LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

The Role of the Arab League and the European Union as Regional Security Organizations

By

Pedro Martínez Díez

A Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs

School of Arts and Sciences

June 2017

LAU
الجامعة اللبنانية الأميركية
Lebanese American University

THESIS APPROVAL FORM

Student Name: Pedro Martinez Diez I.D. #: 201408667

Thesis Title : The role of the Arab League and the European Union as regional security organizations

Program: International Affairs

Department: Social Sciences

School: Arts and Sciences

The undersigned certify that they have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis and approved it in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:

Master of Arts in the major of International Affairs

Thesis Advisor's Name	Dr. Imad Salamey	Signat[redacted]	DATE: 19 / 6 / 17 (Day / Month / Year)
Committee Member's Name	Dr. Sami Baroudi	Signat[redacted]	DATE: 19 / 6 / 17 (Day / Month / Year)
Committee Member's Name	Jennifer Skulte Ouaiss	Signat[redacted]	DATE: 19 / 6 / 17 (Day / Month / Year)

LAU
الجامعة اللبنانية الأميركية
Lebanese American University

THESIS COPYRIGHT RELEASE FORM

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NON-EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION LICENSE

By signing and submitting this license, you (the author(s) or copyright owner) grants the Lebanese American University (LAU) the non-exclusive right to reproduce, translate (as defined below), and/or distribute your submission (including the abstract) worldwide in print and electronic formats and in any medium, including but not limited to audio or video. You agree that LAU may, without changing the content, translate the submission to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation. You also agree that LAU may keep more than one copy of this submission for purposes of security, backup and preservation. You represent that the submission is your original work, and that you have the right to grant the rights contained in this license. You also represent that your submission does not, to the best of your knowledge, infringe upon anyone's copyright. If the submission contains material for which you do not hold copyright, you represent that you have obtained the unrestricted permission of the copyright owner to grant LAU the rights required by this license, and that such third-party owned material is clearly identified and acknowledged within the text or content of the submission. IF THE SUBMISSION IS BASED UPON WORK THAT HAS BEEN SPONSORED OR SUPPORTED BY AN AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN LAU, YOU REPRESENT THAT YOU HAVE FULFILLED ANY RIGHT OF REVIEW OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS REQUIRED BY SUCH CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT. LAU will clearly identify your name(s) as the author(s) or owner(s) of the submission, and will not make any alteration, other than as allowed by this license, to your submission.

Name: Pedro [redacted]

Signature: [redacted]

Date: May 4th 2 [redacted]

LAU
الجامعة اللبنانية الأميركية
Lebanese American University

PLAGIARISM POLICY COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

I certify that:

1. I have read and understood LAU's Plagiarism Policy.
2. I understand that failure to comply with this Policy can lead to academic and disciplinary actions against me.
3. This work is substantially my own, and to the extent that any part of this work is not my own I have indicated that by acknowledging its sources.

Name: Pe[redacted]

Signature: [redacted]

Date: May 4[redacted]

Dedication

To my parents, for providing me with every opportunity they never had

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my supervisor, Doctor Imad Salamey, for his continuous support and guidance throughout the entire process. Also, my two committee-members, Doctors Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss and Sami Baroudi, who have been of immense help and have offered their assistance every step of the way.

The Role of the Arab League and the European Union as Regional Security Organizations

Pedro Martínez Díez

ABSTRACT

Regionalism has been gaining relevance as a decisive factor shaping national security. Using mechanisms and initiatives provided by regional alliances, states have found in regionalism a means to deter external threats. The Arab League and the European Union, for example, are two regional organizations that have confronted security threats -- internal as well as external. In different ways, they have utilized regional security policies and strategies to mitigate conflicts and contain external threats. Through a comparative analysis of their success and effectiveness in crises management, this study aims to provide an assessment of both entities' approaches to mitigate the Darfur and Syrian conflicts. The thesis provides a preliminary evaluation of the approaches implemented while highlighting the advantages and challenges of regionalism in conflict and security management.

Keywords: European Union, Arab League, Regional Organizations, Security, Conflict resolution

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 1
1.1 Introduction. 1
1.2 Arab League. 6
1.2.1 The structure of the Arab League. 9
1.3 European Union. 12
1.3.1 The structure of the European Union. 14
1.4 Comparison of the bodies 15
1.5 The question. 18
1.6 Methodology 20
Chapter 2 22
2.1 Literature review 22
2.1.1 Introduction. 22
2.2 Positivist approaches to regional projects. 24
2.2.1 Classical integration theory 24
2.2.2 New Regionalism. 26
2.3 From constructivism to the region-building approach. 27
2.3.1 Regional security complex theory. 28
2.3.2 The security community theory. 29
2.4 Contemporary EU studies. 30
Chapter 3 31
3.1 New challenges in the matter of security for regional organizations. 31
3.2 Conflict resolution in the Arab League 34
3.2.1 Collective security. 37
3.2.2 The role of the Arab League in the Arab Spring. 40
3.3 Prevention of conflict: the case of the European Union. 51
3.3.1 The European Union: a successful experiment in conflict prevention 52
3.3.2 The prevention of conflict in the normative framework of foreign policy: European treaties and the European security strategy. 55
3.3.3 European action in the matter of conflict prevention: from specific action to a better coherence and effectiveness. 57
3.3.4 A global scope for prevention: horizontal strategy and instruments. 60
3.3.5 The politics of conflict prevention: a general assessment. 62
Chapter 4 65
4. Case studies. 65
4.1 Syria. 66
4.1.1 The role of the Arab League 66
4.1.2 The role of the European Union. 68
4.2 Darfur. 72
4.2.1 The role of the Arab League 73
4.2.2 The role of the European Union. 78
4.2.2.1 Short-term actions. 79
4.2.2.2 Long-term actions. 80
Chapter 5 82
5.1 Conclusions. 82
5.2 Recommendations. 86
References. 90

List of Tables

Table 1 Comparison of bodies……15
Table 2 Comparison of instruments……18

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction.

Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the maintenance of international peace and security as the first purpose of the Organization. In order to achieve this objective, the United Nations planned to develop preventive actions, actions to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes or controversies, or even coercive measures of various kinds. Chapters VI "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" and VII, "Actions in case of threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression," capture many of these possibilities.

Chapter VI, in particular, seeks to find a solution, first and foremost, through negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resorting to regional bodies or agreements, or other peaceful means. A first reference to the possible intervention of Regional Organizations can be illustrated in the case of the Cold War.

During the years of the Cold War, the United Nations seldom launched any Peace Operations. This was mainly due to the confrontation between the Western and Easter blocs which incapacitated the Security Council. In almost 45 years, only thirteen operations were initiated in interstate conflicts. These were mainly operations to observe compliance with a Peace Agreement, with the consent of the parties, in which unarmed military observers were deployed. Forces under the command of the UN were rarely sent on the ground, and no other type of action to resolve conflict accompanied these initiatives.

However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the number of operations increased considerably, especially in the 1990s. At the same time, operations became progressively more complex. For instance, actions were no longer limited to conflicts between States as Resolution 688 of the Security Council (adopted in 1991) extended involvement to internal conflicts -- especially in areas where government functions were suspended and chaos had spread. In these operations, it was no longer sufficient to deploy observers or forces to supervise agreement. Instead, these forces must also extend their efforts to several other duties including securitization of protected areas, humanitarian aid, supervision of electoral processes, safeguarding human rights etc. At the same time, it is also necessary to involve more non-military entities. Resources specialized in fields such as administration, democratization, reconstruction, justice, human rights, humanitarian aid or electoral processes, along with an increased involvement of local police forces, also play a role in conflict mediation.

Little by little, the concept of classic peace operations has been forsaken while the participation of actors from very different fields has increased. This resulted in initiatives becoming more multifunctional and multidisciplinary. At the same time, however, the United Nations system was overwhelmed by the complexity and number of developing operations, which led to the failure of some of them (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia) and eventually prompted a reconstruction of the organization itself. One notable consequence of all these changes was the growing support of regional organizations in the development of operations, under the supervision of the United Nations, leading to the “regionalization” of security.

Up until 1990, there were no references to Regional Organizations in Security Council Resolutions aimed at conflict prevention and resolution. After 1991, however, these references became common, with Resolutions explicitly citing Chapter VIII of the Charter. They expressed appreciation for regional efforts to resolve conflicts, support cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, or regional initiatives. Most references had to do with attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement, but in 1992 the Security Council authorized for the first time the use of force by a regional organization, during the Bosnian war. That year, in the Program for Peace, then-Secretary General Boutros Gali called for the involvement of Regional Organizations, requesting synergies with United Nations mechanisms.

The process of regionalizing peacekeeping operations is a matter of great interest. It has become immensely important to the international community and a necessity because it has, in the majority of cases, thwarted the violation of fundamental human rights and restored peace and security in certain countries that had been convulsed by a series of conflicts.

Additionally, the regionalization of peace operations (preventive diplomacy, establishment, consolidation and peacekeeping, state-building operations) has contributed to the democratization of international relations. Consequently, international organizations have been playing a more important role in maintaining international peace and security. Due to this, regional organizations that were created for defensive or economic purposes have had to adapt to the requirements presented to them by peace-keeping operations and adopt mechanisms that would

allow them to develop such peace keeping operations to guarantee the development and progress of their peoples, as well as to ensure the full fundamental rights and freedom of their citizens.

Nonetheless, the debate on the role of regional organizations in the field of peace keeping and security, and the adequacy of their actions, remains open. At the same time, it does not seem that society in general is aware of the role assumed by these regional organizations, nor does it seem to recognize that a global culture has been created through the awareness of issues such as international peace and security.

This thesis aims to shed light on the role of the European Union and the Arab League as regional security organizations. The study uses the Darfur and Syria crises as case studies and examples of two conflicts that these organizations have had to address and reviews the history and function of both regional organizations to examine their instruments and actions.

This analysis should help reveal which mechanisms were successful and which were not. It also provides a clearer picture of how a regional organization can better react to security threats.

Assessing the dynamics between regional organizations and security threats is especially important because countering these threats is a pivotal matter of concern in the modern world. It can be argued that regionalism has proven to be a major force towards global change in the last decades (Söderbaum: 2013). Although this tendency towards integration has been a constant since World War II, its growing importance in future global affairs would only be revealed during the Cold War. This

political current has been strongly influenced by the economic integration that the world has experimented in modern history.

The performance of these regional organizations around the globe is extremely varied. Europe has, for instance, the highest density of regional institutions and these organs can become rather intrusive when it comes to certain matters that affect national sovereignty. Other regions of the world may not have such a high density of institutions, but tend to be more flexible and inclusive when it comes to decision-making in their regional organizations. One example is the Middle East which is mainly represented by the Arab League (Acharya, Johnston: 2007).

Security matters, and how regional organizations work to mollify them, is of utmost importance these days. If these organizations seek to tackle the global challenges and threats that confront them today, they need to equip themselves with the proper military and civil capacities that will empower them in the role of international actor with full responsibility and autonomy.

The European Union and Arab League are already perceived as global actors by other agents in the international scene who wish to cooperate with them to resolve matters that they could not address solely on their own. As they increase their capacity to react to security threats, particularly terrorism and the management of complex crises, the expectations of other international organizations and nations, as well as public opinion in general, will grow.

In a study like this, it is vital to provide historical context to trace back the development of these regional organizations and understand how current events

were shaped. The two organizations discussed in this thesis have similar yet very distinctive inceptions that are worth explaining briefly.

1.2 Arab League.

The realization of Arab unity has been a popular aspiration among the Arabs. Starting with the creation in the seventh century of the vast Arab empire, which was contemporary to the advent of Islam, it continued in the nineteenth century, on the occasion of the birth of nationalist movements in Europe. The Arab nationalist movement was suddenly revived in the Arab countries, which were at the time under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's entry into World War I gave the many Arab nationalists the hope of creating their independent state in collaboration with Britain.

During World War II, Cairo, the capital of Egypt, was the center of the economic and military decision-making of the British in the Middle East. This key strategic position allowed the Egyptian government to initiate talks with other Arab States to consolidate a closer union among all of them. At that time, the situation in all Arab States was very different; while in the Iraqi and Syrian governments there was a clear desire to foster links between Arab countries, Lebanon (with a large Christian population) did not look at that prospect positively. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the feeling of Arab unity was already more widespread, albeit always keeping national interests ahead. The fact that war had contributed significantly to consolidating the sense of unity among all the Arabs was very clear. This narrowing of ties resulted in a first attempt to create a League of Arab States, further favored by the British impulse, which further ensured the influence in the area.

On March 22 1945, the representatives of seven Arab States signed a pact establishing the League of Arab States. England, which at that time exerted a powerful influence on Arab countries, favored the idea of the creation of this voluntary association of sovereign Arab States. Among the Arabs, opinions were very divided. Some considered the value of the League to be minimum; others were fervent supporters and considered that the creation of the League was the end of a period of historical events and the decisive step towards the unification and liberation of the Arab countries from foreign domination.

Thus the organization was founded in 1945 and based on a somewhat shared culture and common language. The League was established to help Arab countries better coordinate their policies, achieve a united political discourse in the international scene and bring a better future that all Arabs could be a part of. The Charter includes measures for the coordination of multiple affairs including political, economical, legal, security, social, cultural and educational matters. It also supports coordination of trade, immigration between member states and health issues.

All Arab countries are currently members of the League -- even those outside of the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) territories. The seven founding members were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Palestine was also given the status of founding member, with full voting rights, even if at the time it was not, and still isn't, an independent state. The Palestine Liberation Organization, then led by Yasser Arafat, became the country's voting representative

in the 1970's. Over time, the League swelled to the 22 members that it comprises today while various external states have acted as observers over the years.

Establishing this organization, to a large extent, aimed to counter external domination as Western interference has always been a major issue in the Arab World. Internal rivalries also need to be dealt with. Consequently, the League has vowed to replace them with cooperative relationships that would help develop the entire group. The current secretary general is Egyptian-born Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who started his mandate in 2016. Out of the eight general secretaries that the League has had, only one of them has not been Egyptian, which reveals the predominant role this country plays in the League.

