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

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

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THE KING AND THE GENERAL:
Survival Strategies in Jordan and Lebanon

BASSEL FAWZI SALLOUKH
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August 1994

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master's of Arts.

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THE KING AND THE GENERAL: SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN JORDAN AND LEBANON.

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ABSTRACT

This study is a comparative analysis of the survival strategies of two regimes: Jordan's King Hussein and Lebanon's Fu'ad Shihab. It is an exploration of the domestic determinants of foreign policy behaviour, and the relation between foreign policy behaviour and regime consolidation, legitimation, and survival in small, weak state actors located in a permeable regional system. The study advances an hypothesis of four explanatory variables to explain the success and failure of Hussein and Shihab's respective strategies. Husseinism's 'success' - as opposed to Shihabism's 'failure' - may be explained by a successful insulatory regional policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. This enabled the Hashemite regime to restructure state-society relations to consolidate social control, mitigate the effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic arena, and achieve an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments of the society gaining the state allegiance from a sizeable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude est une analyse comparative des stratégies de survie de deux régimes: ceux du Roi Hussein de Jordanie et du Président Libanais Fu'ad Shihab. Cet essai explore les déterminants domestiques de la politique étrangère, de même que la relation entre la politique étrangère, la consolidation du régime. la légitimation, et la survie de petits acteurs étatiques, faibles et situés dans un système régional perméable. L'étude avance une hypothèse consistant de quatre variables explicatives qui élucident, alternativement, le succès ou l'échec des stratégies respectives de Hussein et Shihab. Le 'succès' du Husseinisme - par opposition à 'l'échec' du Shihabisme - peut être expliqué par le succès d'une politique régionale isolatrice, d'un processus historique de formation étatique, de la présence de ressources économiques à la disposition de l'État, et de la possibilité du recours sans entraves à des ressources coercibles. Ceci a permis au régime Hashemite de restructurer les relations État-société en vue de consolider le contrôle étatique, mais aussi de mitiger l'impact des idéologies trans-nationales sur l'arène domestique, et d'atteindre un niveau acceptable d'intégration des différents secteurs de la société, avec pour résultat l'allégeance nationale d'une large partie - ou des secteurs stratégiques - de la population.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to thank Professor Rex Brynen for his generous assistance and intellectual guidance throughout the writing of this study. My friends and colleagues at McGill transformed Montreal's cold winters into pleasurable and productive months. They all deserve my appreciation and gratitude. I am grateful to Joelle Zahar for translating the Abstract into French, and to Yusuf Arafat and Ziad Kurjieh for their help in locating some of the references used in this study.

My greatest debt of gratitude is due my family: Fawzi, Hind, Zeina, and Hashem. My parents' love and support has sustained me throughout this solitary and arduous enterprise. Some time ago, when I was a young high school student, my sister Zeina attempted to explain to me why Lebanon's political system is dubbed a 'consociational democracy.' She then swiftly dismissed its viability. I hope Zeina finds my similar objections persuasive. My brother Hashem has been my life-long companion, and has taken care of me since the day I set foot on this continent. I should like to dedicate this study to him as a small token of my great debt of gratitude.

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In the actions of all men, and especially princes, where there is no court of appeal, the end is all that counts. Let a prince then concern himself with the acquisition or the maintenance of the state; the means employed will always be considered honourable and praised by all ...

Machiavelli, ***The Prince.***

INTRODUCTION

Survival in power is the paramount objective of all state leaders. To be sure, the methods employed to guarantee survival differ, with dramatic consequences for the population, yet the objective is often invariable. In the developing world, where political survival is often closely related to physical survival, the leader's tenure at the helm acquires added urgency. In this case, survival requires the acquisition and maintenance of the state, and the legitimation and consolidation of rule.

This study is a comparative analysis of the survival strategies of two regimes: Jordan's King Hussein and Lebanon's Fu'ad Shihab. It is an exploration of the domestic determinants of foreign policy behaviour, and the relation between foreign policy behaviour and regime maintenance and survival in small, weak state actors located in a permeable regional system. In part, the study attempts to complement, but move away from, the two dominant intellectual traditions in the analysis of foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East: the realist and the psychological/perceptual approaches.[1] Instead of looking *at* states or the decision-making elite, this study looks *into* states, particularly at the domestic factors and political dynamics that constrain and determine foreign policy behaviour, and consequently, at the instrumental use of foreign policy for purposes of regime legitimacy and consolidation.

The purpose of this study is to explain the success and failure of Hussein and Shihab's respective survival strategies. Both regimes devised roughly similar survival strategies in response to the same national problematic. Since independence, Jordan and Lebanon have suffered from a lack of national integration, and consequently, the permeability of state borders to regional ideological currents and manipulation. This situation has often undermined domestic political stability. Facing such a situation, regimes governing developing, permeable, plural societies can resort to the following multi-level, interactive survival strategy: accommodate the regional hegemon in order to insulate the domestic political

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[1] For this line of thinking see Rex Brynen, "Between Parsimony and Parochialism: Comparative Politics, International Relations, and the Study of Middle East Foreign Policy," (Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September 1993), pp. 3-6.

arena from transnational manipulation and, having accomplished this task, engage in a process of state-building, represented by a mix of political, social, and economic reform policies directed at achieving an acceptable level of national integration that would provide the state allegiance from either a sizable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population. The regime may also seek to protect the state from external intervention by eliciting the support of an extra-regional ally. In general, this is what both Jordan and Lebanon endeavoured. Whereas Hussein's survival strategy succeeded, Shihab's failed.

In this study, success refers to the ability of the regime to retain power and control over the political process, and to neutralize the malignant effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic political arena. In the case of Jordan, Hussein's survival in power - and the decline of an active Palestinian or Arab nationalist challenge - is a measure of the success of his survival strategy. As for Shihab, his survival strategy failed as indicated by the failure of the Shihabist team to win re-election in the 1970 presidential elections and the ease in which the domestic cleavages were manipulated by regional (and even domestic) actors culminating in the 1975 civil war.

This study advances an hypothesis of four explanatory variables to explain the success and failure of Hussein and Shihab's respective strategies. Briefly, Husseinism's 'success' - as opposed to Shihabism's 'failure' - may be explained by a successful insulatory regional policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. This enabled the Hashemite regime to restructure state-society relations to consolidate social control, mitigate the effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic arena, and achieve an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments of the society gaining the state allegiance from a sizeable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population.

The analysis opens with a brief heuristic and theoretical discussion in chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the key concepts and models used in the study. The outline of, and the rationale for applying, a specific survival strategy is discussed in detail in chapter one. Chapter two

traces the process of state formation and cleavage institutionalization in Jordan and Lebanon. It includes a discussion of the Arab state system, the domestic determinants of foreign policy in both states, and the foreign policy options they face. Hussein and Shihab's survival strategies are the explicit focus of chapters three and four respectively. Both chapters include a multi-level analysis of each survival strategy, and conclude with an analysis of the causes behind the success or failure of the respective strategy. Chapter five, the conclusion, explains the 'success' and 'failure' of both strategies from a comparative perspective. It also addresses the definitional and theoretical implications of this study to the broader fields of comparative politics and foreign policy analysis in the developing world.

1. PLURAL SOCIETIES: DEFINITION, DILEMMAS, AND MODELS

This chapter is largely heuristic. It develops a theoretical framework for the case studies undertaken in later sections. A workable definition of the plural society concept is presented first. A discussion of hypotheses relating segmental cleavages to political conflict will help refute some preconceptions held about cleavages in general, namely that they are static and primordial. The discussion then turns to the state. A succinct review of the debates pertaining to the autonomy and weakness (or strength) of the state is followed by an explication of two dilemmas - the *'asabiyya* and insecurity dilemmas - experienced by many plural, developing societies. Plural society theorists use the consociational democracy and conflict models to explain political stability in deeply divided societies. Both models are examined as theoretical references to the political systems of Lebanon and Jordan respectively. The chapter closes by reconstructing a possible survival strategy for regimes ruling permeable, developing, plural societies. This strategy exposes the domestic determinants of foreign policy behaviour, and the use of foreign policy for purposes of regime survival in small, plural state actors located in a permeable regional system.

1.1 ***Plural Society: A Definition***

Borrowing from Harry Eckstein, Arend Lijphart defines a plural society as one divided by clearly discernable "segmental cleavages." One of three "kinds" of political divisions identified in Eckstein's typology of political divisions, a segmental cleavage "exists where political divisions follow very closely, and especially concern, lines of objective social differentiation, especially those particularly salient in a society."[2] According to Lijphart, segmental cleavages "may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature;" moreover, in a plural society "political parties, interest groups,

[2] Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 34. The other two divisions are called "specific disagreements" (over specific policy or procedural issues) and "cultural divergence" (differences in cultural orientations and interpretation of political issues), p. 33.

media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages."[3] In this formulation, the source of the political cleavage is sought in social divisions, and then, the political cleavage is related to the characteristics of political conflict.[4] It is the relation between political cleavage and the ensuing characteristics of political conflict that is the subject of hypothesizing. A brief review of these hypotheses is in order.

1.1.1 *Cleavages and Political Conflict: Salient Features*

Hypotheses relating political (or vertical) cleavages with the characteristics of political conflict vary with respect to the cleavages' type, *verzuiling*, cross-cutting, quantity, quality, intensity, hierarchy, and temporality. Among hypotheses that relate cleavage type (social class, cultural differences, religious or secular parties) to the characteristics of political conflict there is general agreement that "cleavage-membership perceptions that are highly intense will result in polarized cleavage system and thereby in violent political conflict."[5] This hypothesis, however, is problematic. Whether or not intense cleavage perceptions lead to violent political conflict may be better explained by reference to particular intervening variables.

Other hypotheses attempt to relate the effect of mutually reinforcing and cross-cutting cleavages on political stability. *Verzuiling* (cumulative segmentation) occurs when segmental cleavages in a particular society mutually reinforce each other, making it more difficult for political leaders to manage and defuse political conflicts following segmental lines. *Verzuiling* can be contrasted with the "cross-cutting cleavages" hypothesis. The cross-cutting hypothesis relates the characteristics of political conflict to the

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[3] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 3-4. For a quintessential case study see Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), especially chapter two.

[4] For a discussion see Alan Zuckerman, "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, 2, (April 1975), pp. 234-5.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 238; see also the discussion by Zuckerman on pp. 238-240.

pattern of the distribution of membership in the different cleavages. Rae and Taylor define the cross-cutting of two cleavages as "the proportion of all the pairs of individuals whose two members are in the same group of one cleavage but in different groups of other cleavages."[6] Seymour M. Lipset has argued that the chances of democratic stability "are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations."[7] In this case, the intensity of political conflict is moderated in two ways: first, "through the modification of individual attitudes and behaviours - not only through cross-pressures at election time ... but by reducing the intensity of individual political feelings in general;" and second, since "the more cross-cutting there is, the smaller the number of persons who are in the same group in both cleavages, and hence the more difficult it is to build a coalition or potential conflict group containing only individuals who have no links with the opposition, i.e., who agree on all their membership."[8] The parsimony of the cross-cutting hypothesis has been criticized on several grounds, and a brief discussion of these criticisms might highlight significant - but often neglected - features of segmental cleavages.

In her study of Switzerland, Carol Schmid criticizes the proponents of the cross-cutting hypothesis for often treating the divisions in society as "static properties."[9] "By failing to take into consideration the changing hierarchy of cleavages and their successive replacement over time" the supporters of the cross-cutting hypothesis are "in danger of ignoring the regulatory processes previously responsible for the depoliticalization [sic] or *ontzuiling* of the cleavage structures which are important contributing factors to the current moderation of inter-subcultural stability."[10] Another example that vindicates Schmid's

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[6] Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 113.

[7] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* expanded and updated edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 77.

[8] Rae and Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages*, pp. 87-88.

[9] Carol L. Schmid, *Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 10.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

contention concerning the possibility of change in the hierarchy of cleavages over time, and disproves the claim that existing cleavages remain as the perennial, dominant, sources of conflict in a certain society is the Nigerian one. Larry Diamond has demonstrated how in the Second Nigerian Republic "major political conflicts have been generated not by [the traditional] ethnic cleavages, but by party, ideological, and class interests."[11] These new lines of cleavage might either temper political conflict or they may prove to be as conducive to conflict as older cleavages.

Another line of criticism against the cross-cutting hypothesis pertains to its reductionist nature. Positing direct relations between political cleavage types and patterns of membership distributions, and, the characteristics of political conflict fails to control for the role played by intervening variables in impeding or enhancing the political expression of particular cleavages. Hence, it is not the cross-cutting or the mutually reinforcing nature of the cleavages that may be responsible for defusing or fomenting political conflict, rather, it is specific circumstances that may cause cleavages to either remain latent or become manifest. Again, the Swiss case is illustrative. Henry Kerr has demonstrated how four intervening variables have impeded the political expression of linguistic divisions in Switzerland. These four variables are "the staggered time-phases associated with the crystallization of the major cleavages ..., the slow tempo of Swiss nation-building and of centralization, the consequent latency of the sense of linguistic identity, and the spatial segmentation of partisan competition."[12] Kerr rightly concludes that "cross-cutting cleavages appear as a necessary, but insufficient condition of social harmony."[13]

Lijphart has also criticized the cross-cutting hypothesis for not emphasizing the importance of

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[11] Larry Diamond, "Cleavages, Conflict and Anxiety in the Second Nigerian Republic," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, 4, (December 1982), p. 658.

[12] Henry H. Kerr, Jr., *Switzerland: Social Cleavage and Partisan Conflict* Sage Professional Papers in Contemporary Political Sociology. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications Ltd., 1974), p. 31.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

cross-pressures operating at the political and social leadership level.[14] By singularly emphasizing the importance of cross-pressures at the mass level, the cross-cutting hypothesis ignores the instrumental role played by prudent elites through overarching accommodation and cooperation in guaranteeing democratic stability in societies segmented along deep, mutually reinforcing social cleavages.[15] In this case the quality of leadership is introduced as a substitute explanatory variable to cross-cutting cleavages in explaining democratic stability in plural societies.

Two additional comments should be made to complement the preceding discussion on segmental cleavages. In his seminal study of British colonial policies towards the ancestral cities in Yorubaland, David Laitin has persuasively shown "how government activity itself may structure opportunity in such a way as to determine the nature of social cleavages within the society" to facilitate social control.[16] By controlling the distribution of economic and political benefits a hegemonic state can influence both the hierarchical structure of societal cleavages and determine which cleavages are politicized and which are depoliticized. Therefore, argues Laitin, primordial ties and identities are "taken" as much as they are "given;" and "the pattern of politicized cleavages may be better understood to be largely a function of the strategies of political control by hegemonic states."[17] Similarly, Ian Lustick has demonstrated how, through a mix of government policies, the Israeli authorities successfully intervened in reviving and intensifying *hamula* (patrilineal kinship association), religious, and tribal identities and cleavages among Israeli Arabs to facilitate their fragmentation and control.[18] Finally, if particular cleavages can be sorted

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[14] See Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 14.

[15] See *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[16] David D. Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 287.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 286 and 308 respectively.

[18] See Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), pp. 118-120, 133, and 135.

and intensified by states seeking social control, then they can also be manipulated, exploited, or exaggerated by political elites either for reasons of political or economic profit, or to justify their hegemony over the political system.[19]

The preceding general theoretical survey on cleavages and political conflict has demonstrated, among other things, that cleavages are not necessarily static nor primordial. State policies play decisive roles in determining and manipulating social cleavages. However, not all states enjoy this prerogative. The ability of a state to manipulate the structure and intensity of existing cleavages is largely a function of its capacity to restructure state-society relations to ensure social control. The success of this endeavour, however, depends on the strength or weakness of the state. But first, what defines a state, and what is a weak state in particular?

1.2 *The Weak State Syndrome: Diagnoses and Dilemmas*

The literature on the state abounds with definitions. The problem, according to Michael Mann, is that most definitions of the state attempt to combine two different levels of analysis, the "institutional" and the "functional."[20] In other words, the state is defined either in terms of its institutional structure or its functions. The predominant definition in the literature, however, is a mixed but largely institutional definition whose intellectual heritage may be traced back to Max Weber. This ideal-type definition views the state as containing the following four main elements:

a) a *differentiated* set of institutions and personnel embodying
b) *centrality* in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover
c) a *territorially-demarcated area*, over which it exercises

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[19] Kuper makes this point in general in Leo Kuper, "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Pluralization and Depluralization," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 485; Diamond makes it with respect to the Nigerian First Republic in Diamond, "Cleavages, Conflict and Anxiety in the Second Nigerian Republic," pp. 630 and 656; and Michael C. Hudson makes the latter point with respect to pre-civil war Lebanon in Michael C. Hudson,"The Problem of Authoritarian Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed," in Nadim Shehadi and Danna Haffar Mills, eds., *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), p. 228.

[20] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 25, 2, (1984), p. 187.

d) a monopoly of *authoritative binding rule-making*, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.[21]

According to this definition, then, states are organizations recognizable by the central location of their differentiated institutions and their (claim to) monopoly over 'binding rule-making.'

Working within the parameters of the preceding Weberian definition of the state, some scholars began classifying states into "strong" or "weak" ones "according to how closely they approximated the ideal type of centralized and fully rationalized Weberian bureaucracy, supposedly able to work its will efficiently and without effective social opposition."[22] Specifically, this new approach - which marked a paradigmatic shift from the dominant society-centric pluralist and structural-functionalist approaches for explaining politics to a state-centric one - underscored the "explanatory centrality of states as potent and autonomous organizational actors," with the ability to restructure society and politics through interventionist policies.[23] To be sure, the criteria for gauging the strength or weakness of a state are not uniform. Yet most attempts focus on "state autonomy" and "the capacities of states," or, on the other hand, the "impacts of states on the content and working of politics."[24]

Michael Mann and Hamza Alavi are two proponents of the state autonomy thesis. Mann draws attention to the "autonomous power" possessed by the state and state elites with respect to other power actors in civil society. This autonomous power, Mann contends, is rooted in "the necessity of the state," "the multiplicity of state functions," and more importantly "the state's unique ability to provide a

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 188. Emphasis in original.

[22] Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 351. For an early attempt see J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," in Louis Cantori and Andrew Zeigler, Jr. eds., *Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 303-332. The essay was originally published in 1968.

[23] Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 6.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 9. Emphasis omitted. For a discussion see pp. 9-28.

territorially-centralized form of organization."[25] Similarly, representing one Neo-Marxist trend, Alavi argues that in post-colonial societies the state is "relatively autonomous;" moreover, and since it is dominated by a "bureaucratic-military oligarchy," the state "mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded."[26]

Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol take a sceptical stance towards definitive statements on state autonomy. They argue that the relation between state autonomy and state capacity for effective socio-economic intervention is not necessarily directly proportional. Rather, this relation should be perceived in a dialectical way.[27] Hence, "states *may* be autonomous actors. Whether or not they are depends on conjunctures of state structure, the relations of states to societies and transnational environments, and the nature of the challenges faced by given states."[28]

An influential model for examining the strength or weakness of states in the Third World is presented by Joel Migdal. Migdal retains the ideal-type Weberian definition of the state, but he situates the state within a different social dynamic, one which challenges its ability to exercise (what Mann calls) 'a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making.'

Migdal presents a model of state-society relations in the Third World that depicts the state as one, among many other, social organizations locked in "an active struggle for social control of the

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[25] Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," pp. 195, 196, and 185 respectively. Emphasis omitted. Mann differentiates between two forms of power possessed by states and state elites: "despotic" and "infrastructural." The former is defined as the "range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiations with civil society groups;" whereas the latter refers to the "capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm." See pp. 188 and 189.

[26] Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* No. 74, (July-August 1972), p. 62.

[27] Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State," p. 353.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 356. Emphasis in original.

population,'' in an ''existing environment of conflict.''[29] In its active struggle with traditional power structures and other social organizations, the state is usually ''hemmed in,'' constrained in its attempt to achieve an ''independent reordering of society.''[30] The state's efforts at social control through a monopoly over the stipulation of social rules governing peoples' social behaviour is actively resisted by existing social organizations - families, clans, tribes, sects, patron-client dyads. These social organizations control the available resources and manipulate the symbols that make up peoples' ''strategies of survival,'' the blueprints that guide people in their actions and beliefs in a conflictual social environment.[31] These strategies provide ''not only a basis for personal survival but also a link for the individual from the realm of personal identity and self-serving action (a personal political economy) to the sphere of group identity and collective action (communal moral economy).''[32] Social organizations offer their own 'strategies of survival' - myriad forms of sanctions, rewards, or symbols - to force people to behave according to (existing) rules and norms. Hence, the society in which numerous Third World states exist is ''weblike,'' it is a ''mélange of fairly autonomous social organizations'' each vying for social control.[33] The contest for social control between these autonomous social organizations is a contest for the provision of viable 'strategies of survival.' The state can wrest social control from the different social organizations only by offering people viable 'strategies of survival' that can replace those offered by the existing autonomous social organizations.

In this conflict environment, the strength (or weakness) of a state hinges upon its capability to

[29] Joel S. Migdal, ''A Model of State-Society Relations,'' in Howard J. Wiarda, ed. *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 48; and Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 30 respectively.

[30] Migdal, ''A Model of State-Society Relations,'' p. 53.

[31] Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, p. 27. Italics omitted.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 37. On page 22, Migdal defines state social control as ''the successful subordination of people's own inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of the behaviour prescribed by state rules.''

execute state-planned social change aimed at enforcing state social control. The state's capabilities include "the capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways. Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on the low end of a spectrum of capabilities."[34] Moreover, the degree of a state's social control and capabilities are closely related: the greater the state social control the higher and easier the state's capabilities, and the greater the chances of success for state policies. On the other hand, in strong Third World societies, where the level of state social control is low, the state runs against the tenacious walls of autonomous social organizations who disrupt state policies by manipulating incentives and rewards through their own social control networks. In this case the state is weak.

1.2.1 *The 'Asabiyya Dilemma*

States in the developing world face many dilemmas. Two particular dilemmas are of special relevance to this study. The first of these dilemmas may be called, borrowing from Ibn Khaldun and Albert Hourani, a *'asabiyya* dilemma: a condition where society is composed of different segments, each with its own *'asabiyya* and its specific vision and definition of the territorial entity.[35] But first, what does Ibn Khaldun's concept of *'asabiyya* connote, and what are the resultant challenges facing a state lacking a single, over-arching, *'asabiyya*?

The concept of *'asabiyya* (group solidarity) occupies centre stage in Ibn Khaldun's philosophic history. It is the single most important factor in explaining the rise and later demise of states, dynasties, or empires. Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri defines *'asabiyya* as a conscious or unconscious social-psychological bond that perpetually unites a group together; moreover, this unity is most manifest and

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. Emphasis in original.

[35] For Hourani's contribution to this concept see the excellent discussion in Albert Hourani, "Visions of Lebanon," in Halim Barakat, ed. *Toward a Viable Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 3-11.

strongest at times when the group, or its members, are threatened by external danger.[36] Furthermore, *'asabiyya* is based neither on real nor imagined lineage (*nasab*), but rather on a "group's permanent shared interests."[37] In fact, al-Jabiri contends, this explains why Ibn Khaldun continuously couples *'asabiyya* with aggression, for a group's *'asabiyya* is catapulted to the fore only when the group's shared material and economic interests are threatened.[38]

According to Ibn Khaldun there are two components to a state's strength: "the actual capabilities of the state and, ... the recognition by others of these capabilities."[39] A strong general (or common) *'asabiyya* and a *ri'asa* (leadership) over people are two necessary conditions for a strong state. *Ri'asa* - and hence *mulk* (kingship) - require the *ghulb* (superiority) of the leader's *'asabiyya*, which is the strongest *'asabiyya*, over all other individual *'asabiyyas*, and the formation of a general *'asabiyya* under the new leadership.[40] However, as Ghassan Salamé notes, this "is not sufficient to build strength. Following that, the whole society must be coalesced (*iltiham*) in accordance with the new authority." *Iltiham* derives from the peoples' recognition of the state's capabilities and strength, it is manifested by political loyalty to the possessors of these capabilities, and it is "the ultimate form of hegemony in its insistence on social integration by and around the ideology professed by the ruling *'asabiyya*." It follows, then, that the

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[36] See Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri, *Fikr Ibn Khaldun: Al- 'Asabiyya wa-l-Dawla, Ma'alim Nadhariyya Khalduniyya fi-l-Tarikh al-'Islami* [The Thought of Ibn Khaldun: Solidarity and the State, the Features of a Khaldunian Theory in Islamic History] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1982), p. 254. Ibn Khaldun distinguishes between a "general" (*'amma*) and a "private" (*khassa*) or individual *'asabiyya*. A general *'asabiyya* is composed of several individual *'asabiyyas*. Each general *'asabiyya* gives rise to a "complete state" (*dawla kuliyya*), such as the Arab, Persian, Umayyad, or 'Abassid states, see pp. 259 and 327-328.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 260. Emphasis omitted.

[38] See *Ibid.*

[39] Ghassan Salamé, "'Strong' and 'Weak' States: A Qualified Return to the *Muqaddimah*," in Giacomo Luciani, ed. *The Arab State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 32. In a some what similar manner, Barry Buzan posited "the degree of socio-political cohesion" as the criterion for differentiating strong from weak states. See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* second edition (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 97. Buzan contends that the "principal distinguishing feature" of a weak state is its "high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government," see p. 99.

[40] See Salamé, "'Strong' and 'Weak' States," p. 32; and al-Jabiri, *Fikr Ibn Khaldun*, pp. 276-277 and 327.

"larger the new *iltiham* the stronger the state."[41] The reverse is also true. In the absence of a strong common *'asabiyya*, society will be deprived of *iltiham*, thus rendering state social control a difficult, if not impossible, task. Society will also lack national integration, with each segment subscribing to its own *'asabiyya* and its specific vision and definition of the polity.

'Asabiyya plays a pivotal functional role in the protection of a group (*'usba*) or state against external aggression. Though he differentiates between external and internal aggression, Ibn Khaldun is only concerned with external aggression against a group or the state. In particular, Ibn Khaldun underscores the role of *'asabiyya* as a "natural bond" uniting the defenders of the group or the state against external aggression.[42] It is evident then that states lacking a single *'asabiyya* will have difficulty defending the polity against external intervention, aggression, or manipulation. Two explanations may be advanced to validate this contention: first, *'asabiyya is* the group power that provides for defence against external aggression; second, the lack of an overarching *'asabiyya* might engender a situation in which there will be a lack of consensus within the state concerning the nature of the external threat, and consequently, external threats will be interpreted differently by different segments of the population. In this case, a state's domestic arena is vulnerable to external intervention and manipulation.

1.2.2 *The Insecurity Dilemma*

Another dilemma experienced by many Third World states is that referred to by Brian Job as the "insecurity dilemma."[43] Where as the *'asabiyya* dilemma depicts the predicament of states lacking social integration, the 'insecurity dilemma' draws attention to the domestic sources of security threats faced by

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[41] All preceding quotations from Salamé, '"Strong and Weak States," p. 32. Last emphasis added.

[42] For a discussion see al-Jabiri, *Fikr Ibn Khaldun*, pp. 248-49.

[43] For the intellectual origin and rationale of this concept see Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in Brian L. Job, ed. *The Insecurity Dilemma* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 11-35.

many Third World regimes and societies. The concept originated from the reaction of some scholars to the parochialism and limited utility of classical international relations paradigms and concepts in certain settings, but especially in the Third World.[44]

In addition to its obsession with the military issue-area, the classical realist paradigm recognizes only external sources of threat to the security of the state. The state is basically a unitary actor, existing in an anarchical international environment. A "security dilemma" develops when individual state actors respond to external threats to their security. It this case, "states, by seeking to advance their *individual* national securities (through policies of arming, deterrence, and alliance), create and sustain an international environment of decreased relative security for themselves and for the collective of states."[45] Yet in the Third World, states are neither unitary actors, they are not necessarily governed by legitimate regimes, nor are their institutional capabilities fully developed. Moreover, the major sources of the security problematic of any state lie not only in the military, but also in the societal, political, economic, and even environmental sectors - in threats generated from within the state.[46] As a result, in many developing states the "sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats *to and from* the regime in power," rather than of solely external threats to the existence of the nation-state.[47]

The realist argument is implausible in other respects as well. In the Third World, the concept of 'national security' is at best ambiguous. As Muhammed Ayoob has contended, and in contrast to the Western nation-state, the 'national security' of every Third World state has three determinative dimensions that should be considered simultaneously: the domestic, the global, and the regional.[48] A state's security

[44] For a general discussion see Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, especially chapters two and three.

