

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Ibid. Page 9

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid. Page 97

⁵⁷ Ibid. Page 278

international terrorism".⁵⁸ It warns the world that "any nation that harbors or supports terrorist will be regarded as a hostile regime".⁵⁹ Moreover, financial institutions that trade, deal with or do business with terrorists would no longer be able to do so with the United States.⁶⁰ Beside governmental policies, non-governmental organizations were formed to promote victory over terrorism "and the movements and ideologies that drive it",⁶¹ and actively seek an increase in the United States military budget, for "the best defense is a good offense".⁶²

To another extent, in "The Paradox of American Power", Joseph Nye elaborated on the American colossus, whether economic, military or socio-cultural.⁶³ American power had several roots and a path along which it was able to grow and thrive. Power was related to culture, values and policies. It was referred to as soft power, as opposed to the traditional military hard power. Soft power meant shaping the preferences of others. Whereas hard power implied traditional power measured in military possessions and armament, soft power meant the ability to make others do what one wanted.⁶⁴ Soft power would set a political agenda in a way that shaped the preferences of others. American soft power derived from American values. In particular, "the values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility and openness that are often expressed in American culture, higher education, and foreign

⁵⁸ George W. Bush, "The Global War on Terrorism, the First 100 Days" The White House, 2001, The Coalition Information Centers, 23 Jun 2007

<<http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/100dayreport.html>>. Page 2

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid. Page 6

⁶¹ AOT Profile, Right Web, International Relations Online, 25 OCT 2006, Americans for Victory over Terrorism, 23 Jun 2007 <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1437>

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: why the World's only Superpower can't go it alone, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, Pp 9-11

⁶⁴ Ibid

policy contribute to American power in many areas".⁶⁵ While globalization is often considered as Americanization, major reasons explain the United States' undeniable top position. Nevertheless, the use of force jeopardized economic interests of the greatest powers. In particular, global governance indeed required a large state to take the lead. It was therefore critical to focus on the balance that some states formed against stronger ones, rather than on the goal of remaining the sole world hegemon. Besides, the sense of hegemonic threat would be reduced if the values or the culture of a powerful state were attractive.

Indeed, the United States would remain the super power regarding traditional military sources but the paradox was that it could not go on if by itself. International goals could not be achieved alone. Furthermore, terrorism itself tended towards soft rather than hard power, because it sought support from a large segment of people for recruitment. The ideal equation would be an addition of both soft and hard powers, which was summed up as smart power.⁶⁶

Terrorism was not new but acquired a striking aspect given the dramatic technological advancement as well as the democratization of technology. In fact, anyone with a modem could access the internet, i.e., free information and large, specific audiences. Globalization therefore brought to the fore inevitable security matters, which, in turn, affected and changed the nature of power. Power was therefore no longer measured in terms of command, coercion and military possessions. It had become characterized by the ability to make others believe in the legitimacy of one's objectives. Indeed, one

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ William Kristol and Joseph Nye, "America in the World: Hard vs. Soft Power", Amherst College, 27 OCT 2004, Amherst, Massachusetts.
<http://www.amherst.edu/~pubaff/events_multimedia/kristolnye/index.html>. Accessed 2 June 2007

could not always get what one wanted; one could be powerful without being preventive enough. The United States, for instance, happened to be the most powerful state. Yet, it was not able to prevent September 11. Nye illustrated soft power through a three-dimensional chessboard example, which ought to be played vertically and horizontally.⁶⁷ The first level represented military power. The second level illustrated economic power. The third level hosted trans-national connections. One could not speak in terms of state power, on that level, exclusively, since it involved non-state actors such as multinational corporations and terrorist organizations. The military and economic dimensions had been indeed already acquired. Yet, the trans-national connections dimension was still required to win the game. Therefore, soft power meant attracting others through intangible assets and resources including culture, political values, policies and institutions. American military power could be counter-balanced, even if such an initiative were unthinkable since the United States was a super power. Nevertheless, with soft power, all countries together could deprive United States foreign policy of legitimacy and therefore weaken American soft power.⁶⁸ As such, soft power meant sharing values worldwide through efficient foreign policies as well as through popular culture, which has been easily and widely spread and which would therefore play an essential role in attracting others. In fact, the current neoconservatives' world order was furthest from being shared by those who were affected by it. Soft power belonged to multilateralism, as opposed to the neoconservatives' new unilateralism, which asserted that American hegemony was benevolent.

⁶⁷ See Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: why the World's only Superpower can't go it alone*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002

⁶⁸ *Ibid*

From a different point of view, Rashid Khalidi observed that the indefinite American conquest of the Middle East was the same as the British conquest two centuries ago.⁶⁹ Yet, Britain was not the sole super power by then. The world order was multi-polar and later bi-polar, whereas the United States currently no longer faces any other power. Khalidi observed that American policy makers were furthest from being experts on the Middle East and that some naively thought that the United States was too strong to even need a strategy.⁷⁰ On the contrary, British imperialism and colonial rule sent experts, geographers, historians and scientists to become more familiar with the peoples and cultures they were presumably liberating. Critics often found that the United States rather had a destabilizing role and that it ought to be balanced by other powers. In general, democracy would be positive if it meant that the United States would respect the elected government of Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. However, so far, democracy only meant doing what the United States wanted.⁷¹

Moreover, Douglas Kellner strongly denounced the unilateral aspect of the Bush Administration policies, which he considered as a complete failure on both the short and long terms.⁷² Kellner particularly found that the Bush Administration's foreign policies were "poorly conceived and badly executed", entailing "blowback and reprisal".⁷³ Such a flawed operation created much more enemies than friends. As a result, from an Arab and Muslim perspective, the United States revealed its most

⁶⁹ Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western footprints and America's perilous path in the Middle East*, 1st cloth ed, Boston : Beacon Press, c2004, Page 45

⁷⁰ *Ibid*

⁷¹ *Ibid*

⁷² See Douglas Kellner, *From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Maryland, 2003

⁷³ *Ibid*, Page 2

aggressive nationalism in displaying unrestrained militarism. In addition, while the United States needed the Arab countries' support in fighting terrorists worldwide, the uncritical American support towards Israel ruined any potential improvement in the relations between the United States and the Arab Muslim countries. The United States "failed to engage in fruitful dialogues with Arabs and Muslims".⁷⁴ Along such a view, American foreign policy did not adequately deal with humanitarian, security and particularly socio-political needs. The United States has rather isolated itself in a campaign that should have been, instead, supported globally. Hostilities therefore mounted among enemies as well as allies against the United States' freedom propaganda. The latter was mostly highlighted in the failure to mediate the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The Bush administration was mostly criticized because it relied on a military-centric approach. It abandoned multilateral efforts clearly needed in such a wide operation. It failed to develop a multilateral coalition against terrorism, "a global problem that requires global solution."⁷⁵ In the wake of September 11 and under the America First approach, the United States renounced to arms treaties. It legitimated an increase of military budget and military interventions. It also tested new nuclear weapons and declared the right to strike any enemy state or organization presumed to support terrorism in order to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The new doctrine of the United States was mainly characterized by a shift in American foreign policy, from containment and deterrence to pre-emptive strikes.

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Ibid

Kellner therefore foresaw a future typical of Georges Orwell that could generate a military and police state domestically and abroad.⁷⁶ The United States' world hegemony was outlined in the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a plan grounded in American military dominance of the world and control of the Persian Gulf region with its oil supplies. The PNAC was established by a group of neo-conservatives including the right wing of the current Bush administration and was perceived as initiating a "New Barbarism",⁷⁷ spreading through the media war fever and terrorist hysteria. Kellner went as far as comparing the right-wing Bush regime to the Nazis and Fascists, which repressed their opponents in order to increase their power.⁷⁸ Neo-conservatives did the same, using the legitimate fear of terrorism to support and develop their military policies, ruining "centuries of American democracy and decades of diplomacy".⁷⁹

From a broader perspective, Kellner observed that while former President Clinton considered security issues as the downside and dark side of globalization, former Secretary of Defence, Colin Powell, said the same after September 11 about terrorism.⁸⁰ Globalization brought people together, but brought them into conflict. He referred to it as the "objective ambiguity of globalization".⁸¹ On the one hand, globalization created social interaction and inclusion. On the other, it led to hostilities and exclusion. Furthermore, unexpected terror events turned instruments of globalization, such as airplanes, into technologies of destruction and set a "frightening

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid. Page 24

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ Ibid. Page 44

⁸¹ Ibid

mediascape.”⁸² As such, there was urgency for rethinking crucial concepts of reality including democracy and globalization along with their respective flaws and limitations. It was also necessary to recognize the fallacies in one’s individual thought and action, and particularly admit the problems present in American leadership.