The Arab League can be considered a pioneer organization. It was established before World War II ended and thus preceded the United Nations. Because the League is rooted in the ideals of Pan-Arabism and protecting itself from European colonialism, it is not surprising that members subscribed the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, which obliged them to come to one another's aid upon external attack and to abstain from using violence against each other.

It is also easy to understand how, from this perspective, the creation of Israel could be seen as just another extension of the West's colonial domination. The West tried to use land in Palestine to make amends and to plant a bastion in the region. These actions have led to suffering among the Arabs who lived there (Toffolo: 2008).

1.2.1 The structure of the Arab League.

With the addition of every new country, the League's operations shift and the influence of each member diminishes. Egypt, for example, has always played a major role in the organization given its size, but in 1980 it was expelled after signing a bilateral peace agreement with Israel. The country was allowed back into the League, but was made to work more cooperatively with the rich Gulf countries and other major actors within the organization.

With time, other changes ensued: new bodies were added, new principles of operation were used and the way in which the League makes decisions shifted. All these changes contributed to the creation of the League's Joint Defense Council in 1950. This organ was not only an effort to expand the level of cooperation between Arabs, but also a step forward towards the League's goal of mutual defense between its members. The Defense Council does not require a unanimous vote to take decisions; the League had learned that this was a very rare condition to be achieved.

Being one of the first regional organizations in the world, the Arab League introduced many concepts that would later be adopted by other international organizations like the United Nations. This process was two-sided, however, as the League would also come to reproduce other organizations' institutions – such as when it created the Arab Parliament, in 2005, based on the European Parliament.

The Arab League arguably has a weak body. It does not have a governing structure that is independent from the governments of the member states and, unlike the

Defense Council, the League's Council needs a unanimous vote to act. This debilitates it from proceeding forward in many situations.

The new political realities do not make any of these tasks easier. The League is torn between the idea of Pan-Arabism and the new-formed states' will to jealously guard their independence and power. In turn, the leaders of these very differently run countries have a hard time agreeing on some basic issues and external pressures, inherited from the Cold War, make intraregional security issues a sad reality.

The organizational structure of the Arab League is rather complex. It is built up as an intricate structure with specialized councils, committees, agencies and other different types of bodies. Its staff, around a thousand employees, is relatively small compared to that of the European Union, which has 20,000 people working for it.

The main bodies of the organization are the following:

- *The League Council:*

Composed of a representative from each member state, it is the organization's highest authority. The council makes the most important decisions and meets twice a year. Additional meetings can be called for by the Secretary General or two or more members, or by any of the member states if another member ever attacked it.

The Council discusses a vast array of issues and writes policies and rules. Each member gets one vote regardless of the size of its population. Important decisions require a unanimous vote. If it is only approved by the majority, the decision will be

exclusively binding in the countries that voted in its favor. Routine matters, however, only require two thirds of the votes to be binding.

- The Special Permanent Committees of the League Council:

The Council is advised by groups of ministers from the different States and technical staff to help them implement the decisions that have been made at the summits.

- The Specialized Ministerial Councils:

These are made up of the pertinent government ministers from each member state; they jointly write policies for their specific field.

- The Office of the Secretary General:

This is the organ that leads the League on a daily basis. The secretary general tries to alert the League to matters that could hurt relations between member states, or with other countries. He also makes sure that the decisions taken by the Council are carried out and will appease disputes between members.

- The Main Departments under the Secretary General:

An assistant Secretary General runs all departments under the Secretary General. This person writes reports and develops projects on the issues that are most important to the organization.

- The Arab Parliament:

Established in 2005, it is the newest organ of the Arab League. With 88 seats -- 4 per country -- its members are selected from every country's government. The

parliamentary meetings are biannual and exclusively tackle social, economic and cultural matters. New legislation cannot be proposed in the Parliament because this entity only reflects on issues that are referred to it by the Council. The absence of law-making powers makes it hard for this organ to become relevant, but such was the case with the European parliament in the beginning, at least partially. Thus, there is hope that the Arab Parliament could become more influential with time (Toffolo: 2008).

1.3 European Union.

World War One dealt a heavy blow to the hegemonic role that Europe had held for centuries. If we add to this the discomfort stemming from economic deterioration and political fragility, aggravated by the crash of 29 and the emergence of nationalisms, it is not surprising that a large body of thinkers and statesmen of the time came to the conviction that only through the unity of Europe could the decline of the continent be stopped. A whole range of Europeanist initiatives and movements arose, although they were still ambiguous, incoherent and lacking in maturity, which did convince the common citizenry.

With World War II, a decisive stage opened for the unification of the continent: a firm conviction was reached that such a hard and bloody conflict should never be repeated. The cornerstone was to launch an irreversible process of integration that would safeguard the security and progress of the continent on democratic bases.

The Marshall Plan (June 5th 1947) and the European Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD April 16th 1948) would favor economic reconstruction; in the political sphere, the Congress of The Hague (7-10 May 1948) brought the Europeanist movements of the time together and encouraged the establishment of a European assembly; on the military level, the signing of the Treaty of Brussels (17 May 1948) - the embryo of the Western European Union - and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Washington, April 4th, 1949), were the bases of the current organizations and bodies.

Undoubtedly, the Schuman Declaration of May 9th 1950 represents the culmination of all these efforts, as it would be the source of inspiration for the European Coal and Steel Community, the foundation stone of the European building. While it outlined an essentially economic plan - a joint coal and steel production under a common High Authority - the ultimate aspiration was to achieve one day political union, a genuine "European Federation", on the understanding that Economic ties would ease the political arena by creating "de facto solidarities" and dispelling historical rivalries.

The European Union was thus established with the goal of putting a halt to the bloody and recurrent wars between neighboring nations that culminated in World War II. The European Coal and Steel Community was born in 1950 to unite its six founding members -- Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands --and achieve lasting peace. During the Cold War, the Treaty of Rome gave birth to the European Economic Community, which created a common market as countries stopped charging custom duties. In 1973, Denmark, the United

Kingdom and Ireland joined, and the influence of the European Parliament in European Affairs increased as citizens were now able to elect their representatives directly. The 1980's brought Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Union and tore down the Berlin Wall, reunifying Germany. Austria, Finland and Sweden become part of the European Union in the 1990's, which also saw the introduction of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties and the Schengen agreement. The latter made it possible for Europeans to roam freely within the Union. Moreover, the Euro progressively became the common currency of Europeans in the decade of the 2000's, which also welcomed twelve more countries into the Union. Around that time, the Treaty of Lisbon was also introduced. This provided the Union with better institutions and coordination methods that were essential for several matters including security.

1.3.1 The structure of the European Union.

The organization has a rather unique institutional set-up: The European Council sets its main priorities where European and national leaders merge to discuss different issues. It sets the main direction of European policy but has no power to pass laws. The different national Heads of State that make it up meet for at least a few days every six months. The high representative for foreign affairs and security policy is also part of the Council.

Representatives that are directly elected by European citizens and are in charge legislation form the European Parliament. The number of elected representatives from every nation is proportionate to each country's size. It also has budgetary and supervisory responsibilities towards the Union's organs and member states.

The European Commission safeguards and promotes the interests of the Union as a whole. It is in charge of promoting and implementing legislation, policies and budgets. Each national government appoints its own members for the Commission. Moreover, each country also defends its own interests at the Council of the European Union. The Council serves as the voice of member states, adopts European laws and coordinates European policies. One of its most important tasks is developing the Union's foreign and security policy.

All responsibilities and powers are laid down in the Treaties, which are the main sources of rules in the European Union. They also explain the functions of the Union's different, smaller organs; these include the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions among others.

1.4 Comparison of the bodies

ARAB LEAGUE		EUROPEAN UNION	
BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS	BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS
Arab Parliament	Functions: - no law-making powers - exclusively social, economic and cultural matters Composition: - members are taken from every country's government	European Parliament	Functions: - legislative and budgetary - political control and consultation - elect the President of the Commission Composition: - representatives elected by the Union's citizens
Council of the League	Functions: - supreme organ - controls and coordinates the League's activities - sees that agreements passed by the various member states are	European Council	Functions: - define the general political directions and priorities - no legislative functions Composition: - Heads of State or Government of the

ARAB LEAGUE		EUROPEAN UNION	
BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS	BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS
	implemented; - appoints the Secretary General Composition: - representatives from the member states Decisions: - each member state has one vote - decisions of the Council are binding only for those states that have voted for them		Member States + its President + the President of the Commission Decisions: - by consensus (except where the Treaties provide otherwise)
		Council	Functions: - legislative and budgetary Composition: - a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote Decisions: - by qualified majority (except where the Treaties provide otherwise)

ARAB LEAGUE		EUROPEAN UNION	
BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS	BODIES	CHARACTERISTICS
Office of the Secretary General (Secretariat General)	- responsible for implementing decisions taken by the Council of the League - headed by the Secretary General with the assistance of several Assistant Secretary Generals and a staff some of whom are permanent, and some temporary - represents the Arab world at the international level	European Commission	Functions: - promote the general interest of the Union - ensure the application of the Treaties - oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union - execute the budget and manage programmes - exercise coordinating, executive and management functions - ensure the Union's external representation, with the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties

1.5 Comparison of instruments

RULES AND INSTRUMENTS			
ARAB LEAGUE		EUROPEAN UNION	
The Arab League Chart	Articles 6 and 7: - in case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council, who shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression; its decision shall be taken unanimously - the decision of the Council shall be binding on all the member States of the League; the decision of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the fundamental structure of that State	Treaty on European Union	Article 18: the High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign, security and defense policy; he shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council Title V: General provisions on the Union's External Action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy - Art. 21: principles that shall guide the Union's action on the international scene - Art. 22: the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union - Art. 24: the Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly; they shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union

RULES AND INSTRUMENTS			
ARAB LEAGUE		EUROPEAN UNION	
Treaty of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation	Articles 1 to 6: - The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means - The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace - A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions about aggressions or security threats. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission. The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	Part five: The Union's External Action - cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid - restrictive measures - international agreements - the Union's relations with international organizations and third countries - solidarity clause

1.6 The question.

This study attempts to answer the question of whether the European Union's action on conflict prevention and its resolutions have been more successful than those of the Arab League. If so, the thesis also aims to examine whether the European Union's very conception and organization contributed to its greater success. In addition, this study draws conclusions from the European Union and Arab League's actions in two conflicts, Darfur and Syria, analyzing which mechanisms were successful and which were not, and proposes some recommendations that would serve to improve the effectiveness of the actions of both organizations when preventing or dealing with resolving conflicts that threaten regional security.

1.7 Methodology.

In order to answer the question explored by this study, various theories formulated about regional organizations and their role in security matters will first be reviewed. Furthermore, the structural instruments that the European Union and the Arab League have at their disposal to address the security problems that affect them are discussed below. Finally, two specific case studies have been chosen: the Darfur conflict and the Syrian war. In both cases, there has been an intervention from both the European Union and Arab League. These are two major conflicts with regional and global impact in terms of their duration, the number of victims, and the instability generated -- particularly in the affected regions. On the other hand, the time gap between the beginning of one conflict and the other offers the possibility of studying, within a certain timeframe, the possible changes in the European Union and the Arab League's action and strategies as a result of the experience acquired in

dealing with the first conflict. This is the rationale behind choosing these two very different cases for this study.

Various bibliographical and journalistic materials have been compared in order to apply the theoretical foundations to the problem that is being studied and to search for the reasons behind the facts through the establishment of cause and effect relationships that will answer the questions that arise from this study.

Chapter Two

2.1 Literature review.

This chapter will present various theories that have been applied to the study of international organizations. More specifically, it will briefly introduce regional organizations within the academic discipline of international relations. First, we will examine two positivist approaches: the classical integration theory and the new regionalism theory. Second, we will look at two constructivist approaches related to the concept of security: the regional security complex theory and the security community theory. Finally, the thesis will introduce the concept of security governance. The development process of the European Union revealed the shortcomings of existing theories and led to numerous contemporary studies on its functionality in various fields, which is relevant to this study of security within international organizations.

2.1.1 Introduction.

The role and nature of international organizations, whether they are regional or global entities, has for an extensive period been subjected to thorough study. Using a wide array of analytical frameworks, research on these institutions has attempted to explore what the causes and motives of their existence are, as well as their effect on the democratization of countries or institutionalization processes. However, the most fundamental question this thesis asks is what effect do international organizations have on the possibility of war between nations or on insecurity in their area of influence (Hasenclever and Weiffen: 2006). Some realists believe that

these organizations are nothing but the reflection of the relative power of states, which in their eyes is completely ineffective and operates around the edges. Therefore, these entities have almost no ability to reduce conflict between their members or in the region (Mearsheimer: 1994). Other realists perceive international relations as mere tools for the great powers to advance their interests in certain regions. A different perspective is offered by Nordstrom (2004), who claims that not all international organizations should be expected to deal with conflict as only those entities that are highly institutionalized are able to mediate or reduce conflict between their members and in their geographical areas. Arguably, organizations comprised mostly of democratic states will be more efficient when tackling conflict prevention and resolution issues in their regions. These organizations provide peaceful behavior, commitment, credibility, and the ability to settle disputes. Hansen (2008) also points out that these institutions will be more effective if their members have similar foreign policies. While they are not always tailored to resolve these issues, and promote cooperation, those that are more highly institutionalized have a better chance of agreeing on measures for crisis contention.

The following sections will present the most relevant approaches to regional projects and the issue of regional security.

2.2 Positivist approaches to regional projects.

2.2.1 Classical integration theory.

The process Europe underwent after World War II developed a kind of literature that intended to explain the integration of the European Union through a theory that would comprehend this progress. Classical integration theory comprises two main approaches, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism with its different classical and liberal forms. Both theories are still relevant today, but they come with problems in terms of state identity.