[45] Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," p. 17. Emphasis in original.

[46] For a discussion see Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 116-134.

[47] Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," p. 18. Emphasis added. See also Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 99 and 104.

[48] See Mohammed Ayoob, "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World," in Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen, eds. *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 31.

agenda in the Third World is determined by the interaction of these three security domains. Be it due to the domestic challenges to its legitimacy, the Third World's marginality to the international system, or the intensity of regional conflicts, the national security of the Third World state is qualitatively different from that of Western states.[49] The security of the Third World state is further exacerbated by "the security predicament" it experiences as a result of the pressures generated by the simultaneous operation of the heavy demands placed upon state institutions by the state-making process and, the intrusive systemic pressures from the international environment that complicate this very process.[50]

In the context of many Third World states, then, competing social organizations carry competing notions of national or state security; moreover, state security is determined by the interaction of domestic, international, and regional factors. At the core of these states' security problematic is a "dissonance between the loci of authority and power" within their respective societies.[51] The convergence of national, regime, and state security is non-existent. Masquerading as *raison d'état, raison du régime* is the only "high priest" governing the security beliefs of Third World ruling regimes, and survival in power is the ultimate salvation sought in this (not other) world.[52] It is in this environment of conflict between different conceptions of 'national security' that the "insecurity dilemma" develops. The consequences of this "insecurity dilemma" are delineated by Job: "(1) less effective security for all or ceratin sectors of the population, (2) less effective capacity of centralized state institutions to provide services and order, and (3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside

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[49] For a list of factors affecting the security of the state in the Third World see *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

[50] See Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective," in Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma*, p. 65.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[52] Borrowed, with some alteration, from Walid Khalidi, "Lebanon: Yesterday and Tomorrow," *Middle East Journal* 43, 3, (Summer 1989), p. 386.

powers."[53] The "insecurity dilemma" clearly demonstrates how on both accounts the logic of the "security dilemma" is violated in the Third World: states in the Third World are primarily preoccupied with domestic rather than external threats, and the survival of the state is guaranteed by international law rather than by the state's ability to neutralize external threats in a supposedly anarchic environment. Albeit no cause for celebration, mutual territorial recognition is the principal reason behind the continued existence of many developing states.[54]

1.3 ***Stability in Plural Societies: Models and Strategies***

In many Third World states the combination of deep segmental cleavages and the aforementioned dilemmas renders governing and state-building a difficult, let alone hazardous, task for both regime and society. Different models and hypotheses are advanced to explain political stability in deeply divided societies. Ruling regimes can also devise survival strategies to ensure the continuity of their tenure at the helm. Prior to discussing one such survival strategy, it is appropriate to discuss two models often used to explain stability in deeply divided societies: the "consociational democracy" and the "control" models. It is worth mentioning, however, that these models are better understood as ideal-type polar opposites of a continuum mapping political stability models and techniques in deeply divided societies. Not all political systems will fit the ideal-types described below. Most systems fall somewhere along the conflict-consociation continuum. It may even be the case that regimes will combine elements of both models in unequal proportions at different times to achieve their objectives. One rather intriguing case is that of a regime opting to use consociation as a conduit or technique for the control of other social segments to achieve parochial partisan interests.[55]

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[53] Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," p. 18.

[54] See Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 92 and 101.

[55] A good example is the period from September 1982 until 6 February 1984 during the presidency of Amin Jumayyil in Lebanon (1982-86).

1.3.1 *The Consociational Democracy Model*

The consociational democracy model is most notably affiliated with the work of Arend Lijphart. This model emerged from Lijphart's critique of Gabriel Almond's typology of political systems.[56] Lijphart contended that Almond's typology fails to explain those "deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies" in Switzerland, Austria, and the Low Countries which are stable democracies in spite of their deep social and subcultural cleavages.[57] The democratic stability of these "consociational democracies," Lijphart noted, must be explained in terms of the "cooperation by the leaders of the different groups which transcends the segmental or subcultural cleavages at the mass level."[58] Overarching cooperation at the elite level, "with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system," is the essential defining characteristic of consociational democracy.[59] The most salient distinction between Almond and Lijphart's typology "concerns the attitudes and actions of the political elites in a potentially, but not inevitably, unstable system."[60] This means, in the words of Lange and Meadwell, that "Lijphart's analysis stresses not the structures and processes of the state through which elites cooperate, but rather the values they bring to their encounters. These values can be taken as formative of, rather than formed by, the political structures and processes through which policy is formulated and implemented."[61]

[56] For the genesis of the consociational model see Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Politics* 1, 1, (April 1968), pp. 3-44. For Almond's typology see Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18, 3, (August 1956), pp. 391-409.

[57] Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, eds. *Issues in Comparative Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 224.

[58] Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 16.

[59] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," p. 21.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[61] Peter Lange and Hudson Meadwell, "Typologies of Democratic Systems: From Political Inputs to Political Economy," in Wiarda, *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, p. 87.

Consociational democracy is defined by four basic characteristics.[62] These four characteristics are all deviations from the Westministerian, majority rule, style of politics. The primary characteristic is government by a "grand coalition." The grand coalition is usually composed of leaders of all significant social segments. Albeit it can take different institutional forms - a cabinet or a federal council - the grand coalition provides a forum where segmental elites can resolve political problems through compromise and inter-segmental bargaining. The second necessary feature of consociational democracy is the "mutual veto" (or concurrent majority). By giving the leaders of every segment the right to veto political decisions, the mutual veto aims at guaranteeing that the interests of each segment are taken into consideration in the decision making process. In turn, the mutual veto mechanism is meant to guarantee unanimity in decision-making and, more importantly, adherence to political decisions by all segments. A third feature is "proportionality." As a conflict regulation mechanism, the basic characteristic of proportionality "is that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength."[63] Proportionality regulates the division of the political, civil service, and other government posts among the different segments of the society in a way reflective of their numerical weight in society. The final characteristic of consociational democracy is "segmental autonomy." The segmental autonomy principle provides every segment or community autonomy in the administration of their exclusive social spheres, especially those of a cultural, linguistic, or religious nature. The objective is to provide minority groups a level of autonomy that enables them to protect their distinct identity and cultural practices against the assimilationist pressures from the culturally dominant segment(s), or at least to feel that they are so doing.

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[62] For a comprehensive discussion see Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 25-44.

[63] Jürg Steiner, "The Principle of Majority and Proportionality," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, 1, (January 1971), p. 63.

1.3.2 *The Control Model*

In contradistinction to the consociational model, Ian Lustick presents the "control model" as an alternative explanation of political stability in deeply divided societies, "one that would focus on effective group control over rival group(s)."[64] Whereas the consociational model emphasizes inter-segmental elite cooperation, the control model focuses upon the emergence and consolidation of a relationship of domination between the segments, where stability is enforced as a result of the superior segment's sustained ability to constrain the political activities and opportunities of the other segment(s). Under a system of control, political stability derives from "the sustained manipulation of *subordinate* segment(s) by a *superordinate* segment."[65]

The control model is based upon an analytical framework that attempts to piot the array of "control techniques" used in deeply divided societies. For any control relationship, this framework should, first, "specify the kinds of factors requiring investigation;" and second, "specify the functional requisites for achieving effective control" in a vertically segmented society. Satisfying the first condition requires "a multilevel analysis which systematically distinguishes pertinent cultural, geographical, ecological, or social structural 'givens' from institutional or ideological factors and from the calculated policies which superordinate groups design and implement in order to achieve control or reinforce the conditions which make its maintenance possible." The second condition could be met by focusing on, first, "how subordinate group members are deprived of facilities for united political action," second, "how the subordinate group is denied access to independent sources of economic support," and third, "how (for purposes of surveillance and resource extraction) effective superordinate penetration of the subordinate

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[64] Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31, 3, (April 1979), p. 326.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 330. Emphasis added. Lustick identifies seven conceptual differences between consociation and control, pp. 330-332.

group is achieved.''[66]

Lustick used this analytical framework to investigate the reasons behind the political quiescence of Israel's Arab minority. The answer, he argued, lies in the presence of ''a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over Israeli Arabs.''[67] Lustick identifies the following three ''components'' of this 'system of control' which serve to fulfil the 'functional requisites' of control: ''Segmentation'' connotes the isolation of the Arab minority from the Jewish population and its internal fragmentation; ''dependence'' describe's the Arab minority's ''enforced reliance'' on the Jewish majority for political and economic resources; and finally, ''cooptation'' refers to ''the use of side payments to Arab elites or potential elites for purposes of surveillance and resource extraction.''[68] Each component of control is examined on three levels of analysis: the ''structural'' (the existing historical, ecological, cultural, and economic circumstances); the ''institutional'' (which pertains to the function's of the state's institutions); and the ''programmatic'' (meaning the specific programs and policies undertaken by the superordinate regime to facilitate the control of the subordinate segment).[69] The systemic nature of control, and hence its efficacy and stability, results from the ''synergistic relationships that exist *among* the aforementioned three components of control - segmentation, dependence, and cooptation - and that exist *within* each component among structural conditions, institutional arrangements, and implemented programs.''[70]

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[66] All quotes from Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 76.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 25. Emphasis omitted.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 79. Emphasis added.

1.3.3 *The State-Building via State-Insulation Survival Strategy in Developing, Permeable, Plural Societies*

In addition to the preceding models, a regime may opt for the following survival strategy to generate political stability in a developing, permeable, plural society. Such societies suffer from a lack of national integration (the *'asabiyya* dilemma) and the permeability of state borders to regional ideological currents and manipulation. In this case, domestic stability is jeopardized not only by domestic segmental competition, but also by the tendency of external and internal actors to manipulate the segmental cleavages in order to advance their regional or domestic goals respectively. Furthermore, the convergence of border permeability and the concomitant manipulation of the segmental cleavages by external (or internal) actors is bound to intensify the existing segmental cleavages, rendering the state ungovernable, and ultimately leading to the unravelling of the political system. Facing this problematic, regimes governing developing, permeable, plural societies can resort to the following survival strategy: accommodate the regional hegemon to insulate the domestic political arena from transnational manipulation and, having accomplished this task, engage in a process of state-building, represented by a mix of political, social, and economic reform policies directed at achieving an acceptable level of national integration that would provide the state allegiance from either a sizable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population. The regime may also elicit support from an extra-regional ally to protect the state from foreign military intervention and to constrain the domestic opposition. But what is the dynamic and the efficacy of this particular survival strategy?

An accommodationist regional policy may accomplish two cardinal and organically linked objectives: it enables the ruling regime to neutralize external threats to domestic stability. At the same time, it neutralizes attempts by domestic actors to appeal to regional supporters or use trans-national ideologies to buttress their leverage in the domestic arena, limiting their ability to destabilize the political system. Once a regime is successful in insulating the domestic arena from external pressures, it can endeavour the long-run eradication of border permeability and state vulnerability to external manipulation.

In the case of plural societies, one effective remedy lies in the process of state- or *'asabiyya*-building. By penetrating society, and by offering palpable incentives through a mix of political, economic, and social reforms, the regime can garner allegiance and support from the populace to the institutions of the state - rather than to the different segmental institutions or symbols. In this case, state-building becomes instrumental in moderating the segmental cleavages in society, the permeability of borders and, ultimately, domestic vulnerability to external manipulation.

This chapter has been largely heuristic. The themes explored in it will be used as conceptual and analytical guides in the later case study analyses. A proper explanation of the success and failure of Hussein and Shihab's survival strategies requires an analysis of the process of state formation and cleavage institutionalization in Jordan and Lebanon, and the regional constraints and foreign policy options they face. These themes are examined in the following chapter.

2. *STATE FORMATION, CLEAVAGE INSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND REGIONAL PERMEABILITY: JORDAN AND LEBANON*

Jordan and Lebanon share a common birth tag: both are originally mandatory creations. The two countries were created by mandatory fiat in the post-World War I British and French imperial scuttle to secure their respective historic, economic, and strategic interests in the Levant. This chapter will trace the process of state formation to unravel the origins of the *'asabiyya* dilemma in both countries. A study of each state's political system allows for an investigation of how the segmental cleavages were institutionalized. Finally, a discussion of the Arab state system and the domestic determinants of foreign policy will cast light on the vulnerability to regional manipulation experienced by states suffering from a *'asabiyya* dilemma and, consequently, the foreign policy options they face.

2.1 *State Formation in Jordan*

Transjordan was created as a result of a short-term arrangement between Amir Abdullah and then British secretary of state for the colonies, Winston Churchill, during their deliberations in Jerusalem at the end of March 1921. To the British, the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan was part of an effort to appease their Sharifian war-time allies, Arab public opinion, and more importantly, as a precautionary measure against possible French designs to claim additional mandatory authority over the southern regions of Greater (or geographic) Syria. The creation of Transjordan marked the first time that its hitherto separate constitutive regions were brought together to form a united political and administrative entity.[71] Under Ottoman administration, the northern and middle regions belonged to the Ottoman Vilayet of Syria, while parts of the southern region belonged to the Ottoman Vilayet of the Hijaz. Indeed, "Transjordan was an artificial creation with little meaning beyond its importance to British strategy and imperial

[71] See Muhammad Ahmad Muhafazah, *'Imarat Sharq al-'Urdun: Nash'atuha wa Tatawuruha fi Rub'i Qarn, 1921-1946* [The Princedom of East Jordan: Its Emergence and Development in a Quarter Century] (Amman: Dar al-Furqan lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi', 1990), p. 8.

communications."[72]

Throughout its early years, Transjordan remained a tentative British creation. Abdullah himself considered Transjordan a temporary stop on a journey he thought would lead to the creation of, and rule over, a Greater Syria. However, northward expansion by the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance beginning in 1922 increased the value of Transjordan in British strategic calculations. The British recognized the need for a physical barrier not only to separate Palestine - then open to Zionist colonization - from Saudi expansionism, but also to insulate Palestine from the zealous Wahhabi ideology which, the British feared, could provide the Palestinian opposition a potent galvanizing rallying cry against the mandatory authorities.[73] Hence, in the "assurance" of May 1923, Great Britain officially recognized "the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan, under the rule of His Highness the Amir Abdullah ibn Husain [sic]." However, this recognition was qualified, and all it amounted to was a British recognition of the existence of a government in Transjordan independent from that in Palestine, but under British control.[74]

In this formative period of the Emirate's history, the segmental composition of the population was differentiated along four, significantly unequal, vertical cleavages: the mode of life and economy, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and religion. The most salient, and relevant, cleavage was that concerning the mode of life and economy of the inhabitants of Transjordan: whether it was pastoral or peasant, nomadic or settled. Tribes were either nomadic, roaming the desert, or settled (*hadari*), dwelling in make-shift houses and cultivating their land. Tribal affiliation was another important cleavage. The Huwaytat, the Bani Sakhr, the 'Adwan, the Majali, and the Sirhan constituted major tribal confederations and clans. Political rivalry closely followed tribal rivalry, and the regime had to maintain balanced relations with the different tribal

[72] Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 213.

[73] See *Ibid.*, pp. 71-2.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-6. The quotation from the British declaration is from *Ibid.*, p. 75.

confederations. The Huwaytat are dominant in the southern regions, the Bani Sakhr and the 'Adwan in the northern regions, and the Majalis are concentrated in Karak. Ethnically, the Arab component of the Emirate was dominant. It was composed not only of the indigenous Arab inhabitants, but also Arab communities from Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz who found their way to Transjordan after the first World War regional settlement. The other ethnic minority groups, the Circassian, Shishani, and Turkemen non-Arabs had been offered arable land and settled in the region by Sultan Abdulhamid II beginning in 1878 in order to subjugate the neighbouring tribes and consolidate Ottoman control in the region.[75] This ethnic cleavage was mitigated by the shared religion of Sunni Islam. Hence, the ethnic cleavage was not deep, nor was it politically salient. Religious cleavages were equally not politically salient. In addition to the dominant religion of Sunni Islam, Christian groups of the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Protestant rites numbered around ten percent of the population, while Shishani Shi'a Muslims were a negligible religious minority.[76]

At this stage Abdullah, with British help, did not face grave difficulties consolidating his rule in Transjordan. A Hijazi and a Sharifian by origin and birth, Abdullah had to lure to his side both the Transjordanian community whom he encountered upon arrival in the area, and the other communities who had filtered into Transjordan. The social basis of the regime would be built by cooptation, force, or assimilation. The Circassians and the bedouins constituted the core of Abdullah's regime and social basis in this formative period. Through over-representation in the administration and guaranteed parliamentary and governmental representation the ethnic minorities, especially the Circassians, were easily assimilated and coopted. The bedouins were recruited into the army, and in exchange for economic aid, education, and employment opportunities their allegiance to the central authorities was secured.[77] Abdullah's

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[75] See Muhafazah, *'Imarat Sharq al-'Urdun*, pp. 26 and 256.

[76] For statistics see Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, p. 55.

[77] See Joseph Hiatt, "State Formation and the Incorporation of Nomads: Local Change and Continuity among Jordanian Bedouin," in Peter Skalník, ed. *Outwitting the State* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), pp. 71-73.

Sharifian credentials automatically appealed to the religiously conservative southern tribes. In order to cement his nascent patronage networks with the tribal chiefs, Abdullah offered these chiefs large tracts of land for symbolic costs in exchange for loyalty and support. He also exempted many tribes from tax payments to win their allegiance. However, this did not mean that tribal challenges to Abdullah's rule were completely pacified, especially from the northern tribes whose ties with Syria were stronger than with the central authorities in Amman. After all, it took British military power to crush the northern 'Adwan revolt of August 1923. Nevertheless, after their military pacification, and subsequent pardoning by Abdullah, the northern tribes became loyal supporters of the Hashemite regime. However, tribal rivalry, especially the 'Adwan-Bani Sakhr rivalry, dominated tribal politics well into the twentieth century, and the conversion of large sections of the southern Transjordanian Huwaytat tribe to Wahhabism created an internal force allied to Abdullah's chief rival, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Saud. As for the Hijazi and the commercial Syrian communities who settled in Transjordan, these were more concerned with commerce than with politics, and they willingly supported Abdullah. In fact, the Hijazi community, traditionally skilled in tribal affairs, played an instrumental role in consolidating Abdullah's tribal relations.[78]

It was the Palestinian and Syrian nationalists who represented a significant menace to the stability of Abdullah's regime. In this case the British authorities in Transjordan actively sought to neutralize the nationalist threat. The British authorities attempted to create a Transjordanian opposition to Syrian and Palestinian nationalists by encouraging anti-nationalist feelings among some Transjordanian leaders. This, the British hoped, would facilitate the expulsion of those nationalist figures who threatened Abdullah's regime and the Emirate's relations with the French mandatory authorities in Syria. By 1924, most Syrian nationalists had been evicted from the Emirate. As for the Palestinian nationalists, many were allowed to stay but only after severing their nationalist connections.[79]

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[78] See Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, pp. 57-8, 91-2, and 98.

[79] See *Ibid.*, pp. 65-6 and 91; and Muhafazah, *'Imarat Sharq al-'Urdun*, pp. 80-81.

In May 1946 the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty was signed recognizing the independence of Transjordan from Great Britain and Abdullah sovereign king. However, the regime and Transjordan's survival were both financially and militarily dependent on British support. The next year, in February 1947, a new constitution was promulgated. It replaced the 1928 Organic Law and renamed Transjordan the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hence, by the end of 1946, the transplanted Hijazi regime was heading a pyramidal hierarchial power structure composed of the following elements: the ruling Hashemites, a loyal Transjordanian constituency, and other coopted (or assimilated) Syrian, Hijazi, and Palestinian communities. But regional developments would profoundly change the character and nature of the Hashemite Kingdom and, consequently, radically alter the structure of its segmental composition.

2.1.1 *The Creation of a 'Asabiyya Dilemma: Segmental Cleavages in Jordan*

In the inter-war period, Abdullah was perpetually vexed by two ambitions: to annex whatever Arab parts remain of Palestine after Zionist settlement, and to reign over a rejuvenated Greater Syria.[80] If, to Abdullah's chagrin, the latter objective proved elusive, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war provided him the opportunity to accomplish the former objective. Thus on the morrow of the 1948 war, and until the official annexation (or 'union') resolution of the Jordanian parliament was promulgated on 25 April 1950, Abdullah followed a policy of "creeping annexation" towards the Transjordanian-controlled parts of Palestine.[81] The process began in earnest with the convening of the "Jericho Congress" on 1 December 1948. The congress, a show of Palestinian support and allegiance to Abdullah arranged by his officials and Palestinian cronies, closed with the adoption of a (multi-version) resolution calling for the union of Palestine and Jordan under a single Kingdom ruled by Abdullah. This was followed by a set of linguistic,

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[80] See Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, p. 155. See also Y. Porath, "Abdallah's Greater Syria Programme," *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, 2, (April 1984), pp. 172-189.

[81] See Avi Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan: 1948-1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), chapter one.

economic, and legislative policies aimed at diluting Palestinian identity and consolidating Hashemite control in the annexed parts of Palestine. Henceforth, Palestine and Transjordan, the two wings of the Kingdom of Jordan, were referred to as the West Bank and the East Bank respectively. The term Palestine was eschewed in official political discourse. Financial loans were selectively offered to pro-Hashemite landlords and notables in Palestine to solidify Hashemite support. And in 1949 a law was promulgated offering Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinian Arabs under Jordanian rule.[82] But the 1948 war and the later annexation of portions of Palestine by Jordan could not transpire without causing structural changes within the expanded Jordanian Kingdom.

Perhaps the most important effect of the flight of many Palestinians from their homes to the West Bank and to Transjordan proper during and after the 1948 war, and the subsequent unity decision of 24 April 1950, was the creation of a new demographic reality in Jordan. Prior to the war the inhabitants of the West Bank numbered some 425,000 while those in the East Bank were around 375,000. The 1948 war added close to 360,000 Palestinian refugees to the West Bank and another 110,000 to the East Bank. These Palestinian refugees were not a monolithic bloc. Rather, some were bedouins while others were villagers or town-dwellers. The urbanites among them were either educated professionals, merchants, artisans, or landowners who settled in the towns rather than in refugee camps after they fled their homes.[83] In 1951-52, after the union, Palestinians constituted 64.57 percent of the Kingdom's total population, with this percentage rising to 68.81 percent if the pre-1948 Palestinians of Amman are included. By 1961, Palestinians represented 43 percent of the population of Transjordan, excluding the West Bank population.[84] The 1967 Arab-Israeli war further compounded Jordan's demographic

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[82] See Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, pp. 190-194.

[83] See Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan*, p. 16.

[84] All statistics are taken from Yazid Yusif Sayigh, *Al-'Urdun wa-l-Filastiniyun: Dirasa fi Wihdat al-Masir 'aw al-Sira' al-Hatmi* [Jordan and the Palestinians: A Study of a United Destiny or the Certain Struggle] (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1987), pp. 12-14. It should be mentioned that statistical figures concerning the exact number of Palestinians in Jordan vary with the source consulted.

predicament. The Israeli occupation of Arab East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip caused around 300,000 Palestinians to move from those areas to the East Bank.[85] The shift from a population characterized by a vast East Jordanian majority to one with a clear and potent Palestinian majority was effected. If, indeed, the 1948 war transformed Jordan into "a complex polity of clashing interests and of diverse class and political identities," the 1967 war further exacerbated this situation.[86] This clash of interests and diversity in identities engendered an acute structural transformation in the segmental composition of the Kingdom largely responsible for the creation of Jordan's *'asabiyya* dilemma, a dilemma rooted in incompatible visions and definitions of the Jordanian kingdom.

Henceforth, the most important segmental cleavage in Jordanian society became the sociopolitical and national distinction between the politically dominant East Jordanians and the refugee and immigrant Palestinian communities. Different reasons gave rise to the antagonism that emerged between the two communities. Perhaps most important was (and still is) the clash in national identities, loyalties, aims, and priorities held by the two communities. The Transjordanians were mainly concerned with the economic and social development of the East Bank; the Palestinians, on the other hand, were particularly concerned with returning to Palestine. Although some Palestinians called for co-existence with the Jordanian Kingdom, many others considered it a temporary shelter, or base, pending the liberation of Palestine. Hence citizenship did not carry similar connotations for all naturalized Jordanians. Especially for the camp dwellers and the Palestinians who came to Jordan after the 1967 war, Jordanian citizenship was perceived as "a convenience rather than an identity or a loyalty."[87] The attitude of both communities to the nascent Israeli state was categorically opposed. Whereas the kingdom's political elite, especially the ruling Hashemites, were more than willing to reach a *modus vivendi* with Israel, the Palestinians regarded Israel

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[85] See Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 1.

[86] Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, p. 206.

[87] Gubser, *Jordan*, p. 15.

as the source of their misery and dispossession. To the Palestinians cooperation with the Israeli 'enemy' was tantamount to treason. Other sources of tension were also present.

In general, the Palestinians were economically more advanced, educationally superior, and politically more sophisticated than their Transjordanian counterparts. That they were relegated to a secondary role in the new polity caused them disenchantment. Before the 1967 war, the Palestinians also resented the one-sided, East Bank concentrated, nature of the regime's economic development, financial, agricultural, and industrial policies - despite the fact that many Palestinians living in the East Bank were able to gain financially from these policies. On the other hand, Transjordanians feared Palestinian economic and political competition in their own country. Transjordanians - especially the bedouin in the south - resented the feeling of superiority the Palestinians demonstrated towards them and looked down with contempt upon the wretched camp refugees. In a nut-shell then, "[p]olitical and economic competition and conflict of interests were to characterize the process of co-existence" between the Transjordanian and Palestinian communities.[88]

The national cleavage was not the only cleavage present in Jordan after 1948. The aforementioned ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic cleavages were also present but were relegated to a lower degree of saliency *vis-à-vis* the national cleavage. In fact, the national cleavage may have mitigated the cleavages among the Transjordanian population, and between them and the Hashemite regime. Hence, the transformation of Jordanian society's segmental composition engendered a change in the configuration of the pre-1948 power structure. To the old social structure was introduced a majority Palestinian contingent, often hostile to the existing regime and its allied segmental pillars. As a result, the new social hierarchy came to be composed of roughly three main sociopolitical segments: the ruling Hashemites; a now expanded Transjordanian community which included, in addition to the indigenous Transjordanians, the assimilated Palestinian, Syrian, and Hijazi communities that had moved to Transjordan before 1948 - an

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[88] Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan*, p. 32; and more generally pp. 32-37.

expanded community whose loyalty and support are cardinal for the continuation of Hashemite rule; and a large Palestinian community whose loyalty to the Kingdom has at times been both elusive and suspect. This latter Palestinian segment may be further divided along temporal and domicile lines. Temporally, there were three major waves of incoming Palestinians to the East Bank: after the 1948 war, between the 1948 and the 1967 wars, and after the 1967 war.[89] By way of domicile, the Palestinians were either housed in the refugee camps or, in the case of the better off, found housing in urban towns.

The Hashemite regime has cultivated strong ties with the Transjordanian community, while at the same time endeavouring to expand its scope of representation to gain legitimacy from as many Palestinians as possible. Often, the regime has been forced to strike a balance between exclusive Transjordanian nationalism and a strong Palestinian identity that refuses to wither away despite, or because of, the experience of exile. The regime's ability to maintain political power, in spite of the transformations that transpired, was made possible, at least in part, by a political system that concentrated both legal and practical power in particular segments of Jordanian society to the exclusion of others. Best conceived in terms of the 'control model' discussed in the previous chapter, this political system is based upon 'the sustained manipulation of subordinate segment(s) by a superordinate segment.' A brief description of the political system in Jordan may clarify this contention.

