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THE UNDP AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BEIRUT SOUTHERN SUBURBS FOLLOWING THE JULY 2006 WAR: AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

BY

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Dedication Page

To my loving parents and friends
THE UNDP AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BEIRUT SOUTHERN SUBURBS FOLLOWING THE JULY 2006 WAR: AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Layal Abu Darwich

Abstract

Throughout its existence as an independent state, Lebanon has had its share of domestic strife and foreign interventions including Israeli invasion with devastating consequences. In 2005, and after the murder of the ex-premier Rafic Hariri, Lebanon entered a new era of heightened political instability. A year later, Israel launched a devastating war against Hezbollah and Lebanon which led to many civilian casualties and unprecedented damage to the country’s infrastructure. The thesis addresses the participation of the United Nations Program in the rehabilitation of Beirut Southern Suburbs in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the July 2006 war. While the thesis sheds lights on all significant regional and international efforts to deal with the socio-economic consequences of the July war, its principal focus is on the UNDP interventions that were carried out to rehabilitate, recover and restore the lives and livelihoods in the Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS). The thesis thus examines the accomplished and ongoing UNDP programs in the BSS in order to highlight the important albeit controversial role of international organizations (specifically the UNDP) in the long-term alteration of social and behavioral interactions with the aim of fostering peace-building and community-building. The
thesis argues that such international-donor programs do not only aim to physically rebuild and rehabilitate infrastructure but have the loftier goal of laying the foundations for sustainable development and peace-building, as envisioned by the UNDP, other international organizations and Western governments.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Human development, Israel, Lebanon, Peace-building, Reconstruction, Recovery, war.
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This study addresses the participation of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the rehabilitation of Lebanon’s southern suburb in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the July 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah. It will mainly focus on the UNDP interventions to rehabilitate, recover and restore the lives and livelihoods in the area. The study will examine both the completed and the ongoing programs implemented in the Beirut Southern Suburbs in order to shed light on the important role that international organizations like the UNDP can play in the long-term modification of social and behavioral interactions aimed towards peace-building and community bonding.

The UNDP does not officially recognize Hezbollah which is perceived to be in control of Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS), the south of Lebanon and some areas of the Bekaa Valley (news outlets often refer to the Beirut Southern Suburbs as a "state within a state"). The UNDP, however, had to liaise and cooperate with informal Hezbollah members in order to implement its programs in areas under the party's control.

Local governance, as practiced in Lebanon, means that municipalities often represent the voters' political inclinations and reflect the powers that are effectively in control of a designated region. As such, the UNDP deals with elected municipal officials, who are sympathetic with the political orientations and views of Hezbollah, if not directly affiliated with it.
The UNDP has a long history of involvement in post-war recovery where it seeks to promote peace and development. The UNDP’s post-conflict recovery has a main purpose to establish “sustainable economic growth and human development”, all the while looking to find and remedy the factors that may cause conflict to arise again. In addition to the restoration of economic and institutional arrangements to the way they were before a war, post-conflict recovery also strives to create a transformation that allows countries that have been devastated by war to rebuild the foundations for “self-sustaining development”, democracy, and peace-building.

Post-war interventions mainly aim to rehabilitate damages and traumas, to provide humanitarian relief, and to restore livelihoods. However, the UNDP’s approach goes beyond recovery to focus on the humanitarian dimension of interventions, aiming to rebuild communities and to engage them in the participation in the rehabilitation and sustainable development processes.

The UNDP interventions targeted the urgent priorities and needs of the war-affected communities. It significantly impacted the lives of this community by restoring livelihoods, income and employment status, as well as supporting income-generating projects. The UNDP implemented socio-economic activities aimed at reducing poverty, expanding economic opportunities, and providing employment. The organization perceives those interventions to strengthen peace-building and, hence, reducing the chances of recurring conflicts.

The long-term goals of such programs also aim at shaking the current status-quo by slowly shifting the mentality of the communities in question towards a better civic understanding of their surroundings. It bases its strategy on a simple rationale: People become gradually immune to partisan and foreign manipulations once they have a future to look ahead for, whether it is higher education, a blossoming career or a bill-paying job.
The study will argue that such international-donor programs aim not only to physically rebuild infrastructures but also to lay strategic plans for human development and therefore invest in community-building projects.

The theoretical framework of the thesis is based on recognizing the growing role of non-state actors in the development process in third world countries, especially those like Lebanon that have undertaken violent and destructive conflicts. As such, it is worth providing a brief literature review of the role of no-state actors in international relations is worth being highlighted. The international system consists of nation-states, international organizations, and private actors.1 “The increasing number of international organizations is parallel to the increasing levels of economic, political, social and cultural transactions between individuals, societies and states.”2 In this context, Lynn Miller in “Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics” stated that “the growth of so many kinds of non-state actors challenges and even weakens the state-centric concept of international politics and replaces it with a transnational system in which relationships are more complex. These organizations changed the international environment.”3

The proliferation of non-state actors has recently led some scholars of international relations “to conclude that states are declining in importance and that non-state actors are gaining status and influence.” New theories of international relations such as the "complex interdependence of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were formed in order to explain new developments.” Scholars such as Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkoph stated that "as the world grown smaller, the mutual

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2 Ibid

3 Ibid
dependence of nation-states and other transnational political actors on one another has grown."⁴ According to Miller, non-state actors are divided into two categories: “International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)” and “Transnational or International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)”. “The first group consists of the non-state actors that are created by nation-states. They are officially documented by government agencies. The second group of non-state international actors is established not by nation-states, but by certain group of individuals, businessmen and other societal forces. This group has no legal bonds with nation-states; therefore, they are truly transnational.”⁵ “IGOs are voluntary associations of sovereign states established to pursue many objectives for which states want to cooperate through sort of formal structure and to which states are unable to realize by themselves.”

Today a large number IGOs existed and were the result of treaties and negotiations “which mainly reflect preferences of stronger states.”⁶ In this context, Miller stated that IGOs “are part of the Westphalian state system in which IGOs are instruments of nation-states.”⁷ The efficiency of IGOs varies from one area to another, one state to another, and also the degree of influence is much related to the weakness of state, as well the capability of states to undertake and implement their own provisions. etc., whereas the “powerful states are less constrained by the principle of IGOs than those who are relatively weak.”⁸

Today, “non-state actors began to substitute nation-states in many areas.”⁹ As viewed by realists, IGOs are simply states’ instruments. In this context, Kenneth Waltz says that IGOs are unable to alter the perception of states and the role of international organizations remains

⁴ Ibid
⁵ Ibid
⁶ Ibid
⁷ Ibid
⁸ Ibid
⁹ Ibid
Nevertheless, this perception was questioned by other scholars who strongly argue that some nation-states are unable to resolve to national and global problems, on their own. “Neoliberals accept the state-dominated view of realists; nevertheless, they suggest that international institutions are also part of the world system and effective in international politics.” In this respect, "the gap between the nation-state ideal and political reality seems to be actually growing rather than narrowing, since recent technological, economic, and social developments have posed enormous challenges to the capacity of territorial states to fulfill their traditional functions of security, welfare, and identity.” When state boundaries do not overlap with national boundaries which do not in most cases, the ascendance of nationalism as a generative order will set into motion a disruptive dual-track process that predisposes stateless-nations … to embark in energetic efforts to normalize their existence.”

It is impossible to separate public from private, domestic from foreign, and political from economic and social matters; therefore, previously narrow concepts of the political process became problematic. "if the political process is defined in terms of the authoritative allocation of values, then private actions in economic and social realms, which affect the values available to other actors, are political actions. If these actions have an impact across state boundaries, they are transnational.” A broader definition of the political process draws attention “to the inadequacy of the state centric understanding of the world politics.” For this purpose, “the state-centric model” seems to consider “activities of transnational actors as outside of the

10 Ibid
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
A powerful liaison exists between the distribution of power and the role of non-state actors. As viewed by realism, “rational actors concern about their self-interests in an anarchic international system. Power is the key variable in explaining behavior of states.” Realist scholars tend to grant “less chance for international cooperation and for effective international institutions.” On the other hand, other scholars like draws on the core concept of realists to validate the “international cooperation… for the long-term interests”. 

The thesis will elaborate more on the UNDP post-July 2006 war reconstruction strategy in Beirut Southern Suburbs area. It will show how the July 2006 war on the Beirut Southern Suburbs area impacted the socio-economic situation, and will examine the projects implemented by the UNDP in the area.

Chapter one will provide an overview of the post war reconstruction theories and practices in the era following the World War II, and will highlight the models of post-conflict recovery applied throughout history, including the one used by the UNDP.

Chapter two will focus on the outbreak of the summer 2006 war on Lebanon as well as will detail its effects on the entire country, and specifically on the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The chapter will also provide an overview on the area following the July war, and the major donors and players who took part of the reconstruction process.

Lebanon is no stranger to violent conflicts. For half a century, this tiny eastern Mediterranean country has suffered domestic strife and multiple invasions. In 1958, a short civil war broke out which was then followed by a far more devastating one that lasted from 1975 to 1991. Israel,
Lebanon's southern neighbor, invaded the country in 1978 and 1982 and occupied parts of southern Lebanon where it established a “buffer security zone” until its withdrawal in 2000. The violence in Lebanon trailed well into the 21st century. In 2005, ex-premier Rafic Hariri was killed. His was the first in a series of assassinations that targeted many well-known, pro-Western political and media figures. One year later, in July 2006, Israel launched a fierce war against Hezbollah (self-dubbed as the “Islamic Resistance”) a predominantly Shiite group founded in 1985 to fight off the Israeli occupation at that time. The war lasted for 33 days and resulted in 1200 Lebanese civilian deaths as well as massive destruction in Lebanese populated areas and infrastructures.

Unfortunately, the rapid unfolding of those events impeded any immediate and much needed full-scale action for recovery, rehabilitation and development in one of the most neglected areas by international donors: the Beirut Southern Suburbs.

The summer 2006 war further aggravated poverty and worsened the socio-economic conditions due to the massive destruction of lives and livelihoods in different areas of Lebanon. It resulted in massive obliteration of key social, economic, and transport infrastructures which disrupted the country’s capacity to deliver social and economic services. The human toll was great: Around 1,200 Lebanese casualties and over 4,000 injured; hundreds of whom were left with permanent disabilities. The population also suffered the internal displacement of almost a million people.

The war also led to the loss of employment throughout Beirut Southern Suburbs due to the destruction of around 2500 small and medium businesses adding to the burdens of governmental social services. The hostilities totally demolished 250 buildings in the Beirut Southern Suburbs area and around 40,000 people were displaced from that area alone. The 2006 war further

20Ibid
eroded the living conditions of the population mostly in terms of unemployment and students dropout rates. While unemployment was common before the war like other places in the country, the destruction of businesses and light industries in the Southern Suburbs compounded the situation into catastrophic dimensions.

Unemployment aggravated poverty, and a significant number of youths were forced to leave schools and education to seek jobs in order to help their families and selves to survive. The difficult living conditions also lead to the outbreak of social problems like drug addiction, increased spontaneous clashes, tensions, and violence among youths, as well as vandalism and robberies.

In this atmosphere of vulnerability, low-level of education, unemployment and poverty, the youth in particular, or the “war generation” in Beirut Southern Suburbs has become a “detached generation” with a sense of alienation and marginalization. This represents a particular challenge to their participation and integration in economic and social life, a requirement that is essential to building and sustaining peace. A vulnerable youth population - combined with unemployment, poverty and other factors – can lead to violence.

In order to identify needs and interventions, the UNDP conducted a post-war living conditions assessment in close partnership with the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Beirut Southern Suburbs are largely unfunded by the international community- mostly due to political considerations. The suburbs are considered to be Hezbollah's stronghold and the party is shunned by Western powers. As a result, the locals are perceived to harbor feelings of alienation and discrimination towards the national government as well as the international community.
The UNDP was able to initiate its emergency program in BSS immediately after the war and later extended it to the “Recovery of Lives and Livelihoods Program” despite the challenges mentioned above.

Chapter three will provide a brief on the background of the history of the UNDP’s role in Lebanon and a glance back on the UNDP role and mandate in Lebanon since the 1990s and prior to the eruption of the July 2006 attack on Lebanon. It will emphasize on how UNDP partnership modality in Lebanon evolved during those years, and will highlight the major challenges and social actions undertaken after the cease fire in August 2006. The chapter will also trace the UNDP’s response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, and examine the actual planning for Early Recovery in the midst of war.

Chapter four will elaborate more on the UNDP interventions in BSS, and highlight the challenges and the major initiatives undertaken to recover and restore lives and Livelihoods. The UNDP has managed to build a strong and trusting relationship with all concerned entities in BSS closely liaising with the local communities at both the grassroots and the local authorities’, namely municipalities, level. It was considered an important achievement towards gaining insight into the residents' characteristics pertaining to social, economic, cultural and political traits, and laying foundations for better planning towards serving the community.

The UNDP is keen on maintaining its ongoing constructive interventions in BSS, especially since it is perceived as a neutral arbiter with the ability to positively affect the livelihoods and opportunities of vulnerable groups and to strengthen inter-communal relationships.

Due to the lack of an equitable development plan in Lebanon, domestic and international organizations and non-governmental organizations, have taken on a significant role rebuilding Lebanon. In the larger context, and with the exception of UNDP and its donors’ efforts, Beirut
Southern Suburbs have been marginalized. The area still lacks targeted donor funding, even after the July 2006 war and the May 2008 clashes which have exacerbated the economic conditions, encouraging local youths to engage in violent and law-breaking actions within Beirut Southern Suburbs and its surroundings.

The population currently suffers from deficient socio-economic conditions and threats to its livelihoods and this current situation is further aggravating previously established vulnerabilities. The UNDP has found it necessary in this context to make a transition from its “Early Recovery Program” to the “Recovery of Lives and Livelihoods” in the Beirut Southern Suburbs program. Based on the above mentioned interventions, efforts have been made since 2006 aiming at decreasing poverty, unemployment, and supporting vulnerable groups, and these efforts have resulted in successfully undertaking projects for better livelihoods.

The conclusion will reassess the UNDP’s intervention in Beirut Southern Suburbs and highlight the major lessons learned from this experience. It will also address and evaluate the criticism raised by many following this intervention, criticism that targets the UNDP political agenda in the area.
CHAPTER TWO

POST CONFLICT RECOVERY IN THE ERA FOLLOWING THE WORLD WAR II: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The term post conflict intervention is defined as the need to help in the reconstruction of “weak” or “failing states after civil wars or states clashes and the concept made its way into the literature on international relations development. It means providing and enhancing socio-economic conditions, strengthening governance, “rule of law, as well as other elements of justice and reconciliation and, very centrally, security”. Recovery is also defined as “achieving socio-economic well-being, involving food security, public health, shelter, educational systems, and a social safety net for all citizens… [and]… an economic strategy for assistance that [is] designed to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, to create legal and regulatory reforms, to lay down the foundation for international trade and investment, and to establish transparent banking and financial institutions”.