Neo-functionalism predicted that a new political community would be created and this community would commence by integrating basic politics, providing equal primary services to citizens of different States, and would culminate in the creation of common legislation (Haas 1958). The process starts by increasing the level of interdependence between different States, which results in the creation of common institutions and enables them to become the most effective form of solving shared problems. The institutions would first deal with economy-related matters before their competences grow and expand to issues of security and defense, thus creating a new regional identity.

Considering the obstacles that the European Union encountered as it tried to strengthen its political integration, however, this theory has been almost completely discarded. This proves that an evolution towards a unified community is not a process that functioned automatically or sustained itself.

Despite its flaws (Haas was rather deterministic in his approach and considered that all States would behave in a similar fashion), neo-functionalism made some very interesting points. It confronted the notion of sovereignty and the security dilemma as immovable principles of international relations. It treated identity and interests as intrinsic variables and considered that they changed with the process instead of provoking it (Haas: 1970).

Intergovernmentalism directly opposes neo-functionalism, stressing the crucial importance of sovereignty for governments. It also rejects any type of determinism in terms of social or economic variables.

The classical variant, developed by Hoffman (1995), argues that every decision taken by a government is motivated by its own interests and is a mere example of intergovernmental bargaining. Hoffman also claimed that this type of integration would never affect "high politics," especially those that relate to foreign affairs and security.

Moravcsik (1993) introduced the liberal version of the theory. While he agrees with the notion of interests being the main source for integration, he claims that these interests are formed during the process of intragovernmental bargaining. This type of bargaining would take place between the government and social actors who believe that their interests would be better satisfied on a European level. The government in turn has an interest in creating these superior institutions to achieve better relations with societal actors.

This theory understands sovereignty as an insurmountable principle in lieu of regarding it as a social construct that can be transformed through the process. Neither author understands identity as a changing variable, and they both believe that all States have similar interests in regard to autonomy.

In the end, neither neo-functionalism nor intergovernmentalism provides a satisfactory and complex explanation for integration processes.

2.2.2 New Regionalism.

This theory tries to distance itself from classic theories arguing that these processes cannot just be understood without other elements like economics. Regionalism is a theory that covers a variety of topics and is not constrained to security alliances or the creation of market agreements (Fawcett and Hurrell: 1995). The different authors who identify with new regionalism, such as Soderbaum and Hettne, give varied definitions. However, these same authors agree that new regionalism is a project that includes cooperation on a multitude of levels, and that it tries to build a regional identity through non-state actors driving the project alongside nation-states. Fawcett states, thus, that the New Regionalism is a project or a series of policies aimed to promote common goals in several issue areas. In analyzing the phenomenon of regionalism, this theory utilizes three types of factors: the global, the regional, and the domestic; it leaves the European Union out of its studies as it considers it a very particular case.

This theory is problematic, however, and has been discarded in recent years due to concerns about the massive number of factors that erupt from its three levels of

analysis, the complexity of their interaction, and the lack of a unified response to them by different states. Moreover, it appears to be an “umbrella theory” that encompasses many different theoretical assumptions from numerous scholars. Söderbaum (2003) notes how most authors provide historical or empirical insights rather than theoretical concepts. Due to this lack of debate, the authors maintain a dichotomy between ideational and material factors that, in lieu of providing additional explanations, usually stresses one over the other. Ideational factors like regional identity cannot be juxtaposed with material factors to be considered independent variables or outcomes of the regionalization process.

Another problem with New Regionalism is that it links peace and security to regionalism, claiming that the only way to achieve lasting security is for regions to become more regionalized (Farrell: 2005). This echoes Haas’s deterministic approach.

2.3 From constructivism to the region-building approach.

Shadowing the New Regionalism approach, two new and more constructivist theories appeared in the field of regionalism: the regional security complex and the security community theories. They both provide a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon but still fail to include ideational factors in the construction of regional projects.

2.3.1 Regional security complex theory.

The literature begins with the different Barry Buzan works, which developed frameworks to understand regions and security with two main aims: developing a theory and elaborating on the concept of securitization with the purpose of analyzing the dynamics of regional security. Buzan and other authors claim that the region became more regionalized by the end of the Cold War, with higher security interdependence and, thereby, a smaller influence from outside superpowers (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde: 1998). Consequently, security interdependence is stronger amongst neighboring countries with a history of war and peace that require similar security practices.

The regional security complex form will depend on the distribution of power, the number of actors, and background factors such as history, religion or culture. In light of the aforementioned factors, a regional security complex will move along a spectrum that goes from conflict formation to security community. This theory is problematic in the sense that it combines neorealist and constructivist frameworks. The former claims that different distribution of capabilities account for States' behavior while the latter defines securitization as an independent feat.

In terms of the dynamics of security, Buzan, Waever and De Wilde go on to explain how for an issue to be securitized, it needs to be perceived as a threat by a securitizing actor that will call for emergency measures. With this approach, the authors aim to extend the security agenda beyond military issues and test the behavior of different regions.

2.3.2 The security community theory.

This theory focuses on the building process of the communities and the achievement of durable peace. Karl Deutsch (1969) first developed this literature and explained the concept of members depending on each other for the greater aim of peace. These members' level of integration stems solely from the elevated number of transactions between societies and their compatibility in terms of societal values and governmental responsiveness. Adler and Barnett (1998) built on this theory with their book "Security Communities" by utilizing a constructivist approach to define communities that use diplomacy over war to resolve their issues. This is made possible by a growth in the interactions between them that the authors explain using three stages: new interactions, exchanges of power, and knowledge and the development of trust. They also talk about the three stages that security communities go through: nascent, when they start considering the possibility of increasing coordination; ascendant, with denser cooperation and networks; and mature, which entails a shared identity.

After reviewing various theories and concepts applicable to regional organizations -- especially from the point of view of security -- the next chapter will examine the challenges that regional organizations face in addressing security issues and how they have handled them. This study focuses on two organizations, the European Union and the Arab League.

2.4 Contemporary EU studies.

As a reaction to the Classical Integration theory, this sub-theory sprang up with an aim to explain the process of the European Union's formation and the entity that it was becoming. One field within Contemporary European studies, "EU security governance," is especially relevant to this study. It will be discussed hereunder:

The concept of security governance was born to study how the European institutional system deals with the post-Cold War security agenda (Kirchner and Sperling: 2007). Given the amount of institutions and layers it has, Kirchner and Sperling claim that the European Union's functioning in this regard cannot be grasped with the traditional concept of a security alliance. Also, the apparition of new security threats calls for a revision of the assessment system, which the authors materialized with their categorization into three areas of action: protection, assurance, and prevention.

Claiming that the theory was purely descriptive, Christou (2010) tried to bridge it with securitization and insecuritization theories. The latter claims that governments create insecurities to control their population and their practices, whether policing or military, have all merged into one singular field of security. The European Union could in this way be a perfect example of this new continuum that leads to the creation of new forms of governing that make borders or certain identities within the population seem dangerous to constrain the general population's freedom.

Chapter Three

3.1 New challenges in the matter of security for regional organizations.

Historically, the concept of security has been heavily linked to the threat of war between States and how to prevent it, prepare it, or wage it. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, security has expanded to encompass concerns that have surfaced after the emergence of new risks or challenges to security. These challenges are now not only focused on the state, but also on the people. Specifically, and alongside terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, many other issues have begun to be defined as security issues, namely: cyberspace, energy sources, the environment, ecology, climate change, virulent pandemics, and human rights.

Therefore, in our day, the concept of security does not only refer to the protection of State borders, but also to the protection of societies and individuals. Security, then, is the ability of States and societies to keep their identities independent and preserve their functional integrity.

Although a feeling of insecurity may contribute to wider coverage from the media, the truth is that a globalized world also implies the existence of different possibilities of conflict that may affect us as a society.

While the threats to States are mainly identified in military terms, the threats to societies and individuals range from the deficiency of political and social structures

to the degradation of the environment. Therefore, aside from the measures of collective defense -- through which, and like the old alliances from the times of the Cold War (for instance, NATO), States force each other to protect themselves from an outside threat -- by using force to defend the member of the Alliance that has been attacked, these States adopt measures for collective security aimed for the common objective of peacefully resolving future conflicts and respecting the same rules. Thus, if one of them resorts to violence, the rest will act to protect them from that internal threat.

Even though the intent to achieve collective security is an old notion, attaining it has not been easy. We need only to remember the failure of the League of Nations or the stagnation that the United Nations suffered due to rivalries during the Cold War period that still exists today, along with the vetoing system that reins in the Security Council.

Large international organizations like the United Nations suffer from the contradiction that as the number of member nations that abide by general rules and achieve the goal of collective security grows, the legitimization of the organization grows with it, and therefore the legitimization of its actions. However, a larger number of actors make it harder for the organization to be effective. It is likely then that more specific regional organizations might be more effective.

The question is whether regional organizations are capable of taking on new challenges, however. The skepticism about their ability is fueled by the criticism over their dependency on stronger powers, their impartiality, and limited resources and efficacy.

Nevertheless, the fact that security issues require a global scope and a multilateral action is more and more widely understood. This should comprise not only the United Nations, but also a broad range of international institutions, whether governmental or nongovernmental (NGO's), to create norms and common rules and solve problems through cooperation.

When it comes to these kinds of actions, regional organizations take the comparative advantage due to their geographical proximity and a bigger sensibility face to local problems. They also benefit from their better disposition to act and make goods and services available to regions with more ease than other institutions. This is very tangible when it comes to conflict prevention or peacekeeping missions.

Regions are, in theory, better positioned for a quicker response and even the prevention of terrorism. It is more probable that they will be able to develop joint systems for information, early alarm, coordination, vigilance, border control, capital control etc. Nonetheless, this cooperation could be affected by the fact that said controls go against the objective of having a more open market and borders that will not hinder the free circulation of goods and labor.

It is easy to understand why the exigencies of security post 9/11 place issues of global terrorism and mass destruction weapons at the forefront of the security agendas of the most relevant regional organizations.

However, problems may arise if not all States agree on the importance of making security issues a priority. They would also have to agree on the political measures to

tackle them, or on the reallocation of resources for these threats instead of utilizing them in other security challenges.

Such disagreements may be the consequence of a conflict of interest -- whether individual or collective interest -- which influences the decisions of States in their foreign and security policies. At the end of the day, even in our modern society, States are still trying to maintain, if not maximize, their power to promote their own national interests.

What is more, hierarchy problems can arise or be reinforced between security organizations which have historically been more powerful in the West.

Yet another problem that may arise from the lack of an adequate response to these threats is the rise in skepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral and regional instruments for cooperation. This might have been caused by the fact that these new threats also prompt regional organizations to adapt. Historically, this has been a slow and difficult process, especially because the functions that are required are complex and affect the national sovereignty of the member states.

3.2 Conflict resolution in the Arab League.

One of the most determinant roles of the Arab League is that of promoting peace between its member states, which in turn helps them integrate with each other. It would be fair to assert that attempting any sort of integration without having first dealt with conflict among the members of the organizations is a lost cause. Haas would even boldly declare in his article "*International integration: the European and*

the Universal process" that the resolution of conflict was one of the best ways to assess any kind of integration process (Hinnebusch: 2001).

Unfortunately, the success of the Arab League in mediating between its members and achieving conflict resolution has been rather mediocre. For their differences to be resolved, most member states had to resort to third-party mediators, which usually responds to the preference of one of the countries involved to use a different diplomatic approach.

This decision was usually due to certain biases within the League or its indifference to matters on which the Council was divided. In his chapter of the book, *"Middle East Dilemma: the politics and economics of Arab integration,"* for which he was also the editor, Michael Hudson comments on how this ineffectiveness was even more acute in the inter-Arab period, when Nasser held the reins of the League. According to Hudson, the organization proved to be ineffectual on a number of different crises -- namely the Lebanese crisis in 1958, the Palestine-Jordanian conflict in 1970 or Black September, the numerous conflicts in Yemen in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the Lebanese civil war. It can also be noted that the League did not provide much of a diplomatic alternative in more recent situations like the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The League's inability to offer a solution to these conflicts could be blamed on several different factors. Firstly, the organization does not assume a clear enough role on these matters in its charter. Article five of said disposition explains how parties should, upon having a dispute, report to the Council exclusively if this matter does not affect the independence of a state, the integrity of its territory or

its ability to be sovereign. If such was the case, the League would not provide them with a legal path that they could follow, which leads, as it has been mentioned before, to member states seeking their own third-party mediators to protect their interests.

A second reason could be what Owen explains as "Arab brotherhood" in his "*State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East"* book[1]. There is a certain vagueness around this concept that affects the League making it unable to resolve disputes between its members. Why would they implement any sort of legal protocol or create any institutions when this "brotherhood" was already in place? Owen considers that the League neglected the matter of conflict resolution, relying exclusively on this notion of brotherhood in the hope that similarities between fellow Arab states would be enough to settle disputes. Providing actual mechanisms to deal with these problems would almost feel inappropriate.

Thirdly, it could be argued that Arab leaders were not willing to give up some of their power to the League so it could deal with such matters. They saw this as a compromise of their own status and would not jeopardize that in favor of the common good. This lack of willingness continues to hinder the League from functioning in an adequate manner to this day.

Fourthly, and even though it is disposed in the nineteenth article of the Arab League's charter, the intention of setting up an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration was never realized. This underscores the Arab League's institutional weakness, much

[1] Owen, R. (2000) State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East, London: Routledge,

unlike the case with the European Union. These limitations prevent the Secretary general from playing a bigger political role in the Arab and International scene.

All these deficiencies, relating to the reluctance of Arab leaders and lack of institutions or protocols, hinder the work of the League towards a conflict-free scene where it should play a defining role in resolving or settling issues between its member states.

