Syrian-Lebanese Refugee Hosting Model:
A Compromise between Refugee Rights and Fears of Host Community

By

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The Presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been affecting host communities in different ways. It is true that refugees are suffering from economic, social, health, and legal difficulties; however, one cannot overlook economic and security threats they might pose on Lebanese community. Despite tough circumstances, the Lebanese government did not take any practical steps to organize the presence of Syrian refugees. It only scrutinized hosting policies to discourage mass influx. At a time when repatriation is not an option, this thesis aims to explore hosting models that can accommodate refugees’ needs while exploring the demographic fears of host community. The proposed hosting model is developed based on field research and a comparative case analysis that draws best practices and lessons derived from hosting strategies of Palestinians in Lebanon, and more recently, Syrians in Jordan.

**Keywords:** Syrian Refugees, Palestinian Refugees, Hosting Models, Camps, Displacement, Refugee Policy
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Chapter 1

An Introduction to the Situation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

The second decade of the 21st century has been a burden on humanity. A refugee crisis described as the worst crisis since World War II has emerged. With more than 21 million refugees from different countries, the world has found itself obliged to share the burden of this crisis. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 53% of refugees worldwide came from three countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria. Refugees coming from Syria are on the top of the list. The number of those who are registered with UNHCR was 4.9 million as these lines were written. However, the number of displaced Syrians might be much higher especially that many are still not registered with UNHCR. Looking at UNHCR’s figures, Lebanon is one of the top hosting countries with refugees from Palestine, Syria, and Iraq (Figures at a Glance).

This crisis has severely affected Lebanon, as it hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees per capita. Indeed, in 2015 the number of officially registered Syrian refugees was 1,017,433 million (Syria Regional Refugee Response). However, the Lebanese government believes that the real number surpasses a million and half. Not only many Syrians are not registered, but also “as of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon's instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included” (Syria Regional Refugee Response). To reflect the complexity of refugees’ situation in Lebanon, Amnesty international described that one of every five Lebanese is a Syrian refugee (Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers).

Lebanon has accepted the burden, although it is not a member of United Nations 1951 refugee convention and despite its stagnating economic and social situation, in addition to security fears. Due to its location on the Syrian borders, along with historic and family ties, Lebanon at the beginning of crisis adopted the policy of open borders. However, this ended in 2015 due to economic burdens and social difficulties with host communities. Despite these economic difficulties, the
UNHCR also highlighted that only 52% of the funding needed to provide refugees’ basic requirements was met.

Currently, some refugees are scattered in unofficial camps, or in informal settlements as UNHCR refers to. Others have self-settled in poor areas close to the borders. Despite the humble assistance provided to refugees, host communities not only started viewing them as a threat but also envied them for getting minimal financial assistance.

The economic fears topped a list of issues that worried host communities. According to World Bank, labor supply in Lebanon increased by at least 30% in 2014, pushing thousands of additional Lebanese into poverty (Lebanon - Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict). As demands increased, prices of goods increased along with housing rents, at a time when wages simultaneously decreased. Moreover, with the continuous sectarian war in Syria that might change the map of the Syrian state, Lebanese are afraid that large number of Syrians might not be able to return to Syria; a concern that was also reflected in fear of naturalization.

Additionally, the Lebanese fear that Syrian refugees might initiate political activity similar to the Palestinians in 1960s, threatening the security and sovereignty of Lebanese state is a point of concern for many Lebanese. (Ben et al. 2013).

1.1 Situation of Syrians in Lebanon

All of the previously mentioned points have increased the misery of Syrian refugees who are already suffering from hardship, poverty, and displacement. In several instances, refugees were attacked both physically and verbally. In addition to their deteriorated economic status, they are facing discrimination and had to deal with social resentment.

Although Lebanese fears might be legitimate, they increased the intolerable suffering of refugees. Thus the question is: how can the need of granting the Syrian refugees minimal human rights be balanced with fears and needs of host societies?

To answer this question one should first explore the main types of hosting models that refugees around the world resorted to. Hosting models are usually divided into two main types: an open inclusive system that incorporates refugees in
the general population against a more exclusive system based on grouping the refugees within internments and camps.

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees resorted to both hosting models. However, the camps are still unofficial and are scattered in different Lebanese areas.

The advantages and disadvantages of both models should be studied, in addition to the exploration of when should each model be used and which one could guarantee a minimum of rights to Syrian refugees, keeping in mind the fears of host community.

Thus, this thesis tries to find out what is the best refugee hosting model that can guarantee such a balance, by studying the situation of both Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community. This thesis explores the fears of both groups studying various economic, social, and security variables. It also tries to probe solutions to economic and social impasse.

This is an exploratory study that will address possible solutions. The methodology of this thesis will be guided by exploring hosting methods that can best improve Syrian refugees’ lives, while examining the ways and means to improve relations with host communities. Guiding this inquiry is a constant referral to the experience of Palestinian refugees in different host countries.

The study gathers empirical data from the experiences of refugees and host societies, focusing on the relation between both groups. This exploratory study also focuses on Lebanon’s experience in hosting two different groups of refugees: Palestinians and Syrians. It also includes a comparison with other host countries who have managed refugees’ influx of both groups. In particular, this thesis examines the host models used by the Jordanians while dealing with their Palestinians and Syrian refugees, compared to Lebanon.

The first part of this thesis will study the case of Syrian refugees living in three different Lebanese areas: a Sunni village, a Shiite village and a Christian village. The visit aims at exploring the situation of refugees living in areas with distinct particularities trying to get an overall understanding about the living conditions of Syrian refugees. The study incudes both: refugees living in informal settlements in addition to self-settled Syrian refugees. Also the situation of Lebanese host community in each area will be explored to study the economic and social difficulties confronted in each area.
The researcher was able to proceed with her field study after getting an approval from LAU Institutional Review Board (IRB). The board approved her human research related to Syrian refugees before it was published. This approval assures that research conducted abides by the ethical principles of the Belmont Report along with regulations and guidelines governing research. She also completed NIH online training and got a certificate that confirms her official eligibility to conduct investigations involving human subject.

The second axis of analysis consists of conducting a comparison on two levels: the first between Palestinian and Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon. The second is a cross-country comparison mainly between Lebanon and Jordan examining the Jordanian host model that was applied to both Syrians and Palestinian refugees. This thesis will include research, observations, and case studies in order to come out with possible recommendation for the hosting method of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis used the comparative research method as opposed to the experimental or the statistical methods. In general, research methods aim at scientific explanation, consisting of the establishment of general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while all other variables are held constant (Lijphart 246).

Nevertheless, the comparative method suffers from two interrelated problems: the existence of too many variables, and a small number of cases. The former is common to virtually all social science research regardless of the particular method and renders the problem of handling many variables more difficult to solve (Babbie 282). Therefore, in order to minimize this problem Lijphart suggests several remedies, like increasing the number of cases or focusing on comparable cases, or analyzing a single country diachronically, a “comparison that of the same unit at different times generally offers a better solution to the control problem than comparison of two or more different but similar units” (Lijphart 253). Diachronical studies have more constants and relatively fewer variables than in many cross-national studies. This is expected to narrow the scope of research, yet secure results that are more robust. Additionally, by using both a diachronical study and comparing both the Palestinian refugees crisis to the Syrian one in Lebanon, this thesis also does
a cross-national comparison of how both Jordan and Lebanon reacted to Palestinian and Syrian refugees’ crisis. Thus, this thesis utilizes the two different research approaches, strengthening their benefits and minimizing their weaknesses. (Jouhari 7)

This thesis will utilize main sources (books, articles, and academic journals and articles) that tackled the primary theoretical issues explored therein, in addition to primary and secondary sources for data analysis and comparison.

1.3 Theoretical Approach

Previous literature agrees that there is no single theory that exclusively explains the issue of refugees and how states respond to them. Most of studied cases used a combination of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to explain refugee’s crisis within the scope of international relations.

Based on Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner’s The Limits of International Law, the realist approach places importance on material threat and pressure from stronger states, while explaining the relationship between host states and refugees. Material threats can be either the benefits that a state gains in return of hosting refugees, or the cumulative bargaining power that the host state can achieve on the international arena.

A second strategic position in which states find themselves can be called coercion. One state, or a coalition of states with convergent interests, forces other states to engage in actions that serve the interest of the first state or states. To understand this strategic situation, imagine that a large and powerful state initially can threaten to punish a small and weak state that engages in any action X. The cost of punishing the small state is trivial. The small state then chooses to engage in the action or not, and the large state responds by punishing the small state or not (Goldsmith and Posner 28).

Although, this might be true with some cases, a closer look at the Lebanese situation shows us that realism does not explain the relation between Lebanon and
the refugees it hosts. It is worth mentioning that Lebanon is not a member of United Nations 1951 refugee convention, thus no one can force it to host refugees. Moreover, although international community appreciated how the Lebanese state contained the refugees, this didn’t strengthen the bargaining power of the Lebanese government.

The first answer that comes to one’s mind while asking why Lebanon agreed to host Syrian refugees is definitely the shared Arab identity and common history. Constructivism assures that countries respond to refugees based on shared identity, norms, culture, and beliefs.

According to Karen Jacobsen “many border communities share ethnic and kinship ties, increasing the likelihood that refugees from the other side of the border will be welcomed and assisted” (Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments 669). This particularly explains why Lebanon and Jordan agreed to open their borders to thousands of refugees.

Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett also argued that national identity affects not only responses towards refugees but also most of the regional politics of the Middle East.

Most nationals living in Arab countries in the Middle East view themselves as Arabs in addition to their main nationality. Shared Arab identity means shared language, history, and norms. Moreover, religion also plays a role in hosting refugees. This is obvious in the way Arab refugees settle in Lebanon; for example Christians stay in Christian areas and Muslims in Muslim areas.

Telhami and Barnett also argue that an important trait of an Arab identity is hospitality, especially in the Levant. This explains why, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Lebanese citizens opened their homes to Syrian refugees until the latter found their own way of settlement.

Constructivism does explain why Lebanon hosted refugees at the start of the crisis. However, with economic difficulties and security concerns constructivism fails in explaining why Lebanon continued to welcome and host Syrian refugees. It also doesn’t clarify the reasons why the Lebanese government changed its policies overtime, especially when policy of open borders came to an end in 2015.

Liberalism on the other hand focuses on the role that international state system should play to cooperate with hosting states and help them bear the burden of refugees. It also asserts the role that hosting states should play in persuading other
states to send financial funds through international organization and non-governmental ones.

Emma Haddad is one of the authors who gave importance to the role of international institutions in binding states to a “mutual recognition of sovereignty, the belief in equality of all states, the principle of non-intervention and international law, which are commonly accepted by all states in the system” (Haddad 11). According to her, international institutions play a role in guarding these principles stressing the importance of human rights.

Liberalism in general focuses on the benefits of working together and it’s usually the role of hosting state to persuade richer ones to aid in helping refugees. For example, Lebanon can warn of the possibility of radicalizing the refugees in case their needs were not met, or creating another wave of refugees’ exodus to Europe. Thus, this will affect the whole international security with the role that ISIS is now playing in the West.

Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher explained the importance of cooperation between powerful states and weaker ones (North versus South) in the scope of international refugee regime, by what they called northern financial assistance. They also emphasized the importance of the ability of weaker state to convince powerful ones to provide funds and financial aids (Betts and Loescher 61-74).

For liberals, the UNHCR acts as an organization that propagates human rights, refugees in particular, while providing temporal assistance until the refugees return to their homeland.

With variables ranging between norms, shared identity, international organizations, and economic assistance from powerful state, the study of Syrian refugees’ dilemma in Lebanon, shall be based on an integrated theoretical approach, mixing between solutions provided by liberals and constructivists.

Thus, this thesis will mainly refer to liberal school while studying possible recommendations to be applied by Lebanese state in order to help it deal with the economic and social burden of Syrian refugees on its host communities.

1.4 Literature Review

In addition to the above mentioned sources regarding the theoretical approach, other sources were considered to study the different hosting methods that
revolve around two systems: an open inclusive system that encourages integration and an exclusive system that encourages grouping refugees within camps. In his book *Managing the Undesirables* Michel Agier, divided the hosting models into a chronological order including self-organized refugees, sorting centers, spaces of confinement, and unprotected camps. In their book *Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations*, Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale provided a roadmap for humanitarian organizations to help them manage refugees’ influx in what they called “transitional settlements”. In *The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries*, Karen Jacobsen wrote a detailed study about integration with local community, and the forms of hosting models that could guarantee that.

To study the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, The researcher didn’t only count on previous research. The researcher conducted her own investigation by visiting camps in three different villages in Lebanon, meeting self-settled refugees, and Lebanese from hosting villages. This was complemented with academic articles, reports from UNHCR and other NGOs working with Syrian refugees for the past six years. The researcher also referred to *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: the Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities*, a book that was published in 2016 concerning the issue of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

To study the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan many sources were used. In addition to UNRWA figures and UNHCR reports, the book *Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement* by Rebecca Roberts was the main source for studying Palestinians in Lebanon. Other sources included May Farah’s *Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Worthy Lives in Unworthy Conditions*, Luisa Gandolfo’s *Palestinians in Jordan: The Politics of Identity*, and other statistical studies.

As for the solutions, the researcher concluded and gave recommendations based on comparing the situation of Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon to the Syrians in Lebanon. Circumstances of Syrians in Jordan were also compared to Syrians in Lebanon. Additional sources were used to present practical steps on how to compensate for the local communities if informal settlements remained as they are. Most of consulted literature did not offer a practical hosting model that suits Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Six years have passed since the Syrian crisis first erupted. Many human rights organizations conducted reports about the inhumane situation Syrian refugees have
been living in and how their rights have been abused in host societies. Nevertheless, few studies tackled the underdeveloped nature of these societies along with the security, economic, and social fears that have contributed in the deterioration of refugees’ situation. Even when this issue was tackled, such observation only focused on describing circumstances as they are, without providing a possible long term solution to the impasse, or by studying and suggesting an alternative hosting model that could be applied to Syrians in Lebanon.

1.5 Conclusion

This thesis is organized into five chapters, including this one. The second chapter explores the hosting methods that the international system usually resorts to when dealing with refugee crisis. There are many ways to organize hosting models, most of them are viewed in the concept of whether they hinder integration or encourage it; especially when integration is considered one of the most desirable durable solutions for refugees.

The third chapter is a report on a trip to three Lebanese areas with different religious backgrounds: Al Marj, a Sunni village, Al Haleneyeh, a Shiite village, and Kherbet Kanafar a Christian one. This visit aimed to have a firsthand examination about the situation there: hosting methods of refugees, circumstances they are living in, situation of host community, in addition to the dilemma reflected in refugees suffering and host community fears. The relation was the most hostile in Al Marj, the village which supported the Syrian revolution the most at the beginning of the crisis. On the other hand, locals in Kherbet Kanafar were benefiting from the services provided by refugees, although they complained about their huge number. In al Haleneyeh, it seems that limits were drawn from the beginning.