The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery

Recent history has witnessed a wave of interventions by government and International agencies in societies that have undergone a series of conflicts, interventions that took the form of humanitarian involvement such as the one in Somalia. They have been justified in terms of

22 United Nations Development Program, “Post Conflict Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity” (paper prepared at the quarterly meeting at UNDP, Lebanon, October 12 2008).
humanitarian international law despite their entrenchments on a narrowly reinterpreted understanding of “Westphalian” notions of state sovereignty.23

In 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia, countries, mainly Europe, agreed to “bring an end to the Thirty Years' War, which had drowned Europe in blood in battles over religion, defined the principles of sovereignty and equality in numerous sub-contracts, and in this way became the constitution of the new system of states in Europe”.24 The “Westphalian” system peaked in the late 1800’s; some forcible interventions were carried out by powerful states in the domestic affairs of weaker ones between 1850 and 1900, but they were less frequent than the periods prior and following these years.25 “The Peace of Westphalia is important in modern international relations theory and is often defined as the beginning of the international system”.26 The Charter of the United Nations today enshrines the norms of sovereignty, where article 2(4) prohibits attacks on “political independence and territorial integrity,” and Article 2(7) sharply restricts intervention”.27 However, various views have debated the notion of “Westphalian” sovereignty, especially with the emergence of internationalism and globalization, whose core values and interpretations appear to negate “Westphalian” sovereignty.28

Early 1990s, “the United Nations” has been endorsing “political action, usually involving military force, which the broad consensus of states would have previously regarded as

25 Ibid
27 Ibid
28 Ibid
illegitimate interference in internal affairs.”

This has endorsed “the approval of military operations to remedy an injustice within the boundaries of a state or the outside administration of domestic matters like police operations.” These actions usually took place without the lacked approval of the target state government: Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia, are examples of such interventions. “The legitimacy and wisdom of specific actions and interventions have often been disputed among states.” Such interventions as the December 1999 “U.S. bombing of Iraq and NATO’s involvement in Kosovo failed to elicit U.N. Security Council endorsement” for example, the same was true for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, “the broad practice of intervention is likely to continue to enjoy broad endorsement within the U.N. Security Council and other international organizations, especially when it can be demonstrated that such intervention aims at saving the lives of threatened civilians.” The Neo-conservative movement has taken this theory to higher levels, by making the assertion that “a lack of democracy may foreshadow future humanitarian crisis and that democracy itself constitutes a human right.” Critics of neo-conservatism have noted that the movement is concerns itself “about democracy, human rights, and humanitarian crises in the countries” that constitute a threat to “American global dominance, places like the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea, Sudan, and Venezuela, while largely ignoring the same issues in other countries considered friendlier to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Georgia, and

29 Ibid
30 Ibid
32 Ibid
33 Ibid
34 Ibid
Colombia”.35 “There is a debate about whether recent infringements on state sovereignty like the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and subsequent de facto partition of Kosovo, and the 2003 Iraq War, reflected these higher principles or whether the real justification was simply self-defense or the promotion of political and economic interests”.36 “Contingent sovereignty” seems to be surfacing as a new concept in international law, it hasn’t however yet gotten to the point where it is recognized as legitimate”.37 Whenever failed states are concerned, more criticism of “Westphalian” sovereignty becomes rampant. In the case of Afghanistan (before the 2001 US-led invasion) for example, it was claimed that “no sovereignty exists and that international intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds and on the grounds that the failed states pose a threat to neighboring countries and the world as a whole.”38

Since the cold war ended, around one hundred and sixteen armed conflicts have erupted, most of which can be classified as civil wars. “The United Nations Security Council consequently launched more than 30 international military interventions” aimed at resolving these internal conflicts.39 While some of them succeeded others failed, in either case, "nation building" tasks had to be dealt with: "to conduct post-conflict reconstruction in failed states.”40 Some of the carried out post-conflict reconstructions either didn’t succeeded at all, or had doubtful levels of success. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan illustrate some of these international military interventions that

were thought to be successful, but ongoing post-conflict reconstruction tasks are still not accomplished. 41

Following the September 11 attacks, some scholars saw post-conflict recovery intervention as an extension of conflict: “the subsequent politicization of post-conflict recovery and entry of post-conflict assistance into the political economy of conflict have fundamentally changed policy making and practice.” 42 Scholars tend to call for “de-politicization” of post-conflict recovery in order “to benefit from an increasingly structured architecture of integrated, directed recovery.” 43

"It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans . . . The role of this country [the USA] should consist of friendly aid . . . Political passion and prejudice should have no part" 44

George C Marshall, 5 June 1947

Sixty years ago, George C Marshall-former US Secretary of State- said that “the reconstruction of war-torn Europe consisted of "friendly aid" given to countries, with certain conditions attached specifically on spending the aid on the priorities that the US had identified.” 45

43 Ibid
The Marshall Plan endorsed an understanding that “the officials in those countries should guide their own recovery.” 46 It also believed that the “recipient-country leaders required control of substantial resources in order to solidify their power and relevance.” 47 The Marshall Plan’s strength and success tends to be viewed as the effect of the massive sums spent; around the current equivalent of 120 billion USD. 48 “The annual per capita levels of assistance provided to the Marshall Plan recipient nations of $129 billion USD “on average, has routinely been exceeded”, although it has not come from a single-donor contribution since then. 49 The way assistance has been doled out and the priorities put forth by donors has been paramount in defining whether a recovery process has succeeded or failed, in all regions of the world from “war-ravaged Europe”, to the “Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.” 50

An examination of 11 countries damaged/destroyed by the war revealed “that combined non-military spending during the first two post-conflict years amounted to a net total of nearly $32 billion, or $1.45 billion per post-conflict zone per year.” 51 “The actual spending differed widely in annual per capita terms, from a low of $24 billion in the Democratic Republic of Congo to a high of $679 billion—more than 28 times as much—in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The amounts provided in Bosnia were more than five times those supplied through the Marshall Plan.” 52

46 Ibid
49 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 Ibid
The above figures highlight the significance of financial support post-war recovery. It can be noted that “the most successful reconstruction phase have benefited from outstanding levels of financial international assistance, like in Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo.” Some of the interventions that were deemed less successful, “such as in DR Congo and Afghanistan” were not provided with the same high levels of financial international assistance. Funding appears to be important; but paradoxes do emerge.

Following the Second World War, a “relatively adequate spending in Germany and low spending in Japan” has lead to positive recoveries and development. High levels of assistance and non-military interventions, however gave rise to “violent breakouts” in East Timor and an "extended insurgency combined with sectarian in-fighting in Iraq." Although high levels of aid financing are essential, they are not enough to create a successful post-conflict recovery effort. The final evaluation of a program’s success also involves the different modalities used, the way assistance is provided, and how different actors are involved. The sectors to which assistance is doled, and to what end, also proves decisive when evaluating the effectiveness of the intervention.

It may be best to begin by reviewing the various definitions that shed the light on the “non-military interventions in post-conflict countries”. Then we will turn to an analytical history of post-conflict recovery that considers the many changes of theory and practice in the past 30 years. We will also address post-9/11 transformations, given their historical uniqueness. Post-conflict countries usually encompass various and conflicting political and economic agendas, this often results in a difficult to balance array of objectives. In striving to reach these objectives, the

53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Ibid, 1701
57 Ibid
recipient state institutions become marginalized, and this creating a danger to the state’s stability, and most importantly to its sovereignty.

**Defining post-war reconstruction**

The definition of post war reconstruction as viewed by Francis Fukuyama is “the first phase of nation-building, which applies to failed states after violent conflict and where international community has to provide security and social support.” 58 He also explains that the “second phase of nation-building is the creation of self-sustaining state institutions which provide security and all essential needs with the help of the international community.” 59 This second phase only becomes possible “after the completion of the first phase” and after assuring security and stability. 60 The third phase involves the strengthening of weak states. 61 Whenever the international community is faced with a failed state and impotent government institutions, Post-war intervention is important.

In 1995, the World Bank was the first to define the term “post-conflict reconstruction as the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.” 62 The two scholars John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan provided a much broader definition to include “justice, reconciliation and security, which is believed to be central.” 63

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59 Ibid
60 Ibid
63 Ibid, 85-96
Security includes “collective and individual security to all actors and addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions.”

There are seven pillars to security: “control of belligerents, territorial security, protection of the populace, protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions, reform of indigenous security institutions, and regional security.”

Amongst the important tasks also is the capability to provide security because it is only after establishing this objective that other reconstruction tasks can be successfully implemented. However, in the absence of justice, socio-economic stabilization and good governance, it wouldn’t be possible to sustain and maintain.

“Justice and reconciliation”: This category “addresses the need to deal with past abuses and create an impartial legal system”. It also aims at strengthening the justice system for better execution of laws in order to prevent future conflicts.

“Security and governance”: The second category is “crucial in supporting and providing conditions for justice and reconciliation.” In order to sustain a proficient justice system socio-economic condition needs to be secured beforehand.

“Social and economic well-being”: The third category “addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and

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65 Ibid
66 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Ibid
initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program.”70 This category seeks to provide emergency program aiming at providing relief and early recovery for the populations at the beginning of post-conflict reconstruction and/or following the end of war. Following the direct relief and the rehabilitation of infrastructure, a restoration of lives and livelihoods and implementation of social and economic development initiatives is very essential. Nevertheless, this can’t be properly and efficiently accomplished in the absence of a fully-functioning security or justice system, in addition to building adequate “governance”. 71

“Governance and participation”: this category “addresses the need to create legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes.”72 Specifically, the need to “establish a representative constitutional structure, strengthen public-sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of the country’s government and policies.”73

Security however remains paramount in the implementation of democratic governance, if institutions and officials are not secured and protected from threatening situations; it creates a higher risk of failure for the period following recovery and reconstruction interventions.

There are four categories of post-war intervention, and there are many different actors participating in the implementation of their respective activities: international organizations, states, national governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, local institutions, local non-governmental organizations, etc… Post conflict reconstruction can be

70 Ibid
71 Ibid
72 Ibid
described as best as an intricate and complex endeavor; with different organizations and actors harboring their own agendas and goals that may not always be complementary.

Post-conflict recovery in both practice and as a field of study has proven to be complex. The developed studies regarding this subject have overlapped such “traditional subjects as political science, economics, sociology, psychology and history”, and have included “various interventions undertaken in the name of post-conflict recovery—infrastructure rehabilitation, governance, economic development, demilitarization, peace building, women’s empowerment, health, and education” among other subjects.  

The introduction of the notion of “mission creep” which is the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals, and the identification of new interventions following wars, bring about more difficult to define it. “It would be easier to define it by aims and objectives namely: to reactivate economic and social development . . . [and] to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence.”

“Despite widespread agreement upon its literal definition, the boundaries between relief, recovery and development are in constant change, and a single post-conflict context is likely to include several geographical areas and populations at varying stages of crisis and development.”

No defined criteria therefore have been established for differentiating between phases. Some scholars favors a more expanded definition, which “excludes basic, life-sustaining relief activities while seeing itself more closely aligned with

74Ibid
questions of local capacity, sustainability and conflict-sensitivity inherent in much contemporary development theory and practice.”

In this paper, post war reconstruction will be defined and labeled through the aims of interventions. The concept of “reconstruction” has become very popular, it has however also been criticized “for suggesting a return to the status quo ante which had been implicated in the cause of the conflict.” It has been implied that the constructive sponsor was unable to dismantle the “weaknesses and vulnerability factors in the pre-conflict environment.” Consequently, the concept of "recovery" became more acceptable because it is used in the economic, social, medical and psychological domains, in addition to being far from the infrastructure-oriented implications and origins of the term “reconstruction.”

“A variety of lesser and emerging terms have also been used, including most notably, post-conflict stabilization.” Reflecting modest aims ‘stabilization’ has been a concept particularly endorsed by militaries and by the British government’s interagency body for post-conflict and fragile states, the Stabilization Unit.” This term was born out of the “war on terror” and the “subsequent international military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it shows a priority to the establishment of basic security, with humanitarian activities serving as force protection and

79 Ibid
80 Ibid
public diplomacy, rather than for more comprehensive civilian domains such as governance and socioeconomic development.”

The humanitarian aid community holds a different view that asserts “post-conflict development” as reflecting the need for post-conflict activities to focus around developmental objectives, rather than more politically-oriented concerns such as democratization or security sector reform.”

A backward overview on post-war reconstruction

Since post-conflict recovery include many actors and a variety of concepts, this paper will strive to present an analysis of the history for the major conceptual literature of the development of post war recovery theories based upon four criteria assessed by different scholars. The criteria include: “the primary sectors of activity, the emerging actors, the aims objectives and final beneficiaries”, as well as the conditions imposed on “recipient state institutions and their relationships with international actors.”

This paper will identify and define three main theories that arose between the 1970s and 2001, based on the four criteria previously mentioned.

“The Economic Liberalization (and its discontents)”

Most of the post-war rehabilitation and recovery processes were undertaken by “the state or states in which the war had occurred”, but were mainly funded by the USA or the USSR.
The period between end of 1970s and beginning of 1980s saw the rise of the notion of economic liberalization as a main component for reconstruction and recovery especially in countries like Sudan, Egypt, Mozambique, and Latin America.  

International actors, particularly the "Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, encouraged (with aid conditionality) the developing and conflict-affected countries” to implement initiatives aiming at pursuing macroeconomic stability, reinforcing “trade and capital account liberalization”, and enhancing “privatization and deregulation”.  

These economic transformations relied on a basic assumption “that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market-democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.”  

This plan necessitated undergoing direct contact with the “recipient state institutions”, although it was ultimately targeted at reducing government “budgets and wages”, and in due course at marginalizing “the state’s involvement in economic and public affairs.”  

Some of the same influences that allayed the Cold War were used in this “intrusive approach”; “structural adjustment has been viewed as a sign of loyalty to liberal democracy and opposition to the communist invasion.” Ingenious heads of “several developing countries”, however, created an equilibrium between U.S and Soviet demands and succeeded in maximizing their...

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87 Barakat, “Post-War Reconstruction and Development,” 55.
88 Ibid
89 Ibid
91 Ibid
92 Ibid
“nations’ access to foreign assistance”, as well as strengthening and maintaining domestic policy autonomy.\textsuperscript{93}

Macroeconomic liberalization and democratization “often failed to provide the sort of stability and economic growth foreseen by their proponents.”\textsuperscript{94} In this context, R. Paris in his book “Peace building in Central America: reproducing the sources of conflict?” stated that “structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala sharpened the risk of conflict deterioration”. H. W. Jeong in “Managing structural adjustment” also implicated IMF policies as being a factor in the kickoff of “conflicts in Sudan in 1985 and Zambia in 1990, as well as in civil fighting across West and North Africa.”\textsuperscript{95}

“While studies demonstrated that certain implementation arrangements could alleviate SAPs’ potentially harmful influence, criticism against the liberal economic model of development started to rise in developing as well as post-conflict countries.”\textsuperscript{96} “Structural adjustment was seen as privileging the elite and marginalizing the most vulnerable as international nongovernmental humanitarian actors intervened to mitigate the loss of financial assistance from previously state-controlled economies.”\textsuperscript{97} “Out of this criticism, a “sustainable human development or people-centered model emerged.”\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid, 795
The “sustainable human development” or “people-centered model” approaches mulled over the trust that the aim of development intervention is to positively promote the lives and livelihoods of the people, enhance participation of communities in developing projects, as well as to sustain a strong and “equal partnership between the developing countries and aid donors.”

The new model foresees a “consensual partnership between international organizations, donors, recipient governments, and civil society organizations”. This model was of a great importance and had influence over post-conflict “environments in Latin America and Southeast Asia.”

This trend was strongly reflected in the rise of social funds provided by international donors to locals or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the sake of implementing development projects aimed at improving the communities. Economic liberalization and the consequent appearance of grassroots development “provided complementary interventions but ones which worked at cross purposes and which were implemented by culturally incompatible institutions.”

A more unified modality was needed to meet “the challenges” of developing conflict ridden-countries in the face of emerging tensions related to the ending the Cold War, and the onset of a succession of new armed clashes. Thus a new phase emerged.