3.2.1 Collective security.

If the Arab League wishes to act as the sole entity in matters of security it needs to meet certain conditions. Member countries would first need to recognize the League as a common interest whose goal is just and worth being defended. The States would then need to be able to protect themselves from outside attacks and create a balance that can prevail. The third condition would be that the biggest international actors among the League's members should also become members of a collective security league that would guard security in the most collective understanding and not just nationally (Schloming: 1991). For all this to happen, there needs to be a consequential adherence to international law and an important consensus between the members so these powers could be exercised without being frowned upon by the international community. All countries would remain sovereign and independent, but they would unite to fend off external aggressions. If the League wishes to maintain peace, joint effort and actions are needed. This goal requires them to adhere to certain legal obligations and integrate their forces. If aggression occurs, the members would impose collective economic, political and

military sanctions that would serve as punishment to this hostility; one member's foe would then become a common foe.

The notion of a collective Arab security system was closely related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Following the Arab-Israeli war in the 1940's and the effort by Jordan to achieve a political settlement with the Israelis, Egypt made a bold move and attempted to link the collective security of the whole league -- especially that of countries having direct disputes with Israel -- to its own military force. This deal actually benefited both parties: Egypt managed to establish itself as the leader of the Arab role, and the rest of the Arab states got to finally integrate their military forces and create a powerful united front against Israel. Thus, in 1950, the States that constituted the League (Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen) implemented the Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty that would help them cooperate to achieve peace through a shared defense system[2.] In turn, the Permanent Military Commission, consisting of representatives of the member countries, as well as the Joint Defense council -- whose members are Foreign Affairs and Defense ministers -- was established. The principal aim of the Treaty was to achieve a system of collective security in the Arab World.

Despite having ratified the treaty, and even though the sixth article of the Charter specifies how the Council would need to unanimously determine the adequate measures to repel an attack on any of the members, the League was not very effective in maintaining the security of the region. They failed at integrating their

[2] Preamble of the Treaty of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League.

national military forces into a single unit, but, in fairness, conditions for this had not been achieved yet[3].

The first condition that was not met was that of the status quo. Iraq was not content with the leadership of Egypt and was very aware of the different military capabilities of the different states constituting the League. It thus threatened to invade Kuwait on several occasions as it considered the small nation to be part of its territory. The League was somewhat successful in containing the conflict in 1963, but during the second attempt, it was necessary for the United States to intervene and coerce a zealous leader like Saddam Hussein to free Kuwait. This second intervention proved, however, how the first one had not been quite as successful as was fathomed, since Iraq still saw the annexation of Kuwait as an option.

The second condition that fell through was member's collective power to be strong enough to face up to the Israelis. Their military was not strong enough to fight Israel's army and the League was not playing an important enough role in coordinating these efforts as well as different militaries. Therefore, all neighboring member states suffered a great lost at the hands of Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, which even saw an attack on Iraq. The war had extreme repercussions on many levels for the Arab States; not even the partial success of the Yom Kippur War, six years later, would make up for it. This 1973 war was launched jointly by Egypt and Syria, but it still did not help establish a more functional regional security system.

The third un-achieved condition was the actual will of Arab leaders to form this alliance, as it would mean they would have to give up some power. Arab leaders did

[3] Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty page 195.

not see regional peace as a collective interest and felt that they had no moral obligations to maintain the status quo. These leaders interfered in each other's affairs for their personal benefit. For instance, Nasser proved to be a megalomaniac who saw himself as the leader of the Arab World, while Iraq and Syria got into a long-lasting conflict. Lebanon and Jordan, in turn, were suffering from the meddling of almost every other Arab state. This enduring struggle for power shaped the relationship between these states, and having failed to agree on a set of regional laws, it was very difficult to determine the right course of action in the different conflicts. Even in the case of the Kuwait-Iraqi conflict, Arab leaders could not agree if it was legitimate for Iraq to aggress the Gulf country.

It can be concluded that the Arab League had relative success in maintaining a somewhat united front against Israel, but it failed to push its Arab military-political collective efforts any further. This was admittedly difficult given the inability of the League to determine its basic definition from the very beginning. Consequently, historical and political events ended up shaping its role in integration and the road towards a joint force. Without a set of rules that defined everyone's functions and duties, however, this proved to be incredibly difficult.

3.2.2 The role of the Arab League in the Arab Spring.

The mobilizations that started in December of 2010 in Tunisia, and sparked uprisings across the Arab world, deeply influenced the political scene in the Middle East and North Africa. These events led to changes in the government in Egypt and Tunisia, brought destabilization to Yemen and Bahrain, and triggered civil war in Syria and Libya.

The Arab League was involved in these events as the only organization that encompassed all the troubled Arab Spring states as members. The League emerged as a natural interlocutor despite its failure to address many other issues that had afflicted the Arab world in the past. Nonetheless, some scholars like Mark Lynch in his *"Making the Arab League Matter"* piece have claimed that the League has proved to be more effective than usual during these events, even taking a stand for democracy against the regimes of Libya and Syria. These revolts changed the usual policy of "no intervention in the internal affairs of the member states" that usually characterizes the League. Lynch has linked this to the growing influence of Gulf States in the League, and the diminishing influence of the traditionally stronger States like Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Silvia Colombo has pointed out an interesting trend in which Gulf countries have influenced the league in the last few years depending on their interests[4]. This is exemplified by how they chose to ignore the revolts in Bahrain, and never raised the issue to the League, but then spoke out about the uprisings in Syria and Libya. Regardless, the Arab League has never been able to play an influential role when resolving disputes independently -- whether they had to do with regional power distribution or not.

It could be argued that the League does not quite have the will to play a significant role in these matters as it is far too focused on respecting the sovereignty of its member states, and it also lacks the organizational skills and structure to really have an impact and enforce decisions. Nonetheless, it can be said that the League has

[4] Colombo, S. (2012) *The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards*, The International Spectator, Vol.47, No. 4, page.110.

had some visibility during the Libyan and Syrian revolutions. There have also been efforts towards a united security force that should be noted.

Surprisingly, the League was not very vocal about the uprisings in Tunisia, but it still cancelled its annual summit because of them. At the next major reunion, different leaders spoke out about the exasperation and dangers that the Arab World was facing and the possibility of the revolts spreading deep into the region as stagnating economies could compromise national security. Considering these concerns, the League decided to grant two billion dollars to suffering economies. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to pay half the amount, but further information about proceedings and recipients is not specified (Colombo: 2012). These grants were, however, unable to solve the problems that Arab societies were facing because they were deeply rooted in extensive corruption and deprivation of opportunities and political freedom. The League needed to address not only the economic roots of the problem, but also the social dissatisfaction that was devastating Tunisia and many other Arab countries. After president Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was ejected, the League called all Tunisians to bring the country out of the crisis in a manner that would respect the will of the people. This is as far as the involvement of the League in the Tunisian post-revolution scenario went.

In the case of Egypt, the then newly appointed secretary general, Nabil Al-Araby, was a well-known supporter of the revolution. This enabled him to serve as a moderator between the protestors and the government. Al-Araby was then appointed as minister of foreign affairs in the post-revolution government before he started his mandate at the League. Al-Araby's occupation of this post was

considered a sign of the Arab League's support for the revolution[5]. Once again, the support did not materialize. When the situation reached a very heated point with the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood by the army in 2013, the League failed to react.

The case of Libya was slightly different, as the League did show a rather potent involvement in the crisis, suspending the country's membership in 2011. It also proposed enforcing a no-fly zone in agreement with the UN Security Council and the African Union. This granted Western countries the right to intervene in Libya -- even if they were not supposed to occupy the territory in any way (Sore: 2010). NATO bombed the country for several months, finally tipping the war's outcome in favor of the rebels and ejecting Al-Gaddafi. Despite the League's support of these previous initiatives, it failed to address once again the roots of the problem, namely the discrepancies between rival parties and the lack of strong political institutions. The League's ineffectiveness has a lot to do with the characteristics of the organization: it may only intervene when it is requested to do so by one of the conflicting parties that must, in turn, be member states. In the case of Libya, its mediation was never requested and thus the League could do very little.

Bahrain and Oman faced a very similar reality in terms of what the League was willing or able to achieve. It remained detached despite several pleas from different Human Rights organizations – many of them reporting ill treatment and torture inflicted on opponents of the regimes -- to the secretary general. As in previous

[5] 35 civil society organizations ask the Arab League Secretary General to discuss the situation in Egypt during the coming Ministerial Council [https://www.fidh.org/en/international-advocacy/other-regional-organisations/league-of-arab-states/35-civil-society-organizations-ask-the-arab-league-secretary-general-to-13895]

cases, the lack of any official calls by member states would be to blame, but in this case, the interest of powerful League members like Qatar and Saudi Arabia also came into play. It is understandable that neighboring Gulf countries feared the potential spillover of the crises, putting their regimes at risk. In contrast, these countries publicly supported revolts that took place in Arab States with regimes they did not have friendly relations with (Colombo: 2012).

The situation that really put the effectiveness of the League to the test, however, was Syria. Protests against president Bashar Al-Assad had swiftly escalated into a civil war that has been tearing the country apart since 2011. The council of foreign ministers did issue 10 statements and called for extraordinary meetings, and Al-Araby even met with Al-Assad to inquire about the different possibilities that the country faced. Later in 2011, Al-Assad agreed with the League's ministerial committee to halt all acts of violence, releasing detained protestors, withdrawing the army from populated areas, and providing the media with access to all areas of the country. Both parties also promised to prevent foreign intervention like what had happened in Libya.

The Syrian government clearly violated this plan as the violence continued and the death toll kept on growing. The Arab League was eventually forced to cancel the country's membership in an extraordinary meeting, which gave hope to some of the protesters. Eighteen countries backed the decision, Lebanon and Yemen opposed, and Iraq was not present[6]. Sanctions were also imposed, among them a travel ban

[6] Syria and the Arab LeagueEver fewer friends, The Economist Online [http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/11/syria-and-arab-league]

for Syrian officers, transactions with Syria's central bank, and commercial transactions with the Syrian government. The decisions were not unanimous, which is one of the requirements for joint-decisions outlined by the Charter. This made some international actors question these actions, claim the violation of the Charter, and blame Qatar for the pressure it had exerted on the League.

It is true that Qatar had assumed a leading position with enthusiasm, considering its economic prosperity and the decreasing influence of Egypt in the last few years. Lebanon and Yemen were exempted from meeting the requirements and Iraq and Jordan refused to put said sanctions in practice for the sake of the Syrian people. The decision was not unanimous, which obstructed the entire procedure from having a positive outcome.

December 2011 brought a peace protocol between Syria and the League, which declared that the main goal (Youssef: 2012) was to protect the Syrian people by convincing the government to stop all acts of violence, release protestors, and withdraw military presence from densely populated areas. The protocol put into place an observer mission composed of experts from the humanitarian and military fields who were dispersed in different areas. This mission reported that the main problem comprised conflict that exploded between armed groups and the Syrian army. This caused the government to respond with more violence, affecting innocent citizens as well.

The Arab League had a problematic stance on this for two reasons: firstly, the head of the mission was Mustafa Al-Dabi, a controversial character involved in war crimes in Darfur. Secondly, the report that was produced was utterly unreliable and

subjective, as the observers had limited access and were completely dependent on the Syrian government for transportation and security (Weber: 2010). Saudi Arabia and Qatar eventually withdrew their teams and the whole mission was completely cancelled by the start of 2012. Evidently, the League was not able to produce an objective report after observing the situation in Syria. It was unable to assess the dimensions of the crisis in its beginnings and implement plans or actions specifically engineered for it. It was also impossible for the League to coerce the Syrian government into following the procedure that had been designed as the institution lacked any kind of instruments or penalties that could be forced onto the Syrian administration.

Another peace initiative was suggested in the winter of 2012 under Qatar's leadership of the council (this is a rotating duty), which had an extremely strong backing from the Gulf Cooperation Council. President Bashar Al-Assad was asked to bestow his power onto a League-appointed deputy, introduce a nationally united government, and schedule an early election. At the first meeting after the plan was introduced, the League called for severing all ties with the Syrian administration in addition to providing political and economic aid to the opposition and demanding that United Nations' Security Council pass a resolution that would call for the end of violence and grant access to humanitarian organizations and aid. Moreover, the League asked the Security Council to supervise the introduction of a future cease-fire, in spite of the draft version being vetoed by two of Syria's allies, Russia and China (Pinfari: 2009). There was some objection amongst the members of the

League as well, with Lebanon and Algeria opposing the deployment of any kind of militarized force.

These movements expose one of the main shortcomings of the League, which is the lack of a regional peacekeeping force that is truly active, and which must rely on forces of the United Nations. Authors like Kirchner and Dominguez believe this is an essential instrument for regional organizations and their security, but is yet another instrument that the League is missing. This also inhibits the League from perhaps contributing to the cease-fire in Syria. The lack of instruments could be explained by the organization's structure and its very adamant fixation on each country's sovereignty.

Referring to the former peace plan, the delegates of the League, in cooperation with France and the United Kingdom, drafted a resolution to take shape as a joint mission to Syria in coordination with the UN. The League hoped for this mission to be greater than its predecessor by working with a very different international backing and mandate. This draft was submitted to the Security Council, and although vetoed by Russia and China, a UN-Arab League appointed envoy was sent to Syria.

In March of that year, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a peace plan consisting of six points. This plan requested from the Syrian government as well as the opposition to halt all signs of violence and achieve, under supervision of the UN, a ceasefire that was effective and would aim to withdraw heavy weaponry from populated areas, deliver humanitarian aid, expedite the release of political detainees, guarantee the free movement of journalists throughout the country, and

respect the freedoms of demonstration and association. As expected, none of the parties complied with these requests and the League had no instrument it could mobilize in this case. This observer mission of over three hundred people was suspended four months after its inception due to intensified violence in the country; it was never renewed.

Al-Araby asked for a different United Nations mandate that could impose a ceasefire on both parties (Youssef: 2010). But due to the Arab League's glaring lack of credibility, many voices called for this issue to be entirely delegated to the international community, particularly to the Security Council. The Syrian government had failed to implement the plan under Arab pressure so there was no other option left except having the international community put pressure on Assad.

Many of the League's member states believed it will not succeed in its efforts to be impartial when dealing with regional issues. Tracing the same line of events that unraveled during the Syrian crisis, and upon the use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians, the League called for an international investigation that was impartial. They never mentioned the word regional and limited themselves to condemning the events.