2. The Dangers of Unilateralism

While Kellner denounced the American war on terrorism, James Noyes focused on the dangers in which the United States now found itself.⁸³ According to Noyes, the short-sighted effect of the war against terrorism was twofold.⁸⁴ On the one hand, it provided better military power to the states willing to cooperate with the United States. On the other hand, the strikes were immediate and targeted concentrated groups of terrorists. However, on the long run, the war’s effects would be negative, and would not achieve the envisioned democratic end-results. On the contrary, the war would bring back past anti-colonialist nationalism. Anti-Americanism was indeed present in the Arab world long before September 11. As such, Noyes observed that the United States had better deal with imperfect alliances while recognizing that excessive pressure might produce far more dangerous regimes.⁸⁵ The end of the cold war hasn’t stopped the arms race. In fact, one camp collapsed, yet there was no proof of de-nuclearization. Weapons of mass destruction kept increasing instead of decreasing. The European Union was highly afraid of nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, many states including the United States and Israel did not

⁸² Ibid. Page 42

⁸³ James H. Noyes, *The US War on Terrorism: Impact on US-Arab Relations*, Emirates Lecture Series, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Page 8

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Ibid

sign anti-nuclear treaties. In addition, it was widely believed that former Iraqi chief Saddam Hussein himself wanted to create an Arab nuclear state in order to offset the Israeli nuclear power. While the United Nations was attempting to unite all states into one world government, such a paradox illustrates the non-globalization of security.

Theories about security and particularly the fight against terrorism constitute today's top priority worldwide. A lot of what had been discussed during the last decade came to the fore after September 11. The American neo-conservatives had launched the PNAC in 1993. According to the PNAC, the United States is to keep any state away from competing with American military power. The United States' plan is to become stronger than it already is. Its objective is to considerably increase its military budget. As such, the whole world now has to deal with the dilemma of being either on the side of the United States or on the opposing side. The United States has decided to fight terrorism through pre-emptive strikes. Legitimate retaliation is no longer the policy employed. The United Nations granted the United States the right to invade Afghanistan after September 11 through a resolution, on the grounds that the United States had suffered internal aggression. Today's novelty drives the world's most powerful state to attack any other state on the assumption that the latter has aggressive intentions toward the former. United States pre-emptive measures have become legitimized. On the one hand, the United States shows the world everyday its determination in fighting terrorism. On the other hand, the United States intends to remain the only champion in what it considers as a global cause. In particular, the global cause finds its source in America's strategic interests in the Middle East.

3. The Middle East as a Strategic Interest

The Middle East has always been the focal point of American international affairs. It constitutes America's biggest interest in terms of oil resources. Yet, it also constitutes the biggest threat to American foreign as well as domestic politics. While problem-solving was mainly centred on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is now diluted within a broader regional scope, including Iran's nuclear capability and the threat it created to the neighbouring states. In addition, a prerequisite to regional security has become the establishment of democracy in non-democratic countries.

3.1 Nuclear Iran as a Terrorist Threat

Iraq has been considered as the last problematic state of the twentieth century. It was dealt with through the classical approach of invading a country and deposing the leader. In parallel, Iran constituted the first core issue of the twenty-first century. However, unlike the former, it was harder to manage since Iran was considered as a more complex state that financially supported and subverted to terrorism frequently. According to Ken Pollack, the difference also lied within the people's choice.⁸⁶ All Iranian people would rally against external military threat. Ideally, Western security could find insight in strengthening its alliance with Iran. Nevertheless, it was observed that Iran would not easily do so. It would test the alliance's resourcefulness first.⁸⁷ In Pollack's words, the nuclear clock had ticked.⁸⁸ While the threat towards the United States was previously composed of religious and revolutionary struggles against the

⁸⁶ Ken Pollack, "A Common Approach to Iran" in *Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East*, edited by Ivo H. Daalder, Nicole Gnesotto, and Philip Gordon, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, c2006, Page 7

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Ibid

evil West, it is now measured in the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Since this had not been confirmed, there were several questions around the Iranian choice to enriching its uranium program. It was observed that uranium was essential for nuclear weapons. Yet, Iran could have chosen another form of energy. Critics noted that Iran's technological base could have been broadened through different fields of research, without being in conflict against the rest of the world. Furthermore, Iran could address strategic concerns with the Non-Proliferation Treaty procedures openly, rather than in hiding its activities. The West's, and particularly, the United States' problems with Iran were primarily about weapons of mass destruction, mainly characterized by nuclear weapons. The West had also denounced Iran as a leading supporter and participant in international terrorism as well as an opponent to the peace process between Israel and the Arab world. Such problems formed two main threats to the West. On the one hand, if Iran acquired the role of a nuclear deterrent, it would no longer be vulnerable to external American military retaliation. According to the American perspective, Iran could need nuclear weapons in order not to fear American retaliation whenever it would perpetrate or support terrorist activities. On the other hand, other states around the region, including Saudi Arabia, North Korea and Pakistan, would want to develop their own nuclear weapons in order to deter any Iranian attack.

More generally, geo-politically, a nuclear Iran would constitute a threat to all of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel, the United States' key allies. Furthermore, it would be difficult to dissuade other states from considering a nuclear development alternative. The United States was therefore faced with two choices. It could allow

Iran nuclear capability which will have catastrophic consequences for the Middle East. It could also strike Iran in order to delay the nuclear program and destabilize the Iranian regime. It was only through such a regional lens that the United States viewed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the core issue of trans-national terrorism.

3.2 The United States' Standpoint towards the Israel – Palestine conflict

It was thought that a positive, optimistic opportunity was to be seized by the United States in order to establish Palestinian and Israeli states with definitive borders side by side. However, the constantly mounting violence, the corrupt Palestinian government and the Israeli unilateral steps took the idea of mutual negotiations away. In addition, the United States had its own view of multilateral engagement in the Middle East. In fact, the United States expected a lot of efforts and sustained engagement from all of Russia's, the United Nations' and the European Union's sides. All sides had to bear the costs of such efforts, a multilateral strategy that would generate "positive regional balance of power".⁸⁹ The United States considered peace as part of a broader Middle East strategy. The American priorities included a legitimate Iraqi government in a stable state. In addition, they aimed at neutralizing and denying Iran nuclear power. They would also reform political, religious and educational principles in the Arab world. Otherwise, the United States could not proceed with a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Furthermore, in the United States' view, these achievements were needed to strengthen alliances with the European Union and with Russia, since the latter had the same peace priority in the Middle East. Therefore, an improvement in one area would

⁸⁹ Ibid. Page 44

lead to improvements in others. As such, the strategy of connecting to dots between the different regional dynamics would help attain success in all tracks. It would ascertain a balance of power favouring moderate forces and would put Islamic extremists on the defensive side.

According to Michael Hudson, oil represented an Arab weapon.⁹⁰ Saudi Arabia had once partially boycotted American and European oil consumption during the Arab-Israeli war. In addition, regional insecurities today were engendered by America's war on terrorism, which made neighbouring regimes more repressive.⁹¹ Israel was an established part of the Middle East as well as the Middle East's super power. In addition, there had been strong Israeli support and lobbying in the United States since the creation of the Zionist state, when the Zionists turned towards the United States instead of Britain. Middle East policy was shaped by American domestic politics. The American president's actions in the Middle East often affected his own future at home. In addition, the president would be influenced by experts and academics referred to as "think tanks", on American Security. Moreover, the State Department, the Congress and the political parties often formed pro-Israeli lobbies. Furthermore, the neoconservatives' revolutionary moment was September 11. Yet, the preparation of the Project for the New American Century had started decades before. The purpose of American policy in the Middle East was therefore to reshape the domestic environment of several states, where "educational systems, religious organizations,

⁹⁰ Michael Hudson, "The United States in the Middle East" in *International relations of the Middle East*, Edited by Louise Fawcett oxford University Press, 2005, Page 303

⁹¹ Ibid

incompetent governments and stagnant economies nurtured anti-American terrorism”.⁹²

3.3 The Israel Lobby and the United States' foreign policy

Israel is considered as a crucial ally in the war on terror because Israel's enemies are the United States' enemies as well. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer had several answers to such an argument.⁹³ First, terrorism was not a single adversary. Second, the terrorist organizations threatening Israel did not threaten the United States, except when they intervene directly against the latter. Third, Palestinian violence was not random. It was rather a reaction to Israel's endless colonization campaign in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, both Walt and Measheimer assert that the United States is exposed and threatened as a consequence of being a close ally to Israel.⁹⁴ In fact, American support to Israel has always been a strong source of Anti-American terrorism. Moreover, the United States has been accused of backing the underdog. Yet, if it were really doing so, it would rather back Israel's opponents since there was a large gap between Israel's military United States constantly reiterates its support for democratic regimes. Yet, the United States has never provided any democracy the immeasurable support it brings to Israel. To another extent, the past of the Jews is truly unforgettable. Yet it neither justifies the barrier that Israel set on the return of the Palestinians, nor Israel's violent attitude towards the Palestinians. In addition, the response between the attack on Israel and the latter's self-defence or

⁹² Ibid. Pp 283-305

⁹³ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *"The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy"*, RWP06-011, March 2006, Pp 1-8, 25 APR 2007 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ksq001/israel_lobby_and_US.pdf

Page 21

⁹⁴ Ibid.

retaliation is no longer measured. Israel has been constantly cited for the killing of Palestinian children as well as of foreign activists in international non-governmental organizations.