Chapter four includes a historic background about Palestinian presence in Lebanon, in order to be used later on as a comparison with Syrian refugees’ experience in an attempt to avoid recurrent mistakes. It also includes a cross examination with Jordan that successfully handled the crisis of Palestinian refugees. This research shows that with respect to Palestinian refugee camps, Lebanon was the worst in building, managing, containing and controlling these camps in the region. It also shows that because of Lebanese discriminative rules, Palestinian refugees
neither integrated with the host community nor repatriated to their own home, although 70 years have passed since they first arrived to Lebanon.

Based on above findings, the fifth chapter suggests possible solutions by taking the Palestinian experience into account. The solutions will range from using funds in long term projects to funding investment in refugees. It will also shed the light on each hosting model, and how each could benefit or harm both Lebanon and the Syrian refugees. It concludes with a realistic refugee-hosting model that suits the Syrian refugees and guarantees their rights, taking into consideration the fears of host community, while exploring the practical steps to implement it.
Chapter 2
Hosting Models

As a reporter covering the arrival of Syrian refugees into Wadi Khaled, the researcher was surprised how poor Lebanese villagers opened their homes to welcome refugees, who were illegally crossing the border between Syria and Lebanon at river of Nahr Al Kabir. The area was crowded with refugees; they were huddled in houses, schools, mosques, and any other space that could be turned into a temporary shelter.

At the beginning of the crisis, the Lebanese government searched for and located refugees in public areas, such as small ad-hoc camps, school, and mosques. Locating refugees in public areas like schools is usually the method governments resort to at the beginning of refugee crisis. As for accommodating refugees with families, it has been suggested as a hosting method that reinforces integration between refugees and local communities. These are only two simple examples of a wide range of hosting models that have been discussed by literature related to refugees and how to contain them.

The views advocating host policies and strategies are many and diverse, but two broad theories are most relevant to our inquiry: an open inclusive system that incorporates refugees in the general population, against a more exclusive system based on grouping the refugees within internments and camps.

Camps have become almost synonymous with the refugee experience yet they are surrounded by controversy. Some argue that although undesirable, refugee camps are sometimes the only practical way to assist refugee groups. Others maintain that there are almost always viable alternatives to camps such as self-settlement. Opponents of refugee camps believe that there is evidence that refugee camps are not good for anyone. Research has demonstrated how for social, economic, environmental and health reasons the
consequences of placing refugees in camps are often negative. Others argue that there is little empirical evidence to prove that self-settlement is better for refugees than an organized camp (Roberts 48).

2.1 Forms of Hosting Models

2.1.1 Gatherings in their Chronological Order

Michel Agier, who visited seven camps in different countries in Africa, noticed in his book Managing the Undesirables that refugees nowadays are treated as undesirable populations unlike refugees of 1930s and 1950s. Refugees of present time are kept away from the masses, thus others would not know about their sufferings. He focused on camps as it was the scope of his study. He talked about four major types of gathering spaces.

2.1.1.1 Self-Organized Refuges

This is where refugees find their first refuge, it is considered as sites of rest “where people stop for a while always ready to leave… This form of cross border point with a low visibility from the viewpoint of the UN and humanitarian organizations, has parallels with other forms of gatherings, in particular so-called “self-settled” campsites” (Agier 41). These sites are not controlled by UNHCR.

2.1.1.2 Sorting Centers

They are similar to self-organized refuges in their temporal border location; however, they are under the control of official administrations like ministries of host country, police institutions, UN agencies and NGOs. These places are transit zones where names of refugees are recorded on files and are categorized for the cause of later redistribution.

Whatever the continent on which they are found, these transit spaces are generally associated with practices of selection, expulsion, or admission, and with contexts of “flow management” that imply for those in movement a
more or less prolonged moment of immobility, waiting, and multiple constraints (Agier 47).

2.1.1.3 Spaces of confinement

Known by planned and official refugee camps. They are usually invisible to the masses as they are located in supervised separate locations. They may include less than 2000 individuals and may have as many as 200000 residents as it happened in Goma region in Republic of Congo between 1994 and 1996.

As a general rule, camps are established on virgin land like a sudden and sometimes violent incursion into the local environment. After first being installed in large tents, the refugees go on to construct around these collective tents huts and cabins out of mud-brick and wood, with roofs of thatch or plastified cloths, the material being generally provided by NGOs… At the same time, in a few months or anything up to a year, there is a gradual improvement of dirt roads, systems of water supply, latrines, septic tanks, as well as some public buildings (Agier 55).

2.1.1.4 Unprotected reserves or camps for internally displaced persons.

2.1.2 Grouped Settlements Vis-a-Vis Dispersed Settlements

In their book *Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations*, Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale tried to summarize the different types of hosting methods used in different refugee crises. The authors argue that bad planning of settlements can have a number of negative effects. It could, in a worst case scenario cause the destabilization of whole countries or even entire regions, like what happened in West Africa (Corsellis and Vitale 7).

This book is an attempt to provide a roadmap for human organizations dealing with the issue of refugee influx and how to host refugees in what they called “transitional settlements”.

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The term transitional settlement (TS) has been defined as settlement and shelter resulting from conflict and natural disasters, ranging from emergency response to durable solutions. The word originates from an approach which extends beyond the traditional response, with its limited focus on the provision of planned camps. The new approach considers the wider impacts of settlement and the options for settlement, emphasizing the need for a transition to durable settlement solutions and local development (Corsellis and Vitale 7).

Before dissecting refugees’ hosting models, one should refer to UNHCR emergencies handbook that summarized what all sorts of shelters should provide to refugees in terms of security and safety.

Shelter must, at a minimum, provide protection from the elements, space to live and store belongings, privacy and emotional security. Shelter is likely to be one of the most important determinants of general living conditions and is often one of the largest items of nonrecurring expenditure (Corsellis and Vitale 14).

This is especially important to consider when resorting to camps as hosting model; especially that camps are usually built from scratch and are made specifically to contain refugees. According to Corsellis and Vitale, camps whether self-settled or planned, in addition to collective centers, fall under their category of grouped settlement.

According to the two authors, the other forms of displaced settlements are grouped under dispersed settlements and include: accommodation with host families, rural self-settlement and urban self-settlement.

Throughout their book, the authors showed their preference for the dispersed model arguing that:
Support by the aid community for dispersed settlement can be practical, responsive, effective, and efficient, and compared with grouped settlement it can offer greater developmental benefits to the local population. Dispersed settlements may also pose a lower security risk than grouped settlements, because they do not offer an obvious target for attack (Corsellis and Vitale 69).

2.1.2.1 Grouped Settlements

The authors defined each of their classification. Starting with grouped settlement, Corsellis and Vitale assured that a self-settled camp is when a displaced community may settle in camps, without any assistance from local government or aid community. The refugees usually settle these camps on a public land, after negotiations with the local population. Self-settled camps are usually established before the arrival of aid organizations. Refugees or displaced group choose this option hoping that it will drive external assistance later on (Corsellis and Vitale 115).

In Lebanon one cannot refer to refugees’ gatherings as camps, for they still lack basic services that are usually found in camps. However, many refugees were self-settled in tents at the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Later, they were sponsored by UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations. However, self-settled tents can still be found in Lebanon, especially on the borders between Lebanese Arsal and Syrian Qusayr. Planned camps on the other hand are more organized to meet refugees’ needs.

Places where displaced populations find accommodation on purpose-built sites, and a full services infrastructure is provided, including water supply, food distribution, non-food item distribution, education, and healthcare, usually exclusively for the population of the site… Camps replicate an entire support system (Corsellis and Vitale 124).
In the case of planned camps, it is the responsibility of international community and host government to choose the location of the camp and usually without any rent expenses incurred.

UNHCR consider camps as a last resort. The main reason is that camps do not encourage refugees to depend on themselves, thus it will be difficult for UNHCR and other aid groups to gradually withdraw their assistance (Corsellis and Vitale 124).

The last form of grouped settlements according to Corsellis and Vitale is collective center. Refugees or displaced persons usually settle in pre-existing structures, like “community centers, town halls, gymnasiums, hotels, warehouses, disused factories, and unfinished buildings” (Corsellis and Vitale 105). Usually, these kinds of settlements are used at the beginning and only for a short period of time, until other form of accommodation can be arranged.

2.1.2.2 Dispersed Settlements

As for dispersed groups, they usually encourage integration between refugees and local communities hosting them. To start with, rural self-settlement, according to Corsellis and Vitale starts when displaced people including refugees cross a border, stop at a village, and negotiate on the use of land. They will later use part of this land for agricultural aims.

On the other hand, urban self-settlement is when displaced populations from urban background decide to settle in a town, occupying unclaimed properties or settling informally.

Refugees, who are dispersed with host families, usually live with local families or on a land owned by them. Members of host family might be relatives or complete strangers. The displaced person may stay for free, pay rent, or work for that family in return. Aid organizations might sometimes offer incentives to local families in order to host refugees.

In 2012, UNHCR provided statistics on location of refugees registered with UNHCR and whether they lived in urban areas, rural areas, or a mixed/unknown location. They also provided statistics concerning type of accommodation ranging from planned/managed camp, self-settled camp, collective centre, reception/transit camp, individual accommodation (private), or undefined if the type was unclear.
Surprisingly UNHCR reported that 54% of refugees were living in individual accommodation. One-third of refugees were living in planned/managed refugee camps. Only 6% were living in self-settled camps and 4% in collective centers. UNHCR also reported that planned/managed refugee camps and self-settled camps were mainly found in rural areas, whereas individual accommodation was the prevailing type of residence in urban areas (UNHCR Global Trends 2012).

2.1.3 Integrating the Refugees or Segregating them?

Whether refugees are grouped or dispersed isn’t the only method to differentiate between settlements. Another important factor to consider is whether the method encourages integration with local society or hinders it.

In a paper published by UNHCR, Karen Jacobsen wrote a detailed study about integration with local community. According to *The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries*, Western countries resort to integration, whereas developing or underdeveloped societies avoid this option.

Many host governments, particularly in Africa, permitted refugees to settle amongst the local host community without official assistance – a practice known as self-settlement. However, the legal aspects of local integration, which require that refugees be granted full refugee status, permanent residency and other human and civil rights, were seldom granted by host governments in developing countries (*The Forgotten Solution* 2).

Thus, forms of settlements that guarantee integration promote more rights and promise a greater legal status for refugees, unlike the other forms of settlements that insist on segregating the refugees. Nevertheless, Jacobsen noticed that even when refugees were integrated in developed countries it didn’t mean that their basic legal rights were always met.

Additionally, the author talked about four kinds of settlements: self-settlement, local settlement, fluid settlement and de-facto integration.
2.1.3.1 Self-settlement

As previously discussed, self-settlement happens when refugees settle amongst the local community without any official help. Whereas assisted-settlement is when refugees are often helped by UNHCR, local governments or other NGOs. In rural areas it takes the forms of camps and local settlements, while it takes the form of mass shelters in urban areas. Jacobsen defined camps as:

Purpose-built sites, usually close to the border, and in rural areas. For security reasons, UNHCR encourages camps to be built at least 50km from the border, but even when this regulation is complied with; camps are often in conflict zones. Since camps are intended to be temporary structures, they are seldom planned for long duration or population growth. Dwelling structures are tents or flimsy huts, while water and sanitation infrastructure is problematic, especially over the long term. Camps are administered by UNHCR and host government (The Forgotten Solution 7).

Jacobson and other scholars agree that camps are usually the form preferred by governments, as they facilitate repatriation due to their poor conditions, unlike UNHCR which calls for resorting to camps as the last option.

2.1.3.2 Local settlements

Also known as organized settlements. These are segregated villages created for refugees. Unlike camps, refugees in these types of settlements are expected to depend on themselves over time and become self-sufficient.

Jacobson noticed that “local settlements have been widely used in Africa, especially Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan, as a response to protracted refugee situations and as an alternative to keeping refugees in camps. But local settlements are not necessarily intended to enable local integration, and some suggest they are intended to prevent it” (The Forgotten Solution 7).

This is because refugees in local settlements are denied freedom of movement and are not allowed to leave the area defined by local authorities.
The needs of hosting governments and donors usually play a role in setting the policy of local settlements. The goals might be either repatriation, or agricultural and economic development. In the first case, the needs of refugees will be met by international aid organizations until repatriation happens. In the second case, Jacobson gave the agricultural settlements of Uganda and Tanzania as an example where underutilized areas were developed by refugees.

2.1.3.3 Fluid Settlement

This is when settlements are seen as a fluid process in which refugees use different forms of settlements. For example, those who are self-settled at the beginning of their arrival might be moved to camps as authorities identify and check them. The opposite might also be true where refugees in camps choose to leave the camps and self-settle within local community. A fluid settlement might also mean that a family chooses a camp as a household survival strategy, while male members leave the camps looking for jobs and would return to the camps when there is no job opportunity.

2.1.3.4 De facto Integration

It happens when self-settled refugees become unofficially integrated as time passes. They can usually financially support themselves by finding a job and can have access to education, health facilities, and housing, and then they might also become socially integrated with host community. Nevertheless, their legal status remains illegal and depending on the government they are either seen as guests, or as illegal immigrants.
2.1.4 Schmidt’s Differences between Camps and Settlements

Dr. Anna Schmidt, in an academic research that was published by Forced Migration Organization, had a simpler categorization for refugees’ hosting models. Based on African refugee studies, she highlighted main differences between the camps and settlements. She summarized five parameters that differentiate between the two: the first is the freedom of movement that is restricted in a camp. It is followed by mode of assistance/economics where refugees living in a camp are prohibited from engaging in economic activity. Camps are also distinguished by parameters of control and mode of governance. Refugee camps are also considered as temporally shelters and are usually smaller than settlements, which are considered as a durable solution.

Schmidt clarified that some scholars consider the approach of “assistance forms” while studying the categories of hosting models. Thus, she differentiates between planned and unplanned rural settlements where refugees rely on themselves in one way or another, and camps where refugees are fully assisted.

To summarize the above, the majority of scholars generally discussed the same patterns of hosting models. However, each one used his own classifications to differentiate among them. Corsellis and Vitale divided what they called transitional settlements into two main categories: grouped settlements and dispersed settlements. The first consists of self-settled camps, planned camps, and collective centers. The second lies in accommodation with host families, rural self-settlement, and urban self-settlement.

Karen Jacobsen differentiated between models that promote integration and those that encourage segregation. She divided her hosting models into four categories. Self-settlement takes place when refugees settle amongst the local community without any official help. Assisted-settlement is when refugees are often helped by UNHCR, local governments or other NGOs. They take the form of camps and local settlements in rural areas and the form of mass shelters in urban areas. Fluid settlement is when a refugee moves from one form of settlement into the other. As for Jacobsen’s fourth category, de-facto integration, it happens when time helps refugees to become integrated with local community, however, their legal status remains illegal.
As for Dr. Anna Schmidt, she simply talked about camps and settlements highlighting main differences among them especially what is allowed in a settlement and restricted in a camp and vice-versa.

