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Lebanese American University

APPROACHES TO PEACE:

**BALANCE OF POWER, COLLECTIVE SECURITY
AND WORLD GOVERNMENT**

By

Jean-Paul CHAMI

Thesis submitted

In partial fulfillment of the Masters of Arts

Degree in International Affairs

Thesis Advisor:

Dr. Kamal YAZIGI

Beirut, Lebanon

- Spring 2004 -

122221

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
School of Arts and Sciences

Approaches to Peace:
Balance of Power, Collective Security and World Government

We hereby approve the thesis of

Jean-Paul Chami

Dr. Kamal Yazigi

Advisor

Dr. Sami Baroudi

Committee Member

Marwan Rouwehib

Dr. Marwan Rouwehib

Committee Member

September 2004

*to my Mom...
for so much patience and unconditional love*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of abbreviations and acronyms	i
List of tables	ii
List of figures	iii
Preface	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Balance of Power as an approach to peace	5
A. Defining national power	5
B. Elements of a nation's power	6
1. Geography as a source of power	7
2. Natural resources as a source of power	8
3. Industrial Capacity as a source of power	8
4. Military Preparedness as a source of power	8
5. Population as a source of power	9
6. National character as a source of power	9
7. National morale as a source of power	10
8. Quality of diplomacy as a source of power	10
9. Quality of government as a source of power	11
C. Definition of BOP	12
D. Elements of BOP politics	13
E. Philosophical assumptions of the approach to peace through BOP	15
F. Preconditions for the formation of a BOP	16
G. Structures of BOP	16
1. Unipolar systems	17
2. Bipolar systems	17
3. Multipolar systems	18
4. What international system patterns are the most stable?	18

5. The current international system	20
H. Evaluation of BOP as an approach to peace	21
1. Weaknesses	21
2. Strengths	24
I. Historical record of the BOP and peace	26
1. Successes of the BOP as an approach to peace	26
2. Failures of the BOP as an approach to peace	27
3. Current BOP considerations	28
J. Conclusion	29
Chapter Two: Collective Security as an approach to peace	31
A. Definition of the concept of CS	32
B. Philosophical assumptions of the approach to peace through CS	33
C. Preconditions for the achievement of CS	34
D. Impediments to the achievement of CS	37
E. Evaluation of CS as an approach to peace	38
1. Weaknesses	38
2. Strengths	40
F. CS organizations	42
1. The Concert of Europe	43
2. The League of Nations (1920-1946)	43
3. The United Nations (1946-present day)	44
4. NATO, from collective defense to CS (1949-present day)	47
G. Historical record of CS and peace	48
1. Failure 1: The invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931	48
2. Failure 2: The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935	49
3. Failure 3: The Yugoslavian crisis in 1991	49
4. 'Relative' successes: Korea and Iraq	50

I. CS versus BOP	51
J. Conclusion	53
Chapter Three: World Government as an approach to peace	57
A. Definition of the concept of WG	58
B. Philosophical assumptions of the approach to peace through WG	59
C. Criticisms of the concept of WG as an approach to peace	60
1. Weaknesses	60
2. Strengths	62
D. Preconditions for the formation of WG	63
E. Obstacles towards the creation of a WG	63
F. Proposals for World Government	64
1. Giueseppe Borgese's proposal	65
2. The Clark / Sohn Plan – a strengthened UN system	66
3. Philippe Isely's proposal – the Federation of Earth	67
4. The James Yunker proposal	68
G. Conclusion	69
Conclusion	74
References	81

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<i>BOP</i>	Balance Of Power
<i>COE</i>	Concert of Europe
<i>CS</i>	Collective Security
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>FUDN</i>	Federal Union of Democratic Nations
<i>GA</i>	General Assembly
<i>IO</i>	International Organization
<i>LON</i>	League of Nations
<i>MNC</i>	Multinational Corporation
<i>NATO</i>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<i>NWFZ</i>	Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone
<i>SC</i>	United Nations Security Council
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNGA</i>	United Nations General Assembly
<i>US</i>	United States
<i>USSR</i>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<i>WEEP</i>	World Economic Equalization Program
<i>WG</i>	World Government
<i>WWI</i>	World War One
<i>WWII</i>	World War Two

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1	Examples of the changing of sources of power with time	11
Table 1.2	Balancing techniques in BOP systems	15
Table 2.2	International Systems throughout history	20
Table 3.1	Giuseppe Borgese's proposed Electoral Colleges	65

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	The three approaches to peace	4
Figure 1.1	Possible distribution of power among states	18
Figure 3.1	Distribution of voting power under the Clark-Sohn proposal	67

PREFACE

The main goal behind writing this thesis is to present the study of three approaches to peace in the most simplistic way possible. For literature, though abundant, has not been in general quite easy for students of international affairs to digest. In addition, the methodology adopted here is clear and well similarly organized across the three chapters. Even though I shall argue in favor of the creation of a world government as the best possible approach to preserving peace, nevertheless this does not deny the many strengths presented by the two other approaches.

The methodology adopted revolves around defining each approach, presenting its philosophical assumptions about what causes wars and what should be done to prevent them, surveying its strengths and weaknesses, including a set of historical examples proving / denying its efficiency all in a very simplistic way.

This thesis is based on publications by prominent authors in the realm of international relations namely concerned with the study of the international system and the interaction of its different components, mainly the nation-states.

The main authors whose publications have been consulted were Claude Inis, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Spanier, John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye. Additionally, two experiences provided this study with more depth and broadened my own personal perspective as well. The first was in July 2003 when I attended the 41st United Nations Graduate Program at Palais des Nations in Geneva, which consisted of series of conferences presented by prominent UN figures. The second was in August 2004 at the UN summer School held at the Lebanese American University in Jbeil and

during which I attended workshops and conferences on conflict analysis and resolution presented by leading UN officers as well as local and foreign professors.

This thesis would have never materialized without the contribution of many people that I need to thank in recognition for their help and support.

I am indebted to my professor and thesis advisor Dr. Kamal Yazigi who have helped me along the journey of the Master's program at the Lebanese American University all the way till the elaboration of my MA thesis.

I owe special thanks to Dr. Sami Baroudi who has been a professor and a friend. I enjoyed working with him as his assistant and benefited immensely from his wide experience and his guidance.

Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Marwan Rouwayheb whom I met during the UN Summer School and who later on generously accepted to fill the vacant place of third reader on the committee on very short notice.

INTRODUCTION

War should belong to the tragic past, to history: it should find no place on humanity's agenda for the future.

- Pope John Paul II (1982) -

Peace encompasses so many meanings. We shall settle in this study with peace as the absence of intense political conflict and rivalry and of large-scale wars. For the concept of true peace, today, is much broader, and requires not only the absence of wars, but also “the presence of decent economic and social standards of living for all people”.¹

The peace of Westphalia brought the birth of the nation-state. Nations have been the primary actor in the international system, and more accurately, great power states. Since WWI, the paradigm of international politics has been witnessing constant efforts for remodeling. First, nation-states have ceased to be the sole players on the international scene. Other actors like regional economic blocks, groupings with a federal character, International Organizations (IOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have emerged and proved to be as influential as the states themselves. An important shift in world politics occurred. Balance of Power politics lost their appeal in an ever more intertwined international relations and globalized world economies. At the same time, the sovereignty of states is diminishing and state-centered world politics are increasingly

¹ Spanier, Games nations play, p.128

losing their appeal in the midst of global threats that cannot be met unless states joined forces and relinquished some of their political autonomy.

Still, the international system of states defined as a “dynamic world-wide system of human relationships that maintain continuity and facilitates change, based on the perceptions of all nations, cultures and people in matters of politics, commerce, industry, environment, technology, society, religion and war” is evermore characterized by anarchy.²

The three approaches to peace dealt with in this thesis revolve around the management of international power relations. Accordingly, peace is viewed as a direct function of the power relationships between states. An efficient management of the distribution of power on the international scene would hence bring hostilities to their end and insure stability.

The three approaches share a common feature: they are all approaches to peace by force as opposed to other [less violent] approaches to peace where peace is reached through international law, disarmament and diplomacy. The three approaches to world peace can be put together under the heading “Peace through Strength”, which is a concept based on the idea that “if you want peace, prepare for war” (from Latin: *vis pacem, para bellum*).³

The three approaches have been selected and sorted according to three factors: chronology, the level of management of the international system, and the school of international political thinking they represent. The approaches range from the oldest,

² World Politics: Definition of International System: <http://stark.kent.edu/~dhart/wpeve/IS.htm>

³ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.292

decentralized most realist approach (Balance of Power) to the most recent, centralized and idealist one (World Government).

The first approach is Balance of power. A realist approach to world affairs *par excellence*, the balance of power idea is a laissez-faire system, with no management mechanisms at all. It advocates that the nation-state remain the major player in an anarchical and oligarchic international system. Realists, hence, view balance of power as the only possible option for deterring wars. They leave the power of coercion in the hands of each state,⁴ and expect that the system itself generate its own immunity against wars and major conflicts.

The second approach is collective security. It comes at halfway between Balance of Power and World Government. It advocates the creation of an alliance with a mechanism capable of interfering whenever aggression is committed between countries. Similarly to the BOP, it advocates the preservation of the nation-state.

The third and final concept is World Government. Newest of the three approaches, and never tried before, it represents the culmination of a trend towards the centralization of world affairs.⁵ Proponents of this concept propose that a super-state be created to centralize the use of violence and force.⁶ Its main point of departure with the two previous approaches is that nations-states, root cause of wars and instability are to be abolished.

In terms of power relations, the Balance of Power is to be viewed as a decentralized approach to power where the system itself regulates power distribution and relations.

⁴ Negretto, Kant and the illusion of collective security, pp.501-523


⁵ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.206

⁶ Negretto, Kant and the illusion of collective security, pp.501-523

World Government symbolizes another extremist approach in which the centralization of power in the hands of a supranational entity prevails. Lastly, Collective Security would represent a sort of a middle range solution to the problem of power on the international level as well as an approach to world stability and security via a partial management approach.⁷

This study aims at presenting those three approaches in the most simplistic way possible since the literature has been so far quite complex, while trying to determine the best, most convincing approach towards an efficient management of power relations among states and peace. The survey of the 3 approaches would reveal their strengths and weaknesses, feasibility, and impediments to their achievement, common features, etc. For each approach, a chapter would be dedicated having the same pattern of analysis: definition of the approach, presenting its main philosophical assumptions, surveying its real and potential obstacles, criticisms, advantages and strengths, and finally historical review of its past achievements and a projection of its future applicability.

Figure 1: *The three approaches to peace*



⁷ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.9

Chapter One

BALANCE OF POWER AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

The only time that the world has seen any extended period of peace is when there has been a balance of power.

- Nixon -

The day we have left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of every nation take care of itself or make partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world.

- Woodrow Wilson -

Before presenting the Balance of Power (BOP) with its too many concepts and applications, it is imperative that we start by defining power in general and national power in particular.

A. DEFINING NATIONAL POWER

Dictionaries generally define power as the “possession of control, authority, or influence over the others”.¹ In other words: “power is the ability to produce the outcome one wishes.”²

¹ Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

² Nye, *The Velvet hegemon: how soft power can help defeat terrorism*, pp.74-76

When it comes to power among nations, power is better expressed as “the ability of a nation to get other nations to do what they otherwise would not do”.³ Besides control, power provides nations the means of preserving their autonomy, wider ranges of action and more safety margins while dealing with less powerful actors.⁴

More concretely, possessing power is possessing power resources, which include such factors like population, territory, natural resources, economy, military forces and political stability. The mere existence of power resources is not sufficient in itself. It is very important that a state possess what is termed “power conversion” mechanisms. Converting power is that a state be able to make efficient use of the resources it holds towards influencing other states’ behavior.⁵

B. ELEMENTS OF A NATION’S POWER

States are distinguished in terms of how much power they hold. Although national power usually means the nation’s military capabilities, there are other equally important capabilities to be taken into consideration. Joseph Nye* categorizes power according to two criteria: hard or soft. Hard power is the use of the stick and carrot policies as a coercive means. Soft power, on the other hand, is a country’s capacity to influence other nations’ decisions through the attractiveness of its culture, ideals, values and policies rather than through force and coercion (i.e. “La francophonie”).⁶

In order to estimate a nation’s power level, one must take into account several factors.

³ Robert Dahl cited in Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, p.50

⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International politics*, pp. 194-195

⁵ Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, pp.50-51

* Joseph S. Nye Jr. is currently the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations. Dean of the Kennedy School (1995-2004). Prior, he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. His most recent books are *The Paradox of American Power* (2002), *Understanding International Conflicts*, (2002), and *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004).

⁶ Nye, *The Velvet hegemon: how soft power can help defeat terrorism*, pp.74-76

Hans Morgenthau* organizes a nation's sources of power into relatively stable or relatively unstable sources, in a mix of tangible (geography, population, etc.) and intangible (political system, leadership, national moral, etc.) components.⁷ Ranging from the most tangible [or stable] factor (geography) to the least tangible [or unstable] factor (governance), the sources of national power are presented here below.