In Walt's and Mearsheimer's view, the crucial aspect of American support for Israel was the unmatched power of Israel Lobby in the United States.⁹⁵ The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), allowed in fact no American politician to pronounce a word that would pressure Israel. Otherwise politicians would be automatically out of the game.⁹⁶ The work of the Israel lobby was also by far much better than the work of any other interest group, particularly the pro-Arab lobby which is in fact weak and almost non-existent.⁹⁷ On the one hand, the Israel lobby has an unordinary influence over the Congress. The latter is almost immune to critics regarding Israel. On the other hand, the lobby is also remarkable in the executive branch. Walt and Mearsheimer found that there have always been high Jewish turn-out votes in key states.⁹⁸ Moreover, there is no room for an even-handed Arab-Israeli discourse through the media. In fact, top editors in chief of the mostly read newspapers are strongly committed to the Israel lobby. In addition, the lobby hosts influential think tanks "that think one way"⁹⁹ as well as advanced centres of strategic studies. In academia, the lobby is present to a lesser extent. Yet, it is trying to prevent criticism towards Israel on campuses. Generally, anyone who would denounce the Israel lobby as directing or managing the media would automatically be accused of being an anti-Semite. Such a tactic proved to be very effective because no one would

⁹⁵ Ibid. Page 14

⁹⁶ Ibid. Page 17

⁹⁷ Ibid. Page 16

⁹⁸ Ibid. Page 18

⁹⁹ Ibid. Page 21

want to bear the anti-Semite label. Like terrorism, the latter denotes wrongdoings and immoral principles that infringe on peoples' lives and security. Most importantly, Israel is a fait-accompli. Its unfair standards towards the Palestinians or their right to exist are no longer questioned. Yet, the latter constitute legitimate criticism since both are contrary to human rights principles.

Israel is a key issue in American presidential campaigns. Walt and Mearsheimer asserted that both the Israeli and American governments worked together to shape American policy towards Iraq, Syria and Iran.¹⁰⁰ As such, the main driving force behind the Iraq occupation was a group of neo-conservatives linked to Israel's Likud party and who did not represent the broader Jewish community. Without the Israel lobby the United States would have been less likely to go to war. As for Syria, Walt and Mearsheimer found that it would serve as a good ally in the war on terror, providing good information about Al Qaeda.¹⁰¹ Syria had never really been in bad terms with the United States. In addition, the United States managed to live with a nuclear Soviet Union, and a nuclear North Korea. It could therefore live with a nuclear Iran. According to both authors, the United States was not directly threatened by Iran.¹⁰² It was the lobby that was pressuring the United States for regime change in the Middle East.

Walt and Mearsheimer therefore supported the theory asserting that the United States was manipulated entirely by Israel.¹⁰³ Yet, such a simplistic dominant-dominated position could not justify the current American policy. In addition, as the sole world

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Page 30

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Page 38

¹⁰² Ibid. Page 39

¹⁰³ Ibid. Page 15

power, the United States is furthest from acting as a blind and obedient follower. The unequal influence of the Israel lobby on American domestic and foreign politics is rather a proof that the global war on terror constitutes a new aspect of the ever-existing American unilateral and unidirectional perspective. In fact, the war on terrorism was intended against the enemies of American hegemony, not the enemies of the United States itself.¹⁰⁴ Besides, instead of verbally pointing out the powerful Israel lobby across the United States, oral criticism could rather be transformed into more concrete and efficient actions, strengthening, for instance, conflict awareness and openness to debates. After all, the striking aspect of the Israeli influence on the United States is not about the policies it stands for. It is rather about the fact debating the Israel lobby is not even an option.

Israel truly constituted the model of a war on terrorism. Moreover, it was widely believed in American that the September 11 attacks proved once and for all that the destinies of Israel and the United States were intertwined.¹⁰⁵ According to the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, “those who close their eyes to Palestinian terrorism will eventually find it on their doorsteps.”¹⁰⁶ The Israeli war on terrorism was therefore more advanced than the American war. Yet, the United States demarcated itself from the exclusively military approach against terrorism in aiming at democratizing the Middle East.

¹⁰⁴James Bovard, *Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to rid the World of Evil*, 1st Palgrave Macmillan ed., New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2003

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Page 279

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

3.4 Democracy in the Middle East

Public opinion in the Middle East had an increasing role under governments that usually used to shape, contain and control information and the media.¹⁰⁷ In today's global information age, repressive governments were in "unchartered waters".¹⁰⁸ Satellite channels raised the voices of the opposition, sometimes in provocative ways, in order to let everyone have a say. The idea was not new since the public in different Arab countries used to be influenced through radio messages and propaganda. Today, live images had much more impact and focused on core issues, making the public become more restless. The television market gave viewers the choice between local or foreign channels. Nevertheless, government and state control over the media ought not to be underestimated. Television channels bureaus were often shut down if too irritating vis-à-vis the ruling authoritarian party or monarch. As a result, Arab governments faced uncertainty. They were still able to contain public dissent but without being sure about the consequences of "crises that inflame public passions".¹⁰⁹ According to Thomas Friedman, individuals had become super empowered.¹¹⁰ Globalization and public empowerment made the individuals able to act directly, bypassing government control. To another extent, it was hard to delineate the legitimacy of the governments in several Middle Eastern and Gulf countries. In fact, the less a government was legitimate, the more it was repressive. In particular, pro-

¹⁰⁷ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East: the consequences of power and the choice for peace*, [Boulder, Colo.]: Westview, 2004, Page 67

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*. Page 86

¹¹⁰ THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN "[Last week's Web vandalism a gentle wake-up call](http://www.milwaukeejournal.com/2000/02/16/last-weeks-web-vandalism-a-gentle-wake-up-call/)". Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, The. Feb 16, 2000. FindArticles.com. 02 Jun. 2007.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4196/is_20000216/ai_n10581844

American governments were often more repressive towards the public opinion in order to accommodate their policies. Most Arab governments therefore found themselves in between pro-American or Israeli policies to be implemented on the one hand, and an angry public to face on the other. While it was widely believed that war initiated by Arab states against Israel was unlikely, Telhami noted that even the shrewdest diplomats were surprised by the exception occurring in 1973 when Egypt and Syria were at war against Israel ¹¹¹ and certainly again in 2006, in Lebanon.

The Israeli- Palestinian conflict was the prism through which Arab opinion viewed American actions. The Arab-Israeli issue became a cycle of reciprocal normalized violence. Neither side learned that violence was not a solution. In addition, when one side was attacked, the public would often pressure the state to take some action, even with a bad outcome. Moreover, it was widely believed that not acting was worse than acting and losing. Finally, many people also took example on countries where violence had worked for a particular cause, expecting the same to happen at home. The Palestinian-Israeli cycle of violence could end through proper foreign mediation and leadership, an idea already widely supported by other countries and international entities, including the United States and Europe.

No reordering of regional politics would solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Telhami's opinion, the United States should persuade both sides, despite having significant economic, military and political support for Israel. ¹¹² The United States faced a dilemma regarding this issue. On the one hand, the United States had a resolute commitment to Israel's security and well-being. On the other hand, because the United

¹¹¹ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East: the consequences of power and the choice for peace*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004

¹¹² *Ibid*

States was identified with Israel, it was hard to be viewed as an objective mediator from the Arab point of view. Also, the Arab and Muslim reactions on America's war on terror was not different from the reaction in other parts of the world. In fact, most views on terrorism conflicted with the American ones. Almost every country empathized with the United States on September 11, but not on the unilateral American definition of global terrorism. In addition, terrorism had a supply as well as a demand side. The United States focused exclusively on the former, while it should also take the latter into consideration. The supply side was a product of organized groups that could be confronted and destroyed with no regard to the groups' aims. Nevertheless, there was also a demand side that brought the very reasons of recruiting, fund-raising and appealing to the public due to either despair or humiliation. The danger of focusing solely of the supply side was that, every time a supplier would be destroyed, other suppliers would arise. Furthermore, the current American administration considered terrorism as a political end, while in most parts of the world, terrorism was rather an immoral means. In addition, the American definition rooted terrorism in the Middle East and Islam, while the rest of the world found that terrorism in the Middle East was a result of politics rather than religion.

An alternative for the United States was to work with regional and international organizations in order to take collective action against a collective issue. The current approach would "engender anything but significant international resentment".¹¹³ The perception vis-à-vis America were not only found in the Arab world. They were common to many parts of the world. All agreed that the unilateral American foreign

¹¹³ Ibid. Page 12

policy expressed through the war on terror and in Iraq in particular served America's interests exclusively.