“Post-cold war challenges to sovereignty”

“The failure of polarizing cold war tensions led to the outbreak of a series of conflicts. As external support was cut, state power weakened in many countries and calls for autonomy and

99 Ibid
100 Ibid
self-determination proliferated.”⁷⁴ Thirty two internecine wars broke out in the 1990s. On a worldwide level, fifty six armed conflicts came to an end between 1989 and 2000. ⁷⁵ Consequently, what once was the communist bloc was now beginning to disintegrate and new countries were being formed. Post-conflict interventions began to increase in number and scope as new notions of state began to emerge. Newly-formed states with ethnically diverse populations like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, were perceived as “unworthy of the sovereignty with which the Westphalian system had endowed them” ⁷⁶ since they were unable to contain ethnic violence and genocide within their borders. This is viewed in “the rise of international administrations within war-torn countries and in the controversial intervention in Kosovo in 1999.”⁷⁷ The “grassroots backlash to economic liberalization withered and humanitarian as well as strategically-oriented actors united around an interventionist impulse.” ⁷⁸ It was in this period that post-conflict recovery activities gained momentum. International actors with peacekeeping forces began what would be called the “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)” of ex-opponents. ⁷⁹ “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” was also introduced in this period as one of the “core activities in post-conflict contexts.” ⁸⁰

Non Governmental Organizations however still controlled most post-conflict activities, and according to “the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)” records, “the

⁷⁴ Ibid
⁷⁶ Ibid
⁷⁷ Ibid
⁷⁹ Ibid
number of international NGOs” grew by 123% from 1990 to 2000.‖

“The number of multi-strata NGOs with global operations increased from 36 to 120 in that same period.‖ These organizations launched a series of interventions aimed at enhancing peace-building and crisis prevention, as well as ensuring social equity. “Justice reform” as a concept began to grow with the understanding “that the root causes of conflict rested in the legacy of past injustices.”

Interferences with economic aspects persisted to concentrate on “liberalization, and privatization” but they also expanded to include “livelihood activities and governance strengthening.”

Although programs “were frequently conducted in the name of peace, equitable development, and justice the rising number of NGOs, the expansion of their mandates and their financing by international institutions meant that recipient states were commonly relegated to observer status in much of their countries’ recovery.”

The question of “good governance” rose in prominence regardless of the lessening role undertaken “by recipient states.” It became obvious that the “previously-assumed link between structural adjustment, increased social spending, liberal democracy and good governance had lost much of its credibility.” Some scholars such as Adrian Leftwich, raised the issue of the “relationship between democratization and economic growth”, and claimed that “nonconsensual and non-democratic measures may often be essential in the early stages of developmental sequences in laying the foundations for growth—and also sustainable democracy in the long

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111 Ibid
113 Ibid
114 Ibid
115 Ibid
116 Ibid
117 Ibid
118 Ibid
Three other scholars, John Brohman, Reginald Herbold, and Ismail Ahmed not only doubted “democratic approaches” but also believed that “the solution in the empowerment of pre-conflict traditional models of governance, participatory or not, which would have greater local validity than imported Western models.” As often happens with foremost model changes a new era or phase of post-conflict recovery was ushered in based on the many questions about the model that had been used in the late 1980’s and the 1990’s.

“Humble consociationalism”

In the late 1990s, the final phase rises, and has since become a primarily academic ideal following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Interventions now needed to show appropriate concern and view the imposing of fundamental modernization plans “regarding gender, social equity, hierarchies, governance, and economics” with skepticism. Operating with “what already exists and within the limits of established institutional arrangements was seen as most important, particularly in relation to governance and the state.” Major socio-economic and political transformations became regarded as a “multi-generational process for which recovery can merely plant the seeds.” This phase is all about emphasizing “consociationalism or collaborative governance that involves the recipient state and local civil society” in the first

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121 Barakat and Zyck, “The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery,” 1075
122 Ibid.
place, and the international community second. This meant that “rather than participatory rapid appraisals (PRAs) which invite individuals from conflict-affected countries to engage in foreign-led processes, the international post-conflict recovery establishment ought to be requesting permission to support a locally-owned process: ultimate authority ought to rest with local actors within communities, local NGOs, and all layers of the public sector.” This phase’s standards materialized in the form of additional “post-conflict reconstruction trust funds.”

Many institutions also strove to “centralize external assistance” to give the recipient state a certain amount of flexibility in determining how the funds would be managed regardless of the specific donor conditions. “Trust funds have been subject to flawed implementation as have many of this phase’s concepts and recommendations: with short-term deadlines, heavily tied contributions, and more donor than recipient involvement.”

Afghanistan, where the warnings of various scholars went unheeded, proved to be the case where a rising insurgency hampered the initial successes. In 2002, the “Third World Quarterly” issued a review on Afghanistan’s rehabilitation and recovery. A paper by Sultan Barakat highlighted potential harms that could rise from similar plans which are "running ahead of Afghan preparedness and pre-empting the process of national negotiation and decision making.”

Other authors further highlighted the constituent elements of this modest approach to Afghanistan’s recovery which include: utilizing “a learning-process approach”, to allow new

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126 Ibid
127 Ibid
128 Ibid
129 Ibid
130 Ibid
“home-grown” models of governance to develop rather than imposing Western models, and to allow Afghan women to set their own definition and pace for social change.”

By ignoring the lessons learned from previous experiences that tried to force an “externally defined recovery agenda” the security situation quickly turned to the worse. After 2002, “the number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks rose by nearly 6000%, annual international military fatalities more than tripled as well.”

The eradication of poppy, the main source of income for rural farmers, made the process deteriorate even more. Adding to that civilian deaths caused by counter insurgency tactics and problems beginning to solidify as a result of wider inclination in post-war reconstruction that took place in the former eight years, mainly following the September 11 attacks.

The approach toward carrying out post-war reconstruction at, and not after conflicts, has been a very significant shift that has an effect on the occurrence and the types of interventions. “The evolving nature of peace agreements, which have involved only some relevant stakeholders, has resulted in the generation of extended insurgencies rather than the sort of smaller-scale spoiler violence seen at the tail end of conflicts in the 1990s.” By beginning to implement activities that are usually associated with post-conflict recover at an earlier stage of the conflict, or before the conflict is resolved, what was meant to be ‘humanitarian’ assistance started to feel the conflict as part of its political economy. Some scholars argue that whereas the first start of recovery activities was noted to provide a “peace dividend” and “demonstrate the

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132 Ibid
benefits of maintained stability, the targeting of initial assistance towards the most violent areas has produced perverse incentives.”\textsuperscript{136} These perverse incentives manifested in the continuation of violence in recovery areas, as well as spread of violence to relatively “peaceful regions (in places such as Afghanistan) to permit and attract insurgent activity, in hopes of maximizing access to resources.”\textsuperscript{137}

“This development represents perhaps the most troubling evolution in post-conflict recovery if, indeed, it may be termed as such, rather than being more appropriately labeled mid-conflict stabilization.”\textsuperscript{138} No in depth reviews have yet been conducted on the results and implications of having “humanitarian” aid actors in the midst of an ongoing conflict. The safety of aid workers in these situations, as well as “the challenges of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are predominant in the literature.”\textsuperscript{139} The military has been assuming most responsibilities whenever ‘reconstruction assistance’ is placed in highly volatile situations, “particularly through the sorts of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) established first in Afghanistan and shortly thereafter in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{140}

The PRT model’s effectiveness has been criticized in the literature as well “and examples of inappropriate interventions (schools built in inappropriate locations and without the benefit of teachers) have proliferated.”\textsuperscript{141} Thus, the military has become yet another player in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 1078-1079
\textsuperscript{141} Barbara Stapleton, “The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?,” (paper prepared for the symposium “State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, Bonn, Germany, May 30 and June 1, 2003).
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid
\end{flushleft}
“Private security companies (PSCs)” and “private military companies (PMCs)” started to take on a major role in post-conflict recovery after 2001. These mostly Western enterprises were a principal supplement to the international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs even engaged in dynamic operations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas, they provided training to newly-formed police and military forces. While reviewing the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq, one should notice the strong role of private companies played in this particular phase, as well as the alongside engagement of many non-governmental organizations in the planning period before the intervention in post-war Iraq. The process of developing strategies for post-war steady-fasting reconstruction and recovery proved to be a distinctive and debatable timing. “It has been fraught with concerns that pre-war planning and the provision of a deluge of humanitarian assistance following conflict may lead to the perceived sanitization of warfare (and, hence, the development of a constituency in Western countries which views conflict as at least a partially humanitarian activity).” The failures of this process however, are equally important; reviews of studies have revealed this failure to result from the failure of inhabitant and military players to coordinate, “the initial unwillingness of the US military to play a role in post-combat peacekeeping or reconstruction operations, the absence of [emergency] planning, and the inability to comprehend the challenges and nuances of post-conflict environments.” Among the different actors participating in the implementation of the post war reconstruction activities are international organizations such as the UNDP, whose work fits into one of the above mentioned post war recovery processes. This international agency aims at initiating

143 Ibid
144 Ibid
145 Ibid
146 MacGinty, “The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq”, 601–617.
148 Ibid
implementations to improve the lives and livelihoods of the people, enhance participation of communities in developing projects, as well as ensure sustainable development, and peace building in the intervened countries, as stated in its general framework and mandate. The international organization seems to mostly endorse the first two theories identified early in this chapter. The “economic liberalization” which calls for improving economic conditions, pursuing economic stability in order to maintain democracy in post conflict areas, the rise of the notion of state sovereignty, and the “emerging of new types of interventions” aiming at enhancing peace building, ensuring good governance, and preventing crisis.\textsuperscript{149} The work of the international organization in general, and the UNDP in specific, is mostly aimed at promoting development, especially in challenging conditions such as wars and disasters. Thus it fits two models mentioned above, especially since the identified aims and objectives in those models correspond to the overall objectives of international organizations, and specifically the UNDP’s mandate. Nevertheless, there are several challenges that result in a post conflict scene: weakened state capacity, destroyed physical, human, and social capital, distorted economic incentives, widespread poverty and massive unemployment. International organizations, namely the UN and its agencies, therefore abide by their policies and aims, and find it crucial to recognize the implications of conflicts, and the necessity to design strategies and programs to provide assistance and intervene in order to provide the proper support for war torn countries, where support is more highly required and essential than in simply poor or undeveloped countries.\textsuperscript{150} The international organizations usually work with “different notions of recovery”; the World Bank for instance, addresses this notion with regards to “the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of society” and “the reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid}
peacetime society, explicitly including governance and rule of law as essential components.”  

The UNDP on the other hand, stresses “capacity development” and further defines recovery as “the process of return from instability and conflict to a normal development trajectory, where a country has reacquired the capability to make and implement economic policy as part of a largely self-sustaining process of economic governance.”

In this paper, we will strictly recognize the UNDP’s role in post conflict recovery; more precisely, the following chapters will approach the agency’s intervention in Lebanon specifically in Beirut Southern Suburbs following the July 2006 war.

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151 Ibid
152 Ibid, 4
CHAPTER THREE

THE CHALLENGES CREATED BY THE JULY 2006 WAR

Introduction

“Pre-conflict” or “pre-disaster planning” for post-conflict conditions though has a huge potential to facilitate better “humanitarian responses”, it can guide to “the adoption of boilerplate interventions which are unable to account for specific effects of an individual crisis.”\(^{153}\) “As a result of the topic's rising visibility and because of the concentration of some of the world’s most protracted conflicts in the Middle East and broader Muslim world new donor countries have emerged to great effect.”\(^{154}\)

“These donors have the potential to increase, or at least maintain, global recovery and development spending in the face of declining contributions from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries.”\(^{155}\)

After the July 2006 Lebanon war Saudi Arabia infused $600 million USD into the country, and following the war on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009, it also pledged an additional $1 billion, half of the total amount needed for the rehabilitation phase.\(^{156}\) “Such figures are all the more startling considering that Saudi Arabia’s official, bilateral development spending amounted to only $58.1 million in 2003.”\(^{157}\) The period of 2003 till 2007,” the total annual non-DAC donor

\(^{153}\) Ibid
\(^{154}\) Ibid
\(^{156}\) Interview with a senior figure at the Council of Development and Reconstruction on September 10, 2010, and information concerning Saudi contributions to the reconstruction of Gaza is from: BBC UK, retrieved 19 January 2010http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7918105.stm,
contributions to Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iraq, increased from $108 million to $547 million, with China and India beginning to play major roles.\textsuperscript{158}

Gulf State donors (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait) not only infused considerable financial resources into the area, but they also did so with a high degree of cultural and, in particular cases, religious contextual familiarity.\textsuperscript{159} “These donors however still have to integrate themselves with multilateral bodies and NGOs which they have shunned in favor of more visible bilateral contributions and non-traditional donors’ approaches, such as cash transfers for owner-driven housing reconstruction in southern Lebanon, [that brings] the sort of simplicity, [limited] conditionality, and low delivery costs which many traditional international actors abandoned long ago.”\textsuperscript{160}

Many scholars have argued that post war interventions in Lebanon were dictated by a combination of ambitions, concerns, interests and objectives. There was also concern about what was behind the so-called proclaimed objectives, which aspiring to recover and rehabilitate the country and the livelihoods of the communities, and whether their main purpose was indeed a continual interests, or a specific hidden political agenda for each and every post-war intervention actor.

This chapter will attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the various interventions undertaken by the various actors in Beirut Southern Suburbs in the period post the July 2006 war, with an overview of major donors and financing mechanism. In the following chapter we will specifically illustrate the United Nations Development Program’s intervention in the area,

\textsuperscript{158}“DAC Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS),” retrieved 14 September 2010, \texttt{http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/}.

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid

by finally assessing the implications of those initiatives and by providing an examination of the overall objectives and projects implemented by the agency in the area.

July 2006 war on Lebanon: Impacts and results

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched a rocket attack on Israel which resulted in the killing of eight Israelis and the kidnapping of two.\footnote{“Israel and Hezbollah war,” retrieved on December 22, 2010, \url{www.brookings.edu/.../2007islamforum_israel%20hezb%20war.pdf}.} Israel responded by attacking Hezbollah sites and areas with the majority of Shiites residents. The 33-day Israeli war on the country in summer 2006 resulted in severe harm to private and public infrastructure, transportation networks, schools, hospitals, housing, businesses and trade. It further aggravated the already existing poverty and created “below standards” socio economic conditions due to destruction, loss of lives, and as importantly loss of livelihoods in different areas of Lebanon. The hostilities lead to the destruction and damage of 125,000 housing units, 612 public schools, 80 private schools, 97 bridges and several hospitals.\footnote{“UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War Report,” retrieved September 10, 2010, \url{www.undp.org.lb/PROFORMA.pdf}.} The human toll was overwhelming: Over 1,200 Lebanese were killed, one-third of them children, and more than 5,000 were wounded, and hundreds of whom were left with permanent disabilities, while more than 1000 people were internally displaced.\footnote{Ibid.} An estimated 100,000 people, mainly youths, emigrated. The July 2006 destruction estimated at 4 billion USD, with an additional 6 billion USD in indirect costs.\footnote{Roger MacGinty, “Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: A Challenge to the Liberal Peace?,” \textit{Conflict, Security & Development} 7(2007): 459–461.} The war affected the overall living standards, especially in the marginalized areas in Lebanon. The regions that were most directly and indirectly affected by the
war are the same as those that have historically witnessed the highest poverty rate in the country: namely South Lebanon, the Beirut Southern Suburbs and the Bekaa. The indirect effect of the war on the economy also exacerbated the conditions of extreme poverty in those regions. The cost of reconstruction was estimated by the government to be in the order of $2.8 billion USD.\textsuperscript{165}

The attack on Lebanon lead to a direct and harsh impact in the socio-economic conditions and almost affected all the sectors; a sharp slowdown marked the economy and worsened further following the war.

