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**THE LEBANESE CRISIS, AND THE PROGRAMME  
OF RECONSTRUCTION IMPLEMENTED BY UNICEF.**

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**A Research Topic  
Presented to Business Division  
Beirut University College**

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APPROVAL OF RESEARCH TOPIC

CANDIDATE LAILA BAHSALI DATE 15th SEPTEMBER 1986.

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TITLE OF RESEARCH TOPIC THE LEBANESE CRISIS, AND THE PROGRAMME OF  
RECONSTRUCTION IMPLEMENTED BY UNICEF

The following professor nominated to serve as the advisor of the  
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THE LEBANESE CRISIS AND THE  
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CHAPTER I

A. Introduction

Lebanon, a very small mediterranean republic, with a surface of 10,452 Km<sup>2</sup>, and over 3 million citizens, surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea on its West, Syria on its North-East, and Palestine (Israel) on its South; and divided administratively into 5 provinces (Muhafazats): Beirut, the capital and its suburbs, Mount-Lebanon, the North, the South, and the Bekaa, has been facing during these past 11 years, many hostilities, occupations, disruptions, disturbances, and war actions, which have damaged many premises of infrastructure, resulting in inadequate educational facilities, health services, and lack of drinking water (Especially in the South), all of which constitute priority problems, and require immediate repair and reconstruction.

B. Statement of the Problem.

The country having lost almost all of its resources, people having been displaced from their villages, and houses, causing a disrupted education for the children, business organizations, corporations, and banks closing down, unemployment and utter instability, employees with no work, citizens becoming poorer and

poorer, and a severe economic recession have made of Lebanon a very weak country on the verge of collapse and extermination, needing all kinds of help and assistance possible.

Therefore, as the country was incapable of facing the situation alone, with not enough funds to repair and help the needy citizens, an appeal was made for assistance, with all kinds of donations, grants, medical and educational services...

This is why UNICEF, which stands for the "United Nations Children's Funds", and which was already helping in the development and raising of the standards of social welfare services in child care institutions, and in the strengthening of services to widowed mothers and their children within the family structure, could not overlook its responsibility in contributing to the reconstruction of the country, in which many areas were occupied, others constantly shelled, roads blocked, destroyed, and in a state of total extinction.

The government, faced with all those problems, could only turn towards the outspread hands of UNICEF, seeking their help in as many areas as they could.

Therefore, the Lebanese Council of Ministers, in its decision on May 1980, agreed that the "Council for Development and Reconstruction" (referred to as CDR) should ask UNICEF to participate in the implementation of a programme for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development work in Lebanon, and in the South especially.

C. Problem Question.

Here, we cannot but ask ourselves some crucial questions such as:

- a. Why was UNICEF approached?
- b. What is its capacity to undertake such social and economic works?
- c. What were UNICEF's achievements in comparison with the stated needs of the country, and the possibilities of work the situation allowed for?
- d. Did it provide enough trained personnel for maintenance?
- e. The situation being as it is, can UNICEF continue with the work it is providing today?

D. Statement of the Purpose.

Being originally a Lebanese, having lived in this country for so long, remembering what it used to be, and how it stands today, it was only normal of me to choose to speak about the Lebanese crisis and situation, along with the difficulties it is facing, and the help it is receiving from donor countries in general, and UNICEF in particular, and therefore, speak about UNICEF's accomplishments, the help it is providing, without forgetting to mention the difficulties faced, the lack in training and maintenance, and the need for new donations if UNICEF is to continue with the rehabilitation programme.

E. Performance Objectives.

a- UNICEF was chosen from among the other non-profit organizations in Lebanon to perform the larger portion of the reconstruction programme, because as Beirut's regional office was the second after the European office to have been established in 1950, it covered many assistance of basic services to all the regions of the Middle-East, and North-Africa;

b- As the government was in need of help, and UNICEF ready to undertake emergency repairs, and since it had many connections with the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) and collaborated closely with it;

c- Since it was known for its neutrality, and readiness to help achieve the stated needs of the Lebanese citizens, and had the possibility of funds raising;

d- And most importantly, since it responded to emergency needs of Lebanese children affected by war, it was then conceived normal and clear that UNICEF could carry on the social work more easily and efficiently than others.

As to show and describe what were UNICEF's achievements in comparison with the stated needs of the country, the study will:

1. Enurmerate the repair, extention and up-grading of preprimary and intermediate schools which are of utmost importance to the displaced children of the area;

2. Describe the repair and restoration of existing health centers, undertaken by the agency, and discuss the required medical supplies and equipment provided;
3. Identify the repair of pumping stations, water mains and reservoirs... sponsored by the agency and discuss the organization of services, and in-service training for the personnel.

These activities, which are carried out in the fields of health, water, and education are classified under the following work plans:

1. Work Plan "I & II", a project funded through the close collaboration of UNICEF and CDR;
2. Work Plan "U" , a UNICEF funded project;
3. Work Plan "X" , funded by different foreign countries.

This report will also summarize, in brief, the emergency activities of UNICEF.

And as will be seen later, our emphasis will be mainly on work plan "I & II", as well as work plan "U", whereby we'll tabulate and present the funds, and costs of different projects, along with the areas of operation.

**F. Definition of Terms and Symbols.**

The definitions of words intended for the study of UNICEF, include the following:

UNICEF : United Nations Children's Funds;  
CDR : Council for Development and Reconstruction;  
CSHP : Community Self-help Projects;  
EEC } : Economic European Community;  
DITTO }

GERMAN AGRO : German Agricultural Cooperation.

Also in this report, we will frequently encounter the following terms, which will be defined for more clarification:

REPAIR : To put in good condition, after being damaged;  
RECONSTRUCTION : To rebuild again into what was the original form;  
REHABILITATION : To restore, to put back into a former position.



## CHAPTER II

### A. Presentation and Analysis of Results.

#### 1. The Lebanese Economic and Social Problems:

Lebanon, caught in the web of internal contractions, as well as age old regional problems, with an economy which has not had time to recover from the past 11 years destructive effects, and Israeli invasion, is facing today great difficulties.

Since the period of 1975 till 1985, the Lebanese economy has been suffering from the continuation of the state of war; in addition, the economy suffered from structural difficulties in all sectors, such as problems of transportation, lack of skilled labour, brain drain of educated professionals and poor infrastructures, while the most affected sectors from this state of war, were the Industry and Agriculture.

General reasons for these difficulties are war, physical destruction of assets and establishments, the weak state of administrative structure and the lack of investment activities.

In addition to the weak performance of the economy, came the government budget deficit and increasing public debt which was estimated at 21.1 billion Lebanese Pounds by the end of 1983.<sup>(1)</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab Countries. Arab Economic Report, (Beirut: General Union, January 1985), p. 202.

This was due to an increase in government expenditures in foreign currency, which caused a reduction in the value of the Lebanese pound and foreign assets of the Central Bank.

Furthermore, the exchange value of the Lebanese pound which has been declining, was accelerated by the rapid successions of crisis, from the full-scale fighting in the Chouf mountains and Beirut's suburbs, to the clashes between different militias, and the resumption of fighting and shelling between the two parts of the divided city.

During the Israeli invasion in summer 1982, and the renewed fighting in 1983-84, industrial establishments in Chweifat-Kfarchima zone, South of Beirut, sustained direct losses, such as the damages of plants, stocks and raw materials, estimated at LL 550 million.<sup>(2)</sup>

This dislocating economy has been made worse by the Israeli policies in South Lebanon, which imposed tight restrictions on the movements of goods and people, as it also tried to penetrate the Lebanese market by a one-way trade and the dumping of some Israeli goods into the market.

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<sup>2</sup> Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), p.2.

The drying-up of investment flows, the drop in agricultural and industrial exports resulted in a sharp reversed position in the Balance of Payments: from a surplus of around \$ 1.32 billion in 1982, to a deficit of \$ 1 billion in 1983.<sup>(3)</sup>

In short, the situation is not encouraging; the economy cannot recover from its state unless an acceptable degree of stability is re-established in the country. Until this is achieved, the economic recession can only get worse.

The Lebanese government must also provide adequate solutions to a number of serious social problems resulting from the continuous 10 years of violence and instability; most importantly are the estimated 700,000 people displaced by the fighting, the 60,666<sup>(4)</sup> apartments damaged since 1975, and the 492<sup>(5)</sup> schools damaged or destroyed since 1975, the hospitals and health centers needing repair and at last but not least, clean potable water and adequate water pumping stations.

Therefore, in the following pages to come, and before showing in details what were UNICEF's accomplishments in reconstructing the governmental premises in Lebanon, an overview of the Lebanese economic and social problems faced by the country since 1975-76

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<sup>3</sup>•Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>•Estimates given by the Resource of National Education and CDR, 1983.

<sup>5</sup>•Council for Development and Reconstruction, 1982.

is necessary. These pages will also include the damages and destructions sustained by the different sectors of the economy.

\* \* \*

a) Agriculture:

The agriculture sector which has been benefiting directly or indirectly around 7% of the 3.3 million Lebanese population in 1981, as compared to 19%<sup>(6)</sup> in 1970, has witnessed a drop in the labour force which resulted from both rural-urban migration and the situation prevailing in the country since 1975-76.

The labour force dropped from an estimated 19.7% or 127,000 persons of the total population in 1970, to around 9.2% or 64,000 persons in 1981.<sup>(7)</sup>

Recent FAO estimates have shown that agricultural output in Lebanon is falling at an annual rate of more than 2% in recent years, while population has increased by around 2.5% annually, which means an annual decrease in the self-sufficiency rate of around 5%.<sup>(8)</sup>

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6. FAO, Agriculture and Development, June 1981.

7. Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), Ch. 1, p.5.

8. FAO estimates, 1981.

The inflow of Israeli agricultural products into the Lebanese market constituted a major threat to the farmers, since such products were sold at a lower price than the Lebanese products. Therefore, the uncontrolled entry of such products into Lebanon has pushed Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, as well as other Arab countries to place restrictions on Lebanese Agricultural exports because of fear that the Israeli products would find their ways into their markets.

On the other hand, the poultry farms were affected during the 1981 Bekaa fightings, where the largest number of such farms are located. Damages were close to LL 25 million, while production dropped to 21 million broilers in 1981, and 20 million in 1982.<sup>(9)</sup>

Another feature to look into concerns the Lebanese fruit production and exports.

In 1981, as a result of the armed clashes around Zahlé in the Bekaa, fruit exports dropped by around 4%, resulting from the 7% drop in the total fruit production.

A further drop in fruit exports and production occurred during 1982-83, as a result of the Israeli invasion and confrontation between different militias.

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<sup>9</sup>Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), p. 14.

The proportion of total fruit exports going to Syria, and which was the largest, dropped from 41.2% in 1980, to 21.4% in 1982.