However, the strong worldwide denunciations did not scold American values. The denunciations were rather addressed against American policies, setting American values at stake. People could favour American freedom and democracy, as well as movies products and most importantly education. Yet, the attitude was negative towards American policy, especially regarding the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the resentment and anger in the Middle East against American policies were expressed as verbal assaults through the media instead of concrete actions against the people's own pro-American government.¹¹⁵ Anti-Americanism was partly explained by the fact the United States relied on Gulf oil and would continue to do so. Any change would not be possible, because the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular, were the biggest oil providers. Any change in this regard would affect the global economy. Nevertheless, the United States could reduce its use and abuse of power since the current military, confrontational and most importantly unilateral approach would hurt enemies as well as friends. According to Telhami, American foreign policy must be aware of the limitations of power.¹¹⁶ Power would not replace diplomacy. Both short term and long term benefits ought to be calculated in exercising power, since making more enemies than friends would be a

¹¹⁴ Richard Nadler "The word on the street: what do Arabs think?". National Review. May 22, 2006. FindArticles.com. 02 Jun. 2007. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_9_58/ai_n16619081

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Ibid. Page 169

wrong start and a bad end. Power was most effective when it was least used. As such, the United States ought to be prevented America from motivating its enemies.¹¹⁷

The inconsistency of American power reported by Joseph Nye is therefore very much illustrated in the fact that the current American policy gives no room for international public opinion, which contradicts the aim of a democratic thrive in the Middle East. American foreign policy therefore leaves only one choice. Whether a state is with the United States or against it is no longer debatable, and non-alignment is not even an option. The opponent, although legitimate, would be labelled as terror advocate. Such a perspective particularly affected trans-Atlantic relations. In fact, Europe's fight against terrorism had the same end-goal. Yet, in comparison with the United States, a unitary European perspective reached a dilemma. European countries could either bandwagon the United States on the war, or stand against it. Their respective foreign policies therefore clashed over the American divide.

Nevertheless, France and Germany both firmly stood as strong independent nations, aware of the Iraq invasion consequences and their scale. Both held a position of strict respect for international resolutions established and voted for at the UN. In particular, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Dominique De Villepin, held an ardent speech before the Security Council, reiterating the French opposition against the use of force in Iraq. As a highly civilized nation, the French priority was to proceed with disarmament through peace and to promote peace in unstable regions instead of increasing existing hostilities. Germany sided with France, finding no plausible link between ousting an authoritarian ruler in Iraq and fighting Al Qaeda.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Page 175

From a wider outlook, the French and German aims were to bring a more united European perspective towards unnecessary aggression in the Middle East, through multilateral and universally valid arguments. As such, the question was neither about militarily fighting terrorism abroad, nor criticizing American unilateralism with mere wordy reactions. It was rather about providing a long-term and efficient approach to strengthen security and counter-terrorist measures at home.

IV. The European Perspective

As opposed to American unilateralism, Europe responded to trans-national terrorism differently. Twice targeted within a short period of time, Europe was also subject to diverse perspectives on counter-terrorism among its countries. Historically, every European country had its own experience with terrorism. Yet, after September 11, all of them converged towards firm measures regarding immigration, an issue increasingly associated with the infiltration of terrorist organizations among the society. In particular, many theoretical views have been developed regarding the role of state frontiers within the European Union. In addition, the European standpoint in the war on terrorism constituted a controversial issue, highlighting the position of Europe in the global security agenda. With regard to the war on terrorism, European multilateralism is expressed as a perspective somehow skeptical about an attempt to implement a unilateral policy, yet, with a global aim. By definition, multilateralism involves three or more states working together within a specific political, economic, social or cultural framework. It seeks a solution to the concerns affecting the parties involved, through articulated negotiations with respect to formal agreements. Multilateralism's end-goal is to reach a consensus prior to taking actions. Since September 11, it has increasingly raised attention in international affairs "specifically though not exclusively between the United States and Europe".¹¹⁸ A multilateral European position, per se, does not constitute a common policy. While some countries immediately stood by the American initiative, others chose not to.

¹¹⁸ Bernhard Jansen, "European Journal of International Law" *Oxford Journals*, 2000, Oxford University Press, 23 Jun 2007 <http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/11/2/309.pdf>

1. Terrorism in Modern Europe

The European perspective on counter-terrorism is quite broad. "Europe" in itself is neither a unitary state nor the whole European Union. In fact, since two new members were added to the latter, it would so far be difficult to assess their respective policies towards terrorism in the European Union framework. Nevertheless, several European states were exemplary in dealing with terrorism. Their know-how came from internal historical exposure to terrorist events. It is therefore worth observing that terrorism was fought on two levels, domestically and internationally, and that international cooperation derived from domestic determination.

Often called "New Terrorism", international terrorism was particularly emphasized in the wake of September 11. September 11 was in fact the watershed which speeded up European efforts against international terrorism. State vigilance was particularly reiterated in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid and London, on March 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005 respectively. A series of essays have been written on the initiatives of individual states of the European Union, from the most experienced country to the least exposed one. In fact, past experiences have shown that terrorism was primary in only few countries, not all around Europe.¹¹⁹ Yet, today, Europe is both a target and a base for trans-national terrorism.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Marianne Van Leeuwen, *Confronting Terrorism: European experiences, Threat Perceptions, and Policies*, edited, Hague : Kluwer Law International, 2003

¹²⁰ European Council, "*A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy*", Brussels, 2003, Page 2. <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/EuropeanUnion.doc> , Accessed May 29, 2007

Terrorism was indeed found everywhere. Yet, it was more striking in Ireland, for instance, which has been dealing with the Northern Ireland cause for centuries.¹²¹

In addition, Spain was under dictatorship until recently. Some decades ago, it began a transition towards democracy, a shift that witnessed a considerable number of anti-democratic terrorist events around the country.¹²² Since then, the Spanish government has been keen on fighting terrorist attacks launched by ETA, the Basque nationalist separatist organization which sought the independence of the Spanish Basque Province. Spain actively promoted anti-terrorist cooperation particularly when it held the European Union presidency in 2002.¹²³ The Spanish government was nevertheless strongly challenged by the people when it decided to join the American troops in Iraq in 2003. The Spanish people's standpoint culminated in the resignation of the government in the wake of the Madrid bombings. The latter made it clear that Spain had become an additional vulnerable target in the eyes of Al Qaida.

Moreover, Italy has always been known for the crimes and killings led by the mafia.¹²⁴ Like most of its European counterpart, Italy had its own history of home-based terrorism. Since the worldwide threatening feelings of September 11, Italy tried to enforce international decisions domestically, and protect its territory. More rigorous efforts were also made following the Madrid and London bombings. Italy's major contribution was mostly highlighted in information and intelligence sharing, especially with the United States.¹²⁵ Italy felt particularly threatened when it joined the United

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ana Ramos, "Spain", in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by Karin Von Hippel, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Page 127

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Domitilla Sagramoso and Andrea Nativi, "Italy", in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by Karin Von Hippel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Pages 80-90.

¹²⁵ Ibid

States in Iraq, where the Italian contingent confronted strong Iraqi resistance. Italy had previously been a major participant in the NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. As a result, the Italian government deployed the police in key and emblematic areas across Italy. Geographically, most researchers observed that Italy was indeed found at the intersection of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, despite Italy's long history of immigrants, the Muslim community felt increasingly marginalized as a result of counter terrorism.¹²⁶

In France and Germany however, security issues derived from the large integration of foreigners, many of whom have become associated with the deplored Islamic terrorism.¹²⁷ In terms of counter-terrorism policies, both countries extended their respective priorities from domestic to international terrorism. France highlighted its numerous efforts in cooperation with outside agencies. In the wake of the Madrid bombings, it instantaneously increased its well-known national "Vigipirate" plan to the highest alert level. The French strategy therefore aimed at sustaining a high level of alertness among its population, while at the same time ensuring some level of regular, daily professional and social life. Both France and Germany include a considerable proportion of "Muslim émigré population".¹²⁸ Cultural differences do exist, but they are nevertheless somehow tolerated in both countries. In addition, both strongly disagreed with the American military invasion of Iraq and refused to participate in the coalition forces at first. Nonetheless, their presence in Afghanistan still made them potential targets for terrorists.

¹²⁶ Ibid. Page 92

¹²⁷ Kevin O'Brien, *"France" in Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by Karin Von Hippel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

¹²⁸ Ibid. Page 38

In particular, Germany was caught in an expected standpoint when it appeared that some of the September 11 hijackers had been trained on its own territory. German analysts then tried to draw similarities between domestic German Islamic groups and Al Qaeda, in order to check whether the two were linked. Analysts focused on three issues including members' recruitment, non-aligned militants and militants who aimed at overthrowing the government and having an Islamic state.

All of the September 11, Madrid and London terrorist acts made Germany increase the priority of anti-terrorist conventions it signed as well as the budget for anti-terrorist agencies.¹²⁹ To another extent, the German population was for a long time surrounded by spies especially by the Gestapo during World War II and the Communist network later on. Their presence affected very much the German society, which sought to live in a "spy-free environment" when the Berlin Wall was demolished.¹³⁰ It no longer wanted to take into account the possible existence of spies or terrorists.