The July 2006 war had also severely affected the environment. The attack on “Jiyyeh power plant” created an environmental disaster with short and longer-term consequences on the lives and livelihoods in various sectors of the economy. 15,000 tons of oil spilled into the sea and along the coast. 20,000 tons of burning fuel over a period of 20 days rendered the atmosphere toxic.\textsuperscript{166} In 2006 Lebanon’s ranking in the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) dropped from 36 (out of 133 countries) to 90, according to the updated indices for 2008 and 2010.\textsuperscript{167} The World Bank validated this fact through undertaking environmental degradation repair work following the July 2006 hostilities. The destruction of buildings and other concrete structures produced nearly 3 million cubic meters of rubble and other demolition waste.\textsuperscript{168}

“The unexploded ordinance (UXO), particularly cluster munitions”, caused a barrier to the return of displaced citizens and to the rehabilitation process. “The United Nations estimated 4 million cluster bombs were dropped” in South Lebanon, the bulk of them after the Security Council had


\textsuperscript{167}Interview with the UNDP-Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Project on Impact of July 2006 war on MDGs progress in Lebanon

adopted a resolution on August 11 stipulating that the end of hostilities will take effect on August 14.\textsuperscript{169}

The Impact on Beirut Southern Suburbs:

Beirut Southern Suburbs is a densely populated area with an estimated resident population of 800,000.\textsuperscript{170} The population, predominantly Shiite, originates mainly from the Bekaa and South of Lebanon from which they were forced to migrate due to the Israeli occupation of the South from 1978 to 2000.\textsuperscript{171} The inadequate urban planning and the rapid expansion of the Beirut Southern Suburbs left its resident population in dismal socio-economic conditions. Moreover, the summer war deteriorated the livelihoods of the population mainly in terms of unemployment, student dropout rates, and consequently the outbreak of social problems. The 2006 summer war resulted in major losses and claimed many lives in addition to the extensive damage to the physical and socio-economic infrastructure. This disrupted the local governance’s capacity to deliver social and economic services. Severe structural and infrastructure damage in Beirut Southern Suburbs affected the transportation networks, schools, hospitals, housing, small and medium enterprises, and some large businesses. The hostilities totally destroyed 250 buildings in Beirut Southern Suburbs: 220 in Haret Hreik, 16 in Chiah, 12 in Borj Al, Barajneh, and 2 in Ghobeiri. Haret Hreik was one of the areas hardest hit in the 2006 war, with more than 75\% of the destruction of the Beirut Southern Suburbs in the area.\textsuperscript{172} 5,000 housing units were totally ruined; including 4000 in Haret Hreik. More than 8,000 housing units were damaged beyond repair, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Interview with the Deputy Mayor of Union of municipalities in Beirut Southern Suburbs, October 22, 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
more than 8,000 housing units were partially damaged in Beirut Southern Suburbs.\textsuperscript{173} An estimate of 40,000 persons were displaced from this area, and four bridges (3 in Haret Hreik, 1 in Ghobeiry), and roads were totally destroyed or damaged beyond repair.\textsuperscript{174} The destruction and hostilities in Beirut Southern Suburbs caused large amounts of rubble and debris to block road access to houses and small and medium enterprises. It also leads to the loss of employment throughout the whole area due to the destruction of around 2,500 Small and Medium Enterprises. The highest percentage of affected livelihoods was perceived to have happened in Haret Hreik.\textsuperscript{175}

The Israeli aggression also significantly affected the livelihood of fishermen in Lebanon particularly those at the port in Ouzai, where an entire fleet of 300 fishing boats was destroyed and fish nets and other equipment of more than 250 fishermen were irreparably damaged.\textsuperscript{176}

The conflict and subsequent reconstruction process has reshaped the socio-economic context of Beirut Southern Suburbs. The most reliable statistics concerning the area comes from the United Nations Development Program, who conducted in close partnership with CAS (Central Administration for Statistics) and ILO (International Labor Organization), a post-war living conditions assessment showing the following findings for the Beirut Southern Suburbs:

\textbf{Table 3.1: Post War Living Conditions Assessment}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Beirut Southern Suburbs</th>
<th>Other areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families living in 1 Room only</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>14.7% Lebanon as a whole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid
\textsuperscript{175} United Nations Development Program, “Impact of War on SMEs” (paper submitted to UNDP, Lebanon, October 2007).
\textsuperscript{176} Interview with the Head of Cooperative of Fishermen in Ouzai Port Taleb Harake, 16 October 2007.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Location/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those seeking immigration</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14% in BSS in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries of health insurance</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>64.1% in Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on artesian wells as primary water source</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3.2% in the South (the least affected areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment of Youth (age range: 15-19) in schools</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>82.2% in Mt. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11.6% in Mt. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working power (age 15+)</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>32.7% (female: 42.4% and male: 29.5%) in Mt. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 7.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male: 12.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in Public sector</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26.9% in Mt. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in the family</td>
<td></td>
<td>Two thirds of the total number of children of Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reconstruction challenges:**

Lebanon’s intricate political situation posed a crucial reconstruction challenge: mainly in the absence of public trust in the government, namely among the Shiites. “This had implications for joined up thinking in postwar reconstruction, and the ability of short-term reconstruction to fit into longer-term development plans.”\(^{177}\)

Additionally, many international players were not seen as “politically” impartial, creating more challenges to their efforts; many adversaries of the Lebanese authority, for example, viewed the

\(^{177}\) McGinty, Reconstructing post-war Lebanon,” 461-462.
United Nations as a fervent body or agency. This was mainly due to their opposition to the UN investigation into the killing of ex-premier Rafic Hariri, an investigation that was viewed as having political implications and motivations. “Some also regarded the UNIFIL as acting as a proxy security force for Israel and resented those parts of Resolution 1701 which would curtail Hezbollah’s activities.” Some INGOs and NGOs were also viewed as “partisan, or in receipt of resources from tainted sources” such as the case of USAID. The complications arose from perceptions that the reconstruction actors are not impartial, and “extended to the ability of some INGOs to work with Hezbollah.” “While Lebanon was relatively fortunate in that many NGOs and international reconstruction actors were already present, or arrived very shortly after the hostilities ceased, this multiplicity of reconstruction actors constituted a coordination [nuisance and lead to a duplication of work in many cases]. There were also concerns associated with the lack of local knowledge held by some INGO representatives.”

One final yet very important reconstruction challenge, and arguably opportunity, was the existing state of underdevelopment in Lebanon. The existing state presented a reconstruction opportunity in that reconstruction endeavors could have a larger impact since they were starting from a low threshold and would tentatively be able to incorporate the unimplemented existing development plans. The difficulty lay in needs assessment, since the lines between the required aid for post war reconstruction and the pre-existing damage from previous conflicts, underdevelopment, or standard neglect were often blurred. “This confused strata of Destruction from multiple conflicts and a normal underdevelopment hampered the prioritization of reconstruction efforts. There was

178 Ibid
179 Ibid
180 Ibid
181 Ibid
182 Interview with head of Depute Mayor in Haret Hreik Municipality on 13 October 2007.
also a confused strata of construction and reconstruction in that much of the building work on-going in southern Lebanon (for example, the construction of large houses by members of the Diaspora) had been planned before the war and could be classed as construction rather than reconstruction.”

Reconstruction opportunities

Beside the former challenges discussed, some opportunities can be highlighted. Lebanon’s experience regarding reconstruction is not recent. Due to previous internal clashes (the Lebanese civil war) and previous violent conflicts, particularly Israelis invasions and occupation of Lebanese territories, people were to a certain extent familiar with reconstruction challenges. The series of the abovementioned major conflicts have not only shaken the country, but have also increased the human, economic and infrastructure vulnerability. As such, a reconstruction process provided an opportunity to strengthen the country’s infrastructure as well as its institutional arrangements. Second, The United Nations has been active in the country as of 1978. Third, Lebanon boasts a “strong civil society and thus possessed many of the coping mechanisms and elements of social capital required for reconstruction.” This meant that “relief assistance could be accelerated and international and local actors could concentrate on longer-term reconstruction and development.” Finally, Lebanon benefits from a strong Diaspora (estimated at 18 million) which to a certain extent supports the local economy.

186 Ibid
Reconstruction players in the reconstruction process

In response to the war, many actors from within Lebanon, the region, and the international community intervened to provide support and rehabilitation to the affected areas and communities, including Beirut Southern Suburbs. However, the diversity of reconstruction players implies emergence of potential competition problems, and duplication as well as can lead to absence of proper communication amongst the diverse actors.188

The principal actors in the reconstruction process in Lebanon in July 2006 included several actors who were invited to provide support to the reconstruction phase, in addition to the Lebanese government was responsible for dealing with the consequences of the war. These players included state donors from the west, many state donors from the Arab World, and international organizations such as the UNDP, in addition to international and local NGOs.

On August 14, 2006, after the acceptance of resolution 1701 and the end of hostilities, the “Reconstruction and Recovery Cell”, that was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister sustained by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), went into operation and set out to prioritize requirements for early recovery in preparation for an international donor conference which Sweden’s Prime Minister had offered to convene in Stockholm on August 31, 2006.189

The Government of Lebanon immediately responded with a number of measures, including the

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provision of relief supplies from existing government stocks, organizing the humanitarian effort, and engaging the international community to provide support. \(^{190}\)

In August 2006 and immediately after the fighting ended, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in a televised appearance pledged that “his organization would help to rebuild homes and compensate those whose homes had been destroyed”. \(^{191}\) “A week after Nasrallah’s pledge to compensate war victims, the United States President George W. Bush announced that the US would provide 230 million USD in reconstruction assistance.” \(^{192}\)

Two important roles were undertaken by in the “international community” including western states, international organizations and ‘financial institutions’ in the post-war recovery phase: the first role was backing the Lebanese government financially and politically and secondly, the international community provided “security guarantees to allow reconstruction to proceed, through the United Nations and other international organizations.” \(^{193}\)

On August 31, 2006, and due to the challenges facing the Lebanese state to handle the reconstruction process, the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery allocates 900 million USD in “reconstruction pledges from EU members, Arab countries, and Japan”, bringing the total amount of funds allocated towards the rebuilding of Lebanon to $1.2 billion USD. \(^{194}\)

The largest donors were Qatar contributing with more than “more than 33%, the Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development with around 13%, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 6.7%,


\(^{193}\)Ibid


\(^{194}\)“Impact Of The July Offensive On The Public Finances In 2006,” (brief preliminary report prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Beirut, Lebanon, August 30, 2006).
while the European Commission (EC)’s contributions—European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and non-ECHO—represented 10% and those of the US approximately six per cent of the total.”\textsuperscript{195} Few months later, in January 2007, another conference, Paris III, was also held to support the Lebanese state, pledging as such around $6.7 billion for the purpose of undertaking administrative and economic reforms, as well as managing the public debt.\textsuperscript{196} However, the immediate intervention, following the cessation of hostilities, in terms of reconstruction the affected areas was undertaken by Jihad Al Binaa, Hizbullah’s reconstruction unit.\textsuperscript{197}

It is worth noting that as soon as the hostilities ended in August 2007, the existing internal political division between the two blocs 14 March and 8 March, were escalated, leading to more political and sectarian fractions.\textsuperscript{198} This division was clearly reflected in the battle between the government (and its 14 March camp supporters) and Hizbullah (and its 8 March supporters) over reconstructing the affected areas, and specifically over the housing sector compensation mechanism. In this regards, the state mechanism for assessment and compensation was established by the Prime Minister’s office. “It involved damage assessments by the Council of the South or the Ministry of the Displaced, auditing of these assessments by Khatib & Alami, and distribution of compensation money.”\textsuperscript{199} However, the delay in disbursing the first payment of compensation to inhabitants provoked criticism. For instance, As- Safir, a local Lebanese pro-8 March newspaper, published an article

\textsuperscript{195}Ibid
\textsuperscript{197}Ibid
\textsuperscript{198}Ibid
\textsuperscript{199}Ibid
in February 4, 2008 highlighting on the delay and the complaints arising where Hizbullah’s representative Hassan Fadlallah “accused the government of spending $10 million of the funds initially allocated to the reconstruction of housing units on infrastructure projects in other regions (including $40 million for the Arab highway in the Bekaa valley).”

Moreover, Waad’s director, Hassan Jachi, “declared that only 50% of the beneficiaries have received the first installment, and accuses the government of deliberately delaying payment in view of creating tensions between the inhabitants and Hezbollah. Such claims were denied by the government.”

However, disputes were intensified over the reimbursement of the second installment. Following the announcement of HRC’s Secretary General, General Yahya Raad, regarding “the difficulty of providing payment for the second phase, a controversy arose regarding the usage of the grants allocated to housing.” “The government denies this, and defended itself by a (relatively late) publication of the latest numbers regarding the use of funds.”

More of the disputes arose over the pace of construction in South Lebanon, where the process has also been slow in the area, partially because of delays in payments to beneficiaries.

In the months and years following the July 2006 war, an emerging presence of non-Western actors evolved into “the non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)”, where countries such as Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia emerged as important actors in the country’s rehabilitation process.

Post-conflict actors support was channeled to Lebanon, including Beirut Southern Suburbs, for two main purposes: 1) “compensation payments for damaged private housing”, 2) “implementing...
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, such as repairing damaged infrastructure”, as well as providing support to local authorities, namely municipalities and local affected communities.\(^{206}\) Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar provided funds to the two facets. “Donors could sponsor a project directly (such as the reconstruction of a bridge), lodge a payment with the government’s account in the Central Bank of Lebanon, and/or provide in-kind contributions (such as, replacement of equipment for schools).”\(^{207}\) Most noteworthy was that different donors followed different methods which resulted in an intricate donor environment.

Most of the non-western donors such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates signed protocols with the Lebanese government, and opted for either “opening accounts at the Lebanese Central Bank or routing funds through the Higher Relief Commission (HRC), located in the prime minister’s office.”\(^{208}\) Iran, who has direct ties to Hezbollah, sidestepped the government and set up the Iranian Contributory Organization for Reconstructing Lebanon (ICORL) and “worked through the municipalities, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and the relevant ministries.”\(^{209}\)

The funds from the Gulf States and Iran to Beirut Southern Suburbs aimed at supporting and rehabilitating the damages in terms of infrastructure, rehabilitation of public schools, ports, namely Ouzai Port, and provision of support to municipalities.

The overall aim of the Kuwaiti pledges for Beirut Southern Suburbs was to not only assist in rehabilitating the damaged areas, but also to assist in nationwide development.\(^{210}\)

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\(^{208}\)Ibid

\(^{209}\)Interview with a senior representative of the Jihad Al Binaa Organization, 6 February 2008

\(^{210}\)Interview with a senior-level figure at Kuwaiti Funds
After the August 2006 ceasefire, Iran stated its willingness to provide support to all destroyed and affected regions with no limited ceiling for funding. It seems to have carried through with its promises, since senior figures at local municipalities in the area of the Beirut Southern Suburbs estimate a hefty amount. It is worth noting that even as Iran was granted an enormous reconstruction presence, no spoken statement was ever stated on the total pledges provided to the country.

The United Arab Emirates has also been an actor by adopting 20 schools in Beirut Southern suburbs, and funding the rehabilitation of the Ouzai Port.  

Finally, Jihad al Binaa (JaB), a privately funded NGO linked to Hezbollah, provided a range of assistance primarily in southern Lebanon but did engage in some direct reconstruction activities in Beirut Southern Suburbs, where it primarily focused on public infrastructure. Waad is Jihad al Binaa’s project to reconstruct Southern Beirut. This project extends over 0.4 square kilometers and its value is estimated at USD 370 million. It is financed both by the money allocated by the state to the inhabitants and by Hezbollah. The project aimed to rebuild damaged homes, businesses, and public buildings. In addition, the project reorganized traffic to make the area more accessible to pedestrians, to improve traffic flow, and to allow for green spaces. However, there have been complaints about slow construction, which sparked debates between Jihad al Binaa and the government. Hassan Jachi, the director of Jihad al Binaa, asserted that the

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211 Interview with the Head of Cooperative of fishermen in Ouzai Port and head of jihad al Binaa NGO in Beirut Southern Suburbs
212 Khalil Gebara, & Gaelle Kibranian, “Corruption, state building, and Communal strife: the role of Non-states actors in Lebanon.”
213 Ibid
214 Ibid
215 Ibid
problems are not related to Waad, and accused the government of delaying payments in order to create problems between Hezbollah and the inhabitants.\(^\text{216}\)

In contrast to the Arab donors, western donors were more concerned with governance and livelihoods programs. The UNDP is a major body for governance & livelihoods support in Lebanon, the European Commission however is also one the major funding agency and supportive of UNDP’s governance initiatives. “UNDP outsources much governance activity to NGOs.”\(^\text{217}\) It is important to note that in following the summer war, “European donors either maintained their pre-existing governance programs or engaged in only small-scale reconstruction assistance.”\(^\text{218}\)

“The international community was more directly involved in Lebanon’s reconstruction through the United Nations and its agencies. While the UN military forces had minimal reconstruction funds allowing for a limited number of quick impact projects, their main contribution was to provide a secure environment in [the whole country] which other UN agencies—notably UNDP and UNICEF—could partake in hands-on reconstruction. UNDP provided vital coordination functions—especially in the initial relief phase of post-war interventions, while UNICEF was particularly involved in repairing damaged water and sewerage infrastructure.”\(^\text{219}\)

Among the United Nations agencies, funds, and programs in Beirut Southern Suburbs we can list WHO, UNFPA and UNHCR, WFP who responded immediately by reorienting their program priorities in light of the unfolding humanitarian crisis, and in anticipation of the recovery needs that to be met after the conflict in the damaged areas, including Beirut Southern Suburbs.

