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ISRAELI COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION

(1999—PRESENT)

By

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ISRAELI COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION

(1999--PRESENT)

Ralph Chahine

ABSTRACT

The period between 1992 and 2015 witnessed a new change in the framework of Israeli elections directly impacting its coalition politics. In 1992 Israel adopted new election law where the Prime Minister is directly elected. It was expected that the law favors large parties and stabilizes government coalitions. The 1999 elections result, however, shrunk the shares of traditional large Knesset parties.

This thesis identifies key aspects that have contributed to the formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments since 1999. The aim is to provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration analyses relevant to electoral structure and political pressure. Quantitative and qualitative analyses show that a coalition government's structural formation is a primary determinant of duration with special consideration given to the role of large and dominant parties. The findings asserts that the coalition structure remains the primary variable determining government performance.

Keywords: Coalition Formation, Coalition Duration, Banzhaf Index, Israel, Dominant Parties.

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Chapter one

Introduction

Starting with the 1996 elections, Israel adopted new election arrangements in 1992 where the Prime Minister is elected directly with the elections of the Knesset (Hazan, 1996). Many supporters of this new arrangement state that these arrangements empower the main parties because the contestants of these parties will be running the Prime minister position. By default this will decrease the power of other smaller parties. On the other hand, the opponents said that the contrary might occur; this means that the weak and small parties would profit more than the stronger ones (H. Diskin & Diskin, 1995). Indeed, the 1999 elections showed that the dominant parties had faced a decrease in their strength while the small parties' strength had increased. Thus, the new reform had raised a new challenge for the dominant parties in the Knesset.

Coalition governments' stability and duration depend on several factors related to the internal security of Israel, along with the external security with neighboring countries mainly Lebanon, and various political conflicts between the coalition parties.

Coalition formation is a necessary process in order for a group of political parties to win the elections. It is not an easy option for parties to win the majority of the seats in the parliament or government without forming a group of coalition. Therefore, this phenomenon is considered an essential one in almost all of the democratic systems, and grabbing at the same time the attention of political scientists and researchers.

For instance, Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition government (1996-1999) was characterized by instability. The resignation of Jacob Ne'eman, the Justice Minister, just after two months from the government formation due to a legal investigation of his previous false confession. After a couple of months, the resignation of Benjamin Begin, the Science and Technology Minister, was admitted due to the "signing of the Hebron Pact" (Hazan & Diskin, 2000).

Further in the year 1997, precisely in April, the Prime Minister Netanyahu was almost accused of a political scandal concerning his recommendation for the assignment of Roni Bar-On to be the Attorney General. Later in June, the resignation of Dan Meridor, Finance Minister, was admitted due to discrepancies between him and Netanyahu. Furthermore that year 1997, internal conflicts within the Likud Party (Netanyahu's Party) had caused the resignation of Avigdor Lieberman, the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office. At the same time, the budget debate had led to a split between Netanyahu and David Levy, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, and the leader of the Gesher party. This split had caused the resignation of David Levy in early 1998. Therefore, the government has lost the support of the Gesher party members in the Knesset, reducing by that its bulk in the Knesset from 66 to 62 seats. Moreover, the resigned ministers have demanded the release of Prime Minister Netanyahu, leading to its early collapse (Hazan & Diskin, 2000).

Before its collapse, the government was faced by the "no-confidence" movements such as the one after the memorandum agreement signed between Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian president, and Netanyahu that was sponsored by the United States (U.S.) President Bill Clinton in October 1998. There was opposition for the agreement by parts of the government coalition. Despite that, the agreement got the approval from the majority of the government members (Hazan & Diskin, 2000).

By December 1998, it was clear that the government had lost its parliamentary majority, and the opposition demanded early elections. The elections was set on May 17, 1999 after Netanyahu's attempts to postpone the elections (Hazan & Diskin, 2000).

The focus of this research starts from that date onward. It focuses on the formation, stability and the duration of the consecutive governments from 1999 till now. This research comes as a continuation of the research implemented by Salamey (2003) that studied the formation of the Israeli' coalition governments from the year 1949 to the year 1999. It is important to continue such research because it will add up an overall analysis of the performance of the consecutive recent governments, and form a basis for further researches in the field of political science.

1.1 The timeline of the government's formation

The electoral system in Israel is known to be a state-wide system of voting. The members of the Israeli Knesset are elected based on a single electoral district. The candidates form a list that might include members of one or more parties (Bain, 2011).

These members are being ranked on this list from their parties, and it is obvious that the members with higher rankings tend to be closer to win the elections. So, in case a party wins a single seat in the parliament, this means that the candidates whose name was firstly listed will become the Knesset member (Bain, 2011).

The Knesset is formed of 120 seats. And for a list to win, it should receive votes in excess of a 2% threshold to be eligible to hold a seat. Afterward, the president of Israel enquires the party with the majority of the seats to form a successful coalition that will lead to a new government (Bain, 2011).

There is a possibility for a call for early elections before the legal period (4 years) of the Knesset term. The first way is when the majority of the Knesset members call for early elections, or the prime minister requests the president to call for early elections. The second way is when the current ruling government decides to resign. Then, a new coalition should be formed, and when it fails to be formed, new elections must be held (Bain, 2011).

As mentioned earlier, Israel held early general elections simultaneously for Prime Minister and the Knesset on May 17, 1999. This is considered the second time in which a similar event happened. The first was in 1996. This time Ehud Barak was selected to form the new government. Ehud Barak is the leader of the One Israel party.

Within a short period for the government of Ehud Barak, in 2001, the Israeli government witnessed new direct elections for its Prime Minister, and this time Ariel Sharon has been elected to lead the 11th government (Hazan, 1996).

In 2003, Ariel Sharon was elected to lead his second government. The coalition government consisted of four parties with a total members of 68. The parties were as follows: Likud with 40 members of the Knesset, Shinui with 15 members, the National

Religious Party with 6 members and the National Unity-Israel Our Home party with 7 members. All these 68 members are members of the Knesset (Hazan & Diskin, 2004).

The conflict among the Israeli officials returned this time due to an internal factor which is related to the separation of Israeli-Palestinian borders, where Sharon conducted a plan of withdrawing the Israeli armed forces from Gaza strip. The members of the Likud party criticized Sharon's plan and considered him giving away Israeli land for the Palestinians. This conflict led the second government of Sharon to collapse; especially after he left the Likud party with other 14 Knesset members to form a new one named Kadima in 2005. After that, Sharon demanded the dissolving of the Knesset, and new elections were held in March, 2006 (A. Diskin & Hazan, 2007).

Due to the health conditions of Sharon, Ehud Olmert, the leader of Kadima party, was elected to lead the new government. Olmert wanted to form a coalition including all parties. The government in the end included: Labor with 19 members of the Knesset, Shas with 12 members, and the Pensioners with 7 members. Kadima has succeeded to obtain 12 ministerial positions in the government after it guaranteed 29 seats out 120 in the Knesset, while the Labor had 7 positions, Shas 4 positions, and the Pensioners 2 positions (A. Diskin & Hazan, 2007).

Furthermore, this government did not live long due to external factors. This time a war between Israel and Lebanon occurred after the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of another eight. The war took place in the summer of 2006, and its results were disastrous for the Israeli government. As the Israeli armed forces are known for their strength, they were not able to achieve anything logistically in this war aside from destruction. The result was the lack of trust in the government, which led to the resignation of both Dan Halutz, Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, in January 2007 and Ehud Olmert in September 2008 (Diskin & Hazan, 2009).

New elections were held in 2009 and included the participation of thirty-three political parties. The main theme that led the elections was the Israeli-Arab conflict, in addition to some political and socio-economic matters. The election results left Kadima with 28 seats, Likud with 27 seats, and Labor with 13 seats.

Two names were recommended for leading the government. Netanyahu, who was nominated by six parties, and Tzipi Livni, who was nominated by her party Kadima, given that she was the party's new leader. Netanyahu was asked to form the new government on February 20, 2009. Likud grasped the key position in the new Knesset. Netanyahu tried hardly to form a government which includes all parties, but Livni insisted not to participate and remained with its party in opposition. On the other hand, the Labor party participated in the government even though some members were against it. Accordingly, Netanyahu formed a coalition that included Israel Our Home, Labor, Shas, and Jewish Home. The coalition government gained the trust and support of the Knesset on March 2009. Netanyahu's new government was said to be an "open coalition" government. This was an unfamiliar phenomenon in the history of Israel. Netanyahu's second government consisted of 30 ministers divided among the coalition parties as follows: Likud had half of the ministers with 15 positions; Israel Our Home and Labor both had five positions, Shas had four positions, and Jewish Home was left with one position (Hazan & Diskin, 2009).

Netanyahu formed the new government in February and it consisted of the following parties: Likud Our Home, Yesh Atid, the Jewish Home, and HaTnua. The 33rd Israeli government composed of 22 ministers from Likud Our Home (12 ministers), Yesh Atid (5 ministers), the Jewish Home (3 ministers), and HaTnua (2 ministers). Netanyahu was hoping to form a government including a large number of coalitions. (A. Diskin & Hazan, 2014).

1.2 How the government is formed in Israel

Until after the elections of the 13th Knesset, it was the President who assigned the task of forming a new government to the head of the list with the best chances of succeeding, who was also usually the head of the largest party in the Knesset. The Government required the approval of the Knesset, so that it needed to represent a coalition supported by a majority of the Knesset members, even if not all of its supporters were actual members in it (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

According to the amendment to the Basic Law: The Government, which was adopted toward the end of the 12th Knesset, as of the elections to the 14th Knesset, simultaneous

elections will take place for the Knesset and a directly elected Prime Minister. As in the past, the new Prime Minister will have to present the Ministers in his Government to the Knesset, as well as the distribution of portfolios amongst them, and obtain its confidence. At the time of presenting his Government, the new Prime Minister announces its basic guidelines, which constitute the new Government's work plan. After the Knesset then expresses its confidence in the new Government, and the Prime Minister and his Ministers declare their allegiance before the Knesset. During its service, all the members of the Government are collectively responsible for the activities of all the Minsters, and for the Government as a whole (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

Most of the Ministers are responsible for one or more Government Ministries, but can also serve as a Minister without Portfolio. Ministers do not have to be Knesset members, while Deputy Ministers (There can be more than one Deputy Minister in each Ministry) must be members. The addition of new Ministers to the Government in the course of its term of office, or a change in the distribution of functions among them, requires the Knesset's approval (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

It is the Government which determines its own working arrangements and the manner in which it adopts decisions. It usually meets for one weekly meeting on Sundays, though in urgent cases additional meetings may be called. The Government may also act by means of standing or occasional Ministerial Committees, some of whose decisions require the approval of the Government as a whole (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

A Government which has resigned or has been brought down by a vote of no confidence, continues to serve until a new Government is formed, and is then called a transitional Government. The number of Ministries maintained by the Government varies from time to time according to the needs and to coalition constraints (Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).

1.3 Research objective

Based on what was mentioned earlier in addition to other factors, this research identifies key aspects that have contributed to the formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments between 1999 and the present.

Furthermore, the period between 1999 and 2015 witnessed a new change in the framework of the elections that requires attention. For example, the main address of the prime ministerial elections in 2013 was economy, social situation, and equal sharing of military service whereas in previous elections, the dominant priority was security. On January 8, 2013 the *Times of Israel* published the findings of a survey regarding what people considered to be of priority the elections: 60% listed socio-economic issues, only 19% considered security (Iran, Syria etc.) to have top priority whereas no more than a mere 16% mentioned peace with the Palestinians. Obviously, the powerful social protests of the summer of 2011 changed domestic discourse in Israel. The protest movement may not have succeeded in taking people to the streets in large numbers again in 2012, but its demands for social justice, affordable housing and a more moderate cost of living changed the country's political agenda. Neither the Middle East Conflict nor the threat posed by Iran disappeared from the agenda, but it was the thematic priorities of the protest movement that dominated it (Hexel, 2013).

In this research, the main questions are: What determines the duration of Israeli coalition governments? Why are some short lived while others long lived? (1999 - Present)

Objective:

This study comes as a continuation to the research carried out by Dr. Imad Salamey titled "Israeli Coalition Governments: Formation and Duration (1949-1999)". It is very important to study the Israeli coalition governments which ruled between 1999 until the current date since this period has witnessed several noticeable events.

The aim of this thesis is to provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration analysis. It will show that a coalition government's structural formation determines its duration.

1.4 Research Design

This research uses two methodological approaches to evaluate the theories of coalition formation and duration. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis.

This section discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of case selections and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

This study provides an analysis of party behaviors based on the systematic characteristics of the coalition system. Moreover, a regression analysis is adopted. The dependent variable is the duration of each government, while the independent variables are the size and number of political parties, representatives alliances and coalitions, the ideology within each government such as the religiously driven government, right wing or left wing government, foreign policy views, etc., and the events that affected the government and were the cause for it to succeed and last or fail and dissolve.