2.2 Hosting Models in Lebanon

Whether you head north, south, east, or west, you will be surrounded with tents. This is how a trip into different Lebanese villages looks like. The situation hasn’t changed for the last six years. The story is the same, children, women, elderly, and men all living in tents that barely protect them from Lebanese hot summers and freezing and flooding winters.

The scattered tents in different Lebanese areas are neither considered camps nor official settlements. UNHCR and other human aid organizations refer to them as informal settlements; not planned, not self-settled, but informal.

According to a map released by UNHCR on December 2016, the refugee agency divided these informal settlements into two categories: settlements that include more than four tents and settlements that include less than four tents. The map clearly shows that these informal settlements are spread all over Lebanese areas, which hold different political or religious views, regardless of the fact that they are not equally distributed.

The number of informal settlements that include more than four tents is 2244 with 37,290 tents and 212,316 refugees. Baalbek is at the top of the list of this category, it includes 712 informal settlements with 74,383 refugees. Zahleh is second with 592 informal settlement and 69,153 refugees followed by West Bekaa with 206 informal settlement and 25,276 refugees (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon).

The number of informal settlements that include less than four tents is 2136 with 3807 tents and 22,230 refugees. Zahleh tops this category with 483 informal settlements. Whereas each of Baabda and Bcharre include one informal settlement (Equity in Crisis Response).

UNHCR also clarified that 81% of Syrian refugees rent their accommodation, including those who live in tents, with average rent price of 200 USD as monthly payment.
68% of all refugees are estimated to rent apartments, often sharing small basic lodgings with other refugee families in overcrowded conditions. The remaining 32% live in fragile environments such as tents in informal settlements, and sub-standard shelter including garages, worksites and unfinished buildings (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon).

According to UNHCR, as the resources of refugees decrease they find themselves evacuated from the locations that they were paying for. Thus, UNHCR did provide a plan for hosting Syrian refugees, however, Lebanese government rejected this plan and both parties failed to reach an agreement.

UNHCR and MOSA identified possible land for medium sized formal sites (10,000-20,000 persons), principally in the Bekaa Valley. These did not receive government approval. The Government policy in May 2014 called for camps in border areas which UNHCR cautioned is not advisable given that border areas are not secured by the Lebanese security forces, and that camps in such volatile areas could be used for rest and recuperation by armed fighters, for recruitment; be targeted by warring factions, aggravating insecurity already present in the border areas. Events in Arsal have borne this out (Syrian Refugees in Lebanon).

Ironically, while UNHCR considers camps as the last option to host refugees, it offered them as a solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon under certain criteria. However, even camps were rejected by the Lebanese government. The current alternative is thousands of informal settlements that are spread all over Lebanon, where refugees lack basic health and human requirements.
Chapter 3

Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: A Field Study

Informal settlements are obvious to anyone who visits rural areas in Lebanon. On the field visit to Bekaa, the researcher passed through hundreds of settlements that look to the passer as calm areas from the outside. However, a closer interaction reveals the chaos, over crowdedness, and the difficulties that the Syrian refugees, living in these tents, suffer from. According to 1951 convention, a refugee is any person who cannot return to his homeland.

Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (1951 convention).

Although this is applicable to Syrian refugees whom the researcher met while conducting this study, nevertheless, these refugees, and as the years passed, gained a new characteristic. They became protracted refugees as they have been in Lebanon for six years. According to UNHCR, protracted refugees are populations of “25,000 or more who have been in exile, in developing countries, for 5 years or more” (Protracted Refugee Situations 2).

Syrians refugees, like other protracted refugees, looked devastated and unwilling to change the circumstances they are living in. The majority have been like this since they arrived to Lebanon. Others, instead of improving their circumstances, have lost many of their privileges and thus their circumstances have worsened.
Refugee situations that remain unresolved for an extended period of time create “protracted” or “warehoused” refugee groups for whom the initial experience of becoming a refugee develops into a way of life. Groups of people find themselves in a state of limbo subject to conditions over which they have little or no control and with few resources or rights to act independently to change their circumstances (Roberts 1).

To have a look on protracted Syrian refugees, especially those living in informal settlements, the researcher visited three Lebanese villages in Bekaa: Kherbet Kanafar, Al Marj, and Al Haleneyeh. These villages represent three areas of different sects welcoming Syrian refugees. Kherbet Kanafar is one of the very few Christian villages containing informal settlements. Usually Syrian refugees in Christian areas resort to renting houses, living in shops, or in extended houses belonging to families they work for. As for Al Marj, it is constituted of Sunni population whereas the Shiites inhabitants of Al Haleneyeh.

3.1 Research Methodology

Research was conducted in three visits to three camps in Lebanon during March 2017. Data was collected through open-ended interviews with focus groups of five individuals interviewed in each camp to ensure that the research is as accurate as it could be, with respect to limited time and resources contributed to the study. Additionally, information was collected informally through observation and casual conversations with other refugees. Interviews were conducted in Arabic. Questions were open-ended to decrease the influence on participants and to give them the chance to describe their ideas as freely as possible. Although, refugees were assured that the research should not endanger them and that their identity can remain anonymous if they wish to, however, some views might not have been expressed as fully as possible, for the below reason.

As the researcher arrived to Bekaa, she found out that as a researcher, one can only have access to the camps by notifying the local municipality in each village. When the researcher informed the municipalities about the reason of her study, a
municipal police officer escorted her to the camps. Although, the researcher asked the municipality police to stay at distance from the interviewees as the interviews were conducted, the researcher believes that his presence disturbed the refugees, which might have affected the accuracy of their answers.

The researcher also interviewed Lebanese inhabitants living or working in areas adjacent to the camps, to study the relation between both the Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities.

Fieldwork findings were supplemented with review of academic articles, reports from UNHCR, and other NGOs working with Syrian refugees for the past six years in addition to books issued related to the subject.

3.2 Field Visit to Bekaa

3.2.1 Al Marj

In a crowded area which looked like a market for Al Marj village rests Al Hamdaneya camp, as Syrian refugees call it. The camp is surrounded by shops owned by Lebanese and sometimes rented by Syrian refugees, who started their own businesses in this Sunni village.

As the researcher approached the shops, Mahmoud, a Lebanese in his late forties insisted on talking to her. “You want to know about the Syrians, I want to tell you about the Syrians.” He grabbed two chairs from his shop and as he sat with the researcher surrounded by a group of other Lebanese and Syrians.

“The presence of Syrian refugees has affected every aspect of our lives; they are opening shops like our shops and selling their goods in cheaper prices risking our businesses. Our economic situation is deteriorating; this is killing us. Has not been for my children, I would have left this country. The Lebanese government is doing nothing to help me as a Lebanese. I pay taxes, they don’t.”

As Syrians stood silently, Bilal, another Lebanese man interfered. “The government had to control them from the beginning, not to act now after six years. They joined different occupations and they are working in almost every field. They are even renting lands and planting them. They go to the shop owner and offer him a rent higher than that paid by Lebanese, so the owner kicks out the Lebanese and gives his shop to the Syrian. As for the houses, two or three Syrian families live in

1 Yatim, Ghinwa. Personal interview. March 2017.
the same house and share the rent. The Lebanese cannot share his apartment with others although rents have increased due to the presence of Syrian refugees. Not only they don’t pay taxes, they don’t have to register their cars or pay any yearly payment tax or registration.”

Lebanese of this group insisted that Syrians pay nothing for Lebanese government. This includes their residencies, which they do not renew.

The researcher looked at Syrians standing nearby and asked Wael “Is it right that you don’t pay taxes?” Before getting an answer, all Syrians who had joined the conversation silently left without commenting or refuting Lebanese claims. Wael answered that he is barely making money to live with his sister let alone paying taxes or renewing residencies. “When I first arrived I was registered with UNHCR, however, they later removed me from their refugee program. The Lebanese want us to work either in farming or constructions. When I worked as a constructor, Lebanese security arrested me and restrained me from working as I lacked legal documents. I opened this sweets shop because I was left with no other option.” When the researcher asked him where he got the money to rent this shop, “I borrowed money” he answered.

Bilal aggressively told him “you are becoming like the Palestinians, a state within a state. If each of you threatened us with a stick you can harm us.”

The researcher asked the Lebanese whether they have security fears or experienced any security threats. They assured her that nothing till now happened in their village, however they are afraid from security threats that the future might hold. She answered but when Syrians first arrived you welcomed, helped, and opened your houses for them. Mahmoud answered “we thought this will take only few months not six years, we are afraid that a day will come and they will force us out from our village.”

The relationship between host and guest usually begins in a friendly manner, but then becomes imbalanced when the visitor is forced to reside in another country and is unable to leave. The host becomes angry and is unable to

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3 Ibid
4 Ibid
either tolerate the burden posed by the guest, or eject him. Over the long term this relationship becomes one of the strong versus the weak, forced to live in the same place. The visitor may not rebel against his host; if he does, he becomes an occupier and the host will exploit his position to pressure the guest, using all possible means, in the hope that he will finally be rid of him (Abu Hamed 8).

At the end of the interview, Wael still described his relation with Lebanese neighbors as a good one.

Despite what seemed like an aggressive mood by the Lebanese host community in Al Marj, things seemed calmer on the other side of the street, where Hamdaneya settlement rests. This settlement alone hosts over 800 refugees; it was built four years ago and includes 117 tents. Most of the refugees have been living there since they arrived. However, this was not the case for Fahed, who works as a doorman for a small school inside the settlement. He rented a house when he arrived from Syria three years ago. Unfortunately, he later had to move into a tent as he lost his savings. He works for ten hours a day and earns a monthly payment of $350 of which he pays $150 as rent for the area that his tent occupies in addition to electricity charges. During the summer he loses his monthly income. Fahed was the only refugee of all those the researcher has met in the three informal settlements who said that he would prefer to return to any area in Syria over staying in Lebanon if camps were built there. According to Fahed, the only problem with the host community is that Lebanese always blame them for things they have no control over. He agrees that some Syrians act with “undesirable attitude”, harming not only the Lebanese but also Syrian refugees themselves.

All refugees in this camp built their own tents and that cost them around $800 for each camp. Every year they pay almost $200 to repair damages caused by harsh winter circumstances.

Shhadeh who is 65 years old and who serves as a guard in Hamdaneya settlement said that he gets food coupons from UNHCR. Nevertheless, sometimes he is obliged to sell these coupons to pay for his rent since he does not work.
Refugees in three settlements agree that all what they are getting from UNHCR are the food coupons. Other refugees, especially those who arrived after 2014, are not even getting the food coupons, as they are not registered with UNHCR due to the ban enacted against new refugees enforced by Lebanese government.

Hamdaneya refugees described their relation with the host community as a good one, they enjoy moving freely, yet they feel that they are a burden on Lebanese citizens especially that the Lebanese state is a weak state as they said.

Alaa, an unemployed Lebanese who is married with children, agreed that Syrians became a burden. “My employer kicked me out a year ago and I was replaced by a Syrian employee because he takes less and doesn’t need any social security documents.”

Lebanese in Al Marj said that they are paying the price for helping the Syrians, when they first arrived and blamed international organizations, including UNHCR, for helping the Syrians and neglecting the needs of poor Lebanese. They are afraid from the future as Syrian children are not going to schools, wondering what will happen to future generations in case Syrians stayed in Lebanon.

Al Marj isn’t a unique case. Refugees of the world are usually “perceived as a problem rather than people with problems so are genuinely rarely welcomed by the host country” (Roberts 28). They are usually considered as economic burden who also share limited natural resources and services becoming sometimes a threat to social stability especially that mostly underdeveloped countries host the big share of refugees according to UNHCR.

3.2.2 Al Haleneyeh

The relation between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community in Al Haleneyeh seemed less aggressive than that of Al Marj. However, some of the Lebanese still blamed the refugees for their deteriorating economic situation.

Sobheyeh who works as a tailor, sat calmly behind her sewing machine in a shop facing one of the camps in Haleneyeh. She said that before the arrival of Syrian refugees she was doing better at her job. A Syrian tailor opened a shop in a neighboring village and now Lebanese who used to come to her from that village go to him instead, although he charges them more than she does, as they prefer to go a

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place nearby. Sobheyyeh believes that some Lebanese harmed Syrian refugees the way some Syrian refugees harmed Lebanese. She doesn’t have security concerns, however, she added “yesterday Syrian refugees attacked a Lebanese man in a personal dispute, this is the kind of trouble I’m concerned about but I don’t think there would be major security threats.”

Hussein, her old neighbor in an adjacent shop said “of course I’m not concerned about security threats, we have Hezbollah, and they keep everything under control.” Hussein added that refugees had no effect on his economic situation.

Not only the Lebanese mentioned Hezbollah during the interviews in Haleneyeh, but also Syrian refugees talked about them. When the researcher asked a group of refugees about their relation with host community, a woman answered that Hezbollah members treat them well. The researcher clarified that she is not asking about Hezbollah but about the citizens she said we are on good terms with them as well.

Doctora Aisha is a Syrian refugee who has been lately suspended from UNHCR although she lives alone with her mom. She said that the relation with the host community was not that bad, implying that some troubles existed. “It is okay though” she said. However, she was interrupted by other refugees who said that the relation was good and she refused to give further comments.

Refugees here also pay the rents of their tents. Those who work, they work as farmers and they take an average of $10 per day although they work for long hours. They do not work on daily basis. Like other refugees, they suffer from economic, health, and social problems. In some cases, extended families live in the same tent so they can afford the rent. They all stressed that only those who are registered with UNHCR get food coupons, of which they said are better than nothing.

All refugees interviewed in this camp preferred to remain in Lebanon until the war is totally over in Syria. They said that even if official camps were built in Syria, they feel safer in Lebanon and in Al Haleneyeh, because the people here are good to them. “It is true that we are overloaded with debts here, but we are safe” said Khaldeyeh.

Despite what Syrians described as economic suffering, Lebanese in Al Haleneyeh like their counterparts in Al Marj blamed NGOs and UNHCR for helping

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6 Ibid
Syrians alone without giving any assistance to the poor host communities in both villages.

Refugees increase the competition in job market and host communities usually resent the attention and aid given to refugee communities. The immediate host community may be poor but rarely receives additional assistance because chronic problems fail to attract the same high levels of international concern as crisis situations (Roberts 46).

That is why citizens of host communities might feel annoyed when it comes to aids, thinking that refugees might be having more privileges than they do.

### 3.2.3 Kherbet Kanafar

A very calm village in West Bekaa, Kherbet Kanafar is one of the few Christian areas in Lebanon that agreed to construct informal settlements for Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, as the researcher arrived to the municipality, she was told that all settlements that are spread in the village will be taken apart and one settlement will be built instead on an area owned by the municipality by the borders of Kherbet Kanafar. The reason behind that is locals’ discontent with the view of the settlements and the pollution they are causing to the environment around them. When set in distinct areas they wouldn’t be visible to Lebanese there.