\(^{216}\) Ibid
\(^{217}\) McGinty, “Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon,” 466.
\(^{218}\) Interview with the deputy mayor of Haret Hreik municipality, Beirut southern suburbs, 2 February 2008
\(^{219}\) McGinty, “Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon,” 466.
Although UNDP is not a humanitarian relief organization, it was able to respond immediately to the unfolding humanitarian crisis because of the structure of its presence in Lebanon: with three sub-offices in the South, Mount Lebanon and the North and its main office in Beirut Southern Suburbs, as well as its ongoing “partnerships with government and local communities” in development programs and projects, and the stock of its earlier experience in the period prior to and following the Taef Agreement. 220

The United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) was among the international organizations that were also involved in shelter, though not housing compensation, in Lebanon and particularly Beirut Southern Lebanon. UN-HABITAT implemented projects in most affected areas that helped thousands recover from the 2006 war. In Beirut Southern Suburbs area, UN-HABITAT initiated an intervention financed by the “European Union humanitarian aid department (ECHO)”, costing approximately 700,000 Euros, in Hey El Soulloum. 221 The UN agency teamed up with the Municipality of Choueifat, the Social Affairs Ministry and the local neighborhood committees and took on the rehabilitation of building and communal infrastructure in the above mentioned area 222. The Paris-based INGO, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), was involved in implementing the above mentioned program. 223

A number of NGOs (around 20) also conducted livelihoods support in the area (e.g. Mercy Corps, International Relief and Development, the Italian NGO ROSS, Handicap International, etc…). 224 NGO initiatives included interventions on small cash-grants to business, support to

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222 Ibid
223 Ibid
224 Field assessment undertaken by UNDP-Beirut Southern Suburbs Office in October 2007.
women, income generation activities and support to public works.\textsuperscript{225} INGOs’ role in Lebanon was important, specifically in Beirut southern suburbs’ immediate post-war relief. “The advantage of this was the professionalism, and the technical and logistical” proficiency aimed at meeting local needs and avoided duplication of some projects due to lack of coordination among the different actors on the field.\textsuperscript{226}

The following Chapter will widely elaborate on the UNDP’s intervention in Beirut Southern Suburbs post the July 2006 war, and more precisely it will focus on the major interventions undertaken by UNDP and the International donors which funded those initiatives.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid

\textsuperscript{226} Interview with Deputy Mayor of Haret Hreik on 13 October, 2007.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNDP IN LEBANON

Introduction

UNDP is the “United Nations' global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life.”227 In 1965, the UNDP was established “to combine the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance” and the “United Nations Special Fund”.228 In 1971, through the implementation of the general assembly resolution 2029 (XX), “the two organizations were fully combined into the UNDP.”229 The UNDP is active in 166 countries, providing support “on global and national development challenges”, as well developing local capacity.230 The UNDP is “an executive board within the United Nations General Assembly, and its administrator is the third highest ranking official of the United Nations after the United Nations Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General.”231 Furthermore, it promotes the protection of human rights and gender equity and women empowerment.232 The UNDP mission is to provide support to countries in order to maintain human development. Under this framework, “all the UNDP policy advice, technical support, advocacy, and contributions to strengthening coherence in global

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229 Ibid
232 Ibid
development finance are aimed at improving the lives and livelihoods, and “in the choices and opportunities open to them.”

As stated in the “Strategic Plan for UNDP 2008-2011, Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development”, and as approved by the “Member States of UNDP's Executive Board in 2007” on four major areas:

1) “Democratic Governance” the UNDP provides the proper policy advice and technical support in order to support and enhance good governance and democracy, building capacities of institutions and individuals, and providing support to local authorities in terms of improving its capacities for better service delivery “especially to women and the poor, as well as to ensure their voices are included in political decision-making.”

Moreover, the UNDP “supports existing democratic institutions by increasing dialogue, enhancing national debate, and facilitating consensus on national governance programs.”

2) “Poverty Reduction and Support for the MDGs” where the UNDP assists countries in developing strategies to better combat and reduce poverty, through enhancing income generation and opportunities, “linking poverty programs with each county’s larger goals and policies, and ensuring a greater voice for the poor”. The UNDP’s work includes implementing “pilot” development initiatives, promoting women’s role in this field.

For instance, the “UNDP International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)”, has

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234 Ibid
236 Ibid
succeeded in Brasilia, Brazil to expand “the capacities of developing countries to design
implement and evaluate socially inclusive development projects.”

3) “Environment and Sustainable Development “ aiming at addressing environmental issues
in order to build the developing countries’ abilities to endorse a sustainable human
development strategies aiming at reducing poverty.” The UNDP’s aim is to enhance
the countries’ capacities in order to better “address the global environmental issues by
providing innovative policy advice and linking partners through environmentally
sensitive development projects that help poor people build sustainable livelihoods.”

The UNDP’s strategy regarding the environment stresses on “effective water governance
including access to water supply and sanitation, access to sustainable energy services,
sustainable land management to combat desertification and land degradation,
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and policies to control emissions of
harmful pollutants and ozone-depleting substances.”

4) “Crisis Prevention and Recovery” the UNDP’s aim is “to reduce the risk of armed
conflicts or disasters, and promotes early recovery after crises have occurred.” The
UNDP’s country offices is present to provide the needed “support to local government in
needs assessment, capacity development”, coordinated planning, and policy and standard
setting. Examples of the UNDP risk reduction programs include efforts to control
small arms proliferation, and programs to encourage peace-building and prevent

undp.org/pages/newsite/menu/about/introduction.jsp?active=0.
241 Ibid
242 Ibid
243 Ibid
244 Ibid
violence.\textsuperscript{245} Recovery programs include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, demining efforts, programs to reintegrate displaced persons, restoration of basic services, and transitional justice systems for countries recovering from warfare.\textsuperscript{246}

The UNDP works within these areas and provides support to program countries by assisting them in monitoring, designing, planning and implementing strategies for “poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development.”\textsuperscript{247}

The UNDP furthermore encourages “gender equality and women's empowerment”, through implementing programs aiming at enhancing the capacities of the countries in developing strategies while reflecting national circumstances and national objectives to meet development goals.\textsuperscript{248}

Moreover, the UNDP acts as an advisory body and its work also include provision of training, and financial support to developing countries.\textsuperscript{249} Furthermore, the UNDP has maintained since 1990 the publication of the annual “Human Development Report based on the Human Development Index”, “to measure and analyze developmental progress. In addition to a global Report, the UNDP publishes regional, national, and local Human Development Reports.”\textsuperscript{250} The

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{250}Ibid
\end{flushright}
UNDP mobilized all “global and national efforts to achieve the goals and national development priorities” set up by hosted countries. 251

**UNDP in Lebanon**

In 1982, the Lebanese government officially requested assistance from the UNDP to support the Lebanese authority in formulating and implementing development initiatives in the country. Accordingly, the two parties signed an agreement, known as “the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA)”, which articulates the mandate and objectives of the UNDP mission in Lebanon, and the responsibility of the Lebanese government in this new partnership, in addition to setting the stage for the establishment of UNPD mission in the country. 252 In this context, the new accord authorizes a permanent presence of the UNDP mission in Lebanon under the guidance of a Resident Representative, which was officially accredited to the country and whom main responsibilities to liaise all the activities and programs of the UNDP with the Lebanese Government. The aim of this partnership is to assist and supplement “the national efforts of Lebanon in solving problems relating to economic development, social progress, equity, and better standards of life.” 253 “The SBA was the legal agreement between the Lebanese government and UNDP outlining the general conditions for UNDP cooperation under which all UNDP program activities are carried out.” 254 This treaty endorses the essential circumstances “under which UNDP and its Executing Agencies shall assist the Government in carrying out its

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253 Ibid

254 Ibid
development projects, and under which such UNDP-assisted projects shall be executed."\textsuperscript{255} “It applies to all UNDP assistance and to such project documents or other instruments as the parties may conclude to define the particulars of such assistance.”\textsuperscript{256} “It is an international treaty that prevails over national laws.”\textsuperscript{257} As such and following the period of civil war, the UNDP was closely involved in the identification of national needs and priorities in the country in order to support the attainment of sustainable development goals.

The Resident Representative of the UNDP Lebanon is considered the decision making authority in the country, and this authority “delegates to various levels of management such as the Country Director and Deputy Resident Representative.”\textsuperscript{258} Decisions in the office are undertaken “by various bodies in the UNDP, including the management group which is responsible for setting the direction of the UNDP program priorities, and the Program and Operations Groups focusing on project management and financial and human resources.”\textsuperscript{259} The UNDP in Lebanon has a close partnership with the “Council of Reconstruction and Development (CDR)”, a public body founded in early 1977 “partially to replace the Ministry of Planning”.\textsuperscript{260} The role of the CDR developed to overpass the mere responsibility to reconstruct and develop, to further include activities that tackles socio-economic matters, and “has therefore become the de facto government counterpart of UNDP.”\textsuperscript{261} Projects and programs are undertaken in close collaboration with the CDR, and in coordination with the relevant ministries and departments engaged in the initiatives.

\textsuperscript{255} ibid
\textsuperscript{256} ibid
\textsuperscript{257} ibid
\textsuperscript{258} “UNDP Lebanon”
\textsuperscript{259} ibid
\textsuperscript{261} UNDP Lebanon”.
In regards to the objectives and directions of the UNDP’s work in Lebanon, it is important to note that the country office and the government are not the sole “decision-makers in this regards”; whereas donors play a key role in financing, providing technical support, as well as sustaining the development activities. Program revisions “are held on a six-month basis that brings together the government, the UNDP, and the donors to discuss progress towards development results, also known as Tripartite Review meetings.” Other participants such as NGOs and members of civil society, and stakeholders frequently participated in those meetings.

2006 in particular was a unique year, and witnessed the emergence of significant resources programs for “the early recovery and post-conflict portfolio, thus becoming the largest UNDP program.” This program delivered “significant results in the areas of physical reconstruction and in recovery of livelihoods in 2007, many of its activities were completed in 2008.” The “UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating Global Progress on Human Development”, a guiding document at the corporate local level, was prepared and endorsed for UNDP in 2007. Accordingly, the UNDP country office in Lebanon planned and developed its programs and results under the framework of this guideline, always in line with “the national priorities and needs”.

A backward perspective to UNDP presence in Lebanon

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262 Ibid
263 Ibid
264 Ibid
265 Ibid
268 UNDP Lebanon.”
As previously mentioned, the UNDP has been present in Lebanon since the 1960s. In the face of the civil war’s devastating toll on human lives, the country’s infrastructure, institutions of state, and economic structure and fiscal framework, the 1989 Taef Agreement brought the civil war to an end, marked the beginning of a new era of political stability, and set in motion opportunities for Lebanon’s reconstruction and economic and social recovery, with the exception of the south that was under Israeli occupation until the year 2000. These promising conditions following the Taef Agreement also prompted the initiation of a modality of “strategic partnership between UNDP and government institutions”, adapted to meet the challenges of Lebanon’s emergence from the devastation of the civil war. In 1991, at the request of the Lebanese government, the UNDP established its first Policy Advisory Unit (PAU) co-located in the Ministry of Finance, to regenerate the foundations of public finance and fiscal reforms. The PAU provides advice on needed policy and legislative reforms, and contributes to their formulation. It also implements approved reform measures within the Ministry, strengthens systems and human resource capacities, and engages in the transfer of knowledge and best practices. This partnership modality was soon replicated in several other service ministries and key government offices to accompany national efforts towards a continuous transition from post-civil war reconstruction, reform and recovery to longer-term and sustained development. As previously mentioned, although the UNDP presence in Lebanon assisted the

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269 Ibid
272 Ibid
274 Ibid
275 Ibid
country following the civil war period and focused on local needs; “its activities can be also seen in the regional perspective”, “Program on Governance in the Arab Region” (POGAR).\textsuperscript{276} POGAR is present since 2000 and is “dedicated to the promotion and development of good governance practices in the Arab States.”\textsuperscript{277} A “Sub-Regional Resource Facility for Arab States (SURF-AS)”, also complements this with a goal to assist UNDP country offices and “maximize knowledge sharing across the region.”\textsuperscript{278}

In parallel to its work with government institutions, the UNDP also established regional offices in three regions of the country: the first, in Mount Lebanon, to assist the displaced of the civil war to return to settle in their communities of origin and help create opportunities for them to resume their lives and livelihoods.\textsuperscript{279} The second UNDP regional office was established in the South, to assist in the socio-economic rehabilitation and development of the areas liberated in the year 2000 after 22 years of Israeli occupation. This assistance included capacity support to the National Demining Office and Mine Action, support to former detainees and the war disabled, regenerating economic and employment opportunities, as well as supporting the youth and women to participate directly in the revitalization and development of their communities.\textsuperscript{280} A third UNDP regional office was established in the late 1990’s in the Northern region of Akkar. This was in line with the growing recognition that regional disparities in socio-economic indicators, particularly poverty indicators, were largely concentrated in the peripheral areas of the country and, most particularly in Akkar.\textsuperscript{281}


\textsuperscript{277}Ibid
\textsuperscript{278}Ibid
\textsuperscript{279}United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.”
\textsuperscript{280}Ibid
\textsuperscript{281}Ibid
The UNDP Programs in Lebanon, similar to the UNDP Programs worldwide, complements national efforts along four main axes of support: “Good Governance”, “Pro-Poor and inclusive economic development”, “Energy and Environment”, and “Equitable Social development”. The UNDP’s support is provided at the level of policy and legislative reforms (capacity building, formulation, implementation, and knowledge transfer) as well as on the ground, through projects formulated and implemented with local communities, civil society organizations, national NGOs and municipalities. By the mid-1990’s, the UNDP’s approach focused on “sustained human development” as the primary objective and measure of overall national development. This was reinforced in 2000 by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals and their subsequent translation into relevant national development targets; prime among those was the reduction of poverty and regional disparities.

As such, the UNDP’s direct presence on the ground and partnerships at policy levels enabled it to respond to the crisis immediately upon the war’s outbreak in July 2006, it also enabled it to respond to the urgent needs for early recovery in the war’s immediate aftermath. Throughout, the UNDP simultaneously engaged in efforts to ensure a smooth transition towards sustained recovery and longer-term development, inclusive of associated policy and legislative reforms corresponding to the thematic pillars on which the UNDP focuses its assistance.