2.1.2 *The Institutionalization of the Segmental Cleavages: The Political System in Jordan*

The political system in Jordan is dominated by a superordinate segment composed of the ruling Hashemites and their Transjordanian supporters. The kingdom's hierarchic, autocratic, neo-patrimonial political structure is almost totally dominated by Transjordanians and coopted Palestinian notables and

[89] An additional fourth wave took place after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by Palestinians who had been working in the Gulf states.

their families. In this system the mass post-1948 Palestinian community is the subordinate segment.[90]

The superordinate segment subscribes to a specific "image of Jordan, ' whose conception of Jordan has been described by Uriel Dann in the following way:

> A kingdom, hereditary in the Hashemite family, successor to the British-mandated emirate of Transjordan, and heir, as far as possible, to the emirate's political, social, and psychological values; hence, the king as linchpin of the political machine; the trappings of monarchy possessing real significance; an establishment jealous for the independence of the state and fearful of 'liberated' pan-Arabism, whatever the origin of its appeals; determined to lean on the West and dependent on its aid; a professional army in the background, to be called out on comparatively slight provocation and used ruthlessly if need be.[91]

The superordinate segment's control over the political system is secured by monopolizing most offices of political or military importance. Its executive arm is the "establishment:" a group of high-level decision makers and the high-level decision enforcers.[92] This 'establishment' is composed of the King, who is the chief executive; the inner Cabinet, especially the Prime minister, the deputy Prime minister, the interior and information (or propaganda) ministers; the army and its high command; the Chief of the Royal Hashemite Diwan and the royal coterie of advisors, friends, and Hashemite relatives.[93] The 'establishment' is staffed by Hashemites, Transjordanians, and coopted Palestinian notables and their families. The latter category is composed of two groups. On the one hand, Palestinian arrivals in Transjordan before 1948, a group that has fully assimilated into Transjordanian society, providing many able prime ministers and politicians who have served loyally under both Kings Abdullah and Hussein.[94] On the other hand, there are the Palestinian notables and politicians who were coopted into the regime

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[90] In reality, these categories are not as water tight as they are presented here. They should be considered as ideal-type, though reductionist, conceptual categories. Transjordanian opposition to Hashemite rule has not been absent, nor are all Palestinians poised against the regime.

[91] Uriel Dann, "Regime and Opposition in Jordan Since 1949," in Menahem Milson, ed. *Society and Political Structure in the Arab World* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 146.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

[93] For a discussion see *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51.

[94] Of the nine prime ministers who served under Abdullah three were of Palestinian origin. The three are Ibrahim Hashim, Tawfic Abul Huda, and Samir al-Rifa'i. All three later served as prime ministers under Hussein. Zeid al-Rifa'i, Samir's son, was a close aid to Hussein and later served as prime minister.

even before the 1950 annexation of the West Bank and offered ministerial and Parliamentary roles. Policy formation on sensitive issues has always been the preserve of Hashemites, Transjordanians, and the pre-1948 East Bank Palestinians, to the exclusion of most West Bank Palestinians.[95] Although the king is the ultimate "decision-*taker*," he is not the sole "decision-*maker*."[96] The 'establishment' does play a role in the actual decision-making process. However, the Cabinet (especially after 1957) is an executive arm of the king, not a policy debating forum. Similarly, foreign policy is the cherished preserve of the king. The Foreign Ministry simply implements the king's foreign policy decisions.[97]

Loyalty to the Hashemite regime is probably the single most important criteria in the selection of ministers or in the promotion of senior officers in the army and security agencies. Among the Transjordanians who participate in governing the kingdom, the southerners are more preponderant than the northerners. Among the minority groups the Circassian and the Shishanis play a prominent role in the 'establishment,' unlike the Christians. Sherifians are often appointed to strategic positions, and the upper echelons of the army are bedouin dominated.[98] Moreover, the core of the army, the police, the security services, and the civil administration is staffed by loyal Transjordanians: the East Bank urban elite, small-town and village people, and bedouin tribes with strong allegiance to the regime.[99]

The prerogatives of the superordinate segment are buttressed by legal mechanisms enshrined in the Constitution of the kingdom. The 1952 Constitution provided for a strong executive embodied in the

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[95] See Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 108-9.

[96] For the distinction between "decision-taking" and "decision-making" see Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Arab Foreign Policies in a Changing Environment," in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of the Arab States: The Challenge of Change* second edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 411; and Rex Brynen's review essay in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, 3, (August 1991), p. 423.

[97] See Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 10-14.

[98] For a discussion see Dann, "Regime and Opposition in Jordan Since 1949," pp. 178-79.

[99] See Uriel Dann, *King Hussein's Survival Strategy* Policy Papers No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), pp. 55-56.

person of the king. This is not without precedent, for the 1952 Constitution developed from the Organic Law of 1928 and the kingdom's first Constitution of 1947.

Promulgated on 16 April 1928, the Organic Law vested both executive and legislative power in the hands of the (then) Amir. The Amir was aided by a Cabinet responsible to him and an Executive Council (previously a Consultative Council) whose role was purely advisory. The Amir was empowered to appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of the members of the Executive Council and the Prime (until 1939 Chief) minister. The Organic Law established a Legislative Council subordinate to the Amir, the prime minister, and the British resident. The Amir convened, dismissed, and dissolved the Legislative Council whose sessions were headed by the Prime minister who in turn is responsible to the Amir. In accordance with the Organic Law an Electoral Law was enacted on 17 June 1928. Among other things, it guaranteed communal representation and institutionalized the over-representation of the minority segments upon whose loyalty the regime depended, i.e. the bedouins, the Circassians, and the Christians. In short, the Organic Law was tailored to serve the interests of the Hashemite Amir and the British authorities. Its absolutist monarchical nature "enabled the Amir to control the governed" while he was being controlled by the British government.[100]

After the 1946 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty recognized the independence of Transjordan a new constitution was promulgated on 1 February 1947 replacing the 1928 Organic Law and transforming the Emirate into a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The new constitution introduced a bicameral legislative assembly composed of a popularly elected lower house and an upper house of notables appointed by the king. However, the king retained all effective authority. In addition to his right to appoint and dismiss the cabinet, the king was empowered to appoint members to the upper house, the presidents of both houses,

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[100] See Naseer H. Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965)* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhaff, 1972), p. 77. For the Organic Law see Aruri, pp. 77-78; and Ahmad Serhal, *Al-Nudhum al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Dusturiyya fi Lubnan wa Kafat al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya* [The Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and All the Arab States] (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1990), pp. 260-61.

and dismiss the legislature.[101] Though it provided for the sharing of legislative power between the king and the Legislative Council, the 1947 constitution provided no checks on the prerogatives of the king.

The union decree of 1950 and the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 heralded the third phase of Jordan's constitutional history. The infusion of a large, highly politicized, Palestinian community into the kingdom at a time when the monarchy was passing through an unstable transition entailed modifications to the existing royal absolutism. There was a need to 'democratize' the political process and introduce legislative checks on the power of the executive. Palestinian and nationalist forces joined together calling for the revision of the 1947 constitution. To appease the domestic opposition and neutralize external criticism and intrigues, the executive promulgated a new constitution on 2 January 1952. In fact, the Hashemite monarchy's political allies used this episode to extricate themselves from a position of subservience to the king. As a result, power was transferred from the hands of the king alone to the Palace as a group, consisting of the monarchy and its political allies.[102]

The 1952 Constitution named the king the head of state, the supreme commander of the army, and the highest executive power. The king exercises his executive power through his ministers (article 26). The king appoints the prime minister, dismisses him, or accepts his resignation (article 35). The single most innovation of the 1952 Constitution was to transform the hitherto non-responsible Council of Ministers into one that, with the prime minister, is collectively accountable to the House of Representatives (article 51). The House is empowered to dismiss the Council of Ministers by an absolute majority vote of no confidence (article 53).[103] By so stipulating, the legislature was permitted, at least theoretically and for the first time, to exercise control over the executive branch and to take a role in decision-making. An attempt to curb absolute royal authority was made by giving the House the power to override the royal

[101] See Serhal, *Al-Nudhum al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Dusturiyya*, pp. 262-63.

[102] For a discussion of this process see Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, pp. 89-91.

[103] Originally, the Constitution demanded a difficult two-thirds vote of no confidence for the government to resign. In 1954 the constitution was amended reducing the two-thirds to an absolute majority vote.

veto by a (difficult) two-thirds vote in both the Senate and the House (article 93). However, while the House can dismiss the Council of Ministers, the king retained the right to dissolve the House of Representatives and issue orders for holding elections to the lower House (article 34). Furthermore, the king may, by royal decree, postpone the summoning of the National Assembly, composed of the upper and lower Houses, for a maximum of two months (article 78) or convene it in extraordinary session to deliberate specific matters (article 82). When the National Assembly is dissolved the constitution empowers the king to rule by royal decree (article 40) and the Cabinet, with the king's approval, to promulgate provisional laws on necessary matters (article 94).[104]

In addition to the preceding Constitutional prerogatives, particular laws gave the regime extra-constitutional powers. The 1935 Emergency Defence Regulations (technically enforced since 1939), the Political Parties Law (1954), and the Anti-Communist Law (1953) provided the regime broad authorities to restrict the rights of citizens.[105] Under the Defence Regulations, for example, the government could restrict or limit any form of political activity, public assembly, or publication deemed detrimental to public interest; moreover, the government could arrest or exile without trial citizens whose activity was considered a threat to national security.

2.2 *State Formation in Lebanon*

On the first of September 1920, the French High Commissioner in Beirut, General Henri Gouraud, proclaimed the creation of the State of 'Greater Lebanon,' or *Grand Liban*. By creating Greater Lebanon, France hoped to establish a loyal and permanent base of support from which it could protect and pursue its cultural, economic, and strategic interests in the Levant. At the same time, the French sought to satisfy

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[104] See text of 1952 Constitution in Abdelaziz Suleiman Ma'aita, "Political Leadership and Modernization: A Case Study of Jordan, 1921-1988," (Ph.D. Thesis, United States International University, 1988), pp. 382-429.

[105] See Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, pp. 34-37.

the aspirations of the Maronites, their traditional protégés and allies in the region, for "an independent Christian state."[106] After all, it was the Maronites, led by their Church, who first conceived of and actively pursued the creation of this 'independent Christian state,' and who later vigorously protected its expanded borders until independence was secured in 1943. To trace the process of state formation in Lebanon entails a short detour into the socio-political regimes that predated, but profoundly shaped, the segmental composition and the political system of the future independent Lebanese state. An optimal point of departure is the Mutasarrifate (*mutasarrifiyya*) regime that existed in Mount Lebanon beginning in the late nineteenth century. But first the precursor of this regime.

The Mutasarrifate is the historical inheritor of, first, the Princedom (*Imara*) and, later, the Double Qa'immaqamate (*qa'immaqamiyya*) regimes of Mount Lebanon. Although there is no direct continuity between the Princedom and later regimes in the Mountain, the history of the Princedom is relevant for at least one reason: the Princedom was "the political institution around which Lebanon would eventually crystallize."[107] It was under Ma'ni rule (1627-1697) that the Princedom began to take shape, bringing together the Druze and Maronite inhabitants and heretofore separate lordships of the Shuf (southern) and the Kisirwan (northern) districts of Mount Lebanon in a loose union under a recognized Ma'ni leadership.[108] The most that can be said about the Ma'ni Princedom is that under the patronage of Amir Fakhr al-Din II (1627-1635) a "subtle symbiosis" developed between the Maronite and Druze communities of the Princedom.[109] To be sure, Fakhr al-Din was no 'Emir of Lebanon,' nor did he found a Lebanese state. The Princedom was no more than an Ottoman tax farm (*iltizam*) whose prince was a tax

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[106] Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 97.

[107] Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," in Leonard Binder, ed. *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 16.

[108] See *Ibid.*

[109] Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 127. The myth that Fakhr al-Din was the founder of a Lebanese state is brilliantly debunked by Salibi in this important book, see chapter six and especially pp. 126-128.

collector employed, appointed and, when the need arose, deposed by the Ottoman authorities. The princedom was so by name only, with no dynasty of reigning princes, legitimacy, sense of common identity, or loyalty from all its inhabitants. Yet this era bequeathed another heritage to later regimes, one that even marked political practice in the independent Lebanese state: this was the "secular principle" of leadership according to which it was expected that the "holder of authority, whether the local lord or the supreme ruler, should stand in a sense above his own community, should protect the religious men and laity of faiths other than his own."[110] With the extinction of the Ma'ni line in 1697 the Ottomans confirmed the Shihabs as their new tax collectors.

Under the rule of the Shihabi prince Bashir II (1788-1840) the whole of Mount Lebanon was politically united. The Shihabs introduced "a unique system of fiscal cantons" which gave their regime "a special character within the broader Ottoman system."[111] Nevertheless, the Princedom remained a feudal hierarchy headed by the Shihabs who held its different parts together. It was not the continuation of an earlier princedom, albeit it was the historical precursor of the later Mutasarrifate regime of Mount Lebanon. In this period, and due to a combination of demographic, political, and economic factors the Maronite-Druze balance of power that had existed in the Princedom was irreversibilly altered in favour of the Maronite community.[112] Perhaps the most important development of this era was the emergence of the Maronite Church, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, as the dominant power in Mount Lebanon.

Before the end of the eighteenth century, politics in the Princedom, though not consciously secular, was not sectarian (or confessional). Rather, an individual's allegiance was first to the feudal lord (*muqat'ji*)

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[110] Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," p. 16.

[111] Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 128.

[112] See Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1977), pp. 6, 8, 13, and 27.

and then to the ruling prince, whether they were of one's religious group or not.[113] This state of affairs would soon change. Internal reforms undertaken by the Maronite Church proved successful in extricating the Church from its economic, and hence political, dependence upon the feudal lords. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Maronite Church had become "the largest, the most organized, and the wealthiest organization in the whole of Mount Lebanon. Its interests as an organization became entwined with those of the political system."[114] With this the seeds of confessional (or communal) politics were sown in Mount Lebanon. It was around this time also that the first stirrings of separatist Maronite nationalism were voiced. Bishop Niqolas Murad (d. 1862) depicted the Maronite self image as that of "a people with a distinct and separate character from their neighbours."[115] His thesis was that "being a national group with their own history, the Maronites should also form a state."[116] But Murad was not alone in articulating (Christian) Lebanese nationalist themes. The Maronite historian Tannus al-Shidyaq (d.1861) was probably the first to introduce the notion that the origin of the Lebanese people can be traced back to the Phoenicians.[117]

The Egyptian invasion of Syria from 1831 until 1840, the communal conflict in the Mountain between the Druze and the Maronites that followed, and the attempt by the Ottoman authorities to apply direct control over Mount Lebanon led to the establishment of a new regime for the Princedom on 1 January 1843. The new regime, which was a by product of the intrigues of the Eastern Question, called for the partition of Mount Lebanon into two administrative districts, a northern district administered by

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[113] See Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 42.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[117] For Shidyaq see Kamal S. Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon* (New York: AMS Press, n.d.), pp. 161-233.

a Maronite district governor (*Qa'immaqam*), and a southern district administered by a Druze.[118] The Double Qa'immaqamate regime provided for a twelve member elected council representing the different religious groups whose role was to advise and assist the governor of each Qa'immaqamate. The Council in each district consisted of a deputy to the district Governor of the same sect of the latter, plus a judge and a tax-assessor from each of the six different sects that inhabited Mount Lebanon: the Maronites, the Druze, the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, the Sunni Muslims, and the Shi'a Muslims (the Sunni and Shi'a Muslims shared the same judge).[119] Hourani notes that it is in this Council that "we find the first embodiment of the communal principle, which has since been the basis of the legislature" in Lebanon.[120] Inherently flawed due to the lack of confessional homogeneity in each district and its inability to acknowledge the developments of the past century, the Qa'immaqamate regime held the peace in Mount Lebanon until 1858. It was only after the sectarian massacres of 1860 that a somewhat lasting regime was inaugurated in Mount Lebanon.

The new regime was finalized on 9 June 1861 in the form of the *Règlement Organique*. The *Règlement* proclaimed Mount Lebanon a *mutasarrifiyya*, a privileged autonomous Ottoman *Sanjak* (administrative region) under the guarantee of its six signatory powers. The Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon was to be ruled by a Catholic Christian plenipotentiary, or *mutasarrif*, who would be appointed by the Porte and responsible directly to Istanbul. The *mutasarrif* had to be an Ottoman subject, but not a Lebanese, and approval for his appointment had to be elicited from the signatory powers.[121] The ruse utilized in meticulously describing the characteristics of the *mutasarrif* was not without reason. "As a

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[118] For the Double Qa'immaqamate system see Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, chapter four.

[119] See Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society*, p. 272; and Malcolm H. Kerr, *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868: A Contemporary Account by Antun Dahir al-'Aqiqi and other Documents* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959), p. 10.

[120] Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," p. 22.

[121] See Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, chapter six.

Christian he would be acceptable to the Maronites, but not being a Maronite - an Ottoman official having the support of Europe - he would stand above the aspirations and conflicts of communities.''[122] The 'communal principle' was restored and institutionalized in the new Administrative Council composed of twelve members and reflecting the segmental composition of the Mutasarrifate: four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni Muslim, and one Shi'a Muslim. Behind the decision to offer the Maronites four seats on the Administrative Council lied the ''underlying assumption of the new system ... that the different communities could live together but that the Maronites were dominant.''[123] This *modus operandi* allowed for the manageability of the Mutasariffate's segmental cleavages because political power was proportionally distributed among the different sects according to their receptive demographic weights. Nevertheless, the introduction of confessionalism to all levels of government only served to sharpen the existing differences between the multitude sects of Mount Lebanon. Only in retrospect did this prove to be an inescapable side effect of the *Règlement* regime.

The ''long peace''[124] procured by the Mutasarrifate regime came to an end with the outbreak of World War I when Mount Lebanon's autonomous status was annulled and it was brought under direct Ottoman rule. In the aftermath of the War, and in accordance with the terms of the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, France was offered the mandate over the territory which includes present day Syria and Lebanon. Now, the Mountain Maronites, led by their Church Patriarch, pressed their case with France for the creation of ''an independent Christian state with exrpanded boundaries under French protection'' and paramount Maronite control.[125] But the demand for an 'independent' state meant independence from

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[122] Hourani, ''Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society,'' p. 22.

[123] *Ibid.*

[124] See Engin Deniz Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[125] Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, p. 21; and Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 25.

Syria, not from the French mandate.[126] The Maronites advanced historical, economic, and geographic reasons to vindicate their case for the expansion of the borders of the old Mutasarriffate. They demanded that Greater Lebanon's borders should include, in addition to the original Mutasarrifate, the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre and their respective hinterlands; the wheat-producing regions of Ba'albek and the Beqa'; and the districts of Rashayya and Hasbayya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian border. But the mainly Sunni and Shi'a Muslim inhabitants of these regions were not of the same opinion. In fact, in 1920, close to half of the population of Greater Lebanon did not accept the legitimacy of the new state. The findings of the 1919 King-Crane Commission provide a sample of the opinions of the six main sectarian groups toward the prospective expanded state.

The overwhelming majority of the Maronites and the Greek Catholics enthusiastically supported the creation of a separate Greater Lebanon under French mandate. The Sunnis strongly opposed the whole idea and insisted on union with Syria. The majority of the Shi'a and the Druze communities were opposed to the creation of Greater Lebanon, though there was some dissidence within their ranks. The Greek Orthodox community, on the other hand, was split: most championed the Syrian unionist cause while others, especially among the notables of Beirut, favoured an independent Lebanon under the French mandate.[127] In the end it was intense lobbying by the Maronites and French interest groups with commercial, financial, educational, religious, or cultural interests in the Levant, and a French government sympathetic to Maronite aspirations but also determined to protect France's interests by establishing a permanent and loyal base in the region that secured the creation of the State of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920 despite the reservations of at least one influential French official. The final decision on

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[126] See Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 33.

[127] There is no unanimity among historians of Lebanon concerning the exact positions of the different sects. For example, Kamal Salibi contends that the Druze "were not opposed in principle" to the establishment of Greater Lebanon. See Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 52. For other perspectives see Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, pp. 67-68; Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," p. 25; and Leila M. T. Meo, *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 48.

the borders, however, "was prompted more by Maronite demands than by French interests."[128]

2.2.1 *The Creation of a 'Asabiyya Dilemma: Segmental Cleavages in Lebanon*

The extension of the frontiers of the Mutasarrifate created a plural society deeply divided along demographic, religious, economic, regional, and cultural cleavages.[129] Since 1920, one feature of these segmental cleavages has been their tendency to cluster together and form polar opposites, hence deepening and hardening the existing cleavages. Thus it was (and still is) the case that the religious, ideological, and cultural inclinations of certain segments of Lebanese society would mesh together, forming one cluster, and standing in polar opposition to the religious, ideological, and cultural inclinations of other segments. Accordingly, Lebanon may be considered a classic case of *verzuiling* (cumulative segmentation).

The 1948 war brought into Lebanon a 100,000 strong, predominantly Sunni Muslim and refugee, Palestinian community, further compounding the country's precarious segmental composition. By 1969, Palestinians in Lebanon numbered around 235,000 due to a second wave of refugees fleeing to Lebanon after the 1967 war and due to natural birth increase.[130] The great majority of Palestinians in Lebanon laboured under harsh social and economic conditions, deprived of basic social services and denied Lebanese citizenship. Beginning in the late 1960s, armed Palestinian commandos began to challenge the Lebanese state's monopoly over coercive resources in the country. The commandos would later become a potent political ally of, and a rallying symbol for, the anti-status quo Lebanese National Movement. As a result, the commandos served to heighten Lebanon's permeability and vulnerability to external intervention in domestic politics.

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[128] For the full story behind the French declaration see Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, chapter two. The French official who advised against the inclusion of the heavily Muslim populated areas was Robert de Caix, then Secretary-General to the French High Commissioner in Beirut. For the quote see p. 97.

[129] For a radical critique of the applicability of the plural society concept to Lebanon see Halim Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," *Middle East Journal* 27, 3, (Summer 1973), pp. 301-318.

[130] See Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 25.

It was the demographic change, closely linked to the religious cleavage, that generated the greatest structural transformation in the segmental composition of the Mutasarrifate. The inclusion of large Muslim populations in Greater Lebanon challenged the demographic preponderance that the Maronites had enjoyed in the Mutasariffate. Whereas in the Mutasariffate the Maronites were a clear majority, in Greater Lebanon all the Christian communities combined could make up only a bare majority.[131] The Christian majority in Greater Lebanon was further eroded due to unequal population growth and out-migration rates that favoured the Muslim segments. This demographic shift exacerbated the existing multi-confessional nature of the Mutasarrifate. Moreover, regionalism over-lapped with religious and economic cleavages. The annexed rural areas were Muslim concentrated and economically backward in comparison with the Mountain and some of the coastal cities. Whereas in the Mutasarrifate the feudal system had almost ceased to exist and the peasants enjoyed an acceptable standard of living, the poor peasants of the rural areas continued to labour under a feudal structure.[132] But probably most important of all were the national and cultural cleavages that created in Greater Lebanon, and later in the independent Lebanese Republic, an acute *'asabiyya* dilemma.

Lebanon's *'asabiyya* dilemma may be described as a condition where different segments of the population subscribe to "different ideas of what Lebanon is and should be," each adhering to its own definition and "vision of Lebanon."[133] For many decades following the creation of Greater Lebanon this *'asabiyya* dilemma manifested itself in two competing 'ideas' or 'ideologies': that of the Mountain Maronites, of a homogenous and compact society, distinct from its surroundings, and embodied in the

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[131] In 1911, the Maronite population of the Mutasarrifate was 242,308, that is 58.4 percent of the 414,858 total population. In 1921 they became 199,181, that is 32.7 percent of the 609,069 total population of Greater Lebanon. Whereas in 1911 the total Christian population of the Mutasarrifate was 79.45 percent of the total population, in 1921 they became 55.12 percent only. According to the 1932 'official' census the Maronites constituted only 29.11 percent of the total population, while the total Christian population had become only 50.73 percent of the total population. For statistics see the chart in Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, p. 98.

[132] For a discussion see *Ibid.*, pp. 100-2.

[133] Hourani, "Visions of Lebanon," p. 7.

Maronite Church; and that of the (mainly Sunni) urban City community, of a trading, mercantilist, and tolerant plural society. With time, however, the Druze and Shi'a communities also began articulating their own ideas of Lebanon.[134]

In the early decades of the nascent Lebanese state the centrifugal effects of the *'asabiyya* dilemma were most evident in two culturally contradictory conceptions of the national identity in the form of Lebanism and Arabism (or Pan-Arabism). According to Hourani both national conceptions may be considered different expressions of the urban idea of Lebanon, the former being "a transplantation of the ideas of the mountain," while the latter was "a transplantation of later [reformist] Ottoman ideas."[135] In this case the debate was about the cultural identity and the historicity of the new state.

The proponents of Lebanism (and its more extreme form, Phoenicianism) emphasized the Mediterranean, Phoenician heritage of *modern* Lebanon - often using the term 'modern' to underscore Lebanon's existence since time immemorial.[136] The Maronites, the main proponents of this conception of Lebanon, were, in the words of Pope Leo X, a "rose among the thorns," culturally - and some argued racially - distinct from their hostile surroundings.[137] Furthermore, Lebanon was a country with a distinct character, one that could be recognizable in all the stages of its history. In essence, then, Lebanon was a Mediterranean country, and like the Phoenicians, "with whom the history of the country begins," the "*modern* Lebanese were called upon to play the role of cultural intermediaries, explaining to the West the material heritage of the East, and introducing the East to the modern material and spiritual civilization

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[134] For a comprehensive discussion see Hourani in *Ibid.*, and Albert Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City: Reflections on the Lebanese Civil War," in Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), especially pp. 173-78.

[135] Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City," pp. 176-77.

[136] Note, for example, the title of Philip K. Hitti's book *Lebanon in History: From Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Macmillan, 1957) which is meant to convey a similar theme.

[137] Quoted in Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 72.

of the West."[138] These themes were best expressed in the following excerpt from the memorandum submitted by the Maronite Patriarch Elias Huwayyik to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference: "Sans remonter à leurs ancêtres Phéniciens, les Libanais ont toujours constitué une entité nationale distincte des groupements voisins par sa langue, ses moeurs, ses affinités, sa culture occidentale."[139] In contradistinction to this thesis, the (mainly Sunni Muslim) proponents of Lebanon's Arabism questioned the very validity of a concept such as historical Lebanon. They maintained that, historically, Lebanon had always been part of Syria, and that it "could claim no special history of its own. Moreover, the history of Syria as a whole, let alone Lebanon, was ultimately Arab history."[140] According to this school of thought, Lebanon, by history and culture, was Arab, neither Mediterranean nor Phoenician.[141] A 'national' formula had to be devised to ameliorate this acute *'asabiyya* dilemma and to secure a working consensus for the independent state. This formula, articulated in *al-Mithaq al-Watani* (National Pact), proved to be the cornerstone upon which Lebanon's political system and its regional and extra-regional polices were based.

2.2.2 *The Institutionalization of the Segmental Cleavages: The Political System in Lebanon*

An unwritten gentlemen's agreement between the Maronite President Bishara al-Khoury and the Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh, the 1943 National Pact was a supplement to the 1926 Constitution that carried equal effectiveness. To resolve Lebanon's national existential dilemma, the Pact described Lebanon as an independent state with a *visage Arabe*, yet "with a special character."[142] The Pact endeavoured

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[138] Kamal S. Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, 1, (1971), p. 81. Emphasis added.

[139] The memorandum is reprinted in Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, pp. 269-78. Quote from p. 270.

[140] See Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 203.

[141] For a comprehensive discussion of the different schools of thought pertaining to the identity of Lebanon around the time of independence see Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 132-35.

[142] Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 18.

a compromise solution between the two poles of Lebanism and Arabism in the form of a trade-off between the then two largest communities - the Maronites and the Sunnis - who took it upon themselves to represent their respective co-religionists. It is generally believed that the Pact embodied on the part of the Muslims their renouncement of the demand to become part of Syria and their acceptance of the continued existence of Lebanon as an independent and sovereign state in the Arab world, provided it considered itself part of the Arab fold, and provided the Christians renounced external - namely French - tutelage. The Pact assumed that "the two wide communities - the Christians and the Muslims - would henceforth temper their ideological excesses and operate under an internal system of loyalty to the state structure and its sovereignty. Statism, or *wataniyya*, was to be the common and future overlapping framework between separatist Lebanese nationalism and unionist Arab nationalism."[143] With respect to Lebanon's position in the Arab orbit, the Pact sought to define Lebanon's relation towards the Arab world in the following way:

> ... Lebanon was to regard itself as an Arab state "with a special character," to cooperate economically, politically, culturally and militarily with the Arab states, act in concert with them on the international level, refuse to align itself in any way with any foreign power against the interests of the Arab states singly or collectively, but in disputes among the Arab states, themselves, was to remain neutral. In return, the Arab states had to recognize its independence and not to make attempts to incorporate it in any unification schemes.[144]

With respect to the political system, the National Pact confirmed certain practices that predated it. In the 1930s a pattern started to emerge by which the top government posts were distributed along the major sects in the country: by 1933 the Presidency had become the preserve of the Maronites; by 1936 the Premiership had been confirmed in the Sunni community; and much later, in 1947, in exchange of Shi'a acquiescence to the new order, the Speakership of the Chamber of Deputies was offered to the Shi'a community. The Pact confirmed these practices, and added some others. In addition to the presidency, the Maronites were to dominate the most sensitive political, security and military positions, such as the

[143] Bassam Abdel-Qader Na'mani, "Confessionalism in Balance: The 1943 National Pact," in Reeva S. Simon, ed. *The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honour of J.C. Hurewitz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 384.