This was an issue of concern to the refugees whom the researcher met in Kherbet Kanafar. Thirty-seven years old Khaldeyeh told the researcher that she doesn’t want the municipality to change their location. “This means that we have to build our own tents all over again. It took me five years to organize this place. It costed me around $2000. Moving us means that we have to pay this over and over again” said Khaldeyeh.

Khaldeyeh was alone in her tent. Her husband was harvesting in a nearby land. He earns almost $17 a day which is more than what Syrians earn in Al Marj and Al Haleneyeh, but like all Syrians he works for long hours in an unsteady manner.
Most of the tents visited in Kherbet Kanafar were empty, the researcher found only the housewives. Men were at work and children were at school.

Aisha was also alone in her tent, which she considers her home. The family built a kitchen and a toilet inside the tent, unlike other settlements where refugees have to share bathrooms and showers. Aisha said that she doesn’t mingle a lot with the locals but her husband is on good terms with them. She said other Lebanese like her gynecologist treat her in a racist way.

Aisha got two of her kids in Kherbet Kanafar; however, she had to go all the way to Zahlé to register them.

Although refugees say that they are on good terms with the locals, they are currently facing two problems. The first one is reflected in their fear of moving their location to the borders of the village, which will cost them more money. The second problem is that those who give birth in Kherbet Kanafar have to go to different villages to register their babies.

According to Statistics Lebanon LTD, Lebanon had 31,000 Syrian newborns in contrast to 72,000 Lebanese newborns in 2013, when the number of Syrian Refugees was approximately 200,000 in the beginning of 2013. Since the number of Syrian refugees has reached approximately 1.5 million, it is expected that the number of Syrian newborns in Lebanon will match or outnumber that of Lebanese newborns by the end of 2015 (Rabil 5).

“We cannot register them in Kherbet Kanafar” according to Mayor Jamil No’eem. “We are afraid of future naturalization. If we registered them here, they will be considered as citizens of this village, which will mean a demographic change that we do not want.”

Fear of naturalizing newborns was also reflected in statements of Lebanese officials. Lebanese minister of foreign affairs Gibran Basil not only opposed registering Syrian refugees, but also rejected to register Syrian newborns as it was

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planned by UNHCR. “According to him registering Syrian newborns would be the beginning of their naturalization, which we have previously warned about” (Rabil 8).

Also due to fear of naturalization, officials in Kherbet Kanafar refused UNHCR’s proposal of renting lands to build settlements. They prefer to keep the lands under their control so that they have the right to move refugees when they sense any problems.

No’eem explained that they are on good terms with the Syrians. They are working in occupations that Lebanese workers in Kherbet Kanafar refuse to do, like farming, according to No’eem. “We cannot blame them for our economic problems. They don’t oblige us to employ them. If they leave, most of the Lebanese here won’t do their jobs. Syrians have always been living in our village. However, after the Syrian crisis they increased in number. That’s why we do not fear any security threat because of their presence” he said.

Other Lebanese in Kherbet Kanafar were not as lenient as No’eem. Jean a Lebanese local said that some Lebanese wouldn’t mind doing what Syrians are doing, however, the low wages that Syrians accept put many Lebanese out of the job market.

Around 1370 Syrian refugees live in Kherbet Kanafar, which is equal to the number of locals who live permanently in the village. This harmed the locals according to Jean. However, he doesn’t have any further fears.

3.3 Hosting Model Preferred by Syrians vis-à-vis Lebanese

Khaldeyeh, the Syrian refugee the researcher met in Kherbet Kanafar lives next to four of her siblings. She prefers this hosting model over being hosted in an official camp. Whether this camp was in Lebanon or Syria, she prefers to remain in an informal settlement despite her economic difficulties.

“I don’t feel like going to any camp in Syria even if we got guarantees that we would not be hurt from the Syrian regime. Unless it is completely safe in Syria, I prefer to stay in Lebanon. It is safer here. As for moving into a camp inside Lebanon or on its borders, I would rather live next to my siblings, instead of living with a large number of total strangers. If anyone initiated any security threat in a camp, we will all pay the price. But here everyone is responsible for his own actions and the Lebanese know us by name” said Khaldeyeh.
All Syrians interviewed for the purpose of this study shared the same view. They all preferred informal settlements over official camps. Even Doctora, the Syrian refugee I met in Al Haleneyeh said that she preferred informal settlements, although she is not working and was suspended from UNHCR. “I prefer moving freely instead of being locked.” Others insisted on the possibility that the whole camp will be affected if any Syrian caused different sorts of troubles. According to them, each one is responsible for his actions in informal settlements.

“Here although we live in a small settlement, we might face troubles with our neighbors. Any person might take advantage of small troubles in a camp and might cause problems for the whole camp if it was constructed. I prefer to live alone and with the help of God I can survive” said Aisha. ⁸

On the other hand, “developing countries tend to have limited and already overstretched resources and are often heavily dependent on external assistance, so the presence of a refugee community is an additional burden” (Roberts 29).

That’s why all the Lebanese that the researcher met to conduct this study agreed that it is better for Syrian refugees to be kept in camps. Some Lebanese talked about constructing the camps in safe areas, others said that these camps should be built in border areas. This would reduce economic and social problems as it was mentioned by Lebanese interviewees.

Mayor Jamil No’eem said that “President Michael Aoun might visit Syria in June. He is expected to discuss the situation of Syrian refugees. There they will put conditions for taking back number of Syrians. After that, Lebanese can discuss what the best hosting model is for Syrians, depending on the number of Syrians who will stay in Lebanon.”

Repatriation is a solution preferred by many Lebanese when it is possible. “Host countries are often poor, grappling with their own socio-economic problems, and would prefer a refugee population, regarded as a burden as well as security threat to be repatriated as soon as possible” (The State of the World’s Refugees).

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3.4 Syrians and Lebanese: Two Sides of a Coin

3.4.1 Syrian Suffering

Based on what the researcher has encountered, the great majority of Syrian refugees prefer the hosting model of informal settlements in which they are currently living in, over official camps. Despite economic, health, and social difficulties, informal settlements provide the Syrians with freedom of movement and work unlike official camps that will restrict this sought freedom. On the other hand, the vast majority of the Lebanese met prefer restricting the presence of Syrian refugees in official camps to organize their presence and decrease the potential difficulties and inconvenience brought up by them. Some Lebanese talked about repatriation and the possibility of sending some refugees back to their country after an agreement is settled between Lebanese and Syrian officials. This possibility was rejected by most Syrians who took part in this study and described Lebanon as a safer place than Syria, explaining that they would not return unless a final peace settlement is reached in their country.

Although Syrians remained positive about the relation with Lebanese, nevertheless they do suffer from racism in addition to their economic problems. “The version that many Syrians used to have about Lebanon and the Lebanese prior to the Syrian revolution hasn’t seen a big change, except that it remains hidden because of the current conditions” (Abu Hamed 8).

Racism takes different forms in different Lebanese host communities. While in Shiite and Christian areas, Syrians are perceived and labeled as “the Sunnis”; in Sunni areas Syrians are blamed for leaving their country instead of staying there to fight their regime.

The Syrians in the view of Lebanese Christians and Shiites form a “Sunni bloc,” which represents a dual problem. First, they aren’t Lebanese, but like the Palestinians in Lebanon they’re potential members of Lebanon’s Sunni sect. Today, the overwhelming majority of residents of Lebanon from all nationalities are Sunni, and this is expressed in different types and forms of sectarian awareness, much of which involves tension. This doesn’t take away
from the formation of a Sunni Lebanese negativity toward the refugees while there is the irony of the emergence of people who blame the Syrians for their revolution against the regime of Bashar Assad, there are those who blame them for not bringing down the regime. This feeds a general negativity, some of it of an offensive character, based on these two contradictory foundations... There are certainly feelings of racism against Syrian refugees (Saade 5).

While Syrians can live within a racist atmosphere, they are more worried about their economic problems. One of the major problems that concern Syrian refugees is the amount of money that they are obliged to pay to renew their residencies. Whether they are registered with UNHCR or not, all Syrians have to pay $200 as yearly renewal fees.

Human Rights Watch noticed that due to these regulations many Syrians lost the legal standing in Lebanon. To their surprise only two of forty refugees that HRW interviewed in 2015 were able to renew their residencies with their UNHCR certificates. Another two were denied their UNHCR certificate but were able to renew their residency with the help of a sponsor (Bobseine 1).

This puts the Syrians at the risk of arrests and ill-treatment. It also restricted their freedom of movement fearing the possibility of being arrested. Most Syrian refugees cannot afford residency fees. According to UNHCR reports “70 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon fall below the poverty line relying on aid to survive; 90% are trapped in a vicious cycle of debt, according to a recent United Nations assessment” (Bobseine 2).

Moreover, Lebanese government started a sponsorship program where Lebanese employers sponsor Syrian employees. This also put the Syrians under the mercy of their employers. Many Syrians reported that they were sexually harassed by their employers according to interviews that were conducted by HRW. Over and
above, it is feared that this sponsorship system aims at turning refugees into “economic migrants” where it will be more “acceptable to force migrants back to Syria than refugees fleeing persecution. Humanitarian workers assisting Syrian refugees are afraid that authorities are re-categorizing refugees as migrants to facilitate their return to Syria in the future” (Bobseine 7).

Although Lebanese citizens complain about losing their jobs for Syrian workers, nevertheless it is not easy for Syrians to find a job and most of those who do usually work illegally for long hours and small wages. “Those registered with UNHCR are prohibited from working in Lebanon and must sign a no-work agreement when they renew their residency, violation of which puts them at risk of arrest and deportation” (Bobseine 2).

3.4.2 Lebanese Fears

While Syrian refugees suffer from a lot of difficulties, one cannot overlook the threat that they unintentionally pose over the Lebanese host community.

Although most of Lebanese interviewed in the study didn’t show any security fear caused by the presence of Syrian refugees in their villages; nevertheless, many times Syrian refugees paid the price of security attacks initiated by extremist groups like Al Nusra and Daesh. Refugees in Syrian settlements were physically attacked when Lebanese soldiers were abducted by both groups in 2014. Syrians were also attacked when explosions took place in areas controlled by Hezbollah killing and injuring hundreds of Lebanese civilians, even though the suicide bombers were not Syrians in many cases.

As for terror in Lebanon, in reading the figures we find that this phenomenon isn’t Syrian, and there’s a lot of fear that it will be proven to be a Lebanese phenomenon. The largest number of terrorists is made up of Lebanese; they are the children of our society. They were trained by ISIS and Nusra, but the suicide bombers and terrorists aren’t outsiders. The ones who have been caught are moving around in Roumieh prison and elsewhere; the majority of the perpetrators are Lebanese and some of taken refuge in Palestinian refugee
camps in a flight from justice. Thus, we shouldn’t make connections or generalize when it comes to our accusations (Hajjar 2).

Nevertheless, according to interviews conducted by HRW, “different international humanitarian workers from different areas in Lebanon like Akkar and Bekaa told Human Rights Watch that “they had received at least one report of armed groups exploiting the economic vulnerability of Syrian refugees to recruit followers” (Bobseine 4).

There is also the fear of spillover of Syrian war into Lebanon especially that many Lebanese parties are supporting opposite warring Syrian groups. Attacking Arsal and trying to enter border towns like Al-Qaa and Ras-Baalbek generated feeling of insecurity among the people accusing refugees of sheltering extremist groups.

On the other hand, March 14 supported Syrian opposition and their allies in Lebanon.

Northern Lebanon, especially Tripoli and Akkar, has emerged as a hub for anti-Syrian activists. Armed groups and weapons flowed into Syria, spearheaded by Salafists. Make-shift hospitals and security zones were established to accommodate the Syrian opposition. When in May 2012 Lebanon’s General security arrested Islamist Shadi Mawlawi on the grounds he was providing material support to Syrian rebels, deadly clashes and demonstrations erupted in northern Lebanon forcing the government to release Mawlawi, and as a result to reveal its appalling weakness. Eventually, in March 2013, Mawlawi was indicted, along with nine Salafists, by Lebanese authorities on the grounds that he belonged to an armed group and Al Nusra Front with the intention of carrying out terror acts and transferring weapons and bombs between Lebanon and Syria (Rabil 6).
Hezbollah on the other hand has publicly asserted its military involvement in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime to protect Lebanon from the jihadists as they claimed, “as well as to support the Syrian regime as an essential part of the Resistance and the anti-Israel rejectionist axis” (Rabil 6).

On a separate note, according to the authors of *Welfare of Syrian Refugees*, a report that was published by WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF in 2015, two-thirds of Syrian refugee children in Lebanon did not receive any education and 44% of all school-aged children have not attended school for at least one year.

Such a large influx of young Syrian refugees with specific needs in terms of schooling, training skills, and employability poses serious challenges on the host communities’ populations, infrastructure, legal framework, and political systems. Institutions or certain facilities (education, health care) may not be set up to absorb such a large population that is so vastly different from the host communities’ populations. Increased attention is inevitable to assure that the long-term of both refugees and host communities are met with great care. (Verme et al. 51).

Although Syrian refugees find it hard to work in Lebanon and most of them are illegal workers, nevertheless they compete with young uneducated Lebanese locals in rural communities.

Some areas of Lebanon had seen up to a 60% decrease in the wage rate for day labour. The World Bank estimated that by end–2014, some 170,000 additional Lebanese will be pushed into poverty. … An additional 220,000–324,000 Lebanese are expected to become unemployed … most of them unskilled youth which would about double the unemployment rate, to over 20 percent (Thibos 4).
Moreover, on many occasions Lebanese officials claimed that Lebanon is unable to afford the increased demand in electricity, water, and sanitation.

All the above has led to increased tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities.

Instances of animosity are often attributed to the perception of some local residents, many of whom face some of the same structural constraints as refugees, that Syrian refugees unfairly benefit from humanitarian aid while dragging down the living conditions and employment prospects of local residents (Thibos 4).
Chapter 4
Palestinians between Lebanon and Jordan

The Lebanese Government has been refusing to build camps for Syrian refugees. Its adamant position is based on its previous experience with building camps for the Palestinians, who fled into Lebanon almost seventy years ago. Lebanon is one of the neighboring countries that welcomed one of the oldest and largest refugee groups that is unique and different from all other refugee groups.

Palestinians have their own UN agency, The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which takes on its account helping Palestinian refugees alone. Meanwhile, UNHCR helps all other refugees, including Syrians. While other refugees can benefit from three durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, assimilation, or resettlement in a third country, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 provides other solution for the Palestinians. “All Palestinians who wish to do so should be allowed to return home, and those who do not should be suitably compensated” (Roberts 5). Nevertheless, it is still almost impossible for most Palestinians to go back home.

Palestinians are probably the most notable refugee group that does not fall under the UNHCR mandate. Palestinians, considered to be the oldest and often the single largest refugee group, form a unique refugee population. For historical and political reasons Palestinians have become separated from other refugee groups in international law and in terms of the assistance, and protection they receive. They are the only population to have been deprived of their nationality and the territory of their former state (Roberts 20).