The May-June 2005 parliamentary elections had delivered a government committed to reforms which were spelled out broadly in the new Government’s “Policy Platform” (bayan el wizari)

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282 Ibid
283 UNDP Lebanon”.
285 Ibid
286 United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.”
that obtained parliament’s vote of confidence.\textsuperscript{288} It subsequently set out to define the measures
needed to achieve electoral, financial, socio-economic and other sector reforms.\textsuperscript{289} Among the
results of these efforts was the expansion of a medium-term package of fiscal and economic
reforms, accompanied by a Social Action Plan, which the Government presented to a donors
conference to held in Beirut in 2006.\textsuperscript{290}

Beginning 2006, the government had been in the process of finalizing the medium-term package
of fiscal and economic reforms aimed at reducing Lebanon’s untenably high sovereign debt to
sustainable levels, and at placing the economy on a sustainable growth path.\textsuperscript{291} For the first time
ever, this package of reforms included a “Social Action Plan” to provide the poor and vulnerable
strata of the population with improved coverage, quality, and efficiency of social protection and
safety net schemes.\textsuperscript{292} An important contribution by the UNDP in this connection was the
inclusion in the Social Action Plan of a commitment to elaborate a comprehensive Social
Development Strategy which would extend beyond social safety nets to encompass a multi-
sector approach to reducing regional disparities in socio-economic indicators, particularly
poverty indicators, and promoting balanced, inclusive and equitable development, framed by the
relevant national targets of the MDGs.\textsuperscript{293} The formulation of this Social Development Strategy
envisioned broad participation by civil society and local communities, investments and
employment creation in the production sectors of the economy, and better integration of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{289} ibid
\item \textsuperscript{290} ibid
\item \textsuperscript{291} United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.”
\item \textsuperscript{292} ibid
\item \textsuperscript{293} ibid
\end{itemize}
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historically poor peripheral regions into the national economy, as well as strengthening decentralization efforts.\textsuperscript{294}

The Government had also initiated a process of engaging the public in a debate of the proposed reform measures, in an effort to refine the measures and to build broad national consensus and support for their implementation before presenting the reform program to a donors’ conference to be held in Beirut by the end of 2006.\textsuperscript{295} The UNDP helped facilitate one such debate between the government and civil society organizations in April 2006.\textsuperscript{296} Economic trends revealed “a projected 6% growth rate by the end of that same year”, helping to recuperate “from a zero growth rate” in the previous year; the country was preparing for a booming summer tourism season.\textsuperscript{297} The preliminary results from the 2004 the UNDP-supported multi-purpose household survey has preliminary indications of Lebanon registering a “9% decline in relative poverty since 1996 (from 28% to 19%) and a 2% decline in extreme poverty (from 7% to 5%).”\textsuperscript{298} These figures were due mainly to the improved “social dimensions of poverty” and showed an ever present great “need to improve the economic dimensions of poverty”, specifically incomes and employment”, when war broke out on July 12, 2006.\textsuperscript{299}

**Outbreak of July war and UNDP’s intervention in Lebanon**

As Israel launched a full-scale war on Lebanon, including a military blockade by air, land and sea which lasted weeks beyond the formal end of the war, the government rallied its effort in response to the humanitarian crisis. The Lebanese government immediately responded with a
number of measures, including the provision of relief supplies from existing government stocks, organizing the humanitarian effort and engaging the international community to provide support. UNDP was able to respond immediately to the humanitarian crisis.

On Day two of the war, as Lebanon was being subjected to massive bombardments of its civilian infrastructure, causing large-scale population displacements, the government requested of the UNDP to add the capacity of the High Relief Committee (HRC) in its efforts to organize and coordinate the overall humanitarian response. UNDP quickly co-located three of its “Mine Action” staff with the HRC and they helped it to devise a humanitarian operations information system to update and consolidate the basic data needed to meet the evolving humanitarian needs on a daily basis. Such basic data were supplied to the HRC by the relevant services ministries, Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), municipalities, and the Lebanese Red Cross. Data included, for example, origin and destination of population movements and displacements, numbers of displaced, the locations where they found refuge and shelter schools, community centers, host families, type and amount of emergency relief supplies required, number and location of civilian casualties, damage and destruction of transport and other civilian infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, power supply, etc.), and numbers and locations of people who were cut off and had become inaccessible as a result of destruction of the road network.

The UNDP also provided a liaison to act, when needed, as a conduit between the HRC and the UN humanitarian agencies, including the preparation of the “UN Flash Appeal”.

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300 Setting the Stage for Long Term Reconstruction.”
304 Ibid
Because of the logistics challenge arising from the bombardments of Lebanon’s transport infrastructure and the military blockade Israel had imposed, the UNDP facilitated the establishment of a functional presence by World Food Program (WFP) in Lebanon to facilitate the transport of relief supplies to populations in need “within Lebanon and safe passage of relief supplies into Lebanon.”\(^{305}\) The participating UN agencies were organized into “Clusters” as follows: health (led by WHO, with “support from UNICEF and UNFPA); food/nutrition (led by WFP), water and sanitation (led by UNICEF), logistics (led by WFP), shelter (led by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR), protection/mine action (led by UNMACC, in cooperation with UNDP).”\(^{306}\)

Following the Lebanese Cabinet’s endorsement of the “UN Flash Appeal” and logistics plan, then Prime Minister Siniora urged that the UN humanitarian operation not extend beyond the planned 90 days.\(^{307}\)

The UNDP immediately committed funding from its own resources, purchased needed relief items from the local markets (cooking utensils, hygiene kits, mattresses, and blankets) and arranged for their transport and direct distribution to the displaced families who had headed to Mount Lebanon and Beirut and were sheltered in schools or public spaces.\(^{308}\) With the arrival to Mount Lebanon of internally displaced families from the South and from the Beirut Southern Suburbs, the UNDP’s regional office in Aley was set to be directly involved in organizing the procurement, transport, delivery and distribution of these relief supplies, in partnership with civil society organizations.\(^{309}\)

\(^{305}\) Ibid
\(^{306}\) Ibid
\(^{307}\) “Lebanon: On the Road to Reconstruction and Recovery.”
\(^{308}\) United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.”
\(^{309}\) Ibid
The UN humanitarian effort represented a comparatively small scale as regarding the overall humanitarian respond, the bulk of which was Lebanese and from the Arab region. The UNDP’s contributions, all of which were funded from its own resources and none from the UN Flash Appeal, were relatively modest, but timely and anchored in its long-standing partnerships with government and with the broad spectrum of civil society organizations, local communities and municipalities, which actually took the lead on the ground, with strong support from the Lebanese Red Cross. “The UN’s Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an agency for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners”, which is normally effective in other humanitarian contexts, proved limited in Lebanon with the existing principal actors.\(^\text{310}\) The IASC assumes a formulaic reliance on UN (rather than national) leadership of the humanitarian response, in collaboration with international NGOs (more than with national NGOs and CSOs) and “traditional” OECD donor partners.\(^\text{311}\) In the context of Lebanon, however, the “traditional” donors are the Arab Gulf States, the Government is highly capable albeit constrained by the imposed military blockade; and Lebanese civil society organizations and NGOs are vibrant, numerous and appeared to be effective.\(^\text{312}\)

While the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon garnered strong national, regional, and international support to meet the emergency relief needs of the people who were displaced or under siege.

The other important dimensions of humanitarian action and imperatives as governed by “international humanitarian and human rights law” - particularly, the protection of civilians, humanitarian access (e.g. for rescuing the wounded), and proportionality in the conduct of war,

\(^{310}\) Ibid
\(^{312}\) United Nations Development Program, “UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery.”
were severely compromised and, in several instances, were violated. The destruction also made risky, not only to deliver and distribute relief supplies, but to rescue and evacuate civilian casualties, or enable civilians to move safely to relatively more secure areas.  

The demonstration at the UN House on July 30, 2006 protesting the massacre of civilians in Qana earlier that same day (the second Qana massacre in a decade), was a disturbing signal of an erosion in the credibility and perception of the UN “as the embodiment of moral authority and international legitimacy, having relinquished its primary responsibility for preserving and promoting international peace and security.”

Nevertheless and in collaboration with Policy Advisory Units in the relevant service ministries and in the Office of the Prime Minister, the UNDP launched Early Recovery planning. The result was a set of five “Quick Starting and High Impact Early Recovery” initiatives to be launched simultaneously at the end of the war and “to be initiated from UNDP’s own resources until such a time when additional resources could be mobilized from the international donor community.”

This Early Recovery package, approved by the Prime Minister prior to the Stockholm donor conference on August 2, 2006, consisted of the following projects: assisted the municipalities in rubble and debris removal; cleaning-up the oil spill in the Lebanese water, restoring fishermen’s livelihoods, reactivation of Public Administration services, and support for National Coordination of Recovery Efforts.

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313 Ibid
314 Ibid
Furthermore, at the sub-national coordination level, the UNDP supported the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) in the planning for, and establishment of four UNRC regional offices, one in each of the four different regions of the country (South, North, Bekaa and Beirut Southern Suburbs), to facilitate and coordinate the recovery efforts on the ground. The UNDP also set in motion plans for undertaking the post-war assessments with the relevant government counterparts, looking ahead to a continuous transition between Early and Sustained Recovery as well as equity and balance across the regions and population groups most affected, directly and/or indirectly, by the war.

At the local level, the UNDP supported the war-affected municipalities’ efforts to undertake participatory community-based damage and needs assessments, on the basis of which they elaborated prioritized recovery plans, thus strengthening local planning and resource mobilization capacities as well.

As indicated above, the UNDP has had a presence on the ground with the people since the early 1990’s in Aley (Mount Lebanon), Tyre (South Lebanon) and Akkar (North Lebanon), which enabled it to participate directly and immediately in the provision of relief supplies. Following the July War, the UNDP established three additional regional offices in Chtaurah for the Bekaa area, in the municipality of Haret Hreik for Beirut Southern suburbs, and in Tripoli (in addition to Akkar) for the North.

With the establishment of UN Resident Coordinator Recovery “hubs” at sub-national levels, funded by European Commission for Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNDP regional offices also support the overall coordination and coherence of

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318 Ibid
319 Ibid
recovery efforts, providing a platform shared by national and international NGOs, civil society organizations, municipal authorities and decentralized ministries as well as donors.\textsuperscript{320}
CHAPTER FIVE

THE UNDP AND THE RECOVERY CHALLENGES IN BEIRUT SOUTHERN SUBURBS

Challenges in Beirut Southern Suburbs:

The Beirut Southern Suburbs is a heavily populated area that suffered from poverty, youth unemployment, and lack of services, conditions that were aggravated by the July 2006 war.

In preparation for the recovery program in the area, the UNDP conducted a detailed assessment with municipalities and local NGOs in Beirut Southern Suburbs to better identify the characteristics and the challenges of the program target areas. The findings were as follows: Unemployment was and still is a major challenge identified throughout the assessment undertaken by the UNDP-Beirut Southern Suburbs office following the July 2006 war. While unemployment was widespread before the war like in other places in the country, the destruction of businesses and light industries in the area compounded the situation into catastrophic dimensions. Around 2,500 families have lost jobs in BSS, further aggravating poverty, and creating a region that has become even more vulnerable and susceptible to havoc. Families became homeless, and jobless in an uncertain political atmosphere. There was a need for immediate assistance to the affected communities in all areas of life, but mainly with livelihoods and the fight against poverty. The majority of enterprises in the area fall into the micro and small categories. Those could be supported and encouraged to initiate programs that facilitate

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322 Interview with Depute Mayor of Haret Hreik Municipality, 13 October 2007.
access to micro-credit in order recapitalize destroyed or damaged equipment and tools and to support skills training.

Another challenge that seemed very significant for an inclusive recovery process was engaging partners from civil society. The aim was to strengthen the participation of civil society organizations to ensure effectiveness of their response in the recovery process.

Moreover, the pace of International NGO support to the Beirut Southern Suburbs following the cessation of war was very slow. It has been observed that few International NGOs are in the area to support the community to recover from its trauma. This may be attributed to the fact that the area of intervention was new to the different players and donors (as compared to the South of Lebanon, where the UNDP, UN agencies and bodies, local and international organizations have been present and active since 2000) and were more familiar with the context. As for Beirut Southern Suburbs, no previous or similar experience to the South had ever been exerted, donors and players were more hesitant to step in, but hesitancy seemed to relinquish following the UNDP’s intervention in the area.

Third identifiable challenge identified was the major gap in coordination issues among the various NGOs working in Beirut Southern Suburbs. Some argued that NGOs even lacked primary knowledge of who is doing what in the area. Thus, a mechanism was needed to ensure proper coordination, dissemination, and exchange of information among the various CSOs to properly support the needs and to provide a setting that promotes complementary and effective interventions.

323 Ibid
324 Ibid
UNDP’s intervention in Beirut Southern Suburbs post July 2006 war

Various internal and external actors took on a significant role in the recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts in Lebanon. They included international organizations, International NGOs and bilateral support from various government agencies and multilateral agencies. However, in the larger context, the Beirut Southern Suburbs was marginalized and lacked targeted funding. The UNDP has played an active lead role in the recovery and development of the area. A relationship was established with the municipalities and other stakeholders ensuring their inclusive participation in the recovery and early rehabilitation process of the region. This was done through providing support on both the institutional and local levels.

As mentioned earlier, a UNRC regional office in Beirut Southern suburbs was established to coordinate and maintain the coherence of all recovery efforts, and launched as such, a plan for the recovery activities.

The resulting rubble of the massive destruction the war caused impeded the return to normalcy, and demanded urgent attention by development actors. Four days after the cessation of hostilities endorsement, the UNDP immediately responded to the humanitarian crisis in Beirut Southern Suburbs and developed an emergency program to address the emerging needs of the community. The UNDP with its partners provided support to municipalities in removing rubble from the streets in the area. Strong liaisons were maintained with the municipalities and the major stakeholders in the four most affected areas in Beirut Southern Suburbs, namely the Haret Hreik, Chiah, Borj El Barajneh and Ghobeiry areas. With the contribution of the Bureau of Crisis

326 Ibid
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), the UNDP was able to launch its rubble removal and rehabilitation of infrastructure activities as a primary emergency intervention identified and prioritized by the communities. Through this contribution, BCPR enabled the UNDP to be present in Beirut Southern Suburbs for the first time during its Program cycle in Lebanon and ensured a strategy compatible with the area and its urgent needs.

Thus, the UNDP established its field presence within the affected community and set up an office in the municipality of Haret Hreik and later in the municipality of Chiah. The UNDP’s team in Beirut Southern Suburbs conducted damage and needs assessment through data collection, information analysis, site visits, and in-depth meetings with local municipalities and the Social Development Centers affiliated to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), as well as grassroots associations, NGOs and other stakeholders. The UNDP followed up the evolving situation in Beirut Southern Suburbs in terms of the direct and indirect impact of conflict on livelihoods and economic recovery, especially at the grassroots level. The needs assessment was periodically updated to identify and adequately respond to the changing needs and context.

The UND Program initiated the execution of many early recovery projects and at a further stage, recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods projects with a budget of $ 2.4 Million USD funded by different donors such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO), Austria and Australia.

The early recovery projects included: the removal of debris as well as “rehabilitation of

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329 Ibid
330 Ibid
infrastructure: electricity poles, sewage systems, rehabilitation of public premises, and provision of machines and equipment to assist the municipalities in performing the necessary restoration and maintenance work.”332 The recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods projects included support to the war affected communities in terms of provision of new equipment, support to youth through vocational training programs, support to the war disabled community, and special support to unemployed women and others affected by the war.

Around $ 900,000 USD were allocated by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) to emergency response and to the rehabilitation phase in Beirut Southern suburbs, which encompassed infrastructure rehabilitation, and to restore the livelihood of the most vulnerable members of the population.333 The SIDA grants reached around $1.9 Million USD for two different stages: the early recovery, and restoration of lives and livelihoods. The projects included in addition to rubble removal and infrastructure works the establishment of a vocational training center, installation of solar energy systems, and provision of support to the war affected fishermen, youths, and women.334

Australia was also among the early donors and contributed to the recovery phase with an amount of $165,000 USD allocated for the rehabilitation of Haret Hreik streets, and restoration of sewage systems, pipe services, sidewalks restoration, as well as procurement of equipment (including computers, scanners, photocopiers and office materials) to the Haret Hreik municipality.335

Under the overall objective of Restoration of Lives and Social Assistance in Lebanon, the Austrian government also allocated around $317,000 USD to Beirut Southern Suburbs for assisting the war affected communities there.  