[144] Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 18.

directorate of public security and the command of the army. In the Chamber of Deputies the Pact stipulated that the ratio of Christian to Muslim deputies was to be fixed at six to five.[145]

The National Pact also accepted the dynamics of the confessional (or sectarian) system. This system had been officially recognized by the 1926 Constitution. Article 95 of the 1926 Constitution stated that "By temporary right ... and with a view to justice and harmony, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the formation of the ministry, without prejudice, however, to the welfare of the State."[146] Henceforth, confessionalism, defined as "a system of proportional representation by religious faith in all government functions," would permeate all state institutions giving the political system, at best, the trappings of a consociational democracy.[147]

In the executive branch, confessionalism is scrupulously maintained. Always occupied by a Maronite, the presidency was the single most powerful executive office. The president was endowed with formal and informal powers that enabled the him to dominate the executive branch. The president has the power to appoint prime ministers, appoint and dismiss Cabinet ministers (article 53), to promulgate laws (article 56), to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (article 55), and to negotiate and ratify international treaties (article 52). The prime minister's ability to influence policy was often a function of his personality, his communal standing, and the amount of latitude in executive affairs given to him by the president. The prime minister, then, was subordinate to the president. Unlike in Jordan, where the Cabinet is a policy-executing institution, in Lebanon the Cabinet is supposedly a policy-making (or at least a policy-deliberating) institution. It has been described as "a true Parliament on a small scale," with the added

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[145] For a discussion see Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 185-87.

[146] See Shafiq Jiha, *Al-Dustur al-Lubnani: Tarikhuh, Ta'dilatuh, Nasuh al-Hali, 1926-1991* [The Lebanese Constitution: Its History, its Amendments, and its Present Text] (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayen, 1991), p. 95, fn. 47.

[147] Clyde G. Hess, Jr. and Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," *Middle East Journal* 8, 1, (Winter 1954), p. 10.

privilege that its deliberations are held in secret.[148] Cabinet posts are distributed in a way that guarantees representation for the six largest religious communities. Under normal conditions, and until the 1975 civil war, certain Cabinet portfolios were nearly always reserved to specific sects: the Christians monopolized the portfolios of the Vice-Premiership (always Greek Orthodox), Foreign Affairs, and Education. The Muslims were often offered the ministries of the Interior (almost always held by the prime minister), Defence, Agriculture, and Post and Telegraph. The remaining ministries make up "the area of bargaining and adjustment when a cabinet is formed."[149] Confessionalism is also taken into consideration in recruitment to non-elective administrative, judicial, diplomatic, and military posts.

Indirectly, the National Pact also recognized Lebanon's religious pluralism as its *raison d'etre*. Michel Chiha (d. 1954), whose ideas provided the theoretical underpinnings for the Pact, counselled communal (or segmental) autonomy and prescribed minimal government interference in the personal, family, and communal matters of the different sectarian communities.[150] These were to be left to the respective religious institutions of each sect. The practice was institutionalized with the establishment of separate religious courts for the different confessional groups along side the state run civil court system. In the same spirit, the state gave religious-run private schools the freedom to choose their educational curricula. However, whether or not confessionalism, Cabinet politics, and communal autonomy are sufficient conditions for Lebanon to be labelled a consociational democracy remains a contentious issue.[151]

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[148] Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in Binder, *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 134.

[149] Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," *Journal of Politics* 24, 3, (August 1962), p. 505. For cabinet politics see also Elie Salem, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal* 21, 4, (Autumn 1967), pp. 488-502.

[150] See Abdo I. Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 107 and 273.

[151] For a defence of the applicability of the consociational democracy model to Lebanon see Antoine Nasri Messarra, *Le Modèle Politique Libanais et sa Survie: Essai sur la Classification et L'Aménagement D'un Système Consociatif* (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1983). For a critique see Mahdi 'Amil (Hassan Hamdan), *Fi-l-Dawla al-Ta'ifiyya* [On the Confessional State] (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1988); and As'ad Abukhalil, "The Politics of Sectarian Ethnicity: Segmentation in Lebanese Society," (Ph.D. Thesis, Georgetown University, 1988), especially pp. 274-280.

2.3 *Regional Permeability, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Options*

In Jordan and Lebanon the *'asabiyya* dilemma has exposed the political arena to the manipulation of external and domestic actors seeking to consolidate their regional or domestic positions. The existence of a highly permeable regional system facilitates the manipulation of the segmental cleavages by regional powers. In this case, external and internal pressures may combine to paralyse the political system, rendering the state ungovernable. Regional and domestic factors not only exacerbate a state's permeability, they can also constrain its foreign policy options. What then are the defining features of the Arab state system, what are the domestic determinants of foreign policy in both Jordan and Lebanon, and what foreign policy options do they face?

2.3.1 *The Arab State System: Regional Permeability and Domestic Vulnerability*

Some scholars have called attention to the existence of a "penetrated" Middle Eastern "subordinate" system with peculiar indigenous characteristics and a distinctive approach to international politics.[152] Other narrower conceptualizations have focused upon the Arab state system per se. In this case, it is argued that since its inception the Arab system has been characterised by a number of special features giving "rise to relations between Arab states which were qualitatively different from those in other regional systems."[153] The presence of a high degree of cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity, and the intensity of the myriad material, societal, and political links among the member states has engendered a situation where "the political systems of Arab states have been closely interconnected and permeable."[154] This permeability - best exemplified in the spill-over effect of

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[152] See L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 5-6 and 18; and Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics* 10, 3, (April 1958), pp. 408-429.

[153] Paul C. Noble, "The Arab System: Opportunities, Constraints, and Pressures," in Korany and Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, p. 55.

[154] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

transnational appeals such as pan-Islamic and pan-Arab ideologies across state borders - has rendered the domestic arena of some states vulnerable to external (and internal) manipulation, especially by aspiring regional hegemons. Permeability has also benefited from a condition prevalent in the Arab world since independence, but more so in the 1950s and 1960s, where political allegiance has had to "fumble its way between two obligations: one to the interest of the sovereign territorial state; the other to the imperative of pan-Arabism."[155] In this case the existence of a set of "all-Arab core concerns" has forced upon states a certain level of scrupulousness towards these concerns in the formulation of their domestic and foreign policies.[156] In the 1950s and 1960s, at the zenith of the Arab system's permeability, some leaders were adept in using core Arab concerns either as devices to legitimize their own regimes or as weapons to discredit their opponents.

Thus in the Arab system, in addition to the distinction between "strong" and "weak" states, it is also possible to distinguish between "hard" and "soft" states where the "hardness" or "softness" of a state varies with "the extent to which state-society relations ... exhibit extensive transnational characteristics."[157] "Soft" states are especially susceptible to the destabilizing effects of transnational appeals. In the 1950s, both Jordan and Lebanon were exposed to the transnational influence of Nasserite Arab nationalism. Systemic factors constrained foreign policy behaviour in both states. This same behaviour was also constrained by specific domestic determinants.

2.3.2 *Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy*

In the Arab system, the domestic environment plays an important role in shaping a state's foreign

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[155] Kamal Salibi, *Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question* Papers on Lebanon No. 8 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988), p. 11.

[156] Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 5.

[157] Rex Brynen, "Palestine and the Arab State System: Permeability, State Consolidation and the *Intifada*," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24, 3, (September 1991), p. 598.

policy "behaviour," to be distinguished from its foreign policy "orientation."[158] The factors that make up the domestic environment either enhance or constrain a state's foreign policy options.[159] In Jordan and Lebanon, the *'asabiyya* dilemma, and the resultant lack of political and social unity, may be considered a primary domestic determinant of foreign policy behaviour. The existence of a majority Palestinian community with a distinct national identity and political agenda has constrained the Hashemite regime's foreign policy options. The Hashemite regime has had to pursue (or look to pursue) an 'honourable, just solution' to the Palestinian problem, one which is sensitive to domestic public opinion and (at least until 1988) in which Jordan figures as an able representative of the Palestinians, while not incurring Palestinian opposition by encroaching on the Palestinian Liberation Organization's role as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.' Beyond the Palestinian problem, the regime has generally attempted to avoid foreign policies that may antagonize the domestic Palestinian community in Jordan. Similarly, in Lebanon, the attempt to mitigate the *'asabiyya* dilemma through the National Pact constrained foreign policy options since this agreement became the regulative principle of the country's regional Arab policy. Any deviations from the principles outlined in the Pact often invited political, and popular, upheaval. Moreover, in addition to constraining foreign policy behaviour, the *'asabiyya* dilemma compounds the regional permeability predicament by facilitating external (or internal) manipulation of the domestic arena. Both countries have faced other domestic determinants that have either constrained or enhanced their foreign policy options.

A lack of natural borders and a geographic location between contending regional aspirants (Iraq, Syria, and Israel) has often exposed Jordan to the pressures of regional powers, constraining the country's foreign policy options. The lack of a viable economic base, due to the paucity of natural resources, has

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[158] For a discussion see Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Arab Foreign Policies in a Changing Environment," in Korany and Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, pp. 412-413.

[159] For a list of such factors see Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Bahgat Korany, "A Literature Survey and a Framework of Analysis," in *Ibid.*, pp.18-20.

had a similar constraining effect on foreign policy options. As a result, Jordan has become heavily dependent upon regional and international aid. Although Jordan's rentier economy has been a beneficiary of the Arab oil economy, since its creation Jordan has been dependent on foreign subsidies, first British and later American. On the other hand, and despite its negligible ability to help implement the regional objectives of Jordanian foreign policy, the role of the Jordanian army as a staunch defender of the monarchy has at times enabled the regime to take unpopular foreign policy decisions when the existence of the regime was threatened.[160] The same effect has resulted from Jordan's political structure and its concentration of executive power in the person of the king.[161]

With the exception of the borders with Israel in the south, geographically Lebanon borders totally on the Syrian hinterland. Economic viability has been partly predicated upon access to the Syrian land routes and, hence, good relations with Syria. The lack of abundant natural resources or a vigorous industrial sector made the Lebanese economy dependent upon the services sector and foreign aid. Consequently, foreign policy options have been constrained by the need to accommodate the interests of the user and donor states. A capitalist system and a *laissez-faire* economy, the historic ties of some Lebanese communities to certain Western states, and the regional Arab policy enunciated in the National Pact have historically translated into a "center-right" position in the international system: "that is, between the West and the non-aligned movement;" maintaining close relations with the Western world but supportive of Arab interests on the international scene.[162] Foreign policy stances away from this

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[160] A case in point is Hussein's dismissal of Suleiman al-Nabulsi's government on 10 April 1957 at the height of the nationalist tide, the appointment of a military government, followed by an army clamp down on dissident elements in the country. Another example was Hussein's refusal to join the union between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq declared on 17 April 1963. The army, again, was called in to crush street riots demanding Jordan's entry to the union.

[161] For a discussion of some of these issues see Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Karen Aboul Kheir, "The Politics of Vulnerability and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Jordan," in Korany and Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, pp. 217-224; and Don Peretz, "Reflections on Domestic Determinants of Jordan's Foreign Policy," in Simon, *The Middle East and North Africa*, pp. 399-408.

[162] Ghassan Salamé, "Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" in Barakat, *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, p. 355.

'center-right' position have often engendered political crises in Lebanon. With respect to regional contenders of power, geography, history, military and political realities have attracted Syria's attention to Lebanon since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Syria ultimately developed a wide array of interests in Lebanon that made it difficult for any Lebanese president to initiate foreign policies that run counter o Syrian interests.[163] As long as social unity proves elusive, and as long as the economy is dependent upon Syrian land routes for access to Arab markets, Lebanese foreign policy is bound to a relation of perpetual accommodation with Syria.

Domestic factors also play an instrumental role in exacerbating Lebanon's permeability to regional pressures and its vulnerability to external intervention. One such factor, in existence throughout most of Lebanon's history, is the lack of an undisputed central authority.[164] The reason for this situation is not difficult to discern, it is rooted in the sharp segmental cleavages that permeate Lebanese society. Kamal Salibi emphasizes the religious cleavage as a determining factor of the lack of central control. He has contended that since "the Lebanese population happens to be divided, socially and politically, between equally forceful Christian and Muslim sides disagreeing on fundamental issues and, because each side includes a variety of sects representing different shades of the opposed political opinions, strong state control in the country was impossible to develop."[165] Historically, this phenomenon has given rise to a situation where foreign countries became the final repositories of power and the ultimate arbiters over matters Lebanese.[166] Another feature of Lebanese politics that has tended to heighten the permeability

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[163] For a discussion of Syrian interests and policies in Lebanon see Bassel Salloukh, "Syrian Policy in Lebanon: Sources of Success," *McGill Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, (1992-93), pp. 95-118.

[164] Rashid Khalidi, "External Intervention in Lebanon: The Historical Dynamics," in S. Seikaly et al., eds. *Quest for Understanding: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1991), p. 108.

[165] Kamal Salibi, *Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question*, p. 7.

[166] See Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," p. 21. Since the withdrawal of the Egyptian army in 1840 from Mount Lebanon under foreign pressure, this trend has proven unbreakable in the political history of Mount Lebanon, and later the Republic of Lebanon.

and vulnerability of the domestic arena to external intervention is "the absence of a single dominant sectarian group" in the country.[167] In practical terms, the lack of hegemony by any segment of Lebanese society has invited foreign powers to intervene in Lebanon either to arbitrate among the different segments and to devise compromise solutions, or to shift the political balance of power in favour of a particular group. Similarly, the lack of a predominant or majority segment in Lebanon has encouraged Lebanese actors to seek external supporters to tip the political balance in their favour. Faced with the aforementioned regional and domestic imperatives, what foreign policy options are available to Jordan and Lebanon?

2.3.3 *Foreign Policy Options for Small States*

With respect to Arab regional policy, Jordan and Lebanon have faced four regional policy options. Nassif Hitti has enumerated these options as "forced accommodation," "confrontation," "passive preventive accommodation," and "active preventive accommodation."[168]

The regime will resort to a policy of forced accommodation when confronting an internal crisis that manifests a lack of domestic consensus over the state's Arab orientation, and when the domestic arena is vulnerable to manipulation and intervention by the regional Arab hegemon. In this case, forced accommodation consists of making concessions to the Arab hegemon without necessarily resolving the state's internal crisis, either to eschew an escalation of domestic conflict, to enact a new consensus, or to prepare for a crack down against the domestic opposition.[169] On the other hand, in the case of a confrontationalist policy, the regime will stand up to the demands and interests of the regional hegemon,

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[167] Khalidi, "External Intervention in Lebanon," p. 109.

[168] See Nassif Hitti, *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimension* Papers on Lebanon No. 9 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1989), pp. 12-13 and 20.

[169] See *Ibid.*, p. 13. Such were the policies of Charles Helou (1964-70) and Suleiman Franjieh (1970-1976) in Lebanon. In Jordan, the period from 1955 to 1957 may be considered representative. It begins with Hussein's decision not to join the Baghdad Pact in December 1955 and ends with the expulsion of the Egyptian military attaché in Jordan and the Egyptian consul general in Jerusalem on 9 June 1957.

aligning itself either with the hegemon's regional or extra-regional foes. In Lebanon, a confrontationalist foreign policy often entailed the complacence of a weak prime minister, ready to forego his community's share of the National Pact, thus permitting the ruling regime to confront the demands and interests of the Arab hegemon.[170] In Jordan, to undertake a confrontationalist policy, the king has relied on the support of the Transjordanian-dominated 'establishment,' especially the army, and the extra-regional power committed to his protection.[171]

An Arab policy of passive preventive accommodation is one in which the regime refrains from taking any action that may provoke the Arab pole wielding the most influence over domestic politics, lest such action lead to unbearable consequences.[172] Finally, an active preventive accommodation Arab policy is characterized by a *rapprochement* with the Arab hegemon aimed at enabling the domestic regime to consolidate the national consensus and reinforce domestic stability.[173] It is active for two reasons: first because it endorses the hegemon's stances in the regional and international arena without necessarily undermining the home country's regional and international interests; second, because its aim is to insulate the domestic political arena from transnational manipulation and engage in a process of state-building to foster national integration.

Among other factors, the choice of any of the preceding options will greatly hinge upon the regime's objectives and the domestic constraints under which foreign policy decision-making labours. The following case study chapters will explore how in Jordan and Lebanon domestic realities determined the

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[170] See *Ibid.*, p. 12. The Arab policies of Camille Sham'oun during the premiership of Sami al-Sulh and of Amin Jumayyil during the premiership of Shafiq al-Wazzan fit this category. Both Sami al-Sulh and Wazzan were second rank Sunni politicians. As was the case in both presidencies, such an Arab policy often led either to the collapse of the national consensus or to political paralysis.

[171] A representative period (interrupted by short periods of accommodation) is the confrontation with Nasser from 1957 to 1967. It begins with the expulsion of the Egyptian military attaché in Jordan and the Egyptian consul general in Jerusalem on 9 June 1957 and ends with Hussein's visit to Cairo on 30 May 1967 and the signing of a bilateral defence pact with Egypt.

[172] See *Ibid.*, p. 20. This was the Arab policy of Ilyas Sarkis (1976-1982).

[173] See *Ibid.* In Lebanon, the policy of Fu'ad Shihab (1958-1964) represents this type. In Jordan, two intervals are representative: the period between June 1967 until the death of Nasser in September 1970; and the supportive stance towards Saddam Hussein in the 1990 Gulf crisis and war.

regime's foreign (but especially regional) policy choice and, more importantly, how this particular foreign policy was used by the regime to serve its ultimate objective: survival.

3. *KING HUSSEIN'S SURVIVAL STRATEGY: HUSSEINISM*

Since his ascension to the throne in 1953, the survival of the Hashemite regime in Jordan has been King Hussein's paramount objective. In his quest for survival, Hussein has relied on a multi-level, interactive survival strategy. As a survival strategy, Husseinism exhibits the role of domestic determinants in shaping the regime's regional policy; and the instrumental role of extra-regional and regional policies in consolidating the regime's domestic position and integrate an otherwise deeply divided society. In this chapter Husseinism is analyzed as it unravelled beginning in the mid 1950s until the early 1970s. A study of the regime's extra-regional policy, particularly its role in protecting the kingdom from external military intervention, reveals its function in the success of the overall strategy. An examination of the regime's regional policies will demonstrate the regime's selective adaptation of an accommodationist regional policy to serve domestic objectives, particularly through insulating the state from regional intervention in the domestic arena. The regime's domestic policies were also effective in ensuring social integration and survival. This entails a scrutiny of the symbols, measures, and institutions that served to legitimize Hashemite rule and integrate Jordan's deeply divided society. Finally, this chapter closes with a brief discussion of the factors that have contributed to the success of Husseinism.

3.1 *The Extra-Regional Umbrella: Protecting the Hashemite Kingdom*

An important component of Hussein's survival strategy has been his reliance, in times of acute crisis, on extra-regional intervention or support to protect the state from the threat of regional military intervention. By protecting the state from regional military threats (or potential threats), and by restraining domestic opponents of the monarchy, the extra-regional deterrence umbrella provides the regime the cover and support to clamp down on domestic opposition, often fuelled and manipulated by regional states. Moreover, state protection provides the regime a breathing space to consolidate its domestic position. This latter objective may be achieved in a multitude of ways: by strengthening the army to deter future regional

or domestic threats, by developing the economy to provide material incentives and rewards in exchange for loyalty to the regime from the social segments most susceptible to foreign manipulation, and by fostering a sense of Jordanian nationhood through different state policies. To be sure, dependence upon extra-regional protection exposed the regime to criticism from domestic and regional foes. Hussein constantly defended his Arab nationalist credentials against charges by regional leaders that he was an agent of Western imperialism. However, the imperatives of survival meant that extra-regional protection was a necessity, not a luxury Hussein could discard to satisfy domestic and regional opinion. As the following analysis will demonstrate, extra-regional support or intervention provided Jordan protection from external intervention on more than one occasion. Who then was responsible for the provision of extra-regional protection and why?

Until the mid 1950s, Jordan's extra-regional protector was Great Britain. According to the 1946 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (revised in 1948) Jordan's finances and defence were guaranteed by Britain in exchange for British military facilities in Jordan. After the second World War, Britain's position in the Middle East seemed secure, and so was Jordan's. However, Nasser's consolidation of power in Egypt in 1954 and the threat posed to Britain's regional allies and interests by his brand of revolutionary Arab nationalism was sufficient cause for British concern. Britain decided to include Jordan in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, a move aimed at reinforcing Jordan as a state, thus safeguarding British influence in the region.[174] The Baghdad Pact, however, challenged Nasser's aspirations for regional hegemony since, according to Nasser, it perpetuated Western domination in the region. At the same time, in 1955, "the center of Anglo-American friction shifted to Jordan, where the United States had always objected to Britain's exclusive status, and from which Britain suspected the United States of aiming to displace

[174] See Michael B. Oren, "A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, December 1955-March 1956," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, 2, (May 1990), p. 174. The Baghdad Pact was an anti-Soviet alliance including Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Britain.

it.''[175]

In October 1955, Britain sent to Jordan Turkey's President Celal Bayar and later Sir Gerald Templer, Commander of the Imperial General Staff, to convince the Jordanian cabinet to join the Baghdad Pact. At the outset, Hussein was willing to enter the Baghdad Pact for the right amount of aid provided by Britain. Nasser also sent to Jordan his Chief-of-Staff General Abdul Hakim 'Amer and Colonel Anwar al-Sadat to mobilize domestic opposition against Jordan's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact. The ensuing riots against the Baghdad Pact in the West Bank forced the successive resignation of Sa'id al-Mufti and Hazza' al-Majali's cabinets. Stability was only restored after the intervention of the army to suppress the riots and the declaration by the new prime minister, Samir al-Rifa'i, of his cabinet's opposition to Jordan's entry to the Baghdad Pact. Hussein's final decision not to enter the Baghdad Pact was largely due to genuine domestic opposition fuelled and manipulated by regional powers seeking to distance Hussein from his British patron. Britain's position in Jordan, and the region, was further undermined when Hussein expelled Glubb Pasha from Jordan on 1 March 1956. Since the 1948 war, Glubb had been the target of intense criticism from Palestinian and Arab quarters. Glubb was blamed for the fall of the towns of Ramla and Lydda to Israeli hands in the 1948 war. Hussein was also in disagreement with Glubb concerning the Arabization of the army and Jordan's defence strategy against Israel. More importantly, Glubb's expulsion was meant to demonstrate to Arab and domestic public opinion Hussein's independence from Western influence to counter Cairo's argument that Jordan was an 'imperialist power.'[176] Although the expulsion of Glubb won Hussein support in Jordan, the Arab world, and among the nationalist officers in the army, the move exposed him to the conspiracies of these same officers since they replaced British officers in sensitive posts in the army. Britain's formal exit from Jordan was concluded when in March 1957 the

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[175] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[176] For Hussein's story see H. M. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1962), chapter nine, especially pp. 107-8 and 114-15.

cabinet of Suleiman al-Nabulsi abrogated the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. With the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty the task of providing an extra-regional umbrella for Jordan was turned over to the United States.

On 5 January 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine was enunciated. Its objective was to fill the power vacuum resulting from the decline in French and British influence in the Middle East on the morrow of the 1956 Suez crisis. It proposed to accomplish this by offering military and economic assistance, or by dispatching troops, to countries threatened by 'international Communism.' The joint Anglo-American contingency planning that followed the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine advised direct military help for Jordan in a crisis situation, and financial help at other times. Although Hussein declined to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, he made effective use of its anti-Communist rationale to mobilize American support during the crises of 1957 and 1958. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine "was instrumental in leading Hussein onto an anti-Communist track, which did much to 'sell' him to the American public as a client in whose survival it was worthwhile to invest."[177] Economically, this meant that following the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and the British subsidy to the Arab Legion, America replaced Britain as the external financier of the Jordanian treasury. In 1958 America began subsidizing Jordan at the annual rate of forty million dollars.[178] Of equal importance to the future survival of Hussein's regime was the military and political support provided by America and Britain during the 1957 and 1958 crises. A study of these crises will demonstrate Hussein's use of extra-regional support, alongside the loyalty of the army's bedouin regiments, to ensure the survival of his regime.

The dismissal of the Nabulsi cabinet on 10 April 1957 triggered a crisis in Jordan that continued until martial law was imposed on the twenty-fifth of the same month. Hussein was convinced that "a

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[177] Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 47.

[178] See Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, p. 63.

deeply laid, cleverly contrived plot" to assassinate him, "overthrow the throne and proclaim Jordan a republic" was hatched by his domestic enemies with external help.[179] The climax of the crisis was the confrontation at the Zerqa military camp between bedouin troops and officers and the *hadari*, non-bedouin, nationalist officers who were inspired, supported, and encouraged by their mentors in Cairo and Damascus. The loyalty of the bedouin officers and soldiers was pivotal to Hussein's survival and his successful confrontation with the nationalist officers headed by 'Ali Abu Nuwar. The April crisis brings to sharp focus the pernicious effects to regime stability of the convergence of domestic and external threats, and the vulnerability of the domestic arena to manipulation by external powers bent on overthrowing or destabilizing the regime. The April crisis also illuminates two important components of Hussein's survival strategy: the use of "skilful diplomacy in support of an overall policy;"[180] and the use of extra-regional support to protect the state from the threat of military intervention by regional powers, thus enabling the army's loyal regiments and the regime's security services to suppress domestic opposition.

During the April crisis Hussein was able to elicit American and Saudi support by playing on their fear of Communism. In Jordan, the opposition's nationalist clamouring was, to a great extent, genuine, part and parcel of the then Arab nationalist wave sweeping across an Arab world under the spell of Nasser. Yet Hussein was successful in depicting the nationalist trend as a mere product of Communist penetration in Jordan. In the Cold War years, when the world was divided into two competing camps, Hussein's ruse was bound to win him American support. Hussein was equally successful in gaining the support of the Saudi regime whose Islamic conservatism loathed revolutionary Communism. America's commitment to Hussein was overtly manifested politically, militarily, and economically. America declared that the integrity and independence of Jordan was vital to the United States, it dispatched units from the U.S. Sixth

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[179] Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, p. 127. For descriptions of the April 1957 crisis see Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 55-59; and the accounts in the biographies-*cum*-histories of Hussein in Peter Snow, *Hussein: A Biography* (New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1972), pp. 106-116; and James Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 36-44. For Hussein's account see Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, pp. 137-151.

[180] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 61.

Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and it allocated a ten million dollars special aid fund for Jordan. This American stance constrained Jordan's regional rivals. Most importantly, it deterred Syria from intervening militarily in Jordan.

Hussein also used diplomacy to neutralize both Syria and Egypt during the crisis. He was convinced that their agents, especially the Egyptians, were collaborating with his domestic opponents. However, Hussein was forced to accommodate this activity lest he antagonize the Egyptian and Syrian leaders during the crisis. He convinced the leaders of both states that his actions against the nationalist politicians and officers were not aimed against the Arab nationalist camp. This policy won Hussein a measure of restraint on the part of Nasser and the Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli. Once he had consolidated his domestic position Hussein went on the offensive against Egypt and Syria, in June 1957, and the propaganda war was resumed.[181] Finally, the timely American aid, added to the funds received from Saudi Arabia, was used to pay the salaries of the loyal bedouin troops.[182] With his borders and finances secured, Hussein was able to crush the domestic opposition and to rout out the anti-regime officers from the military establishment, thus ensuring the survival of the Hashemite regime. A similar scenario transpired in the 1958 July crisis.