1. Geography as a source of power

The geography of a country is the most stable of all factors. Despite the developments in transportation, communication and warfare, the geographical location of a country remains an important factor. The separation of the US from the European continent and Asia by a large body of water is one of the best examples that can be cited and is a fact taken into account by other nations' foreign policies. The size of a country is another important element of the geographical power factor, especially when considering the possibility of a nuclear war. In order to produce a "credible nuclear threat", a nuclear state needs to possess a large territory in order to efficiently scatter its industrial and population centers as well as its nuclear facilities so that it possesses a second-nuclear-strike capability in order to retaliate. In this respect, relatively large countries like the US, Russia and China obviously have an edge over other countries when it comes to making a convincing nuclear threat.⁸

* Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–80) is a famous German American political scientist. He is the father of the realist theory of international relations. He mainly argued that international politics is governed by the competitive and conflictual nature of humankind

⁷ Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, p.115

⁸ Ibid pp.115-119

2. Natural resources as a source of power

Self-sufficient countries in matter of food for example have a clear advantage in terms of power over countries that count on importation to feed their populations. Scarcity of food is a source of permanent weakness. On many occasions the power and the very existence of Great Britain was jeopardized when its ability to import food was jeopardized. Every time the British sea lanes of food where attacked either by sea or by air, the British power was on stake. The same goes as well for raw materials used in industry in general and in military warfare building more specifically.⁹

3. Industrial Capacity as a source of power

Possessing an industrial capacity coupled with industrial know-how is another relatively stable source of power. For instance, despite possessing huge deposits of Uranium, the power of Congo did not increase because Congo does not have the means (nuclear technology, plants, etc.) to turn this highly valuable resource into energy and, hence, real power. On the other hand, the possession of Uranium by an industrially/technologically advanced country like the US would translate into an imminent increase in this country's power.¹⁰

4. Military Preparedness as a source of power

Military preparedness is what gives relevancy to any of the so far described sources of power. It is formed by three main components:

- Innovations in warfare technology which give a temporary advantage to the side that uses them first (i.e. the use of the submarine by the Germans or the tanks by the British in WWI gave both of them a noticeable gain).

⁹ Ibid pp.120-123

¹⁰ Ibid pp.123-126

- The quality of military leadership, which can highly affects a nation's power. (i.e. the military genius of Prussia's Frederick* the Great which manifested through his strategic and tactical innovations).
- Finally, the quantity and quality of armed forces. In order for a nation to be military and consequently politically strong, its military innovations and talented leaders would not be enough. They would have to complemented by a strong, large, and specialized military. ¹¹

5. Population as a source of power

The size of a nation's population in absolute terms is relatively unimportant. Population can simultaneously be an asset to countries like the US or a burden to countries like India. Consequently, high populations are not always a fair indicator of a nation's power.¹² What really count are its distribution and its trends. The more a nation's population is young (i.e. between 20-40), the more productive it would be in terms of military and economic productivity. The trend of a population is also a determinant power factor. By predicting the future distribution of a population, one can estimate the future variation of the size and distribution of a population; thus, one can thus determine a relative strength or weakness of the nation considered.¹³

6. National character as a source of power

National Character is the ensemble of ideas, ideologies and values that constitute peoples' general traits according to which nations are set apart from each other. For instance, the Germans have always been known for their "discipline and thoroughness",

* Frederick the Great (1712-86) was a great military leader and king of Prussia from ruled 1740 till 1786

¹¹ Ibid pp.126-130

¹² Spanier, Games nations play, pp.58-60

¹³ Morgenthau , Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, pp.130-134

the Americans for their “individual initiative and inventiveness” and the Russians for their “elementary force and persistence”. Some people could be described as war-prone or militaristic while others, more pacifists, show greater reluctance for military actions. As a result, the aggressive quality of the national character of some nations would result in an advantage for them in the struggle of power, since their governments would be able to wage war anytime while being backed by their own people.¹⁴

7. National morale as a source of power

National morale is the “soul of national power”. It is the degree of determination with which a people supports the foreign policies of its government in peace but most notably in times of crisis and wars. The level of national morale is reflected by the public opinion. Without such a support, no government could efficiently pursue its policies. Therefore, in difficult times, like when the survival of a nation is at stake, the presence, absence and quality of national morale become particularly important elements. One of the best illustrations ever of a high national morale is Nazi Germany’s people support to their regime during WWII.¹⁵

8. Quality of diplomacy as a source of power

Diplomacy is the “brain of national power”. It is the way foreign policy is conducted. By analogy, diplomacy is expected to bring to a nation in times of peace what military tactics are to bring in war. Chou En Lai*, used to see diplomacy as “the continuation of war by other means”. It is the way through which the different elements of national power are brought together and utilized to best advantage in order to achieve the

¹⁴ Ibid pp..134-140

¹⁵ Ibid pp.140-146

* Chinese statesman (1898-1976)

maximum influence and national benefit on the international level. A good and competent diplomacy increases a nation's real power beyond its limits.¹⁶

9. Quality of government as a source of power

Good government implies a good balance among the nation's power resources (material and human) in accordance with the pursued foreign policy. One requirement is also needed in order for a nation to reach a good level of governance: securing its own people's endorsement for foreign policies, and on some occasions gaining the support of other nations' people as well.¹⁷

Finally, sources of power are constantly shifting over time due to technological advances in communication and military warfare.¹⁸

Table 1.1: *Examples of the changing of sources of power with time*

Spain 16th century	France 18th century	United States 20th century
- Gold	- Population	- Economic scale
- Colonial trade	- Rural industry	- Military forces
- Mercenary armies	- Public administration	- Alliances
- Dynastic ties	- Army	- Universalistic culture
		- Scientific & technical leadership
		- Hub of transnational communication

Source: Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, p.52

¹⁶ Ibid pp.146-150

¹⁷ Ehteshami, *The changing Balance of Power in Asia*, p.6

¹⁸ Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, p.53

C. DEFINITION OF BOP

BOP, a realist concept par excellence, is one of the oldest in international relations¹⁹ since its theory was first formulated in the beginning of the 17th century.²⁰ BOP bears so many meanings that some scholars like Kenneth Waltz* found up to nine distinct meanings.²¹ We shall limit our scope in three main definitions of the BOP.

- BOP as a situation: BOP can be used to describe a situation of equilibrium of power relations among nations or group of nations.²²
- BOP as a policy: BOP can also be expressed as a nation's "policy of prudence" presupposing that every state should act towards preserving the equilibrium of power among states, and that by counterbalancing power by producing/acquiring more power.²³
- BOP as a system: The one definition that interests us the most shall be BOP as a distribution of power among nations (not necessarily with equal shares),²⁴ a system within which power and policy are controlled by the independent constituent units (the nation-states) which operate in the absence of any higher central authority.²⁵

Hence, unless otherwise mentioned, this definition shall be the one to be taken into account throughout this thesis.

¹⁹ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.75

²⁰ Balance of Power, available: http://58.1911encyclopedia.org/B/BA/BALANCE_OF_POWER.htm

* Kenneth Waltz, is Ford Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley. He is past President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988). Writer of *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (1959), *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (1967, reissued in 1992), *Theory of International Politics* (1979), and *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (1995).

²¹ Waltz, *Theory of International politics*, p.117

²² Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.12

²³ *Ibid* p.18

²⁴ *Ibid* p.20

²⁵ *Ibid* p.88

D. ELEMENTS OF BOP POLITICS

In a decentralized system, BOP politics prevail and aim at reducing the power of the great power[s] or at increasing the power of the weak state[s] in order to maintain or reestablish the power balance among states.²⁶ In this respect, states pursue the following balancing approaches:

- They watch out for any potential adversary power and constantly try to match it
- They ally themselves with weaker states
- They abandon previously made alliances when the threat ceases to exist
- They change alliances whenever new threats arise
- They do not harshly punish defeated states because they can still become allies in the future.²⁷

In order to balance against external threats in an anarchic environment, states either resort to self-help through mobilization on the domestic level, or through the formation of temporary alliances if unable to gather enough power to encounter threats.²⁸

According to John Spanier*, 7 principal techniques are used to conduct BOP policies:

1. National mobilization: This technique is an internal balancing technique (in opposition to alliances as an external balancing technique).²⁹ Via armament a state increases its national military force. Through national economic growth a state provides support to its large military forces. And, finally, by psychologically stimulating its people, it provides national endorsement to its policy.³⁰

²⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, pp.185-204

²⁷ Spanier, *Games nations play*, p.123

²⁸ Downs G. (1971), p.42

* John Spanier is an author and lecturer at the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute, the Naval War College and several universities.

²⁹ General rules for Preponderance of power simulation, available:
<http://home.Columbus.rr.com/grmiller/simu/rules.htm>

³⁰ Spanier, *Games nations play*, pp.123-126

2. Alliances: Forging alliances is a time saving technique (in comparison to the first technique) which helps a state increase its own power and security.³¹ Hence, a nation can increase its relative power by adding other nations' power to its own, and indirectly withholding it from its adversaries.³²

3. Compensation: this technique is based on dividing a strategically located country among different powers in order to preserve the balance (i.e. Poland's division between the Soviet Union and Germany before WWII, Korea's division between the Soviet Union and the US in the mid 1940's)³³

4. Neutralization: as opposed to the previous technique, in this practice the contending powers are not granted anything. Neutral Switzerland and its 3 neighbors Germany, France and Italy set the best example.

5. Intervention: by intervening in another state's internal affairs through military or intelligence organizations, can states maintain the balance. Intervention can hence be a direct one or by proxy.

6. Divide and rule: this technique is either directed at preventing the formation of an alliance between 2 powers, or at exploiting weaknesses or differences in the relations of an adversary and his allies.

7. War: the threat of or even the outbreak of war is the last resort to keep the balance or create a new one by causing a redistribution of power. However, nowadays, having two

³¹ Ibid pp.123-126

³² Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, pp.185-204

³³ Spanier, Games nations play, pp.123-126

great powers at war is, to many, highly unlikely due to the presence of weapons of mass destruction that can cause the annihilation of both of them.³⁴

Table 1.2: *Balancing techniques in BOP systems*

1	National mobilization
2	Alliances
3	Compensation
4	Neutralization
5	Intervention
6	Divide and Rule
7	War

Source: Spanier, *Games nations play*, pp.123-126

E. PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE APPROACH TO PEACE THROUGH BOP

The approach to peace via BOP is based upon the assumption that wars are caused by imbalances of power among states. Consequently, by maintaining the BOP, it is expected that wars be abolished, because peace is seen as the product of a balance that is acceptable by the leading powers. Accordingly, the BOP theory claims that facing power with power is the best approach to resolving international conflicts. “Unrestrained power in the system constitutes a menace to all other members states. Power is therefore the best antidote to power.”³⁵ Advocates of BOP establish its importance by maintaining that it preserves the independence of countries and, hence, creating an equilibrium that promotes world order and peace.³⁶

The concept of BOP does not consider limited wars as a destabilizing factor. War is a legitimate device to be used whenever the equilibrium among nations is upset.

³⁴ Ibid pp.123-126

³⁵ Spanier, *Games nations play*, p.121

³⁶ McGraw-Hill, Online Learning Center, Balance of Power, available: http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/007248179x/student_view0/chapter3/a_further_note_2.html

However, a major war among superpowers is considered as destabilizing.³⁷

F. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF A BOP

BOP politics exist under anarchical orders populated by units wishing to survive, which is the case with the international system. Nonetheless, other conditions can be essential to the formation and efficient functioning of a BOP system. Such conditions are:

- the existence of more than 2 major powers,³⁸
- the existence of a balancer, which is a preponderant power capable of holding the balance by always joining the weaker side in order to maintain the status quo (i.e. Great Britain),³⁹
- that military technology do not change rapidly,⁴⁰
- that alliances be flexible, easily formed and broken regardless of values, religion, history, etc.⁴¹

G. STRUCTURES OF BOP

States' behavior changes according to the architecture of the international system, which vary according to the number of main poles (or major powers) it holds and to the distribution of power among them.⁴² The level of stability of the international system depends greatly upon its structure as well. A stable international system is free of major wars and any nation's predominance, while an unstable system is a war-prone system and characterized by the hegemony of one [or few] power(s).⁴³

³⁷ Spanier, Games nations play, p.141

³⁸ Waltz, Theory of International politics, p.121

³⁹ General rules for Preponderance of power simulation, available:
<http://home.Columbus.rr.com/grmiller/simu/rules.htm>

⁴⁰ Waltz, Theory of International politics, p.121

⁴¹ Balance of Power Theory, <http://www.directessays.com/viewpaper.php?request=88382>

⁴² Spanier, Games nations play, p.122

⁴³ Ibid p.141

There are three main distributions of power among nations: Unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems.