Iraq's share dropped from 5% in 1980, to 2.9% in 1982;  
Saudi Arabia's share increased from 23.9% to 32.5%;  
Kuwait's share also increased from 10.7% to 15% in 1982;  
while Jordan's share remained relatively the same, close to 7%.<sup>(10)</sup>

We can conclude by saying that the agricultural sector has sustained heavy direct and indirect losses as a result of the repeated bouts of fighting in Lebanon since 1975-76. Direct losses include the destruction of farms' equipment and structures, especially in the Bekaa, the South and the mountains, with the poultry farms badly hit.

The irrigation system in many areas was badly damaged.

Also in view of the general state of insecurity which has prevailed in the rural areas, crops were left unharvested and many lands were unexploited or underutilized.

In all, direct losses in the period from 1975-76 up to and including the Israeli invasion in Summer 1982, are estimated at more than LL 500 million,<sup>(11)</sup> while indirect losses in the form of production are considerably higher.

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<sup>10</sup>. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, fruit office, 1983.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., p. 16.

b) Industry:

The industrial sector and in particular the manufacturing industry was the main sector to be affected by the civil war and Israeli invasion, either through physical destruction, or loss of invested capital, loss of markets, lack of man-power, and/or increasing debt to the banks.

Direct losses in the industrial sector during the hostilities of 1975-76 were estimated at between LL 500 million and 700 million, and indirect losses at somewhere between a minimum of LL 972 million and a maximum of LL 2.2 billion.<sup>(12)</sup>

An estimated 150 industrial establishments with a total paid-up capital of LL 1 billion were destroyed, another 321 establishments were damaged and close to 20% of fixed capital in industry was lost.<sup>(13)</sup>

Renewed fighting in the second-half of 1978 forced most industrial establishments to operate at close to 60% of capacity; between 1978-80, industrial output at current prices increased by 80%, from LL 2.5 billion to LL 4.5 billion.<sup>(14)</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>. Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), Ch.2, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup>. Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>14</sup>. Ibid., p. 33.

Direct losses sustained by industrial establishments in and around Zahlé (Bekaa) were close to LL 2 billion;<sup>(15)</sup> indirect losses were also large.

During the period between 1975-76 to 1981, the industrial labour force dropped by nearly 50%, and productive capacity declined by around 25%.<sup>(16)</sup>

The Israeli invasion in Summer 1982 made things worse; many plants and factories in the South and in Beirut and its suburbs were either damaged or completely destroyed. The closure of Beirut's port and airport has cut-off many industries from export markets and supplies of materials, and these, along with the rationing of electric power and the low labour turnout, forced even those industries located outside the areas of fighting to stop production or to operate below full capacity.

In early September 1983, when fighting broke out again in Beirut and its suburbs, and in the mountains industrial losses were substantial. An estimated LL 200 million of industrial production was lost, and many establishments were hit or destroyed.<sup>(17)</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>. Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>16</sup>. Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>17</sup>. Ibid., p. 34.



As of the beginning of September 1983, and up to the time of this writing, a total of 100 establishments in the area of Schweifat-Kfarchima (South of Beirut) were completely shut down because of the security situation in that area. These establishments employed around 25,000 full-time and part-time workers, which today are unemployed or laid-off.

Therefore, as a result of the unstable political and security situation, many industrialists became reluctant to expand capacity or to update and modernize the machineries.

Another negative impact of the war was that many Lebanese skilled industrial workers were lured by the better pay in the Gulf countries, and therefore left the country, creating a shortage in the labour force, which was accentuated by the population displacements from their villages as a result of the state of war and instability

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c) The Port of Beirut & Air Transports of Lebanon

i- Port of Beirut:

In 1976, and especially starting in March, the port of Beirut area was transformed into a battle ground. Most of the cargo left in the storage areas and warehouses were looted, and many of the warehouses and cargo handling facilities were put to flames.

Further damages occurred in the second-half of 1978 as a result of the fighting which erupted between different militias.

In all, the damage to the Port of Beirut in form of burnt and destroyed warehouses, cargo equipment and other facilities in 1975-76 up to 1978 was estimated at LL 67 million.<sup>(18)</sup> The total value of merchandise which was stored in the Port's free zone, and the custom zone warehouses and which was stolen or destroyed by fire was estimated at LL 2.10 billion in 1975 and LL 30 million in 1978. Around 60% of this merchandise was destined to Lebanon and the remaining 40% was in transit.<sup>(19)</sup>

The following table will show us the war damage to the Port of Beirut. No further information concerning the destructions after the period of 1978 is available.

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18. Iskandar, Marwan; and Baroudi, Elais. The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83. Published in April 1984 by the Middle East Economic Consultants. The Port of Beirut Ch.4, p.130. Estimation made by the "Compagnie de Gestion et d'Exploitation du Port de Beyrouth".

19. Ibid., p. 130.

Table 1.1Estimates of Damage to Beirut Port Equipment

	(LL Million)	
	1975-76	1978
- Total Warehouses	25.0	5.1
a.- 53 covered warehouses	13.0	-
b.- 30 Open-Air warehouses	7.0	-
c.-100 Private warehouses (Free Zone)	5.0	-
- Administrative Buildings (customs, workshops, internal security)	5.0	-
- Handling Equipment (95% of existing equipment was destroyed)	25.0	2.6
- Damage of utilities	1.0	-
- Clean-up & Removal of Debris	2.6	0.9
T O T A L	58.6	8.6
Merchandise Burnt or Looted	2,100.0	30.0

Source: Compagnie de Gestion et d'Exploitation du  
Port de Beyrouth, 1981.

ii- Air Transport:

Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1975, Beirut International Airport (BIA) has had to close on a number of occasions for varying reasons, and varying periods, including a shut-down of 14 weeks in summer 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The successive closures of the airports, and the damage sustained by the facilities and installations resulted in serious losses to Lebanon's national passenger and cargo airlines, MEA and TMA.

Damage sustained by the airports was estimated at a minimum of LL 150 million,<sup>(20)</sup> including the losses sustained in 1982 following the Israeli invasion.

The frequent interruptions at the airports have had an adverse effect on various activities related to air transport. Many business opportunities in transport and complementary activities were forgone. The fall in passenger traffic and air freight activities resulted in a drop in revenues from duties and other taxes, a vital source of revenue to the government, contributing in the past to a monthly average between LL 8 million and LL 10 million to total revenues.<sup>(21)</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>. Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>21</sup>. Ibid., p. 143.

d) The Banking and Monetary Situation:

The Banking sector remained largely unaffected by the unstable situation in Lebanon in the period from 1975 to the early eighties, and provided a rare bright spot in the Lebanese economy. However, in 1982-83, some strains began to show, as most banks were facing many problems and limitations which were the results of Lebanon's long period of strife and instability, and of which the most important are the following:

i. The accumulation of bad debts:

Starting from 1975-76, a large number of commercial, industrial, and other establishments sustained damages which made it impossible for them to meet their debt obligations. Faced with a declining economy, especially in 1983, some clients were unable to pay their loans according to schedules. As a result of that, there has been a rise in the proportion of bad debts in the portfolio of most commercial banks.

ii. The slow-down in import-export activity:

This had a serious effect on the commercial banks, since the issuing of letters of credit and letters of guarantee constitutes a major profitable aspect of their operations.

iii. Excessive competition:

The general slow down in the economic activity forced

banks towards increasing their competition in order to maintain their share of the volume of banking activity. Many have had imprudent and unguaranteed loans, and thus, faced large losses from default.

iv. The rise in operating costs:

Many banks have opened a series of new branches in different parts and areas of Lebanon during the last few years in order to meet the increasing geographic decentralisation of economic activity. These branches have thus added significantly to the operating costs, without providing the expected return in terms of increased activity and clients, and therefore in Gross Revenue.<sup>(22)</sup>

Turning to the monetary situation, the rise in total liquidity in 1982 was brought about largely through a 106% increase in savings and time deposits in Lebanese pounds with demand deposits and currency in circulation growing by 25.3% and 20.7%<sup>(23)</sup> respectively.

However, in the first half of 1983, deposits in foreign currencies increased by 22.8%, while savings and time deposits (LL) rose by 13.6%, and demand deposits and currency in circulation remained unchanged.<sup>(24)</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>. Ibid., pp 207-209. Ch.5, Banking Activity & Monetary Developments.

<sup>23</sup>. Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>24</sup>. Ibid., p. 211.

The shift from deposits in Lebanese pounds to foreign currency deposits was brought about by the continuing instability in Lebanon, and the general uncertainty about economic prospects and the exchange value of the Lebanese pounds.

The main factor affecting domestic liquidity were claims on public and private sectors. Net claims on public sector increased by 93.5% in 1982, but the rate of increase dropped to 4.1% in the first half of 1983. Claims on private sector rose to 18.4% in 1983 as compared to 18.9% for the whole of 1982. Net external assets which have dropped by 19.9% over the whole of 1982, rose again by 5.1% in the first half of 1983.<sup>(25)</sup>

The Monetary situation of Lebanon in 1982-1983 will be shown in table 1.2

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

Table 1.2Monetary Situation in 1982-1983

(LL Million)

	31/3/82	30/6/82	30/9/82	31/12/82	31/3/83	30/6/83
Paper Currency	4,568	5,262	5,665	5,582	5,251	5,583
Demand Deposits in L.L.	4,393	4,488	5,028	5,488	5,388	5,525
Other Deposits in L.L.	17,722	18,900	20,761	26,014	27,636	29,563
Deposits in Foreign Curren- cies	16,728	17,373	13,624	11,473	13,603	14,092
Other Net Liabilities of the Banking Sector	5,622	5,191	4,537	6,891	6,782	6,864
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>48,391</b>	<b>51,214</b>	<b>49,615</b>	<b>55,448</b>	<b>58,660</b>	<b>61,626</b>
Net External Assets	21,995	21,315	17,099	18,608	19,512	19,563
Claims on the Public Sector	2,384	4,389	7,012	10,844	10,711	11,293
Claims on the Private Sector	23,654	25,510	25,504	25,996	28,437	30,770

Source: Bank of Lebanon



e) The State Budget:

Because of the persistent budget deficit in recent years, and government borrowing to finance urgent expenditures, the public debt increased rapidly. By the end of 1982, the public debt was estimated to have reached LL 16.5 billion, and at the end of 1983 the figure was estimated at LL 23 billion.<sup>(26)</sup>

The government's efforts since 1977 to enhance economic recovery, and to sustain a satisfactory level of economic activity amidst the prevailing insecurity and political uncertainty, have necessitated steady annual increases in state budget allocations from: LL 4 billion in 1980, to LL 6.3 billion in 1982, and LL 8.6 billion in 1983<sup>(27)</sup>; priority under the state budget allocations in recent years has been given to defence, education and public works.

On the other hand, government revenue has fallen sharply since 1975-76, with the widespread insecurity preventing the proper collection of taxes and the absence of state control along the coastline, leading to the rise of illegal ports which have cut-off a substantial part of customs receipts which is a major source of state revenue.

The decline in state revenue since 1975-76 resulted in a persistent and widening deficit in the state budget.