The 1958 July crisis in Jordan was another instance where the Hashemite regime found itself beleaguered by internal and external enemies working in tandem to overthrow the monarchy. In this case a military putsch was planned by anti-monarchist officers in the army. It included the assassination of Hussein, the proclamation of a republic, and a possible union with the then nascent United Arab Republic (1958-1961). Syria and Egypt not only supported the conspirators, they also blockaded Jordan's supply

[181] The occasion was the expulsion of the Egyptian military attaché in Amman Major Fu'ad Hilal and the Egyptian consul general in Jerusalem Brigadier Muhammad Abdul 'Aziz on 9 June 1957. Both were accused of subversion in the Jordanian officer corps before the April 1957 Zerqa crisis.

[182] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 61.

land routes causing an oil crisis in the kingdom.[183] Once the putsch was uncovered, around mid July, Hussein called for military help from the Hashemite regime in Iraq. The help from Iraq did not materialize since the Iraqi regime was overthrown by a military coup on 14 July. Threatened from within and without, Hussein appealed for American and British military intervention on the evening of 16 July, delegating to them the decision on who will send troops to Jordan.[184] Hussein's rationale for inviting Western troops to Jordan explicitly illuminates the extra-regional dimension of his survival strategy. Hussein argued that the decision was meant "to have the military cover of friendly countries ..., and to protect Jordan's frontiers from its surrounding enemies so that the country might gain the breathing space needed to stabilize the domestic fronts, build up its army, [and] strengthen its economy ...."[185]

On the night of 16 July the last of the main conspirators were rounded up by Hussein's men. But the danger to Hussein's survival was not over. The arrival of British troops in Amman on the evening of 17 July deterred any external intervention and discouraged potential attempts to storm Basman Palace where Hussein and his aides were entrenched, guarded by loyal bedouin troops. Once the state was protected from external threats Hussein was able to consolidate his domestic position. The officer corps was purged from anti-monarchy elements under the supervision of Sharif Nasser bin Jamil, Hussein's uncle and commander of the Royal Guards regiment; the loyal bedouin troops and security services effectively suppressed republican feelings and support in their ranks, in government institutions, and in society. As an epilogue to the crisis, on 21 August the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution in the name of Arab League member states calling upon League members to respect the sovereignty, and to abstain from interfering in the domestic affairs, of other League states. Moreover,

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[183] The Syrian connection was through the Nasserite Colonel Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, one time chief of Military Intelligence in Syria and later regional Minister of the Interior in the UAR.

[184] For the details of the July 1958 crisis see Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 86-95; Snow, *Hussein: A Biography*, pp. 123-129; and Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, pp. 50-55. For Hussein's account see Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, pp. 165-171.

[185] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 91.

Dag Hammarskjöld elicited 'good-neighbourliness' assurances from Nasser towards Jordan. The United States and Britain later allocated fifty million dollars and a million sterling pounds respectively in additional budgetary aid to Jordan.[186]

The support of an extra-regional ally was not always successful in protecting Jordan from foreign intervention in a crisis scenario, as the Syrian intervention in 'Black September' 1970 demonstrates. However, this does not mean that Jordan's extra-regional ally did not play a pivotal role in enabling the regime to cope with its domestic crisis, which all along had been the objective of extra-regional intervention. An examination of America's role during the September 1970 crisis in Jordan might help clarify this contention.

Throughout 1968 and 1969, disagreement between the Palestinian commandos (*feda'iyeen*) and the Jordanian authorities over commandos activity within Jordan and across the River Jordan augured ill for the regime. By mid September 1970 intermittent clashes between the commandos and the Jordanian army, followed by a series of airplane hijackings by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), brought matters to a head between the commandos and the army. Most Palestinian groups, especially the PFLP, were determined to overthrow Hussein's regime, convinced that the road to Jerusalem passes through Amman. Hussein, wary that the deteriorating situation might undermine his control over the army, let alone the survival of his regime, gave the army his approval to crush the commandos' threat in Jordan.[187]

Early in the morning, on 17 September, the Jordanian army launched a full scale assault against commandos' strongholds in Amman. As the army's predicted swift victory proved elusive, Hussein

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[186] See Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. 53.

[187] See Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. 126. For the events of Black September 1970 see pp. 131-43; and Snow, *Hussein: A Biography*, pp. 221-236.

became worried of an external military intervention, especially from Syria and Iraq.[188] Yet there was no lack of extra-regional support. As early as 10 September, in response to the PFLP hijackings, the United States placed some American forces on semi-alert and sent an aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean. On the evening of 17 September President Nixon declared that the United States was "prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against Government forces loyal to Hussein."[189] Nixon's declaration followed the dispatch of more aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean. But this was no viable deterrence to the Syrians who on 19 and 20 September sent Syrian troops and a Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) brigade across the border into Jordan. In response to Hussein's calls for help, the American Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean in a visible show of force aimed at forcing the Soviet Union to restrain its Syrian ally. More importantly, the American administration coordinated a contingency plan in which Israel was to intervene to force a Syrian withdrawal from Jordan if such a need arose.[190] On 22 September, after two days of fierce fighting and a slow Syrian advance, the Jordanian army, supported by the Jordanian air force, gained the upper hand in the battle. In the evening of this same day the Syrians began withdrawing from northern Jordan. The external threat to the kingdom had ceased to exist. Hussein could now concentrate his attention on the domestic front and the battle against the Palestinians. What then was the role of Jordan's extra-regional ally in September 1970?

In September 1970 "American diplomacy, through a mixture of subtlety and restraint combined with visible force, had helped to create a situation in which Jordan was able to cope with its own

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[188] An Iraqi force was deployed around Mafraq in northern Jordan. It later withdrew eastward on 19 September in a coordinated move with the Syrian forces poised to enter Jordan.

[189] William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington and Berkeley: The Brookings Institute and University of California Press, 1993), p. 102.

[190] For the response of the American administration during the Jordanian crisis see *Ibid.*, pp. 98-108.

problems."[191] The American show of force in the eastern Mediterranean, in addition to the Israeli mobilization through American coordination, may have been a determining factor in then Syrian Defence Minister Hafiz al-Assad's decision not to commit the Syrian air force to the battle.[192] Without air cover the Syrian forces were left at the mercy of the Jordanian air force who entered the battle on 22 September and inflicted heavy damage on the Syrian ground forces. Perhaps more effectively, it was the commitment of the United States and Israel to support Hussein that prompted Hussein to engage his own air force in the battle.[193] Hussein ordered his air force into action on 22 September because he knew that American and Israeli assistance was forthcoming at his demand. Consequently, Hussein's decision removed the need for American or Israeli intervention.

By the end of September 1970, Hussein had survived yet another challenge to his regime partly through extra-regional help, but mainly due to the strength and loyalty of the Jordanian army. Later, in 1971, Hussein's stance during the September crisis and its contribution to American foreign policy in the Middle East was rewarded when the Nixon administration initiated the M-60 Program amounting to a virtual rearmament and reorganization of the Jordanian armed forces with American assistance.[194] The extra-regional component of Hussein's survival strategy was essential to the survival of the Hashemite regime. The regional component of the strategy has played an equally important role in the survival of the regime.

3.2 *The Regional Diplomacy of Survival: Between Accommodation and Confrontation*

Survival is the primary objective of King Hussein's regional policy. In the formative years of

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[191] *Ibid.*, pp. 113-14.

[192] Another factor may have been his rivalry with Syria's strong man at the time: Salah Jadid.

[193] See Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 113.

[194] See Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. 165.

Hussein's rule, roughly between 1955 and 1967, the main regional threat to the survival of the regime was revolutionary Arab nationalism, spearheaded by Nasser whom Hussein labelled "the latest Pharaoh across the Nile."[195] Jordan's *'asabiyya* dilemma, and the resultant permeability to external manipulation, facilitated Nasser's ability to foment domestic upheaval in Jordan. After all, under Nasser, though Egypt the state was supposed to deal with other Arab states irrespective of their forms, as "a revolution, Egypt should deal only with the people."[196] Egypt and Syria also sought to subvert the Jordanian regime by supporting and instigating army coups and assassination attempts against Hussein. Throughout these years, then, it was Nasser who set the nature and tone of the relationship between most of the 'revolutionary' Arab nationalist states and Hussein.

Until 1970, Hussein's regional policies were largely reactive. Not that Hussein did not initiate policies; this he sometimes did. However, his maneuvers were always within a context already dominated and determined by Nasser. In short, until 1967, it was Hussein who needed Nasser. Proximity to Nasser bestowed a desired degree of Arab nationalist legitimacy upon a king most of whose subjects were more loyal to the champion of Arab nationalism than to the Hashemite throne. Nevertheless, when the political and polemical battles between Cairo and Amman were joined, Hussein played his part with vigour and aggressiveness, never satisfied with responsive tactics. At times of confrontation, Hussein capitalized on every opportunity to discredit Nasser's prestige and undermine his stature as the paramount champion of Arab nationalism. Hussein's efforts aimed at undermining Nasser's appeal in Jordan and, consequently, the vulnerability of Jordan's domestic arena to foreign manipulation. It is in this light that Hussein's endeavour to present himself as the true inheritor of the Arab nationalist mantle should be viewed.

In general, Hussein's decision to confront or accommodate the regional hegemon was governed

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[195] Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, p. 165.

[196] Muhammad Hasanayn Heikal in *al-Ahram*, 29 December 1962, quoted in Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970* third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 28.

by the intensity and the origin of the threat to his survival: an accommodationist policy was chosen when the regime faced grave domestic threats, exacerbated by foreign manipulation, to insulate the domestic arena and enable the coercive agencies to restore the regime's domestic control. Regional confrontation, on the other hand, was often chosen in reaction to a similar policy by the regional hegemon, usually - but not always - when the regime felt domestically secure.

A number of features characterize Hussein's regional policies during the period under review. Hussein's regional policy was geared towards building alliances with like-minded conservative regimes - such as Saudi Arabia - to balance the threat posed by regional challengers. At times when regional accommodation was sought, cooperation with the regional hegemon entailed certain concessions on Hussein's part, be it with respect to his regional relations or domestic policies. Hussein also attempted to cast himself as the mediator among contending Arab states and as their spokesman, a role he was able to play only briefly after the 1964 Arab summit but was to acquire more importance in future years to ameliorate the effect of hostile pressures on the kingdom from its neighbours.[197] The final feature of the regional component of Hussein's survival strategy was the tendency to appoint prime ministers who are identified with particular regional (or extra-regional) policy stances in the service of consolidating or improving the regime's regional position. How then were these tactics employed between 1955 and 1970?

The decision to stay out of the Baghdad Pact marked the beginning of Hussein's relationship of forced accommodation with Nasser. At the time, Hussein could do little but accommodate Nasser to appease domestic opposition, then clamouring for closer relations with Egypt and Syria. Though the opposition in Jordan was largely Palestinian, it also included Jordanians who were willing, in the name of Arab nationalism, to waive their loyalty to the monarchy. After the Baghdad Pact crisis, there followed a series of accommodating decisions that Hussein was obliged to make to consolidate his domestic

[197] See Dessouki and Aboul Kheir, "The Politics of Vulnerability and Survival," p. 224; and Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 138-39.

position and to insulate the kingdom from regional manipulation: these included the expulsion of General Glubb, the appointment of Suleiman al-Nabulsi as Prime Minister, Jordan's entry into the Arab Collective Security Pact, and the termination of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. In this phase of Hussein's regional diplomacy of survival domestic pressure, fuelled by regional manipulation, forced Hussein to accommodate the regional hegemon.

By July 1957 the Hashemite regime was confronted with overwhelming domestic and external threats to its survival, and the symbiotic relation between the two forces was at its highest. Hussein decided that regional accommodation had to end. Hussein had come to the conclusion that his regional enemies were intent on overthrowing him. On 7 July 1957 the Egyptian military attaché in Amman, Major Fu'ad Hilal, and the Egyptian consul general in Jerusalem, Brigadier Muhammad Abdul 'Aziz, both charged with fomenting subversive activities among the officer corps and the general population, were expelled from Jordan. What ensued was a period of confrontation with Nasser and the other Arab nationalist states lasting until the fourth week of May 1967, punctuated with intervals of détente and accommodation. An examination of this period may provide a better understanding of the regional component of Hussein's survival strategy.

Regionally, 1957 witnessed the formation of an alliance between Hussein and the conservative monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The historic rivalry between the Hashemites and the Saudis was set aside for the time being. In the same year Hussein survived the April crisis. The confrontation with Nasser continued into 1958. On 1 February 1958 Syria and Egypt formed a union, the United Arab Republic (UAR). Hussein, in response, formed the Arab Federation on 14 February between Jordan and Iraq. But the bloody republican coup in Iraq on 14 July brought the Arab Federation to a premature end. Then came the July crisis in which domestic and external actors conspired to overthrow Hussein. This time Hussein's survival hinged not only on the loyalty of his troops and security services, but also on direct extra-regional intervention. On the morrow of the July crisis a fragile détente between the UAR and Jordan developed,

largely due to Nasser's desire to consolidate his regional gains accruing from the union with Syria. Hussein demonstrated his desire to mend fences with the revolutionary Arab camp by replacing Samir al-Rifa'i, the veteran prime minister, in May 1959. Rifa'i had been critical of the Arab League, claiming that it was an Egyptian tool.[198] His replacement may be interpreted as an attempt by the regime to demonstrate its desire for a *rapprochement* with Nasser.[199] Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Jordan, on 15 August 1959, took place only due to Nasser's need for cooperation from Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the Arab League to isolate Iraq whose president, 'Abdul Karim Qasim, was wagging an anti-Nasserite campaign in Iraq.[200]

The *rapprochement* between Nasser and Hussein sustained several setbacks in 1960. The year witnessed successive assassination attempts against Hussein and some of his closest *aides-de-camp* culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Hazza' al-Majali on 29 August. Hussein was quick to charge the UAR with complicity in these plots. On 1 October Hussein recognized Qasim's regime in Iraq, a move aimed at capitalizing on the growing rift between Nasser and Qasim that was guaranteed to intimidate the former. On 3 October, in a speech delivered at the United Nations, Hussein openly accused the UAR of subversive activities in Jordan.[201] An interruption in this war of words and deeds occurred between February and May 1961. The occasion was a letter sent by Hussein to Nasser urging the restoration of sensible relations between them and the relaxation of the propaganda war. Though underscoring fine points of disagreement between them, Nasser replied favourably to Hussein's first letter.[202] At the time, Nasser was preoccupied with internal problems, the growing restlessness in Syria,

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[198] For a vindication of Rifa'i's contention see Tawfig Y. Hasou, *The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League* (London: KPI, 1985), especially pp. 162-169.

[199] See Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 106.

[200] See Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 19.

[201] See excerpts from Hussein's speech to the UN in Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, pp. 200-207, especially p. 204.

[202] For a discussion of the letter exchange see Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 114-15.

and his feud with Qasim, and so a truce with Hussein was welcome. This incident supports the contention that Nasser had the last say in shaping the nature of the relation with Jordan.

The relaxation of tensions between the UAR and Jordan, and the period of relative stability enjoyed in Jordan as a result of the correspondence came to an abrupt end in September 1961. After the secession of Syria from the UAR on the morrow of the Syrian army coup on 28 September, Hussein immediately recognized the new secessionist Syrian government of Ma'mun al-Kuzbari. It was yet another example of Hussein's tireless attempts to exploit any opportunity to undermine Nasser's Arab nationalist credentials, and hence, his ability to manipulate the Jordanian domestic arena. Nasser retaliated by breaking off relations with Jordan, and a new era of confrontation began between Jordan and Egypt. Nasser's decision reflected the new orientation of the Egyptian regime toward the rest of the Arab world: "it reversed the course of moderation that it had cautiously developed since 1959 and assumed the stance of the militant revolutionary, uncompromisingly dedicated to the overthrow of all its conservative neighbours."[203]

The same characteristics of past confrontation periods resurfaced anew. After the propaganda war was resumed, Hussein energetically endeavoured to strengthen his relations with his Saudi allies. On 27 September 1962 Hussein travelled to Saudi Arabia and after three days of talks a communique issued by the two parties declared immediate "complete military union" between the two kingdoms and "coordination ... in foreign and inter-Arab policies."[204] The outburst of the Yemeni civil war in September also provided Hussein an opportunity to challenge Nasser's hegemony. Naturally, Hussein sided with the royalist camp, providing them aid and support. He also urged the Saudis to support the Yemeni royalists. The talks in Saudi Arabia and the support to the royalist Yemeni regime were vintage Hussein: consolidating his relations with an allied regional power to balance the threat of another, and reciprocating

[203] Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 25.

[204] Quoted in Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 124.

confrontation aggressively. But Hussein's fortunes soon changed. New regional developments caused a new regional orientation.

The Ba'thi coups in Iraq, on 8 February 1963, and in Syria, on 8 March, paved the way for unity talks between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq culminating in the signing of a document proclaiming the birth of a new United Arab Republic on 17 April.[205] For a while it seemed that Nasser had yet again set the Arab train on the unity track. Anticipating the effect of the unity talks on the domestic arena, Hussein altered his position from regional confrontation to accommodation. The decision was followed by a number of conciliatory measures. When the unity talks commenced Hussein expressed his readiness to cooperate with the prospective union, but made it clear that he was not considering joining it. The radio attacks on Egypt were abruptly ended. Wasfi al-Tall, the staunch anti-Nasser prime minister, was replaced by Samir al-Rifa'i. Hussein also played down his relations with Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni royalists without denying his sympathies for them.

The unity declaration triggered mass rallies in Jordan in support of the new union. On 20 April the rallies had turned into mass demonstrations against the government. Riots broke out in Irbid, Amman, and some West Bank towns. By accommodating his regional enemies, Hussein had won himself some time in anticipation of the domestic explosion. On 27 March, to consolidate his domestic position, Hussein had appointed a new government staffed with members whose loyalty to the regime was proven. Soon after the rioting began the army was sent in to clear the streets, and domestic control was swiftly restored.

Hussein's regional realignment in 1963 was not only tactically wise, it was also timely. The new union proved stillborn. Syria and Iraq were soon preoccupied with their own internal factional struggles. The failure of a Nasserite putsch in Syria in July 1963, and the resultant consolidation of power by the Ba'th, brought Syrian-Egyptian cooperation to an end. Hussein could only benefit from the internal

[205] See the classic study of the unity talks in Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, pp. 44-76. For excerpts from the talks see Muhammad Hasanayn Heikal, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan: Harb al-Thalatheen Sana* (al-Juz' al-'Awal) [The Effervescent Years: The Thirty Years War (part one)] (Cairo: Markaz al-'Ahram lil-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1988), pp. 689-699.

squabbles of the Arab revolutionary camp. At the same time, Nasser's regional fallout after the collapse of the projected union and in Yemen, compounded by domestic problems and a cooling of relations with the United States, forced a change in tactics. By December, the Cairo regime was leaning towards the belief that "positive influence over other governments' policies may be obtained more easily by conciliation and tolerance than by threats or abusiveness."[206] Nasser made use of the first Summit of the Arab head of states in Cairo in January 1964 to correct his relations with the conservative monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia who were "glad of his friendship, and would do what they could afford to accommodate him."[207] The 1964 Summit ushered forth two years of peaceful coexistence between the 'conservative' and the 'revolutionary' regimes. As on previous occasions, Nasser set the tone and Hussein reciprocated.

Relations with Jordan were restored on 15 January, with a show of personal cooperation between Hussein and Nasser. Hussein, always ready to appear with Nasser for domestic public consumption, visited Cairo twice in 1964. After the 1964 Summit, with Nasser's consent, Hussein attempted to play the role of mediator in Arab politics and the spokesman for the Arab states. Yet Hussein had to pay a price for accommodating Nasser: he recognized Egyptian hegemony in Arab politics, agreed to the creation of the PLO and the PLA, agreed to an Arab Unified Military Command under an Egyptian general, released Arab nationalist prisoners in Jordan, activated relations with the Communist bloc, switched his position in the Yemeni civil war recognizing the republican rather than the royalist regime, and finally, in 1965, cooperated with Nasser in the latter's campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[208]

The peaceful coexistence between Hussein and Nasser was violated by Hussein in January 1966 when he sided with Saudi Arabia in the nascent struggle between the emerging contending camps: the

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[206] Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 101.

[207] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[208] See Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 137-38 and 144; and Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 114.

revolutionary and Islamic. The break came in December when Nasser, desiring to present himself as the primary champion of the Palestinian cause and under pressure from Syria to resume the fight against the conservative regimes, publicly attacked Hussein for siding with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia. This round of confrontation continued until Hussein's visit to Cairo on 30 May 1967 and the signing of a bilateral defence pact with Egypt. Hussein's defensive step along the slippery slope leading to the 1967 war reflected his intent to give up his partnership with King Feisal in exchange for Nasser's patronage.[209] Hussein had no other choice. Refusal to join Egypt in the battle against Israel was bound to enrage his domestic (and regional) foes, and might have cost him his throne. In retrospect, his active accommodation of Nasser cost Hussein half his kingdom, but the throne was saved.

The 1967 war exposed the bankruptcy and sterility of the revolutionary camp's vituperations against Israel. Nasser and his revolutionary allies were defeated, and the threat to Hussein from this quarter all but disappeared. Now Hussein and Nasser shared similar objectives: survival and the recovery of the territory lost in the 1967 war. They also shared a common threat to the realization of these objectives: the Palestinian commandos, whose agenda differed from that of most Arab leaders. Consequently, both Nasser and Hussein "developed an interest in reaching a workable settlement with Israel before it was too late."[210] The Khartoum summit of August 1967 was the occasion for Nasser's formal reconciliation with Hussein. Yet Hussein was cognizant of the tactical nature of his alliance with Nasser after the 1967 war: Nasser needed him as a link with the United States and as an intermediary between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.[211] Nevertheless, Hussein made use of this alliance in his struggle against the commandos in September 1970. Once Nasser accepted the Rogers initiative on 23 July 1970 he had no other choice but to favour his alliance with Hussein over that with the Palestinians. The commandos had become an

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[209] See Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 128.

[210] *Ibid.*, p. 137. Significantly, Kerr calls the period between 1967 and 1970 the Nasser-Hussein "Axis," see p. 129.

[211] See *Ibid.*, p. 148; and Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1975), p. 58.

obstacle to the regional settlement desired by the Arab regimes rather than a tactical lever used to strengthen the Arab position.[212] Hence, in September, despite Nasser's warning to Hussein not to "liquidate" the commandos, Hussein's army moved to crush them.[213] Nasser's stance during the crisis and in the Cairo summit convened to resolve the crisis seems to vindicate Hussein's reasoning: throughout the crisis Nasser's criticism of Hussein was restrained, and the summit failed to elicit any formal censure against Hussein. With the death of Nasser on 28 September a turbulent era came to an end in Jordan's regional politics. Malcolm Kerr's verdict on this particular episode of Arab politics is cogent: "The supreme irony of ... [Nasser's] career was that he died in the act of shielding his old enemy ... [Hussein], at the expense of his old clients the Palestinians."[214]

Between 1955 and 1970 Hussein's regional policies were an important part of his survival strategy, playing an instrumental role in the survival of the Hashemite throne in Jordan. By the end of 1970 Hussein had successfully contained the threat from Cairo, even using Nasser's prestige for his own benefit in the September conflict with the commandos. In November 1970 Hafiz al-Assad seized power in Syria. To be sure, Syrian interests in Jordan persisted, especially after 1974, when Damascus developed its Eastern Front strategy. However, in its relations with Jordan, Assad's regime proved to be wiser and more cautious than its predecessors. The posture of enmity and hostility towards Israel helped Hussein in this turbulent period. The *modus vivendi* developed with Israel since King Abdullah's days was respected, with one fatal exception. In 1971 the army eliminated the remaining threat from the commandos in Jordan. King Hussein could now claim victory over his rivals. To better appreciate this victory, it is essential to undertake an

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[212] See 'Issa al-Shu'aibi, "'Ashr Sanawat Min al-Sira' Bayn al-Hukm al-'Urduni wa Munadhamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya," [Ten Years of Struggle Between the Jordanian Regime and the Palestinian Liberation Organization] *Shu'un Filastiniyya* 41/42, (January-February 1975), p. 215.

[213] Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, p. 97. On page 96 Heikal contends that Nasser feared that Hussein might use Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers initiative to clamp down on the commandos, "on the grounds that their patron, Nasser, had apparently withdrawn his support."

[214] Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 153.

examination of the domestic component of Hussein's survival strategy.

3.3 *Domestic Sources of Survival: Symbols and Techniques*

The domestic component of Hussein's survival strategy has played a pivotal role in ensuring the survival of the Hashemite regime in Jordan. After all, the domestic arena is where the state (or regime) intervenes to restructure state-society relations to achieve its paramount objective: survival. There is a need then to examine the symbols and the techniques employed by the regime to legitimize its rule and to integrate an otherwise deeply divided society. Symbols and techniques, however, have not always guaranteed survival. Brute force, deployed selectively but effectively, has saved the regime on numerous occasions.

3.3.1 *Neo-Patrimonial Leadership*

Hussein has effectively used traditional, religious, and pan-Arab symbols to consolidate and legitimize his rule. He perceives and presents himself as "the head of a family as much as the king of a country."[215] As the head of the extended family that is Jordan, Hussein has been able to use the existing patriarchal social structure to rally support from the traditional sectors of the society, specifically from the bedouin tribes whose first loyalty is to the family. The Hashemites' direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and their historic role as Guardians of the Holy Places have appealed to the religiously conservative bedouin and the tribes. In their turn, the Hashemites have cultivated strong personal ties with the bedouin and the tribal chiefs, "often sending their male children to spend a year or two with them to learn the lore of the desert."[216] In addition to the symbolic appeal of the Hashemite descent, the regime has generously lavished palpable material and political rewards to gain the loyalty of the leaders of the

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[215] Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, p. 50.

[216] Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. xxiv.

traditional segments of Jordanian society. In turn, the support of the tribal sheikhs has enabled the regime to cultivate the loyalty of the bedouin and the tribal population. Prominent bedouin tribes and clans are represented in the Royal Hashemite Diwan to ensure the loyalty of their constituencies. The Tribal Council, a department of the Diwan, also serves to promote the loyalty of the bedouin to the monarchy and maintains the monarchy in close touch with the rural areas of the East Bank.[217] This has helped Hussein develop strong personal relations with the Transjordanian rural population. In terms of political patronage and access to government or military posts, Hussein has scrupulously maintained a balance of power between the two main tribal confederations in the north and the south: the Bani Sakhr and the Majali.[218]

Clemency *vis-a-vis* the regime's enemies has been a recurring manifestation of Hussein's paternal rule: one time conspirators were later pardoned and appointed to non-sensitive posts in the kingdom.[219] The regime has also used its Arab nationalist credentials to bolster its legitimacy at the popular level. Throughout the turbulent era of the 1950s and 1960s, the public was continuously reminded of the Hashemite role in the Arab revolt of 1916, a tactic used to counter Nasser's monopolization over the Arab nationalist movement. The reliance on the manipulation of symbols, however, is not a sound survival tactic. Hence, the regime has depended on an array of techniques to consolidate and legitimise its rule.

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[217] For the Royal Diwan and the Tribal Council see Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War*, p. 12.

[218] Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, pp. 106-7 and 116.

[219] The list is long, but the following examples should suffice. Habis al-Majali, accused of taking Prince Nayef's side in the power struggle after the assassination of King Abdullah, became commander of the army in 1958. Abdullah Tell, implicated in the plot to assassinate King Abdullah, was offered a civil service post twenty years later. 'Ali Abu Nuwar, implicated in the April 1957 coup attempt, became ambassador to Paris ten years later. 'Ali al-Hiyyari, who fled to Syria after the April 1957 coup attempt, was appointed ambassador to Egypt in 1971. Sadek Shara', implicated in the March 1959 coup attempt, became Director General of Hussein's passport office in 1971. Suleiman al-Nabulsi, the regime's arch enemy in the late 1950s, was appointed to the Senate in 1964.

3.3.2. *Political-Legal Techniques*

The survival of the Hashemite regime has been predicated upon its ability to appeal to the other two main segments in the kingdom: the Transjordanian and the Palestinian. Since the creation of Transjordan, and especially after 1948, the regime has secured the loyalty of the Transjordanians by fully integrating them into the ruling establishment, the decision-making bodies, the public sector, and the military institutions of the kingdom. The regime's main challenge has been to integrate and control the Palestinian segment. The regime has employed an array of political and legal measures to constrain the political activities and opportunities of the Palestinian (subordinate) segment in Jordan.