Dependent Variables:

Three dependent variables are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, coalition formation analysis is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition size and coalition ideological parameter. Coalition size is simply the number of Knesset seats controlled by the coalition at the inauguration. For our qualitative analysis, the size of the coalition can be considered either large or small. A small coalition is a coalition that is established by the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority. In the second stage, the durational analysis is conducted in which the dependent variable considered is the number of days the coalition lasts in power. In the qualitative case study, we examine the shortest vs. the longest-lived Israeli coalitions in order to compare explanatory variables.

Independent Variables:

In order to explain cabinet formations, two types of independent or explanatory variables are considered. The first is structural, i.e., variables that are measurable through the institutional structure of the government. In this case, it is the dominant party's power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to form a winning

coalition while considering the various possible partnerships. Party power index is established after every national election.

The second set of variables considered in the analysis of coalition formation is event pressures, i.e., variables that vary on yearly bases relative to internal and external political developments. These variables account for a variety of "internal" and "external" political events that present pressure on structural variation during alliance formation.

1.5 Chapter Summaries

The following chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 2, "Literature Review in Coalition Theories," reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers "event" theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined for their contributions and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. The structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory predicts coalitions' structural formations and durations while taking into consideration important national transformations. It further provides means for examining the "event aging thesis."

Chapter 3, "Methodology" describes two methodological approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies is related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming makes a quantitative examination difficult to verify. An inductive comparative qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions. This chapter discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method,

its various phases, the criteria of case selections, and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

In Chapter 4, the data is quantitatively examined to reveal the relationship between coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel was founded. Multiple linear and robust regression analyses were conducted to show the significance of the model developed in chapter 2. While the model was not found significant, partly in light of low sample size, trend analysis showed that the dominant party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike also increased over the years. These changes in trends have become apparent since 1969. A qualitative approach is also conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to examine the most evident variables associated with governments' early breakups and terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide comparative evidence as to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred following the 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition's size, and the coalition's ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments. A comparative qualitative analysis of longest duration governments, compared to shortest duration governments is made.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the quantitative and qualitative data analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings appear to support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets and results in short duration coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and external pressures responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 1969 appear to have had

the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition formations. Supports to our duration hypothesis emerge in the significant negative association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration.

Chapter two

Literature Review

This chapter reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration theories. It is hard to overstate the importance of coalition formation in the economic, political, and social analysis. For example, coalition formation could take the form of a political party formation or any other official entity form such as lobbies, public goods entities, cartel formations, and more (Ray, 2007).

2.1 Coalition formation theories

Laver (1998) discusses the government formation theories in terms of priori or empirical methods on one side, and whether it is cooperative or non-cooperative on the other. Researchers, who support the empirical method in analyzing the government formation process, depend on data and information related to the formation and survival of the government. The data are being collected based on certain variables, which, in return, depend on implicit and explicit abstract models of government formation. Laver (1998) believes that these researches aim not to develop these abstract models, but to pull together the related variables by which represent as possible the real world cases of government formation, survival, and resignation (Laver, 1998).

On the other hand, researchers, who follow the priori methods, depend on setting assumptions which provide a basic description of the government formation main structures. The assumptions are being originated from real world cases in the political world, which form an empirical basis for the development of abstract models. Unlike the empirical method researchers, they aim not to identify variables of government formation based on past experiences, but instead they "build an explicit model of the government-formation process, using plausible starting assumptions and rigorous logical arguments" (Laver, 1998).

Choosing in between the two methods is hard. The priori method is simple to formulate and expresses the assumptions set more than complex models. Also, the "logical

connections in a priori model are clear and explicit, since intuition is rarely helped by arguments that are vague and/or obscure." While the empirical method is more complex when using real world cases (Laver, 1998). In addition, Laver (1998) differentiated between cooperative and non-cooperative game theories as a part of the priori methods of government formation.

The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is crucial to the analysis of government formation in minority legislatures since whether or not they comprise executive coalitions in the sense that different parties control different government positions, incumbent governments are typically sustained in office by voting coalitions of legislative parties. The cooperative approach looks at the payoffs to the various possible coalitions, with the typical implication that the most valuable coalition, however, defined, is likely to form. In this approach, the job is to specify the value of each coalition allowed by the rules of the game. The payoff to any individual actor is deduced as some function of the values of the various coalitions of which the actor is a member and its place in the bargaining structure set out by the rules of the game.

The non-cooperative approach, in contrast, looks at the behavior of individual actors within coalitions, be they parties, party factions, or even individual politicians. An equilibrium government, by this logic, is one preferred over any feasible alternative by all its members; this need not be the most valuable government. Conversely, an incumbent government cannot be in equilibrium if some feasible alternative is preferred by actors who have not only the incentive but also the ability to replace the incumbent with the alternative.

The outcome of the government-formation process is deduced as some equilibrium that results from the playing of an optimal individual strategy by each of the participants. In practice, non-cooperative approaches to modeling government formation have developed hand in hand with an emerging new institutionalist approach to political modeling in general. The two trends feed off each other; the substantive argument that institutions do matter both encourages and is facilitated by the modeling of particular processes as noncooperative games closely tied to the institutional details of a particular case. The

driving intuition is that the making and breaking of governments is a product of the local institutional rules of the government-formation process, encompassing such matters as the sequence in which party leaders are asked to form governments, the procedures for votes of investiture and no confidence, and the allocation of particular policy jurisdictions to particular cabinet portfolios. Each actor exploits features of the local institutional terrain within which government formation takes place to identify and deploy an optimal strategy.

On the other hand, there is no clear description of the cooperative approach as the driving intuition depends on many factors and different patterns which run through the making and breaking of governments. It is so critical that such a detail could deflect the formation of any government from equilibrium, so it is more complicated and depends on the general logic of the situation.

The analyses of government are controlled by the assumptions about politicians as politicians as they might be motivated to office-seeking assumption or in some cases they are assumed to be concerned with the policies of the government and to get them into the office to be able to influence the policy seeking-assumption. There are different comparative studies which show the motivation key of decision makers within different political parties, see Müller & Strom 1997. Political scientists assume that politician could be motivated by office seeking or policy seeking in some other cases could be the mix of the two.

The mix between office and policy seeking could be very complex and is a sign of great difficulty to reach a coherent model with a successful trade-off function in order to link office and policy payoffs. Voters are watching politicians make sure if the pledges made during the election campaign are achieved or not. The policy positions promoted by a politician during the formation process may be the main instrumental feature of a larger party competition. Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 45.60) has explained in detail the interaction between an intrinsic and instrumental policy-seeking. Most of the different old models of government formation consider the making and breaking of governments as competition over the allocation of fixed cabinet positions between different parties and politicians.

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On the other hand, most of the recent studies show that the formation of a government is based on policy seeking assumption. Most of the discussions are based on methodological reasons and organized to the presumed assumption which is office or policy seeking. It could be more specific according to their methodological style, which could be more empirical or priori. Priori models could be also defined by two main approaches as cooperative and non-cooperative.

 SkjæVeland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen (2007) classify coalition theory into two types. The first type takes policy considerations into account and the second type ignores it. The objective of the two type's theory is to win a place in the government.

Martin and Stevenson (2001) state that it is not reasonable for political parties to be responsible only for office in order to accept minority governments, and therefore the main assumption is to form majority cabinets.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1980) suggested a refinement: that coalition from minimal winnings will be formed. All parties which are not necessary for the majority would affect the available places for other parties. It is expected that there will be winning coalitions, and different suggestions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of coalitions in a particular instance of government formation (SkjæVeland et al., 2007).

In policy-oriented theories, the most famous are the minimal connected winning coalition theory Axelrod (1970), as it simply assumes that only parties which are close to each other can form a coalition. The coalitions will not include parties which are not necessary to meet demands, but they will be limited in this sense.

Sened (1996) found that it is confusing in the literature regarding the four stages describing proportional rule system: In the first stage (pre-election), different parties tend to increase their utility. In the second stage which is the election phase, voters choose how to vote. The last stage is known by the legislative stage in which each coalition is trying to implements its own policy.

A complete model should consider all stages together, the best way is to depend on the notion of "backward induction." To be ready for the coalition game, all parties should have

a clear vision for the legislative stage also all voters should have a clear vision about each coalition to match their expectations and the most important for parties is to be able to expect the behavior of voters (Austen-Smith & Bank, 1988).

Some authors limit the role of voters and keep the composition of the legislation as given. The first study of this coalition behavior is "the seminal work of Riker (1962)" his predictions are the main core of the recent studies on this topic. The study focused on the objective of political parties during the post-election period. The model done by Jackson and Moselle (2002) focused on the benefits gained during party formation in the context of the legislative game. The model depends on the legislative bargaining game of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in order to reach the conclusion that the game between legislators is on two dimensions: private good dimension and public good dimension. As in the study done by Levy (2002) and Riviere (1999), the game can be evaluated by the result of formation and whether parties can form or not.

It is important to see if the existence of parties can affect the legislation game or not. Although that the legislative game has two different dimensions but they have an interesting interaction. In the legislative phase, each party is forming a proposal consisting of a coalition, which is important for coalition formation stage and all members in the coalition has the right to accept or to reject the proposal. The proposal is accepted if the majority of the coalition agreed to it. Otherwise, in the second attempt, the party which has highest vote share will form the coalition. A caretaker government will be formed if after the third unsuccessful attempt and it will make its decision equitably. There is an inefficiency in the legislative bargaining process and it is mentioned in the Austen Smith-Banks model. The inefficiency is coming from different party members who might affect the equilibrium outcome.

An idea raised by Jackson and Moselle (2002) to solve the legislative game using a non-cooperative approach. Coalitions are not necessarily connected even if they are winners as it may be equilibria if the two or more extreme parties for a coalition. The legislative influence is not the only factor affecting vote shares, on the other hand, the expected policy is affected by median voters and this is the reason why not all voters are in equilibrium.

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Another conclusion is very close to the results of Jackson and Moselle (2002): Most of the legislators with extreme preference are very close to forming an unconnected coalition and as mentioned before that median voters are the base to make different policies in equilibrium.

Another model is introduced by Baron (1993) which is very similar to the model introduced by Austen Smith and Banks (1988) state that parties tend to increase

Baron (1993) has a very similar model to Austen Smith and Banks (1988) except that parties aim to maximize the aggregate welfare of their supporters and voting are sincere. The main result is that unlike Plurality voting systems there may not be a convergence of policy positions.

2.2 Coalition duration theories

Another model was introduced by Dodd (1974, 1976) who suggested that parties which include moderate fragmentation have the chance to increase the probability of long lived winning coalitions, furthermore other parties with higher fragmentation would result in smaller coalition which contain different minorities and in this case it would produce more coalitions (less or more than majority) depending on the level of conflict.

The work introduced by Dodd seemed to review the model done by Riker model, which is based on the notion of constant-sum games. He stated that it was not enough to form a stable coalition in the European context and this was the sign to some account of policy positions to understand this phenomenon (Schofield, 1993).

Interdependent duration processes are common in politics and other strategic settings. The time to one type of political event frequently depends on the time to another related event, and the time to an event for one actor often depends on the time to that same event for others. Put in a slightly different way, politics and strategic behavior generate inter-dependence across durations and duration inter-dependence across actors (Hays & Kachi, 2009).

Scholarly interest in the empirical determinants of government formation and dissolution in parliamentary democracies is longstanding, and these topics remain among the most central in the comparative study of developed democracies. Two of the most popular topics in this literature are explaining the durations of both coalition bargaining over ministerial portfolios and government survival which is the focus of this research. There is a good reason for this focus. The failure of parliamentary parties to form governments quickly (e.g., the recent crisis in Belgium) and chronic government instability (e.g., Italy for much of the postwar period) have significant social costs and are viewed as symptoms of dysfunctional democracy.

Strøm, Budge, and Laver (1994) highlight the importance of cabinet termination and dissolution rules for government formation. Fearon (1998) also formalizes the effects of expected enforcement levels of bargained outcomes on the bargaining stage itself, in the context of international agreements. His formulation suggests that a long shadow of the future can give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hope of getting a better deal. Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) also formalize explicitly the interdependence of government formation bargaining and the bargained outcome -cabinet survival. The main purpose of Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) is to analyze the conditions under which certain types of coalitions are formed. As an empirical matter, their interest lies in estimating the probability that a particular type of coalition is chosen. Durations of bargaining and government survival still play important roles in their model, but those durations are not the primary focus of their analysis. In their model, the inefficient delay of bargaining is generated mainly by a stochastic factor, the state of the world that is either favorable or unfavorable for a cabinet's survival, while the inefficient delay in Fearon (1998) is mainly due to the dichotomous bargaining choices and (or) uncertainty.