Therefore, with their past experiences, both France and Germany play a major role in today's war against terrorism. They are nevertheless faced with a new dilemma, i.e., their enemy is no longer a state. It is rather an amazingly powerful stateless organization, proliferating around the world and operated by almost virtual masterminds.

Finally, Sweden and the Netherlands were the two least exposed states to terrorism. Both are known for their multicultural societies, and host many foreign organizations

¹²⁹ Tessa Szyszkowitz, "Germany", in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by Karin Von Hippel, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Page 50

¹³⁰ Ibid. Page 54

and groups. Those which aimed at perpetrating violence have often been caught. Yet, the citizens themselves have not been targeted.¹³¹

European countries are a typical example of pluralistic societies in which cultural differences or customs have been diluted and are hard to delineate. In addition, throughout the literature on the subject, it was worth observing that internal and domestic priorities differed from international developments.

National and international measures are therefore not always concurrent. In particular, it would be hard to focus on common European legal and judicial instruments. Instead, the EU foreign policy agenda could start from a more unified counter-terrorism culture. While the former are specific to individual states, the latter is not bounded by territorial sovereignty.

In addition, most citizens of the states which had joined the United States in the Iraq occupation were afraid that such a coalition would render their respective states an inevitable target for future terrorist attacks. In addition, many analysts expressed their fear regarding the open borders inside the European Union. The latter were claimed to ease the influx of people and to therefore make terrorist infiltration more likely. Nevertheless, following the September 11 attacks, there was an optimistic outcome. In fact, the members of the European Union felt more than ever united for the establishment and implementation of counter-terrorist procedures. Through the mobilization of several European institutions, European Union member states proved their respective interests in multilateral actions. Regardless of internal disagreements, the European approach tended to be in general oriented toward calm, negotiable and

¹³¹ Ibid

joint actions.¹³² The New York, Madrid and London episodes in fact served as a catalyst towards more thorough safety measures and accelerated the path toward a common European determination. It has been noticed that there is today more awareness and vigilance among the European citizens than there was before.¹³³ Yet, at the state level, major difficulties prevented a common European policy, particularly around immigration.

2. The Issue of Immigration

The question of immigration constituted a pillar for Nicolas Sarkozy's presidential campaign in France. In fact, the newly elected French president established a ministry for immigration and national identity through which immigration would become selective, on the grounds that integrating large numbers of immigrants from outside Europe would increase the French people's concerns over crime and security.¹³⁴ In 2005, the suburbs of the French capital, mostly inhabited by immigrants, had witnessed violent street riots with sizeable damages including burning parked cars and breaking shop windows on both sides of the streets.

Theoretically, Didier Bigo raised the question of the state's frontiers, along which the European Union members and their respective laws dealt differently with citizens, foreigners and immigrants. "Frontier is an institution."¹³⁵ It framed internal European

¹³² See Jonathan Stevenson, "Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation after 11 September 2001", in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by Karin Von Hippel, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Pp. 208-227

¹³³ Karin Von Hippel, "Conclusion: A Three-Year Progress Report and Tracking Root Causes" in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Pp. 263-269

¹³⁴ "Challenges facing French president-elect Sarkozy", Reuters, Sun May 6, 2007
<http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0411142120070506?pageNumber=2> Accessed May 21, 2007

¹³⁵ Didier Bigo & Elspeth Guild, *Controlling frontiers : free movement into and within Europe*, edited, Aldershot, Hants, England : Ashgate, c2005, Page 52

security through the control of the movement of people as well as goods. In particular, new ways of identification were used by the politicians to better control immigrants. Identity was a key issue in the European Union. It was certainly not new. It was rather reinforced after September 11. In fact, the question of belonging had been transformed into a political matter, restraining the freedom of movement across the EU. As a result, state frontiers neither constituted territorial barriers, nor a link between international financial markets in the age of global economy. They rather served the act of policing in the name of freedom.

However, security concerns were no longer exclusively found along state frontiers. They were found inside the state itself, where immigrants and children of immigrants constituted a threat to all of the professional and social communities. Every person with foreign origins was now considered an “enemy from within”, inside the borders of the state. The European Union was “in danger of being built on fears of imaginary enemies: Immigrants”.¹³⁶ As a Western model of “market democracy”, migrating to the European Union had become the ambition of the nationals of all developing countries. As such, the European Union became an experimental field for new technologies of control.

With freedom on one end of the continuum and security on the other, Bigo analyzed the “Sieve Europe vs. Fortress Europe” argument. Neither perspective was defended. Yet, identity questions were raised and opposed “block against block, cultures and civilizations whose values are seen as antagonistic”.¹³⁷ Both were rooted in globalization and unequal distribution of wealth, which pushed the poor to move

¹³⁶ Ibid. Page 61

¹³⁷ Ibid

towards more prosperous countries. As such, massive immigration put both the state's and the society's security at stake. First, it was considered as a support for terrorism, drug trafficking, urban riots and delinquency. Second, it split the nation and affected national identity. While diversity was accepted, heterogeneity was not. Integration was now a keyword reflecting the migrant as a construct of the national. In practice, migration and terrorism have been particularly taken into consideration within a multilateral framework bringing together European and Mediterranean countries.

As one of the most important fora outside the United Nations, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established at the Euro-Mediterranean council of foreign ministers in Barcelona in 1995. It constitutes a multilateral framework in which Mediterranean and Southern European parties meet. The Partnership particularly illustrates Europe's multilateral efforts towards the Middle East. In fact, the Partnership aims at reaching its political, economic and social objectives through open dialogue, cultural rapprochement and common groundwork. The Partnership seeks a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.¹³⁸ It also aims at the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership as well as the gradual establishment of a free-trade area.¹³⁹ In addition, it emphasizes the rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural relations. As such, it aspires towards a better understanding among cultures and civil societies.¹⁴⁰ The noticeable aspect of the partnership is that it has a bilateral as well as a regional dimension. It holds bilateral relations with the Palestinian Authority and

¹³⁸ "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" *Europa*, 2005, European Commission, 4 Jun 2007

<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index.htm>

¹³⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*

Israel. It also supports the peace process in contributing to the Quartet through the European Union. It therefore brings together parties in conflict and creates conditions to promote, rather than impose, peace, stability and prosperity. In particular, the question of migration constituted one of the pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It has increasingly been associated with the root-causes of terrorism. Both migration regulation and counter-terrorism have been brought to the forefront of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership together, under the same title. Europe's proximity to the Mediterranean region made it an ideal destination for nationals of countries in crisis. Whether political, military or economic, the crises in the Middle East Mediterranean regions have constantly led to massive migrations to Europe. Europe therefore found itself a host to a continuous influx of people. With the recent rise of terrorism linked to Muslim or Arab origins, Europe then sought to control inward migration, yet, with respect to refugees' asylum and human rights. In fact, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Europe aimed at turning the delicate political debate of migration into a positive factor of growth and success for all of the Partnership's members.¹⁴¹ In establishing a comprehensive approach to deal with migration, the Partnership was also keen on differentiating the cases according to the respective situations of the source countries. In addition, long-term development programs on migratory flows were created, particularly concerning poverty eradication, institution building and conflict prevention. Beside immigration, European freedom and security were also part of the broader context of the global security agenda.

¹⁴¹ "Migration and Asylum in the External Relations" *Europa*, 2005, European Commission, 4 Jun 2007 <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/migration/intro/index.htm>

3. Europe, the Global Security Agenda and Strategic Interests in the Middle East

The trans-Atlantic relationship turned, for some, into a “strategic dissonance”.¹⁴² Forsberg and Herd have in fact categorized Europe into five groups, namely, Atlantic, Core, New, Non-aligned and Peripheral. The groups attributed to Europe different weights in terms of foreign policy and represented respectively the UK, Germany, the new EU members, the Nordic countries of Sweden and Finland and finally Russia. The authors then studied the relations between the US and each of the groups through the theoretical views of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism.