The League's call for a new UN mission was never answered. It thus resorted to establishing a committee on the Syrian crisis in November of 2012. The committee was tasked with submitting a draft of a plan that would achieve a political solution to the issue and show a united Arab front to the international community. The plan revolved around forming a provisional nationally unified government and deploying a peacekeeping force led by the United Nations in the country that would guarantee

stability during this transitional period. This idea was borrowed from the Darfur case, where a force of this type was sent to Sudan while the country was being torn apart by a bloody civil war.

The league took a decisive step in March 2013 when it transferred Syria's vacant seat to members of the opposition, led by Mouaz al Khatib. The leaders of the League believed that recognizing the opposition in their organization would bring them some momentum and push developments in the country with the help of external powers, especially the United Nations. This action on the part of the Arab League was considered as a legitimization and endorsement of the Syrian opposition. It provoked and was severely criticized by the Syrian government and other countries like Russia and Iran (Youssef: 2012).

Generally, the actions taken by the League between 2011 and 2013 were considered provocative by the Syrian regime as well as the protestors that opposed them. The regime blamed the League for their dismissal and accused it of violating the country's sovereignty and the non-intervention principle. To the Syrian government, the prospect of a joint peacekeeping unit threatened its power as did the approval of foreign intervention in the affairs of the country. From their end, protestors felt that the League had arrived too late to the party and failed the people of Syria by not being able to meet their demands. It is important to mention, however, that it was extremely difficult for the League to help given the level of disunity that had characterized the Syrian opposition over the past few years [7].

[7] Arab League summit underway amid divisions [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/arab-league-summit-201432552716861683.html]

The League abstained from fully intervening in the crises of Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt, resigning itself to coordination actions for the settlement and consensus whenever possible. This lack of maneuvering ability is not limited to the Arab revolts; it is inherent to the League from its very inception. The structure and principles of the League consider many of these crises to be internal affairs; it thus regards meddling with them as a violation of the country's sovereignty, which is a crucial issue for the organization and its members. This concern with their right to sovereignty stops members of the League from developing concrete regional security instruments, as noted by Kirschner and Dominguez (2014).

Although members have formed conflict prevention instruments, as previously discussed in this thesis, the League does not have a mandate for intervention in intra-country crises per se. The proceedings do not mention internal crises when they talk about introducing peacekeeping missions. The Arab League lacks actual instruments that can be implemented to create common policies and is thus ineffective when it comes to enforcing provisions. Its emphasis on sovereignty poses serious challenges to upholding human rights as well. This became clear during the Arab Spring protests, as the League failed to address these issues, considering them to be relative to each State individually. Human rights violations in Arab countries have systematically been overlooked, if not denied, by the League since its beginnings and it has yet to establish its own Human Rights court[8]. Moreover, and despite many non-governmental organizations calling for it, the

[8] The Arab League and Human Rights: Challenges ahead, page 17 [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_lea_uk-lddouble.pdf]

League still has not asked the Security Council to defer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.

3.3 Prevention of conflict: the case of the European Union.

This next part aims to outline different conflict prevention interventions executed by the European Union, as a relevant regional organization in Europe. Nonetheless, it is necessary to define this entity as an atypical example of an organization that deals with the prevention of conflict. In fact, the European Union is not primarily a security organization, and thus, the prevention and management of conflict is not its principal task or objective. Such tasks would be more directly linked with entities like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In essence, the European Union is an organization of economic, political and social integration; it has progressively made a place for itself as a civil power in the international scene. Over time, the European Union has gradually developed important actions, and even a global policy of international and domestic conflict prevention that targets other countries. This conflict prevention policy is only one of several security-related actions adopted by this singular international actor.

The promotion of peace and the prevention of conflict in the European mainland is a consubstantial issue to the European political project. We cannot forget that the economic integration of the European continent was first introduced to avoid a new conflict between Germany and France. This attribute of the European DNA was present since the very beginning, but it became even more obvious with the

development of Europe as a political actor through the creation of the Foreign Policy and Common Security in the Maastricht treaty.

In 2003, the European Union formulated its first security concept: the European Security Strategy. This initiative upholds the prevention of conflict as one of its main strategies, and it is prioritized to fight the menaces that threaten international security. Because the European Union has had a peculiar integration process -- specially from an economic point of view, but also with a bigger political scope every day -- it has attained a wide range of economic, commercial, political, social, and cultural instruments that can be added to those usually employed in the resolution of conflicts. For all these reasons, the priority given to the prevention of conflict can be understood not only within the framework of guaranteeing international security, but also, and mostly, as the exterior projection of the European model.

3.3.1 The European Union: a successful experiment in conflict prevention

In its very construction, the European Union was, since the beginning, a project for peace. It was conceived as the only way to avoid chronic confrontations between the European nation-states that were fighting for continental hegemony. As Hazel Smith maintains, the idea of a European federation is as old as that of the State (around five hundred years old). After each of the big wars between European States, different nations had tried to come up with proposals to unite the continent to deter future, armed conflicts[9]. This European model of integration has proved to

[9] Smith, H: European Union Foreign Policy, Pluto Press, London, 2002, p. 34.

be successful as a mechanism of conflict resolution and prevention between members of the Union.

The contemporary European Union, which appeared after the declaration of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, in 1950, was conceived from the start as a peace project made possible through de facto solidarity and shared sovereignty. The declaration itself clearly underscores the objective of the Union as not solely economic, but also political -- namely to achieve peace between Europeans. Economic integration, or de facto solidarity, is just the means to achieve this political goal.

The European Union tried to achieve peace by reining in sovereign States though their voluntary submission to the rule of a superior law and common institutions. It is from that principle that a body of European normative regulations emanates; this group of laws is what initiated the construction of the political union of the European States. On the other hand, the European project has characterized itself for transcending itself and finding its reason to be facing the outside world: "the contribution that an organized and lively Europe can bring to civilization is essential to assure amicable relations"[10]. From the very beginning, the Community conceived its exterior dimension with the objective of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights everywhere in the world.

The basis for the cooperation of European member states in the international scene was laid down through the system of intergovernmental cooperation of the European politic cooperation; moreover, the European identity is defined in the

[10] "Robert Schuman declaration", Paris May 9th 1950, quote.

Copenhagen declaration. The principles of European exterior action are deduced from this declaration; they are no more than the shared values, common interests, and unitary vision of the world. Among those shared values, peacekeeping and the creation of a vast stability zone are some of the most important. This shows how the goal of peacekeeping has been a distinguishing feature of the exterior action of member states since the creation of the first instruments for an emerging foreign policy.

The European Union, created in 1992, affirms its compromise with peace through the formulation of its objectives and the instauration of a common foreign policy. It emerged as a civil power that is determined to transmit its project of peace to the world. In the articulation of its objectives, it is expressly mentioned that the European Union has a compromise with the promotion of peace and the protection of human rights[11]. It does indeed carry out a foreign policy that is committed to peace to the extent that the Union has started to build its common security and defense policy focusing on the tasks of crisis prevention, management, and peacekeeping.

From a practical point of view, it can be established that European foreign policy has worked towards the goal of peace. In this sense, the European Union was the first to include in its numerous international treaties for development aid a clause that was specifically aimed at democracy. It also assigns much of its aid to tasks of institutional construction, the creation of civil society in States outside the Union, and education -- all of these are means for the creation and upholding of

[11] Taken from article 11 of the Maastrich treaty.

democratic societies. The strategy to integrate Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union has been significantly successful. This foreign policy has ensured a smooth and peaceful democratic transition in these countries[12].

In the 1950's, the European model created the notion of conflict resolution towards the inside, which sets outs the logic of interdependence in overcoming the state as means to prevent future civil war between Europeans. Since this model of conflict resolution towards the inside has proven to be effective, the European Union is pondering whether to export it through different foreign policy strategies.

3.3.2 The prevention of conflict in the normative framework of foreign policy: European treaties and the European security strategy.

The European Union has been intensely active in the field of conflict prevention since the nineties. The European treaties that currently remain in force, however, do not specifically contemplate the prevention of conflict as an objective or merely a line of action of the European common foreign and security policy. As it has been discussed, the European activities in this field would fall under the general objective of this common foreign and security policy to "maintain peace and strengthen international security," as provided by the Maastricht treaty. Not even the reform of the Amsterdam treaty -- which included the Petersberg tasks in the treaties -- frequently used in the prevention of conflict, makes an express reference.

[12] *The enlargement of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2003.

The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified on 13 December 2007, and successor to the European Constitution, does mention the prevention of conflict as one of the objectives of the common foreign and security policy as well as a scope of activity where Petersberg tasks could be carried out. This treaty did not come into force because it was rejected by several countries so these dispositions could never be applied. In this sense, the newly derived article 21 in the Maastricht treaty establishes that "preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security in accordance to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords and the Charter of Paris" will be an objective of the European exterior action.

Further down in the Maastricht treaty, the new article 42, relating to the dispositions of common policy of security and defense, establishes, in relation to the instruments available to said policy, that "the Union may resort to such means in missions outside of the Union granted that those missions seek to ensure the prevention of conflict, peacekeeping, and the strengthening of international security as described by the UN charter." The next article, or new 43, which deals with Petersberg tasks, greatly extends the hypothesis in which the Union can carry out this type of task. Among the new cases, the missions for the prevention of conflict are contemplated.

The constitutional framework that is in force, thus, does not make any explicit reference to the prevention of conflict. The Treaty of Lisbon would, if it ever were to come into force, resolve this omission. The European strategy for security, which embodies the general orientation of the European foreign policy and the doctrine in the field of security, makes an outright reference to the prevention of conflict as a

necessary policy to guarantee the Union's security. This strategy known as the "Solana strategy" was adopted in 2003 by the European Council and was inspired by the same political reflection as the European Constitution, which was developed in those years and is the precedent of the Lisbon Treaty. It is not surprising then that both documents make a reference to one of the Union's most important foreign policy lines of action since "Europe needs to be willing to assume its responsibility in international peacekeeping and the construction of a better world."

The European Strategy for Peace supports a wide vision of security that considers economic and political factors to be at the root of many problems. This strategy strongly backs the notion that the root causes of conflict and insecurity should be dealt with, not only their manifestations. For this reason, the Union encourages the promotion of structural stability as a means to prevent conflict through early intervention utilizing a whole range of instruments that the European Union has access to: political, diplomatic, military, civil, commercial, and developmental. The EU prioritizes a strategy that will, before anything, "favor an intervention that is early, quick and forceful if needed"[13]. In adopting the report on the revision of strategy in December 2008, the European Council renewed its compromise with preventive approaches that encourage structural stability.

3.3.3 European action in the matter of conflict prevention: from specific action to a better coherence and effectiveness.

Before a normative framework for treaties existed, the European Union would execute different activities and policies somewhat aimed at the prevention of

[13] European Council: A safe EU in a better world. Quote. P11.

conflict, the promotion of peace, and the internal stability of States. The Union would then utilize economic tools such as development aid and the democracy clause, trade agreements, humanitarian aid or, even, a promise of adhesion (like in the case of the countries of Southern Europe in the 1980's) to achieve its goals.

The first documents that made an explicit reference to conflict prevention were approved in the mid 1990's and had no general scope, as they were centered on Africa[14]. Since the decade of the 2000's, it has become clear that there was a need to adopt a general scope that would provide unity and coherence to the different European activities that address conflict prevention.

The European Council then tasked the High representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy with developing a joint report, which was submitted at the 2000 European Council in Nice. This report sought to provide a global scope on European Policy regarding conflict prevention that would bring together all of the European activities in this field as carried out by the Union, or its member states, through different instruments.

The report begins with the assumption that the success of the European Union's model as a mechanism of conflict prevention can be exported abroad. It goes on to establish the different challenges that the European Union would have to face to achieve an effective conflict prevention policy. The first would be to place prevention as a main objective of the European foreign policy, and lay out some priorities of action in this field. The second challenge would be the need for

[14] The European Council passed a document in 1995 with the title "Preventive diplomacy, conflicto resolution and peacekeeping in Africa".

promoting the early action of the Union, making it more and more proactive, rather than reactive, so it can deploy its resources in a timely and coordinated manner.

The third challenge consists of making coherent and consistent use of the Union's various resources, especially those that suffer under the control of different bodies of the European Union. The resources that need reinforced integration to obtain better results are development aid, trade, humanitarian and economic instruments, the common foreign and security policy instruments, cooperation in justice and national policies, and even those military and civil capabilities that serve to deal with crises -- namely, the deployment of Petersberg tasks. If the Union seeks to be more effective, they need to develop concrete approaches on how to utilize these instruments in risk countries or regions. Lastly, the report recommended that it was necessary to establish partnerships with other international organizations or national actors to act jointly and achieve those prevention objectives.

Building upon the challenges described by the report and the ad hoc recommendations it made, the Union adopted the principal documents that draw its global policy on the matter of conflict prevention. These are, on the one hand, the 2001 Communication from the European Council and the European Union program for the prevention of violent conflicts, adopted in Gothenburg, which drawing from the reflection of the Commission, is an action plan that tries to give coherence and effectiveness to all European actions in these fields.

Both initiatives are rather ambitious and are the result of the notable activism of the Swedish presidency -- particularly that of foreign affairs Minister Anna Lindh -- after the events of 9/11. What was novel about this new framework was that it

rendered conflict prevention a transversal objective that could integrate in all European policies for foreign intervention. The European Union's will to strengthen its effectiveness and activity in this matter is clearly shown in the intent to approve an annual report on the application and balance of this program of action.

3.3.4 A global scope for prevention: horizontal strategy and instruments.

The Gothenburg program explains the current orientation on conflict prevention and is the political framework that articulates all exterior action aimed at this objective. It deals with four main elements that seek to reinforce coherence and the effectiveness of the ensemble of the actions. Firstly, it proposes to set clear political priorities to intervene during the prevention phase. It considers that the strategy is effective because it is ready to take measures before the situation worsens and leads to violence. For that, it suggests that the Council expand on a large list of potentially conflictive matters to determine both the areas and the regions that might require intervention. In that aspect, the European Council should adopt preventive strategies that are simultaneously coherent and comprehensive, while the Commission must reinforce those elements that tend towards the prevention of conflict in the Strategic National Plans that are adopted for each of the countries that receive European cooperation aid.