There are fewer theoretical studies of government termination. Laver and Shepsle (1996) stress that the ending of one cabinet begins the formation process for the next and that dissolution and formation are conceptually non-separable, though their own emphasis is more on the making than breaking of governments.

Lupia and Strøm (1995) show that majority government may dissolve and call early elections when the expected payoff is high enough. Their model explains why a cabinet, which is a symmetry of the earlier bargaining process, might find it worthwhile to terminate its tenure and call an election. All of these studies make important contributions but fall short of the kind of system integration that we see as necessary.

Hays and Kachi (2009) data set consists of 475 cabinets from sixteen Western European countries -Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (Fourth Republic), Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The data run between 1945 and 1998.

Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between the time it takes for government formation and the length of government survival in their sample. Governments that formed in less than fifty days survived, on average, 580 days whereas coalitions that took more than 100 days to reach agreement lasted 818 days. This is a bit perplexing since we might expect long delays in government formation to be indicative of the inability of parliamentary parties to work together effectively (King et al., 1990). There is another way to look at this relationship, however. Parties that anticipate long-lasting governments may bargain harder over coalition agreements since these agreements will determine the balance of executive power, distribution of benefits from holding office, and overall course of policy for a significant period of time into the future (Hays & Kachi, 2009).

2.2.1 Party change

Changing parties may result in coalition crisis which affects the strategy and tactics (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Several literatures describe the party change as changes happening on the operation level such as change in the leadership, a dominant factor within the party, or a strong external factor (Harmel & Janda, 1994).

Harmel and Janda (1994) expect that a political party could face dramatic changes when the party experiences an external shock. External shocks are always related to the ability of each part to achieve their goals. There are external shocks which are linked to the abilities of each party to achieve its main target. The reason why some the vote-maximizing parties

are more likely to change especially after an electoral loss. Vote-maximizing parties lose confidence in their policies or importance of key position especially when they lose the chance to participate in the government, On the other hand, it is not necessary to face an external shock to party change as it could be an internal change.

The life cycle of the coalition is described by Müller and Miller (2005), stating that there is a conflict during different stages as the government formation stage and election stage which evaluate the whole process.

There are two different types of conflict which occur inside the party during the government formation phase. The conflict occurs during breakdowns in any negotiation which is essential for the formation of the coalition.

Most of the parties involved in fruitless negotiations are not able to overcome disagreement and could stay for a long time in a conflict situation. If the government is formed by a coalition of these parties then this statement should be qualified especially after another negotiation attempt, which is usually supported by other parties in the coalition (Müller & Miller, 2005).

All breakdowns during the formation stage of government is a sign of disagreement between parties and it happens mainly during the negotiation phase. In case that they are able to form a stable government it means that they are able to overcome conflicts (Müller & Miller, 2005).

First, most of the compromises in order to form the government are not formal generally speaking the parties agree to disagree (Timmermans, 2003). Secondly, if all parties were able to overcome all challenges and conflict they will produce an unstable policy which might produce more issues during the reign of the government.

All negotiations, in order to form a coalition, may not be linked to the government formation for two reasons. First, Party leaders may not accept the deal as it did not meet their expectations. In other cases office-seekers may refuse a junior position in the coalition in order to increase their chances to get a senior position in the future, this is the

reason why some of the negotiation attempts were not considered to be serious by actors involved in government formation stage (Müller & Miller, 2005).

Although that it is not serious enough and wasting time and effort but parties like to keep it that way to show the other outside world that they working for the sake of government formation. On the other hand, the negotiations to form a coalition might not succeed because of intraparty resistance.

The worst case scenario when the negotiator's proposal might not be accepted during the voting stage at a party congress, but there are many options which intra-party politics can undermine inter-party agreement (Müller & Miller, 2005). There is a survey of the coalition of politics which includes 15 different western countries and it shows that intra-party politics is highly accepted and relevant during the coalition formation (Müller & Strøm, 2000). As there is no accurate data about the rule done by the intraparty politics but it is obvious that it was essential for coalition formation.

On the other hand, party leaders prevent to have a direct deal with other leaders as it might affect the performance of their voters as voters are not tolerant or flexible with other parties or policies as party leaders. Also, inside the party, some activities of party members could affect the position of party leaders by inner-party voting. The stability of the party leaders is very important to have a stable coalition as all negotiation attempts are the first step to have a coalition.

Coalition governance it has been defined as the black box. Laver and Shepsle (1996), who introduced the governance questions to coalition research did not consider coalition governance concept but they focused on government formation and stability.

On the other hand, there is significant research that has focused on different mechanisms of coalition government and different models in order to define the issues related to the coalition governance (Thies, 2001; Lanny W. Martin & Vanberg, 2004). And who are supporting the single-party governments usually view the coalition as causing two main issues as affecting the government stability and rigid policy.

Conflicts could also lead to cabinet termination. It could occur between coalition parties or between parties from different coalitions. It is clear that cabinets could be terminated as a result of high-level conflicts.

There are some cabinets who display fewer conflicts as cabinets that serve until the end of their constitutional inter-election period, and cabinets that terminate early for strategic reasons. Termination for a strategic reason gives more flexibility and the ability for action between the parties in the cabinet.

For more simplicity, these conflicts could be between the party's members in the government or between members who are not in the government. There is an estimation that 24.4% of coalitions after the war in the western countries were terminated as a result of the policy conflict between coalition parties. It is not clear whether these conflicts reflect the preferences of the party leaders or acted based on the reaction of their rank-and-file (Müller & Miller, 2005).

 Although it is necessary to avoid inter-party conflict, but it is not avoidable and some degree of conflict will happen even if all parties are satisfied with the share of votes. In addition, the coalition varies simultaneously with the degree and level of conflict between coalition parties. On the other hand, it is possible to find coalition parties running for elections with no statement about their coalition preference and they might fight each other vigorously. These elections generally follow a conflictual government and this could be the reason for parties to rule out more cooperation to have a stable government in order to reduce the risk of termination (Müller & Miller, 2005).

The research on inter-party cooperation is essential although, it concentrates on the noticeable circumstances (Gschwend, Johnston, & Pattie, 2003) and pre-electoral coalition agreements (Müller & Strøm, 2000). Choosing the party strategy is complicated and is not easy to define. The fundamental choices of each party affect the performance and the intra-party conflict, these fundamentals choices are classified into stand-alone or seek cooperation in the electoral arena.

The main question here is that whether each party should decide on their candidates, or the voters should decide on this matter. It is important to understand that these two choices are not linked to each other, and each one could lead to totally different results. The intra-party conflict could be classified into two main principals stand-alone vs. seek cooperation and might go further to the choices of the partners. The intra-party conflict could be about identifying the main competitor as it is essential to give the right signals to the voters in order to gain the maximum benefits and might affect the pre-empting the decision about government formation (Müller & Miller, 2005).

2.3 The Israeli politics reflection on public

Since its formation, the Israeli's political, economic, and administrative systems are considered to be "centralized" (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989). This "centralized" system was never faced by opposition movements that might lead to the development of "alternative power bases," for example, interest groups as a part of the civil society with liberal features (Arian, 1997).

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the situation has changed, and public dissatisfaction has risen as a result of the unsuccessful policies of the Labor party. Normally, the public movements use democratic processes in order to alternate the current government and its policies or to at least make changes within, such as demonstrations, strikes, media, etc. But what happened in the 1960 was an opposite reality. For example, the settlers attempted to settle illegal settlements in the territories occupied in 1967 aimed at highlighting certain scenarios and facts in order to enforce a specific reality on the government" (Ben-Porat & Mizrahi, 2005).

Ben-Porat and Mizrahi (2005) as well as Mizrahi and Meydani (2003) believed that:

> During the 1970s and 1980s, sociopolitical processes, discussed elsewhere, led to the inability of the government to produce efficient and stable policy decisions, as well as to political stalemate. This intensified the feeling among the Israeli public that the government continuously faltered to provide public services, combined with the sense that influence channels were blocked. It had consequently

encouraged more groups to pursue alternative politics. The emergence of informal institution embodies an even deeper change in informal institutions, i.e., the nature of relations between citizens and politicians in Israel. In the 1950s and 1960s, these relations were informally based on a top-down orientation, in the sense that policies were decided through a highly centralized system with very limited participation of citizens. In the 1980s and 1990s, on the other hand, the nature of these informal relations was transformed, and recast in a bottom-up orientation.

Also, from the creation of the state in 1948 until 1977, the Labor party was always the party with the majority of Knesset members, and, thus, was always ruling the government. After that year, the party's power was declined by the strong presence of the right wing. So, it ended up in the opposition or participating in the government formed by the right wing party, the Likud (Doron, 2013).

There are three main elements behind the rise of the right and the decline of the left in the Israeli politics. The number of the Israeli electorate has changed. The increasing number of immigrants to Israel played a major role in the electoral system (Doron, 2013).

The other element that played an important role in rising the right party was the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories in the year 1967. The last element was related to the degree of tension created by the extent to which Labor were ready to accept social democracy (Doron, 2013).

This chapter reviewed the various researches provided on coalition formation and duration theories. It discussed the main tenets of the structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. Lastly, it described the reflection of Israeli politics on the public in Israel. All of the above mentioned is going to be translated into qualitative and quantitative analysis in Chapter 4.

Chapter three

Methodology

This research examines two methodological approaches to evaluate the theories presented. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis.

This chapter discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of case selections and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

This study, which is a continuation of the study implemented by Salamey (2003), provides an analysis of party behaviors based on the systematic characteristics of the coalition system. The formed coalitions are the analysis element, and the parties forming the coalition are the sub-elements.

Normally, the parties with the majority seats in the Israeli Knesset form the government coalition. The formation process includes the engagement of the majority party in a series of negotiations with the other coalition parties or the minority ones in order to form the government.

This study assumes that the last day of the coalition (or termination date) is the day when a new coalition starts ruling (Salamey, 2003). Moreover, a regression analysis is being adopted as follows:

Dependent Variables

Three dependent variables are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, coalition formation analysis is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition size and coalition ideological parameter. Coalition size is simply the number of Knesset seats controlled by the coalition upon inauguration. For our qualitative analysis, the size of the

coalition can be considered either large or small. A small coalition is a coalition that is established by the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority. In the second stage, the durational analysis is conducted in which the dependent variable considered is the number of days the coalition lasts in power. In the qualitative case study, we examine the shortest versus the longest-lived Israeli coalitions in order to compare explanatory variables.

Independent Variables

In order to explain cabinet formations, two types of independent or explanatory variables are considered. The first is structural, i.e., variables that are measurable through the institutional structure of the government. In this case, it is the dominant party's power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition while considering the various possible partnerships. Party power index is established after every national election. The study uses Banzhaf's power index as a measurement of the power of the dominant party to form winning coalitions within the Knesset.

The second set of variables considered in the analysis of coalition formation are event pressures, i.e., variables that vary on yearly bases relative to internal and external political developments. These variables account for a variety of "internal" and "external" political events that present pressure on structural variation during alliance formation. For example, variables as a source for explaining the size and ideological formations of governments are: annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, the annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product, the annual percentage of immigrants relative to population, the annual percentage of unemployment, the annual percentage of strikers per strike. In addition to the variables needed for the quantitative study, United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic growth were also taken into consideration.

Durational analysis event pressure variables are also examined and combined with variables such as the coalition size and ideology parameter in order to determine the combined impact on the durability of the government.

Measuring Coalition Size

The coalition size is determined based on the original number of Knesset's seats controlled by the coalition partner parties (Salamey, 2003).

Measuring the Competitiveness of the Coalition System

The coalition competition is formed when dominant parties uses their less power to form a coalition (Salamey, 2003). This means that the more is the dominant party power in the Knesset, the less will be its competition in the Knesset to form a new coalition. The study measures the relative power of the dominant party to form a coalition by using Banzhaf's power index. Banzhaf's power index measures the power of each party to form a winning coalition relative to other parties. It is noted that Banzhaf's power index measures "the power of the party relative to the coalition's members based solely on the number of seats" (Salamey, 2003).

Measuring Coalition Duration

The coalition duration in the government refers to the number of days it is ruling; in other words, from the first day it was inaugurated by the Knesset to the day a new government is kicked off (Salamey, 2003).

Measuring Event Pressure Variables

Event pressure variables are an example of political, social, or economic variables that tend to impact the whole nation's economy (Salamey, 2003).

Data Analysis

After compiling the data into seven cases representing the entire Israeli array of coalition governments a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two stages.

In the first phase, we regressed independent variables on the size and then on the ideological parameter of the coalition as dependent variables. This is conducted in order to

measure the significance of the multiple regression models in accounting for size and an ideological parameter of the coalition.

In the second phase, we regressed independent variables, along with size and ideology, on duration as the dependent variable. This was done in two steps: first we regressed the model using first year events data as to determine first year events in the life of government in days; second, we regressed the last year events data as to determine last year events in the life of government in days.