Between Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, the latter group is believed to suffer from the harshest living conditions. This chapter provides a
historic overview of Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the restrictions they face, and
the present situation that they are experiencing, in order to compare it with possible
outcome of Syrian refugees’ presence in Lebanon in the coming years. This
comparison also aims at finding possible lessons that Lebanese can learn from their
experience with the Palestinians.

Additionally, this chapter also summarizes the experience of Palestinians in
Jordan, which is to a far extent better than that of their counterparts in Lebanon,
despite the similarity of security threats at the beginning. During these years
Palestinians tried to use both countries as a home base to fight Israel from.

This comparison aims at exploring the reasons why Jordan succeeded at a
time when Lebanon failed in embracing Palestinians throughout all these years, in an
attempt to avoid repeating the same mistakes with Syrian refugees.

4.1 Palestinians in Lebanon… A Historic Overview

Palestinian refugees are considered a protracted refugee group. Like the
Syrians, these groups are a cause for concern. “Warehousing is the practice of
keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness,
and dependency—their lives on indefinite hold—in violation of their basic rights
under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention” (Smith 38).

From the one million Palestinian refugees caused by the 1948 first Arab-
Israeli war, 100,000 fled to Lebanon. By mid-1950’s, 16 UNRWA official camps
were built in Lebanon in addition to numerous other unofficial camps.

Like Syrian refugees, when the Palestinians first arrived to Lebanon, many
received help from ordinary Lebanese and were hosted in the homes of the Lebanese
who either knew them or sympathized with them. Wealthier Palestinians or those
who had families were able to live privately. As for many other Palestinians, they
chose to settle within Lebanese communities to work and help their families.
However, as the years passed they found it necessary to move to camps for their
survival (Gorokhoff 316).

At the beginning of the crisis, the situation between Lebanese and
Palestinians was not as bad as it became in the years that followed. Palestinians
enjoyed acceptable level of freedom of expression and little hostility, meanwhile the
Lebanese government took steps to monitor and control their activities.
The establishment of official camps allowed the Lebanese to develop a system of state control in the camps which was rigorously imposed between 1958 and 1969. The deliberate location of camps away from the Lebanon-Israelis border also allowed the Lebanese army to secure the border and disperse the refugees into smaller, more easily controlled scattered groups (Roberts 78).

However, this precarious peace was shaken by three events that took place during a short interval that changed the way how Palestinian refugees reacted to Israeli attacks: the Six-Day War, the Cairo Accords, and Black September. These incidents that took place between 1967 and 1970 had an effect on the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan.

After the Six-Day war, in which the Arab states lost West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians thought it is important to turn into their own resistance groups like Fatah and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to fight Israel. More Palestinian refugees arrived to Lebanon after 1967 war, leading to additional guerillas’ activity in Lebanon. With the loss of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians turned to south Lebanon as a base and launched many attacks against Israel from there. As a consequence, Lebanon was subject to revengeful Israeli attacks. The Lebanese government decided to confront Palestinians but after several clashes the latter forced the Lebanese army out of camps. These events led to Cairo accords between Lebanese government and PLO, which allowed Palestinian autonomy in camps under the condition that Palestinians agree to recognize Lebanese sovereignty. The PLO was also allowed to establish military bases in south Lebanon under the condition of coordinating with Lebanese High Command. This step secured their guerilla activities; something that didn’t happen within any other Arab hosting country; thus distinguishing Palestinian experience in Lebanon. Although clashes continued between both groups, nevertheless PLO settled in Lebanon after it was expelled from Jordan due to Black September events (Roberts 80-82).
The Lebanese civil war in 1975 started with the Christian Phalangist massacre of 27 Palestinians in a bus. This divided the Lebanese, Muslim militias sided with Palestinian factions against right-wing groups led by Phalangists. Palestinian camps in Christian areas were the weakest point and were either attacked or besieged. Fatah joined the fighting and sided with PLO after the massacres that took place in refugee camps. Israel joined the scene and attacked Lebanon and occupied its southern villages in an attempt to destroy the PLO in 1978, and stop its attacks into northern Israel. However, it withdrew under the pressure of international community only to launch another full invasion in 1982 when it reached Beirut. Thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians were killed; several Palestinian camps were severely damaged. Although both parties reached a ceasefire and withdrew from Beirut, nevertheless, Israel broke the ceasefire by committing the Sabra and Shatila massacre using the Phalangists. Around 2400 Palestinians were killed (Roberts 82-84).

Not only Israel launched attacks against camps, Palestinians also suffered from camps wars with the Lebanese Shiite Amal movement during civil war.

As the war ended, Palestinians were the main party to be blamed, as if Lebanese themselves had nothing to do with the war. The refugees became the scapegoat for this devastating war, and they are still paying its price. The camps that were destroyed were not rebuilt and instead of 16 camps, only 12 camps were left in Lebanon nowadays that vary in size, from containing few hundred to 50,000.

As many scholars have established, that Lebanon has been the host country that has been the most hostile to and imposed the most restrictions on the Palestinian refugees. Lebanon has not ratified “the Convention Relating to the Status of refugees (1951) or the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), and extends no special treatment to refugees. Partly because of these restrictions, and partly because of the Palestinians active involvement in Lebanon’s civil war and frequent Israeli incursions, the refugees experience in Lebanon is unparalleled; even after six decades, Palestinian refugees are still regarded as foreigners (Farah 280).
“There are three groups of Palestinians in Lebanon: registered refugees, non-registered refugees and non-identified refugees. Registered refugees are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities… This group is entitled to UNRWA services. Non-registered refugees, who number around 35,000, are those registered only with the Lebanese authorities and not with UNRWA; they are able to access some UNRWA services. Non-identified refugees number around 5,000. They are in the country illegally and are not entitled to UNRWA services and receive no assistance from the government” (Roberts 94).

Nevertheless, the exact size of Palestinian population is unknown. However, UNRWA provides approximate figures of registered refugees.

Some 450,000 refugees are registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, with many living in the country’s 12 refugee camps. Palestine refugees represent an estimated ten per cent of the population of Lebanon. Around 53 per cent of the Palestine refugees in Lebanon live in the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps, all of which suffer from serious problems (Where we Work).

4.1.1 Repressing the Palestinians in Lebanon

Since the end of Lebanese civil war, the relation between Palestinians and their Lebanese host community remained hostile. The Lebanese blame Palestinian refugees for both: the civil war and Israeli attacks. Indeed, Lebanese especially right wing Christian parties and their supporters, blame Palestinians for Israeli military attacks against their country as a result of cross-border violence between Palestinians and Israelis.

On the other hand “the Lebanese government regards the Palestinian as a destabilizing factor in an already unstable country and pursues anti-Palestinian
policies. It has gained popular support for its stance by concentrating the blame for the civil war on the Palestinians” (Roberts 8).

Palestinians in Lebanon are among the most underprivileged groups of Palestinians in the region and they highly rely on UNRWA, at a time when the level of support they receive is decreasing with time. For a long period, they were restricted from working in 70 professions, they lack the freedom of movement, right of owning property, and they have no access to state schools and medical facilities.

As a result of government policies that discriminate against Palestinians in Lebanon, UNRWA claims that Lebanon has the highest percentage of Palestinian refugees who are living in abject poverty and who are registered with the Agency’s “special hardship” programs of all its five areas of operation (Roberts 7).

These discriminative policies affect every single aspect of refugees’ lives who could not improve their situation, despite the fact that they have been in Lebanon for seventy years. They still live in shelters that were supposed to be temporary. The camps are overcrowded and contaminated, and their inhabitants suffer from poverty, debt, and unemployment.

“The living conditions in all camps are poor. There is severe overcrowding, a lack of privacy and natural light, unsanitary conditions and in adequate housing and infrastructure” (Roberts 103). That is why refugees in these camps refer to themselves as “the forgotten people”.

Palestinians are not only restricted from owning any property on Lebanese territories, despite the fact that other foreigners can, Palestinians are also not allowed to increase the area of their camps or build new ones.

In the south for example “the government maintains tight control over the camps, monitors all Palestinian activities, forbids building materials entering the camps freely, and strictly imposes all laws referring to Palestinians” (Roberts 10).

Four of their camps were completely destroyed during the civil war and they could not replace them, including Tal al Za’atar. That mentioned, population growth, has also made present camps overcrowded. Lebanon, in comparison to neighboring
countries has the largest percentage of Palestinians living in camps, around 53% of them according to UNRWA. Palestinians find themselves obliged to remain in camps because of poverty caused by restrictions on employment, thus they cannot offer to live outside their camps due to high rents (Roberts 35).

Despite having lived in Lebanon for 60 years, or having been born there, most Palestinians have been unable to obtain citizenship. Without citizenship, Palestinians are considered foreigners, and as such have been barred from 72 professions. In 2005 the rules were relaxed and so Palestinians were barred from only 20 professions which still included engineering, medicine, and law… according to UNRWA, unemployment among the Palestinians in camps in 2008 exceeded 60% (Roberts 100).

Palestinians, nevertheless, can work illegally in any profession if they find an employer who agrees to employ them; however, they will be paid less than their Lebanese counterparts.

As for citizenship, it is agreed that if Palestinians were to be granted the citizenship, they will challenge the Lebanese demographic stability as the majority of them are Sunni. Thus, Palestinian integration might cause a threat to country’s sectarian balance and division of power. Yet, this did not stop the Lebanese from granting Christian Palestinians the citizenship as they arrived to Lebanon.

Most Palestinians in Lebanon were born as refugees and were denied their basic rights and lived in hard economic conditions inside camps, which can mostly be accessible via showing the identity documents due to heavy military presence around the camps. All these conditions not only made Palestinians a poor population but also left them in debt. UNRWA reports that Palestinians in Lebanon is the group that depends the most on external assistance in a country where their students can only access UNRWA schools. Hence, this created a dependency culture. Assistance that Palestinian refugees get from UNRWA and other NGOs might improve their living conditions inside the camps and provide them with better economic opportunities; however, it demoralizes them on the social and psychological level,
hindering them from trying to find better alternatives and social and economic advancement.

Lebanese policies aim at showing “the international community that the Palestinians can never be settled permanently in Lebanon because they threaten internal stability, and second to reduce the size of the population through imposing restrictions that impede daily life to the extent that Palestinians are compelled to leave Lebanon. These policies have led to a warehousing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which means that they are denied basic rights including freedom of movement and the right to work, forcing many to rely on external assistance for survival (Roberts 89).

Over and above, the presence of numerous numbers of NGOs, UNRWA, in addition to the fact that the camps lack a central leadership and unified representation since PLO’s withdrawal in 1982, led to a diffusion of power. Camp inhabitants complain about the absence of structure and good governance that undermines their ability of improvement (Roberts 149).

Contemporary Palestinian communities in camps in Lebanon exist without a formal system of governance. The lack of governance has negative effects on all aspects of camp life, and threatens the daily lives of the vast majority of camp inhabitants whose primary concerns are domestic. Governance refers to the existence of recognized and accepted institutions that exercise authority and control within agreed spheres of public and private life and are accountable for civil society. International bodies such as the World Bank and United Nations Development program (UNDP) argue that sustainable development and stability cannot be achieved without good governance (Roberts 165).
This has rendered a hostile relationship between Palestinians and Lebanese which affects the coping mechanism of the Palestinians, who despite the 70 years that they have spent in Lebanon, still long for going to a home of which most have not physically encountered. Moreover, “host community does not disguise its animosity towards the Palestinians. This creates a feeling of isolation among the Palestinians in the camps and some prefer to remain in the camps for long periods because they fear for their safety outside” (Roberts 152).

Through its strict policies, the Lebanese government claims that it is protecting Palestinian right of return and is signaling to the international community that naturalizing the Palestinians would not be possible in Lebanon.

Additionally, May Farah, in Diasporas of The Modern Middle East, wrote a research paper about feeling of belonging with respect to Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. Based on her case study she noticed that refugees living in camps lacked any sense of belonging to Lebanon even if they were born and raised in Lebanon. However, those living outside camps and sharing poor neighborhoods with the Lebanese did not wish to return to Palestine and had stronger feelings of belonging despite the fact that they lacked basic rights.

Moreover, Falling Behind is a report that was conducted by Age A. Tiltnes. This report summarizes the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon based on a survey that was conducted in 1999 and its results were published in 2001. The report noticed that households which have managed to settle outside camps and gatherings tend to be better off than those that have not.

It also showed that Lebanese restrictions forced Palestinians to take advantage of any chance to leave Lebanon. Indeed, Palestinians in Lebanon migrate to Europe more than Palestinians elsewhere. In Germany 80% of the 80,000 Palestinians there came from Lebanon. According to the study “motivation to leave is better economic opportunities and a decent standard of living. Migration is also seen as a means to get away from social exclusion, and obtain civil and human rights” (Tiltnes 14).

Scholars agree that it is the discriminatory practices of Lebanese government that prevent Palestinians living in camps from fully integrating.
“Despite—or thanks to—being denied the most basic economic and political rights and enduring the harsh conditions of life in refugee camps, the Palestinian refugees continue to embrace and assert their identity as Palestinian” (Farah 286).

4.2 Palestinians in Jordan… Historic Overview

Despite the fact that Jordan almost had same security threats initiated by the Palestinians, nevertheless, it succeeded in containing them and in bonding refugees with the Jordanian host community. A larger percentage of Palestinians in Jordan is integrated with the society than in Lebanon.

The first presence of Palestinians in Jordan dates back to the 1920s when British authorities divided the region creating the Emirate of Transjordan. However, this chapter focuses on the presence of Palestinians in Jordan after 1940s, mainly after the creation of state of Israel.

In 1948 population of “Transjordan” was around 450,000. With the arrival of first wave of Palestinians, it changed radically with the addition of 900,000 of whom at least half were considered as refugees. Original inhabitants of Transjordan were Bedouins, unlike the Palestinians who were more advanced on different levels, from education to employment, trade, and health care. Unlike the Lebanese, the native citizens of Transjordan were enthusiastic about containing the Palestinians, but it was the latter that were reluctant to the possibility of integration with a monarchy (Gandolfo 2).

In 1949, King Abdullah’s desire to absorb the refugees and improve the position of Palestinians was reflected by adopting a law that enabled Palestinians to gain a Jordanian passport and later Jordanian nationality (Gandolfo 8).

The relation between Palestinians and Jordanians was disturbed by the idea of State of Israel and the fear that Palestinians might lose their homeland for good. While Jordan tried to contain Palestinians and be the only Arab state to naturalize them, Palestinians have always perceived Jordan as a place to use to fight for taking their lands back.