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<sup>26</sup> Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), Ch.8, p. 270.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 270.

Table 1.3Projected State Budget Revenue, 1974-1983

(LL Million)

	1974	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983
Direct Taxes & Other duties	324	548	719	1,013	1,196	1,426
Indirect Taxes & duties	485	625	964	1,111	726	2,230
Revenues from State property & Investments	31	22	28	22	23	24
Other Revenues	169	206	789	855	1,500	1,404
SUBTOTAL	1,012	1,403	2,501	3,001	3,445	5,084
Extraordinary (Budget Deficit)	213	857	1,506	1,488	2,855	3,525
T O T A L	1,225	2,260	4,007	4,489	6,300	8,610

Source: Ministry of Finance, 1984.

Budget receipt in Lebanon may be grouped into three categories, as was seen in the previous table: direct fees and taxes, indirect revenue, and revenue from state property.

Direct taxes and fees include the income tax, the built-up property tax, land registration fees, stamp fees, and private motor vehicle tax.

Indirect taxes include customs duties, taxes on fuel and cement.<sup>(28)</sup>

Looking at the revenue projected under the state budget, we note that it increased considerably between 1980-83, though at a slower rate than the increase in allocations. The resultant deficit forced the Lebanese government to borrow heavily from both the Commercial banks and the Bank of Lebanon.

In 1980, the projected revenue under the state budget amounted to LL 2.5 billion, as compared to total budget allocations of LL 4 billion, reflecting thus a deficit ratio of 37%.<sup>(29)</sup> Projected revenue rose to LL 3 billion in 1981, as compared with total allocations of LL 4.489 billion.<sup>(30)</sup>

In 1982, the total projected revenue was LL 3.545 billion, with a budget deficit projected at LL 2.855 billion.<sup>(31)</sup>

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28. Ibid., p. 278.

29. Ibid., p. 282.

30. Ibid., p. 282.

31. Ibid., p. 282.

The projected deficit widened further in 1983, to reach LL 3.525 billion. Projected revenue for 1983 was raised considerably due to the encouraging political and climate security, to reach L.L 5.084 billion, while total state budget allocations was L.L.8.610 billion.<sup>(32)</sup>

Extraordinary state revenue under the state budget, and which reflects the size of the deficit was only LL 213 million in 1974, but rose to LL 857 million in 1978, and LL 1.506 billion in 1980. In 1981, the deficit rose to LL 1,488 billion, and under the budget of 1982 and 1983 the deficit was around LL 2.855 billion and LL 3.525 billion respectively.<sup>(33)</sup>

Turning to customs receipts which traditionally account for around 35% of the total state revenue, we note that the sharp drop in 1975-76, was due to the closure of Beirut Port. The situation worsened in 1978, as customs receipts dropped mainly because of renewed fighting in areas surrounding the Port of Beirut. In 1979 and 1980, there were some improvements as a result of better security conditions, but in 1981, they dropped to LL 436 million, or 36% less than what was collected in 1980.<sup>(34)</sup>

Therefore, the Lebanese government faced with a persistent and widening budget deficit since 1975-76, resorted to borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon and Commercial banks, as well as from external sources.

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<sup>32</sup>. Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>33</sup>. Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>34</sup>. Ibid., pp. 282-283.

Available statistics show that the state budget deficit was financed by the banking sector (commercial banks and Bank of Lebanon) by the amount of LL 865 million in 1978, LL 1,214 million in 1979, and nearly LL 2 billion in 1980.<sup>(35)</sup>

The public sector indebtedness to the banking sector increased further to reach LL 2.389 billion in 1981, and LL 10.844 billion in 1982.<sup>(36)</sup>

The public sector's net position with the Bank of Lebanon shifted from creditor LL 984 million at the end of 1981, to debtor LL 620 million at the end of 1982. Government borrowing from the bank of Lebanon started in 1976 to bridge the budget deficit which resulted from the drop in government revenue. By the end of 1982, the Bank of Lebanon claims on the public sector reached LL 1.752 billion, as compared with LL 1.981 billion by the end of 1981.<sup>(37)</sup>

The growth in the Bank of Lebanon's claims on the public sector was mainly attributed to the failure of the Lebanese government to cover its deficit through subscriptions by commercial banks to treasury bills. But when subscriptions to treasury bills picked up, the bank's claims on the treasury fell from LL 4.002 billion in 1982, to 2.203 billion, and LL 1.752 billion at the end of that same year, 1982.<sup>(38)</sup>

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35. Ibid., p. 285.

36. Ibid., p. 286.

37. Ibid., pp. 286-288.

38. Ibid., p. 288.

The successive issues of treasury bills, however, have meant an increase in the public sector's indebtedness to commercial banks from LL 3.337 billion at the end of 1981, to LL 3.380 billion at the end of June 1982, and LL 10.224 billion by the end of the year. (39)

Despite the improvement in customs receipts and tax collection in 1983, the public debt continued to rise mainly because of the increased expenditure on rebuilding the army and the need to finance major public projects with the urgency dictated by political considerations. The situation worsened with the outbreak of renewed fighting in Mount-Lebanon and the Chouf, and the huge financial burden to the government which was caused by the fighting. As a result, public debt was estimated to have reached LL 23 billion by the end of 1983. (40)

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f) Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments:

Because of the limited size of the local market, the industrial and agricultural products are largely export-oriented, and because of the Lebanese high propensity to import, the foreign trade sector has always been of a vital importance in the Lebanese economy; and because of its limited resources, imports were greater than exports, causing therefore a large trade deficit.

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39. Ibid., p. 288.

40. Ibid., p. 288.

Foreign trade activity was largely affected by the hostilities which swept Lebanon since 1975-76. The large losses in the industrial and agricultural sectors, the widespread of fighting, and war actions caused by the Israeli invasion in 1982, have led to a sharp decline in the exports; (Lebanon's main merchandise exports were: vegetables, metal products, textiles, cement, glass, etc...

As for imports, statistical information show that Lebanese Imports were LL 5.9 billion in 1977, and with a 12% increase in 1978, largely because of illegal ports.<sup>(41)</sup> In 1982, imports increased to LL 13.5 billion, and amounted to around LL 7.5 billion in the first half of 1983.<sup>(42)</sup>

The table below illustrates the development of the Balance of Trade during 1980-83.

<u>Table 1.4</u>				
<u>Balance of Trade 1980-83</u>				
(LL Million)				
	1980	1981	1982	1983
Exports(fob)	2,983	3,608	3,450	2,799
Imports(fob)	11,614	13,977	14,895	15,260
Balance of Trade	-8,631	-10,369	-11,445	-12,461
(-) deficit.				

Source: IMF, Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, 1984.

<sup>41</sup>. Ibid., Ch.9, pp. 291-293.

<sup>42</sup>. Ibid., p. 294.

In spite of the large trade deficit, Lebanon achieved a net surplus on its balance of payments estimated at LL 1.49 billion in 1980, LL 1.2 billion in 1981, and LL 1.32 billion in 1982.<sup>(43)</sup> This overall surplus was the result of a large surplus on the remittances and capital accounts.

The balance of payments position was reversed dramatically in 1983, with a net deficit estimated by the Bank of Lebanon at nearly \$ 1 billion, or around LL 5.4 billion at the exchange rate prevailing at the end of that year.<sup>(44)</sup>

A number of factors brought about the change in the balance of payments. For one thing, the trade deficit in 1983 was larger than in 1980-82, this was due to the sharp decline in exports at a time when imports remained steady. For another, remittances from Lebanese workers abroad are estimated to have drastically dropped in 1983, largely because of the economic situation in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. It was also believed that there was a considerable flight of capital from the country, because of the political uncertainty and unstable security conditions.

Finally purchases of arms and ammunitions for the Lebanese army, constituted another severe drain on Lebanon's foreign exchange reserves during the year.

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<sup>43</sup>. Ibid., p. 300.

<sup>44</sup>. Ibid., p. 300.



Now turning to another aspect of the Lebanese crisis, i.e. the social problems faced by the Lebanese Population since the 1975-76 outbreak of violence, and which have gave outcomes and implications.

This section will comprise problems concerning water supply, education, and housing; and although these problems can be, and are parts of the Lebanese economy, as they were subject to damages and destructions and needed repair, and/or reconstruction, yet they also constitute grave social problems which will be discussed in the following lines.

\* \* \*

g) Water Supply:

In fact, and since the late sixties, Beirut has faced an increasingly difficult water supply problem. Studies for a project to supply 30 million cubic meters a year of potable water to Beirut from the Awali river were completed in 1969, but its implementation was to start in 1983. The total cost of that project was estimated at LL 43 million in 1969.

This water shortage in Beirut and its suburbs in the natural outcome of a number of factors:

- The distribution network is in a bad state of deterioration;

- The delay in the implementation of water supply projects;
- Maintenance work was made impossible in some areas due to the fighting which raged in the period 1975-76 to 1983.

During this period, the total population of Beirut swelled considerably, following the hostilities, bombardements, shelling, and killing of innocent citizens and which have caused around 362,000 persons to leave their villages seeking security in other areas, and placing therefore considerable pressure on the water distribution network which was not upgraded at anything like the rate of growth in demand.

Therefore, as the water supply network in Beirut and its suburbs suffered extensive damage during the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982, and as the repair of this damage was beyond the capabilities of the "Bureau des Eaux de Beyrouth", help was sought from the government of West Germany and which was provided free of charge.

Special attention was given to potable water supply and irrigation projects.

Several projects were initiated and comprised a number of water supply projects under the UNICEF projects for South Lebanon (which will be discussed later, in the second part of this chapter).

Of these, 18 projects were completed prior to the 1982 invasion, at a cost of LL 1.768 million,<sup>(45)</sup> and included the installation of pumps, the repair of water reservoirs and the construction of new reservoirs, and the installation of water distribution pipelines.

A further 41 similar projects involving a total outlay of LL 4.41 million<sup>(46)</sup> were nearly finished at the time of the invasion, but unfortunately most of the work completed were undone by the war.

A total of LL 1.94 million in damage were sustained by the water pumping stations in Beirut and its suburbs, in addition to LL 13.575 million in damage to pipe installations. Pumping stations in the South of Lebanon were also severely damaged and rehabilitation costs were estimated at close to LL 15 million; in addition, the irrigation system in the South Sustained damage estimated at LL 4.5 million.<sup>(47)</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>. Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>46</sup>. Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>47</sup>. Ibid., p. 199.

#### h) Housing Problems:

Lebanon housing problem has grave social and political implications, since it is borne mainly by low and middle income families, while there is a surplus of luxury housing units which can be afforded by higher income groups.