Regression analysis

The researcher has constructed a model based on several variables, and was analyzed according to ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis; where the dependent variable was the number of seats and the independent variables are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) change, foreign aids, severity of conflict, log of number of immigrants as percent of population, log of number of strikers per strike, and dominant party power index. The study focused on six governments from the year 1999 till 2015, and due to the fact that the results were not reliable, the researcher had to widen the range of the sample to cover all of the Israeli governments from 1949 till 2015. IBM SPSS Statistics 20 was used to obtain the results. Further details are presented hereunder.

Banzhaf power index and other indicators

The researcher had conducted Banzhaf power index in order to determine the power of the winning coalition. According to (Nachmias 1974), the minimal winning coalition is 61 members. The methodology of calculating Banzhaf to calculate power index is found in Appendix 1.

Other indices were used to evaluate the winning coalition performances in accordance with their duration. The GDP change is calculated based on year to year data

$$\Delta \ in \ GDP = \frac{GDP_{year2} - GDP_{year1}}{GDP_{year1}} \times 100\% \quad \text{...... (1)}$$

The log of a number of immigrants as a percent of the population for a certain year is calculated based on the following formula:

$$\log\left(\frac{\text{Number of immigrants}}{\text{Population size}}\right) \dots\dots (2)$$

The log of a number of strikers per strike is calculated based on the following formula:

$$\log\left(\frac{\text{Number of strikers}}{\text{Number of strikes}}\right) \dots\dots (3)$$

The foreign aid represents the total annual money received by the Israeli government in millions of dollars. The total aid is classified into military, economic and refugee's settlement. All of these aid in this research are based on the U.S. aid only to Israel.

The researcher has depended on a scale of one to six in determining the severity of conflict index; where one indicates a very low severity and six indicates a high level of severity. In Order to calculate these values, additional two sources of external pressure were used which are: The United Nations resolution and the border attacks. The United Nations (U.N.) resolution are those adopted by the general assembly and Security Council. The researcher coded the resolutions based on scale zero to two referring to zero as no annual condemnation of Israel, one as some condemnations available, and two as severe ones available. The researcher as well coded the border attacks based on a scale from one to four where one means low attacks and four means high. Finally, the researcher added the UN resolution with the border of attack scores to obtain the severity of conflict index that does not exceed six as a score. All data concerning this index were collected from the Jewish Virtual Library and the Israeli ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Qualitative Analysis

In this section, the researcher conducted qualitative analysis based on the following parameters. The researcher illustrated the coalition size and ideology. The size was determined based on the number of seats presented in the Knesset. The coalition size is determined based on the original number of Knesset's seats controlled by the coalition partner parties (Salamey 2003). The size is considered either large or small. The coalition

is considered relatively small when it has a minimum number of seats in the Knesset, and the researcher is going to use the term minimum winning coalition (MWC) to refer for the small coalition. On the other hand, a large coalition (LWC) refers to coalitions that exceed the minimum winning ones. Another parameter is the coalition ideology, this refers to the type of partnerships the parties' form which is based on a combination of left center, right and/or religious. This categorization is based on the data provided by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign affairs.

Chapter four

Findings and Results

In this section, the findings of the study are presented. The findings are divided into subsections. In the first subsection, an independent or explanatory variable is being considered. The variable is a structural variable that is measurable through the institutional structure of the government. In this case, it is the dominant party's power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition while considering the various possible partnerships. This requires the analysis of three dependent variables such as the coalition formation analysis, which is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition size and coalition ideological parameter.

Then, a set of variables are being analyzed. These variables account for a variety of "internal" and "external" political events that present pressure on structural variation during alliance formation. For example, variables as a source for explaining the size and ideological formations of governments are: annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, the annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product, the annual percentage of immigrants relative to population, the annual percentage of unemployment, the annual percentage of strikers per strikes. In addition to the variables needed for the quantitative study such as United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic growth.

Afterwards, a quantitative analysis using multiple linear regression analysis is demonstrated.

In the second subsection, an overview of the changes occurred within the Israeli parties over the period under study. It is important to reflect the degree of stability each party, or at least the majority parties, has. In the third subsection, a qualitative method analyzing the duration of the governments is being implemented.

4.1 Results

4.1.1 Banzhaf Power Index and other Indicators

The Knesset is constituted of 120 members of Knesset, and therefore a minimal winning coalition is to include only 61 members or that combination which least exceeds 61 (Nachmias, 1974).

Table 1 Members of the 15th Knesset (1969 – 1974)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
One Israel	20.2	26	0.56854
Likud	14.1	19	0.36786
Shas	13	17	0.33319
Meretz	7.6	10	0.1734
Yisrael Be`Aliyah	5.1	6	0.10663
Shinui	5	6	0.10663
Center Party	5	6	0.10663
National Religious Party	4.2	5	0.08905
Yahadut Hatorah	3.7	5	0.08905
United Arab List	3.4	5	0.08905
Ihud Leumi	3	4	0.07123
Yisrael Beitenu	2.6	4	0.07123
Hadash	2.6	3	0.05414
National Democratic Assembly*	1.9	2	0.03522
Am Ehad	1.9	2	0.03522
Labor-Meimad	0	0	0
Ihud Leumi-Yisrael Beteinu	0	0	0
Gesher	0	0	0
Democratic Choice	0	0	0

National Arab Party	0	0	0
Arab Movement for Renewal	0	0	0
Herut - National Movement	0	0	0
National Unity - National Progressive Alliance	0	0	0

* The National Democratic Assembly is also known as Balad

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (One Israel) is 0.568.

Table 2 Parliamentary Groups in the 28th Government (1999 – 2001)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected
One Israel	20.2	26
Shas	13	17
Meretz	7.6	10
Yisrael Be`Aliyah	5.1	6
Center Party	5	6
National Religious Party	4.2	5
Yahadut Hatorah	3.7	5

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The 28th government coalition was formed by Ehud Barak on July 6, 1999, and was consisted of: One Israel, Shas, Meretz, Center Party, Mafdal, Yahadut Hatorah, and Yisrael B'Aliya. When the government was formed, there were 18 active ministers, and that number later increased to 24 (Knesset, 2017).

Table 3 Parliamentary Groups in the 29th Government (2001 - 2003)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected
One Israel (Labor-Meimad)	20.2	26
Likud	14.1	19
Shas	13	17
Yisrael Be`aliyah	5.1	6
Center Party	5	6
National Religious Party	4.2	5
Yahadut Hatorah	3.7	5
Yisrael Beitenu	2.6	4
Am Ehad	1.9	2
Ihud Leumi-Yisrael Beteinu	0	0
Geshe	0	0

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

Table 4 Members of the 16th Knesset (10/03/1974 – 03/06/1974)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
Likud	29.4	38	0.7793
Labor-Meimad	14.5	19	0.21631
Shinui	12.3	15	0.19922
Shas	8.2	11	0.15039
HaIchud HaLeumi	5.5	7	0.08887
Meretz-Democratic Choice-Shahar	5.2	6	0.07666
National Religious Party	4.2	6	0.07666
United Torah Judaism	4.3	5	0.06445
Hadash-Ta'al	3	3	0.03857
Am Ehad	2.8	3	0.03857

Balad	2.3	3	0.03857
Yisrael Be'aliyah	2.2	2	0.02588
United Arab List	2.1	2	0.02588
Agudat Yisrael	0	0	0
Degel Hatorah	0	0	0
Renewed National Religious Zionism	0	0	0
Zionism Liberalism Equality	0	0	0
Kadima	0	0	0
Secular Faction	0	0	0
Yisrael Beitenu	0	0	0
Habayit Haleumi	0	0	0
Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta-al)	0	0	0

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (Likud) is 0.779.

Table 5 Parliamentary Groups in the 30th Government (2003 - 2006)

Parliamentary Group	**Votes in Percentage**	**Number of Seats Elected**
Likud	29.4	38
Shinui	12.3	15
HaIchud HaLeumi	5.5	7
National Religious Party	4.2	6

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The 30th Government coalition was formed by Ariel Sharon on February 28, 2003, and consisted of: Likud, Shinui, Ichud Leumi, and the National Religious Party (Knesset, 2017).

Table 6 Members of the 17th Knesset (1974 – 1977)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
Kadima	22	29	0.62012
Labor-Meimad	15.1	19	0.3252
Shas	9.5	12	0.20898
Likud	9	12	0.20898
Yisrael Beitenu	9	11	0.19141
Ichud Leumi - Mafdal	7.1	9	0.15625
Gil Pensioners Party	5.9	7	0.11914
United Torah Judaism	4.7	6	0.10352
Meretz	3.8	5	0.08398
Ra'am-Ta'al	3	4	0.06836
Hadash	2.7	3	0.05078
Balad	2.3	3	0.05078
Justice for the Elderly	0	0	0
The Right Way	0	0	0
Labor Under Ehud Barak	0	0	0
Meimad	0	0	0
Agudat Yisrael	0	0	0
Degel Hatorah	0	0	0
Habayit Hayehudi - Mafdal and Ichud Leumi	0	0	0
Habayit Hayehudi - Mafdal	0	0	0
Achi	0	0	0
Moledet - Ichud Leumi	0	0	0

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (Kadima) is 0.62.

Table 7 Parliamentary Groups in the 31st Government (2006 - 2009)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected
Kadima	22	29
Labor-Meimad	15.1	19
Shas	9.5	12
Yisrael Beitenu	9	11
Gil Pensioners Party	5.9	7

Source: Knesset.gov.il

The 31st government coalition was formed by Ehud Olmert on May 4th, 2006, and was consisted of: Kadima, Labor-Meimad, Shas, Yisrael Beitenu, and Gil Pensioners Party (Knesset, 2017).

Table 8 Members of the 18th Knesset (1977 – 1981)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
Kadima	22.5	28	0.50537
Likud	21.6	27	0.47998
Yisrael Beitenu	11.7	15	0.27002
Labor Under Ehud Barak	9.9	13	0.21924
Shas	8.5	11	0.1958
United Torah Judaism	4.4	5	0.07275
Ra'am-Ta'al	3.4	4	0.06006
Ichud Leumi	3.3	4	0.06006
Hadash	3.3	4	0.06006
New Movement - Meretz	3	3	0.04834
Habayit Hayehudi	2.9	3	0.04834
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	2.5	3	0.04834
Haatzma'u	0	0	0

Labor	0	0	0
Otzma Leyisrael	0	0	0
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni	0	0	0
Arab Democratic Party	0	0	0
Single MK - Chaim Amsellem	0	0	0

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (Kadima) is 0.505.

Table 9 Parliamentary Groups in the 32nd Government (2009 - 2013)

Parliamentary Group	**Votes in Percentage**	**Number of Seats Elected**
Kadima	22.5	28
Likud	21.6	27
Yisrael Beitenu	11.7	15
Labor Under Ehud Barak	9.9	13
Shas	8.5	11
Habayit Hayehudi	2.9	3

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The 32nd government coalition was formed by Binyamin Netanyahu on March 31, 2009, and was consisted of: Likud, Kadima, Labor under Ehud Barak, Yisrael Beitenu, Shas, and Habayit Hayehudi (Knesset, 2017).

Table 10 Members of the 19th Knesset (1981 – 1983)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
Likud Yisrael Beitenu	23.34	31	0.64697
Yesh Atid	14.33	19	0.30615
Israel Labor Party	11.39	15	0.24854
Habayit Hayehudi	9.12	12	0.19385
Shas	8.75	11	0.1792
United Torah Judaism	5.16	7	0.11475
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni	4.99	6	0.09814
Meretz	4.55	6	0.09814
United Arab List - Arab Movement for Renewal	3.65	4	0.06494
Hadash	2.99	4	0.06494
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	2.56	3	0.04834
Kadima	2.08	2	0.03271
Likud - National Liberal Movement	0	0	0
Yisrael Beitenu	0	0	0
United Arab List	0	0	0
Arab Movement for Renewal	0	0	0

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (Likud Yisrael Beitenu) is 0.646.

Table 11 Parliamentary Groups in the 33rd Government (2013 - 2015)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected
Likud Yisrael Beitenu	23.34	31
Yesh Atid	14.33	19
Habayit Hayehudi	9.12	12
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni	4.99	6

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The 33rd government coalition was formed by Binyamin Netanyahu on March 18, 2013, was consisted of: Likud Yisrael Beitenu, Yesh Atid, Habayit Hayehudi, and Hatenua (Knesset, 2017).

Table 12 Members of the 20th Knesset (1983 – 1984)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected	Banzhaf Power Index
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister	23.4	30	0.58008
Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni	18.67	24	0.39648
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)	10.6	13	0.23242
Yesh Atid Chaired by Yair Lapid	8.82	11	0.18945
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon	7.49	10	0.1582
Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett	6.74	8	0.14648
Shas	5.74	7	0.12695
Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman	5.1	6	0.09961
United Torah Judaism	4.99	6	0.09961
Israel's Left	2.99	5	0.07617

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The Banzhaf index for the dominant party (Likud) is 0.58.