1. Unipolar systems

Unipolar systems are characterized by the domination of a single power. The Roman Empire was the closest international system ever to unipolarity. Some say that the immediate post WWII moment was a unipolar American one because the Germans and Japanese collapsed while the French, British were too weak, and the Russians did not possess the atomic bomb at that time.⁴⁴

2. Bipolar systems

In a bipolar structure, two superpowers [or coalitions of powers] exist.⁴⁵ Two scenarios are possible under bipolar systems: The first one is an Unbalanced Bipolar System where two great powers unequally powerful prevail. Such a system cannot last much because the stronger power will eventually conquer the weaker rival. That is essentially why the world would never witness such a disposition of power.⁴⁶ The second scenario is a Balanced Bipolar System, which is ruled by two great powers equally powerful. According to John Mearsheimer*, this system is the most stable of all.⁴⁷ The era that followed the end of WWII witnessed a bipolar system that lasted for 55 years with the US and the Soviet Union as the two opposing poles while the other powers were only secondary players.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid pp.142-143

⁴⁵ Ibid p.141

⁴⁶ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp.337-338

* John Mearsheimer is a professor of political science (security and international politics) at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize

⁴⁷ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 337-338


⁴⁸ Spanier, *Games nations play*, p.142

3. Multipolar systems

Multipolar systems are systems governed by three or more great powers. As in bipolar systems, multipolar systems can be either balanced or unbalanced. The main difference between the two is that Unbalanced Multipolar systems are characterized by the existence of a potential hegemon, and consequently are considered to be the least stable of all systems.⁴⁹

BOP theory is applicable to any of the polar configurations, but it is most often associated with multipolar systems.⁵⁰

Figure 1.1: *Possible distribution of power among states*



Source: Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 337-338

4. What international system patterns are the most stable?

Some would argue that small systems (with few major powers) are better than large ones (i.e. Morgenthau, Waltz, Mearsheimer) because they are more stable and their members can more easily manage their affairs.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 337-338

⁵⁰ McGraw-Hill, Online Learning Center, Balance of Power, http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/007248179x/student_view0/chapter3/a_further_note_2.html

⁵¹ Waltz, *Theory of International politics*, p.136

In a bipolar structure, more managerial effort is involved than in an other system in the sense that the two great powers, the two system managers, have enough incentives to motivate them to be implicated in most happenings on the international arena⁵² and to play leading roles in managing world affairs and maintaining stability.⁵³ Others (Spanier, Singer) would describe bipolar systems as systems of unavoidable confrontation between the two leading powers⁵⁴ where all hostilities are concentrated between one single pair of enemies.⁵⁵ Any loss of power by one side is immensely perceived as a gain in power by the other side and a threat to the power equilibrium between them and hence a fear that the other might seek hegemony. Any shift of power is magnified and can cause considerable tension in the world.⁵⁶

In comparison with multipolar systems, bipolar systems are usually perceived as much more stable systems due to 3 factors. Firstly, under bipolarity there are fewer opportunities for conflict with only two possible great rival powers, whereas multipolar systems present much more great-great power combinations ready to fight each other. In multipolar systems, "who is a danger to whom is often unclear".⁵⁷ Secondly, multipolar structures witness more power inequalities, hence, more chances for great powers clashes.⁵⁸ Thirdly, bipolar systems are considered to be inherently more stable than multipolar ones because the probability for miscalculation is very low with only one main threat coming from one major power.⁵⁹

⁵² Ibid p.205

⁵³ Ibid p.208

⁵⁴ Spanier, Games nations play, pp.142-143

⁵⁵ General rules for Preponderance of power simulation, available:

<http://home.Columbus.rr.com/grmiller/simu/rules.htm>

⁵⁶ Spanier, Games nations play, pp.142-143

⁵⁷ Waltz, Theory of International politics, p.171

⁵⁸ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 338-344

⁵⁹ General rules for Preponderance of power simulation, available:

<http://home.Columbus.rr.com/grmiller/simu/rules.htm>

Thus, war seems to be less likely to occur in bipolar systems and the most likely to take place under unbalanced multipolar systems* where hegemonic states aspire to dominate the system. However, apparently the situation most conducive to conflict, tension and instability seems to be the one where there is one overwhelming dominant power surrounded by a number of small size powers, in other words, the international system at the start of the 21st century.

Table 2.2: International Systems throughout history

Unipolarity	
The Roman Empire	800-1806
Balanced Bipolarity	
The Cold war era	1945-1990
Balanced Multipolarity	
First Napoleonic era	1792-1793
The 19 th century	1815-1902
Interwar years	1919-1938
Unbalanced Multipolarity	
Second Napoleonic era	1793-1815
Kaiser Reich era	1903-1918
The Nazi era	1939-1945

Source: Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp.347-356

5. The current international system

Since the turn of the twentieth century, the US has been in a position of world leadership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the US emerged as the world's only military superpower. While some contend that the post Cold War system has been so far a multipolar one,⁶⁰ many see the US as the next Roman Empire. The Americans are undoubtedly very powerful, but not to the extent of

* In particular, three and five power systems are considered as the least stable of all (Waltz, Gilpin)

⁶⁰ Downs George W. *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, p.133

dominating the world and becoming a world hegemon ⁶¹ because the US military capacity is currently already highly overextended ⁶² With heavy presence in Iraq and Afghanistan where 8 out of 10 of the American active divisions are involved, the US army has already declared working beyond its capacity.⁶³ If we take a look at the different policies adopted by the different US presidents so far, we come to the conclusion that two main policies have been adopted through time: the first tries to apply the American value system to the rest of the world by being “the” world leader and the second favors a BOP in which the US is “a” world leader.⁶⁴ The current Bush administration (2000-2004) has clearly opted for the first policy, by constantly taking unilateral initiatives of intervention anywhere on the globe.

H. EVALUATION OF BOP AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

1. Weaknesses

While some view the BOP as the best guarantee of stability and peace in the world, critics like Woodrow Wilson* and Franklin Roosevelt** contend that it has been the cause of most of the wars.⁶⁵

- BOP as a cause of wars: The main severe critics to the BOP system stem from the idealist and international socialist schools of thought.⁶⁶ Idealist Woodrow Wilson saw the BOP as an unreliable system that was not able to prevent the eruption of

⁶¹ Ahmad, Domination or Isolation? Renewing the balance of power. Available: http://Princeton.edu/~afp/vol003_iss07/ahmed.shtml

⁶² Rojas Alberto Muller. Here come the gringos. Available: http://vheadline.com/printer_news.asp?id=17948

⁶³ Ahmad, Domination or Isolation? Renewing the balance of power,. Available: http://Princeton.edu/~afp/vol003_iss07/ahmed.shtml

⁶⁴ Must America be the World Leader? Available: <http://geocities.com/CapitolHill/6807/wleader.html>

* Woodrow Wilson was the US president from 1912-1920

** Franklin D. Roosevelt was US president from 1933 till 1945

⁶⁵ Waltz, Theory of International politics, p.117

⁶⁶ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.45

WWI. In addition, he saw it as politically immoral and called for the creation of a system of power management in international relations.⁶⁷ Furthermore, he even blamed BOP politics for being the real cause of war.⁶⁸

- BOP as a weak deterrent: In a situation of equal power, either one of the two rival sides may win or lose. Thus, a surprise attack from one of them may topple the BOP in favor of the attacker and give him an advantage. By that, BOP becomes an incentive to wage a war. In addition, it is equally important to note that few have been the times when leaders' subjective perceptions of situations of deterrence matched the real and objective power calculations. In other words, BOP considerations are often based on power calculations, which are often so inaccurate and misleading that detecting the existence of a situation of deterrence is rendered an almost impossible task. Adding statesmen's potential for miscalculations to their predisposition to take risks, the importance of deterrence in general is hence undermined, and by that, the deterrent effect claim of the BOP becomes insignificant.⁶⁹

- BOP as a sponsor of constant arms races: Many portray the BOP as a "Balance of terror" promoting the production of more and better arms, creating a vicious circle of constant cycles of fear and discomfort about security.⁷⁰

- BOP as a financial burden on states: As a direct result from the preceding point, we can conclude that by trying to maintain the BOP states have to pursue a constant

⁶⁷ Ibid p.87

⁶⁸ Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, p.49

⁶⁹ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.56-57

⁷⁰ Ibid p.61

arms race which would increasingly burden their national budget while deteriorating their productive sectors.⁷¹

- BOP as a cause of instability: In order to work properly, the BOP necessitates constant effort of readjustment by the system's constitutive units because the relative balance among them is constantly shifting (due to armament and constant alliance changes). This would, hence, cause anxiety and generate instability.⁷²

- BOP as a cause of wars of greater scales: BOP systems involve so many alliances that when a war occurs, it is likely that a large number of participants would take part in it. The best example is given to us by the outbreak of World War One which witnessed a domino effect regarding the number of states that signed up to fight.⁷³

- Stability not peace: Apparently the BOP can bring stability but not peace.⁷⁴ The main difference between the two concepts is simply in their respective definitions. While peace, is in short the absence of wars, stability is namely the absence of great scale wars (among great powers). Many of the supporters of the BOP do claim that the major role played by the BOP is preserving states' independence by preventing the rise and domination of any hegemonic state, with war remaining a last [but 'legitimate'] resort.⁷⁵ Hence, the dilemma we face is the following: war is in itself a means and its prevention the end.⁷⁶ To establish an interstates' equilibrium, war is a welcomed device to be used in the international anarchical to restore an adequate

⁷¹ Ibid p.19

⁷² Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, p.297

⁷³ Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, p.297

⁷⁴ Nye, Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history, p.49

⁷⁵ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.52

⁷⁶ Ibid p.54

power equation that can limit major wars for an undetermined period of time.

- The belligerent character of BOP: The BOP is based on the assumption that states' ultimate goal is their self-preservation and survival. In that respect they will use force at any time they feel threatened. This fact cancels out any 'pacifist' role of the BOP⁷⁷ because under BOP considerations, war is an appropriate tool to be used.

2. Strengths

Proponents of the BOP as an approach to peace like Nixon*, Churchill** and Clemenceau*** namely praise it for providing world stability by preventing the rise of a world hegemon and deterring acts of aggression through the maintenance of power equilibrium among states, giving them fewer incentives to go to war.

- BOP as a guarantor of peace: Hans Morgenthau, another vivid supporter of BOP as an approach to peace, contends that BOP is a method that has "developed throughout history to maintain international order and peace".⁷⁸ Under a BOP system, any state will think twice before committing any act of aggression against any other state (or group of states) and hence upsetting peace. The reason behind this is the fact that through alliances enough power will face any aggressor that he will be straight away persuaded of his folly".⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Ibid p.54

* Richard Nixon was the 37th US president (1968-1974)

** Sir Winston Churchill was Britain's first Minister from 1940-1945. Received Nobel prize for literature in 1953

*** Georges Clemenceau was France premier in 1906-1909 and again from 1917-1919

⁷⁸ Morgenthau H. cited in Claude, Power and International Relations, p.52

⁷⁹ Charles O. Lerche Jr. cited in Claude, Power and International Relations, p.41

- BOP as a promoter of Equilibrium: To those who consider that the best cure for power is power itself, the BOP system is praised because it is seen as a system promoting a “just equilibrium” between states by constantly providing counterbalancing power to the rising power of any state (or of a combination of states)⁸⁰ preventing any one nation from becoming too strong to enforce its will upon the rest.⁸¹ Consequently, aggression is preempted on regular basis⁸² through the internal mechanism of the BOP commonly compared to Adam Smith’s economic concept of the invisible hand effect. And, since wars are a direct result of states’ feeling of insecurity, a power equilibrium among states would bring a sense of security and, hence, abolish war.

- BOP as an efficient deterrent: Since wars are begun with the expectation of winning, facing an opponent with equal strength would generally discourage the attacker, hence preventing war.⁸³

- BOP as a contributor to the ‘likelihood’ of peace: supporters of BOP see in it a mechanism that hinders and slows up the outbreak of wars because the sense of equilibrium it provides is considered to be a barrier to the emergence of a hegemon and a foundation of stability.⁸⁴ Consequently, BOP provides a sense of security to states and reduces the possibility of wars.

The existence of equilibrium tends to promote peace - it protects the independence of states by discouraging attack, it prevents universal empire by discouraging schemes of conquest, it maintains the stability of the status quo by discouraging disturbances... all the merits...to the equilibrium involve the

⁸⁰ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.42

⁸¹ Balance of Power. Available: http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/balance_of_power

⁸² Claude, Power and International Relations, p.42

⁸³ Ibid p.56

⁸⁴ Ibid p.54

claim...that it contributes to the likelihood of peace.⁸⁵

- BOP as a hegemony inhibiting mechanism: The BOP is more likely viewed and described not as a peace keeping mechanism but more as an antidote to the run for world hegemony by any state. For at any attempt to take on the world by any power the BOP will generate a coalition that will “repel the bid for hegemony”.⁸⁶

I. HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE BOP AND PEACE

From the 16th century until WWII, BOP politics prevailed. During that time, Britain played the role of balancer on the European continent in many shifting alliances. After WWII, a bipolar BOP was created, confronting the US and its allies (NATO members) against the Soviet Union and its satellites (the Warsaw pact members). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US and NATO countries became the world's supreme powers.⁸⁷

1. Successes of the BOP as an approach to peace

The era stretching from 1648 to 1789 was seen as a stable period of history mainly due to the BOP. Through BOP strategies, European monarchies managed expansionist competition for most of this period until the burst of the French Revolution which was characterized by a rise of nationalist aspirations and conflicting ideologies and the developing political systems which all led to conflicts. BOP politics were undermined and war was the consequence.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Ibid p.54

⁸⁶ Ibid p.59

⁸⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, Balance of Power, Available:
<http://www.Britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=381717&query=bipolar&ct=gen1>

⁸⁸ Kraig, Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks for the Persian Gulf, Available:
http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol11/0409_kraig.asp

The era of greatest success of the BOP is incontestably the hundred years between the Treaty of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic wars in 1814, till the outbreak of WWI in 1914.⁸⁹ Except for the Crimean war in 1850 no serious clashes were recorded. This period was characterized by intense diplomatic relations among the great powers.⁹⁰