An estimated 112,000 housing units were partially damaged or completely destroyed in the period from 1975-76 to the end of 1982, of which some 72,000 units were damaged during the Israeli invasion.<sup>(48)</sup>

In Beirut and Mount-Lebanon alone, a total of 9,888 housing units were damaged or destroyed, of which 9,727 units were in Beirut, including 2,808 houses partially damaged, another 4,822 severely damaged, and the remaining 2,258 totally destroyed. The total value of damages in the 1982 prices is estimated at LL 2,834 million in Beirut, LL 515 million in South Lebanon, and LL 85 million in Mount-Lebanon.<sup>(49)</sup>

Damages to public buildings and military barracks were estimated at around LL 200 million, not including government buildings in South Lebanon, for which estimates are not available.<sup>(50)</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Estimates from the Council for Development and Reconstruction, 1982.

<sup>49</sup> Marwan Iskandar and Elias Baroudi, The Lebanese Economy in 1982-83, (Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants, April 1984), Ch.3, p. 68.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 330.

Lebanon's housing problem is perhaps no where more serious than in Beirut southern suburbs.

Israeli invasion and aggressions in the South, starting from the late sixties, resulted in a growing movement of low-income farming families from the South towards Beirut where they settled, mainly in the southern suburbs. Gradually, the area became overpopulated, with a total population estimated at 600,000 persons in 1983.<sup>(51)</sup>

As this population swelled, an accute housing shortage developed, and the absence of government control and authority, public and privately-owned land was taken for the building of illegal apartment blocks and houses.

Illegal building activity in recent years, has extended to the perimeter of Beirut International Airport, thus posing a threat to civil aviation.

Renewed fighting in the Chouf mountains, Beirut and Tripoli in 1983 brought a further wave of destruction to houses and property, and additional population displacements.

As for the estimated damages caused by the Israeli invasion to the hospitals and health centers, the amount of LL 174 million was sustained, of which 65% were in buildings and the remainder in equipment.

Damage to health institutions in South Lebanon totalled around LL114.3 million, and were concentrated in Tyre and Nabatiyeh region.<sup>(52)</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>. Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>52</sup>. Ibid., p. 330. CDR, 1982.

i) Education:

A large number of schools and vocational training institutes were destroyed or damaged as a result of the continuous fighting between different militias as of 1975-76, from the Israeli invasion at that time and in 1982, and the renewed fighting in 1983 and the first part of 1984.

During the academic year 1979-80, Lebanon had 1,430 schools, 480 private non-commercial schools and 548 private commercial schools, or a total of 2,458 schools at all pre-university levels.<sup>(53)</sup>

Total school enrolment in 1979-80 was estimated at 752,555 students, or around 25% of the Lebanese estimated population of 3.3 million.<sup>(54)</sup>

Estimates provided by the "Resource of National Education, and CDR" state that 492 schools were damaged or destroyed starting from 1975 till the writing of this paper, while 295 schools stopped functioning, mainly because they are situated in dangerous areas.

Estimates of damage caused by the Israeli invasion in 1982 were:

- In the South, 50 public schools and 24 private schools providing education to around 33,405 students were partially damaged. Another 16 schools in the same region were totally destroyed.<sup>(55)</sup>

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53. Ibid., p. 307.

54. Ibid., p. 308.

55. Estimates prepared by the Council for Development and Reconstruction, 1982.

- Damage to vocational school buildings in the South were around LL 4.99 million, in addition to equipment losses close to LL 205,000.<sup>(56)</sup>
- Another LL 10 million in damage were sustained by the vocational school at Bir-Hassan in Beirut, with losses in equipment amounting to LL 400,000.<sup>(57)</sup>

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Therefore, in such a moribund situation with a continuous outbreak of violence, hostilities and shelling since 1975-76, many localities or areas became over-populated by the displaced persons who ran from their devastated or ravaged villages, leaving behind their possessions, houses, and/or dead beloved-ones. Losses were inestimable: houses on which the owners spent their lives building, stone over stone were burnt; lands, furniture, shops... everything owned was destroyed.

Over 100,000 persons left their homes in very cruel circumstances, to find themselves piled in the reception centers, waiting for the humanitarian organizations to help. The major part of these displaced persons, exiled in their own country, have not been integrated in the society.

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<sup>56</sup>. CDR, 1982.

<sup>57</sup>. CDR, 1982.

Children who have left their devastated villages, and destroyed schools are still without education. Their parents, who have become poorer, often do not own enough money to buy their daily provisions, so how can they afford to send their children to school?

And if we were to turn towards the government, to the help it can provide these children, we see that it is almost impossible; the reason is that many public schools, situated in safer areas, are today occupied by the displaced persons, each family in a room.

Many persons, and especially the children, were deprived from warm clothes, as many ran in the summer clothes they had on, unaware of their future misery; some were without shoes, without beds and covers, and had to sleep on wooden-boards in the shelters or parkings supervised for them, or even in the open air, under the trees.

Many had, in order to give a bath to their children, to transport water in whatever available kittles they had, from the tab, to the so-called bathroom which in fact is a dark corridor or corner.

There was a shortage of water everywhere, especially in the so-called safer areas which became overpopulated, placing thus a heavy pressure on water distribution network which was originally designed to supply the limited amount of persons in that or that area.



2,000 is the number of war handicapped children,<sup>(58)</sup> and this figure omits all those sicknesses caused by the long days and nights spent in damp shelters, eating whatever available food there was, pretending covers were beds, without speaking of the hygienic conditions which are almost inexistant. Each person had the right to a shower per month, with a polluted and cold water that no child or old man could stand. These were the causes of diarrhoea, flu and skin infections.<sup>(59)</sup>

Aliment rations were distributed by 1,200 calories<sup>(60)</sup> per person, per day. Sweets, cigarettes and coffee-considered as luxury items- are inexistant, as they do not figure in the list of products sent by the humanitarian centers.

Children have lost the taste for games; many have perished from malnutrition and need of medecines. 11 years of war have taught us that shelling in Lebanon, as opposed to the different wars in the world, is aiming not at military positions only, but at the civil population, notably the children. The Lebanese child is the first victim; mortality in children is 20% greater than in adults.<sup>(61)</sup>

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58. Aida Kamar, "Education: Bad hygienic conditions", Magazine (24 March 1984, No.1390), p. 33.

59. Ibid., p. 33.

60. Claude Abou Nader, "Lebanon", Magazine (3 Dec. 1983, No. 1374), p. 19.

61. Aida Kamar, "Education: Insecurity", Magazine (3 Dec. 1983, No.1374), p. 34.

Many children became orphans during these past years, without a father or a mother, and sometimes without both. The situation is tragic when mothers tend to lose their husbands, without having any kind of professional skill to help them in finding work. In such circumstances, the family is condemned to misery.

Such is the grim reality; men without work, children without schools, and often left without either parents. Refugees, as they have been called, live from the donations received. They have been humiliated, dishonored, and in addition to financial and social problems, they have psychological disturbances caused by the feeling of non-belonging, inadaptation, disgust and fear.

And now, from the perspective of the Lebanese citizens who are not refugees, those who have remained in their houses, areas or villages, we notice that in such families, few children are really desired, and pregnancy represents for a large number of female, the obsessions of insecurity and dark future.

Besides, a decline in birth-rate has been manifested, and figures show a decline of 20% at the AUH hospital, 35% at the St. Georges hospital and 30% at the Rizk hospital; while demands for abortions are dreadful.<sup>(62)</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>. Aida Kamar, "Education: Il n'y aura plus d'Enfants", Magazine (3 Decembre 1984, No. 1380), p. 30.

At the time of birth, instead of the feeling of joy and thankfulness, parents tend to be worried about what kind of future and stability they can offer to this newly-born child.

Recent statistics have shown an increase in the number of divorces, causing a painful situation for both parents and children.

In every family there is an increase in conflict, resulting from financial problems, confessional and specially from nervous tension.

The basic conclusion to be drawn from the preceding study of the Lebanese social and economic situation is unmistakably a very grim one.

Activity in most sectors were severely disrupted, and premises severely damaged or destroyed, resulting thus in inadequate educational facilities, lack of potable water, destruction of houses and hospitals; ports and airports were constantly shelled, leading to their forced closure, and resulting therefore, in export and import decline, in lesser customs receipts and taxes, and therefore in lesser state revenue.

Persons running from their villages, leaving behind everything they owned, had to be taken care off.

International organizations such as the Red Cross, Caritas and UNICEF have provided great help when the refugees arrived from every part of Lebanon, especially from the South, and the Chouf.

And needless to say, the Lebanese government faced with such a situation was incapable of providing alone all the help needed.

Therefore, on January 31 1977, and under decree Law No.5, the Lebanese government established the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), to replace the Ministry of Planning, and entrusted it with the task of preparing and following up the implementation of an overall reconstruction and development plan to overcome the ravages of the past years hostilities, as it also entrusted it the task of negotiating external technical and economic assistance agreements.

So UNICEF which was already helping in the development and raising of the standard of social welfare services in child care institutions, and which was supplying food for children, cooking utensils, medicines, drugs, blankets, mattresses, and clothing to the displaced people, was approached by the CDR, to assist in implementing some of the reconstruction and rehabilitation work projects, related to health, water and education.

A summary of the estimated damage and/or destructions caused by the Israeli invasion in 1982, as to the sectors of schools, health institutions, potable water, housing, port, airport, agriculture and industry will be shown in the following table.

Table 1.5

Estimates of Damage caused by the Israeli  
Invasion in 1982.

(L.L thousand)

SCHOOLS:

a. South Lebanon:	
- Public schools	34,871
- Private schools	29,248
- Vocational schools	5,195
b. Beirut:	
- Public schools	13,210
- Private schools	17,305
- Directorate of Youth & Sports	209,500
- Vocational schools	10,400
TOTAL SCHOOLS:	319,729

HEALTH INSTITUTIONS:

a. South Lebanon (Public & Private)	114,307
b. Beirut	
- Public	111,850
- Private	62,200
TOTAL HEALTH	288,357

POTABLE WATER:

a. South Lebanon	15,000
b. Beirut	15,515
TOTAL POTABLE WATER	30,515

IRRIGATION (SOUTH LEBANON)

4,500

GOVERNMENT BUILDING (BEIRUT) <sup>(1)</sup>

60,465

ARMY BUILDINGS:

a. Beirut	55,000
b. Mount Lebanon	1,000
c. South Lebanon	34,000
d. Bekaa' & North Lebanon	50,000
TOTAL ARMY BUILDINGS	140,000

<sup>1</sup>. Estimates of damage in South Lebanon are not available.

Table 1.5 (Continued)

	(LL thousand)
<u>BEIRUT AIRPORT</u>	120,000
<u>BEIRUT PORT</u>	36,000
<u>AGRICULTURE (SOUTH LEBANON)</u> <sup>(2)</sup>	203,500
<u>INDUSTRY</u>	357,385
<u>HOUSING:</u>	
a. South Lebanon	515,525
b. Beirut	2,833,763
c. Mount Lebanon	85,365
	<hr/>
TOTAL HOUSING	3,434,654
GRAND TOTAL	4,995,105

SOURCE: CDR, 1982.  
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<sup>2</sup> Estimates of Damage in Beirut are not available.