Table 13 Parliamentary Groups in the 34th Government (2015 - Present)

Parliamentary Group	Votes in Percentage	Number of Seats Elected
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister	23.40	30
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon	7.49	10
Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett	6.74	8
Shas	5.74	7
Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman	5.10	6
United Torah Judaism	4.99	6

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The 34th government coalition was formed by Benjamin Netanyahu on May 14, 2015, and was consisted of: Likud, Kulanu, HaBayit HaYehudi, United Torah Judaism and Shas (Knesset, 2017).

Table 14 Size and Ideological Parameters of the Israeli Governments 1999 - Present

Government	Seats	Size	Coalition Ideology
28	75	LWC	Left, Center, Religious
29	90	LWC	Right, Left, Center, Religious
30	66	MWC	Right, Center, Religious
31	78	LWC	Center, Left, Religious
32	97	LWC	Right, Left, Religious
33	68	MWC	
34	67	MWC	

Source: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017)

Table 15 Distribution of Knesset Seats by Parties by Knesset

	Knesset					
	15	16	17	18	19	20
Political Parties						
Am Ehad	2	3				
Center Party	6					
Gil Pensioners Party			7			
Habayit Hayehudi				3	12	8
Hadash	3		3	4	4	
Hadash-Ta'al		3				
HaIchud HaLeumi		7				
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni					6	
Ichud Leumi – Mafdal[*]			9			
Ihud Leumi	4			4		
Israel Labor Party					15	
Israel's Left						5
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List) [*]						13
Kadima			29	28	2	
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon						10
Labor Under Ehud Barak				13		
Labor-Meimad		19	19			
Likud	19	38	12	27	31	30
Meretz	10		5		6	
Meretz-Democratic Choice-Shahar[*]		6				
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	2	3	3	3	3	
National Religious Party	5	6				
New Movement - Meretz[*]				3		
One Israel	26					
Ra'am-Ta'al			4	4		
Shas	17	11	12	11	11	7
Shinui	6	15				
United Arab List - Arab Movement for Renewal[*]					4	
United Arab List	5	2				
United Torah Judaism (Yahadut Hatorah)	5	5	6	5	7	6
Yesh Atid					19	11
Yisrael Be`aliyah	6	2				
Yisrael Beitenu	4		11	15		6
Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni						24

[*] These parties have formed a joint and won the seats as one party.

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

Table 16 Power Index of the Ruling Dominant Party in the Knesset

Knesset	Parliamentary Group	Year	Banzhaf Power Index of Dominant Party
15	One Israel	1999	0.56854
16	Likud	2003	0.7793
17	Kadima	2006	0.62012
18	Kadima	2009	0.50537
19	Likud Yisrael Beitenu	2013	0.64697
20	Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister	2015	0.58008

After combining all the governments together, Figure 1 shows the comparison of the Power Index for all governments from the year 1999 to 2015. This graph is a graphical summary illustration to all the analysis provided before concerning Banzhaf Power Index.

Figure 1 Power Index of Dominant Party

The index went through three phases. The first is an incline after the year 1999. The second is a decline after the year 2001. Then, the third is another incline after the year 2009. After combining all the governments together, Figure 1 shows the comparison of the Power Index for all governments from the year 1999 to 2015. This graph is a graphical summary illustration to all the analysis provided before concerning Banzhaf Power Index.

Figure 1).

Figure 2 Number of Days in Power

Source: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017)

When studying the duration of governments in power, it is noticed that the duration has slightly increased over the years from 1999 to 2003. Then, it has extremely increased in years between 2003 and 2009, fluctuating from very short to very long duration cabinets. After the year 2009, the duration has dramatically dropped, but still in the high levels (see Figure 2).

Figure 3 Government's Parties Number of Seats in Knesset

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

In Figure 3, coalitions' size slightly decreased from the year 1999 to the year 2001, and afterward it has witnessed a noticeable increase till the year 2009. After the year 2009, the number of seats decreased, but still above the lower level reached in the year 2001. It can be noticed that coalitions were variating in their size formations between small and very large sized formations. They appeared to have shifted from mainly large sized formations (70 seats) in 1999 too small sized formations (53-59 seats) between years 2001 and 2006. Then, they shifted to large and very large sized formations (61-98 seats) between the years 2006 and 2015.

Internal and External political events present a pressure on the structural variation during coalition formation. Therefore, variables that play an important role in the destiny of the coalition such as the annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, the annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product, the annual percentage of immigrants relative to population, the annual percentage of unemployment, the annual percentage of strikers per strikes, United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic growth are presented below.

Figure 4 Annual U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (Millions of Dollars)

Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c)

U.S. Foreign aids to Israel amounted between 2 and 4 billion U.S. dollars annually (Figure 4). It is been noticed from the figure above that the main purposes of the U.S. Foreign aid to Israel are for military uses. While the aid for Economic purposes has dramatically declined from the year 1999 to totally stop after the year 2007, the aid for resettlement purposes remained constant over the whole period. Table 17 shows these break down more precisely.

Table 17 The Breakdown of the U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (Millions of Dollars)

Year	Military^	Economic*	Refugee Resettlement°	ASHA**	All Other†	Total
1999	1,860.00	1,080.00	70			$3,010.00
2000	3,120.00	949.1	60	2.8		$4,132.00
2001	1,975.60	838.2	60	2.3		$2,876.10
2002	2,040.00	720	60	2.7	28	$2,850.70
2003	3,086.40	596.1	59.6	3.1		$3,745.20
2004	2,147.30	477.2	49.7	3.2	9.9	$2,687.30
2005	2,202.20	357	50	3		$2,612.20
2006	2,257.00	237	40		0.5	$2,534.50
2007	2,340.00	120	40	3	0.2	$2,503.20
2008	2,380.00		40	3.9		$2,423.90
2009	2,550.00		30	3.9		$2,583.90
2010	2,775.00		25	3.8		$2,803.80
2011	3,000.00		25	4.2		$3,029.20
2012	3,075.00		20	3		$3,098.00
2013	3,100.00		15			$3,115.00
2014	3,100.00		15			$3,115.00
2015	3,100.00		10			$3,110.00
2016	3,100.00		10			$3,110.00

Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c)

^ Military aid: 1959-1973 (Loans); 1974-1984 (Loans & Grants); 1984-Present (Grants)

* Economic aid is a combination of grants and loans. Israel stopped receiving economic aid of any sort in 2007

° Refugee resettlement aid is earmarked for the Jewish Agency/United Israel Appeal to help transport and resettle immigrants in Israel. It was primarily used to help Soviet immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s. Today it is used for Ethiopian immigrants.

** This is funding allocated to American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA)

† Includes Food for Peace (loans & grants); Export-Import Bank aid; Housing Loans; Cooperative Development aid; and, others.

Includes $1.92 billion in regular military assistance and $1.2 billion for implementation of the Wye Agreement.

Table 18 Strikes and Lock-outs, Strikers and Persons Locked-out, Work Days Lost and Slow-downs

Year	Participants in slow-downs	Slow-downs	Work days lost	Strikers and persons locked-out	Strikes and lockouts
1999	72,437	34	1,640,891	292,583	66
2000	73,621	56	2,011,263	297,882	54
2001	287,401	58	2,039,974	426,560	62
2002	158,590	34	1,488,120	1,647,810	47
2003	562,877	64	2,725,159	1,258,904	60
2004	199,673	55	1,224,423	722,875	49
2005	125,270	44	244,236	103,666	57
2006	187,465	40	136,189	125,730	35
2007	562,126	37	2,548,627	386,075	30
2008	47,205	31	87,151	19,275	14
2009	27,567	18	208,691	50,866	15
2010	57,564	13	168,864	35,844	24
2011	30,778	12	556,748	290,820	25
2012	222,708	17	462,960	168,950	24
2013	42,998	28	52,274	21,730	25
2014	62,900	25	103,553	38,808	26
2015	20,055	23	167,353	29,891	38

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

The number of strikers per strike in Israel is considered one of the major indicators with a potential to disrupt and threaten governments' longevity. Major strikes occurred mainly before the year 2006. After that year, strikes were shy (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 Annual Strikers Per Strike

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

The severity of external conflicts shows that Israel continued to exist in an environment of conflict and confrontation. Several conflicts have been witnessed during the 1999 – present period. The major events concentrated around the second intifada, the second Lebanon war, and for its first time, the tension of relations between Turkey and Israel after the latter killed Turkish activists. Figure 6 shows that the severity of external conflicts reached its maximum and was relatively high during the period 1999 and 2006. This period that witnessed the second intifada with around 1,100 casualties and the Lebanon war with 164 casualties.

Table 19 External Conflicts and Their Severity

Major Events	Year	Casualty	Fatality	Skirmishes/ Attacks	U.N. Resolution	Severity
Second Intifada	2000	1,100		1	1	2
	2001			3	1	4
	2002			4	2	6
	2003			3	1	4
	2004			2	2	4
	2005			1	1	2
Second Lebanon War	2006	164		4	1	5
	2007	0			1	1
Operation Cast Lead	2008	14		1	0	1
	2009			1	1	2
Turkish pro-Palestinian activists killed in clashes	2010	0		1	0	1
	2011	0			0	0

Operation Pillar of Defense	2012	6		1	0	1
	2013	0			1	1
Operation Protective Edge	2014	73		2	0	2
	2015	0			1	1
	2016	0			1	1

Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b)

Figure 6 Severity of External Conflicts Confronted by Israeli Governments

Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b), (BBC, 2017)

Noticeable increase in the annual change in Israel's GDP occurred in the year 2000 which it reached 8.13% from 3.42%. Then, it dramatically dropped to 0.09% and -0.19 % in years 2001 and 2002 respectively. Since the year 2003 onwards, the consecutive Israeli governments have succeeded to maintain the change in the GDP between 1% and 5% (see Figure 7).

Israel's annual unemployment rate slightly increased from the year 1999 to reach its maximum in the year 2003 scoring 10.71% and year 2004 scoring 10.37%. These two years are considered the second and third years that these rates reached to such levels since the creation of Israel. Then, the unemployment rate slightly decreased over time to reach its lower rate in the history of Israel of 5.24% in the year 2015 (see Figure 8).

Figure 7 Annual Change in Israeli GDP

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

Figure 8 Unemployment rate Total, % of labor force, 1999 – 2015

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the annual number of immigrants per population, and the approximate number of immigrants during governments' time in power, respectively. This means that the more the number of immigrants to Israel, the more the people are satisfied with the performance of the government ruling in that year. Thus, this will encourage immigrants to immigrate to Israel. Both figures show a dramatic decrease in the number of immigrants from the year 1999 to the year 2008. Afterward, the rate was constant over the rest of the period in both figures.

Figure 9 Annual Immigration and Immigration per Population Rate by Israeli Governments

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

Figure 10 Approximate Number of Immigrants by Israeli Governments

Source: (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017)

4.1.2 Regression Analysis

Table 20 OLS Regression Analysis of Number of Coalition's Seats (n= 6)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	1.000[a]	1.000	.	.

a. Predictors: (Constant), Dominant Party Power Index, GDP change
year to year, Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population,
Severity of Conflict, Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike, Foreign Aid

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1285.714	6	214.286	.	.[b]
	Residual	.000	0	.		
	Total	1285.714	6			

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Coalition Seats in the Knesset

b. Predictors: (Constant), Dominant Party Power Index, GDP change year to year, Log of Number
of Immigrants as Percent of Population, Severity of Conflict, Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike,
Foreign Aid

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-2.808	.000		.	.
	GDP change year to year	752.088	.000	.807	.	.
	Foreign Aid	-.031	.000	-.819	.	.
	Severity of Conflict	-4.571	.000	-.685	.	.
	Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population	-21.632	.000	-.423	.	.

Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike	38.410	.000	1.333	.	.
Dominant Party Power Index	-41.752	.000	-.248	.	.

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Coalition Seats in the Knesset

After applying the regression analysis on the six governments from 1999 – 2015, it is clear that there is a problem with the results due to the six independent variables and a small range of data. This is explained by the degree of freedom. In order to avoid this, the researcher has included all the data related to all the governments of Israel from 1949 – 2015.