The year 1951 witnessed deterioration for the peaceful presence of Palestinians in Jordan. It was marked first by the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al Solh in Amman by a member of Syrian National Party followed by the assassination of King Abdullah in Jerusalem.
In 1964, the Arab league created Palestinian Liberation Organization, under Egyptian control and its faction joined Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian army. Jordan however remained cautious about it (Gandolfo 12). By 1970, PLO created a quasi-autonomous administration in Jordan causing clashes with Jordanian army and posing a threat to Jordanian sovereignty and Kingdom’s stability. This was topped by the utilization of Jordanian territory to attack Israel, presenting a threat to internal security.

Despite these events, Jordan didn’t close its doors in front of additional Palestinian refugees. In 1967 after Israeli annexation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, 140,000 additional Palestinians were registered with UNRWA after ‘an Naksah’ six day war. “The impact was to be lasting: by 1999 Jordan was host to 1.52 million Palestinian refugees, 4325 seeking UNHCR refugee status and a further 800,000 displaced persons” (Gandolfo 9). Today 2000000 Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, of whom most have Jordanian citizenship.

For Arafat, Jordan became a battle field. In September 1970 Palestinians hijacked 5 airplanes, three of them landed in Zarqa with 600 hostages. King Hussein was humiliated on the international stage. He then took the decision to attack the Fedayeen. Black September drew a new line of alliance; Syria and Iraq supporting Palestinian fighters and Jordan and Israel in opposition.

“For Israel, intervention had become a necessity, for had Jordan fallen to the Syrian army or Palestinian fighters the threat to the Israeli state would have edged closer” (Gandolfo 34).

Black September caused distrust that led to denials of citizenship rights, healthcare, and education, security was strengthened around refugee camps and Palestinians related to radical leftist groups were arrested.

In brief, due to the attempt to overthrow King Hussein, assassination of Prime Minster Wasfi Tal, in addition to other assassinations in London, and the events of Black September, the PLO was exiled to Lebanon.

Palestinian refugees in Jordan are divided into 3 types:

While the pre-1948 residents identify themselves as Jordanian and thrive commercially, professionally, and politically, the post-1948 refugees did not
live in camps and constitute the “silent minority”, though they have enjoyed equal success in terms of integration. Resentment persists amidst the refugees of 1967 and 1990-1991, as a high proportion of refugees of 1967 remain in the camps disgruntled, unsettled, despondent, militant or potentially so (Gandolfo 9).

4.2.1 Palestinian Rights in Jordan

The first step to contain Palestinian refugees was by granting them citizenship. It was followed by parliamentary representation in the lower elected chamber of deputies.

Transjordanian nationality dates back to the 1920s where according to British mandate the Transjordanian nationality law stated that any “person who had his usual place of residence in Transjordan for the period of twelve months preceding the sixth day of August 1924” (Gandolfo 44).

In 1954, this law was amended into Jordanian Nationality law which adapted a legislation to include Palestinian refugees “anyone carrying Palestinian passport issued before 15 May 1948 – provided that he is not Jewish- and habitually residing in Jordan during the period of 20 December -16 February 1954” (Gandolfo 45).

The law also mentioned that “An Arab who resides in Jordan and has resided there for 15 consecutive years has the right to acquire Jordanian nationality, provided that he gives up his original nationality in accordance with his country’s laws” (Gandolfo 47). Moreover, after acquiring nationality, applicant should wait for 12 more years to be granted positions in public sector including becoming a candidate for elections in Majlis Al Nowab (Gandolfo 48).

In 1949, the Additional Law 56 provided Palestinians with a passport facilitating the movement of refugees into other countries looking for business opportunities. The passport issued aimed at calming an expanding population after annexation of West Bank in 1948 (Gandolfo 51).

In 1988 King Hussein announced the dismantling of the legal and administrative links between the two areas affecting citizenship status and identity of West Bankers. Although King Hussein wanted to look like acting upon Palestinian desire after 1987 Intifada, Gandolfo notices Jordan used it as an excuse.
Given the demographic imbalance between the Palestinian and Jordanian components of the population, the intifada exposed Jordan’s vulnerability and provided a golden opportunity to flee the growing Palestinian unrest and prevent a spread of the discontent to Jordan (Gandolfo 61).

Jordan continued to issue Jordanian Passports to Palestinians in the West Bank. However, Palestinians from West Bank or Gaza living in Jordan with a temporary passport are not allowed to benefit from free health care and as for education they are supposed to compete on 5% of seats dedicated for Arab foreigners (Gandolfo 67).

In addition to temporary passports; green, blue, pink and yellow cards differentiated between Palestinians living in Jordan. The holders of each enjoy different levels of rights.

4.3 Palestinians in Jordan… A hybrid Identity

In her book *Palestinians in Jordan*, Luisa Gandolfo elaborated how Palestinians sustained their original Palestinian identity even when they became Jordanians causing sometimes a sort of clash of identities between both groups. However, they maintained a hybrid identity embracing both the al-qawmiyya of the Palestinian movement and Jordanian al-wataniyya.

“A hybrid ideology has emerged that enabled the Palestinian-Jordanians to retain their longing for Palestinian statehood while demonstrating individual belonging to Jordan, thereby facilitating integration within Jordanian society” (Gandolfo 81).

Palestinian identity realizes Palestine as a viable state where as Jordanian identity legitimizes the “presence of Jordanian populace as the host, owners, and leaders of the kingdom” (Gandolfo 85).

“Although many are considered de jure Jordanian citizens, the desire for a homeland of their own kept the Palestinian refugees from forging a sense of Jordanian national identity, rendering Jordan forever the host state and never the homeland” (Gandolfo 94). This was partly caused by the conditions of Palestinians in
camps where Jordan state gave an excuse for its awful conditions by saying that a camp shouldn’t be a comfortable alternative to homeland (Gandolfo 95).

Gandolfo recognizes that socio-economic differences affect Palestinian identity in diaspora stating that Palestinian Jordanians like Palestinians elsewhere experience discrimination and abrogation of their rights as citizens (denial of full schooling, exclusionary clauses of electoral law...). Nevertheless, according to FAFO report, refugees in Jordan have the best access to health services. In Lebanon, refugees rely mainly on UNRWA and NGOs for medical assistance. In this aspect, the report concluded “refugees are less satisfied with local medical facilities than refugees in Jordan and Syria” (Tiltnes 22).

**4.3.1 Integration of Palestinians in Jordan**

There are three types of Palestinians living in Jordan, each integrated within the Jordanian society in a different pattern. They were definitely affected by their socio-economic status.

4.3.1.1 The elite

Palestinian diverse social category that was integrated with Jordanian elite of high ranking government and military officers. Their social integration and financial security came on the expense of their “Palestinianess”.

4.3.1.2 Middle class

The members of this group reestablished their businesses in new country arriving as small merchants who developed and progressed. This helped decrease their hostility to host society as years passed.

4.3.1.3 Inhabitants of refugee camps who are still hostile to their host community

For the people of the Gaza Camp it’s the worst because it’s even difficult to find a job, travel, and have proper documents or to attend universities and schools. These people are totally Palestinians. Those who have good businesses and are involved in political life are even more integrated in the society and they are not the same at all (Gandolfo 175).
For the middle class and elite, who have worked fastidiously during the last sixty years to re-establish their lives, both economically and socially, the prospect of leaving behind friends, schools, jobs, and a home is generally less appealing. For the inhabitants of refugee camps, however, life never settled completely. They are merely a population anticipating the imminent arrival of their homeland, to which they would return to, regardless of the conditions (Gandolfo 195).

4.4 Comparative Conclusion

It is generally accepted that for much of the time following 1948, Palestinians in Lebanon have had a worse position than those in any of the other UNRWA fields. In Jordan, the majority of Palestinians is entitled to full citizenship and therefor enjoys the same rights as Jordanian citizens… Palestinians who came from the Gaza strip in 1967 have only temporary passports. The Jordanian state has, for the most of the last 60 years, sustained reasonable relations with the Palestinians. Only 18% of the almost 1.9 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan live in camps (Roberts 30).

This small percentage lives in ten camps spread all over Jordan. Despite all security threats imposed by Palestinians, Jordan did not treat all of them in the same way. Categorizing Palestinians helped Jordan embrace large number of refugees keeping in mind the welfare of Jordanian kingdom. Unlike Lebanon, where it is believed that the discriminatory policies set by the state are not only the reason for Palestinian suffering but also for the hostile relations between both groups. Such conditions continue to prevail despite the seventy years which have passed since the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.
In the next chapter, we will use the Palestinian experience in Lebanon and Jordan as an opening to draw possible solutions for Syrian refugees’ crisis and to avoid repeating the same mistakes especially with the Lebanese case, benefiting from the Jordanian experience.
Chapter 5
Possible Solutions

In the previous chapter we discussed how and why Lebanon failed in containing the Palestinians who suffer the most in comparison with their counterparts in the region. This chapter will shed the light on the pitfalls that caused this suffering which alienated the refugees although they have been in Lebanon for the past 70 years. Comparing Palestinian experience with Syrian one aims at avoiding repeating same mistakes, knowing that making the refugees suffer does not mean accelerating their return to their homeland.

5.1 Lessons Learnt from Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Both Syrians and Palestinians were welcomed when they first arrived and both enjoyed many freedoms. During her coverage for Al Arabiya News Channel, the researcher used to meet injured soldiers from Free Syrian Army (Jeish al Hor) in Lebanese regions opposing Hezbollah in the north at the beginning of the crisis. Its members used to openly express their willingness to not only overthrow Syrian regime but also to fight Hezbollah inside Lebanon without taking into consideration the fact that they were being treated in Lebanon. They were supported by Lebanese groups who were later involved in the fighting inside Syria simultaneously as Hezbollah joined the Syrian war supporting the Assad regime. This looks more or less like the case when Muslim militias saw in PLO their savior and sided with it at the beginning of Lebanese civil war. The first mistake that Lebanese repeated with both Palestinians and Syrians is that they got overwhelmed by the causes of both groups and became part of their struggle, seeing them as the rescuer from whom they consider “the other” Lebanese instead of drawing limits and helping them solely on a humanitarian level.

As the Lebanese state refuses to build official camps to host Syrians, one should keep in mind that Lebanese succeeded between 1958 and 1969 in controlling the Palestinian camps that were built away from the borders because they were easily
scattered. After the civil war and after PLO expelled the Lebanese army from the camps, it is the Lebanese state that made it acceptable for Palestinians to practice their autonomy in the camps according to Cairo accords. Till now Lebanese state and army are not allowed to enter Palestinian camps. Thus, Lebanon can succeed in controlling the Syrian camps like they did it with Palestinian ones prior to 1969 if the government wishes to, as long as it avoids signing agreements that legalize Syrian autonomy over their camps. On the other hand, Palestinian camps were the weakest link when some of them were attacked and damaged during the civil war and Israeli invasion, killing thousands of Palestinians. Moreover, Lebanon provides the worst example for hosting camps in the region. The living situation in Palestinian camps located all over Lebanon is disastrous. Roberts describes life in three different camps. One of them is Bourj al-Barajneh which is, despite UMRWA’s effort to undertake pest control, and maintain sewage systems and water supplies, “always dirty and home to many undernourished stray cats, oversized rats and cockroaches… The sewage system, which was connected to the municipal network in early 1990’s, is inadequate, and regularly overflows covering the streets in untreated sewage” (Roberts 125).

Camps should be avoided on the long run as they turned out to be a bad solution for both Palestinians and Lebanese and the same will most probably happen with Syrians. However, the Lebanese state should participate in any future hosting model used to host the Syrians in order to keep security threats under control. Appropriate humanitarian and security intervention at an earlier stage helps in avoiding future problems.

On the security level, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis Lebanese border villages suffered from rocket attacks initiated by Syrian army killing Lebanese civilians. The Syrian army claimed that these attacks came as a response to actions of Syrian opposition through Lebanese border. Nevertheless, the Lebanese state succeeded in controlling the borders and in containing the security threat; something it failed to do with Palestinians who used its borders to attack Israel putting Lebanon under revengeful Israeli attacks. Moreover, PLO was allowed to establish military bases in the south according to Cairo accords, giving it an official blessing for guerilla activities; something that didn’t happen with the Syrians.

Seventy years have passed and the relation between Palestinians and Lebanese is still hostile. The suffering of Palestinians did not facilitate their
repatriation to Palestine, as it is argued by Lebanese state. They still rely on UNRWA due to the lack of legal status that gives them proper work permit despite the fact that a whole generation by now has been born in Lebanon. They are still living in shelters that were temporal, and in overcrowded camps suffering from poverty, debt, and unemployment. These discriminative policies prevented Palestinians from integrating with the Lebanese after all these years.

The exclusion of the Palestinians from formal state structures highlights their refugee status and precludes the development of feelings of loyalty or belonging to Lebanon which, in a more inclusive environment, might have developed over the 60 years. The host community’s deliberate attempts to alienate the Palestinians have raised the potential threat they pose to Lebanon’s stability. The so-called “security islands”, which is how the Lebanese authorities refer to the camps, arguing that they ensure Lebanon’s security, have led to the warehousing of Palestinian refugees. Ironically, it is this warehousing that generates Palestinian hostility towards the Lebanese and increases the potential threat they pose to security (Roberts 169).

To avoid alienating the Syrians as it happened with Palestinians and to contain them instead of forcing them into supposed “security islands”, one should also learn from the Jordanian experience and how integrating the Palestinian refugees there, helped in creating a feeling of belonging for at least as substantial part of them. Experience of Palestinians in Jordan is a proof on how integration and less restrictive host policies create better relations between refugees and host communities. The Lebanese state should be strict with Syrians on security level but more lenient on human level adopting more inclusive policies. The argument that the suffering of Syrian refugees would be a catalyst for getting them back to their country was refuted by the Palestinian example.
5.2 Syrians in Jordan

The number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan is 658,015. 141,099 of them live in camps, and 516,916 are self-settled in rural and urban areas. However, the real number exceeds a million according to Jordanian officials (UNHCR Warns Funding Cuts Threaten Aid).

According to a study conducted by Khalid Al Wazani, the socio-economic implications of Syrian refugees on Jordan are similar to that of Lebanon. As Syrian refugees arrived to Jordan through unofficial borders, they were hosted in shelters, public parks, and public facilities. Government facilitated their reregistration with UNHCR that built offices around these shelters. They were also hosted by families.

UNHCR said that living conditions for more than half a million refugees living outside of camps in the country had become increasingly tough, swelling the population of other camps. The latest survey showed 86 per cent of urban refugees live below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 JOD (approx. US$95) per capita per month (Rummery 2015).

Like Lebanon, Syrians in Jordan are competing with Jordanians for jobs, especially that they agree to receive less wages, as they can adapt with financial aid they receive from UNHCR. Both refugees in Jordan and Lebanon work illegally. In Lebanon, Syrians need a work permit and despite past agreements between Syrian and Lebanese government, the latter is reluctant to issue such permits. In Jordan, it’s almost impossible to work legally as Syrians are obliged to show a proof that their specific skill is not available in Jordanian candidates. Thus, they work illegally and with lower wages (Verme et al). While in Lebanon the majority of refugees work illegally, in Jordan “according to the labour ministry, about 160,000 Syrians are working illegally. They mostly work in the informal sector and are exposed to hazards and exploitation” (Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria). This also led to hostile relationship with host community.
The labor and trade problems may be a major driver of social tension. In July 2013, the government lifted fuel subsidies and raised tax on telecommunications, sparking tensions between Jordanians and Syrians as the government tried to adapt to the largest wave of refugees ever seen by the country (Wazani 81).