Another era of relative peace has been the Cold-war era, for the balance that existed between the Soviet Union and the US was due an equilibrium, which resulted from an equal distribution of power among the two rivals. Many argue that it was not the BOP that maintained stability during this era. It was the fear of mutual annihilation that for instance prevented that the Cuban Missile Crisis to escalate to a real confrontation between the two gigantic powers.⁹¹

2. Failures of the BOP as an approach to peace

The major failure attributed to the BOP is for not having been able to prevent the outbreak of WWI, which was mainly caused by the formation of rigid blocks of alliances.⁹²

Many rely on counterexamples to undermine the pacifist claims of the BOP. They present the following arguments that namely contradict BOP thinking:

- the Peloponnesian war would not have occurred if Athens and Sparta did not insist so much on keeping the BOP between them;
- the era of the Pax Romana of the Roman Empire period during which there was not any BOP, and still there was peace

⁸⁹ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.70

⁹⁰ Aron, *Assessing Systems for advancing peace, prosperity and civilization*. Available: <http://www2.iuj.ac.jp/periscope/paperV21A.htmB6/1/2004>

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Waltz, *Theory of International politics*, p.166

- finally, the theory of BOP does not explain why there have not been any war between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, or between the United States and Canada or Mexico, knowing the huge power disparity among them.⁹³

3. Current BOP considerations

Will there be a new BOP in the 21st century? While liberal thinkers negate any possible return to BOP thinking and practice, realists never stopped interpreting international political happenings in terms of BOP. Many of them point at the Asia-Pacific region, where peace and stability are seen as dependent on a tripolar structured BOP among the 3 main players in the region: the US, China and Japan. Some argue that the current BOP is in an unbalanced status because China is still weaker than Japan and the US in terms of economic, military and diplomatic capacities. Consequently, China needs to increase its relative power vis-à-vis the 2 other players to reestablish a balanced triangular relationship. While others would say that, by increasing its power, China would be jeopardizing any prospects for stability in the region and call upon the US to prevent China from gaining more coercive power.⁹⁴

Others depict the US drive for hegemony and EU's two main powers, Germany and France, attempts at containing it as a "rebirth of balance of power politics" similar to the triple entente in WWI except this time France and Germany along with Russia and China.⁹⁵ BOP politics are carried out by the US through a strong foreign policy: by constructing regional orders governed by balanced power relationships, the US is trying to create a stable international system. For instance, the American support to countries like Taiwan, Japan and South Korea in Asia creates a balance with China and North

⁹³ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.295

⁹⁴ When a Balance of Power can be destabilizing, Available: <http://www.rand.org/publications/mr/mr1571/mr1571.ch37.pdf>

⁹⁵ Bello, *The Reemergence Of Balance-Of-Power Politics*, Available: http://www.rio10.dk/upload/att/the_reemergence_of_balance.doc

Korea, hence preventing the rise of any hegemonic power in the region. At other occasions, the US military presence in certain regions is imposing a kind of balance or even order (Iraq and Afghanistan). The Americans have been acting so far as the 21st century's balancers and policemen of the international system.

J. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the international equilibrium created by the BOP can generate a situation favorable to the maintenance of stability. But can we go as far as to maintain that BOP is reliable enough to be a valid approach to peace?

Clearly, BOP does not have peace as its main target. It mainly aims at preserving the security of each state and at protecting the state-system as a whole.⁹⁶

Some would even go as far as to say that history has proven that BOP has been unable to limit wars and aggressions and periods of BOP have been the deadliest of all:

The relationship between peace and the BOP appears to be exactly the opposite of what has often been claimed. Periods of balance are periods of warfare, while periods of preponderance are periods of peace.⁹⁷

The BOP is viewed as an experience that once took place but not as to be seen again due to the political, ideological and technological changes⁹⁸ which brought other important factors to be taken into account nowadays by any political decision maker. Power considerations had to stop being politicians' number one interest because the rise of democracy, nationalistic feelings and ideologies brought additional limitations to statesmen's freedom to base their policies merely upon power considerations. Moreover, technological revolution in military capabilities made the accurate measurement of other states' relative strength a very difficult task, if not an impossible

⁹⁶ Spanier, *Games nations play*, p.121

⁹⁷ Organski cited in: *General rules for Preponderance of power simulation*, Available: <http://home.Columbus.rr.com/grmiller/simu/rules.htm>

⁹⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.74-75

one.⁹⁹ Some would also add that the lack of a multipolar system and the unavailability of a balancer also made impossible for the BOP to rise again as a guarantor of stability.¹⁰⁰ Since the end of WWII, the world has witnessed the concentration of power in the hands of two superpowers during the cold war and presently one single superpower monopolizes an overwhelming power. Consequently, and with the absence of a state or group of states qualified to play the role of balancer, BOP cannot possibly work.

Finally, some concede that nuclear weapons changed the nature of international relations by abolishing any further BOP thinking¹⁰¹, and that, since the Cold-War days because all out wars became too costly to everyone, no state, no matter how strong it is, would want to venture and declare war on a nuclear power, especially since nuclear technology has stopped being monopolized by a couple of powers.

The record of BOP in the prevention of wars has proven to be a weak one. Some form of management of the international system seems to be required. A partially managed system through collective security might be more efficient than the laissez-faire BOP system.

⁹⁹ Ibid p.92

¹⁰⁰ Ibid pp.74-75

¹⁰¹ Gareau, *The Balance of Power and Nuclear Deterrence*, p.132

Chapter Two

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

*There must be, not balance of power, but a community of power;
not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace...*

- Woodrow Wilson -

*I believe that I express the views of my countrymen when I state
that the old policies, the old alliances, the old combinations and
balances of power, have proved themselves inadequate for the
preservation of world peace...*

- Franklin D. Roosevelt -

The idea of CS comes as a middle way solution to the problem of conflicts and war between the instable BOP system and the usually depicted as a too idealistic project of world government (WG) matter of discussion in the following chapter. ¹

During the 17th century, William Penn^{*} was the first to bring the concept of Collective Security (CS) and to talk about peace as a collective concern.² In the year 1915, it was

¹ Roskin & Berry, IR: An Introduction to International Relations, p.474

^{*} William Penn (1644-1718) was a writer and leading figure of the English Quakers and founder of the American colony, Pennsylvania that became the state of Pennsylvania later on. He was involved in the politics of England.

² What is the Connection between Limitations of National Sovereignty in Constitutional Law and Collective Security, Available:
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/collective_security.html

proposed in The Hague (the Netherlands) that the Balance of Power (BOP) be abandoned and an international enforcement mechanism be created. A mechanism based on the “mobilization of diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against states” unwilling to peacefully resolve their disputes: the CS system was created.³ The end of WWI showed us that peace couldn’t be preserved by a mere BOP.⁴ A new world order prevailed, an order that called for a collective approach to international power management advocating the creation of a mechanism able to provide a partially managed international system in comparison to the old decentralized and anarchical BOP system.⁵ During that same time, the idea of CS was gaining more and more support. Its most passionate supporter ever was Woodrow Wilson whose ideas and enthusiasm led to the birth of a current of political thinking (Wilsonianism), which believes that global peace and prosperity can be achieved through CS.⁶ During the last 20 years, the idea of CS has been gaining additional significance due to two main events: the collapse of the bipolar balance of power in 1989 and the success of the coalition led by the US against Iraq in 1990.⁷

A. DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF CS

CS is a liberal concept proposing the creation of an international system in which all states contribute towards the prevention or the ending of any aggression by jointly resorting to moral, economic, diplomatic and military measures to pressure the warring parties in order to cease aggression⁸ and peacefully settle their disputes. States bound by a CS agreement are compelled to act together to defend the side under attack against

³ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.107-108

⁴ Negretto, *Kant and the illusion of collective security*, pp.501-523

⁵ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.107-108

⁶ Smith, *A Wilsonian world*, pp.62-66

⁷ Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.110

its aggressor.⁹ Simply put, CS uses “the action of all states against all [violent] states”.

The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security for all states by the action of all states, against all states, which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power.¹⁰

As opposed to alliances and coalitions, which are directed to aggressions from outside the community of signatory states, CS is inward oriented in order to prevent aggressions from within the members of the system.¹¹ Under CS, “an ally is an ally to nobody in particular, but with everybody in general”.¹²

CS is meant to deter aggressive states and provide a sense of security to all participating states¹³ by creating an imbalance of power in favor of the defenders of the world order.¹⁴

Nowadays, CS has taken a broader definition, and is involving more actions than peace related operations: the protection of human rights, assistance in humanitarian relief and in democratic state-building operations, and the protection of minorities.¹⁵

B. PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE APPROACH TO PEACE THROUGH CS

The concept of CS comes as a direct answer to the old system of alliances, balances of power, and secret diplomacy, which are suspected to make war inevitable.¹⁶

The philosophical assumption presented by CS revolves around the idea that in order to stop wars, the equilibrium advocated by BOP thinking has to be replaced by a

⁹ Ibid p.115

¹⁰ Ibid p.110

¹¹ Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

¹² Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.254

¹³ What is the Connection between Limitations of National Sovereignty in Constitutional Law and Collective Security, 18th General IPRA Conference Tampere, Finland,
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/collective_security.html

¹⁴ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.258

¹⁵ Albright, *Building a collective security system*, pp.331-334

¹⁶ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.152

“concentration of power”.¹⁷ Anarchy has to be met with a some form of management and organization.

Thus, CS aims at establishing a world where collective sanctions are so costly to any state (or group of states) that no acts of aggression will be committed.¹⁸

The concept of CS stems from a specific perspective, which depicts the world as a united community of actors in which any danger posed by any actor has to be met by all the other actors.¹⁹

“Any war is everybody’s war”. CS assumes that relations among states and humans have become so interconnected that any breach of peace anywhere becomes a threat everywhere. Hence geographical remoteness of conflicts has become an idle concept. The advice comes from Alfred Nemours, Haitian representative in the League of Nations. Referring to the Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, he said: “Great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or colored, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody’s Ethiopia.”²⁰

Finally, CS does not call for changing the basic structure of the international system, neither by requesting the replacement of the system’s basic units, nor does it advocate the creation of a world state.²¹

C. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CS

In order for CS to function properly, the following preconditions have to be present:

- International power diffusion: the ideal climate for CS is a world in which power is

¹⁷ Ibid p.112

¹⁸ Ibid p.195

¹⁹ Ibid p.114

²⁰ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, pp.250-251

²¹ Ranney, *Governing: an Introduction to political science*, p.447

evenly distributed among all states. And, in contrast, a world with power concentrated in few major states is the least favorable for CS to work.²² When every state in the system holds limited power and influence, has reduced military capabilities and lacks economic sufficiency, no state will be able to act aggressively because it knows in advance that it will not be able to bear the punishment, be it economic military, or political.²³

- The availability of armed force: an efficient CS system has to have a mechanism capable of deterring violence and acts of aggression.²⁴ In that respect, one of the following requirements have to be present:

- that member states would promise to cooperate and use their armed forces when necessary, or
- that each member states would designate a number of its forces and place them at the disposal of an international body, which will use them for collective security purposes, or
- that an international armed force be created and exclusively controlled by the CS organ.²⁵

- A powerful deterrence device: An overwhelming power has to be available and kept in the background because mere agreements cannot keep peace. Military force need to exist (as a last resort) in order to guarantee the peace of the world.²⁶

We cannot do without force...you cannot establish freedom...without force.²⁷

²² Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.257

²³ *Ibid* p.260

²⁴ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.173

²⁵ *Ibid* p.173

²⁶ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.96-98

²⁷ Woodrow Wilson cited in Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.101

- A democratic environment: CS is said to work best in a system of democratic states. Democratic regimes are known to value their common political features more than power balances among them.²⁸
- Some restriction on nation's sovereignty: Nation-states are also required to relinquish a part of their sovereignty, in particular the part related to their relations with other nations involving their decision to resort to war.²⁹
- A commitment to the concept of CS: CS requests that governments and peoples embrace the concept of "indivisibility of peace"³⁰ which considers that any nation's future is closely linked to the security and welfare of all other nations.³¹
- The commitment of governments: CS requires the commitment of all governments in addition to peoples' understanding and support. If not, any member-state(s) that take act on his/their own to oppose a certain act of aggression would be acting like states in anarchical BOP systems. Unless participants show full commitment to the system, it will eventually fall apart.³²

In addition to all the above mentioned requirements, the implementation of a healthy CS system entails that member-states do not have any alliances with or against other powers outside the CS community³³, that they be willing to fight in order to maintain the status quo³⁴, that they agree on a clear-cut definition of aggression in order for all of

²⁸ Goodby, *Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War*, pp.299-321

²⁹ What is the Connection between Limitations of National Sovereignty in Constitutional Law and Collective Security, Available:

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/collective_security.html

³⁰ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.250

³¹ Ranney, *Governing: an Introduction to political science*, p.447

³² Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

³³ Negretto, *Kant and the illusion of collective security*, pp.501-523

³⁴ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.254

them to agree whenever aggression is committed ³⁵, and finally, that the CS system function impartially and regardless of states' individual preferences and interests.³⁶

D. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CS

The application of CS is obstructed by many problems:

- States' selfish and independent nature: CS requires that states be altruistic units, which they are not. It also requires that they let others make decisions on their behalf, another matter they can never approve of.³⁷ The commitment to CS requires that states participate in sanctions against any aggressor, hence indirectly limiting the leaders' conduct of their own foreign policy. Many of them will thus be disinclined to give up their autonomy in foreign affairs decision-making.³⁸ Consequently, the efficiency of the CS is jeopardized.