Table 21 OLS Regression Analysis of Number of Coalition's Seats (n= 33)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.590[a]	.348	.203	12.87811

a. Predictors: (Constant), Dominant Party Power Index, Severity of Conflict, GDP change year to year, Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population, Foreign Aid, Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2388.785	6	398.131	2.401	.055[b]
	Residual	4477.832	27	165.846		
	Total	6866.618	33			

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Coalition Seats in the Knesset

b. Predictors: (Constant), Dominant Party Power Index, Severity of Conflict, GDP change year to year, Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population, Foreign Aid, Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	33.529	32.790		1.023	.316
	GDP change year to year	-17.134	68.316	-.045	-.251	.804
	Foreign Aid	-.003	.002	-.362	-1.591	.123
	Severity of Conflict	1.552	2.186	.134	.710	.484
	Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population	-19.694	6.427	-.668	-3.064	.005
	Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike	-5.415	7.127	-.237	-.760	.454
	Dominant Party Power Index	24.967	25.417	.252	.982	.335

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Coalition Seats in the Knesset

In short, the quantitative study based on a multiple linear regression model did not yield the expected results due to a relatively large sample size pitted against a small sample. This is explained by the degree of freedom. Taking into account data from 1945 until present also failed to yield to desired results. For this reason, the results of the overall research will be derived from the qualitative case study. Nevertheless, the quantitative model was not discarded for future references while conducting similar studies for different governments.

4.2 Changes in Israeli party formation

Several parties during the mentioned years under study have witnessed political conflicts between the members of the same party causing some members to leave it and form another one. For example, in the year 1999, Gesher left One Israel and the New Way joined. One Israel changed its name to Labor-Meimad. In the same Knesset round, two members of the Yisrael Be'aliyah left the party to form the Democratic Choice party. Also, two Knesset members left the United Arab List party to establish the National Arab Party, and one left from the same party to establish the National Unity - National Progressive Alliance party. Right Israel party was formed by a previous member of Moledet party.

In early 2005, United Torah Judaism split into Agudat Yisrael and Degel Hatorah, and the Renewed National Religious Zionism split from the National Religious Party. In mid-year

2005, Labor-Meimad changed its name to Labor-Meimad-Am Ehad after Am Ehad has joined it. Also, Meretz-Democratic Choice-Shahar changed its name to Yahad and the Democratic Choice. In addition, Joseph Paritzky, a member of the Knesset, left Shinui to form the Zionism Liberalism Equality party. Moreover, Kadima split from the Likud in late 2005.

In early 2006, Yisrael Beitenu left from the Ichud Leumi-Yisrael Beitenu-Moledet-Tekuma party to be changed into Ichud Leumi-Moledet-Tekuma. Also, the Secular Faction split from Shinui, and Habayit Haleumi split from the Secular Faction. After the Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta-al) split, the name was changed to Hadash.

In early 2011, the Labor under Ehud Barak parliamentary group divided into two separate groups: Haatzma'ut and the Israel Labor Party (Labor). Lately, in 2012, two Knesset members split from Ichud Leumi to form the Otzma Leyisrael faction party, seven Knesset members split from Kadima to form Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni, and Talab El-Sana, a Knesset member, left Ra'am-Ta'al to form the Arab Democratic Party.

4.3 Short and Long Duration Coalitions: Qualitative Analysis

In this section, a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. After going over the duration days of the coalitions from 1999 till 2015, it seems there are no short lived coalitions. This means the researcher is focusing on analyzing only the long lived coalitions. The longest is the 32nd government with 1448 days, and the shortest is the 28th government with 610 days. Netanyahu's recent government is still surviving with more than 670 days.

Explanatory variables examined include economics, immigration, and external pressure and structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition's size, and the coalition ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the long durability of the governments.

Table 22 Longest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions 1999-2015 (in days)

Knesset	Government	Begins	Ends	Prime Minister	Duration
15	28th	7/6/1999	3/7/2001	Ehud Barak	610
15	29th	3/7/2001	2/28/2003	Ariel Sharon	723
16	30th	2/28/2003	5/4/2006	Ariel Sharon/Ehud Olmert	1161
17	31st	5/4/2006	3/31/2009	Ehud Olmert	1062
18	32nd	3/31/2009	3/18/2013	Binyamin Netanyahu	1448
19	33rd	3/18/2013	5/14/2015	Binyamin Netanyahu	787
20	34th	5/14/2015	Present	Binyamin Netanyahu	668

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.3.1 The 28th Israeli Government

Table 23 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Fifteenth Knesset

Name of List	Number of Seats in 15th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
One Israel	26	0
Likud	19	21
Shas	17	17
Meretz	10	10

Yisrael Be`Aliyah	6	4
Shinui	6	6
Center Party	6	3
National Religious Party	5	5
Yahadut Hatorah	5	5
United Arab List	5	2
Ihud Leumi	4	0
Yisrael Beitenu	4	0
Hadash	3	3
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	2	1
Am Ehad	2	2
Labor-Meimad	0	25
Ihud Leumi-Yisrael Beteinu	0	7
Gesher	0	2
Democratic Choice	0	2
National Arab Party	0	2
Arab Movement for Renewal	0	1
Herut - National Movement	0	1
National Unity - National Progressive Alliance	0	1

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.3.2 The 29th Israeli Government

See Table 23.

4.4.3 The 30th Israeli Government

Table 24 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Sixteenth Knesset

Name of List	Number of Seats in the 16th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
Likud	38	27
Labor-Meimad	19	21
Shinui	15	2
Shas	11	11
HaIchud HaLeumi	7	4
Meretz-Democratic Choice-Shahar	6	6
National Religious Party	6	4
United Torah Judaism	5	0
Hadash-Ta'al	3	2
Am Ehad	3	0

Balad	3	3
Yisrael Be'aliyah	2	0
United Arab List	2	2
Agudat Yisrael	0	3
Degel Hatorah	0	2
Renewed National Religious Zionism	0	2
Zionism Liberalism Equality	0	1
Kadima	0	14
Secular Faction	0	9
Yisrael Beitenu	0	4
Habayit Haleumi	0	2
Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta-al)	0	1

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.4.4 The 31st Israeli Government

Table 25 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Seventeenth Knesset

Name of List	Number of Seats in the 17th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
Kadima	29	29
Labor-Meimad	19	0
Shas	12	12
Likud	12	12
Yisrael Beitenu	11	11
Ichud Leumi - Mafdal	9	0
Gil Pensioners Party	7	6
United Torah Judaism	6	0
Meretz	5	5
Ra'am-Ta'al	4	4
Hadash	3	3
Balad	3	3
Justice for the Elderly	0	0
The Right Way	0	1
Labor Under Ehud Barak	0	18
Meimad	0	1
Agudat Yisrael	0	3
Degel Hatorah	0	3
Habayit Hayehudi - Mafdal and Ichud Leumi	0	0
Habayit Hayehudi - Mafdal	0	5

Achi	0	2
Moledet - Ichud Leumi	0	2

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.4.5 The 32nd Israeli Government

Table 26 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Eighteenth Knesset

Name of List	Number of Seats in the 18th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
Kadima	28	21
Likud	27	27
Yisrael Beitenu	15	15
Labor Under Ehud Barak	13	0
Shas	11	10
United Torah Judaism	5	5
Ra'am-Ta'al	4	3
Ichud Leumi	4	2
Hadash	4	4
New Movement - Meretz	3	3
Habayit Hayehudi	3	3
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	3	3
Haatzma'ut	0	5
Labor[1]	0	8
Otzma Leyisrael	0	2
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni	0	7
Arab Democratic Party	0	1
Single MK - Chaim Amsellem	0	1

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.4.6 The 33rd Israeli Government

Table 27 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Nineteenth Knesset

Name of List	Number of Seats in the 19th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
Likud Yisrael Beitenu	31	0
Yesh Atid	19	19
Israel Labor Party	15	15
Habayit Hayehudi	12	12
Shas	11	11

United Torah Judaism	7	7
Hatenua Chaired by Tzipi Livni	6	6
Meretz	6	6
United Arab List - Arab Movement for Renewal	4	0
Hadash	4	4
National Democratic Assembly (Balad)	3	3
Kadima	2	2
Likud - National Liberal Movement	0	18
Yisrael Beitenu	0	13
United Arab List	0	3
Arab Movement for Renewal	0	1

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

4.4.7 The 34th Israeli Government

Table 28 Political Parties' Distribution of Seats in the Twentieth Knesset

Parliamentary Group	Number of Seats in the 20th Knesset	Number of Seats Before Next Elections
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister	30	30
Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni	24	24
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)	13	13
Yesh Atid Chaired by Yair Lapid	11	11
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon	10	10
Habayit Hayehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett	8	8
Shas	7	7
Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman	6	6
United Torah Judaism	6	6
Israel's Left	5	5

Source: (Knesset, 2017)

The researcher illustrated the coalition size and ideology. The size was determined based on the number of seats presented in the Knesset as shown in Table 23, Table 24,Table 25Table 26Table 27Table 28. The size is considered either large or small. The coalition is considered relatively small when it has a minimum number of seats in the Knesset, and the

researcher is going to use the term minimum winning coalition (MWC) to refer for the small coalition. On the other hand, a large coalition (LWC) refers to coalitions that exceed the minimum winning ones. The 28th, 29th, 31st and 32nd Governments were considered large coalition governments, while the 30th and 33rd governments are considered minimum winning coalitions.

Summing up, these groups of governments have shown a better performance and lived longer compared to the governments before 1995. The management of the economic situation by these governments is overall successful as these government succeeded to lower the inflation rate, the unemployment rate and the number of strikes. In a political point of view, the power index of dominant party varied among the various coalitions scoring its lowest value in the 32 government in 2009 and it is the highest with the 30th government in 2001. Moreover, this period 1999-present has witnessed changes and conflicts inside the parties causing the formation of new parties and the deterioration of others. Furthermore, Israel has witnessed lower severity of external conflicts. More details and analysis are provided in the next chapter.

Chapter five

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, the researcher discusses the effectiveness of seven Israeli government performances along with their duration. Generally, these groups of governments, especially after 2005, have shown a better performance and lived longer compared to the governments before 1995. In principle, these governments are considered long lived coalition with the shortest relating to Barak's 28th government with a duration of 659 days, and the longest is Netanyahu's 32nd government with 1,448 days. The management of the economic situation by these governments is overall successful as these government succeeded to lower the inflation rate, the unemployment rate and the number of strikes.

On the other hand, these governments enhanced the GDP, the balance of trade and the balance of the budget. These governments also succeeded to receive an increase in the US foreign aid to Israel. Unfortunately, the government policies and programs have not encouraged more immigrants to Israel as the rate of immigrants per one thousand resident decreased from 13 in 1999 to 3.3 in 2015.

In a political point of view, it is concluded that there is a positive relationship between the duration of government party's number of seat in Knesset; the more the number of seats the government has, the longer this government lived. In addition, the power index of dominant party varied among the various coalitions scoring its lowest value in the 32 government in 2009 and it is the highest with the 30th government in 2001. Moreover, this period 1999-present has witnessed changes and conflicts inside the parties causing the formation of new parties and the deterioration of others.

Furthermore, Israel has witnessed lower severity of external conflicts during this period except for 2002 and 2006. Hereunder, the details of the economic, politic and immigration situations of these governments are explained.

In this section, a summarized analysis is being demonstrated that covers all the variables proposed for the study. This provides a structured comparison between the governments,

and illustrates the reasons behind the results provided before in the previous chapter. To make it easy to understand, the researcher has covered for every government its performance in relation to the economy, immigration and politics.

5.1 The 28th Israeli Government

The 28th government was formed on July 6th, 1999 under the 15th Knesset rule and headed by Ehud Barak with 18 ministers and it lasted for 610 days where it has resigned on March 7th, 2001. The government coalition contained 7 parties which are: one Israel with the majority of the seats in the Knesset, Shas, Meretz, Center Party, Mafdal, Yahadut Hatorah, and Yisrael B'Aliya. It is important to mention that the second major party in the Knesset based on a number of seats, the Likud party with 90 seats has not participated in the government. The government was forced to resign due to security reasons accompanied by the second Intifada (Knesset, 2017).

Economy

The basic guidelines of this government were to fight against terrorism and to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the objectives is to lower unemployment by creating job opportunities, reducing social gaps and improving living conditions. In addition, one of its objectives is to promote immigrations to Israel. The government adopted stable growth programs that integrated with international economies in order to improve the standard of living along with the advancement of science and technology (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

From its program as well, the government tried to improve public health, employment, and housing conditions with paying attention to the elderly, retirees, handicapped and single parent families (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

For the 28th government, the GDP scored 586,427 million Israeli New Shekel (NIS) (162,271 million dollars) in 1999 and increased to 638,900 million NIS (176,791 million dollars) in the year 2001. The unemployment rate was 8.88% in the year 1999 and increased to 9.35% in the year 2001 and it is obvious because of the beginning of second Intifada in 2000. During the whole period of this government 182 strikes occurred, which

account for around one million strikers for the whole period (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded deficit in the balance of payments, this deficit has increased from -1,558 million dollars in the year 1999 to -1,775 million dollars in 2001, in other words, increase about 40%. The balance of trade for the same period also was negative its scored in the year 1999 -2,848 million dollars and increased to -2,982 million dollars in 2001, which is an increase of about 5% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 1999 was 5.3 %, which decreased to 1.1% in the year 2001 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

The government conducted tax policy that is generally higher than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The tax to GDP ratio scored 34.8% in the year 2000 which is higher than the OECD's ratio (34%). This ratio has decreased in 2001 by only 0.1% (34%) but it was still higher than the OCEDs ratio (33.5%) (OECD, 2016).