Secondly, it seeks to strengthen coherence between an early alert, the action, and the political strategy built into the prevention framework. With this in mind, the Political and Security Committee, which is a specific organ of the Council, is requested to intensify its activity on prevention and to follow up on all European prevention activities. The representatives of the member states, the delegations of

the Commission, and the special representatives must all contribute their knowledge to the service of the Council so it can formulate these policies. The exchange of information with experts from other international organizations devoted to prevention (such as the United Nations, the OSCE, NGOs, the Commission and the member states) is encouraged to achieve effectiveness. To enhance coherence, it is suggested that both the communitarian institutions and the member states reinforce their operative cooperation by fulfilling the orientations adopted by the European Council.

Thirdly, it was proposed that the Union make an effective and coordinated use of all the adequate tools to achieve the prevention of conflict. This can only be attained if all institutions conform to a horizontal strategy of prevention that will be integrated in all their actions and instruments of exterior action. Among the long-term instruments, we can mention development aid, trade, arms control, the promotion of Human Rights and democracy, environmental policies, politic dialogue, and the assistance to processes of institutional reform. In the framework of development aid, a new instrument of stability was recently approved, which seeks to expressly fund actions on the matter of conflict prevention.

Regarding short-term action, the European Union performs tasks of prevention through diplomatic instruments, the electoral observation and assistance, humanitarian aid, and the missions of the European security and defense policy -- which might be civil, military or mixed. All of these instruments, utilized to effectively achieve concrete objectives, must tackle the root causes of the conflicts.

Fourthly, it is decided and established that the Union should ask for the cooperation of other international organizations dedicated to the prevention of conflict and associate with them. These organizations include the United Nations, the OSCE and others, as well as civil society. Such cooperation should encompass all levels, from the early alert to action and evaluation. Consequently, priority was given to the exchange of information with the United Nations and the OSCE to reinforce cooperation on the matter of crisis management with NATO, as well as with other organizations, associations and non-governmental actors.

These four lines of action try to bring coherence and effectiveness to the whole of the exterior European action on the matter of conflict prevention. This renders this political objective a transversal matter to be integrated in all European policy with an exterior dimension.

3.3.5 The politics of conflict prevention: a general assessment.

Since 2001, the European Union has been executing several policies that are articulated in a horizontal manner on the matter of conflict prevention. This illustrates the Union's resolve to integrate this objective in all foreign policy actions belonging to the different communitarian organs. Assessing the results of any conflict prevention strategy is extremely challenging. This is partly because the very nature of the question makes it difficult to identify successes. In fact, only cases where conflict prevention failed and conflict ensued are recognized; there is no such visibility for the success stories.

However, what can be assessed is the level to which the objectives laid out by the Gothenburg plan were achieved. In 2001, the European Parliament highlighted the deficiencies of European policy regarding Commission Communication, criticizing even the approach of the new initiatives of that year. The Parliament considered that these initiatives did not adequately address the rigidity of the current system of pillars in the prevention of conflict, the need to establish a strengthened inter-institutional cooperation to overcome the fragmentary pillar policies, the difficulties of guaranteeing cooperation between member states, the difference in pace between civil and military programs, the need for an important internal training, and the lack of a real operational and strategic cooperation with NGOs and other members of civil society – among others[15].

Every year, the Council itself develops a report on the implementation of the Gothenburg plan, which can be used to determine whether some of these limitations have been overcome. In this report, the Council evaluates the progress of each objective and makes a series of recommendations to improve the coherence and effectiveness of these activities.

The 2008 report positively values the global action of general nature. The Council understands that efforts have been made to improve conflict prevention aptitude, continue raising awareness and enhancing the approach to conflict prevention, develop the necessary means and capacities and elevate the coherence between the different external instruments as well as the cooperation between the different EU institutions and member states. In spite of all this praise, the report offers a long

[15] European Parliament: Resolution on the Commission Communication relating to the prevention of conflict, December 13th 2001 (A5-0394/2001), part. 2

list of recommendations ranging from a better integration of this objective in the different policies to the reinforcement of capacities and the encouragement of cooperation with other international organizations. Therefore, even the European Council recognizes that there is room for improvement in the coherence and effectiveness of European policy.

The authors who have tackled this topic, and have globally assessed the coherence and effectiveness of this political strategy, have been massively critical. For instance, Niño holds that reactive policies are still prioritized in the Union since they are more visible and less complex, given also that the early warning systems do not function as effectively as is desired[16]. The author maintains that the European Union does not adequately evaluate the impact of stabilizing policies and the problems that arise when it comes to cooperating with international organizations and guaranteeing cooperation between the Union and its member states.

For his part, Stewart agrees with some of these appreciations, which he believes are caused by the incoherence between the actions of the different pillars[17]. He also holds that despite the dominating discourse, the European Union is prioritizing military response in matters of conflict prevention instead of structural action that tackles the causes of conflict. Globally, it seems that even if some work has been done, there is still a lot of work to do if the Union aspires to achieve an effective and cohesive policy.

---

[16] Niño Pérez, J. *La Política de prevención de conflictos de la UE tras el 11 de septiembre de 2001 (The EU's conflict prevention policy after 9/11).* 2009. 142-147.

[17] Stewart, E. J. *Capabilities and coherence? The evolution of the European Union conflicto prevention. European foreign affairs review,* vol. 13, nº 2. 2008. 229-253.

Chapter Four

4. Case studies.

This study will be completed with the assessment of the actions of the Arab League and the European Union in two conflicts that have posed a threat to their security or that of the international arena in general: Syria and Darfur.

The conflict in Darfur shocked the West with images of displaced persons and the bloody confrontations at the border. It serves as a great example to assess the effectiveness of these two institutions when dealing with genocide and massive violations of Human Rights.

The reasoning behind the choice of the Darfur conflict was its acute presence on international media and the severity of the violations of Human Rights that it originated. This was an event that was widely advertised in Western media and the campaigns calling for aid to raise funds were an everyday feat on television. Its consequences can be traced till today, with thousands of displaced and the rise of terrorism in the area and overseas.

Syria was a direct result of the Arab Spring; the revolts against a dictatorship plunged the country into a civil war with more than two factions. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Salafist militant group, soon emerged and began to occupy more and more land within the country, harboring international terrorists to train and export them to Europe.

The reason why the war in Syria was deemed to be a good example was its current importance as one of the biggest ongoing conflicts in the world. Its future ramifications and effects cannot quite be fathomed yet and the toll that it has taken on its people and the international community as a whole is incommensurable.

4.1 Syria.

The Syrian revolution started as a peaceful and popular protest against the dictatorship of Al-Assad and the Baath Party. Two years later, the revolution had turned into a bloody civil war, although the calls for rights, and an inclusive and free Syria persisted (Youssef: 2012).

The Al-Assad regime still clings to power, but many armed groups are disputing over control of different areas of the country. The Syrian Opposition Coalition has wide support amongst civilians and (to an extent) the support of the armed groups that are somewhat organized under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. Nonetheless, other armed groups, like the Salafist (Al Nusra in particular) or the Kurdish fighters are not loyal to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and are gaining more and more ground which has provoked clashes between them. Al-Assad, in turn, has placed his army mostly in the Damascus region, coastal areas, and the main roads leading to the sea and the Lebanese capital.

4.1.1 The role of the Arab League.

The sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict impedes the League from offering a collective solution. The Arab League had long ago succumbed to identity politics that fuel the rivalry between States (Gumbo: 2014). It becomes even clearer that

this is a sectarian conflict[18] when all of the different countries that participated in the crisis are taken into account: the initial 2011 Security Council resolution was vetoed thrice by China and Russia (Assad's allies); Turkey has allegedly been harboring rebels and advocating regime change in Syria, with Qatar and other Gulf States injecting funds into the same cause; the United States has bombed the Islamic State and is thought to have sponsored rebels, although it has never publicly admitted doing so; and lastly, Iran and Iraq have been military and financially supporting the Assad regime to counteract Turkey and Gulf States.

The League initially stated that it would not take any kind of unilateral action in response to the crisis. Nonetheless, after nine months of non-stop violence against Syrian citizens, it introduced a plan that called on the government to bring violence to a halt, release political prisoners, and demilitarize civilian areas. Al-Assad failed to fulfill the plan and Syria's Arab League membership was revoked in 2011, followed by economic sanctions. In December of that year, the government agreed to sign a peace deal that allowed for a mission to observe and draft a report on the crisis. The mission was cancelled weeks later, however, due to security concerns on the ground. The League then encouraged the Security Council to take action and created a joint envoy with the UN to alleviate the crisis. By the end of 2012, the League joined forces with the Gulf Cooperation Council and recognized the National Coalition for the Syrian opposition so the representative model for the country would be more inclusive. This made it the official interlocutor for Syria in the League in 2013. In summer of that year, the League blamed Syria for a chemical attack on its citizens, urging the international community to act against the regime.

[18] Youssef, H. (2012) *Mediation and conflict resolution in the Arab World: the role of the Arab League*

4.1.2 The role of the European Union.

In 2011, at the beginning of what later came to be known as “The Arab Spring,” the corridors of Brussels believed that if any country should start a revolution, it was Syria. But also, if any regime could resist such upheaval, it was Assad’s.

The Assad regime was skilled enough to turn a pacific revolution into a civil war that has killed hundreds of thousands thus far, and rattled the security of Syria’s neighboring countries as well as Europe. The number of asylum requests has soared since 2011. According to Eurostat’s data for first-time asylum seekers, a fifth of those came from Syria in 2015. Europe’s security has been compromised due to European citizens turned jihadists, who trained and participated in the violence in Syria, and are now ready to return home and commit terrorist attacks.

At the beginning of the revolution, Europeans were optimistic about the country’s future, but as the violence skyrocketed and the war dragged on, migration and internal security became bigger concerns, allowing for the rise of nationalist parties across the continent. Moreover, Europe seems to be exhausted from the memories of past interventions in the Middle East, but it needs to make a choice between containing war or supporting partners who advocate for governance and a sense of inclusiveness in the Middle East.

-Europe’s institutional response:

The EU diplomatic service was created in early 2011, taking over the responsibilities of the European Commission in the field of foreign policy instruments. Apart from 15 years of direct experience with Damascus, the new

diplomats had several tools to handle upcoming challenges. These included the individual experiences of each member State and a 2007 study of Syria's civil society which was performed by the Commission[19].

The post-Lisbon Treaty institutions used mostly humanitarian and development tools and the process of intervention challenged structures that were not meant for such matters. The European External Action Service's most vital task was to oversee the efforts of the European Union and make sure that they were coherent and were also redirected to countries in the vicinity like Jordan and Lebanon.

Remotely, the European Union intervenes in Syria through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which supports Human Rights fighters and victims of abusive practices; and the Development Cooperation instrument, which covers a wider range of issues like ending poverty, governance or law. On the ground, the Union is working alongside individual member states and visits the Syrian capital monthly. With the growing frustration from Syrian civil society about the type of aid that was being received (mainly food packages), the focus shifted towards "resilience and recovery practices,"[20] which included classes for civil resistance or traineeships for entrepreneurs.

The EU's response to the crisis was disrupted by a number of factors: The Lisbon Treaty attempted to detach foreign affairs from the European Commission's duties, but these changes could not be implemented in time, and the new diplomatic services found themselves striving for relevance while the Commission strongly

[19] State-Civil society relations in Syria. Spitz Rene

[20] European Commission, DG European neighborhood policy and enlargement negotiations, "EU Regional trust fund in response to the Syrian Crisis", the "Madad Fund": Q&A with Additional information for partners (2015), 8.

influenced the political scene. One example of this is the Marad Fund for Syria, launched by the Commission's Directorate for Development with no coordination with the Diplomatic services, which failed because no member states had been involved in its development from the beginning. The staff, institutions, and EU's budget are not fit for a warfare situation. Instruments and habits are still very much humanitarian-oriented and those developed by the military were clearly wanting. The Union has yet to use its own military resources to solve a war situation because of the obvious lack of resources caused by the opposition of most members states to devote 2 percent of the budget to such matters.

The West's choice to abstain from providing substantial armed support made local governance impossible. Regulations, which require up to eighteen months to clear initiatives, prevented tactical responses from being effective. Thankfully, progress has been made, since then, when the "Regional strategy for Syria and Iraq" was born in February 2015. The strategy stressed the necessity to "scale up preparedness and rapid response capacities"[21]. A few more efficient instruments arose then: The instrument for stability and peace, for instance, replaced the instrument for stability and was awarded more funds. The rapid reaction mechanism fulfilled to an extent the need for reactivity, making it possible for certain actions to be cleared within forty-eight hours with merely a couple of signatures. This was even applicable for non-humanitarian projects.

A group like ISIS will always be quicker on the ground than an external organization, but that gap was -- at least and in theory -- substantially minimized. Nonetheless,

[21] European Commission, Elements for and EU Regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat, Joint Communication, JOIN (2015).

the bulk of the budget dedicated to this matter remained linked to heavy bureaucracy, which made for very lengthy processes (Benhamou: 2016).

As the war intensified, the influence of the EU continued to be rather discreet as most of the aid is being spent through funds that are multinational and thus go unnoticed. This is unfortunate because Europe is actually the biggest donor to Syria, responding to the crisis in two main ways: first, it provides the victims of the conflict with care and, second, it has sanctioned Syrian leaders with war crime histories. Despite the sanctions that were imposed, however, the desired effect did not materialize, and the regime did not run out of funds by the summer of 2013. On the other hand, thousands of refugees poured into neighboring countries that lacked the resources to accommodate them.