## 2- UNICEF Historical Background.

UNICEF was created on the 11th of December 1946, to help meet the emergency needs of children in post-war Europe and China, for food, medicines and clothing.

In 1950, the General Assembly enlarged UNICEF's mandate to emphasize programmes of long-range benefit to children of developing countries.

In 1953, the General Assembly decided that UNICEF should continue this work indefinitely, and its name which stood first for the "United Nations Children's Emergency Funds", was changed to the "United Nations Children's Funds"; the words "International" and "Emergency" being dropped, but the familiar "UNICEF" acronym was retained.

As mentioned before, UNICEF in Lebanon was first established in 1950; its Beirut Office was the second in the world after the Europe offices.

UNICEF, through its country offices, cooperates with developing countries government, in the effort to meet the needs of children, gearing cooperation to each country's situation, but with a relatively greater support for the least-developed ones.

### 3- Organization.

UNICEF is an integral, but semi-autonomous part of the United Nations, with 41 member Executive Board, which usually meets once a year to establish policies, review programmes and approve budgets...

The Executive Director, who is responsible for the administration of UNICEF, is appointed in consultation with the Board, by the United Nations Secretary General; and since 1980, the Executive Director has been Mr. James P. Grant.

### 4- Goals and Policies

#### a) Basic right of child:

UNICEF's ultimate goal is to enable every child to enjoy the basic rights of children, which are:

- the protection and up-bringing in a family;
- community environment, designated to promote their health and well-being.

UNICEF does not only seek support for its programmes, but also to increase public awareness of children problems, by advocacy with the governments, civic leaders, educators, and the public at large.

It cooperates with the government of the country involved, and gives greater attention to those programmes benefiting



children and the family, including water supply, health and nutrition, education and improvement in the situation of women.

Help is given to develop these policies, and this through advisory services, or exchange of experience, training, procurement and delivery of supplies and equipment.

Implementing these policies give us programmes, provided with the cooperation of a range of sectoral ministries or authorities, including those responsible for health, education, social services, agriculturerural development, community development, water supply and sanitation.

b) Women's Concern:

A new policy of UNICEF concerns women, whom due to the persistence of traditional attitudes and practices, were prevented from moving into the social and economic main-stream of their societies.

UNICEF therefore recommends that women's activities should be development-oriented, rather than welfare-based, and that all actions should be taken to yield direct social, health, and economic benefits to women living in poverty, for their own well-being.

c) Low-Cost Health Techniques:

UNICEF is particularly concerned with the continuing high rates of infant and young children mortality and disease.

Researches and on the field-work have shown the following basic indicators in Lebanon:

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1984</u>
<u>Infant Mortality Rate</u> (under 1 year)	75	48
<u>Total Population</u> (millions)	-	2.6
<u>Annual Number of Birth/infant</u> <u>and Child Death</u> (0-4 years)	-	78/5
<u>GNP/Capita</u> (US \$)	-	1070
<u>Life Expectancy</u> at birth(years)	-	65
<u>% Adults literate</u> male/female	-	83/64
<u>% Age Group Enrolled</u> in Primary schools Male/Female	-	115/105
<u>% Share of Household</u> income	-	-

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Source: United Nations Population Division, United Nations  
Statistical Office and UNESCO.

UNICEF believes possible to the world to reduce deaths and prevent disabilities by at least half, within a decade, through the use of a handful of low-cost actions or practical means such as:

1. Growth checking, i.e (detecting malnutrition);
2. Oral Rehydration Theory (ORT);
3. Breast-Feeding; and
4. Universal Immunization by 1990.

Other measures taken against causes of child death are the spreading of knowledge and basic skills within the community; special attention should be given to:

- a. Family spacing of births; and
- b. Food supplements.

which contribute in improving the health and nutrition of mothers and children, and further reduce death.

Lebanon, as well as other 40 developing countries are following UNICEF's programme of the "Child Survival and Development Revolution", by implementing one or all of these four low-cost methods to reduce death and malnutrition in children.

## 5- Criteria used to implement the projects.

### a) Procedures:

The procedures followed by UNICEF to implement the projects of reconstruction are summarized as follows:

Projects are identified in collaboration with the official authorities and the ministries concerned. Then a work plan is prepared by UNICEF, which summarizes the projects by their different sectors, i.e. water, health and education, along with their locations and rough costs estimates.

This work plan is then reviewed by the ministries concerned and after discussions, it is sent to CDR for endorsement, review and approval.

After approval, UNICEF starts preparing files for each and every individual project, based on a site survey. These files contain detailed information concerning the location of work, the sources of funds, the authorities concerned, the method of implementation, the time of completion, and estimated costs based on market prices.

These files are then discussed in a joint CDR/UNICEF committee for approval, after which UNICEF's engineers undertake a detailed survey concerning the project involved, and prepare the tender documents, which are of 3 types:

- Open tendering;
- Selective tendering; and
- Mutual agreement.

The criteria for using anyone of the above, depends on the exigencies of the work at hand.

Tenders or bidings are sent to UNICEF to be opened publicly by a committee office. They are read are registered and checked to see whether they comply with the administrative and financial conditions specified in the contract. These tenders are then sent to the technical section for evaluation.

This section undertakes to review all the valid bids on the following basis:

- i. Comparative analysis of total prices;
- ii. Item analysis, based on prevailing market price, adherence to the required specifications and type of work; and
- iii. Noting comments on previous performance of the contractors.

Then technical section then prepares tables showing the items of work, and the contractor's prices, remarks, comments on performance and their recommandation, based on the above, for the bidder to be given the contract.

All contracts for supplies and services must be awarded on a competitive basis to the lowest acceptable bidder and subject to the review of an independent contract review committee, who reviews recommendations and then makes another recommendation to the chief of the project, on the award of the contract, for his final decision.

b) Implementation Phase:

After the contract is awarded, the tenderer is called upon to finalize the contract, i.e sign the form of agreement and present a 10% bank guarantee. The contract is then sent to the CDR, then to UNICEF's representative for final signature. Thereafter, a work-order is issued to the contractor, requesting him to start work...

c) Completion of Work:

On completion of work, the following certificates are issued:

- i. Completion Certificate;
- ii. Handover Certificate.

After the works are handed over, the 10% bank guarantee submitted by the contractor upon signing the contract is returned to him, and he submits instead a 5% guarantee for a period of one year, which is returned to him after that year, following a site visit by UNICEF's engineer to discuss with the authority concerned if there is or not any deficiency in work.

## 6) Achievements.

The reconstruction of South Lebanon, a programme implemented by UNICEF between 1981-85, is made of two parts: Work plan "I & II", Work plan "U", in addition to the emergency operations in the summer of 1982 and the 1985 work plan.

### a) Work Plan "I & II":

On the 20th of November 1979, the 10th Arab Summit Conference held in Tunisia, agreed to finance the reconstruction of projects in Lebanon.

And the Lebanese Council of Ministers, in its decision No.34 of November the 28th 1979, designated the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to be in charge of such an activity, which agreed to ask UNICEF to implement some of the reconstruction and rehabilitation work in the South, related to health, education, and water.

The basic objective behind this programme was to strengthen the government in the priorities the country defines for itself. For this purpose, UNICEF had to extend its office in Beirut, hired additional staff members and opened an office in South Lebanon, 30 Km East of Tyre city, in Qana village.

The geographic area covered by this work plan programme, extended from the Southern boarder of Lebanon to the Litani River, North of Saida.

This agreement was signed by UNICEF and CDR, on the 14th of October 1980, with a value of LL 150 million from Arab funds, allocated for the reconstruction of South Lebanon at the Arab Summit in Tunasia.

The Work Plan "I & II" contains the following projects:

i- The repair of hospitals and caza health centers, the reconstruction of 2 health centers, and the provision of medical supplies and equipment...

For these projects (health), a budget of LL 5.7 million was assigned;

ii- The rehabilitation of pumping stations, the installation of pumps, control panels, the replacement of pipes and the control of water quality.

An amount of LL 42.5 million was assigned to the water sector;

iii- The repair and/or extension of damaged premises of schools, and the provision of equipment (education), with an assigned budget of LL 101.6 million.

The community self-help project is then elaborated to assist the population in whatever endeavour of the public need; the budget amounted to LL 0.2 million.



b) 1982 Emergency Operation

The invasion of June 1982 swept Lebanon, reaching this time beyond the Litani River, to Beirut the capital, resulting in tremendous destruction in the health, water and education sectors.

Beirut suffered severe shortage of water, the occupying forces had cut off the water supplies and electrical power.

Thus emergency aid and relief operations were immediately organized by UNICEF office in West Beirut, in Qana office and in Baabda office.

The emergency programme ended in September 1982, and had cost \$ 5 million which was provided through a UNICEF appeal for donations, made by some 20 countries.

Some 910,000 children benefited from the assistance, including 349,000 children in South, 460,000 children in greater Beirut and suburbs, and 56,000 in West Bekaa.

c) Work Plan "U"

Because of the concern and inefficiency of UNICEF/Lebanon during the emergency situations, an appeal was made by UNICEF, new York headquarters, for funds to allow the reconstruction work in the fields already under the domain of execution.

The geographic area covered by this programme reached Beirut mainly, the South partly, the Chouf and West Bekaa.

This work plan was approved on November 1982, against the budget of \$ 34.4 million, with a two years implementation period.

Work Plan "U" includes the following projects:

- i- Health, \$ 5.1 million: for the repair and equipment of hospitals and health centers and outlets including dispensaries...
- ii- Water, \$ 17.9 million: for the replacement of reservoirs, the rehabilitation of pumping stations and the construction of a treatment plant.
- iii- Education, \$ 10.2 million: for the repair of damaged schools in Beirut and six vocational schools in South Lebanon.

d) The 1985 Work Plan "X"

This programme foreseen to be completed in 1964, could not be implemented according to schedule, due to security reasons , and thus had to be implemented in 1985.

But meanwhile, since the existing set-up in the organization could cope with more work in other areas outside the South, and since the need for rehabilitation of water, health and education facilities was at its utmost, a work plan "X" was prepared

and approved for an amount of \$ 8.13 million, to assist the North Muhafazat and the Bekaa. It was estimated to be completed during 1986.

Donations were received from: the Australian government, the Canadian government and the US Aid.

The total amount received being \$ 5.62 million.

In the Education Sector, the biggest provision was for the replacement of furniture in schools affected by recent fighting, or which have been occupied by displaced persons;

On the Health Side, \$ 875,000 has been allocated for repair and re-equipping of dispensaries and hospitals;

In the Water Sector, it included the rehabilitation of pumping stations, pipelines, reservoirs in Beirut, Barouk, Batroun, Tripoli, Zhorta, Akkar and Baalbeck, for a total of \$ 5.5 million.

## 7. Budgetary Status of the "RSL" activities.

In the following context, we'll show the Direct Capital costs undertaken to implement the different projects, in the fields of health, water and education.