There is no data available for the parliamentary questions to this government in the Knesset.

Immigration

The government aimed to promote immigration through continues dialogue and cooperation with immigrants. The government works to integrate immigrant's scientists and academics into Israel, integrate immigrants into the education system, guarantee their right and obligations, integrate them into the government and civil service and support them by all other means (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

An estimate of 180,000 immigrants entered the country between 1999 and 2001. The majority was from the former Soviet Union around 151,000 immigrant and the rest come from U.S.A., Canada, France, United Kingdom (U.K.), Argentina, South Africa and Ethiopia. The second origin of immigration after the former Soviet Unions are from Ethiopia with a total number 7,700 immigrants (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

<u>Politics</u>

From the guidelines of this government is to strengthen the defense forces of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), and that was clear by the success of increasing the military foreign aid from 1,860 million dollars in 1999 to 3,120 million dollars in 2001 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c). One of its objectives also is to extend negotiations with the Palestinian part. The government considers Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian authorities as an essential partner to achieve peace in the region so, its objective is to maintain the relationship with these countries (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

In mid-2000, the U.S. president Bill Clinton invited the Israeli Prime Minister Barak and the Palestinian authority chairman Arafat for peace negotiations at Camp David. The negotiation concluded without any agreement. In the late year 2000 Ariel Sharon, the head of the Likud party, has visited temple mount. An incident which caused the second intifada since this place considered holy for Palestinians (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

The Intifada came as a response to Sharon's visit with his soldiers, where the Palestinians tried to prevent them from entering their holy Mosques there were around 1,500 protester and 1,500 police soldiers against them. The violent actions from the Palestinian side were restricted by stone throwing. The demonstrations extended over the following days and weeks these demonstration has caused 100 Israeli were deaths and more than 500 Palestine's deaths. In May 2001, there were unsuccessful efforts to cease fire between the two parties (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

5.2 The 29th Israeli Government

The 29th government was formed on March 7th, 2001 under the 15th Knesset rule and headed by Ariel Sharon with 26 ministers and it lasted for 723 days where it has resigned in February 28th, 2003. The government coalition contained 11 parties which are: one Israel with the majority of the seats in the Knesset, Likud, Shas, Yisrael Be`Aliyah, Center Party, National Religious Party, Yahadut Hatorah, Yisrael Beitenu, Am Ehad, Ihud Leumi-Yisrael Beteinu, and Gesher. This time, in this government, the Likud has participated in

the coalition. In November 2002 the Labor party ministers have resigned from the government (Knesset, 2017).

Economy

The basic guidelines of this government are to ensure national security, achieve peace between Israel and its neighbors, create free economic development and social welfare, fight poverty and unemployment (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

One of the objectives is to develop a free and balanced economy by reducing the gaps and maintaining social justice also, it seeks a stable growth and improving social welfare through setting new policies. One of the other goals is to promote equality between genders this means empowering the role of women in government, academia, labor force and the economy. In addition, the government aims at maintaining lower inflation levels through reducing the expenses and increasing productivity as well as setting suitable monetary policies. The government encourages privatization and builds confidence in the capital market. Of course, its role was to create jobs, limit monopolies and encourage investments (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

For the 29th government, the GDP scored 638,900 million NIS (176,791 million dollars) in 2001 and increased to 644,787 Million NIS (178,420 million dollars) in the year 2003. The unemployment rate was 9.53% in the year 2001 and increased to 10.71% in the year 2003 is the highest unemployment rate in the Israeli history the second intifada continues and clearly would have affected negatively the economic situation (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

During the whole period of this government 169 strikes occurred, which account for around three million strikers for the whole period. The number of strikes was approximately constant. The average annual strikers per strike has reached its maximum in 2003 scoring 20,981.73 strikers per strike (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded deficit in the balance of payments, this deficit has decreased from -1,775 million dollars in the year 2001 to +968 million dollars in 2003, in other words, decreased about 155%. The balance of trade for the same period also was negative

and scored -2,982 million dollars in the year 2001 and decreased to -833 million dollars in 2003, which is a decrease of about 72% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 2001 was 1.1%, which decreased to 0.7% in the year 2001 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

The government objective concerning tax reform plans is to reduce tax rates and expand the tax base. This was translated practically through the following numbers. The government continues with its tax policy with higher tax to GDP ratio (34.7% in 2001, 33.9% in 2002, and 33.3% in 2003) than the OECD's (33.5%, 33.2%, and 33.2% respectively). Generally, it is lower than the previous government policy. The government performed better than the previous government in this issue (OECD, 2016).

There is no data available for the parliamentary questions to this government in the Knesset.

Immigration

This government also continues to increase immigration to Israel through creating suitable social and economic conditions and supporting them with all types of means (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

The government aims to promote immigration through continues dialogue and cooperation with immigrants. The government works to integrate immigrant's scientists and academics into Israel, integrate immigrants into the education system, guarantee their right and obligations, integrate them into the government and civil service and support them by all other means (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

An estimate of 100,000 immigrants entered the country between 2001 and 2003. The majority was from the former Soviet Union around 64,000 immigrant and the rest come from USA, Canada, France, U.K., Argentina, South Africa and Ethiopia. The second origin of immigration after the former Soviet Unions are from Ethiopia with a total number 9,000 immigrants (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

Politics

The main objective of this government is to maintain Israel's security and promote regional stability through fighting against terrorism. The government's agenda is to request agreements with the Palestinian authorities to maintain peace. Also, it requested from the Lebanese government to enter peace negotiations with Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

From the guidelines of this government is to strengthen the defense forces of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), and that was clear by the success of increasing the military foreign aid to reach 7,100 million dollars during the period 2001-2003 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c).

In March 27th, 2002, the Prime Minister Sharon gave his orders to start "Defensive Shield" operation to limit the Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets. The military operation targeted several cities in the west bank and Gaza Strip requiring the call up for more than 20,000 reserve Israeli soldiers. According to Israeli officials, seventy percent of the Palestinian attacks on the Israeli targets were dropped. The second Intifada continued during this government (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

5.3 The 30th Israeli Government

The 30th government was formed in February 28th, 2003 under the 16th Knesset rule and headed by Ariel Sharon with 23 ministers and it lasted for 1,161 days where it has resigned on May 4th, 2006. The government coalition contained 4 parties which are: Likud, Shinui, Ichud Leumi, and the National Religious Party. This government was led by two ministers the first is Sharon and when he had the cerebrovascular incident Ehud Olmert was asked to lead the government (Knesset, 2017).

Economy

This guideline of this government do not differ from the previous government as the objectives are to develop a free and balanced economy by reducing the gaps and maintaining social justice also, it seeks a stable growth and improving social welfare

through setting new policies. One of the other goals is to promote equality between genders this means empowering the role of women in government, academia, labor force and the economy. In addition, the government aims at maintaining lower inflation levels through reducing the expenses and increasing productivity as well as setting suitable monetary policies. The government encourages privatization and builds confidence in the capital market. Of course, its role was to create jobs, limit monopolies and encourage investments (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

For the 30th government, the GDP scored 644,787 million NIS (178,420 million dollars) in 2003 and increased to 745,720 Million NIS (206,486 million dollars) in the year 2006. The unemployment rate was 10.71% in the year 2003 and decreased to 8.40% in the year 2006 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

During the whole period of this government 201 strikes occurred, which account for around two million strikers for the whole period. The number of strikes was approximately constant (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded a surplus in the balance of payments, this surplus has increased from 968 million dollars in the year 2003 to 7,292 million dollars in 2006, in other words, increased about 654%. The balance of trade for the same period also was negative its scored -833 million dollars in the year 2003 and the government succeeded to turn this deficit into a surplus of 517 million dollars in 2006, which is an increase of about 162% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 2003 was 0.7%, which increased to 2.1% in the year 2006 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

The government objective concerning tax reform plans is to reduce tax rates and expand the tax base. This was translated practically through the following numbers. The government continues with its tax policy with higher tax to GDP ratio (33.3% in 2003, 33.3% in 2004, 33.6% in 2005 and 34.1% in 2006) than the OECD's (33.2%, 33.1%, 33.6% and 33.7% respectively). In 2005 the two ratios have met but later the Israeli tax to

GDP ratio has increased more than the OECD's ratio (OECD, 2016). Generally, it is lower than the previous government tax policy ratios.

Parliamentary questions to the government

The Knesset has addressed a total of 5,109 questions to government ministries with an average of 1,613 questions per year. The questions included 362 urgent questions, 1,288 direct questions and 3,459 regular questions (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

Immigration

This government also continues to increase immigration to Israel through creating suitable social and economic conditions and supporting them with all types of means. The government aims to promote immigration through continues dialogue and cooperation with immigrants. The government works to integrate immigrant's scientists and academics into Israel, integrate immigrants into the education system, guarantee their right and obligations, integrate them into the government and civil service and support them by all other means (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

An estimate of 84,000 immigrants entered the country between 2001 and 2003. The majority was from the former Soviet Union around 32,000 immigrant and the rest come from USA, Canada, France, U.K., Argentina, South Africa and Ethiopia. The second origin of immigration after the former Soviet Unions are from Ethiopia with a total number 14,000 immigrants (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

Politics

The main objective of this government is to maintain Israel's security and promote regional stability through fighting against terrorism. The government's agenda is to request agreements with the Palestinian authorities to maintain peace. Also, it requested from the Lebanese government to enter peace negotiations with Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

From the guidelines of this government is to strengthen the defense forces of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), and that was clear by the success of increasing the

military foreign aid to reach 9,700 million dollars during the period 2003-2006 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c). The Intifada ended in 2005 during this government role (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

5.4 The 31st Israeli Government

The 31st government was formed in May 4th, 2006 under the 17th Knesset rule and headed by Ehud Olmert with 24 ministers and it lasted for 1,062 days where it has resigned in March 31th, 2009. The government coalition contained 5 parties which are: Kadima, Labor-Meimad, Shas, Yisrael Beitenu, and Gil Pensioners Party. It is noticed that the Likud with 12 seats in the Knesset did not participate in the government (Knesset, 2017).

Economy

This government's guidelines differ from the previous governments in a way that it's more specific in its targets. For example, the economic part in the government guideline was classified into three sections: the fiscal policy, the economic policy, and the minimum wage. In the fiscal part, the government has said as of the budgetary year 2007 a rise in the expenditure rate to the growth rate of 1.7 % of the last year budget. It also targeted not to exceed 3% deficit of the budget it sought a stable growing economy, reducing the national debt, avoiding imposing new taxes and reducing social gaps. In addition, the government aimed at reducing an employment rate by around one-third of the current rate (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

While in the economic policy the government tended to implement structural reforms that mean implementing efficient processes on all market and governmental levels. Also, the government aims at decreasing inequality and achieving maximal transparency in the state budget. Concerning minimum wages, the government's objective was to raise the minimum wage to 4,600 NIS (1,000 dollars) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

All these mentioned procedures have helped the government to survive longer; knowing that it is the one of the longest government in the history of Israel so far.

For the 31st government, the GDP scored 745,720 million NIS (206,486 million dollars) in the year 2006 and increased to 827,225 million NIS (230,433 million dollars) in the year 2009. The unemployment rate was 8.4% in the year 2006 and decreased to 7.54% in the year 2009. During this government period and since its start in 2006 the government succeeded to lower the unemployment rate year after year till 2008 which reached 6.1% and after that, in 2009 it increased less than 1 % which is not considered anyways a high index (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

During the whole period of this government 94 strikes occurred, which account for around 582 thousand strikers for the whole period (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded a surplus in the balance of payments, this surplus has increased from 7,292 million dollars in the year 2006 to 8,077 million dollars in 2009, in other words, increased about 11%. The balance of trade for the same period also was 517 million dollars in the year 2006 and the government succeeded to turn it into a surplus of 5,933 million dollars in 2009, which is an increase of about 1048% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 2006 was 2.1%, which increased to 3.3% in the year 2009 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

This government has succeeded after its second year to lower the tax to GDP ratio below the OECD countries. It scored 34.1% in 2006, 34% in 2007, 31.7% in 2008 and 29.7 in 2009. While the OECD's ratio has scored 33.7%, 33.8%, 33.2% and 32.4% in years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively (OECD, 2016).