The Union sends help through diverse channels and agencies, establishing different camps that provide shelter, education and food. Some 4.3 billion euros have been spent since 2011 on Syria and have affected neighboring countries -- mainly Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq[22].

Brussels decided to spend 50% of the budget on Syria and the rest in neighboring countries that have absorbed some of the repercussions of the crisis. Assigning funds was extremely challenging, as half of the aid was handled by the Syrian regime, but the Union tried to target their desired audience while limiting adverse effects. Nevertheless, European aid policies have resulted in certain extremely important unexpected consequences: Inflation levels rose, especially with respect to basic goods like wheat, which was detrimental the population's purchasing

[22] European Commission, Elements for and EU Regional Strategy, 11.

power[23]. Moreover, because some of the aid went to the Syrian government, it benefited Assad's regime and other groups that the European Union opposes[24]. Sanctions on trade destabilized the Syrian economy and even helped some members of Assad's clan with their businesses[25].

All the aid that the European Union injected served only to slow down further spillovers. On the other hand, it indirectly catalyzed the escalation that was occurring, isolating the opposition and making it radicalize.

4.2 Darfur.

Darfur represents one of the greatest international crises in recent history. It is a clear example of the incapability of recently independent countries like Sudan to build a nation that is strong enough to incorporate all the cultural and ethnic aspects of its society into a strong and united entity. The region is home to 597 different tribes and groups that speak 115 languages and have varied religions and creeds. This vast diversity sparked lengthy conflicts and battles.

Some blame the crisis on the scarcity of resources in the region and the struggle to control them, and while this is true, experts have another explanation. In their view, the crisis was a struggle between the different tribes and their interests. Analysis for conflict mitigation, of course, was far simpler in the 1950's, when a mediator would have sufficed. In today's world, is must be conceived on a much grander scale that leans on International Institutions and governments (Haydar Ibrahim Ali: 2007).

[23] D. Butter. Syria's Economy, picking up the pieces, Chatham house, The royal institute of international affairs (London June 2015), 13.
[24] European Commission: towards an EU response to situations of fragility, COM (2007).
[25] C. Portela: EU Sanctions against Syria: conflict management by other means, Egmont. Royal Institute for International Affairs (2012).

4.2.1 The role of the Arab League.

Despite the large number of peace initiatives and talks that the Arab League has initiated, the League remains merely a partner in other organizations and nations' projects. The problem with the League is that its mediation role is restricted to conflicts between its different member states; it cannot participate in conflicts within the States themselves, and it will always try to paint them in the best possible light to the outside world. To elaborate, instead of recognizing human rights crises, the Arab League considers member states' internal conflicts a matter of maintaining the country's stability to avoid external intervention. This is understandable given the long history of colonization and foreign occupation in Arab countries.

The attack that triggered the Darfur war in 2003 came at a very sensitive point. At the time, the long-withstanding conflict between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army was about to be settled. This was not a new event, as the prior seventeen years of war between the North and the South attest, but Darfur somehow really managed to capture the attention of the West. At the same time, the Sudanese and Arab media described the crisis as a Western/American conspiracy fueled by the greed for oil and the extreme right/Christians/Israel.

The Darfur conflict did not fully capture the League's attention until a warrant for President Bashir was issued, after he arrested several members of the military in response to an attack in Omdurman. During the crisis, Darfur assumed leadership of the League and, during the Khartoum Summit of 2006, Secretary General Amr

Moussa expressed the bitter feeling of injustice that the Arab World feels towards the West. The same exact sentiments are, however, felt by the Sudanese population towards their government and the Arab League (Weber: 2010).

As the League's connection to Sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan plays a very important role in many aspects ranging from security to water supply. The League fears Sudan's connections to terrorist groups and regards it as a "primitive cousin" whose claim of being Arab is taken lightly. Sudan's troubled relationship with Egypt, a central force in the League, does not help its case either.

The situation in Darfur was never regarded as one of the great "Arab causes" like Palestine or other civil wars in the African continent, but rather, as an internal issue that created instability within the country. The League never recognized that the conflict could be based on an imbalance of power, and viewed it as a tribal affair that had caught international attention, resulting in a clash between the government in Khartoum and the West. Although different organizations asked for them to adhere to the Geneva conventions for Human Rights, the Darfur rebels gained recognition in the West. In the Arab World, however, they were accused of being a mere instrument for the West to infiltrate the country. The League was entranced by outside interference and the conflict's international implications, completely overlooking its domestic roots and dynamics.

In May of 2004, the League did send an investigation mission to Darfur, and although it never publicly reported its findings, leaked sections showed baffling human rights abuse on both sides (Weber: 2010). Sudan's Foreign Affairs Minister

called for help from the League[26]. And while the League did not offer any military support, it placed itself in favor of the Khartoum government in the international scene, blaming the destabilization of the country on foreign actors[27]. The Arab League urged the United Nations and its Security Council to call off their 30-day ultimatum for the Khartoum government to disarm rebel forces, asserting that it was beyond their control. These claims actually hurt the credibility of the League as a mediator with access to all parties of the conflict.

The Abuja peace talks that led to the peace agreement of 2006 were not inclusive in the slightest because they did not invite Arab rebel groups or civil society to the conversation. The Arab League's diplomacy approach seems driven by the need to have none of its leaders lose face, so in this case they just aimed for the government in Khartoum to get in the least trouble possible. Their declaration of 2006 only called for support of the Khartoum government. Even in more recent declarations that were signed by Sudan and neighboring countries, the focus of the text is on the traffic of light weapons across borders[28]. The bottom line is that, only member states with direct interest in the Sudan (like Egypt or Libya) were willing to respond to the conflict. Even then, they chose to do so by upgrading their national security as opposed to working as a common entity in coordination with the Arab League.

---

[26] *Sudan seeks help in avoiding sanctions*, Irish Times, August 4th 2004, [https://www.irishtimes.com/news/sudan-seeks-arab-help-in-avoiding-sanctions-1.987086]

[27] *Arabs rally to Sudan as world condemns it over Darfur*, Sudan Tribune, July 27th 2004 [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article4257]

[28] *Khartoum declaration on the control of small arms and light weapons across the neighboring countries of Western Sudan*, May of 2012 [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP_SD_CPR_Khartoum_Declaration_SALW.pdf]

The Khartoum government requested assistance from the Arab League in their resistance against a UN forces intervention, but all they managed to accomplish was for the League to endorse the African Union intervention instead. This did not translate to anything more than 10 percent of what had been promised and a small number of Arab soldiers[29].

The 2008 attack on Omdurman served as a wake-up call for the Arab World. This time Khartoum could not reassure the League or the concerned Egyptians, and peace talks had to be initiated.

Justice was seen as a very specific concept by the Arab League, the clearest example being the Palestinian conflict. Its views the International Criminal Court as merely an instrument of control from the West; and even if most of the League's member states have signed the Rome Statue, few of them have ratified it[30]. The concept of responsibility is hardly ever mentioned in the League's communications and the International Criminal Court's verdict against president Al-Bashir was considered an exaggeration. In 2009, during the Doha summit, the League even refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Court[31]. Unfortunately, the League does not seem to value the rights of citizens as much as it values the sovereignty and the recognition of the leader of the country – even if the support for Bashir seemed to be backed by public opinion in the Arab World, making him a sort of anti-neo-colonialism symbol.

---

[29] About the Arab stance vis-à-vis Darfur, Nadim Hasbani, International Crisis Group ,march 2007, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/about-arab-stance-vis-vis-darfur] translated from original in Al Hayat.

[30] See [http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Signatories_RomeStatute.pdf]

[31] *Sudan's leader arrives in Qatar*, Brian Murphy, The Washington Post, March 2009,[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/29/AR2009032902507.html?wprss=rss_world/mideast]

The League handles very few of the Arab initiatives for peace in Darfur. Most of them are just individual country projects that were later adopted by the institution. One of the most relevant examples was Doha in 2008, when foreign ministers of Arab nations, including Libya, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, decided to coordinate efforts for Darfur. Libya was one of the most active countries when it came to initiating talks, but in light of recent events, that is no longer the case.

The structural problem of the approach to the Darfur crisis seems very clear. Crises were addressed separately and without engaging all stakeholders in the peace talks. This only creates more opportunities for conflict, confusion, and misinformation, thereby thwarting any efforts or pressure applied to resolve the crisis. This crisis also exposes the disconnection between the Arab elite, its leaders, and its population. Sudanese civil society should have been included in the conversation so the League could have produced a more sensible, unified message.

The Arab Spring sparked two attempts to overthrow the Sudanese government. The 2013 protests really took the capital by storm, crossing class divides and resulting in an estimated 21,000 deaths[32]. Bashir's mismanagement of the country's finances left the country bankrupt, but there seem to be no other suitable figures to replace him. Rebels regularly attack the capital's fringes, and borders are not safe, which gives this impression that Bashir's government is the only thing standing between the people and dangerous barbarians. This fragile stability is certainly not a good compromise, so if a full revolution did not manage to explode this time, it surely is coming.

[32] *Sudan is finally building up to its own Arab Spring*, Nesrine Malike, The Guardian October 2013.

4.2.2 The role of the European Union.

It is inevitable to consider the complexity of the European Union as one of the challenges that hindered its outreach efforts in Sudan. European member states tend to act more bilaterally than through the European Union, which the EU sees as something complimentary, but it could be the result of the organization's lack of a clear structure for foreign policy. Singular country activities have reached the European level in certain instances, like the European Force. This lack of coordination is in a way compensated by the huge amount of funds that are allocated to Arab countries; Europaid reports that in recent years, the Union has donated up to 17 trillion US dollars per year to up to 20 different Arab States.

In terms of cooperation with other international organizations, the EU Special representative for Sudan regularly makes visits to the Arab League, collaborating as well with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Nonetheless, Darfur seems not to be included in many forums aimed at conflict resolutions, like Euromed, which usually only address processes in the Middle East (Gya: 2010). It is again up to particular states to finance initiatives -- sometimes indirectly through other countries like Libya -- and put pressure on the EU, like it is the case in Spain[33].

The involvement of the European Union in the Sudan was not extensive when the crisis broke out in 2003. It was only when the flood of refugees became noticeable that the Union reacted and injected money through the UNHCR. It took another year to commence with individual projects for the humanitarian crisis. While the US

[33] *Darfur: Peacemaking, peacekeeping and recommendations for Spain*. Borja Lasheras, Observatorio de Política Exterior Español, Memorando OPEX no. 74/2008.

described the crisis as a genocide, Europe failed to do so[34]. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the European Union has only been involved in conflict resolution since the 2000's and still very much relies on the UN to make these types of decisions, often following their lead and criteria.

All political responses from the EU in Africa go through the Political and Security committee after being formulated by the Africa Working Party (COAFR). On the ground, the council communicates itself through an EU Special representative that it appoints for each case. The Special representative has developed a series of actions for the conflict that can be catalogued as short and long term.

4.2.2.1 Short-term actions.

Initially, the parliament considered a large-scale military operation, but the lack of support rendered this first project a simple support mission. Tackling conflicts that are geographically closer to the Union has been a constant in European politics and history, so this did not come as a big surprise. There was resistance from both sides, but the support mission finally went ahead[35]. The initial total investment was 305 million euros and the support continued until the end of 2007, when the United Nations relieved the Union of its work.

The spotlight was back on the conflict in 2007 regarding internally displaced individuals. France pushed for the establishment of a mission, creating EUFOR in the beginning of 2008, which aimed to provide security for refugees in the area (Gya:

[34] *Sudan Massacres are not genocide says EU*, Rory Carroll, The Guardian August 2004 [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/10/eu.sudan]

[35] About the Arab stance vis-à-vis Darfur, Nadim Hasbani, International Crisis Group ,march 2007, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/about-arab-stance-vis-vis-darfur] translated from original in Al Hayat.

2010). This initiative was criticized for different reasons. Chad, the country that the refugees were spilling into, saw this deployment as an attempt by the French to colonize the area. Once the idea caught on, the entire project's scale was deemed clearly insufficient and unable to make any significant changes. It is true that the initiative did not achieve security in certain areas, and that it might have adopted more of a humanitarian scope; but this was the first time that a European Force had managed to collaborate and synchronize with a UN force, and they arguably did so successfully (Seybert: 2008). This experience provided both entities with a very insightful lesson for joint, short-term action.

4.2.2.2 Long-term actions.

Short-term and long-term actions have unfortunately been kept separate and have not been integrated in the European Union. The council, which was the organ that sent the mission to Sudan, seems sometimes unaware of the work that the commission is carrying out and vice versa. The commission deals mostly with political relations between countries and elaborates on policies for financial instruments and cooperation for development, in the case of Africa as agreed in the Cotonou agreement[36].

The main objective for Sudan is to implement the 2005 peace agreement that should have ended the civil war between the South and the North. The commission regularly communicates with Khartoum through the EU Special representative for Sudan, but they have avoided direct contact with Al-Bashir, as instructed by the International Criminal Court.

[36] See: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf]

Beyond short-term and long-term responses, and as it has been explained before, individual European countries have taken part in negotiations and peace talks as permanent members of the United Nations. The European Union is in direct contact with the coordinators of the mediations between the UN and the African Union, and remains involved in the talks, but its exact role needs to be specified in this. Even with the Lisbon Treaty coming to force in 2009, the priorities of the Union still lie with its neighboring countries and bigger-scale conflicts like the occupation of Palestine.

On the one hand, considering the history of European occupation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the European Union has clearly not done enough. On the other hand, the Union has poured millions in aid into the region, mostly aimed at humanitarian needs but also to ensure, to a certain extent, the security of the region and in turn minimize the risk of security attacks in the old continent. The Union, in short, needs to find its own role in international conflict and really commit if it decides to intervene, providing more resources of all kinds (including military) and cooperating with civil society to ensure that everyone's needs are taken care of and everybody's voice is heard.

Chapter Five

5.1 Conclusions.

The promotion of peace and stability has been an objective of the European Union since the very first actions in the field of foreign policy and common security. The idea of preventing conflict with a global coherent scope is more recent, though, as it was only introduced in 2001. Afterwards, a comprehensive approach was put into place, but its effectiveness is hard to determine given its nature.