Tabulated data will inform us about the projects, their sources of funds, and capital costs.

But as will be seen throughout these tables or budgets, no administrative and personnel costs are mentioned; they are not included in the information given, due to internal security and secrecy measures. What can be said, is that these administrative costs constitute usually 7% of the total amount contributed.

### a) Summary of UNICEF Assistance:

A summary of the assistance of UNICEF to the reconstruction of South Lebanon between 1981-85, along with the sources of funds which made these activities possible, are given below:

Table 7.1:

Sources of funds, corresponding Work Plans,  
and the areas of operation.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>	<u>Amount (\$)</u>	<u>Work Plan</u>	<u>Area of Operation</u>
1981-1985	Arab funds to Lebanese	\$ 25 million (LL 150 million)*	"I&II"	South of Lebanon up to Litani River.
1982-1985	Donor countries, in answer to UNICEF head-quarter appeal for Lebanon	\$ 34.3million	"U"	South Lebanon up to Beirut Damascus.
1982-1985	Donor countries, in answer to UNICEF appeal for Lebanon	\$ 5.62 million (amount received)	"X" \$8.13 million (total value of the work plan)	All over the country
1981-1985	TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED \$ 64.92 MILLION			

\* Arab funds were made available to UNICEF in Lebanese pounds. During the implementation of CDR/UNICEF programme Work Plan I & II, the average value of the \$ was equal to LL 6.

Table 7.2: Total Budgets of the "RSL" activities.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Work Plan</u>	<u>Available Funds</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>
1981- 1985	WP "I&II"	\$ 25 million	Completed: \$ 23 million Underway : \$ 2 million
1982- 1985	WP "U"	\$ 34.3million	Completed: \$ 28,007,000 Underway : \$ 6,300,000
1985	WP "X"	\$ 5.6 million	Completed: \$ 4,243,267 Underway : \$ 1,683,860

NOTE: Arab funds were made in Lebanese pounds, therefore, for report conveniences, the calculations were made in Lebanese pounds and totals translated into US dollars.

The totals above do not include administrative costs.

b) Repair and Rehabilitation of Health Outlets:

The only source of free health services in Lebanon is still government hospitals, dispensaries and health centers.

Hospitals were not equally equipped and efficient all over the country, and in many of the remote areas and especially in the South, the health outlets were inadequate.

The situation worsened with the increase of hostilities and violence in the South, because of the supplementary demand put on hospitals and dispensaries by injured patients who could not reach the Capital, and also because of the immigration of many staff of the medical personnel.

Therefore, with the objective of restoring the governmental infrastructure of the Ministry of Health, UNICEF undertook the repair and/or reconstruction of structures, and the provision of damaged or destroyed equipment and furniture of the affected institutions to meet the immediate emergency needs of deprived, and displaced war affected citizens.

A total of 10 governmental hospitals received assistance from UNICEF, either on the repair of premises or in the procurement of equipment.

These hospitals are: Tyre, Tibnine, Marjeyoun, Saida, Jezzine (which are in the South), and will receive most of our attention), plus 5 other hospitals situated in Mount Lebanon and West Bekaa.

As for the health centers, these care are free of charge, but unfortunately, the centers are often neglected and inadequately equipped.

Tyre, Saida and Hasbaya were among the first projects to be implemented by UNICEF from the pool of Arab funds, while the Nabatiyeh and Bint-Jbeil centers were constructed by the use of US and Australian funds.

The total number of projects in the health sector, between 1981-85, covering both Work Plan "I & II" and "U", reached the number of 118, out of which 107 projects were completed.



Table 7.3: Cost of Health Outlets.

<u>Hospitals</u>	<u>Cost of Work &amp; Supplies(\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
<u>-South Lebanon</u>		
Tyre	822,600	Pool of Arab funds/ CDR, and funds raised by UNICEF.
Tibnine	406,860	Ditto
Marjeyoun	207,165	Ditto
Jezzine	238,000	Arab funds/CDR and UNICEF.
Saida	246,110	Arab funds/CDR
<u>-Mount Lebanon</u>		
Shahhar	659,340	US Aid
Baabda	220,035	US Aid
Beit Eddine	27,460	Arab funds/CDR
<u>-West Bekaa</u>		
Khirbet kanafar	24,560	US Aid
Rachaya	18,540	US Aid
Consultancy for the reconstruction of a hospital	80,540	Norwegian contribution.
<u>HEALTH CENTERS</u>	<u>Cost of Work &amp; Supplies(\$)</u>	<u>Sources of funds</u>
<u>-South Lebanon</u>		
Tyre	11,150	Arab funds/CDR and US Aid.
Saida	4,425	Arab funds/CDR
Hasbaya	2,700	Arab funds/CDR
Nabatiyeh	283,160	US Aid
Bint Jbeil	471,300	
Ghobeiri	456,900	Australian funds
Equipment	459,000	Funds raised by UNICEF

Table 7.3(Continued)- Beirut

Equipment to Beirut Municipality Center.	317,870	US Aid
Dispensaries	201,535	US Aid
<u>OUTLETS:</u>		
Saida	70,500	Arab funds/CDR
Beirut	700,762	US Aid/Funds raised by UNICEF
Drugstore Medical Supplies to hospitals	79,680	US Aid
Furniture for hospitals	239,329	Funds raised by UNICEF
Ambulances for Ministry of Health	276,881	US Aid

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TOTAL:       \$   6,526,402

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Tyre hospital: Is situated in a very populated area, it serves 67 villages and towns in the surroundings.

Since 1978, Tyre hospital was a target of several attacks and consequently suffered serious damages.

In 1980, UNICEF staff members visited the hospital to assess the damage and the needs.

Work started in March 1981, and included the repair of premises, the construction of vaults, reservoirs, treatment rooms, and the provision of electric power. But damaged once again in 1982, the surgical wing and the main building were repaired once more.

The hospital received equipment procured by UNICEF according to needs; furniture and mattresses, as well as various items of medical equipment from Arab funds.

Tibnine Hospital: Serves 40 villages, and around 110,000 of population. Services rendered by this hospital were very thin.

The two storey building has been occupied by various armed elements in the past. Some departments were inaccessible for repair.

Restoration of the structure in October 1982 was partially completed. The balance of repairs were finally completed in 1984.

Today, assisted and guarded by UNIFIL's Irish Battalion, Tibnine hospital is attending to emergency cases, accidents and war injuries.

Marjeyoun Hospital: Serves 31 villages. The hospital structure needed repairs, which were undertaken in two phases: March 1982, and July 1984. It was also provided with essential needed equipment; its X-Ray machine was also repaired from the pool of Arab Funds.

Saida Hospital: Saida government hospital, prior to the civil war, was of major importance in the infrastructure of governmental services in the South.

The hospital was accessible to the surrounding population due to good access roads.

Prior to 1982 invasion, the hospital received furniture and mattresses.

During the invasion, it was completely destroyed

by bombardments. And while UNICEF had been asked to erect a temporary hospital near the destroyed structure, a subsequent proposal by US Aid for a similar project resulted in the cancellation of UNICEF's project.

Jezzine Hospital: This 60 beds hospital, has suffered from abandonment/occupation, deterioration and looting.

Repairs were undertaken in 1983, and UNICEF agreed with CDR to furnish and re-equip the hospital. But unfortunately, events in 1984, resulted in the city being inaccessible from Beirut, and therefore, equipment delivery was finalized in 1985.

Upon the invasion of 1982, the area of conflict extended to reach the Beirut/Damascus Road, covering thus, 4 more cazas, namely: West Bekaa, Rachaya, Aley and Baabda.

The increased demand on hospital services in the above mentioned areas, resulted in a request from the government for UNICEF to assist the governmental hospitals in the area of:

I- West Bekaa, to the hospital of Khirbet Kanafar; UNICEF had supplied and installed a generator and provided equipment from US Aid donations;

II- Rachaya rural hospital which needed repair works and the installation of a small generator from US Aid contribution;

III- Chouf mountain, where the Beit Eddine hospital was damaged, and repairs to the premises from UNICEF raised funds were implemented by UNICEF;

IV- Aley Caza, where both repair and equipment were needed for Shahhar hospital; Baabda hospital received an X-Ray machine, transformer, and emergency repairs. Both hospitals were assisted from US Aid funds.

c) Repair and Rehabilitation of Water Network:

With the population growth on one hand, and the displacement of citizens on the other, a serious pressure is put on the water network, which had already been suffering from worn-out tools and equipment, old pipes and lack of maintenance, adding to that, the repeated aggressions on the South, which have damaged or destroyed many water installations and pumping stations.

In the South, there are four Water Authorities, serving 7 cazas; these Water Authorities are:

Table 7.4

<u>Name</u>	<u>Main Source</u>	<u>No. of villages they serve</u>	<u>Cazas</u>	<u>Estimated No. of beneficiary persons.</u>
Tyre water Authority	Ras El-Ain	100	Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun.	225,000
Jabel Amel	Litani River, Taibeh	70	Hasbaya, Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun.	200,000
Nabeh Tasseh	Nabeh Tasseh	159	Saida, Jezzine, Nabatiyeh.	225,000
Saida	2 deep wells	7	Said Suburbs.	100,000

Beirut and its suburbs are receiving water from two Water Authorities, they are:

Table 7.5

<u>Name</u>	<u>Main Source</u>	<u>No. of villa- ges they serve.</u>	<u>Cazas</u>	<u>Estimated No. of Beneficiary persons.</u>
Beirut Water Authority	Geita	21 districts in Beirut	Beirut	1,000,000
Ain Delbe Water Authority	Ain Delbe	20 suburbs in East-South Beirut	Beirut suburbs	800,000

\* \* \* \* \*



Tyre Water Authority: The official Tyre water authority is responsible for the supply and distribution of water to a big number of villages in Tyre, and some villages in Bint Jbeil Caza.

The major item of this water authority is the Ras El-Ain system which has been subject to all kind of aggressions, from illegal take-offs to concentrated weights of military equipment and shells, to air raids, etc...

The security and political situation in the area did not allow for the proper running and maintenance of the system, nor to its development to meet the demographic changes and the demand-supply criteria in the area; all of these resulted in a poor supply of water, inadequate networks and thirsty villages.

When CDR/UNICEF signed the agreement, the Ministry of Water, along with UNICEF identified in their work plan the first water project related to Ras el-Ain pumping station. The project was prepared, approved and implemented from funds made available by Arab countries to repair the damages and cracks of supply lines and reservoirs.

In 1982, when the invasion of Lebanon took place, Ras El-Ain pumping station received a direct hit due to air bombs, and was therefore completely destroyed. By the end of 1982, orders were placed for new pumps and motors; contracts were signed for the construction of a new station, as well as for the repair/replacements of items to get the treatment plant working.