Parliamentary questions to the government

The Knesset has addressed a total of 3,746 questions to government ministries with an average of 1,322 questions per year. The questions included 284 urgent questions, 1,171 direct questions and 2,291 regular questions (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

<u>Immigration</u>

The government aimed at establishing a dialogue with immigrants from different countries (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

An estimate of 86,858 immigrants entered the country between 2005 and 2009, which has increased compared to the previous government. Generally speaking, these group of governments, especially after 2005, are better performed long lived compare to the governments before 1995 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

An estimate of 65,000 immigrants entered the country between 2006 and 2009. The majority was from the former Soviet Union around 20,000 immigrant and the rest come from USA, Canada, France, U.K., Argentina, South Africa and Ethiopia. The second origin of immigration after the former Soviet Unions are from USA and Canada with a total number 11,000 immigrants (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

<u>Politics</u>

The main objective of this government is to maintain Israel's security and promote regional stability through fighting against terrorism. The government's agenda is to request agreements with the Palestinian authorities to maintain peace (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

From the guidelines of this government is to study the possibility of reducing the security budget as of the year 2007 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The military foreign aid reached to 9,527 million dollars during the period 2006-2009 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c).

This government has witnessed on July 2006 the second war with Lebanon after Hezbollah guerrillas killed 8 of the Israelis defense and abducted to others. The war ended in September 2006. The war resulted in the loss of 121 Israeli soldiers, 600 Hezbollah fighters, and 44 Israeli civilians as well as in the kidnap of two Israeli soldiers, more than 600 injured Israeli soldiers and 1,500 injured Israeli civilians. After nearly 2 years, Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to exchange prisoners where Hezbollah has returned the bodies

of the two kidnapped soldiers, and Israel returned the main leader in Hezbollah with four guerrillas and the remains of 200 Hezbollah fighters (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

Moreover, this government has witnessed another conflict, but this time with Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008. The Israeli defense forces launched Airstrikes against Hamas under the operation which called the operation Cast Lead. The operation came as a reflex of the rocket attacks that Hamas launched against Israel. In order to cease fire, the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has initiated a cease fire agreement that was accepted by the Israeli part and ceased the file in January 2009 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

This operation resulted in the loss of around nine hundred Palestinians from Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Israel announced the loss of 500 fighters from Hamas during the operation. Israel announced the kill of 10 Israelis (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

5.5 The 32nd Israeli Government

The 32nd government was formed in March 31st, 2009 under the 18th Knesset rule and headed by Benyamin Netanyahu with 30 ministers and it lasted for 1,448 days where it has resigned in March 18th, 2013. The government coalition contained 6 parties which are: Likud, Kadima, Labor under Ehud Barak, Yisrael Beitenu, Shas, and Habayit Hayehudi (Knesset, 2017).

Economy

This government lacks the structure in its guidelines as it only mentioned bulletins of its suggested plan for the period. The guidelines covered briefly that it will deal with the economic crisis by boosting sustainable growth and creating jobs (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

For the 32nd government, the GDP scored 827,225 million NIS (230,433 million dollars) in 2009 and increased to 981,269 million NIS (273,344 million dollars) in the year 2013. The unemployment rate was 7.54% in the year 2009 and decreased to 6.21% in the year 2009 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

During the whole period of this government 113 strikes occurred, which account for around 570 thousand strikers for the whole period. The number of strikes was approximately constant (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded a surplus in the balance of payments, this surplus has increased from 8,077 million dollars in the year 2009 to 9,831 million dollars in 2013, in other words, increased about 22%. The balance of trade for the same period also was 5,933 million dollars in the year 2009 and the government succeeded to turn it into a surplus of 6,625 million dollars in 2009, which is an increase of about 12% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 2009 was 3.3 %, which decreased to 1.5% in the year 2013 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

This government maintained the tax to GDP ratio lower than the OECD's level. the ratio scored 29.7%, 30.5%, 30.8%, 29.7% and 30.7% in years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. While, the OECD's tax to GDP ratio scored 32.4% in the year 2009, 32.6% in The year 2010, 33 % in The year 2011, 33.4% in the year 2012 and 33.8 % in The year 2013 (OECD, 2016).

Parliamentary questions to the government

The Knesset has addressed a total of 4,197 questions to government ministries with an average of 1,049 questions per year. The questions included 444 urgent questions, 2,042 direct questions and 1,711 regular questions (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

Immigration

The government listed immigration in its priorities and aimed at increasing immigration to Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The government actually succeeded to increase the number of immigrants in accordance with the previous government the number of immigrants has increased 6 thousand in the period from 2006 to 2009 to 81,544 immigrants from period 2009 to 2013. The majority comes from the former Soviet Union of about 36 thousand immigrants. The second is from USA and Canada of 14 thousand and

third from France of 10 thousand immigrants. This time Ethiopia has decreased to the fourth place with 8 thousand immigrants (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

Politics

Israel continues to seek security and social justice as well as peace with its neighbors (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). During the role of this government, the Israeli defense forces have launched the operation pillar of defense as a reflex to the rocket fired by Hamas in Gaza the operation was launched in November 2012. The operation resulted in the loss of six Israelis by Palestinian rockets and the loss of 30 senior Palestinians in Hamas. The number of rockets fired at Israel by the Hamas fighters were 1,506 rockets. The Iron Dome has intercepted only 421 of these rockets (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

From the guidelines of this government is to strengthen the defense forces of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), and that was clear by the success of increasing the military foreign aid to reach 14,500 million during the whole period from 2009 to 2013 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c).

5.6 The 33rd Israeli Government

The 33rd government was formed in March 18st 2013 under the 19th Knesset rule and headed by Benyamin Netanyahu with 22 ministers and it lasted for 787 days where it has resigned on May 14th, 2015. The government coalition contained 4 parties which are: Likud Yisrael Beitenu, Yesh Atid, Habayit Hayehudi, and Hatenua (Knesset, 2017). There are not any guidelines available for this governments.

Economy

For the 33rd government, the GDP scored 981,269 million NIS (273,344 million dollars) in year 2013and increased to 1,037,694 million NIS (289,062 million dollars) in the year 2015. The unemployment rate was 6.21% in the year 2013 and decreased to 5.24% in the year 2015. This is the lowest value in the history of Israel achieved (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

During the whole period of this government, there were only 89 strikes, which account for around 90 thousand strikers for the whole period, and this value is the lowest value in the history of Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The government has yielded a surplus in the balance of payments, this surplus has increased from 9,831 million dollars in the year 2013 to 13,732 million dollars in 2015, in other words, increased about 40%. The balance of trade for the same period also was 6,625 million dollars in the year 2013 and the government succeeded to turn it into a surplus of 9,006 million dollars in 2015, which is an increase of about 36% (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The average inflation years for 2013 was 1.5%, which decreased to -0.6% in the year 2015 (Bank of Israel, 2017).

This government maintained the tax to GDP ratio lower than the OECD's level. The ratio scored 30.7%, 31.2% and 31.4 % in years 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. While, the OECD's tax to GDP ratio scored 33.8 % in the year 2013, 34.2% in the year 2014 and 34.3 % in the year 2015 (OECD, 2016).

Parliamentary questions to the government

The Knesset has addressed a total of 1,792 questions to government ministries with an average of 896 questions per year. The questions included 228 urgent questions, 1,221 direct questions and 343 regular questions (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

Immigration

An estimate of 69,000 immigrants entered the country between 2013 and 2015, which has decreased compared to the previous government (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017a).

Politics

In July 2014, the Israeli defense forces have launched a new operation against Hamas in Gaza strip and was named operation protective edge. The operation launched after the increase of rocket fire from Gaza strip to Israeli regions. The operation lasted until August

2014, and it resulted in the loss of more than nine hundred fighters from Hamas, and the imprisoned of 25. On the Israeli side 64 Israeli defense forces soldiers were killed, 463 Israeli defense forces soldiers were wounded, three Israeli civilians were killed and 83 Israeli civilians were wounded (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

The operation targeted 4,762 Hamas sites, and it destroyed around 32 tunnels full destruction. In return, Hamas has fired at Israel around 3,356 rockets, where 2,303 of these rockets hit Israel, while 578 of these rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017b).

From the guidelines of this government is to strengthen the defense forces of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), and that was clear by the success of increasing the military foreign aid to reach 9,300 million during the whole period from 2013 to 2015 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c).

5.7 The 34th Israeli Government

The 34th government was formed in May 14st 2015 under the 20th Knesset rule and headed by Benyamin Netanyahu with 28 ministers till present. The government coalition contained 6 parties which are: Likud, Kulanu, HaBayit HaYehudi, United Torah Judaism, Yisrael Beitenu and Shas (Knesset, 2017). There are not any guidelines available for this governments. In addition, there are no data available to this date about the economic performance of this government.

The military foreign aid during this government has reached 6,200 million dollars during the period from the year 2015 to 2016 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2017c).

Parliamentary questions to the government

Since the government is still in office to the present time the following numbers cover only from the beginning of the government till February 17th, 2016.

The Knesset has addressed a total of 869 questions to government ministries with an average of 985 questions per year. The questions included 139 urgent questions, 560 direct questions and 170 regular questions (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

5.8 Chapter Summaries

The following chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 2, "Literature Review in Coalition Theories," reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers "event" theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined for their contributions and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. The structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory predicts coalitions' structural formations and durations while taking into consideration important national transformations. It further provides means for examining the "event aging thesis."

Chapter 3, "Methodology" examines two methodological approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies is related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming makes a quantitative examination difficult to verify. An inductive comparative qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions. This chapter discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of case selections, and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

In Chapter 4, the data is quantitatively examined to reveal the relationship between coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel was founded. Multiple linear and robust regression analyses were conducted to show the significance of the model developed in chapter 2. While the model was not found

significant, partly in light of low sample size, trend analysis showed that the dominant party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike also increased over the years. These changes in trends have become apparent since 1969. A qualitative approach is also conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to examine the most evident variables associated with governments' early breakups and terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide comparative evidence as to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred following the 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition's size, and the coalition's ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments. A comparative qualitative analysis of longest duration governments, compared to shortest duration governments is made.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the quantitative and qualitative data analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings appear to support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets and results in short duration coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and external pressures responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 1969 appear to have had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition formations. Supports to our duration hypothesis emerge in the significant negative association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration.

Israel seems to be a nation that seeks to improve its performances on all levels. This was clear through the indicators provided in this chapter and the previous one. From the

guidelines of the governments, it is noticed that the set objectives reflect the interests of the Israeli public, and not the interests of the rulers. This was highlighted by a robust government structure which has improved over the years in order to yield more stable Israeli governments. This study has also shown that electing a Prime Minister simultaneously with the Knesset, a practice adopted in Israel between 1996 and 2001, had little to no effect on the results yielded in this study. Moreover, Israel like any other nation contains the elements of corruption, but it also contains a strict and independent juristic system that prevent or limit such incidents. In addition, the formation of coalitions system in Israel helps in improving the cooperation among all the nations' parties and players, which in return will provide the best benefit to the country.

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Appendix 1

BANZHAF POWER INDEX

The standardized Banzhaf index, normalized Banzhaf index or just Banzhaf index was introduced two decades after Shapley-Shubik index by lawyer John F. Banzhaf in 1965 (Banzhaf 1965). The index calculates voter I's swings like the Shapley-Shubik index.

While the latter one analyzes all possible voter permutations the former index considers each distinct coalition only once thus concentrating on voter combinations. The standardized Banzhaf index value for voter i is obtained by dividing the sum of i's swings (regarding all possible 2^n combinations) by the sum of all voters' all swings hence giving I's proportion of all swings. Formally voter f's standardized Banzhaf index is calculated as

$$\overline{\beta_i} = \frac{\sum_{S \subseteq N}[\vartheta\ (S) - \ \vartheta\ (S \backslash \{i\})]}{\sum_{j \in N} \sum_{S \subseteq N}[\vartheta\ (S) - \ \vartheta\ (S \backslash \{j\})]}$$

The standardized Banzhaf index can be interpreted to give an answer to the question: what is voter i's relative share among all pivotal positions (swings)?

Example:

Consider a three voter weighted voting game where voter A has 50 votes, B 49 votes and C one vote with a quota of 51, i.e. [51; 50, 49, 1]. In order to find the pivotal positions for each voter, we have to analyze all the possible voter combinations. There are always 2^n (n being the number of voters) of them, so in this case, we have 2*2*2=8 possible combinations which are:

Combination	Weight	Status	Critical voters
a	50	Losing	-
ab	99	Winning	a,b
ac	51	Winning	a,c
abc	100	Winning	a
b	49	Losing	-
bc	50	Losing	-
c	1	Losing	-
0	0	Losing	-

First, the winning coalitions which meet the vote threshold have to be found: these are ab, ac, and abc. The critical voters (swings) are found within the winning coalitions by withdrawing a voter and checking whether the remaining coalition is winning. Clearly, in coalition ab both voters are critical, thus both have a swing. In the grand coalition abc the coalition would still remain winning. There are altogether five swings, a has three of them, b and c one swing. Thus, the Banzhaf index scores are a = 3/5, b = 1/5, c = 1/5.

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