- Military technology: The technological breakthrough in modern warfare brought in devastating weaponry such as the nuclear and hydrogen bombs and posed major security problems threatening the relevance of CS as a means of international power management.³⁹

- The formation of the CS military force: On the one hand, agreeing on the number of armed forces to be provided by the great powers can become a source of controversy. Under the United Nations (UN), the US favored high numbers of troops and military equipment while the Soviet Union and France favored limited number of forces.⁴⁰

³⁵ Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

³⁶ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.254

³⁷ Roskin & Berry, *IR: An Introduction to International Relations*, p.476

³⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.202

³⁹ *Ibid* p.194

⁴⁰ *Ibid* p.179

Agreeing on the composition of the armed forces is another impediment. Also in the UN the Soviet Union, fearing the creation of a western block against it, demanded that contributions be equal while the other 4 major powers wanted them to be equivalent to each state's own power.⁴¹

E. EVALUATION OF CS AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

1. Weaknesses

Critics of CS contend that the previously mentioned necessary conditions for the implementation of CS (see section C) are unlikely to exist.⁴² While many of them admit in general that CS is a realistic approach about power considerations, nevertheless they criticize it as being an unrealistic one in terms of policy and applicability.⁴³ The following points summarize their major claims about CS as an approach to peace.

- Uncertain involvement of all participants: The will of participants in CS agreements to abide by them is the most criticized facet of CS. When called upon to participate in destructive wars, some of them might be unwilling to meet their treaty obligation.⁴⁴ International organizations like the UN, responsible for the implementation of CS work in a system of sovereign states. States are free to disagree, cancel or ignore these organizations or any international law.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Ibid pp.181-182

⁴² Goodby, *Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War*, pp.299-321

⁴³ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.95

⁴⁴ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.298

⁴⁵ Ibid p.389

- Lower deterrence due to nuclear weapons: opponents of the idea of CS claim that nuclear weapons undermine CS's deterrence ability because it is impossible to raise enough power against a nuclear power.⁴⁶

- An unclear definition of acts of aggression: Defining and agreeing upon what is an act of aggression is a highly debatable issue under CS. What might look like a terrorist or aggressive act to some, might be interpreted by others as an act of self-defense and preservation. Each state has its own views in respect of what is an act of violence and what is not. In addition, states tend to consider a certain act of aggression as a violation to CS usually only whenever they are directly threatened or their interests are at stake.⁴⁷ Thus, the so far confusing definition of aggression limits the efficiency of any CS system in our world.⁴⁸

- Reduced states' defensive capabilities: Should a large number of states refuse to resist a certain aggression, the threatened states will have to defend themselves with fewer capabilities than under a BOP system both in terms of military readiness and alliances⁴⁹, since under CS states are expected to relinquish the same extensive policies of armaments pursued under BOP.

- Delay in actions: CS is blamed for not being able to provide swift military responses whenever aggression occurs. The reaction of the member-states, the mobilization and deployment of their troops often take too long, whereas alliances provide better military readiness in terms of joint exercises and war plans. The coalition against

⁴⁶ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.46-47

⁴⁷ *Ibid* p.107

⁴⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.196-197

⁴⁹ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.59-60

Iraq in 1990, which required 6 months of preparation is the best example of slow collective answers can be.⁵⁰

- A faded past performance of CS: Critics of CS point at the not-so-bright history of CS organizations, namely the LON and the UN, as a proof of failure and impotence of CS.⁵¹
- Potential "Free-riders" states: it is believed that many states would try to use the CS system without actually paying for the system's cost. With the absence of a coercive mechanism to enforce the collection of states' contributions, many states would be tempted to "free-ride".⁵²

2. Strengths

Fervent advocates of CS as an approach to peace like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull* attribute the following advantages of CS:

- CS as a sponsor of international cooperation: CS encourages international cooperation.⁵³ Under CS, international institutions bolster cooperation and peaceful international relations among states, hence increasing the number of agreements and leading to interstate socialization. This would, hence, promote common international values and norms and create a peaceful international environment.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

⁵¹ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, p.47

⁵² Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

* Cordell Hull was US Secretary of State from 1933 till 1944

⁵³ *Collective Security*, available: <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec.htm>

⁵⁴ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.48-51

- No power struggle: By bringing on the international arena a preponderant source of power, a CS system would create a feeling of security and eliminate the potential for arms races.⁵⁵

- A better situation for the small powers: Through CS, a protective international system would be created insuring the protection of weak states and relieving them from the uncertainty they used to live in under the BOP system where they were exploited by the great powers.⁵⁶

- A better deterrence due to nuclear weapons: Proponents of CS contend that in a nuclear world, CS would perform even better than in a non-nuclear world. They base their conclusion on the following reasoning: Since nuclear capacity is not monopolized by the aggressor state, the latter knows in advance that it would not only face defeat by conventional weapons, but also risk nuclear annihilation. Nukes would raise the potential costs of any aggression, and would then lead to less violence and more stability.⁵⁷

- The opposition to any aggression: By agreement, CS would secure that any aggression would be opposed, while in BOP systems potential aggressors would go on with their aggression if they think they won't be affecting the balance or disturbing major powers or major alliances.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.113

⁵⁶ *Ibid* p.113

⁵⁷ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.46-47

⁵⁸ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.298

- Ameliorating the security dilemma: CS ameliorates the security dilemma by reducing the chances that spirals of fear might lead to hostility and conflict. It promotes cooperation among states, increases transparency and reduces the possibility for misperception and uncertainty, and encourages states to keep only a minimal level of offensive capability.⁵⁹
- Conceptual merits of CS: One of CS theory's merits is that it insists on postulating that states must be controlled and that war anywhere is a threat to order everywhere.⁶⁰
- Past performance of CS: Proponents of CS admit that the League and the UN failed to preserve peace but put the blame on "historically contingent circumstances" where the major powers were either unwilling or incapable of acting. American isolationism, economic and military weak France and UK, French and British dislike of fighting another continental war account for the inefficiency of CS under the LON. As for CS under the UN, it was hampered by the Cold War. History demonstrated that "CS does not always work but not that it cannot work".⁶¹

F. CS ORGANIZATIONS

Throughout history 3 organizations symbolized the concept of CS: the concert of Europe (COE), the League of Nations (LON), and the United Nations (UN). Exceptionally, an additional organization would be also considered in this section, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which although not intended as a CS device, has been playing that role since the end of the Cold war.

⁵⁹ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.51-55

⁶⁰ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.282

⁶¹ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.47-48

1. The Concert of Europe

The COE, which followed the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, is often seen as the most successful CS experience so far. This settlement reached among great powers, preserved peace among them for decades (from 1815 to 1850) demonstrating for the first time that great powers could cooperate and coexist peacefully. The COE comprised 4 major powers (Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain) and greatly resembled the current G8.⁶² Proponents of CS often point to the COE in the 19th century as a successful experience of CS.⁶³ The COE is said to have been successful because it was flexible, informal and limited in membership.⁶⁴ The COE facilitated communication among the great powers and prevented the rise of fear and feelings of insecurity.⁶⁵ However, it was blamed for practically ignoring small states and considering them as unimportant whilst resolving any conflict.⁶⁶

2. The League of Nations (1920-1946)

Shortly after the end of WWI, the LON was founded in 1920 in Geneva and was the first clear and conscious embodiment of the principle of CS. One of the main purposes for the creation of the League was to prevent another world war.

The failure of the LON

However, the league failed for the following reasons: Firstly, under the LON, the control of armed forces remained in the hands of states. They also had the jurisdiction to veto any collective decision. In this respect, the so-called CS system at that time was

⁶² Ibid pp.117-125

⁶³ Sarasin, *Collective Security: Shield of Freedom*, p.6

⁶⁴ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.117-125

⁶⁵ Ibid p.106

⁶⁶ Sarasin, *Collective Security: Shield of Freedom*, p.6

still a BOP system.⁶⁷ Secondly, the failure and the disintegration of the LON were also attributed to Wilson's inability to convince his own state to become a member.⁶⁸ Some say that had the US participated in the LON, WWII might have been avoided. Thirdly, the LON was weakened due to disagreements on major political questions among its members, in addition to the fact that it was entitled to intervene to end conflicts only whenever unanimous approval of its members was reached. That's why war simply went on.⁶⁹ The League proved ineffective in defusing the hostilities that led to World War II in 1939. Japan's invasion Manchuria and China, Germany absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and Italy's overtaking of both Ethiopia and Albania were too much for the League to handle. Shortly afterwards, it disintegrated.⁷⁰

The contributions of the LON

The League worked more as an economic and social organization rather than a CS and dispute settling body. It helped stabilize finances and bring relief to the war victims during the immediate post-WWI era. It was concerned with improving work conditions and taking care of refugees.

3. The United Nations (1946-present day)

Following WWII, the UN was created to help maintain peace and security through CS and peacekeeping. The UN's main bodies are the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC), which is composed by 5 permanent members* (the 5 victorious great powers of WWI) granted the veto right and 10 non-permanent members.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.132

⁶⁸ Ibid p.144

⁶⁹ Sarasin, Collective Security: Shield of Freedom, p.10

⁷⁰ "League of Nations", Compton's Reference Collection Encyclopedia

* China, France, Russia, UK and the US

⁷¹ Evans, Security Council: The UN Role in the Implementation of Collective Security in the 21st Century, available: <http://www.odu.edu/al/mun/2003/sc-unrcs-sc.htm>

The founders of the UN rejected the BOP system asserting that aggression anywhere is everybody's business and all states have a common interest in maintaining peace and order anywhere on this planet.⁷²

Sadly, the UN had so far very limited success in resolving international disputes. At some point it turned to be a peacekeeping mechanism, which came as a response to conflicts over boundaries, where UN troops were sent to monitor cease-fires.⁷³ Peacekeeping operations too were never considered as a major success for they only reduced the extent of violence without ever leading to the resolution or alleviation of the conflicts.⁷⁴ The most notable peacekeeping operations were those in Lebanon (1958 till present day), Congo (1960-64) and India-Pakistan (1965 till present day).⁷⁵ The UN peacekeeping efforts have always been undermined because of the unavailability of a real force its own.⁷⁶

Current UN problems

The UN has been seriously criticized for its inefficiency for so many years now. Surprisingly, even some high UN staff members condemn the current ineffective UN system.⁷⁷ For the UN currently, more than ever before, is facing a set of obstacles seriously limiting the scope of its action.

The UN's action is constantly hindered by the veto system, which permits any of the 5 major powers to freeze any resolution even amid the approval of the all the other 14 members. It is highly unlikely that any of the 5 permanent UNSC members would accept any resolution limiting their international influence and power, and they will

⁷² Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.278

⁷³ Lyons, *A new collective security: the United Nations and international peace*, pp.173-199

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Samuels, *Peace problems at the UN: after the cold war*, pp.13-14

⁷⁷ 41st Graduate Study Program, UN, Palais des Nations, July 2003

eventually use their veto right to preserve their dominance of world affairs. Consequently, the SC cannot take CS action against any one of them.⁷⁸

The UN also faces panoply of other major obstacles like the lack of financial and human resources in addition to constant political differences among its members.⁷⁹

As a final point, the UN is at the present time facing very hard times due to US policies. The American administration, with its unilateral preventive action, is jeopardizing the UN's founding principle of CS, threatening by that the international organization's (IO) future.⁸⁰

How to strengthen the UN?

Proposals for reforming the UN and rendering it an efficient mechanism of CS capable of rapidly dealing with and ending small conflicts before they grow into big ones include the following suggestions:

- The reinforcement of the UN specialized agencies⁸¹
- Endowing the UN with a capable force of its own in order to enhance its enforcement capability.⁸²
- Expanding the UNSC permanent membership [for a better representation of the world community] by letting important contributors like Japan* and Germany** join the 5 permanent members [without veto powers], so that the SC reflects the current international balance.⁸³ In addition, developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America should be given each a rotating seat in order for large countries like

⁷⁸ Negretto, Kant and the illusion of collective security, pp.501-523

⁷⁹ Goodby, Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War, pp.299-321

⁸⁰ The New York Times, Jan 2, 2004, p. A16

⁸¹ Kennedy & Russet, Reforming the United Nations, pp.56-71

⁸² Quoting UN veteran Samuel R. Insanally, Samuels G. (Nov 15, 1993)

* Japan is the 2nd main contributor to the UN budget with USD 263 millions in 2000

** Germany is the 3rd main contributor to the UN budget with USD 132 millions in 2000

⁸³ Kennedy & Russet, Reforming the United Nations, pp.56-71

Nigeria, Brazil and India be present more frequently on the SC.⁸⁴

- Abolishing the veto system.⁸⁵

The advantages of the UN system

So far the main benefit from having the UN have been the fact that it facilitates third party diplomacy. Under the auspices of the UN, warring states that usually cannot arrange bilateral meetings can meet and negotiate.⁸⁶ In addition, the UN environment provides an early warning system for future problems and potential disagreements. By carefully listening to discussions, one can easily detect upcoming world tensions. Finally, poor countries that cannot afford having embassies in every country can easily get in contact with all the nations through their representative at the UN.⁸⁷

4. NATO, from collective defense to CS (1949-present day)

The North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington in 1949 created an alliance of 12 nations committed to each other defense.⁸⁸ Thus, unlike the UN and the LON, NATO is an example of collective defense, which is a coalition of a relatively small number of states under the mutual agreement to defend the group against outside attacks⁸⁹ from an already known potential threat⁹⁰ which was the communist threat during the Cold War era)⁹¹, while CS is directed at defense against aggression from within the pact.⁹²

Although primarily designed for collective defense purposes, NATO has exceeded its

⁸⁴ Lyons, A new collective security: the United Nations and international peace, pp.173-199

⁸⁵ Kennedy & Russet, Reforming the United Nations, pp.56-71

⁸⁶ Roskin & Berry, IR: An Introduction to International Relations, p.488

⁸⁷ Ibid pp.483-484

⁸⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty, available: <http://nato.int/welcome/home.htm>

⁸⁹ Collective Security, <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec.htm>

⁹⁰ Goodby, Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War, pp.299-321

⁹¹ Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization, p.266

⁹² Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, p.298

initial role and has been acting as a CS mechanism encompassing all European countries. .