**Early Recovery phase**

As previously mentioned, the UNDP first initiated the rubble removal and restoration of municipal services and utilities. This quick starting-high impact early recovery project concentrated on restoring the capacity of cash-strapped local municipalities to provide a number of critical services immediately following the war. The UNDP initially provided from its own resources $200,000 USD in cash grants to the four most war-affected municipalities in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut namely Haret Hreik, Borj Al Barajneh, Chiah and Ghobeiry, allocating to each in proportion to the extent of war damage and destruction in their communities.

A few days following the cessation of hostilities, a meeting was held with the mayors of these municipalities, after which early recovery plans were developed and prioritized, and work began immediately on clearing the tons of rubble and debris from side streets with the needed machinery and equipment, complementing the larger efforts on the main roads undertaken by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

Alongside rubble removal, other small-scale activities included repair of neighborhood side streets and public buildings, restoration of basic utilities and services like the repair of street lights and clean-up of sections of the sewage systems and storm water conduits.

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336 Ibid
The rubble removal activities were conducted with small grants provided to municipalities aimed at procuring heavy machinery to open the blocked roads and remove the rubble at lower costs. This initiative enabled the municipalities to cut the cost for renting rubble removal machineries and employ local labor for the public works. With generous contributions from other donors such as, ECHO, Austria and Australia, the UNDP was able to quickly expand its coverage to activities in the four municipalities in the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The UNDP supported the restoration of municipal lighting, the rehabilitation of roads, irrigation canals, storm water conduits and market stalls, and the procurement of electric generators and machinery to strengthen the ability of the municipalities to increase their responsiveness to local recovery needs.\textsuperscript{339}

The donors largely contributed to the ongoing recovery initiatives as an effort to overcome the war consequences, with SIDA allocating an amount totaling $344,000 USD for rubble removal and rehabilitation of infrastructure,\textsuperscript{340} ECHO allocating around $548,000 USD for rubble removal, road repairs, restoration of street lamps and public buildings,\textsuperscript{341} and Australia allocating $165,000 USD for the rehabilitation of two major streets in the area.\textsuperscript{342}

The grants from SIDA, ECHO and Australia for rubble removal and infrastructure rehabilitation aimed at supporting the municipalities in Beirut Southern Suburbs in the process of rubble removal, in order to facilitate reconstruction works and to process demolition waste, thus creating opportunities for the recovery and re-use of processed materials and safe return of the locals to their houses. This initiative, in addition to clearing the areas from rubble in an environmentally sound manner, also provided local employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{343}

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\textsuperscript{339}United Nations Development Program, “Lebanon Early Recovery Report.”
\textsuperscript{341}European Commission, “Single Form Contribution Agreement -Final Report.”
\textsuperscript{342}United Nations Development Program, “UNDP Beirut Southern Suburbs regional Office Progress Report.”
\textsuperscript{343}Ibid
\end{flushright}
The works were undertaken following an assessment of the amounts of rubble for clearance, and accordingly three contracts were signed for rubble removal in the areas of Haret Hreik, Borj Barajneh and Chiah in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut. The selection of the locations and the contract amounts were determined based on the amount of rubble to be removed. Haret Hreik topped the list of municipalities in the amount of rubble removal it required. At that time, the assessment revealed that up to “105,000 m³ of rubble needed to be removed” from Haret Hreik. Chiah came in second with “3,200 m³ of rubble to be removed” and Borj al Barajneh third with “22,000 m³ of rubble to be removed.” This phase was crucial for the next stage aiming at the restoration of basic “services such as rebuilding roads, restoring power and the rebuilding and rehabilitation of some housing.”

The early recovery interventions funded by ECHO included basic community infrastructure repairs to Haret Hreik, Chiah, Borj el Barajneh and Ghobeiry such as rubble removal, rehabilitation of infrastructure roads repair, clean-up and repair of sewage systems, sidewalks restorations, repair of municipal building, and procurement of machinery. This initiative was developed further to include providing municipalities with grants for the procurement of machinery thus facilitating debris removal at decreased costs, and having the sustainable benefit of having this heavy machinery to use later in the capacity building stages of the municipalities in Beirut Southern Suburbs.

As for SIDA, the contribution falls under the title of “Recovery Assistance to the Basic Community Infrastructure and Services in Beirut Southern Suburbs” and “Emergency
The first phase of projects included rehabilitating of the infrastructure of Borj El Barajneh which encompassed the following activities: sidewalks restorations, drinking water restorations, sewage repairs, lighting repairs, asphalt for roads, and municipal clinic rehabilitation. Solar Water Heaters were provided in Beirut Southern Suburbs to local community facilities such as public clinics and schools. This activity directly decreased household costs on electricity, while simultaneously decreasing electricity demand on the Government which already suffered from a low supply capacity. It also ultimately saved carbon dioxide emissions; a major environmental concern. Interventions included the installation of solar heating systems in 10 locations in the Borj el Barjaneh area, and solar lighting in Ghobeiry municipality and some streets in that area.

As for Australia, the amount allocated was for the rehabilitation of two streets in the Haret Hreik area.

Recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods

At later stages, the UNDP’s interventions shifted from early recovery activities to recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods. The former entailed specific infrastructure rehabilitation, clearance of rubble and debris (an amount of 130,240 m$^3$ of rubble removed), road repairs (about 12 roads were repaired), repair of public buildings (three municipalities), restoration of street
lamp/poles in seven streets, repair of sewage systems and storm water conduits in ten streets, procurement of tools and 20 pieces of machinery for municipal service delivery.\(^{353}\)

As for the recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods phase, the UNDP initiated set of projects (with a budget of around $1.5 million USD) and funded by SIDA, ECHO, and Austria to respond to urgent needs of the war affected communities.\(^{354}\) With the presence of the UNDP sub-regional offices in Beirut Southern Suburbs, the UNDP assessed the most pressing needs of the communities through surveying the damages accrued to the infrastructure of the villages, and the effect on the residents’ socio economic circumstances. The assessment was used to help local municipalities in prioritizing the interventions needed with and in preparing their respective recovery plans accordingly.

The UNDP then initiated and implemented the recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods project to meet the needs and urgent requirements of the socio-economic situation in war affected communities.\(^{355}\) Initiatives entailed support programs at both the local and institutional level. Interventions varied from vocational training to unemployed youths, support to Small and Medium Enterprises to restoration of economic activities of fishermen, in addition to other infrastructure restoration for better service delivery in the community and improved socio-economic activities.\(^{356}\) The main objective of this initiative was aimed at restoring the livelihoods, income and employability status of the affected population during the war. The project supported the economy development and in return assisted in reducing the poverty factor.
At an early stage, the oil spill from Israel’s naval blockade and bombing of the Ouzai port were devastating to the fisheries sector. An estimated 600 fishermen and their families lost their only source of income as a result.\(^{357}\) The UNDP allocated $200,000 USD from its own resources and with support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for the Fishermen’s Associations in Lebanon to repair damaged boats, provide fishing nets and engines, and rebuild the fish market in the Ouzai Port.\(^{358}\) The UNDP initially focused on fishermen because they were among the poorest occupational groups whose livelihoods were devastated by both the oil spill and direct destruction of their main economic assets, it extended its focus afterwards to other occupational categories under the overall objective of restoring lives and livelihoods, which the UNDP considers as the measure of sustained recovery.

The following activities are illustrative of the UNDP’s initiatives for preserving livelihoods, with funding support from ECHO, Austria, and SIDA.

The ECHO funded interventions at this stage with a budget of around $348,000 USD and which included the restoration of the popular markets in Mouawad Street in the Chiah area.\(^{359}\) The project included repairs to the markets for the purpose of restoring the economic livelihood, targeting 300 Medium and Small Enterprises. It included Interlock pavements and widening of sidewalks, planting sidewalks with trees, placing benches on sidewalks, providing garbage bins on sidewalks, installing a sign with the street name, installing a sign with all shop names, and building speed bumps.\(^{360}\) Another alternative market for fruits and vegetable was reconstructed in the Hey

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\(^{358}\) “Lebanon Crisis Flash Appeal.”


\(^{360}\) Ibid
El Soulloum area aiming at restoring livelihoods in the area.\textsuperscript{361} The project rehabilitated the alternative fruit and vegetable market in Hey El Soulloum to allow 110 vegetable and fruit sellers to relocate from the crowded streets to a place where they could exhibit and sell their locally produced goods.\textsuperscript{362} The market is environmentally and health friendly first and foremost, secondly the market provides sellers with the opportunity to display their products at a lower rent rate giving the chance to a wider range of poor residents to sell their goods. Thirdly, the market is a more organized, safe, and secure place for sellers to promote their local products, and for visitors (especially women) where accidents of harassment and stealing could be avoided. The market provided direct support for those who lost their jobs after the war, and were unemployed and it stimulated economic recovery.\textsuperscript{363} Lastly, ECHO funded the training of around 120 unemployed persons in Beirut Southern Suburbs, through the provision of vocational training courses to increase employability through capacity building in specific fields (such as car mechanics; beauty training; and heating/cooling systems and aluminum) especially for those who lost their jobs after the July war. This in addition to the provision of tool kits at the end of the training that were meant to support the beneficiaries in starting-up their own small enterprises even if they could not get employed.\textsuperscript{364} The project was implemented through three non-governmental organizations, namely Amel Association, Imam Sadr Foundation, and YMCA.\textsuperscript{365} Overall, it improved the socio-economic conditions in some areas in Beirut Southern Suburbs by creating productive employment opportunities, skills development, and empowerment for the affected communities where both the UNDP and ECHO aimed at raising the standards and the living conditions of the population.

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid,\textsuperscript{362} Ibid\textsuperscript{363} Ibid\textsuperscript{364} Ibid\textsuperscript{365} Ibid
As for SIDA, interventions in this phase fell under “Emergency Restoration of Lives and Livelihoods” with a budget of around $685,000 USD that was allocated for the establishment and equipping of a vocational training center and permanent market for women’s home made products in Haret Hreik. This was done with the purpose of assisting the vulnerable and affected community to acquire knowledge of occupational skills, and to provide more employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{366}

Under the overall objective of this phase, it was essential to provide support to fishermen of the Ouzai and Jnah ports that were affected by the July war. Interventions included the provision of radars to 150 fishermen for better underwater fish location, and a later stage, the provision of equipment at a such as cooling rooms and an Ice fridge to support income generation at the port.\textsuperscript{367} Another intervention implemented in partnership with the Kuwaiti Fund was the re-channeling of the old affected sewage system in Ouzai in order for it to be discharged outside the port in an adequate source to avoid damage to the fishing industry.\textsuperscript{368} The previous condition of the sewage networks severely affected on the socio-economic conditions of the fishermen and their families. The sewage networks of the Ouzai area used to discharge at the port, polluting the fishing waters, which in return affected the health of the fishermen and “the quantity and quality” of fishing.\textsuperscript{369} The UNDP intervention restored the sewage system and therefore restored the lives and livelihoods of the fisherman and the population of the surrounding area. The rehabilitation of the main entrance at the Ouzai Port damaged by the July war was also crucial before concluding the support given to fishermen in the area.\textsuperscript{370}

\textsuperscript{366} Swedish International Development Agency, “SIDA Progress Report.”
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid
Hey El Soulloum is the poorest and the most disadvantaged area in Beirut Southern Suburbs. With a total area of 2.7 km², the population is estimated at 120,000. 371 Hey El Soulloum administratively falls under the Municipality of Choueifat. 372 The extreme majority of inhabitants in Hey El Soulloum do not however originate from Choueifat, and residents are not represented in the Choueifat municipal council. Only 300 out of 120,000 people have the right to vote during the municipal elections of Choueifat. 373 The area was plagued by unorganized construction, lack of basic public services (including social, educational and health) and pollution and inadequate living conditions were translated in shortages in electricity and water provisions. Although it wasn’t highly affected or damaged by the war, the UNDP initiated some interventions for the sake of supporting the livelihoods of this, the poorest area in Beirut Southern suburbs. 374 The implementation of initiatives was targeted mainly at the unemployed women and youths. 375 The support was in the form of procuring equipment and machineries for women to start-up their own business at home, and the building of a Football playground aiming at enhancing peace-building and preventing crises. 376

The Austrian projects in the second phase worked with a budget of $317,000 USD under the title of “Restoration of Livelihoods and Social Assistance in Lebanon”. 377 The projects included provision of direct support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Haret Hreik through the procurement of tools and equipment for 128 SMEs that were affected or destroyed during the July war. 378 Another intervention was the provision of physiotherapy Equipment to two Primary Health

372 Ibid
373 Ibid
374 Ibid
375 Ibid
376 Ibid
377 Ibid
378 Ibid
Care centers in Borj El Barajneh and Ghobeiry municipalities, designated principally to serve the war disabled.\textsuperscript{379} Under the framework of this objective, another intervention was undertaken through the provision of maintenance of aid devices for 54 war disabled persons in Beirut Southern Suburbs.\textsuperscript{380}

As described earlier, the UNDP’s interventions varied from early recovery activities to recovery of lives and livelihoods, and seemed to succeeded in supporting the local affected community, it also prepared the ground for a longer term development initiative in the area, aimed at working further on developing the capacities of the concerned entities to better plan interventions and programs. The interventions showed interest in implementing immediate action for the support of the income generation and social integration aspects. The first post war rehabilitation program focused on providing the needed services, whereas the second one focused more on extending the needed services while keeping in mind the institutional building perspective to complement the efforts made by all previous interventions. The implemented program will then remain the backbone structure of a larger comprehensive intervention in the area while always considering and understanding “the complexity and sensitivity of both the target area and the target population.”\textsuperscript{381}
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The Lebanese state was faced with some daunting tasks in the post July 2006 war era. The country had suffered substantial devastation by Israel’s heavy bombing, compounded by external actors’ political and economic intrusions, and a politically divided interior. Heavy fiscal and budgetary issues also needed to be addressed in order to stimulate a weak and imbalanced economy.

Lebanon witnessed the rise of a series of conflicts; ranging from internal sectarian conflicts, to foreign occupations, insurgencies, the rise of transnational armed groups, and the use of Lebanon as a regional incubator for regional conflicts that often play out on its territories by proxy. It is the observed weakness of the Lebanese state that lay at the root of the country’s woes, although the role of outside actors cannot be minimized. Following the July war, the Lebanese government was again faced with its inability to exercise its fundamental state sovereignty; it also found itself unable to assume exclusive or even primary responsibility for post war-reconstruction and recovery. It was viewed by many that the efforts of international donor agencies to alleviate and rebuild Lebanon following the latest war, needed to stress on enhancing the capabilities of the Lebanese authority.