Until 1967, the regime concentrated its energies on restricting the activities of the (largely) Palestinian opposition parties and inhibiting the emergence of a united, effective political leadership, representative of Palestinian opinion in the West Bank.[220] The most effective legal measures in this regard were the Emergency Defence Regulations, the Political Parties Law (1954), and the Anti-Communist Law (1953). These laws empowered the regime to suppress any form of political activity, dissolve or prohibit any form of political organization, that threatened (or was felt to threaten) the survival of the regime. This amounted to a legal intervention by the regime to structure the opposition's political organization. In the 1950s these legal prerogatives were used to prevent the creation of two parties that actively opposed the policies of the regime: the pan-Arab Ba'th and the Islamic al-Tahrir party. In April 1957, on the morrow of the coup attempt, all political parties were disbanded making political activity almost impossible. In the long run, this latter initiative created a political vacuum within the Transjordanian community that left the monarchy as the sole focus for their loyalty and the main institution around which they could rally.[221]

As a means to consolidate its domestic position and guarantee its survival, the Jordanian regime

[220] See Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, pp. 92-110.

[221] Sayigh, *Al-'Urdun wa-l-Filastiniyun*, p. 58.

has effectively utilized what Donald Horowitz calls "structural techniques," particularly that involving the "reshaping of ... electoral arrangements."[222] Often, the regime shaped electoral arrangements as to ensure the election of loyal candidates to Parliament and to strengthen "parochial-local interests against all-West-Bank aspirations."[223] Election results were manipulated by giving soldiers the right to vote wherever they were stationed on election day, and by restricting suffrage to persons who paid taxes on some form of asset. The former ruse guaranteed regime candidates substantial votes in the West Bank, while the latter worked in favour of the traditional property owners to the detriment of the emerging opposition figures.[224] Furthermore, the party system was structured to overrepresent the sparsely populated, pro-regime, southern region of the East Bank. The loyal ethnic and religious Transjordanian minorities are also overrepresented in Parliament. Similarly, in the West Bank, districts loyal to the regime were overrepresented. In short, the "more sympathetic and loyal the inhabitants of the constituency were to the regime the more seats they were allotted in Parliament."[225] Apart from the usual pressures on undesirable candidates, a final, and desperate, measure used by the regime to prevent the election of objectionable candidates was to call them for National Guard training near election time.[226]

The success of the regime in constraining the political activities and opportunities of the subordinate Palestinian segment of society also hinged on its ability to manipulate this segment's existing internal cleavages and fragmentation. This was facilitated by the persistence of conflict among the different political groups in the West Bank, enabling the regime to distinguish between the opposition parties and

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[222] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 596.

[223] Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, p. 104.

[224] See *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

[225] *Ibid.*, p. 106. Hence in the 1950s, the Jerusalem district and Ramallah, with populations of 150,000 and 120,000 respectively were represented by only three members in the lower House. On the other hand, the districts of Karak, Ma'an, and Tafila, in the southern East Bank, with a population of only 90,000, were represented by five members.

[226] See Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, p. 38.

increase the possibilities of internal conflicts among them.[227] Electoral arrangements were shaped to emphasize parochial *hamula* (clan or extended family) allegiances, exacerbating relations between the different Palestinian groups. In the traditional Nashashibi-Husayni conflict the Hashemites relied on their clients the Nashashibis. Hashemite supporters among the Palestinians were favoured by the regime in the distribution of economic resources, creating tensions between those who opposed the regime and those who were willing to benefit from the resources made available by the regime. Furthermore, Palestinians residing in Jordan since 1948 felt threatened by the wave of separatist Palestinian nationalism of the late 1950s and 1960s. The regime favoured the former group and cultivated their loyalty by bestowing political patronage upon them.[228] Finally, until 1957, the incessant competition between political parties in Jordan served to weaken their ability as an effective opposition to the regime, thus facilitating the regimes's task to undermine their activities through the security services.

Political cooptation was another tool used by the regime to extend its authority over the Palestinians, and to elicit a degree of legitimacy from its large Palestinian population. The practice of ''selective appointment'' of members of the Palestinian elite to senior government positions began before the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and continued in later years.[229] From the outset, influential Palestinian notables not associated with the Husayni faction in Jerusalem were appointed to the Senate, to cabinet posts, and to governorships, and the election of their followers to the lower House was arranged by the authorities; moreover, ''Palestinians whose influence derived from their former positions in the British Mandatory civil service, were immediately integrated into the upper echelons of the Jordanian

[227] See Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, p. 45.

[228] See Sayigh, *Al-'Urdun wa-l-Filastiniyun*, p. 43.

[229] Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, p. 8. In 1949 three West Bank Palestinians served as cabinet ministers: Ruhi 'Abdul Hadi, from Nablus, in Foreign Affairs; Khulusi Khayri, from Ramallah, in Trade and Agriculture; and Musa Nasir, from Ramallah, in Communications.

bureaucracy."[230] Especially after the failure of the union attempt of 1963, Hussein was effective in neutralizing Palestinian nationalist opposition figures through cooptation, usually by offering them ministerial or ambassadorial posts.[231] However, coopted Palestinians, loyalists or not, were often kept away from the important and sensitive portfolios, such as the premiership, the interior ministry, the ministry of information, and the high security and army posts. The aim of these political appointments was "to stress the Palestinian presence in the governing system and to make it seem more representative."[232] The effect of the coopted politicians on the decision-making process relating to substantive matters was rather minimal.

3.3.3 *Socio-Economic Policies*

Since its inception, the Hashemite regime has used social and economic policies to engender allegiance to the regime and an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments in Jordan. The regime's main instrument in achieving the political integration of the Palestinian refugees was to grant them Jordanian citizenship and its resultant political rights. By granting citizenship to the refugees the regime sought to dilute Palestinian identity and suppress separatist Palestinian feelings, legitimize its claim of being the only viable country for Palestinians, and incorporate them into the institutions of the kingdom. Citizenship was also a source of material benefits for the refugees who, as Jordanian citizens, could travel in search of work in the Arab world. "Hence economic benefits were coupled with political rights to provide for the refugees' potential absorbtion within the new framework."[233]

Education and enrolment in UNRWA's (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees)

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[230] Clinton Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge 1948-1983: A Political History* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 135.

[231] Palestinian opposition figures such as Anwar Nusseibeh, Qadri Tuqan, Anwar al-Khatib, Rashad al-Khatib, and Hanna 'Atallah were offered ministerial or ambassadorial posts in the 1960s. See Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, pp. 17 and 135.

[232] Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, pp. 63-64.

[233] Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan*, p. 45.

Work Projects were other means to integrate the refugees into the new polity. Vocational training and education prepared the second generation refugees for participation in the life of their new state. The regime supported integrative schemes such as the resettlement of refugees through agricultural projects and the building of proper dwellings to replace the existing tents. These schemes gave the Palestinian refugees a sense of permanency in Jordan, and the regime hoped that better living conditions will accelerate their integration into Jordan. Finally, by playing a mediating role between the refugees and UNRWA, the regime escaped being blamed for the refugees' wretched conditions. This won the regime the loyalty of the refugees and facilitated their integration. The regime's integrative schemes were somewhat successful. The exigencies of every-day life ultimately distracted the refugees from their fundamental goal: return to Palestine. In the process, the regime had gained the respect of the refugees who, until the 1960s, "did not try to organize themselves as a distinct group, concentrating rather on their integration into" Jordan.[234]

The selective distribution of economic rewards - what Horowitz calls "distributive policies"[235] - has been a cornerstone of the regime's strategy to coopt both its Transjordanian and Palestinian subjects. Since the creation of Jordan, the regime has depended on foreign (British then American and Arab) subsidy to offer its subjects viable 'strategies of survival' in exchange for loyalty, or at least, acquiescence to Hashemite rule. For example, between 1967 and 1972, external aid "served to support a growing public sector," an important source of employment in Jordan, "with government expenditures representing about one third of GDP."[236]

The promise of economic felicity was instrumental in procuring Palestinian acquiescence to Hashemite rule and integration into Jordanian society. By providing its Palestinian subjects the opportunity

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[234] *Ibid.*, p. 40. For UNRWA's role see pp. 62, 70, and 71.

[235] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 596.

[236] Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25, 1, (March 1992), p. 78.

to benefit materially as Jordanian citizens, the regime hoped to demonstrate the economic benefits that would accrue from the continuity of Hashemite rule. In the 1970s, socio-economic planning was aimed at increasing work opportunities in the hope that material incentives would gain the regime allegiance from the Palestinian segment.[237] The regime manipulated economic incentives and rewards in a manner that served its integration policy. The dependency of West Bank Palestinians on the regime in Amman was heightened by the regime's deliberate policy of inhibiting the independent development of the West Bank economy, ultimately leading to its dependence upon that of the East Bank and Israel.[238] By the 1980s - when Jordan's economy was reaping the benefits of the oil boom, the relocation of many Arab and foreign companies from Beirut to Amman, and the activity at the port of 'Aqaba due to the Iran-Iraq war - Palestinians were playing the dominant role in the economy.[239] Palestinians held the highest positions in the business and financial sectors.

Jordan's position as an indirect beneficiary of the Arab oil economy led to the emergence of an externally financed neo-patrimonial political economy centred around the Hashemite monarchy which contributed to the regime's survival.[240] The material satisfaction of large segments of the population muted pressures for democratization, at least until the late 1980s. Jordanian rentierism, an indirect beneficiary of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 world oil price hikes and the Arab oil economy, placed huge economic resources at the disposal of the regime. The regime distributed these resources in the form of material rewards that enhanced the stability of the regime. Loyal tribal leaders were major recipients of financial and material rewards from the regime, which made them dependent on the regime to retain their

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[237] See Sayigh, *Al-'Urdun wa-l-Filastiniyun*, p. 44.

[238] See Ghazi al-Khalili, "Siyasaat al-Nizam al-'Urduni Tijah Mas'alat Taqrir Mustaqbal al-Dafa al-Gharbiyya wa Qita' Gaza," [The Policies of the Jordanian Regime Toward Determining the Future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip] *Shu'un Filastiniyya* 53/54, (January/February 1976), p. 51.

[239] See Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, p. 136.

[240] See Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World," especially pp. 70 and 78-83 from which this paragraph draws heavily.

social power. State resources were mainly targeted at the loyal Transjordanian elite and population. "State investment funds often seemed disproportionably directed towards the provision of services and infrastructure to those areas of the country predominantly populated by Transjordanian rather than Palestinian citizens."[241] The regime bartered employment for support from the Transjordanians; around three quarters of the Transjordanian population was employed in the expanding public sector. The Palestinians also benefited from Jordanian rentierism. Palestinian entrepreneurs excelled in the trade, service, small and medium scale manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, Jordanian citizenship enabled a great number of Palestinians to migrate to the Gulf states in search of work. The remittances of these migrants were an important source of income for many Palestinian families in Jordan. Jordanian rentierism "played a key role in national integration, knitting together an otherwise deeply divided population ... around the central core of the Hashemite monarchy."[242]

3.3.4 *The Role of Coercive Institutions*

The regime has relied on coercive measures to strengthen its control over the domestic arena and secure its survival. At times of open domestic confrontation (1956-57, 1958, 1963, 1966, and 1970-71), direct military action was undertaken by the loyal bedouin regiments of the army. The bedouin dominated officer corps and the elite Royal Guards shielded the monarchy from many a coup attempt. On most other occasions, the regime resorted to more subtle coercive measures against the domestic opposition. The security services, especially the General Intelligence Directorate (*Mudiriyyat al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma*), have been successful in suppressing political activity deemed threatening to the survival of the regime. Preventative measures are often taken against undesirable political activists to ensure central control: official papers and the certificate of 'good behaviour,' the latter essential for employment, are withheld

[241] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[242] *Ibid.*

by the authorities to pressure and constrain the activities of some individuals.[243]

The coercive institutions have also played an important role in state-building and national integration. The Arab Legion (later the Jordan Arab Army) was a primary medium for the integration of the bedouin into the state. By offering economic aid, education, and opportunities for employment during the crisis years of the 1930s, the army secured the bedouin's acceptance of, and loyalty to, the central government.[244] Major Transjordanian bedouin tribes, such as the Huwaytat, the Bani Sakhr, and the Sirhan are heavily represented in the army. Eventually, the bedouin dominated the officers corps and the mobile strike forces. By the 1970s the JAA was "essentially a tribal army, a force based on and reflecting the social structure of what were once the major bedouin tribes."[245] Members of the military establishment enjoy wide social and economic privileges. The military establishment ultimately became a major employer in the Jordanian economy, and the sole source of income for many bedouin and rural families.[246] In 1976 conscription was introduced in Jordan, partly to provide the kingdom with a reserve force, and "partly to bring together the youth of the country at a formative period in their lives in the interest of nation-building."[247] Yet conscription has reduced the Transjordanian character of the army, particularly its lower ranks with future consequences that are difficult to predict. By the late 1980s, some observers were drawing attention to the development of a sense of statehood and nationhood among the different segments of Jordanian society, largely absent when Hussein first assumed his royal

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[243] See Sayigh, *Al-'Urdun wa-l-Filastiniyun*, pp. 48-49.

[244] See Hiatt, "State Formation and the Incorporation of Nomads," pp. 71-73. See also P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 140.

[245] Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* The Washington Papers, 108, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 22.

[246] See Hasan al-Ja'ba, "Siyasat al-Nidham wa-l-'Azma al-'Iqtisadiyya al-Rahina fi-l-'Urdun," [Regime Policy and the Current Economic Crisis in Jordan] *Shu'un Filastiniyya* 15, (November 1972), p. 115.

[247] Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. 174.

responsibilities.[248] Kamal Salibi points to the Jordanian experiment as an example of an Arab state that has successfully reconciled the twin demands of *wataniyya* and *qawmiyya*, unlike most other Arab states who "remain at a loss over how to reconcile their individuality as nation-states with the reality and dictates of their common Arabism."[249]

3.4 *The Success of Husseinism*

This chapter has advanced a multi-level, interactive analysis of King Hussein's survival strategy until the early 1970s. Hussein's ability to retain power and control over the political process, his ability to neutralize the malignant effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic arena throughout the turbulent formative years of his rule, combined with the emergence of a sense of Jordanian statehood and nationhood, is indicative of the success of his survival strategy. What then are the causes of Husseinism's success?

Husseinism's success is rooted in the positive contribution of every component of the strategy to the overall survival strategy, and in the mutually reinforcing interaction among the three components. In general, the extra-regional umbrella protected the kingdom from external regional intervention and helped constrain the domestic enemies of the regime. This enabled the regime to effectively deploy the state's coercive resources against the domestic opposition at times of open confrontation. Similarly, as a reaction to Jordan's *'asabiyya* dilemma, Hussein's regional accommodation policy was selectively used to insulate the state from regional intervention and manipulation, and enable the state's coercive agencies to clamp down on the domestic opposition.

The subsidy and aid offered by Jordan's extra-regional and regional allies, and the revenues

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[248] See Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Nationalism*, p. 171; and Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*, p. 223.

[249] Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), p. 274.

accruing from Jordanian rentierism, placed essential economic resources at the disposal of the Hashemite regime.[250] Combined with Jordan's hierarchic political structure and the loyal coercive agencies, these economic resources allowed the regime a high degree of political and economic autonomy from society. The regime's autonomy from society enabled it to successfully regulate state-society relations through an array of economic, social, and political policies and techniques aimed at strengthening its social control over the population. The regime consolidated its social control by controlling the distribution of economic rewards and sanctions. The regime's supportive economic policies were dispensed in different ways: either through employment in the public sector, through the externally financed neo-patrimonial political economy, or by partaking of the material benefits made available by Jordanian citizenship. Social control was also attained by neutralizing the subordinate Palestinian segment of Jordanian society. This the regime achieved in different ways, but mainly by manipulating structural cleavages within the Palestinian segment, coopting Palestinian opposition politicians, and brute coercion or intimidation. The same policies and techniques were used to promote legitimacy for the regime and engender an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments of Jordan's deeply divided society. The cumulative result of the aforementioned extra-regional, regional, and domestic policies was the success of Husseinism. Having completed the analysis of Husseinism in this chapter, it is now appropriate to turn to an examination of the survival strategy of Fu'ad Shihab.

[250] For the share of foreign revenues in government expenditure see table 9.2 in Hesham Garaibeh, "Gov ment Income Sources and the Development of the Taxation System - the Case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait," in Hazem Beb wi and Giacomo Luciani, eds. *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 202.

4. FU'AD SHIHAB'S SURVIVAL STRATEGY: SHIHABISM

In the political history of Lebanon, Shihabism refers to the policies of President Fu'ad Shihab (1958-64) and his protégé and successor President Charles Helou (1964-70). Among other things, Shihabism is identified with *étatism*, state-building, and the promotion of national unity among the different segments of Lebanon. In this chapter Shihabism is reconstructed as a multi-level, interactive survival strategy whose objective was the resolution of Lebanon's *'asabiyya* dilemma. The strategy devised by Shihab was composed of two primary components: one external, the other domestic. Active preventive accommodation of the regional hegemon was chosen to insulate the country from foreign intervention and manipulation. Once insulation was achieved, and a relative degree of state autonomy was secured, the Shihabist regime undertook a series of political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms to promote national integration and allegiance to the state. In the long run, the success of this strategy would mitigate the country's permeability predicament releasing the state from the burdens of perennial regional accommodation. This chapter will commence with a brief analysis of the 1958 civil war in Lebanon. After all, the 1958 war was the backdrop to the Shihab regime's extra-regional, regional, and domestic policies. After examining Shihabism's extra-regional, regional, and domestic policies, the chapter will close with an analysis of the factors that led to the failure of Shihabism.

4.1 *The 1958 Civil War: The 'Asabiyya Dilemma Exposed*

The 1958 civil war in Lebanon was essentially a violent demonstration of the country's *'asabiyya* dilemma. The lack of a unified vision and consensus among the Lebanese concerning Lebanon's cultural, regional, and extra-regional orientation was the root cause of the war; all other factors, regional or otherwise, were either derivative or external manifestations of this basic national syndrome.[251]

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[251] See Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 28; and Khalidi, "External Intervention in Lebanon," p. 112.

Furthermore, the 1958 war simultaneously exposed Lebanon's permeability and the vulnerability of certain segments of society to external manipulation, and the inclination of some segmental leaders adhering to a pan-Arab ideological orientation (by choice or convenience) to employ Arab nationalist slogans to muster regional support against the local authorities, thus strengthening their control over their respective constituencies. On the regional level, the 1958 war demonstrated how, in the highly permeable Arab system of the 1950s and 1960s, "extra-state symbolism and ideology came to represent an important avenue for both the stabilization and destabilization of Arab regimes."[252]

The direct causes of the 1958 war are rooted in the convergence of domestic grievances, regional polarization, and extra-regional cold war rivalry. The post-1954 domestic, regional, and extra-regional policies of the Sham'oun presidency (1952-58) were also responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in May 1958. Domestically, the grievances of the (mainly Sunni) opposition were many. The Sunnis and the Shi'a were especially dissatisfied with Maronite monopoly and domination over state institutions, the civil service, and foreign policy decision-making; furthermore, they were acutely aware of the disparity in government investment favouring the (Christian) northern mountainous areas to the detriment of the rural (Muslim) areas. The nepotism and corruption of Sham'oun and his entourage alienated many politicians from the regime, as did the regime's attempts to undermine the power of the traditional *zu'ama'* (strongmen) by rigging the parliamentary elections of 1957 - an act interpreted by some as a prelude to Sham'oun's amending of the 1926 Constitution to secure a second presidential term. Finally, Sham'oun incurred the wrath of the Sunni political establishment when he bypassed popular Sunni leaders, such as Sa'ib Salam and Abdullah al-Yafi, and appointed Sami al-Sulh as prime minister in November 1956 after the outbreak of the Suez crisis. By so doing, Sham'oun had violated a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the Lebanese political game, one that acknowledged "that the Sunni ... [Muslims] should be represented by a vigorous Prime Minister capable of defending their interests in the face of the

[252] Brynen, "Palestine and the Arab State System," p. 600.

extensive powers of the Christian President."[253]

Sham'oun's foreign policies were no less conducive to the rupture of the political consensus in 1958. As previously mentioned, according to the 1943 National Pact, Lebanon was to follow a neutral Arab policy and a 'center-right' extra-regional orientation; moreover, Lebanon should not align itself with any foreign power against the interests of the Arab states singly or collectively. Until 1954, Sham'oun successfully steered Lebanese foreign policy to meet the preceding guidelines. By 1955, however, his foreign policy began to fumble.

Although Sham'oun declined to publicly join the 1955 Baghdad Pact for fear of antagonizing Muslim Lebanese and Arab public opinion, he supported it, and behind the scenes negotiations were held with Turkey, ostensibly for Lebanon to join the defence arrangement.[254] Furthermore, the Arab policies of the Sham'oun administration seemed to identify Lebanon with the Hashemite camp in the nascent Egyptian-Iraqi conflict, violating Lebanon's essential neutrality in inter-Arab affairs. In 1956, on the morrow of the tripartite invasion of Suez, Sham'oun refused to condemn the aggression or break off relations with Great Britain and France. He feared that such a move might further erode Western - namely British - influence in the region. In turn, this could weaken Western guarantees for the Lebanese state and, consequently, undermine Maronite dominance and privileges in Lebanon.[255] Thus Sham'oun was intent on asserting the distinctness of Lebanon's foreign policy from that of Egypt. Naturally, this decision engendered the disaffection of many Muslim politicians in Lebanon and the Arab radical camp led by Egypt.

On 16 March 1957 Sham'oun decided to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine, at a time when Arab

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[253] Malcolm Kerr, "The Lebanese Civil War," in Evan Luard, ed. *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 68.

[254] See Bassam Abdel Kader Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976: The Interplay of Domestic, Regional, and International Politics," (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1982), pp. 164-65; and Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1985), p. 84.

[255] See Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976," p. 173.

nationalists in Lebanon were clamouring for cooperation with Nasser and for strict positive neutrality in the extra-regional arena. The decision divided the Lebanese into supporters and opponents of the Doctrine.[256] The Muslim opponents of the Doctrine clustered around Nasser's Arab nationalist leadership. Sham'oun's endorsement of the Doctrine was considered a *casus belli* by Egypt and Syria. Henceforth, Egypt began to work against the Sham'oun regime, inciting the Muslim Lebanese public against it through a fierce propaganda campaign. In April 1957, Nasser encouraged the formation in Lebanon of the United National Front, an organization of anti-Sham'oun Muslim and Christian politicians opposed to Sham'oun's Arab policy.[257] When on 1 February 1958 the UAR was created, Lebanon's permeability and vulnerability to external manipulation, and the willingness of local politicians to utilise segmental cleavages and external support against the local authorities, converged. Some Muslim deputies ambiguously demanded union with the UAR.[258] Yet support to the union was a tactical convenience used by the Sunni *zu'ama'* to rally support from their domestic constituency. Nevertheless, their stance provided Egypt a bridge-head, through the Arab nationalist opposition, to reorient what it perceived as a misguided policy orientation on the part of the Sham'oun regime, one that failed to serve Nasser's regional interests and designs. Thus by early 1958 the domestic, regional, and extra-regional policies of Sham'oun had removed the domestic and regional consensus necessary for the smooth functioning of the Lebanese political system.

The civil war commenced in earnest on 8 May 1958 with the murder of Nasib al-Matni, an opposition journalist. The express goal of the Muslim armed rebellion was to oust the Sham'oun regime. Of equal importance, however, was the opposition's demand that the regime rescind its endorsement of

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[256] The Kata'ib (Phalange), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Maronite community, Sami al-Sulh, and 'Adel 'Usayran supported the Doctrine. Namani argues that the Druze clan lead by Kamal Junblat "held back outright condemnation" of the Doctrine. See Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976," p. 199.

[257] See Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 226.

[258] See Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976," p. 207.

the Eisenhower Doctrine. The regime was supported by the internal security forces, the Phalange party, the SSNP, and irregular Christian volunteers. In addition to the propaganda campaign against the regime, the UAR supplied the rebels with money and weapons. The army commander, General Fu'ad Shihab, refused to engage the army in the battle against the opposition fearing the disintegration of the army along confessional lines. The army interfered selectively to maintain a balance between the warring factions and to protect key government and public facilities. On 15 July, after an official request by Sham'oun, with an eye on events in Iraq and Jordan, and to reassure its northern tier allies of its commitment to defend their security, America activated the Eisenhower Doctrine and landed Marines in Beirut. The American troops deployed around key American institutions in the city, but carefully avoided rebel-held areas and renounced any intention to defend the Lebanese government against rebel attacks. Following the arrival of the Marines, Eisenhower sent to Lebanon a special emissary, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Murphy, to negotiate an amicable resolution of the war. The objective of American diplomacy was "to exert a calming psychological influence that would enable the Lebanese, free of any real or imagined threat of intimidation or intervention from the UAR, to find a compromise formula to set their own house in order within the framework of their traditional institutions."[259] Yet the compromise formula was worked out between America and Nasser.[260] As a result, Sham'oun could continue in office until his constitutional term expired on 23 September. Meanwhile, Parliament elected Fu'ad Shihab president, and Rashid Karami, a rebel leader from Tripoli, was appointed prime minister. Karami swiftly renounced Lebanon's

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[259] Kerr, "The Lebanese Civil War," p. 82.

[260] On 20 May 1958, in a meeting between Nasser and Raymond Hare, American ambassador to Egypt, Nasser suggested that Shihab should be elected president and that Egypt and America use their good-offices with the warring parties to restore stability in Lebanon. See the minutes of the meeting in Heikal, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan*, pp. 326-28. Later, in June, Nasser informed Miles Copeland that Rashid Karami was his choice for prime minister. See Copeland, *Games of Nations*, p. 237. When Sa'ib Salam realized that he had been dropped by Nasser, he raised the slogan "neither victor nor vanquished," which reflected his will to accept a minimalist solution to the crisis based on the return to the spirit of the 1943 National Pact. See Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976," p. 232.

commitment to the Eisenhower Doctrine.[261] After a brief Christian 'counter-revolt' in October, a four-man emergency cabinet was formed on 14 October as a symbol of national reconciliation. The war had reached its denouement. On 27 October, the last of the American troops left Beirut.

Albeit short lived, the civil war of 1958 exposed the centrifugal forces at work in Lebanon. To be sure, most Muslim politicians did not disavow the formula enunciated in the 1943 National Pact. There were no plans to overthrow the existing political arrangements, nor to re-unite the Muslim areas of Lebanon with the Syrian hinterland.[262] However, the crisis underscored the lack of national allegiance among a large segment of the population, especially the Muslim inhabitants of the rural areas. The crisis also demonstrated the willingness of the "pan-Arab Islamic opposition" to invite external Arab intervention in Lebanese affairs in the name of the pan-Arab ideal to serve their parochial political interests and their domestic struggles.[263] More importantly, the 1958 war glaringly exhibited how Lebanon's permeability to pan-Arab ideologies was manipulated by an aspiring regional hegemon bent on intervening in the internal politics of weaker states to secure its position in the regional game of political domination.

4.2 *Regional Accommodation and Extra-Regional Neutrality: Insulating the Shihabist State*

When Shihab assumed the levers of power in late September 1958, Lebanon was a "malintegrated state," its institutional structure was closer to that of a "merchant republic" than a modern state, ruled

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[261] See Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1980), p. 304.

[262] See Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban, 1920-70," in Roger Owen, ed. *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 29. See also Bassem al-Jisr, *Fu'ad Shihab: Dhalika al-Majhul* [Fu'ad Shihab: That Mystery] (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbou'at lil-Tawzi' wa-l-Nashr, 1988), p. 35.

[263] Salibi, *Lebanon and the Middle Eastern Question*, p. 11.

through a "confessional sectocracy."[264] As a result of the competing conceptions of security entertained by the regime and different segments of society, Lebanon faced an acute 'insecurity dilemma.' This 'insecurity dilemma' was manifested in less effective security for each segment of society; the weakness of central institutions in providing services and order; and the vulnerability of the country and the population to external intervention and manipulation. Shihab's Lebanon consisted then of a political society that was internally divided and vulnerable to external pressures from a regional hegemonic power. Moreover, Shihab was acutely aware of the need to promote a sense of national unity in Lebanon, a *sine qua non* for the restoration of a semblance of statehood to the Lebanese polity. But to accomplish this task Lebanon had to be insulated from the buffeting regional ideological winds that had often aggravated, and at times created, conflicts among the different Lebanese segments. Only by insulating the state from external manipulation and intervention could domestic stability be procured and a process of state- and *'asabiyya*-building, aimed at the creation of a sense of allegiance to the state and its institutions, prove viable in a deeply divided society such as that of Lebanon in 1958. What then was the policy pursued by Shihab to achieve state insulation from regional manipulation?