For some, NATO stands as a very powerful CS mechanism in the service of peace and human welfare.⁹³

The breakdown in achieving efficient CS under the UN system was the main the reason behind NATO increasingly gaining a bigger role in world affairs. Currently, NATO enjoys a wider margin of action than the UNSC.

G. HISTORICAL RECORD OF CS AND PEACE

The history of the CS is not a bright one. Many historical instances show that it has not worked as expected. Constant failures of implementing CS by both the LON and the UN unleashed harsh critics against the theory of CS mainly from the part of the realist camp. The Japanese and Italian aggressions of the 1930's are two obvious proofs of the failure of CS under the LON because they were neither prevented nor resolved.⁹⁴ The Yugoslavian crisis in 1991 is another failure under the UN. On the other hand, CS has limited and relative successes namely in Korea (1950) and in Iraq (1990).

1. Failure 1: The invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931

This was the LON's first serious test. The Japanese militarists invaded Manchuria in 1931. All the League was able to do was to send a commission to investigate and report. Japan was condemned and, consequently, it quit the LON maintaining its acquired territory.⁹⁵

The League's states did not take action back then either because the aggression took

⁹³ Sarasin, *Collective Security: Shield of Freedom*, p.83

⁹⁴ Negretto, *Kant and the illusion of collective security*, pp.501-523

⁹⁵ *The League of Nations: An Outline History (1920-1946)*, Geneva Library UNOG, <http://www.unog.ch/frames/library/archives/lon/overview2.html>

place in an area they did not care about or simply due to a mere indifference. In addition, countries like France and Britain did not want to provoke Japan fearing for their colonies in Southeast Asia.⁹⁶

2. Failure 2: The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935

The greatest test for the LON came in October 1935 when Italy conquered the African kingdom of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The League leading members France and Great Britain vainly attempted diplomacy and even threatened Italy with economic sanctions. CS failed again as the Italian aggression was not confronted as it was supposed to be. This incident marked the beginning of the end of the LON.⁹⁷

3. Failure 3: The Yugoslavian crisis in 1991

Strong nationalist feelings, foreign debt, inflation and unemployment led to the Yugoslavian crisis during which Bosnian-Muslims, Serbs, and Croats fiercely fought each other.⁹⁸ Critics of CS cite the Yugoslavian crisis as a major post-Cold war UN failure to implement CS. From the pre-conflict stage to the crisis itself, UN's collective action has been too slow and inefficient at the same time.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Roskin & Berry, IR: An Introduction to International Relations, p.475

⁹⁷ The League of Nations: An Outline History (1920-1946), Geneva Library UNOG, <http://www.unog.ch/frames/library/archives/lon/overview2.html>

⁹⁸ The Breakup of Yugoslavia 1990-1997, available: <http://campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/EastEurope/YugoBreakup.CP.html>

⁹⁹ Goodby, Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War, pp.299-321

4. Relative successes: Korea and Iraq

The successes of CS are attributed to the UN. In addition to its peacekeeping efforts, the UN is praised for having intervened in two major crises since its creation: in 1950 in South Korea and in 1990 in the Gulf region.¹⁰⁰ Concerning the communist assault on South Korea, many argue that the action against this aggression would have not been feasible if the Soviets (who supported the actions of the North Koreans) did not boycott the SC and probably used their veto right against the resolution condemning the aggression and supporting the military action. Critics even say that the Korean case was not a CS case, maintaining that US forces merely fought under the UN flag. In addition, the other countries contribution was negligible while some other countries did not contribute at all (i.e. China and the Soviet Union who supported Korea).¹⁰¹

Regarding Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, a similar interpretation can be used. The Gulf War (Desert Storm Operation) took place in the most idealistic CS setting ever. The Soviet Union has recently collapsed and could not veto any decision against the Iraqi regime who stood alone against all the other countries with no true allies or supporters. Nevertheless, the support for the military operation was hesitant and the collective action was successful only because Iraq was a "lonely aggressor".¹⁰² And, had the Soviet Union not collapsed; it would most probably have vetoed the resolution against Iraq. Finally, the Gulf war was criticized for heavily relying on the US to lead the military effort.¹⁰³

Finally, some tend to interpret the Gulf War in terms of BOP politics. If that was the case, the intervention should have happened earlier since the Iraqi army was already known as one of the strongest armies of the world, and the need to balance its strength

¹⁰⁰ Lyons, A new collective security: the United Nations and international peace, pp.173-199

¹⁰¹ Roskin & Berry, IR: An Introduction to International Relations, p.476

¹⁰² Clark, The trouble with Collective Security, pp.237-258

¹⁰³ Evans, Security Council: The UN Role in the Implementation of Collective Security in the 21st Century, available: <http://www.odu.edu/al/mun/2003/sc-unrcs-sc.htm>

was required long before in order to preserve the balance in the Gulf. Therefore, the assumption that the action in Iraq was based on BOP considerations is a faulty one.

I. CS VERSUS BOP

The concept of CS is not opposed to the concept of BOP.¹⁰⁴ Some even say that CS is a continuation of BOP¹⁰⁵ in the sense that CS claims to provide peace by making it clear to any potential aggressor that an overwhelming force is ready to mobilize whenever an act of aggression is perpetrated, which is similar to alliances under BOP.¹⁰⁶ In addition, CS insists on preserving the sovereignty of the nation-state.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.¹⁰⁷

Regarding the use of power towards providing stability, CS relies on an “overwhelming preponderance of power” to efficiently deter aggressors and maintain peace, whereas BOP relies on power equilibrium among nations as a guarantee of peace.¹⁰⁸

In a BOP system, allies jointly deter or attack an excessive source of power whether it is one state or a coalition of states, while in a CS system joint action is prompted whenever an aggressive policy is pursued whether by a major or a small power.¹⁰⁹

CS presents an organized system in opposition to the decentralized BOP, which encouraged states to operate separately and uncoordinatedly towards achieving order.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.133

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid* p.138

¹⁰⁶ Ranney, *Governing: an Introduction to political science*, pp.447 & 456

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Charter I, article 2

¹⁰⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.111

¹⁰⁹ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.255

¹¹⁰ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.113

Whereas BOP relies on the “expectation that peace will spontaneously emerge from the interaction among competitive states”, CS stresses the creation of an apparatus embodying a coordinated community of states collectively working and contributing to achieve peace.¹¹¹

Despite many defects, mainly concerning its applicability, CS presents numerous advantages over balancing under total anarchy, especially when properly implemented:

- Better deterrence: Deterrence under CS is more efficient than under BOP. In BOP, aggressors are sometimes tempted to break the balance knowing that all they might face would be an almost equal power to theirs. Therefore they try to overthrow the balance by launching an unexpected attack that might lead to their victory. While in CS, potential aggressors know in advance that they would face a preponderant rather than merely equivalent force and thus are deterred.¹¹²
- Better alliances: In CS, coalitions are much more stable than under anarchy. Even if not all states of the CS system joined in to end a particular conflict, it is certain that the coalition against the aggressor would be far more robust than in BOP. Under BOP only threatened states or ones with direct interests will oppose the aggression whereas under CS, countries with no vital interests would still participate to resist the aggression and to show their commitment to the preservation of the international order under CS principles.

¹¹¹ Ibid p.114

¹¹² Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, pp.41-44

- Certainty and not misperceptions: A CS system would involve coalitions which are much more stable than the ones formed under anarchy. The preponderant force created by the system would eliminate the possibility of a war breaking out because of some leader's misreading of the power configuration.¹¹³
- Easier detection of aggressor states: CS provides an easier identification of states with aggressive intentions. CS encourages states to maintain low levels of military capacities. Hence, any military preparation for war by any state would be easily noticed and a more quick intervention [or preemption] would be mobilized.¹¹⁴

J. CONCLUSION

As shown in this chapter, CS has not so far achieved much if not to say practically nothing at all. Even its two main achievements regarding the Korean and Iraqi crises are doubtful. The prerequisites for CS, hence, have never been attained. Thus, this is why CS has never been "the operative system of international relations".¹¹⁵ To many, the LON and the UN have been a disappointment. Advocates of CS assert that the main obstacle to the functioning of CS has been the Cold War's bipolar struggle from 1945 to 1989. Now that the Cold War has ended, are conditions more favorable than in 1814, 1919 or 1945?¹¹⁶ The answer is simply: NO. The harm is actually caused by the veto system [rather than by mere bad historical coincidences] and it is too hard to be endured anymore by the international organization and time for changing it is ripe for nothing of importance can be achieved without the unanimous consent of the five major powers. The need for a healthy and efficient UN is crucial; otherwise, it will continue to act only

¹¹³ Ibid p.45

¹¹⁴ Ibid pp.45-46

¹¹⁵ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.261

¹¹⁶ Clark, *The trouble with Collective Security*, pp.237-258

on small scale problems involving small powers [the way it was probably initially designed for].

Currently, US policies are becoming another major impediment for the UN's action. The UN cannot not withstand further American unipolarity, cultural clashes nor constant huge geopolitical pressures. Eventually it will lose all credibility and crash just like the LON.¹¹⁷ The UN's current weakness is mainly nothing but the reflection of the policies of the US and the other major powers. While contributing with less than 1% of its defense budget, the US is apparently doing everything possible to exhaust the international organization and to cause its retirement.

The US preemptive and unilateral measures against terrorism are clearly jeopardizing the principles of CS and, hence, the role of the UN.¹¹⁸ Failing to create a CS system will only be coupled with more unilateral interventions by great powers wishing to secure their borders and interests. This will undoubtedly lead to the rise of regional police-nations / hegemon. In the same line with this realistic prevision, one can only predict that an increased interference by the major powers in world's affairs would result in severe reactions from repressed states, hence to more wars and bloodshed.¹¹⁹

Perhaps institutions whose members possess common social values and share the same domestic political systems like NATO and the EU are bound to be stronger than other institutions.¹²⁰ "It is becoming very obvious that NATO will be given an increased role in world security from now on" said Staffan de Mistura, personal representative of the

¹¹⁷ Glennon, *Why the Security Council failed*, p.16

¹¹⁸ Annan Kofi, *US preemption threatens collective security*, pp.31-33

¹¹⁹ Goodby, *Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War*, pp.299-321

¹²⁰ Keohane, *International Institutions: can interdependence work?*, pp.82-96

UN's Secretary General in South Lebanon.¹²¹ "CS can only be pursued through the UN by acquiring a permanent well-trained professional and dedicated force in readiness"¹²², loyal to its flag and to no state or through NATO by expanding NATO's military jurisdiction to other regions.¹²³

In the 21st century CS needs to be reevaluated according to the current world situation. CS has to address states' internal conflicts as well as inter-nations disputes, hence gaining more responsibilities. In a world where national security has become so much closely entangled with international security, a world where dangerous conflicts are more frequently arising from internal disputes and the frustration of ignored people, intrastate conflict has become more pronounced lately as the new challenge for peace and security. The international community is moving towards justifying international intervention in states' internal affairs. In the absence of intervention, it is highly likely that conflict would spread to other neighboring states.¹²⁴

Collective action is, hence, expected to be set off whenever an internal state conflict is about to become a wider one, whenever the survival of a democratic regime is at stake and whenever a crime against humanity (i.e. ethnic cleansing) is being conducted,¹²⁵ since it will definitely be much easier to stop a small war than to put an end to a large-scale conflict. Consequently, the task of any CS mechanism is becoming more and more complex and difficult.

¹²¹ De Mistura Staffan, On: the UN, peacekeeping and UNIFIL. United Nations Summer School

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Bandow, *Avoiding War: U.S. security and international security*, pp.156-174

¹²⁴ Goodby, *Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War*, pp.299-321

¹²⁵ Ibid

Under CS, all states would benefit from the deterrence provided by the CS system and thus from security, however, that does not imply that all states contribute to the costs of the CS system. This is due to the absence of a tax collection authority to ensure that all states are paying their share of the costs. Some states would benefit without paying the costs of military action, economic sanctions, etc.¹²⁶ At this stage, the need for a global central authority becomes imperative... That is why is viewed not as a permanent solution to the problem of world order but as a transitional phase or a stepping-stone leading to WG? ¹²⁷ CS is not seen as an end in itself but rather as a step towards reaching World Government...¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, p.107

¹²⁷ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.246

¹²⁸ What is the Connection between Limitations of National Sovereignty in Constitutional Law and Collective Security, 18th General IPRA Conference Tampere, Finland,
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/collective_security.html

Chapter Three

WORLD GOVERNMENT AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

No sword in the hands of a Leviathan, no peace.