The hostile relation between Jordanian and Syrians was reflected in a statistical study published in Wazani’s report. It showed that in June 2013, 73.5% of the study population and 55% of opinion leaders would refuse entry to any new waves of Syrian refugees to Jordan. 87% of them said it would be better to keep the Syrians in refugee camps to prohibit them from integrating with local communities, while 92% of the study population claimed that the existence of Syrians in Jordan had compromised job opportunities for Jordanians (Wazani 81).

Unlike Syrians in Lebanon, Syrians in Jordan receive financial housing subsidy from UNHCR. Moreover, in Jordan one can find Syrian families living together to share the burden of high rents. This caused an increase in rents the way it happened in Lebanon. “Real estate prices soared with the coming of Syrians by up to 100%, making access to housing extremely difficult for Jordanians, especially newlywed couples” (Wazani 83).

Also in Jordan costs are needed for social protection and health programs as 70% of Syrian refugees consist of females and children below 11 years old. “The government has spent, according to the Ministry of Health’s (MOH) reports, around US$35 million on medical care for the Syrian refugees between January and April 2013, with only US$5 million provided in direct foreign aid during that period” (Wazani 80).

In many villages in Lebanon like Al Marj and Kherbet Kanafar, the number of Syrian refuges is equal to the number of Lebanese citizens living in them. This scenario repeats itself in areas like Mafraq in Jordan that hosts 90,000 Syrian refugees who are equal in number to Jordanians living there, thus causing a demographic imbalance.
The Syrian refugee issue has, no doubt, increased the challenges already faced by Mafraq and Irbid. Especially, as a result of the increasing size and flow rates of refugees, the two governorates are suffering from great economic and institutional vulnerability. The host municipalities are encountering abnormality, both in terms of numbers and the demographic characteristics of new comers. The municipalities were already unprepared to address such pressures, which overstrain the infrastructure and other public services, including health, education, transport, garbage management, sanitation, water and power (Wazani 77).

To control the Syrian refugees’ effect on Jordanian society, the government created a high commission mandated with Syrian refugees’ affairs. It also appointed Jordan Hashemite charity organization (JHCO) as the only agency authorized to deal with local and foreign charities willing to donate money, unlike Lebanon where many NGOs operate simultaneously without any cooperation leading to waste of efforts and money. Indeed, the presence of too many NGOs can harm the cause. Especially that they do not coordinate among each other to avoid duplicating funding for similar projects. They become rivals who compete over funds.

Also, in cooperation with UNHCR, Al Za’atari camp was established in 2012 in Mafraq that contain the largest number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. It became the second largest refugee camp in the world (Wazani 59-60). Za’atari camp “was supplied with the best possible infrastructure and was developed in line with the increasing inflows of refugees, climate and physical and structural needs. Four field schools were established…in addition to four field hospitals” (Wazani 60). It includes 80,000 registered refugees (Verme et al 40).

According to UNHCR, the camp was set in nine days starting 2012, and grew with time. Refugees there faced problems with electricity and phone communication at the beginning. The tents that hosted refugees originally were replaced by prefabricated shelters (Rummery 2015).

While there are no official refugee camps in Lebanon, where refugees are dispersed in local communities, Jordan built four camps that included 20% of the refugees at a time when 80% of them live in non-camp settings. In addition to
Za’atari, refugees live in Marjeeb al-Fahood, Cyber City, and Al-Azraq (Verme et al. 40).

Unlike Lebanon, Syrian refugees in Jordan are exempted from any yearly payments that are required as their residency fees.

5.3 Solutions based on Jordanian Experience

Naturalizing Palestinians and granting them Jordanian citizenship have created a sense of national belonging among Jordanian Palestinians, unlike Lebanon where feelings of hostility were mutual among Lebanese and Palestinians. Naturalizing Syrians in Lebanon seems to be an “out of the question” solution. Nevertheless, Lebanese state can still follow some procedures to at least legalize the status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon especially that current procedures turned the majority of Syrians into illegal refugees. All Syrians interviewed by the researcher during her field study said that they couldn’t renew their residency because they couldn’t afford paying $200 for each member of the family, who is above 15 years old. It is not rational to ask poor families, who are living in tents, to pay this amount, whether they are registered with UNHCR or not.

5.3.1 Recommendations

5.3.1.1 Issuing Cards

As Jordan did with Palestinians when it categorized them into groups ranging from passport holders, green, blue, pink and yellow card holders, Lebanese state can do the same with Syrians. These cards can organize the Syrians as working force. The government can force residency fees, over rich and middle class families and exempt poor families from these fees. Money earned can be used to help host communities.

5.3.1.2 Prefabricated Shelters

Renewing residency fees was one of the top issues that worried Syrian refugees in Al Marj, Kherbet Kanafar, and Haleneyeh. Another issue that they all shared was the fact that they have to pay between $200 and $300 each year as maintenance for their tents that are usually worn out by weather conditions. As some Syrian refugees have prefabricated shelters in Za’atari camp, UNHCR should reach
an agreement with Lebanese state and help refugees to gradually replace their tents with these shelters. Tents not only make refugees suffer from harsh weather conditions, but are also a waste of money. If UNHCR cannot afford this alone, it can share the burden with refugees who are already paying $300 each year for the maintenance of their tents. They can also find a sponsor from Gulf Arab countries who can also share the burden to finish this project. It is recommended to find a Lebanese manufacturer; thus Lebanese community can benefit from selling these prefabricated shelters. It’s true that these shelters might cost more money but they don’t need yearly maintenance fees. They are also the best solution for sunny summers and stormy winters. Moreover, when it is time for refugees to go back to Syria they can take these shelters with them especially that majority of refugees said that they lost their houses because of the war.

UNHCR has already tried what it called the Refugee Housing Unit in Ethiopia. It cooperated with a non-profit Swedish industrial design firm and the IKEA Foundation to replace tents with these units. In the same way UNHCR can cooperate with non-profit organizations or find sponsors from Gulf countries or international societies to replace tents of Syrian refugees with similar units.

Constructed of waterproof, sun and flame retardant materials around a steel frame, each unit was designed with solar lights that minimize the need to use open flames and allow for reading and studying inside. The frame and recyclable, non-toxic panels were specially designed to withstand the strong winds yet be light enough to be shipped halfway around the globe in flat-packed boxes…With additions like a shade net, the modular unit truly becomes a semi-permanent home, where families feel protected and comfortable (Better Shelter Unit).

5.3.1.3 Supervising NGOs

The third recommendation, based on Jordanian experience, is putting Lebanese State Ministry for Refugee Affairs in charge for coordinating and organizing the work of different NGOs to make sure that they don’t provide similar aid and services to same informal settlements, guaranteeing that the largest number of refugees are benefiting from these organizations. Some of the refugees met by the
researcher complained that NGOs are not being fair in their distributions and stressed that some settlements didn’t receive any help at a time when other settlements get simultaneous help from different groups.

5.3.1.4 Housing Allowance

Last but not least, as UNHCR provides housing subsidy for Syrian refugees in Jordan, it should provide housing allowance to most vulnerable Syrian refugees in Lebanon, if helping all registered refugees is not possible. In 2013 while covering a news story, the researcher met Um Mohammad, she was an old lady in her early seventies selling tissues on Verdun Street. She said that she lost the three of her sons during the Syrian war and she was selling tissues because she became the only family provider for her grandchildren. She was living in a small room in Ouzai and taking care of seven kids; the eldest was 6 years old. A year later the researcher met the same women by coincidence in an informal settlement in Ketermaya. She moved to a tent with her grandchildren. She said that she couldn’t afford keeping them in that small room. Um Mohammad represents one of the most vulnerable refugees and people like her should not be left alone to fight for their living.

Jordan is an example of a country that overlooked security threats posed by Palestinians as they first arrived to Jordan and succeeded in integrating a large number of them on the long run, at a time when Lebanon is still suffering from security threats posed by Palestinian camps that became shelters for extremist groups. Those who were sent in booby-trapped cars to kill themselves in Beirut southern suburb were connected in one way or another to Palestinian camps. Lebanese shouldn’t repeat the same mistake with Syrians and blame them for kidnapping Lebanese soldiers or for turning the borders of Arsal into battlefields. On the contrary, they should understand that refugees are hurt more than the Lebanese by such actions, and that they can do nothing about them. Naturalizing the Syrians seems impossible for the time being but the Lebanese state should find another way to embrace and integrate Syrian refugees.

5.4 Camps vis-à-vis Settlements...

Before comparing camps to settlements and studying the pros and cons of each model to decide which is the best model suitable for hosting Syrian refugees,
one should keep in mind two aspects: first at a time when Syrian refugees in Lebanon prefer the current situation and would rather stay in informal dispersed settlements, Lebanese host community prefers to build camps and host the refugees in them. The second aspect is Lebanon’s bad experience in managing camps and keeping its refugees safe the way it dealt with Palestinian camps, knowing that they serve as the worst model of similar camps in the region.

On the other hand, the main difference between settlements and camps is that the first encourages integration and creates a less dependable community, whereas the second hinders integration and creates a community that depends on external assistance. UNHCR is finding troubles in getting full funding, thus many refugees have been suspended from its program. In turn, this created a dependable refugee community, which on the long run might jeopardize the lives of thousands of refugees.

An appeal for the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, or 3RP, for 2017 was launched in Helsinki in January - seeking US$4.63 billion. So far, only US$433 million — or 9 per cent of the funding sought — has been received, aggravating an already precarious situation. Last year’s plan received just 63 per cent (US$2.88 billion) of the US$4.54 billion requested. This has left Syrian refugees – over 70 per cent of whom are women and children – facing the prospect of deep cuts to health, shelter, protection and other services (UNHCR Warns Funding Cuts threaten Aid).

In her study that was published in Forced Migration Online, Anna Schmidt talked about the advantages and disadvantages of both camps and settlements. She mentioned that while camps ignore the resources and capacities of refugees themselves, defenders of camps emphasize their advantages in “facilitating organized repatriation of refugees, attracting international assistance due to the higher visibility of impact, and their superior ability to monitor and target recipients and distribute aid faster and more effectively” (Schmidt 7). She also notices that camps assure the most basic right, the right to life by becoming a part of international ‘burden sharing’.
However, other critics warn from endangering more basic rights like restrictions on freedom of movement (Schmidt 11).

Camps also pose a sort of security threat. “Camps do not solve security problems. They are in fact added sources of instability and insecurity … because they aggravate existing security problems and create new ones” (The Forgotten Solution 13). Camps also “provide fertile ground for recruitment of young men and woman for military activities by rebel groups” (Schmidt 13).

There is widespread evidence that refugees import with them the security problems of the regions they flee, and create new dynamics in the RHA that lead to other security problems like crime. As shown in the Appendix, both camp and self-settled refugees are subject to a range of dangers, including direct attacks on camps, military recruitment, and resentment and abuse by locals and authorities. From the perspective of the host government, placing refugees in camps might seem to address these problems. Camps sequester refugees from the host population, and make them easier to monitor and control. However, camps do not solve security problems and are in fact added sources of instability and insecurity for the RHA because they aggravate existing security problems and create new ones (The Forgotten Solution 13).

Camps include ingredients for crime and violence where frustrated men become more open to get involved with militias and to commit organized crimes. Crimes for example flourished in some camps especially in West Africa and the Thai-Burmese border that became zones of drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal logging, and gun running (The Forgotten Solution 13).

Moreover, Jacobson finds in her study that self-settlements are safer when camps become targets to enemies. On the other hand, it is difficult for UNHCR and NGOs to reach self-settled refugees and protect them.
It is true that planned settlements focus on productive potential of the refugees making them independent of international aid. However, the success of planned settlements also depends on the economic capacity of host community which plays a role in facilitating or hindering integration. It is believed that for the benefits of local economy it’s better to keep refugees within camps, thus international community can share their economic burden.

Gaim Kibreab argued that with Africa being unable to provide essential goods and services for its citizens because of its economic problems makes integration “wishful thinking based on inadequate understanding of the economic, social and political realities of the present day Africa” (Kibreab 474). Thus it’s better to keep refugees in camps or even planned settlements as long as they are not self-settled.

However, integration would seem an acceptable choice if refugees bring with them new goods and services without inflicting any competition to the local citizens. Otherwise, integration according to Jacobson would have a negative effect on local labor market. If refugees are more skilled or agree to take fewer wages, there is a possibility that they will displace local people and replace them. This, on the other hand, would bring positive consequences for the overall economy and productivity of the host country.

Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale tried to summarize the different types of hosting methods in their book *Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations*. They divided their methods into grouped settlements which include collective centers and self-settled camps vis-à-vis dispersed settlements where refugees stay with host families or on their own in rural or urban areas.

The authors argue that it is more difficult for refugees in group settlements to achieve durable solutions in comparison to those from dispersed settlements. Refugees in dispersed settlements rely more on each other and on their own capabilities. Whereas, refugees in grouped settlements act collectively, relying heavily on external assistance (Corsellis and Vitale 69).

The below table summarizes the disadvantages of both models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems with dispersed settlements</th>
<th>Problems with grouped settlements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees self-settle close to border areas</td>
<td>Risk to security of both displaced and</td>
</tr>
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which may increase their vulnerability in addition to the vulnerability of host society

host society as camps might encourage insurgency by armed forces

Compromised security if there is history of hostility between refugees and host community or whether they have different ethnic or political background

Concentration of demand of natural sources

Confusion to aid agencies making assessment of need difficult resulting in inappropriate assistance programs also affecting speed and efficiency of aid

Segregation causes inequality of support offered to refugees with respect to host communities, which might create tension

Sometimes, security and stability brought by local authorities and aid communities can be enhanced more if refugees are concentrated into groups

De-skilling and increased dependency within displaced population

High capital investment without knowing how much the situation will remain

(Corsellis, Vitale 72-73)

5.5 Suggesting Possible Methods and Solutions to Host Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

While UNHCR suggested building camps in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanese government insisted that any camp should be built in border areas⁹. Members of Lebanese host community also favored the option of camps in border areas at a time when Syrians preferred the current form of informal settlements dispersed in different Lebanese areas.

UNHCR took a good decision when it refused to build camps on border areas knowing that they are not secured by Lebanese security forces and can be targeted by both extremist groups and Syrian regime. This option does not only pose danger over the refugees but it can also intensify already existing insecurity of border areas, risking the security of border villages. While hosting all refugees in camps is rejected by Lebanese government, UNHCR should suggest the possibility of hosting the most vulnerable refugees in a camp that can be built in the Bekaa Valley. This camp shall

⁹ This was thoroughly discussed in chapter 2
only include refugees who cannot depend on themselves, and who can only survive on international assistance. They include elderly, orphans, sick refugees, and refugees with physical and mental disabilities who lost their caregiver. Having these people in a camp would make it easier for them to get needed assistance and refugees like these won’t cause security threat for the host community.