Shihab's choice of an active preventive accommodationist Arab policy was determined by a set of tangible domestic and regional realities. On the domestic level, and due to Nasserism's appeal to a wide segment of Lebanese society, it was evident that outright "opposition to Nasser was impossible if the national unity of the Lebanese people was to be restored and preserved."[265] Hence, a *rapprochement* with Nasser was not only meant to serve Shihab's insulatory objectives, it was also meant to neutralize the Sunni politicians' instrumental use of Nasserism to strengthen their position with their constituencies and the local authorities. Needless to say, Shihab hoped that a preventive accommodationist regional

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[264] For the three terms see respectively: N. Kliot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, 1, (January 1987), p. 54; Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964," *Middle Eastern Studies* 2, 3, (April 1966), p. 214; and Georges Corm quoted in Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), p. 26.

[265] Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab," p. 218.

policy would bring an end to the intervention and manipulations of the Egyptian regime in Lebanese politics. Shihab's Arab policy was also determined by the then regional configuration of power. Since in the late 1950s the Arab system was "a highly unbalanced, virtually one-power system, dominated by Egypt," the decision to appease the dominant regional hegemon was tactically correct.[266] Furthermore, by appeasing Egypt, and due to Nasser's regional clout, Shihab could guarantee Lebanon's insulation from the intervention of other regional powers - especially Syria.[267]

After his election to the presidency, Shihab immediately demonstrated his desire to accommodate Nasser and to reorient Lebanon's foreign policy away from the pro-Hashemite and pro-American course it had assumed under Sham'oun, opting for a course closer to that pursued by President Bishara al-Khoury (1943-1952) before 1950: avoid identifying Lebanon with any Western military alliance, close cooperation with the Arab states, and a neutral stance on inter-Arab conflicts.[268] On 10 September 1958, some fourteen days prior to the official beginning of his presidential tenure, Shihab sent Nasser a letter in which he expressed his desire to begin a new era between the "fraternal" UAR and Lebanon. Shihab went on to emphasise his determination to make maximum efforts to rectify relations between the two states, and to search for "positive steps" that would enable the two states to enter an era of "constructive cooperation based on sincerity and candour," in the service of "the unity of the Arab rank."[269] Later, in another effort at accommodation, Shihab withdrew the complaint submitted to the UN by the Sham'oun regime, accusing the UAR of sending men and weapons to Lebanon, prior to the publication of Dag Hammarskjöld's report on Lebanon's complaint.

These tentative steps later developed into a mutual agreement between Nasser and Shihab. The

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[266] Noble, "The Arab System," p. 50.

[267] See Hitti, *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon*, p. 23.

[268] See Tawfiq Kfoury, *Al-Shihabiyya wa Siyasat al-Mawqif* [Shihabism and Stance Politics] (Beirut: n.p.. 1980), p. 233.

[269] See the text of the letter in Heikal, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan*, pp. 860-61. Quotes from p. 860.

occasion was a meeting between the two presidents on 25 March 1959, ostensibly held to resolve economic disagreements between the two states. Characteristically, Shihab refused to meet Nasser in Cairo, Damascus, or Beirut lest this antagonizes Christian public opinion. The meeting was held in a metal kiosk in the neutral zone along the Syrian-Lebanese border. The *modus vivendi* reached in this meeting served the purposes of the two leaders.[270] Shihab committed himself to steer Lebanon away from international alliances or policies that were detrimental to Arab (read Egyptian) interests; moreover, Shihab assured Nasser that he would not tolerate in Lebanon any activities aimed at undermining the UAR. Implicit in this agreement was Shihab's recognition of a vaguely defined Egyptian influence in Lebanon and his willingness to accommodate and support Egyptian interests and policies in the Arab world. On his part, Nasser recognized Lebanon's 'special status' in the Arab world, agreed to limit his ambitions in Lebanon, and committed himself to help the Shihab regime safeguard and consolidate Lebanon's national unity. Practically, this meant providing an Egyptian political umbrella to insulate Lebanon from external regional manipulation and intervention. It also meant tempering the excesses of the Sunni political leadership in Lebanon. To complete his insulation objective, Shihab was obliged to devise a viable extra-regional foreign policy. In many ways, Shihab's pro-Nasser Arab policy shaped his extra-regional policy.

The Shihab regime's pro-Nasser Arab policy, at a time when the Cold War was at its zenith, meant that total neutrality in the international arena was not a viable option.[271] However, from 1958 until just after the 1967 war, Lebanon was the subject of an informal agreement between Egypt and America, the two powers that were strongest in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time.[272] This convergence of interests between Egypt and America over Lebanon enabled the Shihab regime simultaneously to pursue

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[270] For the meeting and the agreement see al-Jisr, *Fu'ad Shihab: Dhalika al-Majhul*, pp. 71-77; Kfoury, *Al-Shihabiyya wa Siyasat al-Mawqif*, pp. 233-235; and Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, p. 102.

[271] See Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 15.

[272] See Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, p. 93. See also Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 19; and Kerr, "The Lebanese Civil War," p. 85.

a pro-Nasser Arab policy and an extra-regional policy that brought Lebanon back to its traditional 'center-right' position in the international arena. Under Shihab, this stance was practically translated in the form of economic and cultural closeness to the West, particularly to France, "but only to the extent permitted by a generally pro-[Nasser] Arab policy," and in an effort to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union.[273]

Absolute reliance on the United States in the extra-regional arena was bound to antagonize the Muslim communities and their pan-Arab protégés. A similar approach towards the Soviet Union was bound to alienate the powerful commercial-financial oligarchy and Lebanon's traditional Western allies. Consequently, the Shihab regime eschewed the two preceding options. To resolve this dilemma, Shihab turned to France at a time when the latter's credentials in the Arab world were rising due to de Gaulle's stance on Algeria. The Shihab regime's identification with France in the extra-regional arena was the closest it could get to neutrality without offending pan-Arab opinion. However, this stance was the source of some mutual mistrust between the Shihabist regime and the United States.[274]

As a result of Shihab's regional and extra-regional policies, Lebanon's regional and extra-regional interests were safeguarded, it was insulated from the malignant repercussions of 'the Arab Cold War,' and the cardinal objective of external guarantees for domestic stability was secured. Indeed, Lebanon did concede some of its freedom in the Arab and international arena, but this was a meagre cost for the domestic benefits that accrued from this trade-off. Having addressed Lebanon's permeability predicament by insulating the state from external manipulation, and having elicited external guarantees for domestic satiability, Shihab began implementing his domestic agenda.

4.3 *Domestic Engineering: Building al-Mujtama' al-Jadid and al-Dawla al-Haditha*

Shihab's domestic policies were largely shaped by the condition of national fragmentation

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[273] Salamé, "Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" p. 355. See also al-Jisr, *Fu'ad Shihab: Dhalika al-Majhul*, p. 72.

[274] See Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 15.

prevailing in Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1958 war. The regime's single most important objective was the restoration of national unity among the different Lebanese segments. National unity was considered a necessary condition for the future resolution of Lebanon's permeability predicament. Domestically then, Shihabism was preoccupied with fostering a feeling of common citizenship among all Lebanese. The state would procure *iltiham* in society by promoting a trans-segmental *'asabiyya* that stresses national unity and a shared loyalty and allegiance to Lebanon as a final indisputable country. *Iltiham* would then reduce the existing segmental cleavages and, concomitantly, the country's permeability and vulnerability to external manipulation, hence freeing the state from the burdens of a perennial preventive accommodationist regional policy. However, no such national *iltiham* and allegiance could be engendered without the alleviation of the political and socio-economic disfranchisement felt by a great sector of the (mainly rural) Muslim population. After all, Shihab was convinced that the "fundamental causes of the 1958 crisis were socioeconomic, arising from the crystallizing discontent in Lebanon's own underdeveloped areas."[275] This diagnosis of the domestic arena led to a two pronged domestic policy that embodied Shihab's political and socio-economic reforms, and his aim to create national *iltiham* and allegiance: these were the construction of *al-mujtama' al-jadid* (the new society) and *al-dawla al-haditha* (the modern state).

The process of establishing *al-mujtama' al-jadid* and *al-dawla al-haditha* was to move contrapuntally. Both programs were parallel instruments of the same policy. In other words, only by introducing political and socio-economic reforms geared towards alleviating regional and segmental disparities, and the restoration of the pre-1958 national consensus, could Shihab's aim of political stability and national unity be achieved. This rationale sprang from a basic conviction held by Shihab: that "Lebanon is a country of sects," and that everyone is treated "according to this reality."[276] Shihab was

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[275] Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* Westview Encore Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 312-3.

[276] Munah al-Sulh, *al-Maruniyya al-Siyasiyya: Sira Dhatiyya* [Political Maronitism: A Personal Account] (Beirut: Dar al-Safir, c1976), quoted in Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 29.

not inclined to tamper with Maronite prerogatives and dominance of the political system, rather he wanted to project the state's concern for the principle of distributive justice to gain the allegiance of the disenfranchised segments of society. The idea of *al-mujtama' al-jadid* reflected Shihab's vision of establishing "an invisible social balance" between the different segments of Lebanese society as a support to the existing confessional system.[277]

Yet *iltiham* can only be procured by an efficient modern state, capable of penetrating the peripheral areas of society and implementing its socio-economic reforms. Moreover, the creation of national unity and loyalty to the state required strong state agencies and institutions that could offer an array of services in exchange for the citizens' allegiance to the state. As already noted, in an environment of conflict, where the state is locked in an active struggle for social control over the population with other autonomous social organizations, the state's capability to wrest social control hinges upon its ability to provide its citizens viable 'strategies of survival.' To be successful in this endeavour, however, the Shihabist state had to secure for itself a degree of relative autonomy from other, competing social organizations. Only then could the state undertake political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms aimed at promoting national unity and garnering allegiance from hitherto disenfranchised segments to the state, its symbols and its institutions, rather than to parochial segmental symbols and institutions. In the following sections, the domestic component of Shihab's survival strategy will be analyzed to highlight its function in the regime's overall survival strategy.

4.3.1 *The Shihabist Establishment: The Search for Relative Autonomy*

The promotion of national unity entails not only state-insulation from the external environment, but also a relative degree of state autonomy from traditional domestic power structures and social

[277] Quoted in Hazem Saghiya, *Ta'rib al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyya: Al-Hizb, al-Sulta, al-Khawf* [The Arabization of the Lebanese Phalange: The Party, the Authority, the Fear] (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1991), p. 36.

organizations. Modernizing regimes pursuing this objective can employ either of the following options, with the choice hinging in great part on the specific nature of their respective societies and political systems. They may either cooperate with some elements of the traditional establishment to create a new power base relatively autonomous from the traditional political establishment, or sever all links with the traditional political establishment. The segmental nature of Lebanese society, the consociational formalities of Lebanese politics, and Shihab's commitment to preserve at least the form of democratic practice automatically excluded the utilization of the latter option. Shihab was left with the former option to insulate the state from other autonomous social organizations. Practically, this meant undermining the power base of the traditional *zu'ama'*.

Shihab's drive to secure a degree of relative autonomy for the state is exemplified in his attempt to "circumvent traditional politics without, however, disturbing 'normal' political life," which was based primarily on patrimonial practices.[278] The target of this campaign were the traditional *zu'ama'* who had hitherto monopolized political practice in the country, along the way making a fortune through political nepotism and government corruption.[279] The campaign against the traditional *zu'ama'* took several courses. On the one hand, Shihab established a political power base that was relatively autonomous from the pressures of the old, establishment politicians and the powerful Christian commercial-financial oligarchy. This power structure consisted of an alliance between the following groups: the more progressive, reform oriented, traditional politicians; the rural, largely non-Christian landowners; and a large contingent of young, non-political, professional technocrats and army men, who were to promote non-

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[278] Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 297. For patrimonial politics in Lebanon see Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 102-120.

[279] For an analysis of the *zu'ama'* see Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective," in Binder, *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 85-105.

partisanship and improve administrative efficiency, and who owed their loyalty to Shihab personally.[280] Shihab preferred to rule through the latter group, an inner circle of trusted aides and advisors whom he paternally referred to as *'awladi* (my children). They were strategically appointed to the Presidential Office, the *Deuxième Bureau* (military intelligence), and the middle-level bureaucracy.

The same objective of circumventing traditional politics was also accomplished by relying on the military establishment and the *Deuxième Bureau*, two institutions that enjoyed a high degree of organizational coherence, loyalty to the President and the state, in addition to their independence from the traditional political establishment. These coercive institutions made sure that the different apparatus of the state remained loyal to Shihab. The tactics employed to achieve this objective differed: they infiltrated groups suspected of loyalty to the commercial and financial oligarchy; they maintained a heavy-handed control over the entire political system, keeping a close watch on the regime's political opponents; and they directly intervened in Parliamentary elections, through intimidation and dissuasion, to secure the election of Shihabist candidates or to eliminate opposition candidates.[281] Moreover, the *Deuxième Bureau* played an instrumental role in disrupting the clientelist system of social control operated by the *zu'ama'*.[282] Traditionally, many *zu'ama'* depended on local *qabadayat* (strongarm street leaders) to maintain social and political control over their constituency. In return, the *zu'ama'* offered the *qabadayat* material and financial rewards, and they protected them from the central authorities. To undermine the

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[280] See Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 300 and fn. 13, p. 333. Pierre Jumayyil, Kamal Junblat, René Mu'awwad, and Rashid Karami are examples of the first group. Sabri Himadé is an example of the second group. Ilyas Sarkis (Maronite), Director General of the Presidential Office; Antonne Sa'd (Maronite), Director of the *Deuxième Bureau*; Colonel Gabriel 'Gabi' Lahoud (Maronite), Deputy Director of the *Deuxième Bureau* under Shihab and Director of the *Deuxième Bureau* under Helou; General Jamil Lahoud (Maronite), Director of the Military Room in the Presidential Palace; Brigadier Tawfiq Jalbout (Greek Orthodox), Director of General Security; General Wafiq al-Husami (Sunni), Head of the Military Court; Colonel Yousef Shmayt (Druze), Chief of Staff; and the aides and advisors, Captain Ahmad al-Hajj (Sunni), Shafiq Muharram (Sunni), Fu'ad Boutros (Greek Orthodox), Munah al-Sulh (Sunni), and Sami al-Khatib (Sunni) represent the third group.

[281] See Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, p. 96.

[282] See Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), p. 5. See also Michael Johnson, "Popular Movements and Primordial Loyalties in Beirut," in Talal Asad and Roger Owen, eds. *The Sociology of "Developing Societies:" The Middle East* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), p. 184.

power of the *zu'ama'*, the *Deuxième Bureau* recruited many of these *qabadayat*, offering them protection and financial rewards to secure their services to the state. The *qabadayat* became the clients of the state rather than the *zu'ama'*. This tactic was particularly efficacious during Parliamentary elections, for it was the *qabadayat* who mobilized the *za'im's* constituency at election times.

Due to the sectarian nature of the Lebanese political system, the Shihabist establishment needed a viable confessional cover. In this regard, Shihabism benefited from certain structural peculiarities of the Lebanese political scene. Shihab proved adept at manipulating intra-sectarian competition, whether inter- or intra-regional, to provide his regime confessional cover.[283] The Shihabist inter-sectarian alliance, by including long time reform proponents, was able to neutralize political forces - such as Kamal Junblat - that were considered menaces by previous regimes.[284] Furthermore, the aforementioned political alliance tended to compensate for Shihab's lack of a popular, broad-based, party movement, a derivative of his military background and his contempt for personal and party intrigues.[285] Hence, Shihab worked through the old confessional system to secure the state relative autonomy to undertake necessary political, administrative, and socio-economic reforms that would promote national unity and mitigate Lebanon's permeability predicament.

4.3.2 *Political and Administrative Reforms*

Demands for political and administrative reforms antedated the Shihab regime. The political and

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[283] On the inter-regional level, Shihab depended on Rashid Karami of Tripoli rather than Sa'ib Salam of Beirut to fill the Sunni Premiership; similarly, he depended on Sabri Himadé of the Ba'albak-Hermel region in the eastern Beqa' rather than Kamel al-Ass'ad in the south to fill the Shi'a post of speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. On the intra-regional level, Shihab favoured René Mu'awwad over Suleiman Franjieh in the (Maronite) north; Muhammad Safi al-Din, 'Ali Bazzi, and 'Ali 'Arab over Kamel al-Ass'ad in the (Shi'a) south; 'Abdullah al-Yafi and 'Uthman al-Danna over Sa'ib Salam in (Sunni) Beirut; and Rashid Karami over 'Abdul Majid Rifa'i in (Sunni) Tripoli. There were other reasons why Shihab depended on certain politicians to the exclusion of others. Shihab's poor relations with Salam excluded the latter from many cabinets. Shihab relied on Pierre Jumayyil and Kamal Junblat to undermine Camille Sham'oun's political prestige.

[284] See Farid al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt: Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, 2, (April 1988), p. 181.

[285] See Wade R. Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943-1976* (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), p. 60.

administrative reforms introduced by Shihab were largely aimed at securing the allegiance of the Muslim segments to the state and enhancing the efficiency of state institutions in executing the regime's socio-economic policies. One technique employed by Shihabism in the Parliamentary elections of 1960 was to increase the seats of the Chamber of Deputies from 66 to 99 and use the *qada'* (district) rather than the *muhafazza* (province) as the electoral district. This 'structural technique' brought to Parliament most of the leaders of the 1958 revolt and counter-revolt, channelling their rivalries and conflicts from the streets to the official political institutions.[286] Furthermore, the move provided Shihab a wider civilian base of support to compensate for his military background, and offered the different regions a greater level of political representation.[287]

Shihab's sensitivity to Lebanon's sectarian composition convinced him of the need to de-confessionalize the office of the presidency to provide the Muslim segments a symbol they can rally around. This was in stark contrast to the policies pursued by Sham'oun during the latter years of his presidential tenure. Shihab opted for the role of a balancer between the different segments of Lebanese society, reserving for himself the role of an "external arbiter" and a "master chef" of a trans-segmental coalition.[288] By so doing, Shihab was able to restore the 'secular principle' of the presidency, a necessary condition for amicable coexistence between the different segments of Lebanon's deeply divided society.

The administrative reforms inaugurated by Shihabism best exhibit the regime's desire to promote confessional balance and re-invigorate the state administration. The Shihabist state attempted to elicit allegiance from the Muslim segments by establishing a confessional balance in the distribution of posts and offices in the government and the bureaucracy among the major segments of society. Administrative

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[286] See al-Jisr, *Fu'ad Shihab: Dhalika al-Majhul*, p. 56; and Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut*, p. 137.

[287] On the former point see Ghassan Salamé, *Al-Mujtama' wa-l-Dawla fi-l-Mashriq al-'Arabi* [Society and State in the Arab East] (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-'Arabiyya, 1987), p. 137.

[288] Michael C. Hudson, "The Breakdown of Democracy in Lebanon," *Journal of International Affairs* 38, 2, (Winter 1985), pp. 289 and 291 respectively. See also Meir Zamir, "The Lebanese Presidential Elections of 1970 and their Impact on the Civil War of 1975-1976," *Middle Eastern Studies* 16, 1, (January 1980), p. 62.

reforms had been a rallying cry for the opposition against Sham'oun, and Shihab felt obliged to address these demands. To demonstrate the impartiality of the regime, Shihab scrupulously enforced a policy of a strictly equal division of posts at every administrative level between Christian and Muslim (including Druze) officials.[289] The 1959 Personnel Law re-affirmed the constitutional requirement (article 95) that Christians and Muslims should be equally represented in the state bureaucracy.[290] Though this policy tended to benefit the Sunnis and the Druze at the expense of the Shi'a, and the Sunnis of Tripoli and Sidon over their co-religionists in Beirut, it did placate Muslim demands for more equitable representation in the state bureaucracy. This, however, does not mean that Shihab was not privately sensitive to the preservation of Christian preponderance in the more sensitive state agencies and the private sector.[291]

Unlike any of its predecessors, Shihabism was committed to state-building and administrative efficiency. After all, without strong state institutions the regime could not hope to accomplish its socio-economic reforms and promote national unity. The administrative and bureaucratic reforms undertaken by Shihabism were geared towards strengthening state institutions, curbing bureaucratic corruption upon which the traditional *zu'ama'* depended for patronage, and increasing the efficiency of the bureaucracy and the civil service.[292] A number of administrative units were created by Shihab and his successor Charles Helou (1964-1970) to supervise these reforms: these included the Civil Service Board, the Central Inspection Administration, and the General Disciplinary Council.[293] Administrative reform was carried

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[289] See Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab," p. 218.

[290] See Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut*, p. 137. This was the '6 by 6 *mukarrar*' (repeated) formula devised to distribute the top administrative and governmental positions under Shihab.

[291] For one example see the incident reported in Abukhalil, "The Politics of Sectarian Ethnicity," p. 234. This can also be deduced from a review of the personnel appointed to the sensitive security posts, see fn. 280 above.

[292] See Ralf Crow and Adnan Iskandar, "Al-'Islah al-'Idari fi Lubnan: 1958-1959" [Administrative Reform in Lebanon] *Al-Abhath* 14, 1, (March 1961), pp. 73-4.

[293] See Elie A. Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 96-100; and Iskandar E. Bashir, *Civil Service Reforms in Lebanon* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1977), pp. 27-37.

out by presidential decree, a sign of the state's determination to force through its reform policies against the wishes of the traditional political establishment and their protégés in the bureaucracy. In 1966, Helou purged some two hundred officials from the government bureaucracy in an anti-corruption campaign. The injection of professionals into state institutions, and the employment of personnel along meritorious rather than patrimonial lines, enhanced bureaucratic efficiency and served the Shihabist *étatist* objective of controlling the government bureaucracy. It was also meant to ensure the state support from an inter-sectarian group of middle class professionals.

4.3.3 ***Socio-Economic Reforms***

In large measure, Shihab diagnosed the 1958 crisis as the revolt of the poor, Muslim, rural areas against the wealthy, Christian regions. The domestic precipitates of the 1958 revolt were not difficult to discern. Years of government neglect and economic deprivation, combined with a tenuous national identity and shallow allegiance to the state, precipitated the revolt in the rural areas. Consequently, Shihab made the development of the rural areas a paramount objective of his socio-economic policies. Alleviating development and class disparities among the different regions and segments was meant to reduce the sources of conflict between the different segments. This, it was hoped, could help transform communal allegiance into national allegiance, and consequently, mitigate Lebanon's permeability predicament in the long run.

Shihab's vision of *al-mujtama' al-jadid* was best elaborated in a speech he delivered on 21 November 1962. Shihab explained that the goal of his regime's development activity is not merely to increase standards of living and achieve social justice, but to melt the Lebanese in one society based not on coexistence or association among the different segments but on each citizen's conviction of being an integral part of a single people and totally loyal to a single country.[294] Towards this end Shihabism put

[294] See excerpts from the speech in Kfoury, *al-Shihabiyya wa Siyasat al-Mawqif*, p. 185.

to use an array of "distributive policies" that "aim to change the ... [confessional] balance of economic opportunities and rewards."[295]

Economically, Shihabism was synonymous with development planning, not to enforce central controls over the economy but to complement the private sector and redress the imbalance in regional development. This meant maintaining the liberal, *laissez-faire* economy while creating government institutions to ensure a balanced economy and an acceptable degree of social justice. To avoid the temporizing of government ministries and guarantee swift execution, most of the regime's development projects were not placed under the direct supervision of any ministry. In 1959 Shihab commissioned Father Louis Joseph Lebret (head of the Paris based Institute International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement Intégral et Harmonise) to undertake a comprehensive survey of Lebanon's resources to provide empirical data for planning purposes. In 1959 the Ministry of General Planning was reorganized and charged with the formulation of broad planning policies. In 1965 a five-year plan was adopted, based on Lebret's IRFED studies, intended to promote development and further the cause of social justice.[296] The interest of the Shihabist regime in rural development was evident. The Litani River Development Plan was initiated for the benefit of the southern and the Beqa' Valley regions. Similarly, the Office of Social Development was established to operate in the rural areas. In the realm of public works, government planning targeted the Muslim rural areas since these were the most economically deprived. The objective of the Shihabist public works' policy was the provision of roads, running water and electricity to every Lebanese village as a prerequisite to the development of the rural areas. The Shi'a inhabited regions, victims of perennial government neglect in the past, were particularly affected by this policy. Furthermore, the state endeavoured to integrate the rural areas into the state educational system, trade unions, and the

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[295] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 596.

[296] For a discussion of development planning in Lebanon see Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution*, pp. 107-137.

network of government services.[297]

The Shihabist drive for social control focused on replacing the existing social organizations by the state as the source of services and rewards to the individual citizen. By multiplying the points of direct contact between the state machinery and the individual, the state sought to bypass the *zu'ama'* and undermine their traditional role as intermediaries between their clients and the state.[298] The state endeavoured to cater directly to the needs of the citizens in the hope that it could substitute patron-client allegiance by a broader state-citizen allegiance, and replace the patrimonial relation upon which the *za'im's* power hinged by a rational, legal relation *à la* Weber. In the same spirit, the state launched irrigation projects to supply farmers in the south and the Beqa' region with water that could free them from the control of feudal notables and landlords. Traditionally, rural notables and landlords wielded immense leverage over farmers by controlling the distribution of water in their respective regions. However, these irrigation projects failed to materialize due to the resistance of powerful notables and landlords and government inefficiency. The Green Plan, a semi-autonomous government organization, was established in 1963 to develop agriculture by distributing and planting fruit trees and by helping farmers cultivate new land, reclaim formerly arable land, and build agricultural roads. The Green Plan was also devised to curb rural migration to the cities. State patronage on this scope could have served to strengthen state social control. Yet the Green Plan tended to benefit those rural *zu'ama'* allied with the Shihabist regime, or their key clients among the rich peasantry.[299] The state also attempted to consolidate its social control by offering the public an array of social services. Under Shihab, and for the first time in Lebanon, a comprehensive social security law was promulgated by presidential decree on 26 September 1963. The law was intended to cover medical and maternity insurance, insurance for job-related accidents and

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[297] See Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, p. 57; and Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab," p. 220.

[298] See Hottinger, "Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective," p. 100.

[299] See Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut*, p. 147.

sickness, and old age pension rights for workers.

By introducing the preceding reforms and projects, both in rural and other areas, the state hoped to undermine the social control exercised by existing social organizations, especially the *zu'ama'*, and garner popular allegiance to the state and its institutions. The results of the 1968 Parliamentary elections and the 1970 presidential elections exposed the failure of Shihabism.[300] Many anti-Shihabists returned to the Chamber of Deputies in 1968 preventing the Shihabists from electing one of their own, Ilyas Sarkis, in the 1970 presidential elections. Consequently, Shihabism lost its control over the executive and legislative institutions. The regime of President Suleiman Franjieh (1970-1976) swiftly dismantled the Shihabist security apparatus, bringing to trial key Shihabists in the army and the *Deuxième Bureau* on corruption charges and replacing them by Franjieh loyalists. Shihabists were also purged from the state bureaucracy, and the role of the development planning agencies was marginalized. What then were the causes of Shihabism's failure?