First, the authors observed that, despite Britain’s support for the United States over the Iraq occupation, the United Kingdom was nevertheless placed at the heart of Europe in security and military matters.¹⁴³ In fact, the United Kingdom had supported positions opposed to American policies in essential matters such as global warming and the International Criminal Court. However, the special UK-US relationship was sustained throughout the two mandates of the Bush administration, in the course of which the United States acted as a military leader and the United Kingdom as a broker between the United States and Europe. In fact, it has been noted that despite its lower military strength, the European Union was much stronger than the United States in terms of regional integration, multilateralism and the use of non-military policy instruments. Second, the authors found that Germany still constituted the United States’ security partner, despite the German disagreement over Iraq. Indeed, there was a genuine sense across Germany that the American rationale for war in Iraq lacked legitimacy and

¹⁴² See Thomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd, *Divided West : European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship*, Oxford : Chatham House, c2006

¹⁴³ Ibid. Page 47

prudence. The German people were not convinced that Al Qaeda and September 11 were linked to Iraq and undermined the United States refusal to extend the UN inspection over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Germany's policy was therefore in favour of respecting cooperation. As such, despite its asserted sense of independence vis-à-vis the United States, Germany articulated interests and policies from a European rather than a German position. Germany, as well as France, had been labelled the Old Europe because they opposed American policy over Iraq. As such, they no longer constituted the "anchor of a unified European approach to strategic issues."¹⁴⁴

As opposed to Old Europe, New Europe was constituted by the members which had just accessed the European Union and through which the strong Atlantic attitude could fluctuate. In fact, the authors observed that New Europe was increasingly prepared to disagree with and criticize American's leadership. In addition, having other countries bandwagon by New Europe could make trans-Atlantic relations more effective. Yet, a Polish figure noted that the "Old Europe" expression was an erroneous accusation and contrary to the European trend. As such, a more unified Europe led to more obstacles, challenges and dilemmas vis-à-vis the United States.

To another extent, the leaders and the people of non-aligned countries such as Sweden and Finland remained equidistant towards Atlantic Europe on the one hand and Core Europe on the other. In particular, the leaders explained to the people why their respective countries would support the United States and the principles of self-defence and pre-emption. Consequently, such dissonance between the United States and the European Union promoted equidistant non-alignment.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. Page 67

Finally, according to the authors, inter-European disagreements and Atlantic rifts formed an opportunity for Russia, or the Periphery Europe, to exploit the latter and legitimate Russia's own interests. Nevertheless, the authors also observed that Russia had to beware such an advantage since its attitude could actually heal the rifts. The authors therefore aimed at answering whether the overall European soft power could influence the global application of American hard power.¹⁴⁵

On the one hand, according to Realism, states fearing American hegemony were more likely to oppose the United States, whereas states depending on American hegemony would rather support it. Such a scenario was best illustrated by Core Europe, which attempted to counter-balance American power in diverging strategic interests and capabilities.

On the other hand, Liberalism found the strength of trans-Atlantic relations through institutional networks, common economic cultures and shared values. Atlantic, Core and New Europe belonged to such a category, as opposed to Non-aligned and Periphery Europe.

Finally, Constructivism considered that identity, cultures and beliefs shaped domestic as well as international politics and therefore foreign and security policies. Therefore, support towards the United States would be low in cultures where anti-Americanism was strong such as Core Europe, as opposed to trans-Atlantic and New Europe. In addition, the authors found that Periphery and Non-Aligned Europe would lie somewhere between the two extremes.

In summary, different theories led to different European stands towards the United States and to the common conclusion of strategic dissonance. On the one hand, Russia

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. Page 189

would take advantage of such a strategic environment in which it could pick and choose policy responses to particular issues and float freely between coalitions. If anything, there could be a European Union dependence on Russia rather than a Russian dependence on the European Union. On the other hand, strategic dissonance exposed new European Union members to lower risks and costs of political trade-offs, since they were not bound by a common European security and defence policy. Finally, disagreements and fragmentation allowed non-aligned countries to have more room for manoeuvres while convergence would make it difficult for them to act freely.¹⁴⁶

Outside such theoretical perspectives, Jurgen Habermas recalled that there were two dates the Europeans could not forget. First, newspapers accounted that Spanish Prime Minister Aznar wanted European governments supporting the United States on the Iraq occupation to swear an oath of loyalty to President Bush. Second, no one could forget the 15th of February, 2003, the day mass demonstrations took place against the Iraq occupation in major European Union cities including London, Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin and Paris. According to Habermas, such “overpowering demonstrations” were the largest since the end of World War II and constituted the “Birth of a European Public”.¹⁴⁷ In fact, if the European Union were to compete against the United States regarding a “universalistic international order”¹⁴⁸ or if it were to form a political counter-weight to hegemonic unilateralism, then it ought to

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. Page 136

¹⁴⁷ Jurgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge, U.K. : Polity Press, 2006, Page 40

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. Page 50

“acquire self-confidence and an independent profile”.¹⁴⁹ In particular it ought not to take position against the West since it belonged to it. In addition, it should not contest liberal traditions, which constitute the pillars of the oldest democracy, rooted, in fact, in Europe itself. It should rather beware of dangerous ideologies of the people currently in power, who formed a neo-conservative contingent. With a new and reborn France, Europe should have a greater role in the Middle East region and be able to transform economic factors into political influences. As the European Council stated, “security is a precondition of development”¹⁵⁰. In addition, “security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system”.¹⁵¹ Europe ought to therefore reaffirm the existence of a permanent Euro-power,¹⁵² always ready to act as a mediator as well as a guarantor of peace. United States unilateralism vis-à-vis the world, independent of the United Nations, was likely to increase tensions between the Middle East, the United States and Europe. Furthermore, all researchers agreed that the Arab-Israeli peace process would serve common American and European interests if it were solved. As an unconditional and committed supporter, the United States would be more able to pressure Israel. All depended on whether the United States had the will as well as the domestic support to do so, or if it would remain influenced by domestic groups. If the conflict were not solved, there would be more divergences between the United States and Europe.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ European Council, “*A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy*”, Brussels, 2003, Page 2. <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/EuropeanUnion.doc> , Accessed May 29, 2007

¹⁵¹ Ibid. Page 5

¹⁵² Winfried Veit, “*La Nouvelle Donne Géopolitique de l'Europe : De la Chute du Mur à L'Europe des Vingt-Cinq*”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Paris, March 2005, Page 9.

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/paris/50147.pdf> , Accessed May 29, 2007

The close economic competition between the United States and the European Union could not be denied. In fact, the European Union was appealing to most parts of the world. In terms of trade, the European Union economy was almost as strong as that of the United States. The European Monetary Union and the Euro currency were very challenging to the United States. However, the fact that national identities were stronger than a common European identity presented a real setback to the European Union. In addition, the European Union was not as close to the United States as it was frequently considered under the “West” label.¹⁵³ As such, European Union members were bound together by the fact that they all feared a common American challenge. Otherwise, the EU/US relations were eroding.¹⁵⁴

The United States has become the sole super power. Yet, the emerging Middle East, as several researchers called it, had become a matter with which the United States and Europe had to deal with either together or separately. The Middle East is indeed a region continuously changing. Every publication at different times would mention the “New Middle East”. Within the New Middle East environment lied common interests as well as divergences of both the United States and Europe. As such, approximate stability ought to be reached.¹⁵⁵ Otherwise, new issues of refugees would entail, as well as domestic pressures in Europe and the United States against unwanted intervention. Europe would be more vulnerable than the United States because of its proximity with the Middle East. In addition, dependence on Middle East oil made the

¹⁵³ See Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power, why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Page 33

¹⁵⁵ See Phebe Marr, “*The United States, Europe and the Middle East: Cooperation, Cooptation or Confrontation?*” in *The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit*, edited by B.A. Roberson, Routledge, 1998, Pp 74-103

United States and Europe wary of fluctuation of oil price since the latter would affect the global economy and lead to economic recession. Moreover, both the United States and Europe had strong commercial interests in the strategic waterways and lines of communication of the Middle East. Important Middle Age maritime discoveries indeed attributed less importance to the Middle East. Yet, it had both a weight and a role in international trade. Other strategic Western interests in the Middle East were democracy and human rights, which formed a prerequisite for market economies.

To another extent, the United States and Europe differed on the question of Islamic revival. From the American perspective, democratic process and human rights would allow moderate Islamic elements to have an open role in political systems and thus render Islamic states less hostile. However, the European approach opposed such logic, fearing hostile Islamist governments instead.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, divergences lied in geographic distance. Europe was obviously closer than the United States. While the United States acted as the provider of arms to deter and neutralize opposing powers, Europe was the Middle East's trade partner. As such, Europe could not avoid interdependence because of the proximity factor. In addition, American foreign policy tended more towards coercive diplomacy including sanctions and isolations. Yet, Europe favoured trade as a constructive engagement with authoritarian or religious states. Moreover, the shared European and American desire for stability in countries of the Middle East region and the Persian Gulf, particularly for the free flow of oil and the protection of trade routes, had not led to common policies.

¹⁵⁶ See Phebe Marr, *"The United States, Europe and the Middle East: Cooperation, Cooptation or Confrontation?"* in *The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit*, edited by B.A. Roberson, Routledge, 1998, Pp 74-103.