The recovery and rehabilitation process was not an easy one, and had to be dependent on the benevolence of regional and international donors. Although, the post July 2006 war recovery seemed a more difficult task than previous recovery efforts (comparing with the post-civil war era in 1990 for example), what remained constant is the historically demonstrated remarkable resilience of the Lebanese people. The government today is much weaker and subject to
considerable sectarian divisions; and the situation has created greater dependence on the
benevolence of international donors. To complicate the government problems, there has been
significant “capital flight”, as well as migration of skilled labor despite the end of the war.
Since 1990, Lebanon has not been able to generate enough jobs for its young population
resulting in skilled people exiting the country; the July 2006 war and the ensuing political
instability has not rendered the situation any better. Nevertheless, Lebanon retains significant
regional and International importance that hinges on the following factors: first the successful
reconstruction of the country’s war damaged and long neglected infrastructure. Second, tackling
the unsustainable fiscal shortages and debt extensions, as well as reinvigorating the private sector
and enhancing the recovery of small and medium sized enterprises. Third, it is pivotal to tap on
the strength Lebanon’s banking sector to foster development, as well as strengthening the
institutions of the government. There are however clear limits to what the country can do without
outside help. Lebanon’s future seems to depend heavily on the support of international lenders
and donors. In this view “the outcomes of the Paris III conference will be pivotal.”
As a result of the summer attack the reconstruction efforts were focused on areas with a clear
Shiite majority, in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in rural areas of the country’s South and Bekaa
region. These areas are under the sway of Hezbollah and to a lesser extent the Amal movement.
Further complicating the reconstruction and recovery processes in the post July 2006 era is the
heightened politicization of the Lebanese political system, where the country is divided between
Hezbollah and its supporters (The March 8 Camp) and what is usually referred to as the loyalist
camp (The Mach 14 Coalition). While state institutions today are in a better shape than during
the civil war era, the state still faces major difficulties due to inefficiency in the work of

government, lingering nepotism, and a troubled relationship with Hezbollah and its allies who seemed to hold veto power over all government decisions. It was clear that opposing actors were trying to gain control over the reconstruction and recovery processes during the post summer war era. This latest phase of reconstruction was characterized by being an overt struggle over resources and power, and a competition for influence over the weakened institutions of the Lebanese state, even more so than what was happening in the 1990s. A further feature of the post July 2006 milieu is the heightened role of regional and international donors in the reconstruction and recovery processes, as well as in providing livelihood support for vulnerable groups.

After the July war ended, polarization in the Lebanese interior became more apparent, and joint reconstruction and victim compensation agreements fell apart as a result. The country became divided between two opposing camps: the first being “March 14 Coalition, led by Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated prime minister Saad Hariri, a coalition” that constituted the government majority and whose agenda leaned towards conserving the status quo in the balance of power in the country. The second camp or as it was called “the opposition” was led by Hezbollah, and in December 2006, the members of this camp, in a form of dissent, pulled out of government institutions and began “extra-parliamentary” protests in central Beirut, the seat of most governmental buildings.

But it was over reconstructing the rubble of Beirut's southern suburbs that political wrangling had been most intense, whereby Hezbollah's construction firm Jihad al Binaa claimed it was hampered in its efforts to begin rebuilding Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS) because of a lack of cooperation from the government. Hezbollah reinvigorated “by its self-proclaimed victory over Israel, had announced taking responsibility for fixing the July 2006 War damages and had in turn
been accused by the government of monopolizing reconstruction efforts instead of collaborating with central state institutions.”

International donors may, rather unintentionally, play a major political role in the internal Lebanese conflict through the pretext of reconstruction interventions. In Lebanon Western players like France and the United States, in addition to several Sunni Arab states supported loyalist camp that maintained hold over the premiership since Fouad Siniora became Prime Minister in the summer of 2005, Iran on the other hand gave full support to Hezbollah, seen as its main outpost in Lebanon. Stated otherwise, wider geo-political battles at the local and international levels caught the reconstruction drive in the crossfire. Tasks, which should have been performed by the state, were being undertaken primarily by local non-state players, especially Hezbollah, as well as regional and international players including the UNDP.

Even when it comes to providing security for its citizens, the Lebanese state is reliant on resolution 1701 which stabilizes the situation in the south and provides some protections from Israel, as well as on tacit understandings between the security forces and Hezbollah.

Above all, there is no internal consensus in Lebanon about what constitutes an appropriate reconstruction and recovery process. A case in point are the activities of the UNDP in Beirut Southern Suburbs which have not embraced Hezbollah (the dominant player in the area), and that have been viewed with skepticism by this group.

Despite all the challenges, the UNDP was able to step in the area following the end of the war, for the first time in its presence in Lebanon, and initiated its emergency program immediately

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after the war and later extended it to the recovery of lives and livelihoods program. Paradoxically, Hezbollah-run municipalities didn’t refuse donations from Western countries and from the UNDP despite political fractions, and donors didn’t hesitate to intervene or fund initiatives. As such, the post war reconstruction phase in the area witnessed for the first time the presence and intervention of major international actors that took on a major role in this context, primarily Western donors, the International organizations, International and local NGOs.

In other words, and despite the troubled relationship between Hezbollah and many UN bodies, particularly the UNDP, elected officials who are known to be close to Hezbollah, didn’t have qualms about working with the UNDP. This made problematic (or be it in a positive way) the stereotypical image of the UNDP as a puppet of the west. For some elected officials in the area, who were known to have links to Hezbollah, the UNDP was seen as a positive influence on the community.

The UNDP had signed agreements with elected municipal heads; and those agreements enabled the UNDP to implement projects with the support of local community and local authority. The UNDP couldn’t have undertaken any imitative in Beirut Southern Suburbs, if Hezbollah hadn’t accepted to operate.

Those who worked with the UNDP didn’t perceive it as a serious challenge to the political outlook of the program, as long as its activities were cleared by the elected municipal heads who presumably review those matters with the Party itself. Implicitly Hezbollah gave the green light (or perhaps just the yellow light) because Hezbollah did not want to be seen as embracing the UNDP nor did the UNDP want to be seen as close to Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not completely closed to the idea of being linked to an International organization, as long as their work is perceived as non-political and non-threatening to the party’s hold over the area.
The paper’s conclusion falls into two categories: evaluating the proclaimed objectives set by the UNDP while launching their first recovery intervention in the area after the July 2006 war, and learning lessons for future interventions.

Under the framework of recovering the affected area and providing support to the affected communities, the UNDP and western donors’ statements fall under the headline of dealing with elected local authorities respecting as such the democratic rule in the country.

While closely coordinating with the local communities at both grassroots and local authorities’ level, the UNDP has built a strong and trusting relationship with all concerned entities, an important achievement for a better understanding of their social, economic, cultural and political aspects, and thus making for better planning and serving the community. The UNDP was also keen to maintain its ongoing constructive interventions in BSS particularly in order to be also perceived as a “neutral arbiter” with the ability to positively affect livelihoods and opportunities of vulnerable groups, and to strengthen the inter-communal relationships between the local residents themselves, and with their local authorities.

The UNDP acted as first respondent making its presence felt shortly after hostilities ended, by providing food, temporarily shelters and supplied needs for survival in collaboration with other UN agencies. Second it can be added that such interventions can be potentially influential to a large degree in local governance in the area, and more specifically the local community. On the other hand, reforms in the long term also has the potential to change population perceptions—a very important aspect in the complex political climate of Lebanon. However, one can argue that what subsequently happened in May 2008 (when Hezbollah took over most of Beirut in direct defiance to the government) suggest that the Lebanese political climate remained resistant to the
impacts of governance interventions, and sectarianism again showed its powerful hold over the fragmented population.

The UNDP’s intervention in the area, aiming at providing recovery assistance as a primary objective, was very logical to a context of a damaged area where governance programming could be inappropriate when there was a need to meet other priorities such the reconstruction of damages and humanitarian needs. However, some viewed that this type of intervention as a calculated effort to use their post war reconstruction assistance to maximize political return, given the program’s in depth understanding of Lebanon’s politico-social intricacies.

Reconstructing the area, repairing infrastructure and restoring lives and livelihoods could have an immediacy that governance programming can’t achieve, especially given the dire financial situation of the Lebanese state; nevertheless this doesn’t mean to halt the reform efforts exerted by the UNDP and western donors at the policy level.

Because reconstruction assistance was often disbursed through municipalities and local community, and the organization’s presence in the area allowed the UNDP to make connections to residents, political parties, and other local groups. On this level, the post-war reconstruction can be viewed as exceeding infrastructure rebuilding and building state capacity for the provision of social services. It goes further to affect the ambitions, and worldview of the key reconstruction actors: and in this case the UNDP’s overall aims and objectives. The first conclusion can be drawn here that the UNDP’s post war intervention in the area allowed many people to recover, and provided assistance to needs but was very limited in terms of policy change and furthermore in terms of political gain, if the intention ever existed.

Although the organization was aware of the importance of the recovery phase, it was clear in its projects documents following the recovery phase, that: “any reconstruction boom must be
complemented with policy reforms and state intervention that would transform such a boom into more sustainable post-reconstruction economic growth.\textsuperscript{385} This was illustrated in the set of launched plans and strategy following the war by the UNDP in terms allocating pledges for the policy reforms and democratic governance, such as strengthening the electoral process in Lebanon, Capacity Development for Fiscal Reform and Management, and support to the Prime Minister Office in the launching of new initiatives to support the set of early recovery projects previously launched and to further replace them once those are resumed\textsuperscript{386}. This was reflected in the launching of a set of poverty and social development initiatives on the ground, such as the ART GOLD program in the country including BSS, a project financed by the Government of Italy through the UNDP.\textsuperscript{387} “The initiative was designed as a key [program] instrument in support of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) achievement, by focusing on building capacity for local governance and decentralized, participatory development management in [program] countries (the local dimension), and by facilitating and strengthening strategic partnerships and cooperative arrangements between different local development actors and between municipalities.”\textsuperscript{388}

For a reconstruction to be successful, establishing a developmental state should be complementary to the reconstruction. With this in mind, state intervention becomes needed in order to set national priorities and to have control over key sectors. In this respect, post war

\textsuperscript{385} Ibid
\textsuperscript{387} United Nations Development Program, Lebanon. \url{http://www.undp.org.lb/ProjectFactSheet/projectDetail.cfm?projectId=46}, retrieved January 12, 2011.
\textsuperscript{388} Ibid
reconstruction planning as viewed by the UNDP “must be a part of a national development plan with clear macroeconomic and sectored objectives”.

In reviewing the first interventions by the UNDP regarding the recovery of infrastructure and livelihoods, reviewers were relatively positive. The first reason was the existence of an urgent need for interventions in most areas, making any interventions successful.

This paper has not elaborated on the strategies of the UNDP, “in terms of the approach towards political transition or economic reform”; it had rather identified and reviewed the initiatives implemented and their aims. It has focused on the planning process and implementation of initiatives to translate the UNDP “inputs into outputs and outcomes on the ground.”

There are important lessons to be drawn from BSS in many areas; like the success of recovering process from war, reintegration, restoration of lives and livelihoods. It seems clear that the first strategy in the area made a difference in a number of spheres, such as supporting communities, empowering affected women and youths, reducing unemployment, enhancing socio-economic conditions, etc…

Beirut Southern Suburbs provides some valuable positive lessons. The UNDP’s planning process did produce a set of plans and strategies that were of value to the UNDP’s image in the area and in building trust with a new community in Lebanon.

On the ground, the UNDP was relatively positively viewed by the community and the there was unanimous disapproval for the central government, that was seen as neglecting its role in helping its people. Criticism was also aimed at some interventions that were seen as deficient and lacking in long term thinking and coordination or having a limited view of the situation and not completing the tasks needed, as well as being selective or biased in the distribution of aid.

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389 Ibid
390 Ibid
391 Ibid
The on-ground support helped to create a sense of cooperation with local authorities and citizens. This was accomplished by helping in the planning process and in strengthening the capabilities for implementation, attesting to the significance of the UNDP operations in BSS. Local authorities reported that the UNDP was the first body to make its presence felt on the ground. Though modest in size, the quick delivered support package was viewed to have a high impact by the local authority representatives consulted by the mission. “It has been particularly appreciated that - other than rubble clearance (which was a first priority anyway) - the prioritization of subsequent rehabilitation and recovery support by UNDP was left to the municipalities themselves”.\(^{392}\) It was also highlighted that municipalities had gained precious time by being allowed to utilize the UNDP-standard contracting and procurement regulation. Moreover, as the UNDP project office was converted into becoming a UN Resident Coordinator’s hub, it was seemingly successful in sharing information and coordinating support activities, while providing entry to UN agencies and NGOs that had not been active in this region previously.”\(^{393}\)

The earlier and subsequent area-specific support following the war, had positive results and was a pioneer in having multiple objectives related to ameliorating the results of war, in addition to augmenting “balanced regional development”.\(^{394}\) After its completion, The Beirut suburbs projects had the following effects: “improved livelihoods, increased confidence among communities and local leadership, and a foundation of support for development-management and good-governance practices.”\(^ {395}\)

\(^{392}\) Ibid
\(^{393}\) Ibid
\(^{394}\) Ibid
\(^{395}\) Ibid
“UNDP (and its partners) proved to be guided by a strategy for transitioning from crisis-response and early-recovery to sustainable recovery (i.e. longer-term recovery, nationhood formation and development).”\textsuperscript{396} This is reflected by the launching a new set of plans and programs in Lebanon and BSS as previously mentioned, including the “ARTGOLD” initiative in the area, as well as the “Peace building” project.\textsuperscript{397} Those initiatives comprised such components as “the direct-impact, local-level support interventions that builds onto the various recovery and socio-economic development projects supported thus far, while capitalizing on the credibility earned due to the successful post-2006 early-recovery support”, and above all peace building and crisis prevention.\textsuperscript{398} More importantly is that those projects would also engage with communities/municipalities that pertain to even pro Hezbollah run-municipalities – in order to cultivate trust and collaboration for the real needs of the population.

In BSS, and before the recovery project was about to be wound-down, this project was launched through the UNDP- Social and Development Portfolio and settled in the area. Thus far the launching of ART GOLD seems to be efficient and necessary – “as it could build onto the networking engineered by the completed UNDP sub-office recovery projects.”\textsuperscript{399} In order to ensure success, the challenges in the area have to be scrutinized by the UNDP and its partners following the recovery period with the purpose of formulating a strategy that is able to maximize on previous successes in order to gain consensus just as it determinedly meets all challenges.

The post-summer support consisted as an entry point for the lately launched ART GOLD project. The new project provided almost a similar intervention as the first stage and a more sustainable development strategy aiming at reducing crisis and maintaining peace building. This project will

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\item[396] Ibid
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\item[398] Ibid
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also be used to test and develop new methods for reconstruction and development. It is successful outcomes to date in reaching out to most municipalities places it in an ideal place to generate broader strategies that will have long term impact.

To conclude, enhancing the Lebanese government’s capacity along with economic development plans and social reconciliation are key factors in creating a long-term solution and in ending the cycle of violence in Lebanon. Strengthening the government’s legitimacy and role is akin to a safety net against insurgency, rather than the use of military action. The UNDP presence in BSS could create a doorway through which the government can step in and assume its responsibilities and its proper role in the lives of its citizens.

Following the summer war, the UNDP made some giant efforts in providing humanitarian relief, and at a later stage, in providing such services as food aid, and funding “for water, sanitation, health projects, and de-mining efforts.” However, the organization was not really active in solidifying the government’s legitimacy or validity in the eyes of its citizens in BSS. The UNDP should have a plan of promoting and strengthening the Lebanese government.

Within this strategic context of governmental empowerment, future assistance should have a twofold aim: Provide the needed services, and increase the role of the Lebanese government through delegating some aid responsibility to certain government agencies. Accelerating the distribution of additional funding and assistance is another very important measure that the UNDP can take to empower the Lebanese government. Additionally, the presence of “ARTGOLD” in the area raises hope for implementing more developed initiatives aiming at further sustaining peace building and social development.

In conclusion, the weakness of the state, the role of non-state actors, including International organizations such as UNDP, proved again that the role of non-state actors in the development

400 Ibid
process in third world countries especially those like Lebanon that have undertaken violent and destructive conflicts, deficit and financial problems, as well as internal political and sectarian fractions, is growing.

Once more, the summer 2006 war had revealed the weakness of the Lebanese state in planning and undertaking an emergency plan capable of sustaining development and recovery. The various emerging funding towards the post-war reconstruction period in Lebanon could have brought some satisfactory financial compensation but no long term solutions. As such, now it is more than due time for the Lebanese state to re-consider the establishment of a strategic emergency plan.

On the other hand, the new positive image of UNDP in the BSS area, the positive socio-economic impacts of the implemented initiatives, the capacity building of local authority and civil society, all of the above shows the positive role an Intentional organization such UNDP can play in the reconstruction process. But once more without ignoring the leading role the state must play in setting in order to set national priorities and have control over key actors, and which is not playing in many spheres, again leaving the ground for a growing role to non-state actors.
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