4.4 *The Failure of Shihabism*

Prior to explicating the reasons behind the failure of the Shihabist experiment, there is a need to highlight some of its salient successes. The promotion of a sense of national unity among the different Lebanese segments is arguably the supreme short term achievement of Shihabism. That Shihab was able to swiftly restore order and unity to the Lebanese polity after the 1958 war is a testimony to his credentials as an astute statesman. It also reflects his judicious instrumental use of foreign and domestic policies to insulate Lebanon from regional struggles in order to implement a sustained state-building project. The Shihabist experience was successful and innovative in two additional respects. On the one hand, Shihab was able to create a personal political organization that was relatively autonomous from the traditional

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[300] See Jalal Zuwiyya, *The Parliamentary Election of Lebanon: 1968* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972); and Zamir, "The Lebanese Presidential Elections of 1970 and their Impact on the Civil War of 1975-1976," pp. 50-59.

political establishment. This organization was composed of a group of aides, advisors, and technocrats who owed their loyalty entirely to the President, acted as his implementors within the bureaucracy and carried on his campaign to create an efficient and capable administration. In the Shihabist strategy, the preceding group was to provide the steering core of the prospective *al-dawla al-haditha*. On the other hand, the Shihabist experience introduced, for the first time in the history of the Lebanese Republic, a trans-segmental political philosophy - a *nahj* - that has survived till this day - albeit in an abused form - in the country's political lexicon. That this project and philosophy was ultimately defeated and disowned by the traditional political establishment was a major reason behind the elusiveness of *al-mujtama' al-jadid*, and the failure of the Shihabist adventure.

The reasons that led to the failure of Shihabism can be roughly divided into three categories: the first pertaining to the inherent limitations of the Shihabist project; the second, to the impediments faced in the implementation of the Shihabist project; and finally, to factors beyond the control of the Shihabist regime.

With respect to its inherent limitations, probably the most important factor contributing to the failure of Shihabism was the regime's unwillingness and inability to overhaul the existing confessional system. In fact, Shihabism made use of the confessional system - especially in its campaign against the old establishment *zu'ama'* - which resulted in the hardening of confessional practices and sectarian identities. At the outset of his tenure, Shihab was content with insuring the smooth functioning of the confessional system along the *spirit* of the National Pact. Whether this was a tactical decision or a missed opportunity to overhaul the political system by Shihab is retrospective speculation. However, it seems that by the end of the 1960s Shihab was convinced that Lebanon's political system needed basic and structural reforms. Yet he was equally convinced that the public, let alone the politicians, were not ready to support

or accept such reforms.[301] The refusal to tamper with the confessional system meant that Shihab had to work through the system, at times in alliance with the very traditional politicians (the *fromagistes*, or ''cheese-eaters'' as he contemptuously dubbed them) he was determined to undermine. But Shihab had no other choice since he was committed to retain a semblance of democratic practice. Accommodating some *zu'ama'* proved to be the avenue through which corruption entered into the Shihabist apparatus. Furthermore, as an exercise in *étatism* geared towards rectifying the negative effects of ''a poorly legitimized and clumsily executed elite consociationalism,'' Shihabism failed to furnish that ''synthesis of power sharing and power concentration that ideally is what Lebanon needs,'' consequently, Shihabism degenerated into ''a crude perversion - a caricature - of the old consociational model.''[302]

The failure of Shihabism can also be attributed to the method of implementing some reforms, and to the myriad opposing forces with which Shihabism had to grapple in the implementation of its policies. The Shihabist state subsidized both private and public service institutions as part of a social reform package that allowed these institutions to offer more social services. Since most private institutions have sectarian affiliations, Shihabism ended reinforcing the sectarian structure of these institutions and, ultimately, of society.[303] Shihabism's scrupulous distribution of all public posts along sectarian lines was equally conducive to strengthening political sectarianism. Yet it was in the active struggle that ensued between the Shihabist state and other social organizations for social control that Shihabism met its most tenacious and formidable challenge.

Although the Shihabist state enjoyed a relative degree of political autonomy, and was able to divert resources from Beirut to the rural areas, its economic autonomy from the powerful commercial-

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[301] This is the impression that emerges from Shihab's brief statement expressing his refusal to run for the 1970 presidential elections. See the text of the statement in al-Jisr, *Fu'ad Shihab: Dhalika al-Majhul*, pp. 121-22.

[302] Hudson, "The Problem of Authoritarian Power in Lebanese Politics," p. 237.

[303] See Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, p. 57. This pertains to educational, health, recreational, and medical institutions.

financial oligarchy was severely limited.[304] The development planning initiatives of Shihabism were resisted by a powerful "confessional-class" coalition composed of the urban, mercantilist, financial, bourgeoisie and the traditional politicians.[305] The powerful commercial-financial oligarchy resisted the Shihabist state's efforts to support industrial and agricultural development. As a result, the Shihabist tenure registered a net five percent drop in the share of agriculture in GDP.[306] This struggle between the 'confessional-class' coalition and Shihabism exposed the latter's inherent dilemma: it could not survive in power without mobilizing popular support against the 'confessional-class' coalition; but to do so would have brought the Shihabist establishment into direct conflict with this coalition and would have entailed drastic changes to the Shihabist agenda and the Lebanese political system, an option Shihabism ultimately eschewed.[307] The diversionary tactics and the resistance of the commercial-financial oligarchy to state development projects and reforms inhibited the regime from utilizing its limited economic resources in an efficacious way. Lebanon's lopsided economy continued to favour the services, commercial, and financial sectors, and direct taxation continued to form a small percentage of government revenues. Furthermore, the state failed to effectively challenge the clientelist system operated by the *zu'ama'*, and hence, their control over the distribution of material sanctions and rewards. The Shihabist tactic of manipulating rather than displacing the clientelist system served to perpetuate this system's efficacy and use by the *zu'ama'* as a tool for social control. These accumulative Shihabist failures eroded the state's ability to wrest social control from the autonomous organizations.

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[304] See Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut*, p. 140.

[305] Salamé, *Al-Mujtama' wa-l-Dawla fi-l-Mashriq al-'Arabi*, p. 210. The politicians were Camille Sham'oun, Raymond Eddé, and Pierre Jumayyil from *al-Hilf al-Thulathi* (the Tripartite Alliance), and Sa'ib Salam, Kamel al-As'ad, and Suleiman Franjieh from *Takatul al-Wasat* (the Centre Coalition).

[306] For example, the commercial-financial oligarchy successfully blocked state plans to expand the tobacco and sugar processing industries. See Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut*, p. 148. See also table 26 in B. J. Odeh, *Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985), p. 84.

[307] See Mahdi 'Amil (Hassan Hamdan), *Al-Nadhariyya fi-l-Mumarasa al-Siyasiyya: Bahth fi 'Asbab al-Harb al-'Ahliyya fi Lubnan* (al-Qusm al-'Awal) [The Theory in Political Practice: A Study of the Causes of the Civil War in Lebanon (part one)] (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1979), pp. 310-11 and 314, and more generally pp. 303-323.

Shihabism suffered from its inability to sanitize government institutions from old habits. Corruption, nepotism, and bureaucratic paralysis in government institutions were not eradicated because administrative reform was effective at the higher levels but failed to have considerable impact at the lower levels of the administration.[308] This meant that the Shihabists were doomed to lose the battle for social control of the population against the more entrenched traditional forces. The Shihabist predicament was exacerbated by the need to accommodate some rural *zu'ama'* who provided the Shihabist regime confessional cover. The ensuing trilateral competition between the Shihabist implementors, other state officials, and the strongmen (*zu'ama'*) ended in the defeat of the first group. The elegance of theoretical Shihabism encountered its nemesis in the mundane realities of Migdal's "triangle of accommodation."[309] In addition to the preceding factors, there existed other intervening factors that contributed to the failure of Shihabism.

One such factor was the massive rural migration to Beirut in the wake of the failure of many Shihabist development projects in the rural areas and the mobilizing effects of the Shihabist programme of building rural schools. In the 1960s, around 120,000 rural inhabitant (nearly twenty percent of the rural population) poured into the cities via the Shihabist-installed road network connecting the rural areas to the capital city.[310] This ruralization of the city, occurring at a time when the country was experiencing hyper-modernization, placed unbearable loads on the political system, exposing its limited functional capabilities.[311] The Shihabist strategists had failed to consider this scenario.

Nor could the Shihabists anticipate the regional forces and the domestic political polarization that

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[308] See Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 317.

[309] See Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, pp. 238-58.

[310] See Salim Nasr, "The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism," *MERIP Reports* 73 (December 1978), p. 10; and Roger Owen, "The Economic History of Lebanon 1943-1974: Its Salient Features," in Barakat, *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, p. 35.

[311] On the loads-capabilities theme see Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," *Comparative Politics* 1, 2, (January 1969), pp. 245-263.

was unleashed in Lebanon on the morrow of the 1967 war, the events of Black September in Jordan in 1970, and the death of Nasser that same month. The cumulative result of all these developments was the re-polarization of Lebanese society, the end of Lebanon's insulation from regional struggles and conflicts, and the demise of a necessary component of the Shihabist survival strategy.

The arming of the Palestinians in Lebanon after 1967 and their confrontation with the Shihabist military establishment eroded the latter's credentials in Muslim eyes. Muslim support to the Palestinians, and the confessional composition of the Lebanese army, constrained the regime's ability to effectively use its coercive resources against the commandos. The swing in Muslim public opinion to the side of the commandos demonstrated the failure of Shihabism to resolve Lebanon's *'asabiyya* dilemma and the resultant permeability predicament by promoting a trans-segmental 'Lebanese' *'asabiyya*. Furthermore, disagreement over Lebanon's regional policies and the regime's policy towards the commandos alienated Christian public opinion and ruptured the Kamal Junblat-Pierre Jumayyil alliance upon which the Shihabist had relied for political support.[312] In August 1970, facing all the aforementioned centrifugal pressures and challenges, Shihabism was forced out of power when Ilias Sarkis, the Shihabist presidential candidate, lost the parliamentary ballot to Suleiman Franjieh by a margin of one vote. The later explosion of Lebanon would underscore the lethal consequences of Shihabism's failures, many of which can not be attributed to Shihabism itself.

[312] See Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, p. 120. It should be mentioned that throughout Shihab's tenure, the *Deuxième Bureau* maintained strict control over the Palestinian camps.

5. CONCLUSION: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The detailed analysis of Husseinism and Shihabism undertaken in the preceding chapters now permits a comparative exploration of the 'success' and 'failure' of each strategy. Four explanatory variables are advanced to explain Husseinism's 'success' as opposed to Shihabism's 'failure.' This accomplished, the discussion concludes with an examination of the definitional and theoretical implications of this study to the broader fields of comparative politics and foreign policy analysis in the developing world, but especially in the Middle East.

5.1 ***Husseinism and Shihabism: Explaining 'Success' and 'Failure'***

Four explanatory variables may be advanced to explain Husseinism's 'success' - as opposed to Shihabism's 'failure' - to retain power and control over the political process, and to neutralize the deleterious effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic political arena. The first variable pertains to the regime's ability to insulate the domestic arena from regional manipulation by an accommodationist regional policy. Albeit selectively and reactively in Hussein's case, a regional accommodationist policy was pursued by both regimes towards the same regional hegemon: Nasserite Egypt. Moreover, both regimes' accommodationist regional policies were relatively successful in insulating the domestic arena from external (and domestic) manipulations. The failure of Shihabism, in spite of a relatively successful accommodationist regional policy, suggests that insulation is a necessary, but insufficient condition for the success of the survival strategy. Hence, 'success' should be explained by reference to other variables.

One such variable is the historical process of state formation in Jordan and Lebanon. This variable is closely linked to the state's (or regime's) ability to secure a relative degree of autonomy from existing social organizations which, in turn, enables the regime to successfully implement its integrative social and economic policies. The process of state formation in Jordan, and the concomitant institutionalization of the segmental cleavages in a hierarchic, control political system, ensured the regime a high degree of

political autonomy from society. Consequently, the state was able to penetrate society and regulate state-society relations through an array of economic, social, and political policies that strengthened its social control. This latter objective was facilitated by the regime's ability to undermine and divide the (subordinate) Palestinian segment, mainly through 'structural techniques,' 'distributive policies,' intimidation, or manipulating its internal cleavages.

In contrast, the process of state formation in Lebanon bequeathed society a multitude of autonomous social organizations that successfully resisted state attempts to penetrate society and regulate social relationships to consolidate social control. In spite of all government attempts to undermine their social control, the *zu'ama'* were able to retain control over the clientelist system and, hence, the loyalty of their constituencies. The severity of the socio-economic disparity between the different Lebanese segments and regions, a consequence of the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and years of government neglect, also hindered the successful implementation of the Shihabists' integrative policies. The resultant failure of the state's socio-economic reforms was central to the failure of its survival strategy, and consequently, the failure to transform parochial segmental loyalties into a single trans-segmental 'Lebanese' *'asabiyya*. Similarly, the historically rooted, confessionally based political system designed to serve elite and mercantilist interests placed structural limitations on Shihabism. The Shihabists were compelled to retain the consociational trappings of the Lebanese confessional political system. They accomplished this by manipulating intra-segmental inter- and intra-regional competition. As a result, confessionalism and sectarianism were not undermined, rather they were recognized and strengthened. This tended to harden sectarian identities, later permitting an alliance of traditional politicians to vote the Shihabists out of power.

The disparity in economic resources available for both regimes was also responsible for the 'success' and 'failure' of Husseinism and Shihabism. The subsidies paid by Jordan's extra-regional and regional allies compensated for Jordan's paucity in natural resources and allowed the regime a relative

degree of economic autonomy. The regime was able to appropriate these resources to finance a neo-patrimonial political economy and an expanding public sector that helped win the allegiance of the regime's Transjordanian pillars and supporters. The regime's control of the distribution of economic rewards and sanctions, and the provision of an environment conducive to productive economic activity, contributed to the success of its integrative policies and created support for Hashemite rule from strategic sectors in the Palestinian community, especially the upper-middle classes. External subsidies also freed the regime from the need to rely on heavy direct taxation of the population to generate government revenues to finance the different integrative socio-economic policies. Such an economic obligation might have otherwise disrupted the regime's integrative policies and alienated strategic social segments from the regime. Beginning in the 1970s, Jordanian rentierism contributed to the success of the regime's integrative socio-economic policies. Jordanian rentierism placed huge economic resources at the disposal of the regime. The regime used these resources to strengthen the loyalty of its Transjordanian subjects and harness among the Palestinian segment a vested interest in the perpetuation of Hashemite rule.

In Lebanon, the powerful commercial-financial oligarchy deprived the Shihabist regime that degree of economic autonomy necessary for the successful implementation of its integrative socio-economic policies. The Shihabists failed to appropriate sufficient resources to improve the industrial and agricultural sectors. As a result, the economy continued to favour the financial, commercial, and service sectors. The Shihabist regime's predicament was compounded by its commitment to *laissez-faire* economics and the hegemonic influence of the commercial-financial oligarchy which hindered the state's ability to increase its extractive capacities through direct taxation. Consequently, the Shihabist objective of wresting social control from existing social organizations and creating a trans-segmental 'Lebanese' *'asabiyya* through state-sponsored, integrative, socio-economic policies proved elusive.

The final variable that may explain Husseinism's 'success' as opposed to Shihabism's 'failure' pertains to the coercive resources available to the regime, including the regime's ability to utilize these

resources without hindrance from external or internal actors. By establishing loyal coercive agencies - such as the bedouin dominated mobile strike forces and the intelligence services - the Hashemite regime was able to effectively and freely use its coercive resources against domestic and regional foes. The protective umbrella provided by Jordan's extra-regional ally also enabled the regime to use its coercive resources freely and effectively. In contrast, the arming of the Palestinians in Lebanon after 1967, Muslim Lebanese support to the commandos, the confessional composition of the Lebanese army, and the Arab states' disapproval of the Shihabists' suppression of Palestinian military activity from Lebanon challenged the Shihabist regime's monopoly over coercive capabilities in the country and constrained its ability to effectively use its coercive resources. Consequently, Shihabism lost the support of allied politicians, and hence its bid for a third presidential tenure.

5.2 *Definitional and Theoretical Implications*

The preceding conclusions expose the lack of a definitional consensus on what constitutes a 'weak' state. In the theoretical literature pertaining to state strength, at least two broad definitional criteria utilized to judge the strength (or weakness) of a state may be discerned: the Ibn Khaldunian criterion, and the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion. Ibn Khaldun relates state strength to the degree of social integration and *iltiham* (coalescence) among the different segments of society around the *'asabiyya* propagated by the ruling regime. Consequently, as noted earlier, the larger the *iltiham* the stronger the state. On the other hand, according to the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion of measuring state strength, the strength of a state hinges upon its capability to execute state-planned social change aimed at enforcing state social control. The higher the state's capability 'to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways' the stronger the state. Unlike the Ibn Khaldunian criterion, the Migdalian criterion addresses the topic of state strength in a functional manner.

This study demonstrates that states considered 'weak' by one definitional criterion (the Ibn

Khaldunian) may be 'strong' according to another (the Neo-Weberian Migdalian). Jordan, a 'weak' state according to the Ibn Khaldunian criterion since it suffers from a *'asabiyya* dilemma, is at the same time a 'strong' state when the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion is applied. Despite competing segmental visions and definitions of the common territorial entity, the success of Husseinism is indicative of the high capabilities of the Jordanian state to penetrate society, regulate state-society relations, and appropriate state resources in a manner conducive to the consolidation and legitimation of Hashemite rule. To be sure, the Jordanian case is exceptional at least in one important way: extra-regional and regional financial support compensated for the regime's weakness in extracting resources from society. Nevertheless, a typology in which states are differentiated with respect to their strength or weakness and the degree to which state-society relations exhibit transnational permeability (i.e., 'soft' or 'hard' states) yields two possible scenarios. In a four box matrix crossing soft/hard states with (Neo-Weberian Migdalian) strong/weak states, Jordan occupies the soft/strong box while Lebanon occupies the soft/weak box. However, in a similar matrix crossing soft/hard states with (Ibn Khaldunian) strong/weak states, both Jordan and Lebanon occupy the soft/weak box. Naturally, this definitional disarray in the literature on state strength hampers efforts at comparative theory-building.

The analysis undertaken in this study also lends itself to a critique of the consociational democracy model and its applicability in Lebanon. As a model employed to explain democratic stability in deeply divided societies, consociational democracy stresses overarching cooperation at the elite level as a mechanism to counteract centrifugal tendencies in the political system. Thus, consociational democracy is defined by two organically related characteristics: consociation among segmental elites, and a democratic political system. Lijphart maintains that, despite some flaws in its consociational institutions and its far from perfect record, Lebanon was a consociational democracy until the outbreak of the 1975 civil war. The confessional proportionality of the Lebanese political system, the dynamics of Cabinet politics as an embodiment of the twin consociational institutions of grand coalition and mutual veto, and

segmental (or communal) autonomy are cited by Lijphart as evidence to vindicate his contention.[313] However, a close scrutiny of the workings of the Lebanese political system, and particularly of Shihabism, reveals that the applicability of consociational democracy in Lebanon may be contested, specifically regarding its consociational and democratic characteristics.

Since independence, and until the promulgation of the 21 September 1990 constitutional amendments, the powers of the Maronite presidency have hindered the proper functioning of consociational democracy in Lebanon. As previously noted, the president's constitutional prerogatives enabled him to dominate the executive branch. This nullified the functions of two necessary consociational institutions: the grand coalition and the mutual veto. The Cabinet has traditionally functioned as a confessional cover for the Maronite president rather than a grand coalition for segmental elites. Similarly, the array of constitutional prerogatives enjoyed by the president hampered the ability of the non-Maronite segmental elites to exercise any veto power against the president. Consequently, the consociational nature of the political system was, at best, superficial and minimal.[314] Nor was proportionality scrupulously enforced. The distribution of government posts, and the parliamentary ratio between Christian and Muslim deputies, was based upon the outdated 1932 'official' census which recognized a slight Christian majority in the country. The later shift in the population balance in favour of the Muslim segments led to their political disenfranchisement. Among the necessary institutions of consociational democracy, segmental autonomy was the only one that functioned properly in Lebanon. This, however, hardened the existing segmental cleavages, strengthened sectarian tendencies in society, and compounded Lebanon's *'asabiyya* dilemma. In the long-run, segmental autonomy intensified the centrifugal pressures placed upon the

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[313] See Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 147-150. For a critique see Abukhalil, "The Politics of Sectarian Ethnicity," pp. 275-280.

[314] The disenchantment of Muslim politicians with Maronite hegemony over the political system is clearly expressed in the deliberations of the Lausanne conference in March 1984. In these talks, Rashid Karami contended that the Lebanese political system is participatory and consociational only in a superficial manner, dominated by the Maronite President's executive prerogatives. See *Genev-Lozan: Al-Mahadir al-Sirriyya al-Kamila* [Geneva-Lausanne: The Complete Secret Minutes] with a foreword by Tallal Salman (Beirut: Al-Markaz al-'Arabi lil-Ma'lumat, 1984), pp. 294 and 307.

political system, pressures that precipitated its rupture in 1975.

The Shihabist experiment highlights the aforementioned consociational and democratic shortfalls of consociational democracy in Lebanon, and of the model in general. As previously mentioned, Shihab's ability to build an autonomous political establishment was greatly facilitated by certain structural features peculiar to the Lebanese domestic arena: namely inter- and intra-regional competition among the political elites of the same segment. This is particularly true of the Sunni and Shi'a segments, whose political leaders compete among themselves along inter- and intra-regional lines for the post of the prime minister, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, and other Cabinet and government portfolios. The Maronite president could manipulate Sunni and Shi'a intra-segmental competition to establish a confessional cover for his regime. Indeed, intra-segmental competition ensured the Maronite president a pool of reserve candidates for the confessionally ear-marked government posts. Hence, the threat of being replaced by a politician from one's own segment, and lose the claim to segmental leadership at the state (or national) level, was a constant source of subtle pressure upon any strong, recalcitrant Sunni prime minister. In most instances, the relation between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister, in addition to other segmental elites, was one of asymmetrical accommodation rather than consociation. The prime minister had to comply with the presidential line, otherwise a replacement would be arranged.

This form of accommodation at the elite level, though securing a façade of elite consociation, undermined both the consociational and the democratic characteristics of consociational democracy in Lebanon. The outcome was a political system that disproportionally served the interests of the Maronite elite and their chosen counterparts from other segments, in comparison with those of other segmental leaders and their respective constituencies. It seems, then, that in Lebanon consociational democracy was flawed because it was *superficially* consociational. In this respect, the Lebanese case reveals how the consociational democracy model fails to control for the constraining effects of elite intra-segmental inter- and intra-regional competition on elite cooperation at the national level; furthermore, it demonstrates the

instrumental use of superficial consociation to legitimize the domination of the political system by one segment among others in a plural society.

The broader theoretical implications of this study for other young, plural, permeable, developing states are not difficult to discern. States suffering from a *'asabiyya* dilemma, existing in a permeable regional system, are precarious, but not necessarily unviable. To be sure, the continued existence of these states is often guaranteed by international law. However, their future viability may also hinge on the regime's (or state's) ability to execute successful integrative survival strategies that guarantee the regime's survival and achieve an acceptable level of national integration providing the state allegiance either from a sizeable number, or from strategic segments, in the population. The comparative analysis of Husseinism and Shihabism suggests that the success of an integrative survival strategy depends on conjunctures of a successful insulatory foreign policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. In constructing a successful survival strategy, the regime's tactics are constrained by the socio-political effects of the historical process of state formation and by the availability of economic resources under its control. Similarly, its ability to employ its coercive resources without hindrance is not always guaranteed. On the other hand, the regime may orient its foreign policy in any manner conducive to the success of the survival strategy.

A successful insulatory foreign policy enables the state to neutralize challenges emanating from the trans-national (and domestic) environment, and allows the state the domestic space necessary for a sustained state- and *'asabiyya*-building effort. Of course, the state can also benefit from extra-regional protection to bolster its position *vis-à-vis* domestic and regional challengers.[315] In any case, as this study indicates, the success of the state's integrative survival strategy also hinges on the degree of political and

[315] The lack of a regional hegemon may complicate the regime's insulatory policy. In this case, small, weak states may become pawns in the struggle for regional hegemony.

economic autonomy enjoyed by the state, and its ability to use its coercive resources effectively and without hindrance.

Once it successfully insulates the domestic arena from trans-national ideologies, in developing, plural societies, the state's ability to secure a degree of political and economic autonomy is a consequence of the historical process of state formation and the availability of economic resources under state control. The historical process of state formation, and the resultant institutionalization of the cleavages in a particular political system, determines the political structure through which the state acts and the political environment in which the state initiates its interventionist policies. Whether or not this context will be advantageous or disadvantageous to the success of state policies depends on the particular political system and environment. The historical process of state formation also shapes the nature of the social challenges facing the state as it attempts to restructure state-society relations through socio-economic intervention. The state's ability to replace existing social organizations depends on how entrenched, institutionalized, and effective these organizations are in offering symbolic and material sustenance to the population. The availability of economic resources under state control determines whether or not the state is capable of undertaking integrative socio-economic policies to consolidate its social control. Moreover, as the Jordanian case suggests, a state can use its extra-regional and regional alliances to compensate for the lack of a viable natural economic base, and hence, finance its integrative socio-economic policies.

Finally, as a result of contending conceptions of 'national security' entertained by different segments of the population and by the ruling regime, the 'insecurity dilemma' faced by many developing, plural societies, exposes the state to external and domestic threats to its survival. To ensure its physical and political survival, hence any hope for the success of its integrative policies, the state should monopolize coercive capabilities across the country and secure the ability to use its coercive resources effectively and without hindrance from internal or external powers. The role of an extra-regional ally may prove instrumental in enabling the regime accomplish this latter obligation. By furnishing a protective

umbrella at times of crisis, the support of an extra-regional ally may facilitate the coercive agencies' task of securing regime control over the domestic arena.

One additional comment should be added to the preceding definitional and theoretical implications of this study. The comparative analysis of Husseinism and Shihabism highlights the theoretical efficacy of studies that emphasize domestic determinants and internal political dynamics in explaining foreign policy-making, -taking, and behaviour in the Middle East. These studies help complement the existing literature on foreign policy analysis that emphasizes either the systemic balance of power (realist approach) or the individual beliefs of the ruling elite (psychological/perceptual models). On many occasions, domestic (or internal) sources of security threat to regime survival dictated foreign policy behaviour. In Jordan and Lebanon, the *'asabiyya* dilemma, and the resultant lack of political and social unity, was a primary domestic determinant of foreign - especially regional - policy behaviour; the lack of a viable domestic consensus over the regime's regional or extra-regional orientation constrained both regimes' foreign policy options. Similarly, in both states an accommodationist policy toward the regional hegemon was pursued to mitigate the effects of the 'insecurity dilemma,' a dilemma embodied in competing notions of 'national security' among different segments of the population and in the vulnerability of the domestic arena to external manipulations. Moreover, foreign policy was not only shaped by domestic dynamics, it was instrumentally used to serve the regime's integrative domestic policies and regime maintenance, legitimation, and ultimately survival.

Hussein's regional policy swings from confrontation to accommodation were predicated by the need to accommodate regional hegemons to face overwhelming domestic challenges to regime survival. At times of acute domestic crisis, Hussein had to accommodate the regional actor wielding the greatest influence over the domestic arena to insulate the kingdom from regional manipulation and, consequently, enable the coercive agencies restore the regime's domestic control. Evidently, without its ability to secure survival in power the regime could not launch successful long-term integrative policies. Similarly, by

adhering to an active preventive accommodationist regional policy Shihab hoped to insulate the domestic political arena from the manipulations of external actors bent on consolidating their regional hegemony and domestic legitimacy, and from the instrumental use of trans-national ideologies by internal actors to advance their domestic objectives. An accommodationist regional policy enabled Shihab restore a precarious national consensus among the different segments of the population and create domestic conditions conducive for a sustained state- and *'asabiyya*-building effort that would mitigate Lebanon's *'asabiyya* dilemma in the long-run.

This study has advanced a comparative analysis of regime survival strategies in Jordan and Lebanon. The definitional and theoretical implications generated from the comparative analysis of the respective 'success' and 'failure' of Husseinism and Shihabism should not be restricted to the study of Middle East comparative politics and foreign policy analysis; rather, they may contribute to theory-building in similar sub-fields across other developing regions. More importantly, this study underscores the instrumental role of interventionist state policies in securing regime survival. Successful interventionist state policies play a pivotal role in the success of the larger multi-level, interactive survival strategy designed to maintain, consolidate, and legitimize regime rule. By creating domestic conditions conducive to the successful execution of interventionist policies, foreign policy behaviour plays an equally important role in regime survival. However, the 'success' or 'failure' of the survival strategy will hinge upon variables similar to those advanced in this essay. Hence, regimes governing precarious states are not necessarily ephemeral; they can construct survival strategies to ensure the continuity of their rule. After all, in the actions of all regimes, 'where there is no court of appeal,' survival is the sole desired end.

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