- Thomas Hobbes -

From the end of WWII in 1945 till the year 2000, statistics show that 199 wars have been fought by 81 countries, with 69 countries being the theatre of fighting. Nearly half the planet's population is living on less than 2 dollars per day.¹ More and more world problems are going unresolved. All indications denote that catastrophe is not far behind. Apparently, neither BOP nor CS has worked.

Today we are living in an increasingly globalized and unified world. The international community is facing ever mounting common international problems like the greenhouse effects, global warming, poverty, hunger, resource shortages, illness and wars. Facing those problems that can easily trespass any known inter-states boundaries, requires a holistic vision on the level of the whole planet. That is maybe the reason why internationalism has become today's main trend in international affairs.² Environmentalists, for instance, propose world-scale solutions to environmental

¹ Students demand World Government Appeal to World Leaders and Give Peace a Chance and Heal the World. US Newswire, May 19, 2000, no.5857

² Smith, A Wilsonian world, pp.62-66

would ever be able to establish peace.⁸

As an international power management mechanism, WG comes as a continuation of the idea CS, but it is seen as the direct opposite to BOP because it postulates the centralization of power by the world state while BOP calls for the total decentralization of power.⁹

B. PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE APPROACH TO PEACE THROUGH WG

WG is a cosmopolitan based thinking that presents a unique approach to world order. It sees war as the natural product of the state-system, and, hence, calls for eliminating nation-states and replacing the system.¹⁰

The basic philosophical assumption of WG lies in the fact that wars, no matter what causes them, take place because of the absence of a higher authority to prevent them by imposing restraints on the states.¹¹

Many universalist thinkers, of whom Immanuel Kant*, described the state system as a lawless system and as the main reason behind wars. Thus, they advocated the setting up of an external coercive apparatus to establish peace among states: the world government.¹² Authority is logically the best remedy for anarchy.¹³

⁸ Ibid p.225

⁹ Ibid p.223

¹⁰ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.412

¹¹ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.389

* Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is an influential German philosopher writer of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781)

¹² Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.391

¹³ Ibid p.395

Hence, in order to reach lasting stability and peace, a government endowed with a superior power needs to be created in order to enforce the law upon individuals (states).¹⁴ In this same line of thinking, Thomas Hobbes* said that if man is inherently aggressive, peace couldn't possibly be reached without the existence of an ultimate authority that he termed "the Leviathan", and which was capable of enforcing order.¹⁵

C. CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT OF WG AS AN APPROACH TO PEACE

1. Weaknesses

- Inefficient previous nations' mergers experiences: One of the critics of WG is based on historical observations. History shows that whenever different people were organized into a large unit, they quasi always tried to split off again. The Union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic in 1958-1961, the incorporation of Tibet in China in 1911, and the integration of the Balkan states into the USSR after WWI, which all failed. The later even is suspected to be the cause behind the collapse of the USSR in 1989. In addition, it is worth noticing that most of the tension in the world today is located in regions where people are unwilling to merge with other identities (i.e. North Ireland, East Timor, the Basques, the Tamils, etc.).¹⁶

- WG as a dictatorship: Another critic of WG is that it is feared that nothing would guarantee that WG does not transform into a "worldwide tyranny".¹⁷ In order to be efficient, the created WG has to possess immense power. Consequently, a world

¹⁴ Spanier, Games nations play, 627

* Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is an English political theorist, writer of "the Leviathan" in 1651

¹⁵ Negretto, Kant and the illusion of collective security, pp.501-523

¹⁶ Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, pp.392-393

¹⁷ Ibid pp.394-395

tyrant would probably emanate and instead of a democratic WG, a world dictatorship would be unleashed.¹⁸

- Critic of the analogy with federalism: WG is reached by analogy to the federal system, by generalizing from national governments to WG and transferring governmental techniques from the domestic to the global level. This approach is considered to be flawed. Firstly, federal governments do not always maintain peace. Civil wars are common in such states i.e. the US civil war between 1815-1913 causing around 600.000 casualties.¹⁹ Secondly, the huge variation in the dimensions from the national to the international scale need to be taken into account: a macro government would not necessarily function and perform the same as a micro government.²⁰ Thirdly, while the 13 colonies that initially constituted the United States regrouped people descended from the same ancestors, sharing the same language and religions and attached to the same principles of government, the WG would involve people with huge disparities: different languages, religions and traditions, whose ancestors often fought each other. In brief, WG is seen as an impossible scheme due to geographical and ethnic reasons.²¹

- WG's inability to provide world order: Some fear that a WG might be either too weak, and, hence, unable to maintain order, or excessively strong and, hence, repressive. In both cases, it would not reach its main goal of establishing international order.²²

¹⁸ Spanier, Games nations play, pp.628-629

¹⁹ Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, pp.393-394

²⁰ Claude, Power and International Relations, p.220

²¹ Opitz Edmund A. <http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=681>

²² Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, pp.395-396

2. Strengths

Supporters of WG like Sigmund Freud* and Immanuel Kant see in it the only system capable of efficiently managing international power relations for the following reasons:

- WG as a source of union: A central government would unite countries with diverse ethnic groups and prevent any ethnic antagonisms or the rise of any nationalistic separatists feelings. One of the best examples to be cited would undoubtedly be the former Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito*.²³
- WG as a source of economic prosperity: WG government would relieve states from the great burden of maintaining military forces. Consequently, economic prosperity would naturally follow.²⁴
- WG as a source of peace: In Emery Reves words, law was always able to produce peace and conflict among social units ceased whenever a higher unit established its own sovereignty by incorporating the sovereignties of the smaller social groups.

War takes place whenever and wherever non-integrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact.²⁵

To prevent wars among nations, the integration of the scattered conflicting national sovereignties into one unified, higher sovereignty, capable of creating a legal order within which all peoples may enjoy equal security, equal obligations and equal rights under law, is required.²⁶

* Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was a noted Austrian physician. In addition to his interest in psychotherapy, he wrote several pieces social and political issues

‡ Marshal Tito (1892-1980) was the president of Yugoslavia (1953-1980). He led the Yugoslav Partisans, an army of freedom fighters who successfully fought Hitler's armies in World War II.

²³ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, pp.393-394

²⁴ Yunker, *Rethinking World Government: a new approach*, p.3

²⁵ Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, p.121

²⁶ *Ibid* p.125

- Reducing the nuclear threat: A WG with great political and military power can reduce the threat of conventional wars in general and nuclear wars in particular.²⁷ The formation of a WG with strong and effective authority over nations would not permit wars among its basic components (the old nation-states) the same way national governments would between cities, counties, districts, and so on.²⁸

D. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF WG

The major requirement in order for any project of WG to see the light is that loyalty would start shifting from the national level towards the supranational community.²⁹ For that shift to materialize, people have to recognize the benefits (mainly economic) that would be brought by a new and larger community.³⁰

In addition, some require that the participating states would have reached advanced economic growth levels and retain high political and administrative capabilities, for under developed countries would constitute a burden on the WG and would not be able positively contribute to its creation.

E. OBSTACLES TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A WG

Contrary to the general belief that IOs constitute a stepping-stone to WG, some consider IOs to be the main impediment to world federalism. They argue that IOs, mainly the UN, are “structured around the preservation of state sovereignty”.³¹

In addition, many agree that depriving states of their effective power is simply not a feasible task.³²

²⁷ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach, p.3

²⁸ Ibid (March 2000)

²⁹ Spanier, Games nations play, pp.636-637

³⁰ Ibid p.633

³¹ Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, p.391

³² Claude, Power and International Relations, p.275

Racial, linguistic and religious differences, along with ideological disagreements, disparities in economic welfare, nationalism, etc. would hinder the progress towards WG.³³

According to James Yunker, global economic inequality is the main obstacle to WG.³⁴

As mentioned previously, WG requires the deep changing of peoples' "attitudes, loyalties, attachments, and values". This process is hard and requires a lot of time.³⁵

Finally, states continue to place their national interests ahead of international ones, hindering by that any potential movement towards uniting and creating a world central authority.³⁶

F. PROPOSALS FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT

Many proposals for WG have been advanced. Some said that one great power would dominate world affairs and guarantee peace. Others advocated a world structure including along with Europe, countries like India and China and representatives of the world's religious leaders.³⁷

In this section, four schemes of WG are surveyed. The first 3 are usually called the "Conventional Proposals" for WG, came during the first years following WW2. The fourth proposal is a much more recent one.

³³ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach, p.3

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization, p.418

³⁶ Spanier, Games nations play, p.630

³⁷ Barash & Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, p.389

1. Giuseppe Borgese's * proposal – the Federal Republic of the world

Borgese's WG consists of a unicameral legislative arm forming a world council of 99 elected counselors. In order to form the council, Borgese brought in the concept of "Electoral Colleges" defined as geographically and culturally close nations (see table 3.1). He then suggested that the council be formed by 9 "Electoral Colleges" each Electoral College initially containing 9 nations, which makes 81 seats; to fill the 18 remaining seats, nations will have the right to freely select to pertain to whatever "Electoral College" they desire regardless of geography. Votes would be equally distributed among counselors.

Table 3.1: *Giuseppe Borgese's proposed Electoral Colleges*

1	Western Europe
2	US, UK & Canada, Australia & New Zealand
3	Russia & neighboring
4	North Africa, Near and Middle East
5	Sub-Saharan Africa
6	India, Pakistan, Bangladesh & neighboring
7	China, Korea, Japan & neighboring
8	Indonesia, Vietnam & neighboring
9	Western Hemisphere South of the US

Source: Yunker, *Rethinking World Government: a new approach*, p.3

Weaknesses:

The main defect of this proposal is that most Electoral Colleges would be dominated by the poor nations. The first two Colleges (see table x, numbers 1 & 2) would be composed of rich countries and the remaining 7 of poorer countries.

* Giuseppe Borgese was Chancellor of University of Chicago. He wrote "Foundations of the World Republic" in 1953 containing a draft of a world constitution

Strengths

The Borgese proposal for a Federal Republic of the World guarantees that no one nation block of nations would possess excessive power within the WG.³⁸

2. The Clark / Sohn Plan – a strengthened UN system

The most pronounced plan was the Clark/Sohn ** plan in the year 1966, which called for a better and more efficient role for the UN by transforming the GA into a unicameral legislature responsible of disarmament matters and the maintenance of world peace.³⁹

In other words, this highly detailed plan mainly revolves around “transforming the UN into a world peacekeeping unit” and a more legitimate decision making apparatus than the current IO. The following points summarize its main ideas and propositions:

- States would lose their independence regarding disarmament and war matters
- The General Assembly (GA) would be given more power and the voting weight of each nation would be proportional to the size of its population. China, India, Russia and the US would have 30 votes each, and the next 8 largest countries 15 votes, and so on.
- The Security Council (SC) would be deprived of its veto power
- An inspection commission would secure states’ progressive disarmament
- A World Peace Force would be created under the UN’s direct supervision. It would even be supplied with nuclear weapons to deter any nuclear threat.⁴⁰

Weaknesses

The Clark/Sohn’s main defect is said to be that it never proposed the different phases

³⁸ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach, p.3


^{**} Grenville Clark & Louis Sohn were two international lawyers who called for the revision of the UN Charter and its transformation into a WG. They wrote “World Peace through World Law” in 1958.

³⁹ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach, p.3

⁴⁰ Clark G. & Sohn L. (1960), pp.xvii-xlii

that would lead to the creation of such a WG.⁴¹ Another flaw is that most likely, poor countries will outweigh rich countries and largely dominate the GA (see figure x).⁴²

Figure 3.1: *Potential distribution of voting power among nations under the Clark-Sohn proposal for WG*



Source: Yunker, *Rethinking World Government: a new approach*, p.3

Strengths

Clark- Sohn put restrictions on states' war abilities while maintaining their freedom in conducting any other aspects of their domestic life.⁴³

3. Philippe Isely's * proposal – the Federation of Earth

This proposal is in a sense unique because Isely tried to implement it in the real world through his position in the World Constitution and Parliament Association, which has ratified in June 1977 in Austria the first draft of a world constitution. An improved version of this draft was ratified at the fourth session of the World Constituent Assembly in May 1991 in Portugal.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, pp.391-392

⁴² Yunker, *Rethinking World Government: a new approach*, p.3

⁴³ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, pp.393-394

* Philippe Isely has been for several years Secretary-General of the World Constituent and Parliament Association in Colorado.

⁴⁴ Yunker, *Rethinking World Government: a new approach*, p.3

Isely proposed the creation of 3 houses: the House of peoples, the house of nations, and the house of counselors. Here too, representatives of the poorer countries would outnumber those of the richer countries in both House of peoples and house of nations in order to accurately reflect the reality of the today's world; for both the number poor nations and the number of poor populations are far greater than the number of rich nations and rich peoples. Since, the house of counselor, which main task is to intervene whenever a deadlock arises between the first two houses, is elected from both houses, a direct implication would be that poor countries would dominate all three houses.

Weakness

Here again, the domination of WG by the poor countries represents the main defect in Isely's proposal.

Strength

The Isely proposal mainly ensures a better representation of all countries and is the only proposal that has been tried out though not on an official level.