Table 7.6: Shows the Global Assistance to

Tyre Water Authority

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Repair & Rehabilitation of pumping stations	1,927,000	Arab Funds/CDR & US Aid.
Extension of treatment	804,445	Arab Funds/CDR & US Aid.
Drilling of wells, equipping and installing chlorination	467,200	Arab Funds/CDR.
Construction of reservoirs	1,346,984	Arab funds/US Aid CDR/UNICEF.
Repair of reservoirs and pipes	993,365	Arab Funds/CDR EEC/UNICEF

TOTAL ASSISTANCE \$ 5,538,994

=====

Jabel Amel Water Authority: The sources of this water authority are the Litani River and a well in Chebaa.

- The Litani system was built in 1958, and draws water from the Litani River. Survey of the system started at the beginning of the programme.

Damaged equipment were identified and then replaced, the same was done for the destroyed reservoirs.

Following the 1982 invasion, some pipelines had been damaged by heavy military vehicles and had to be replaced.

- The Chebaa system was built between 1926 and 1932, during the French mandate, and takes water from the Mghara spring in Chebaa. Quantities of pipes and valves were supplied to repair damaged lines; also in January 1985, galvanized pipes were supplied to Chebaa.

These projects were funded from Arab funds made available through CDR and implemented by UNICEF, and by US Aid and German-Agro committee.

Table 7.7: Shows the total amount given to the  
Jabel Amel Water Authority.

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Rehabilitation of pumping station	433,830	Arab funds/CDR.
Construction of reservoirs	1,148,105	Arab funds/CDR, & funds raised by UNICEF.
Pipes	693,102	Arab funds/CDR & EEC.
Treatment Plant	913,071	US Aid/funds by UNICEF,
Drilling, equipping of wells	674,800	German Agro
TOTAL:	<u>\$ 3,862,908</u> =====	

Nabeh Tasseh Water Authority: This water system takes water from this source (Nabeh Tasseh) which is a series of abundant sweet water springs located in a deep gorge in the mountains.

From the Arab funds made available for reconstruction and rehabilitation, assistance was mainly in the rehabilitation of the main pumping station equipment, supply and installation of pumpset, and the drilling of a number of deep wells.

Parts of US Aid, EEC, and German Committee contributions were used to implement new reservoirs construction and pipeline rehabilitation.

Table 7.8: Shows assistance provided to Nabeh Tasseh  
Water Authority.

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Construction of reservoirs	668,289	US Aid, German Agro & UNICEF.
Supply & Installation of pipes	367,863	EEC.
Installation of equipment and construction of pumphouse	274,450	Arab funds/CDR/ UNICEF.
Chlorination Equipment (Study of Water supply, and pumping station).	141,190	Arab funds/CDR
Drilling of wells and installation of equipment	864,324	Arab funds/CDR.
<hr/>		
TOTAL:	\$ 2,316,116	

=====

Saida Water Authority: This water authority supplies the town of Saida and suburbs only.

In 1981, there was a shortage of water at the Saida hospital, and a well was drilled and equipped to give an independent supply of water to this large hospital. This well was completed in December 1984, with a total cost of \$ 168,543.

After the 1982 invasion, the CDR/UNICEF programme supplied for the distribution of water pumphouse in Saida, and the installation of electrical equipment.

Table 7.9 Shows assistance to Saida Water Authority

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs(\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Installation of a well at Saida Hospital	168,543	Arab funds/CDR.
Rehabilitation of Saida pumping station	38,504	Arab funds/CDR
Supply of pipes	62,275	Funds raised by UNICEF.
TOTAL:	<u>\$ 269,322</u> =====	

Ain Delbeh Water Authority: This water authority is responsible for the supply and distribution of water to the South-East and Southern suburbs of Beirut.

Ain Delbeh Water System consists mainly of:

- Ain Delbeh Spring in the mountain;
- A series of 13 underground wells;
- A water treatment plant.

The area which this water system extends, includes the most densely populated area in the country, especially in the southern suburbs, which are inhabited by the lowest-income group citizens, and which provided the largest labour force for the industrial areas of the city.

The water distribution in that area is 30 years old, and the pumping equipment is also quite old, and together with the incidents of violence and shelling occurring in that area, a large part of that system got damaged.

Work undertaken to assist Ain Delbeh Water Authority are three:



- Rehabilitation of pumping station;
- Replacement of pipes, repair of reservoirs; and
- The provision of vehicles for the Water Authority itself.

Table 7.10:        Shows Assistance to  
                         Ain Delbeh Water Authority

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs(\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Rehabilitation of pumping station	1,370,212	EEC, US Aid, and funds raised by UNICEF.
Chlorination equipment	40,000	Arab funds/CDR.
Repair of water network	1,434,270	Austrian donations, and UNICEF
Drilling and construction of a well	91,853	Arab funds/CDR, and US Aid, and Austrian funds.
Prefabricated reservoir	31,540	Funds raised by UNICEF.
	<hr/>	
TOTAL:	\$ 2,967,875	
	<hr/>	

Beirut Water Authority: This water authority is in charge of water supplies to the northern and eastern suburbs of the city, as far as Nahr El Kalb.

During the 1982 summer invasion, Beirut system was severely damaged, and therefore, a lot of repair works were carried out on equipment and the network.

After the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, projects were prepared and implemented for repair of distribution mains and pumping mains. Also 9 large generators were provided to the authority so that it could continue pumping water to the city during power cuts.

Funds for this purpose were given by: EEC, US Aid, and Australian contributions.

Table 7.11: Total assistance provided to  
Beirut Water Authority.

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Repair of pipes, replacement of pipes, and construction of pipeline	1,205,410	EEC, US Aid, and Australian funds.
Rehabilitation of pumping station, supply of pumps, and generators	1,511,812	Funds raised by UNICEF, and Australian funds.
Vehicles, chlorination equipment	125,000	Funds raised by UNICEF, partly EEC.
TOTAL:	<u>\$ 2,842,222</u> =====	

Assistance was also provided to two other Water Authorities serving the southern and south-eastern part of Lebanon, and suffering from the same circumstances as the South. These Water Authorities are the Barouk and Shamseen Water Authorities.

Table 7.12: Barouk Water Authority

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
Supply and installation of generators	41,786	EEC funds, raised by UNICEF.
Repair of a tunnel	65,992	Ditto
TOTAL	\$ 107,778	
	=====	

Table 7.13: Shows assistance to  
Shamseen Water Authority

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Costs (\$)</u>	<u>Sources of funds</u>
Drilling of a well in West Bekaa	61,500	Funds raised by UNICEF
Drilling of 4 wells in Rachaya Caza	259,915	Arab funds/CDR.
TOTAL	\$ 321,415 =====	

\* \* \* \*

In addition to these projects in the water sector, assistance was also given to complete the drilling of 20 wells in South Lebanon, costing \$ 2.6 million.

Consultative surveys concerning new reservoirs and the supply lines to these reservoirs had cost \$ 208,340.

Three water authorities received pipes for their own use. UNICEF supplied these pipes for \$107,223 and also prefabricated water tanks for an amount of \$106,400. These projects were financed from the pool of funds raised by UNICEF.

In the water sector, 451 projects were implemented, 379 were completed. This programme funded through CDR and UNICEF, had reached a cost of \$21.31 million.

d) Repair and Rehabilitation of Schools in Lebanon:

In this troubled country, UNICEF's main concern was to provide children with a safe environment, along with a safe drinking water and health care; the repair of schools was a major item in the reconstruction programme.

Schools ranged from a one room school, to a three storey building; whatever the size, these schools needed maintenance to remedy leaking roofs, worn-out windows and doors. Furniture was too old. Teaching equipment was practically non-existent, and the aggressions against the South since 1976, affected these schools drastically, premises were destroyed and furniture burnt.

Schools which had escaped direct hits were damaged partially by the displaced persons seeking shelter in the school buildings, one family in a room.

Thus following the CDR/UNICEF agreement, and through a close collaboration between UNICEF staff and the Ministry of Education, and the Education Department of South Lebanon, surveys were studied as well as priorities and requests for schools in need of urgent repair.

The aim was to allow families in the South to remain there, or to return after the hostilities, and give their children some education.

The repaired schools are scattered over 7 cazas of the South;  
they are:

<u>Cazas</u>	<u>No. of schools</u>
Jezzine	6
Saida	4
Tyre	42
Nabatiyeh	17
Bint Jbeil	19
Marjeyoun	25
Hasbaya	14
<hr/>	
TOTAL:	127 schools.

The programme then extended to other cazas in the Bekaa, to North Lebanon and other parts of the country:

Rachaya	14
Tripoli	10
Batroun	1
Beirut	11
Metn	3
Chouf	1
<hr/>	
TOTAL	40 schools.

The total cost amounted to \$ 14,023,557, including the  
procurement and the repair/extension works.

After the 1982 invasion, many schools were damaged, this time concentrating more in Beirut.

The programme funded through the appeal that UNICEF launched for the reconstruction of Lebanon after the invasion included the repair of schools in Beirut and the repair and rehabilitation of six vocational schools in the South, (Bint Jbeil, Jezzine, Nabatiyeh, and Machgara).

The cost of rehabilitation of 6 vocational schools reached \$ 2.6 million. Every vocational school can host around 700 students. From funds made available by UNICEF, 84 schools were repaired and rehabilitated, including 6 vocational schools.

<u>Cazas</u>	<u>No. of schools</u>
Beirut	75
Chouf	3
South	6
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	84 schools
TOTAL COST. \$	8,926,443



Table 7.14: Summary of the Assistance to  
Education.

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of schools</u>	<u>Sources of Funds</u>
The South	127	Arab funds/CDR.
West Bekaa	14	Ditto.
North Lebanon	11	Ditto.
Metn	3	Ditto.
Chouf	4	Funds raised by UNICEF.
Beirut	86	US Aid, Arab funds, CDR, and funds raised by UNICEF.
Vocational schools	6	Australia/Norwegian technical contribution.
<hr/>		
TOTAL	251 schools	
TOTAL COST \$	22,950,000	

e) Community Self-Help Projects (CSHP)

The whole operation of reconstruction and rehabilitation undertaken by UNICEF should be seen in the light of the intention behind it.

Implementing the work together with the Lebanese government meant to encourage the population in the areas affected by war, to hold on to their land, and return if they had left.

Reconstructing the basic services facilities in health, water and education was complemented by the effort of allowing the population to complete projects for the community benefit which they have initiated themselves, thus encouraging them to participate in reconstructing their villages. This is what a community self-help project stands for.

Many organized themselves into learning to look at the needs of their towns and finding ways to cope with these needs.

Encouraging this spirit, CDR agreed that UNICEF displays assistance to some of these projects if the following criteria were present:

- Be the property of the village;
- Be funded 35% at least by the population;
- Be implemented by the population itself; and
- Endorsed by an official local authority,

in which case the CDR/UNICEF programme provides the material for construction.

Therefore, many projects were initiated in the South; 30 projects were assisted from Arab funds/CDR, and 12 from funds raised by UNICEF.