Other refugees who are content in staying in informal settlements, at a time when Lebanese government refuses the possibility of building camps, can stay where they are as they wish. Informal settlements help refugees depend on themselves, especially when UNHCR complains about not getting sufficient funds. Nevertheless, their legal status should be adjusted by exempting them from yearly residency fees.

This seems as the most reasonable solution, which is the closest to local integration that is suggested by UNHCR as one of three durable solutions, in addition to voluntary repatriation and resettlement.

Voluntary repatriation seems currently impossible, since Syria is still not a safe place to return to, and most of the refugees that the researcher has met refuse to go back until the war is totally over. As for resettlement it is transferring refugees from an asylum country to another to be granted permanent settlement.

UNHCR is mandated by its Statute and the UN General Assembly Resolutions to undertake resettlement as one of the three durable solutions. Resettlement is unique in that it is the only durable solution that involves the relocation of refugees from an asylum country to a third country. There were 16.1 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world at the end of 2015, but less than one per cent were resettled that year (Bavman 2017).

According to UNHCR 16,300 Syrian refugees were sent to a third country leaving Lebanon in 2016. Although this is a step that helps Lebanon in decreasing the number of refugees, however more than a million refugees are still in Lebanon. Thus dealing with their presence is indispensable.
5.5.1 Compensating the Lebanese Host Society

To keep refugees in their informal settlements as they wish, UNHCR in addition to NGOs should compensate host communities in order to help Lebanese locals overcome their incurred hardships and resentments.

There is evidence to suggest that poorer host communities can be hurt by refugee influxes. At the start of a refugee emergency, the condition of the host community should be assessed to determine assistance required by that community as well as that required by the refugee population (Chambers, 42-43).

On the other hand, the Lebanese society and international community should expect that Syrians would not leave Lebanon anytime soon as the situation in their homeland is still dangerous with many international players taking part in the war over there. Hence “mechanisms to protect and assist refugees need to be changed to provide effective long-term support that is sustainable and promotes development, returns dignity and self-respect to refugees’ groups, and is acceptable to the host community” (Roberts 1).

The major problem of how UNHCR dealt with helping Syrian refugees is that it didn’t implement durable solutions from the beginning, at a time when its representatives always complained about not getting enough funds.

The problem with funding is that it either targets relief programs or development, which creates what the author called “relief-development gap”. Refugees and development are usually perceived as two different issues, they deal with refugees as a temporary situation and emergencies, that’s why they focus on the need of relief instead of development, lacking the skills and experience of long-term planning (Roberts 40-41).
Although, better planning should have been implemented from the beginning, nevertheless UNHCR, the international community, NGOs and the Lebanese government can still network to improve the situation.

5.5.2 Role of the Lebanese State and the International Community

This thesis shows how Lebanese host community changed from welcoming the Syrians and helping them, to blaming them for their economic and social deterioration. That’s why depending on shared norms, beliefs, and culture becomes insufficient to maintain a healthy relationship between refugees and host community. Although, constructivism explains why Lebanon opened its borders to the refugees despite the fact that it is not a part of 1951 Convention or other international treatment, it sets the basics of liberalism that will help Lebanese government keep refugees within its state, without risking its stability and security.

Thus, this thesis will mainly refer to liberal school while studying possible recommendations to be applied by Lebanese state, in order to help it deal with the economic and social burden of Syrian refugees on its host communities.

While international community should share the burden with the Lebanese state, the latter has also to play a role in reaching international community, and convince it to help Lebanon and its host community in accommodating more than a million and a half Syrian refugees. In her book *The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns*, Emma Haddad talked about refugees as responsibility of the whole international society, asserting the role of international institutions in ensuring sovereign and equal states that guarantee human rights in general and rights of refugees in particular.

"The (modern) refugee is only fully intelligible within the context of a pluralist system of states in which individual political communities fail to guarantee the content of substantive sovereignty" (Haddad 63).

Syrian refugees are not the sole responsibility of Lebanon. They didn’t choose it as their exile neither did Lebanon offer help. However, due to its close distance to Syria and shared culture and family ties, Lebanon was one of the few options that were considered as a safe haven for Syrians. International and Arab community are obliged to support Lebanon in taking over the responsibility to help refugees and provide them with the economic and social aids needed to guarantee decent living conditions.
On the other hand, Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher talked about the concept of “cross-issue persuasion” where UNHCR plays a role in convincing Northern powerful states to help southern weak ones, in their mission of hosting refugees. Southern states become the refugees’ destination only because of their geographical location. South states lack economic and social factors that enable them to bear the consequences turning them into asylum countries. That’s why north states should take part in sharing the burden and it is the duty of UNHCR to convince them about the nature and scope of this cooperation.

Lebanon and UNHCR can use the pretext of terrorist attacks taking place in different European countries to warn about dangerous outcomes if refugees are not helped, as they can be radicalized and may also be obliged to take illegal routes of migration. Extremist groups can also succeed in recruiting refugees due to their economic needs, which will worsen regional and international security.

What Lebanon should ask for is development projects that benefit both its citizens and Syrian refugees in addition to better access to education and employment. However, development plans are hindered by the distrust between international donors and host societies.

Donors may suspect that host society is propagating for development plans to personally benefit from the international aid instead of helping the refugees. On the other hand, when international donors would positively like to pursue development plans, host society would worry that their intentions hide inclinations to permanently integrate refugees within host society (Roberts 41).

Both Lebanese government and international community should acknowledge that a well-established development plan isn’t only good for Lebanese community but also for Syrian refugees. Knowing that high percentage of Syrian refugees live in Bekaa and in north Lebanon, it is good to mention that these two regions suffer the most.
“Sixty per cent of the registered Syrian refugees are in the North and Beka’a Valley regions, which are also the poorest regions in Lebanon. These two regions have been historically marginalized as reconstruction after the end of the civil war in Lebanon in 1990 saw most wealth flow to the greater Beirut region” (Dahi 2014).

International organizations should support villages that receive refugees to encourage them.

Assistance given to refugees had long-term consequences for their integration into host societies, and for the economic and political development of host states. Assistance could create resentment against refugees, especially when the host society was also suffering from deprivation or political tension, as after the First World War. This highlights a particular risk: when assistance to refugees is perceived as being a kind of favoritism provided by external actors, or coming at the cost of local taxpayers, tensions can quickly rise (White et al 2016).

Additionally, when Lebanon was in the midst of its reconstruction boom in the late nineties, 600,000 to 700,000 seasonal Syrian migrant workers, worked in the big infrastructure projects and in agriculture. Launching similar projects, funded by the international community, building highways, school and hospitals, can ensure the proper infrastructure to host communities help them bear the burden of thousands of refugees, and at the same time employ thousands of Syrians and Lebanese in good paying jobs.

Natural resources, in addition to electric and health services have been affected by the huge refugee influx in regions that are already underdeveloped. Municipalities should be given greater role in carrying out development projects by
cooperating with UNHCR as they know best the needs of their local society. However, UNHCR should be responsible for deciding how to finance the projects.

Shifting to development means investment in upgrading the water, electricity and health infrastructure as well as launching projects (perhaps with mixed public and private sector involvement) that can generate jobs and alleviate poverty. These must target the most vulnerable areas such as the Beka’a Valley and the North in Lebanon and the Mafraq governorate in Jordan. Such spending should target all vulnerable communities particularly in the most under-served areas. Development initiatives administered by the state such as infrastructural investment in services, health care, education and job creation, and targeting host communities as well as refugees, have the benefit of strengthening state capacity and relieving tensions at the same time as addressing refugees’ needs (Dahi 2014).

Other projects should include training programs to teach Syrian refugees activities that they can rely on for their living, to make them less dependent on humanitarian aids.

Most refugees are children who therefore have specific needs in terms of schooling, training, and health care. If refugee children do not go to school, human capital cannot be built, with consequent long term developmental implications. Understanding the potential dimensions of this loss helps to design policies that prevent or at least mitigate these losses (Verme et al 44).

For this purpose, international community should take part in improving public school sector in Lebanon, to help both Lebanese and Syrian students. Public schools in Lebanon work in two shifts, the morning shift includes Lebanese students
and afternoon shift includes Syrian students. Still almost half of Syrian children are not registered in schools in Lebanon. It’s important for Lebanese as much as it is important for Syrians to send Syrian students to get an education because “by failing to educate refugee children, the international community is not only dashing their hopes and aspirations but also turning a blind eye to potential environments where violent extremism can take hold” (Brandt and Robert 2017).

International community should also improve employment opportunities and help in opening markets to Syrian refugees. This can be done by initiating partnerships with private sectors in host societies, in a way to create working opportunities without negatively affecting the position of Lebanese locals.

This can be done by “enabling refugees to access seed funding to start new businesses, and where necessary providing them with the technical assistance to do so; and procuring goods and services from businesses that hire refugees” (Brandt and Robert 2017).

Increasing foreign aid is the only way that will make all these recommendations possible. Unfortunately “Syrian Crisis Fund, intended to finance the internationally agreed humanitarian response plan for Syria and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) regional refugee and resilience plan, is less than half funded” (Brandt 2016). International community should know that by funding these projects they are not only helping Lebanon and other host countries but also helping themselves by keeping these refugees in Lebanon rather than hosting them in their own countries and tolerating the burden.

5.6 Conclusion

This paper has reached the conclusion that it’s better for refugees to remain in their informal settlements, as per their wishes, if the other option is keeping them in camps built between the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Although border camps are preferred by Lebanese government and people, nevertheless, these camps are dangerous for both the Syrians and Lebanese security, as they can be on one hand targeted by Syrian army and on the other hand be turned into a harbor for extremist groups in border areas.

It is true that all Lebanese locals interviewed preferred hosting refugees in camps. However, the intensity of hostility differed from one village to the other.
Local politics definitely had its effect on the relationship between refugees and different host communities. The highly tensed relation between locals of Al Marj and Syrian refugees can be attributed to the fact that Al Marj didn’t draw limits from the beginning when Syrian refugees first arrived. The Sunni village was totally supportive of the Syrian revolution and Syrian refugees who fled Assad’s regime. That’s why Syrians found themselves able to work in different fields, which led to higher competition with the locals of Al Marj.

On the other hand, the scenario was different in Al Haleneyeh and Kherbet Kanafar. While in the first village Hezbollah tried to keep the situation under its control drawing limits for the refugees from the beginning, locals of Kherbet Kanafar knew what they wanted from the refugees and benefited from the services they supply, which are usually not fulfilled by the locals. Still, the locals of both villages showed some concerns related to high number of refugees; however, they reflected less hostile emotions than their counterparts in Al Haleneyeh.

Future research can try to tackle this issue by studying larger number of villages with different sectarian background. Elaborating on this angle can show how local politics affect the relations between refugees and host communities. Future research can also elaborate more on what development projects could the Lebanese government adopt and how they can be financed by international community and rich Arab countries in order to ease the hostile relations between refugees and host communities.

Meanwhile, knowing that the received aid funds don’t exceed 60% of needed amount received in 2016, it is better not to turn refugees into dependent individuals who rely on international aids but to survive relying on their own capabilities. Thus:

a) Municipalities should take part with UNHCR to organize these informal settlements and to carry out development projects that benefit both groups. Public school sector, water, electric, health, and road infrastructure projects should be implemented as they provide parallel benefits for locals and refugees.

b) Tents should be replaced with prefabricated shelters. Residency fees should be cancelled.

c) Funding should be increased and host villages should be included in assistantship programs to facilitate integration of Syrian refugees. Also the West should play a role in creating employment opportunities.
d) Informal settlements can still facilitate repatriation as soon as the war in Syria is over. Also they can facilitate the work of NGOs that can reach the refugees easily under the condition that the effort of NGOs is organized under one official representative.

e) Although camps should be avoided, nevertheless, there is no harm in constructing a camp inside Bekaa to host most vulnerable refugees who cannot integrate within the society.

It is the duty of the developed countries to help Lebanon in hosting Syrian refugees, otherwise these refugees will seek illegal roots to move into these developed countries or they will be an easy target for extremist groups. Fighting poverty will help sustain stability in the region and in the world.
Works Cited


Guterres, António. "High-Level Segment of the 66th session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme on the Afghan refugee situation.” Closing remarks by António Guterres, United Nations High


Saade, Wissam. "For Lebanese Christians not all Syrians are Syrians." The Peace Building in Lebanon, no. 7, Feb. 2015, p. 5,


NOTICE OF IRB APPROVAL

To: Ms. Ghinwa Yatim
    Advisor: Dr. Imad Salamey
    Assistant Professor
    School of Arts & Sciences

Date: 7 March 2017
RE: IRB #: LAU.SAS.IS1.7/Mar/2017
    Protocol Title: Hosting Model for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

The above referenced research project has been approved by the Lebanese American University, Institutional Review Board (LAU IRB). This approval is limited to the activities described in the Approved Research Protocol and all submitted documents listed on page 2 of this letter. Enclosed with this letter are the stamped approved documents that must be used.

APPROVAL CONDITIONS FOR ALL LAU APPROVED HUMAN RESEARCH PROTOCOLS

LAU RESEARCH POLICIES: All individuals engaged in the research project must adhere to the approved protocol and all applicable LAU IRB Research Policies. PARTICIPANTS must NOT be involved in any research related activity prior to IRB approval date or after the expiration date.

PROTOCOL EXPIRATION: The LAU IRB approval expiry date is listed above. The IRB Office will send an email at least 45 days prior to protocol approval expiry - Request for Continuing Review - in order to avoid any temporary hold on the initial protocol approval. It is your responsibility to apply for continuing review and receive continuing approval for the duration of the research project. Failure to send Request for Continuation before the expiry date will result in suspension of the approval of this research project on the expiration date.

MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS: All protocol modifications must be approved by the IRB prior to implementation.

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT COMPLETION: A notification of research project closure and a summary of findings must be sent to the IRB office upon completion. Study files must be retained for a period of 3 years from the date of notification of project completion.

IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ABOVE CONDITIONS, THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR SHOULD MEET WITH THE IRB ADMINISTRATORS IN ORDER TO RESOLVE SUCH CONDITIONS. IRB APPROVAL CANNOT BE GRANTED UNTIL NON-COMPLIANT ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact the IRB office by email at christine.chalhoub@lau.edu.lb
The IRB operates in compliance with the national regulations pertaining to research under the Lebanese Minister of Public Health’s Decision No. 141 dated 27/1/2016 under LAU IRB Authorization reference 2016/3708, the international guidelines for Good Clinical Practice, the US Office of Human Research Protection (45CFR46) and the Food and Drug Administration (21CFR56). LAU IRB U.S. Identifier as an international institution: FWA00014723 and IRB Registration # IRB00006954 LAUIRB#1

Dr. Costantina Dabhar

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