4. The James Yunker proposal

The three Conventional Proposals share a common defect. They do not guarantee that the future WG would not become "an oppressive instrumentality for radical redistribution of world income".⁴⁵ James Yunker*, who asserts that now that the Cold War has ended, the only obstacle to the creation of a WG is global economic inequality. Consequently, his [long term] solution would encompass a global economic

⁴⁵ Ibid

* James Yunker is a professor of Economics at Western Illinois University. He wrote extensively on world government. His main argument is that global economic progress can be reached through a major economic foreign development assistance program similar to the Marshall Plan following WWII

development assistance program (World Economic Equalization Program – WEEP), a Marshall plan on a larger geographical and financial scale, aiming at reducing the economic gap through foreign aid via large capital transfers from rich to poor nations. By using economic computer simulations, he expects that his scheme would lead to common economic progress: living standards in poor countries would rise at a higher rate in comparison with the rise expected in developed countries, therefore narrowing down the gap between them. Additionally, Yunker proposes the creation of another organism, the Federal Union of Democratic Nations (FUDN), which would be a legitimate and qualified state entity with the power to promulgate and enforce laws, levy taxes, raise its own military, and even have its own flag, anthem, capital city, etc. the FUDN would comprise a legislative, an executive and a legal arm just like any government, and its leaders would be directly elected by the people.⁴⁶

G. CONCLUSION

How feasible is WG in our present era?

Some say that the momentum for the creation of a WG has already passed, and that less and less voices are calling for it.⁴⁷ Claude Inis, a prominent author on the management of the international system and on approaches to peace, sees no realistic prospect of the establishment of a supranational government.⁴⁸ And, indeed, voices against the creation of a WG and disbelieving in the possibility of its establishment are not few.

The creation of WG is threatened by the fact that rich countries would probably try to oppose it. By relinquishing their military might, they would be giving up their main coercive method. Consequently, poor countries would exert enormous pressure on them

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.412

⁴⁸ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p.208

to share what they have (resources, technology, welfare, etc.).⁴⁹

Creating a WG is a must, for the world requires now more than ever before a world government that can tackle the worldwide issues of the new century.⁵⁰ The need for a WG is mounting. The attacks of the 11 of September 2001 on the US brought a bitter reality: Terrorism has taken a completely new shape and transnational terrorism has gained so much power demonstrating that vast-scale violence capabilities are no longer restricted to nation-states alone.⁵¹

And although by accepting the rule of a WG, countries will lose a very important prerequisite of national foreign policy and state sovereignty, which is their decision to go to war (or not), they nonetheless would gain perennial national security. Some might even add the fact that countries have rarely been autonomous in their decision of joining a war. The best two examples would probably be how the Soviet Union and the US were forced to enter WWII. Therefore, WG would not deprive states of something they have not already lost.⁵²

It is true that an international system ruled and managed by a central authority might not be a perfect world, nevertheless, it is unlikely that it would be any worse or more dangerous than the current world we live in.⁵³

Although people have deep loyalty to their nation-states, however, the feeling of world citizenship is still an attainable target. This idea is reached by analogy to countries like the US where Arabs and Jews, English and Irish, Vietnamese and Chinese live together

⁴⁹ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, pp.394-395

⁵⁰ Students demand World Government Appeal to World Leaders and Give Peace a Chance and Heal the World. *US Newswire*, May 19, 2000, no.5857

⁵¹ Hoffman, *World Governance: Beyond Utopia*. pp.27-35

⁵² Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.395

⁵³ *Ibid* p.397

peacefully, or Switzerland where three main subpopulations speaking three different languages (French, German and Italian) live in peace.⁵⁴

As for the proposals for WG, the 3 conventional ones request more weight for the poorer populations, hence, the created WG will demand a drastic redistribution of world income from rich nations towards poor ones. In this case, it is likely that the population of rich countries would resist such a measure. And if the WG is to enforce its decision, this would make of it a totalitarian and repressive state rather than the democratic world apparatus everybody is looking for.

Additionally, all 3 WG schemes share a common defect. They all called for an almost complete disarmament of all states.

There can be no genuine peace...until there is complete disarmament of every nation without exception (Clark-Sohn)

If the World Republic is defective in power, it will disintegrate as did the Roman unity when it grew weak. The World Republic needs to monopolize weapons, wield sanctions and forces that are needed to repress insurrection and separation. (Giuseppe Borgese)

...the Federation of the Earth would require total disarmament to proceed upon ratification. (Philippe Isely)

Consequently, by drastically taking away all states' military power, the WG would become a mechanism capable of imposing law upon any state(s). However, with no form whatsoever of resistance, WG might even become a world bully. Therefore, it might be wiser that states maintain military forces but in limited amounts. It have been argued that the fact that "not having been able so far to formulate a scheme for WG in which a sharing of military power between the government and the national governments accounts for the weakness of the world federalist concept and

⁵⁴ Ibid pp.398-400

movement.”⁵⁵

As for James Yunker’s proposal, it seems to be the most realistic one mainly for suggesting that the economic gaps [between north and south] be abolished. However, in addition to economy, other discordances among the planet’s population are arising and become more and more acute with time. Religion, language, races, ideologies are constant threats to the world’s stability. The last 3 years have witnessed the rise of serious religious-based confrontation mainly between the Christian west and the Muslim East probably confirming Huntington’s prediction of the “clash of civilization”*.

Creating a WG is not a simple task. It can though be achieved through long processes and mechanisms. The UN agencies can be of a great help in the creation of a WG. They can prepare the ground for the coming of a WG by helping to slowly convert peoples’ nationalistic feelings to cosmopolitan ones and abolish such obstacles to WG like the values and loyalties people have.⁵⁶

Another positive contribution from the UN system is functionalism, brought mainly by UN specialized agencies, can be the adequate approach that can facilitate the creation of a WG. “Functionalism is the victory of economics over politics” Via economic integration and cooperation, functionalism would help move away from the nation-state system toward an integrated world culminating with the establishment of a WG. Even while remaining “politically fragmented”, it is undeniable that our world has become

⁵⁵ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach, p.3

* Samuel Huntington is [brief description]. In his famous book “The Clash of Civilizations”, he mainly argues that major ideological wars are over, and that now time has come for a major conflict between the West (western Europe and North America) from one side and the East (the Muslim world and Confucians) from the other.

⁵⁶ Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization, p.418

“functionally integrated”⁵⁷ By working together on relatively small issues like the environment and diseases, states are increasingly learning to cooperate and the political tension, which prevents the building of a WG, is being broken.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Barash & Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, p.388

⁵⁸ Roskin M. & Berry N. (1990), p.486

CONCLUSION

Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind.

- John F. Kennedy -

The three approaches to peace previously surveyed share many similarities, however they are set apart by many divergences as well.

BOP and CS share the same reasoning in respect of states as main components of the international society. On the other hand, in WG thinking, the state's importance is undermined leaving the ground for a much more important authority: the world state.¹

Proponents of CS and WG recognize the necessity of some form of "centralized management of international relations", while BOP advocates insist on a *Laissez-faire system*.²

¹ Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp.273-274

² *Ibid* p.274

In CS and WG systems, preponderous power is in the hands of the community (i.e. the UN and the world state) unlike in a BOP system where it is monopolized by a single state [with potential hegemonic inclinations] or a group of major states.³

While CS and WG are mainly directed against acts of aggression, BOP is directed against states capabilities and possible intentions.⁴

A weird similarity has been invoked between BOP and WG. It has been said that both approaches advocate the centralization of power. The realist camp leaves power in the hands of a small group of states while the idealist camp requests that power be concentrated in the hands of a supreme world authority.⁵

In BOP we have alliances, which are limited groupings of states while CS presents a universal grouping of nation-states.

BOP brings inefficient deterrence, hence an unstable peace. On the other hand, CS and WG bring in a power by far greater than any power or alliances of powers that it is much more expected that it will efficiently dissuade any act of aggression.

BOP is an individualistic solution or approach to the problem of security whereas CS and WG present collective solutions.

³ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.257

⁴ Downs, *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, p.138

⁵ Negretto, *Kant and the illusion of collective security*, pp.501-523

Other alternatives

Were the nation-state system to prevail, what other possible alternatives are still available?

- Zones of peace:

Currently a triangle of stable peace is currently stretching from Australia to Japan across the North Atlantic to Finland including 18 countries with no intentions at all of fighting each other. According to Professor Christopher Mitchell* zones of peace in general and Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones (NWFZs) in particular are to gain more and more importance in the future. He expects that more regions would become nuclear free (i.e. Western Europe). At the same time, he remains skeptical about NWFZs becoming so generalized as to reach the entire planet because as he put it: "major nuclear powers would simply not give up their toys".⁶

- Regionalism

By willingly submitting their identities to regionally integrated blocs (i.e. the EU), states will help create *zones of peace* and security communities in the world.⁷

- Concert of great powers

The concert of power system is implemented by agreement between the involved powers. It stresses the benefits of cooperation in order to bring lasting peace. "Nations realize they have mutual interests and align together in order to protect and develop that interest" The Concert of Europe was created according to this same current of thinking.

* Professor Christopher Mitchell is French-Cumbie professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University (USA)

⁶ UN Summer school on conflict Prevention and transformation, 28/08/2004

⁷ Bull, The anarchical society, pp.286-305

- Strengthening the UN and giving more role to non-state actors

Many advocate that a strengthened UN system would perform better.⁸ T. Murithi claims that the UN political system has to be revised in order for it to address the new challenges. The UN 50-year old charter is outdated and needs some lifting. In addition to states, the new UN system has to include transnational corporations, non-state actors, minorities and sub-national groups. In other words, the UN has to be transformed into a global assembly of the people.⁹

- World society

Finally, the creation of a World Society represents an additional attempt to world peace and stability and a fairly good alternative to [the too idealistic] WG, especially since it does not involve the creation of a world police. This scheme will materialize only when cosmopolitan culture is shared by all people throughout the world. This would require that common social ideas be produced, adopted and go in pair with the development of an enhanced international interpersonal communication interface capable of taking humanity beyond the complexities of languages and customs. Consequently, international social cohesion. So far the main traits of a cosmopolitan culture have been western ones. Perhaps now it is the time for some new cultures with particularistic features to make their contribution to this worldwide culture we look forward to. Non-western elements need to be in the formula for a universal international society to see the light.¹⁰

⁸ Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The problems and Progress of International Organization*, p.413

⁹ Murithi T. Program Officer (UNITAR). On: *Rethinking the United Nations system: Prospects for a world Federation of Nations*

¹⁰ Bull, *The anarchical society*, pp. 303-305

WG, the most promising approach to peace

So far, history has shown us that international order and national sovereignty cannot coexist. Consequently, a WG has to be established to bring peace and stability to the world. Nowadays, some even would go as far as to say that BOP has become utopia and WG is a much more realist way of thinking. ¹¹

The declining importance of the states vis-à-vis non-states actors like IGOs, NGOs, MNCs and so on, can be read as a positive sign towards an increased consensus on the issue of WG, since the system will tend to be a less state centric one?

During the Cold War from the 50s till the late 80s, both communist and non-communist regimes rejected the concept of WG, each fearing that such a government would impose on them the socioeconomic and political preferences of the “other side”. Now that this major ideological struggle has vanished, maybe we have reached the ripe moment of moving beyond the UN and creating a federal WG in the near future... ¹²

But today, the world faces other problems. The main obstacle to WG seems to have become the wide world economic gap and world income unequal distribution among nations ¹³. After the East versus West during the days of the Cold War, now it is North versus South. ¹⁴ Another potential ideological obstacle has been unleashed after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York. Christian West versus Muslim East is today’s trend in international relations discussions and political life proving day by day that Samuel Huntington’s most debated prediction is not far from becoming real.

¹¹ Spanier, Games nations play, p.630

¹² Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach. International Journal on World Peace, p.3

¹³ UN Office Geneva, Proposed new ways and means to strengthen the United Nations capability for Collective Action, pp.4-6

¹⁴ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach. International Journal on World Peace, p.3

At any rate, any proposal for WG should not jeopardize the interests of existing nations. The creation of the LON following WWI and the UN following WWII prove at least that humanity seeks relentlessly the creation of a world state hoping to bring order to the anarchical world we live in and stop the waste of valuable economic resources devoted to military purposes.¹⁵

After long years and many try-outs, one system has so far never gotten the chance to be implemented: WG. Creating a WG seems to have become a more feasible and realistic project, while many other alternatives, such as reforming the UN, are becoming too idealistic since the veto powers would never let go of their privileges and powers. Hence the UN should disintegrate and a new mechanism be created all over again, a mechanism that can ensure the full participation of all nations, but also minority group, civil society, NGOs, MNCs, etc.

Final word

From lessons derived from history, it is noticed that the interest in world governance increased simultaneously after each of the two great world wars¹⁶, but most notably shortly after WW2 when humanity became so terrified by the imagined dreadful consequences of a potential third world war, bearing in mind the horrors following the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁷

The end of the Cold war was expected to bring a similar call for change in world politics through world governance though it did not. Maybe because the Cold war was not deadly as the two major world wars were. Apparently, since there is so far no evidence that states have started to place international interests ahead of their national

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Barash D. & Webel C. (2002), pp.402-404

¹⁷ Yunker, Rethinking World Government: a new approach. International Journal on World Peace, p.3

interests, humanity has yet to endure another great war and suffer tremendously before a serious step can be taken towards radically changing the international system and international relations with the making of a brand new world order. Sadly, it is feared that this time, with the deadliness of today's instruments of war, the apocalypse could be not far behind...

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