Conflict prevention is not a specific Union policy. It is a political objective that is tackled through all the instruments that the European Union has. These could be economic, diplomatic, or even security and defense related. This wide scope responds to the fact that the Union is a civil power; it is a direct consequence of the peculiar political nature of the European integration process.

The fact that this policy wishes to adopt prevention as an objective through actions that give priority to structural stability makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of these actions. In this sense, it is much easier to perceive failure through the breakout of conflict than valuing how long-term policies -- like certain processes or agreements on cooperation, or global policies like the expansion or adhesion ones -- might have served to avoid conflicts that never took place.

From the perspective of the evaluations of the results of this new approach, both institutions and doctrine agree on pointing out the errors derived from the fact that, given the trans-pillar nature of it, we have different institutions being

responsible for the different instruments that apply this policy. This lack of coherence is not exclusive to conflict prevention; it is a recurring and problematic issue in all European foreign policies.

With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union presented some important solutions towards a global approach, as it establishes one person to formulate and manage foreign policy, the High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs (currently Federica Mogherini), and a sole responsible administration, the European external action service. Other matters such as coordination with member states and other international and civil society organizations, on the other hand, will have to be dealt with on a political level. The Union now has the adequate approach and tools to deal with the complex nature of conflict, but it still needs to apply them in a more coordinated and coherent manner.

In the case of Syria, specifically, European institutions fail to address pressing matters with adequate response. Humanitarian solutions are just not enough for military problems. It is rather a paradox that the Union keeps on applying these types of policies when its involvement in the International arena is well beyond that and calls for case-by-case, military responses that prove they have not forsaken civil society and minority groups. With few resources, and being out of its element, the Union needs a far more flexible model to defend its interests.

In the case of the Arab League, the Arab Spring uprisings and the events that followed made clear that countries in the Arab world suffer from acute internal conflicts that threaten lasting peace in the region. The crises have also shown how the protection of human rights is of vital importance to human security in Arab

States and the stability of that part of the world. If the League takes an effective and clear stance on this, it would have a deep signification since it is one of the very few organizations where all Arab States come together to reflect on the issues that they share.

In spite of the many failures, the League has managed to transform and play a more active role in the Syrian and Libyan crises. Compared to some of the League's actions in previous internal crises, these two countries received plenty of attention: Libya saw how the League called out the regime for its authoritarianism and its atrocious practices and requested foreign intervention. Syria also received some help, with the League trying to build a dialogue platform between the warring groups. They also sent in a mission to observe the situation, imposed economic and political boycotts, and worked on different peace plans (although none of them were successful). These efforts were far greater than anything that had been attempted in Yemen or Bahrain. The second remarkable effort was placing the issue on the international agenda, especially before the Security Council at the United Nations, through the drafting of peace plans. During the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, however, the League remained silent in international community. The third particularity was that, and unlike in Libya, the League never promoted foreign intervention despite pressure from some members like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This opposition to foreign intervention can be regarded as a rather wise act on the part of the League since, from previous experiences like Iraq, it has learned that this type of intervention is problematic in Arab countries. Such an interference might have further damaged the League's already questionable impartiality as its member

states always prefer a political transition that hands over the power to some other force rather than having Western powers intervene and deploy troops in the country (Barnett: 1995). The role of Syria as a fault line in the region due to its socio-political dynamics needs to be taken into account as well if the League wishes to avoid spill-overs into neighboring countries. The forth particularity it that it was a rather eventful feat, as it was the first time that the League brought up the need for a specific regional peacekeeping force in an intra-regional conflict.

Nonetheless, these incomplete achievements do not automatically transform the Arab League into a regional actor with relevant influence. Its overall involvement in the Arab uprisings can be summarized as a failure since its organizational particularities prevented it from taking proper action. As previously discussed, the main issues were its decision-making challenges, its excessive stress on sovereignty, its credibility problem, and the shortage of decision-enforcing tools.

It is dangerous to generalize from such few cases, but the cases that have been dealt with shed some light on the role regional organizations play when it comes to solving regional security problems. It has been made very apparent how some regional organizations are hesitant to cooperate in security related problems considering their extreme focus on their member states' sovereignty, the aversion to external intervention, and the principle of self-determination. Such preoccupations pose serious problems for these organizations in terms of autonomy and empowerment, as well as with regard to the development of mechanisms and instruments like peacekeeping forces. The commitment to handle regional security issues needs to be much higher. This case has shown how

problems of this type are hard to tackle regardless of their characteristics. If these problems are of an intra-state kind, touching on sovereignty and the self-determination of a regime, which is almost always the case, regional organization hesitate when taking a stance and acting on it. However, the same thing happens if these problems affect the whole of the region and have been going on for a while. The organizations fail to come up with a solution that is sustainable.

Conquering these problems seems a formidable task, especially for the Arab League, although it is also hard for the European Union. Thus, it could be said that expectations must be lowered when it comes to regional organizations that are situated in conflict-ridden areas and what they can realistically achieve. For post-conflict scenarios, they could perhaps start by enhancing the mechanism for being proactive and the protection of Human Rights.

5.2 Recommendations.

If the Arab League wishes to be more effective it should put more work into its organizational characteristics, and improve its protection of Human Rights and the mechanisms that can be used in the resolution of intra-state conflicts. The revision of decision-making procedures and a stronger Secretary General would also bring a greater advantage to the way the League functions and is able to respond and intervene in times of crisis. In principle, this would only ameliorate the credibility problem that obstructs member states from having better communication with the League about their internal problems and how to deal with these types of crises and post-revolution periods -- like it happened in the Northern African countries.

The Arab League's work on Human Rights needs to be transformed and completely improved. The mechanisms for implementation of new policies could be advanced by focusing more on reporting violations, and investigating and petitioning for new laws. Creating a Human Rights Court and an investigatory organism for war crimes would also bring a lot of credibility to the institution. The Arab League is definitely capable of functioning better in a post-revolutionary scenario, as it has shown slight improvement, but it needs to implement further measures if it wishes to be taken seriously by the International Community (Gumbo: 2014).

In relation to Sudan, it would be advisable for the League to draft a common peace policy agenda. The League itself could carry out Arab peace initiatives: reducing competition and promoting synergies, thus boosting the institution's reputation as a conflict mediator. Although the concept of Human Rights is not present in the League's statutes, conflict mediation is, so the institution should make efforts to bridge this gap between the narrative and actual practices.

In the case of Syria, and as the Security Council and the Arab League seem to have fallen hostage to vetoing and their members' interests, it would be preferable that action be taken by the General Assembly of the UN, through different mechanisms. This should include international military intervention and negotiations that are inclusive of all sectors and parts of society. There is a need for new elections, which in theory would harmonize the different sectarian interests. New institutions should be placed to define genocide, avoid mass murder, and engage all sectarian realities.

The European Union, for its part and in the case of Syria in particular, should reevaluate its sanctions policy so as to not hurt Syrian civilians and their economy;

support neighboring countries, as this would palliate the refugee crisis; reinforce its support to opposition groups in a military manner; support government reforms and decentralization for the different needs of the different regions of the country; adapt European instruments so they can provide military support; and boost the security budget[37].

The Sudanese case is somewhat similar. The European Union needs to merge its long-term and short-term actions and instruments to develop external action. The commitment to stay in the region needs to be serious and long-term. The Union must engage with Arab civil society and carry out an in-depth evaluation of the political scene and the consequences that a secession could have. The Union's involvement with NGO's needs to be greater, as well as their communications and support of peace processes that are currently spearheaded by the United Nations and the African Union (Gya: 2009).

While the EU is not a perfect model of regional organization that can be exported to any other region of the world without taking into account geographical, historical, political and social characteristics, it does seem appropriate that other regional organizations, such as the Arab League, implement some of their organizational characteristics, specially in terms of conflict prevention and resolution, such as the creation of specific bodies with specific powers to carry out a unified policy in the area. The commitment that the European Union upholds to the defense of human rights and the expansion of democracy and social development in neighboring countries should also be a part of the Arab League's future policies. However, the

[37] Stiftung, H. (2013) *What can the European Union do in Syria?*

European Union itself must continue to take steps to improve, by strengthening its common security and cooperation instruments, and by coordinating policies, actors, and instruments so that their actions are consistent with the principles that inspire them.

References

Adler, E. Barnett, M. (1998). *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arteaga, F. (2015). *El poder militar suní: ¿hacia un ejército árabe? (The Sunni military power: towards an Arab army?)*. Madrid: Real Instituto El Cano.

Barnett, M. N. (1995). *Sovereignty, nationalism and regional order in the Arab States System*. London: Cambridge Press.

Bjoern, H. (2008). *EUFOR Tchad/RCA: a cautionary note*. European Security Review no. 37 ISIS Europe.

Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E. and Nordstrom, T. (2004). *Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?* World Politics 57: 1–38.

Borgen, C. J. (1994). *The theory and practice of regional organization intervention in civil wars*. New York: St John's Univerity.

Butter, D. (2015). Syria's Economy: picking up the pieces. London: Chatham House, the Royal Institute of international affairs.

Christou G. et al. (2010). European Security: putting the "security" back in. London: Taylor & Francis.

Buzan, B. Waever, O. de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Colombo, S. (2012). The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards. Manchester: The International Spectator.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1969). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. New York: Greenwood Press.

European Commission, (2015). Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat. Joint communication.

European Commission, (2007). Towards an EU response to situations of fragility: engaging in difficult environments for sustaining development, stability and peace. Brussels: COM.

European Commission (2014). A global actor in search of a strategy. European Union foreign policy between multilateralism and bilateralism. Brussels: COM.

Farrell, M. (2005). EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance. Brussels: European Foreign Affairs review, Kluwer Law International.

Fatjó, P. Colom, G. (2012). La defensa de la Unión European: voluntades básicas y capacidades militares. (The defense of the EU: basic military capacities and aims). Barcelona: UAB.

Fawcett, L. Hurrell, A. (1995). Regionalism in World Politics. London: Clarendon Press.

Feliu, Luis. (2015). Iniciativa de fuerza militar pan-árabe de la liga de los estados árabes. Fortalezas and limitaciones (Initiative for a pan-Arab military force from the Arab League: Limitations and strengths). Madrid: IEEE.

FRIDE (2015). Desafíos para la política exterior europea en 2015. Cómo abordan los demás el desorden (Challenges for foreign EU policy in 2015, how do others deal with mayhem). Madrid: FRIDE.

Gaub, F. (2015). Stuck in the barracks: the Joint Arab Force. Brussels: ISS.

Graham, K. Felício, T. (2005). Regional security and global governance: a proposal for a regional-global security mechanism. Brussels: Egmont.

Gumbo, B. (2014). The Hobbesian Nightmare in the Arab League: A collision of identity, politics and national interests in Middle East Conflicts. Harare: Department of political and administrative studies.

Gya, G. Herz, J. (2009). EUFOR Tchad/RCA update: in ESDP and EU mission Update. European Security Review no 43. Brussels: ISIS Europe.

Hansen, H. E., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., & Nemeth, S. C. (2008). IO mediation of interstate conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 295–325.

Haas, Ernst B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. California: Standford University Press.

Haas, Ernst B (1970). The study of regional integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorizing. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin press.

Hasenclever, A. Weiffer, B. (2006). International institutions are they key: a new perspective on the democratic key. London: British International Studies Association.

Hellquist, E. (2014). Regional Organizations and sanctions against members. Explaining the different trajectories of the African Union, the Arab League and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Berlin: KFG.

Herbst, J. (2007). Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa, in A. Acharya and A. I. Johnston (eds), Crafting Cooperation. Regional International Institutions in

Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129-144.

Hesham, Y. (2012). Mediation and conflict resolution in the Arab world: the role of the Arab League. London: Bloomsbury.

Hettne, B. Inotai, A. Sunkel, O. (2008). Globalism and the new Regionalism. London: McMillan.

Hinnebusch, R. (2001). The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. London: Lynne Rienner.

Hoffman, Stanley (1995). The European Sisyphus. Essays on Europe 1964-94. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hudson Michael C. ed., (1999). Middle East Dilemma: The politics and Economics of Arab Integration. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kirchner, E. Sperling, J. (2007). EU Security Governance. Manchester University Press.

Lynch, M. (2012). Making the Arab League matter. London: Foreign policy edition.

Major, C. (2011). European Rapid Response Forces. Berlin: SWP.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. Cambridge: International Security, 19(3), 5–49.

Miralles, D. (2004). An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response. Bellaterra. IUEE.

Montanaro, L. Schünemann, J. (2011). Walk the talk: the EU needs and effective early warning system to match its ambitions to prevent conflict and promote peace. Madrid: FRIDE.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community. A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), pp. 473-524.

Owen, R (2000). State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East. London: Routledge.

Pinfari, M. (2009). Nothing but failure. The Arab League and The Gulf Cooperation Council as mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts. London: department for international development.

Portela, C. (2012). The EU’s sanctions against Syria: conflict management by other means. London: Royal Institute for international Affairs.

Sahin, Z. (2014). The rebirth of a dead organization: questioning the role of the Arab League in the Arab uprising process. Istanbul: Center for strategic research.

Schloming, G. (1991). Power and Principle in International Affairs. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Söderbaum, F. Shaw, T. (2003). Theories of New Regionalism. London: McMillan.

Söderbaum, F. (2013). What's wrong with Regional Integration? The problem of Eurocentrism. Gothenburg: Robert Schuman Centre for European Studies.

Sore, S. (2010). Establishing regional integration: the African Union and the European Union. Minnesota: Malacaster College International.

Spitz, R. (2014). State-Civil society relations in Syria. Cambridge: Lambert.

Toffolo, C. (2008). The Arab League (International organizations). New York: Chelsea House Publishers.

Weber, A. (2010). Bridging the gap between narrative and practices: the role of the Arab League in Darfur. Madrid: FRIDE

Youssef, H. (2012). Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: The Role of the Arab League. Hamburg: IFSH.