Some researchers argued that American power has its own limitations in the Middle East.¹⁵⁷ Georges Joffé divided the Middle East region into sub-regions, each with its own foreign policy imperatives. Since the end of the Cold War, the region was already referred to as the New Middle East with an expansion to Central Asia. Yet, in addition to the American actor, Europe could also have a key role in the Middle East regional affairs. This would be possible only if Europe knew how to catch the opportunity. Europe would have to become more proactive, especially since Western interests had narrowed down from three to two after the fall of the Soviet Union. These interests were about oil access and Israeli Security. To another extent, the Middle East was to be integrated in the global economy through the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, which focused on economic restructuring of the region and heavy foreign debts. Nevertheless, American foreign policy pressured economic aid under the conditions of a “new moral order”, i.e., the spread of human rights and respect of minority interests through the establishment of democratic governments.¹⁵⁸

Security and economic restructuring therefore dominated the West’s agenda in the Middle East. Since Western policies were not particularly successful and often counter-productive, Joffé thought it was a clear sign that the West should reassess its position in the region, i.e., measure the damage on Middle East perceptions of Western values and its effect on future relations. Overall, from the point of view of the South, rather than a platform for social, economic and political progress, the Middle East would generate antagonism against the West for fear of neo-colonial and neo-imperialist interference. The majority of the Middle East’s public opinion thought that

¹⁵⁷ See George Joffé, “Relations between the Middle East and the West: the view from the South” in *The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit*, edited by B.A. Roberson, Routledge 1998, Pp-45-73.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*

power was a key factor in international relations and that the Middle East had always been victim of Western power abuse.¹⁵⁹ Power is indeed a key. Yet, the usual victimization process is very common and should change. The people of the Middle East could rather seek improvement concretely, instead of throwing mere wordy reactions. Victimization is well-understood, given both the historical and present status of the region. Yet, it can not be justified.

An analysis of Europe's multilateral perspective over crucial regions associated with trans-national terrorism would be incomplete without mentioning the question of Iran. As opposed to the threatening tone of the United States, Europe has been keen on dissuading Iran from resorting to terrorist actions or support trans-national terrorist groups, through softer means. In fact, the relations between the European Union and Iran have been growing, while they were practically inexistent between the United States and Iran. More recently, the United States seemed to have recognized the power of Iran in the Middle East, a position that Iran sought by constantly reminding the United States and the world of its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has been considered as a sponsor of terrorism when the 1979 Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah's regime, on the grounds that it was backed by the United States. Post-revolution Islamists refuted American influence over Iran. As a result, militant students seized the American embassy in Tehran for almost two years. The relations between the United State and Iran were therefore cut short. Furthermore, Iran strongly expressed its nuclear objectives over the years, a position increasingly contested by the United States as well as the international community. The United States in fact warned

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

its allies worldwide and particularly around the Persian neighborhood of Iran's terrorist pursuits. In the American view, a nuclear Iran would threaten the region's stability and security. It would finance, equip and support extremist terrorists in the Middle East region in their anti-American, and more generally, anti-Liberal aspirations.

Since September 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted several resolutions calling Iran for more transparency in nuclear elements enrichment and the suspension of all its related activities. The European Union in general, and France in particular, based their actions towards Iran on firm principles, rejecting the idea of a nuclear Iran, yet, working multilaterally in search of a political solution carefully negotiated.¹⁶⁰ The 15th of November 2004, the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) signed the Paris Agreement with Iran. The agreement aimed at reaffirming Iran's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ensuring that Iran did not and would not acquire nuclear weapons.¹⁶¹

The European Union worked together with Iran towards closer relations. No bilateral contractual relations were established,¹⁶² yet, there were major developments within the political context, through dialogues covering issues such as the Middle East peace process, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the fight against terrorism. The EU-Iran relations were particularly characterized in trade. The

¹⁶⁰ "Question nucléaire - Présentation." France Diplomacie. 18 SEP 2006. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 8 Jun 2007 <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/iran_420/question-nucleaire_4050/presentation_14132.html>.

¹⁶¹ "Agreement between Iran, Germany, United Kingdom and France." France Diplomacie. 18 SEP 2006. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 8 Jun 2007 <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/iran_420/question-nucleaire_4050/agreement-between-iran-germany-united-kingdom-and-france_14191.html>.

¹⁶² "Recent history of the EU-Iran relations" Europa, 2005, European Commission, 8 Jun 2007 <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm>

European Union is Iran's major trade partner in both exports and imports. The European Union imports are mostly found in the energy sector, while exports to Iran include machinery, transport equipment and chemicals.¹⁶³ Through trade and investment incentives, the European Union strongly supports Iran's accession to the WTO. It firmly believes that greater economic, political and security cooperation is mutually reinforcing and constitutes the basis for progress in counter-terrorism. Italian corporations, in particular, have significant investments in Iran's petroleum industry and consider increasing existing investments there.¹⁶⁴ As a result, the United States has strongly urged Italy to prevent its banks and corporations from doing business in Iran, on the grounds that such investments financed the energy sector as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁶⁵ Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi had in fact strongly denounced Iran's nuclear plans, supporting United Nations sanctions as well as deadlines for Iran to halt nuclear enrichment.¹⁶⁶ According to Italy's export credit agency, risk exposure abroad was mostly concentrated in Iran.¹⁶⁷ Italy has been also listed among the top four investors in Iran, along with China, France and Germany.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, France and Germany were compelled to tightly control the branches of an Iranian state-owned bank over their respective territories, on the grounds that the bank's profits served Iran's weapon technology.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Stewart, Phil. "For Italy, Iran's nuclear hopes carry high price." *Reuters*. 05 JUN 2007. 8 Jun 2007 <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USL057225790070605> Page 1

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. Page 2

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

As such, the campaign led by the United States discouraged any new economic entry in Iran. In addition, the established European businesses in Iran were about to lose a lot in ceasing bilateral commerce.

In summary, there are common European and American interests to promote peace in the Middle East.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the fundamental inequality between the United States and the European Union lied in their respective influence and roles. The United States military and political role in the Middle East and its consequent developments strongly influenced United States domestic politics. In Albert Hourani's words, the United States was in fact the representative of the West in the Middle East. It was also Israel's main external security partner. As for Europe, it rather had a commercial role in the Middle East. Europe, with the exception of some states, generally emphasized its rapprochement with Arab states. Europe rather served as a facilitator rather than a major actor in Middle East relations. The rivalry between the United States and the European Union would be a rather simplistic reason to explain such a schema. In fact, Europe itself can only act upon consensus among its members. It would be therefore difficult to obtain a European-American agreement since inter-European agreements can hardly be attained. In addition, the Middle East was like a bicycle, i.e., it either moved forward or fell over. The situation would therefore be neither stable nor sustainable, hence the need to "re-calibrating diplomacy", according to the "logic of gradualism"¹⁷¹. Finally, Europe and the United States are not the only important actors

¹⁷⁰ See Richard Haas, "The United States, Europe, and the Middle East Peace Process" in *Allies Divided: Transatlantic policies for the greater Middle East*, edited by Robert D. Blackwill & Michael Stürmer, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1997, Pp. 61-78

¹⁷¹ Ibid. Page 71

in the Middle East. Regional actors had a major role as well, with legitimate agendas of their own that ought to be taken into consideration.

V. Conclusion

After such thorough analysis, it could be agreed with Guelke that terrorism is indeed a strategy of suppression that affirms absolute illegitimacy of those engaged in violence. It is applied to a particular campaign of violence with which the government is unwilling to address political demands.¹⁷² Terrorism used to be associated with anarchist violence, underscoring two elements central to the term's usage. On the one hand, while terrorism denoted absolutely illegitimate violence, terrorists were not just enemies of particular governments. They were rather enemies of all governments. On the other hand, terrorism was associated with anarchist slogans, such as "propaganda by the deed"¹⁷³, underlining the purpose of the actions. The latter was to convey a message to a much larger audience than the immediate targets affected. In addition, terrorism was commonly performed through political assassinations and the explosion of bombs in public places. Furthermore, it was hard to define a terrorist. Similarly to Adam Roberts, Adrian Guelke pointed to the fact that one's terrorist was another person's freedom fighter.¹⁷⁴

In an attempt to define terrorism, Roberts quoted Alexis de Tocqueville according to whom terrorism was a box with a false bottom.¹⁷⁵ Roberts noted that, after September 11, the question was no longer about defining terrorism. The latter had in fact become "clandestine, willfully destructive of human life on a colossal scale and a product of

¹⁷² Ibid. Page 211

¹⁷³ Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995, Page 50

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. Page 190

¹⁷⁵ Adam Roberts, "Can We Define Terrorism?", *Oxford Today*, The University Magazine, Volume 14, Number 2, Hilary 2002, <http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/2001-02/v14n2/04.shtml>, Accessed May 28, 2007

the classic delusion that dramatic acts of violence would make the opponent's system collapse."¹⁷⁶ The crucial question was rather about defining the targets of the war on terror, and of the military actions and police measures. Furthermore, the scope of the definition changed to include aid cuts to organizations suspected of terrorist activities. In general, it is easier to define terrorist acts rather than terrorism itself. The term used to have a number of distinct meanings and was often used in dictatorial governments against their own citizens. Terrorism used to be continuously associated with the killing and assassination of political leaders and heads of state. Furthermore, it was inconceivable that a student shooting would lead to a world war. As such, the variety of forms of terrorism posed the problem of prohibiting terrorism. It was hard to delineate what the term encompassed. According to Roberts, a key question is therefore whether the reliance on terror truly distinguishes a movement from its political opponents. "If parts of a movement have employed terrorist methods, is *terrorist* an accurate description of the movement as a whole, made up of many different wings, and employing many different modes of action?"¹⁷⁷ As such, an internationally agreed definition of terrorism would serve as a good basis for argument but not a definitive end to it.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, Freedman observed that defining terror generically was indeed difficult. Yet, it ought not to be put aside and left for specific contexts. It could also be agreed terrorism was a weapon used by the weak against the strong. It did not catch the enemy in the latter's strongest point. It rather found the enemies weakness and vulnerabilities, particularly within social structure.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁷ Ibid

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ Lawrence Freedman, *Superterrorism: Policy Responses*, edited, Malden, Mass. : Blackwell Pub., c2002

The fundamental observation about the global war on terrorism is that the latter differs from the ordinary concept of war in several aspects, including the scope, the purpose, the target and the methodology it involves. However, regardless of the aspect and the tools of terrorist attacks, global international cooperation has been prompted by and against such violence.¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, rather than an international cooperation, the war on terror could be considered as a new designation of the typical American leadership in world affairs, particularly the Middle East, where it links terrorism to economic deprivation and failed states. According to Karin Von Hippel, had terrorism truly been linked to poverty, the United States should have sought to eliminate it across Africa first. In addition, states could not be qualified as failed, because the notion of failure presumes a specific level of success that all states must reach, which is not the case.

As unobtrusive as it was, American unilateralism was expressed since the very first shock of September 11, when America felt almost embarrassed by the world's solidarity with the tragedy. However, it managed to isolate itself in 2003 during the occupation of Iraq.¹⁸¹ In Antonio Gramsci's widely accepted political discourse, hegemony is the combination of coercion and consent, the dominance within the state and the system of states. While American foreign policy is that of coercion, Europe considers that such policy over-emphasizes politico-military dimension of international politics. Terrorism is not a war and can not be eliminated by military means alone. It ought to rather be countered through economic development, negotiation, policing and intelligence. In contrast, America considers that European

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Ibid. Page 198

governments place far too much faith in diplomacy and economic aid. According to the United States, the target is clear. It must be attacked and defeated.¹⁸²

American hegemony over the war on terror indeed affected Euro-American relations. Europe could either choose to accept American predominance, work within such framework and bandwagon, or balance against American dominance relying on European institutions as a “competing centre of power”.¹⁸³ Yet, Europe should not be assessed in comparison with the United States. Europe is not a construct of America. It has its own values and its own identity. Several political scientists remained skeptical vis-à-vis the European Union enlargement and were convinced that the latter would only erode a common Euro-centric security strategy.¹⁸⁴ Regardless of inter-European disagreements, especially the failure of a common European Union constitution, inter-European relations remained strong. This was highlighted very recently by the last visit of former President Jacques Chirac to Germany, and the similar trip undertaken by his successor, the same day he was sworn in. In fact, both France and Germany constitute the pillars of the European Union and Germany is currently in charge of the rotating European Union presidency.¹⁸⁵ Despite President Sarkozy’s outspoken interests in American political and economic traits, a stronger European Union could now find the opportunity to dissociate itself from American hard foreign policies and

¹⁸² William Wallace, “*American Hegemony: European Dilemmas*” in *Super Terrorism: Policy Responses*, edited, Malden, Mass. : Blackwell Pub., c2002

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* Page 105

¹⁸⁴ See Winfried Veit, “*La Nouvelle Donne Géopolitique de l’Europe : De la Chute du Mur à L’Europe des Vingt-Cinq*”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Paris, March 2005. Pp 2-11.

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/paris/50147.pdf> , Accessed May 29, 2007

¹⁸⁵ See Noah Berkin, “*Sarkozy vows action on EU, EADS in Berlin*”, Reuters 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSPAB00321220070516?pageNumber=1> Accessed May 16, 2007

bring back the United States into multilateral perspectives, the essence of global counter-terrorism.

Whether the latter should take the form of a war or not remained a controversial debate, in theory and practice, with opposing sides advancing arguments that seemed, at first sight, coherent and plausible. Lawrence Freedman analyzed both sides of the debate. According to him, Liberals might say that Realists found limits to their theory, since the most powerful state and head of the uni-polar world was brutally hit. Yet, it was attacked at the heart of its economic and military symbols. As such, whether rich or poor “no country can be dismissed as irrelevant to security”.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, “war” is a realist term that is not part of the Liberals vocabulary. In fact, Realism sharpened divisions and considered multilateralism as a partial alternative only. Beyond the alliance lied the enemy.¹⁸⁷ To another extent, once war was declared, some states could opt for neutrality. In the war on terrorism, neutrality is not even an option. The main holistic argument was that after an attack of such a scale, performed by a political entity in a specific country, war was not a choice. It was rather a strategic imperative.¹⁸⁸ In Freedman’s opinion, it was not unusual to declare war against problems such as poverty and racism. Yet, it was atypical against a tactic like terrorism. Positively, wars were fought for democracy, liberation and civilization. Negatively, they were fought against aggression, colonization and now terrorism.¹⁸⁹

A question that kept coming to my mind while reviewing the war on terrorism was whether the latter had room for weak states such as Lebanon. Lebanon had previously

¹⁸⁶ Lawrence Freedman, *Superterrorism: policy responses*, edited, Malden, Mass. : Blackwell Pub., c2002, page 144

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. Page 45

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

experienced a war within, over and through its territory.¹⁹⁰ On the one hand, there had been a war within the country, i.e., among different internal factions. On the other hand, there had also been a war over Lebanon, i.e., over which regional party would actually take control of the country. Furthermore, there had concurrently been war through Lebanon, a kind of settlement of geopolitical accounts among international powers. As such, Lebanon had always been the battleground for national, regional and global conflicts.

Lebanon's role in the war on terrorism seems to be no different, given the unprecedented scale of the Israeli attacks on the country in summer 2006, against an internal group and, more broadly, against regional competitors, on the grounds that Israel had the right to defend itself against terrorism. Lebanon therefore provided "an arena for armed conflicts involving several state and non-state actors."¹⁹¹ It was a weak state which could easily be exploited internally and externally by any party, at anytime. As such, it was argued that it could not be held accountable for the actions that occurred on its own territory. While the different internal parties, oriented by regional and international actors, continue to shape Lebanese foreign policy, the Lebanese people want a policy based on Lebanese interests exclusively.¹⁹² In particular, the different sectarian communities never abandoned their respective foreign aspirations, constantly developing formal and informal relations with international partners. Therefore "sectarian foreign agendas" generated considerable

¹⁹⁰ See Walid Mubarak, *The Position of a Weak State in an Unstable Region: The Case of Lebanon*, Emirate Lecture Series 44, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Study for Strategic Studies and Research, 2003

¹⁹¹ Farid el Khazen, "Patterns of State Failure: the Case of Lebanon", in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, edited by Tore Bjorgo, Routledge, Page 187

¹⁹² See Tom Pierre Najem, "Lebanon and Europe: Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State", in *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, Gerd Nonneman, edited, London, Routledge, c2005, Pp 100-122.

inter-communal mistrust.¹⁹³ President Sarkozy rejected the idea of a country bounded by its own fate. Yet, unlike the strong French nation, weak ones such as Lebanon are likely to remain victims of a fate drawn by the whole world's interests regardless of its own.

Therefore, through “the ruses of globalization”¹⁹⁴, the United States sought a diplomacy adapted to the realities of the twenty-first century, i.e., its own balanced synthesis between national interests and the defence of values as well as common goods of the world. However, the costs of unilateralism certainly made the United States rethink its relationship with the rest of the world and move towards a new kind of leadership. In fighting trans-national terrorism, the United States could adhere to multilateralism and consider it as an opportunity “for conscious exercise of a leadership” that nations called for, rather than a constraint on the United States' sovereignty.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, the threat of trans-national terrorism, specifically Al Qaeda, cannot be denied. It is very present everywhere. It is taken into consideration at every occasion, at summits or grand reunions, during which vigilance reaches its highest level. In addition, after every “Western” geo-political decision concerning the Middle East, for instance, an immediate and bloody response claimed by Al Qaeda follows, targeting massive innocent civilians. Such actions can only raise worldwide anger and devastation, as well as a strong avenging feeling towards the perpetrators. America decided to avenge worldwide terrorism victims in launching a war on terrorism itself.

¹⁹³ Ibid. Page 103

¹⁹⁴ James Bovard, *Terrorism and Tyranny :Trampling Freedom,Justice, and Peace to rid the World of Evil* , 1st Palgrave Macmillan ed., New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2003, Page 97

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. Page 107

Yet, there is an inevitable reality common to all types of war and this one is no exception. There is no victory at war. The only victory is that of the people who have endured it.

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