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>No. of Projects</u>
- Repair of roads	16
- Completion of community halls	10
- Assistance of water projects undertaken by population	6
- Construction of playground	2
- Repair of a clinic	1
- Provision of insecticides, and garbage container	3
- Completion of community school	3
- Assistance in transport of construction material	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL PROJETS	42
TOTAL COST \$	663,248

Arab funds : \$ 483,794 = LL 2,902,766\*

Funds raised by UNICEF: \$ 179,454

TOTAL \$ 663,248

\*: Arab funds were made available to UNICEF in Lebanese pounds. During that period, the average value of the dollar \$ was equal to LL 6.

f) Training:

The training component was introduced in Work Plan "U" as a field to be looked into, necessary after the first step of reconstruction has been underway.

Training, which was meant to be a major component of the rehabilitation programme could not materialize properly, due to the political and security situation prevailing in the country.

Staff were not available, especially in areas where training was most needed. Yet attempts were made to launch this programme in collaboration with the basic programme section of UNICEF in Beirut.

Health : A survey was conducted to identify paramedical personnel; a number of posters were printed for the training programme, but due to security reasons, follow-ups were not possible.

The cost of the project amounted to \$ 14,141.

Education : A contract for preparing a new curriculum for vocational training for teachers and students was signed. It consisted of supplying a complete set of teaching materials regarding the practical exercises for the Bacc. Technique. This educational training programme cost amounted to \$ 120,000.

Water : Workers were trained on site, using equipment under UNICEF's supervision. This personnel is meant to secure operation and maintenance to the new installations.

The budget for the training was not big, it reached only \$ 134,141.

Therefore, the total cost of the training programme in the fields of health, water and education amounted to \$ 268,282.

\* \* \* \*

## Summary

Table 7.15

## Number and Cost of Projects

R.S.L.

1981 - 1985

	HEALTH		WATER		EDUCATION		CSHF		TRAINING		GRAND TOTAL	BALANCE
	Com. U. way*	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way	Com. U. way		
WP "I&II" (DR/UNICEF Arab funds LL150 million \$ 25million*	No. of projects 46	-	218	17	191	6	30	-	-	-	508	-
	Costs (\$)	1.7m	6.7m	1.1m	13.4m	.536m	4.95m	-	-	-	23m	2million
WP "U" UNICEF appeal for Lebanon \$34.4million	No. of projects 61	11	161	55	45	9	9	3	3	1	358	-
	Costs (\$)	3.2m	1.67m	10.76m	3.76m	8.45m	.565m	.131m	.037m	.014m	.254m	5.6million
Total funds available	Total projects	118	451		251		42		4		866	
\$59.4 million	Total Costs	\$6.57million	\$21.31million	\$22.9million	\$2.663million	\$2.268million					\$51.8million	\$7.6million

- Note: 1. Underway includes projects under Implementation, under bidding, study or preparation.  
 2. LL 150=\$ 25m. (The average value of the \$ was equal at that period to LL 6)  
 3. Figures above do not include the administrative and overhead costs.  
 4. Figures above do not include Emergency funds of 1982 and 1985.

LIST OF MAJOR DONORS TO  
Work Plan "U"

<u>Sources of Funds governments &amp; Community</u>	<u>Amount (\$)</u>
Canada	12.800 million.
US committee	2.200 million.
Switzerland Government.	0.145
Swedish govt.	1 million.
Saudi Arabia govt.	6 million.
Oman govt.	1 million.
Norway govt.	1.500 million.
Italian govt.	2.200 million.
Australian govt.	5.600 million.
Finland govt.	0.350
Denmark govt.	0.800
German Agro committee	0.460
<hr/>	
TOTAL \$	34.4 million.

CHAPTER III  
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,  
AND SUMMARY

A. CONCLUSION

1. Evaluation of UNICEF accomplishments.

a. UNICEF, which is still providing the basic services and relief operations to help the wartorn country due to the outbreak of troubles in 1975, supplying food for children, cooking utensils, medicines, blankets and mattresses, clothing, etc... to the citizens of the country;

UNICEF, which could not overlook the many needs unanswered for a long time in the southern part of the country, is now overburdened by occupation, where much of repair and rehabilitation works are needed to be done. The agency implemented an emergency programme, (a) to supply and improve the quality of drinking water, (b) to provide dispensaries with medicines, drugs, equipment and ambulances, and (c) to supply furniture and teaching equipment to many one-room schools of the many villages in the South.

Therefore, due to the great accomplishments of the agency in the relief and rehabilitation works and programmes, UNICEF was approached by the "CDR" to participate in the programme of reconstruction of Lebanon;



b. UNICEF, known to possess capacity and skill, called for humanitarian work, and was approached to provide that help.

The agency's close working relationship with UNIFIL was considered an added advantage in carrying out humanitarian surveys and security services, facilitating communication and transport to the capital and to areas under its control. Without UNIFIL's help and collaboration, it could have been very difficult for UNICEF to get through many of the areas in the South, where different militias and forces are in control.

c. UNICEF has handled so far, a total number of 866 projects over the five year period, beginning 1980 till 1985.

The projects account for as follows:

118 projects in health, 451 in water projects, 251 projects in education, 42 projects in community self-help projects (CSHP), and 4 projects in training.

Out of these, 107 projects in the Health sector were completed, 379 in the Water Sector, 236 in Education, 39 in CSHP and 3 in Training, totalling 764: the number of projects completed by December 1985.

Some of the Achievements to catalogue here, may be the impact the agency left on the citizens, who finding the work carried out by UNICEF were motivated and encouraged to

participate in reconstructing their villages. It provided an added incentive to people to organize themselves and recognize the needs of their villages and towns. A feeling of collegial responsibility was developed amongst the people in the villages.

UNICEF being capable of identifying talent and skills, contracted the best engineers and contractors available in the area. This helped in providing the required specifications for projects, writing and developing procedures for the work.

Since engineers, staff members and employees are well paid and enjoy a better working condition, it helped expedite the implementation and completion of projects. Eventhough many projects had to be postponed due to security reasons, UNICEF did not choose to wait for better situations to return. They rather went ahead with reconstructing the new projects to meet the citizen's needs.

d. However effective and important UNICEF's projects and accomplishments might have been, the continuing hostilities and fighting call for help and assistance until all the damage and destructions cease to exist.

The problems are never ending. As soon as one problem is taken care of, other problems raise their ugly heads and demand immediate attention or solution.

And as mentioned previously and shown in table 7.15, concerning "the number and costs of projects", 764 projects were completed, out of which only four were in the training sector. Projects concerning health, water and education need continuous follow-ups, maintenance and supervision. Responsible persons, with the proper mix of technical and administrative skills should be trained to take over the work, and keep what was achieved in good shape.

Therefore, training which was introduced in Work Plan "U" as a necessary step after reconstruction has taken place could not materialize properly on account of the security and political situation prevailing in the country. Staff were not available because of the difficulty of communication and restrictions on movements in the different parts of the country; personnel involved with training were scattered, and few reported to duty, failing to secure the necessary maintenance of basic equipment.

What made the situation worse, were the crippled offices of the government, the slowness and inefficiency of employees occupying the wrong positions;

Many were not, and still are not reporting to work, because they either live in dangerous areas, or because their offices are situated in dangerous areas; therefore, administrative work is slowed down, causing the delay of activities which are essential to life, and of priorities which are to be served before any other programme.

e- As shown in summary table 7.15, UNICEF has still some 102 projects underway to be implemented, with the total investment value of \$ 8 million. The projects are supposed to be completed by the end of 1986.

If by that period, no contributions, grants and/or donations are received by UNICEF to start the implementation of new activities, the organization would have to shut down temporarily, if not permanently, until funding is received.

## 2. Impact of the work

The evaluation of the activities carried out by UNICEF cannot be limited to the material achievements only; the work has a manifold impact on the social and economic condition of the country. These counterparts are many, be it the government institutions, or the ministries and local contractors; for them UNICEF has set the pace of an uninterrupted work under all circumstances.

This attitude inspired confidence and encouraged employees to report to duty and emerge from the generalized panic to cope with the requirements of work.

Another impact of the enterprise of UNICEF was observed on the local labour in the South; it raised the standard of work, building up abilities of local small contractors in the area, created more labor opportunities, and more activities, and thus, hope among the population.

This has certainly contributed in maintaining life in many areas in the South, encouraged investments which strengthened the survival efforts of the population. And most important, is that this achievement has strengthened the link of the so long forgotten and now badly affected South, to be various departments of the government; thus creating among the citizens more confidence in the government's endeavour and interest in the South.

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## B. RECOMMENDATIONS

If by the end of 1986, UNICEF (Lebanon) does not receive any contributions or donations from governmental and/or non-governmental sectors to undertake additional projects, it would have to look for some new means to procure money to its enterprise.

Shutting down its offices would be a great loss to the Lebanese government and population. UNICEF has been challenging, during the past 11 years, all kinds of hostilities, dangers, destructions, and restrictions on movements and transportation. Members of its staff, living on the eastern side of the city have to cross daily; some to avoid the trouble and risk of crossing daily from one side to the other, have rented furnished apartments or rooms in the western side, seeing their family only during the week-ends.

Therefore, to loose this goodwill, courage and assistance in reconstructing the affected areas, would mean a great loss to Lebanon, which absolutely needs strong foundations such as: UNICEF, the RED CROSS and the HARIRI's.

- UNICEF should launch a campaign whereby through the different means of advertisement (TV, Radio, Newspapers, Magazines, as well as posters and greeting cards), it can attract the attention of the Lebanese people to the fact as how much

help is needed in the reconstruction of the country.

Citizens should not wait for all the help to come from the traditional donors; they can and should work together, hand in hand, to reconstruct the damaged areas.

- UNICEF should collaborate closely with the Hariri foundation which has been offering tremendous help to Lebanese, whether in providing job-opportunities for them, in the country or abroad, or in giving them loans to reconstruct their houses, damaged by shelling.

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### C. SUMMARY

This study has given us an overview of the Lebanese crisis, whether in its economy, or in its social areas or fields, along with the damage sustained by the different sectors of the country, during the past 11 years of war, as it has also summarized the activities carried out by UNICEF in Lebanon, for the reconstruction of war damaged facilities in the fields of health, water and education.

The focus was mainly on the weak performance of the economy, in its different sectors, such as: Agriculture, Industry, Ports, Airports, Foreign Trade, the Banking and Monetary Situation, the State Budget and Balance of Payments, as well as, Education, Water Supply and Housing Problems. It has also focused on the social problems and their impact on the children, the misery they live in, and how UNICEF was able to help in the reconstruction and rehabilitation programme.

The activities undertaken between 1981-85 are classified as Work Plans "I&II" and "U".

They were funded through a CDR/UNICEF collaboration.

The Work Plans "I & II" and "U" studied above are 90% completed -764 projects- and there is still a number of 102 projects underway to be implemented by the end of 1986.

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