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## Home is where the heart is; citizenship is where it is safe: dual citizenship and Europe

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In a country with a history of conflict, Lebanese not only have long sought emigration as a means of improving their safety and prosperity but also have sought out second passports as ‘safeguards’ to be used when things got rough at home. Little has been done on how Lebanese view these ‘second passports’ and the actual citizenship that comes with them. This article seeks to tackle this topic through analysing interviews of 10 Lebanese citizens who also hold European citizenship through naturalisation. How these Lebanese view their European citizenships will be described before turning to discussion of how this may affect the understandings of citizenship in Europe. The article concludes by looking on how the understandings of citizenship in liberal democracies in Europe on the part of citizens who normally reside outside of the state and who obtain citizenship as a ‘safety’ option may affect the broader understandings of citizenship in these countries.

**Keywords:** dual citizenship; citizenship; identity; Europe; Lebanese; national belonging

Dual citizenship challenges one of the most stable and long-lasting assumptions of the modern era, namely that the nation-state constitutes the highest institution and the largest group of people . . . to which an individual can affirm allegiance. (Howard 2003, p. 698)

I keep my French nationality [sic] because the Lebanese state can’t protect me. Even here in Lebanon, as soon as I set foot in the French Embassy, I’m protected. The [French] state will protect me. (Bachir, 52)<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

In a country with a history of conflict and ongoing political tensions, Lebanese not only have long sought emigration as a means of improving their safety and prosperity but also have sought out second passports as ‘safeguards’ to be used when things got rough at home, while allowing them to remain in their homeland when times are good. Analysis of this type of citizenship construction – secondary and non-resident – is virtually untouched in the broad and deep literature on citizenship. Thus, this article will seek to describe and analyse this ‘type’ of citizenship while also discussing how this might affect the understandings of citizenship in liberal, democratic countries in the European space.

Unsurprisingly, the behaviour of Lebanese regarding obtaining second citizenships varies significantly based on when, how and why Lebanese obtain dual citizenship in European countries. This reflects not only differences in motivation but also the level and depth of the relationship between the Lebanese individual and the specific European country. Thus, there are those who obtain the citizenship of the country of one's non-Lebanese, European spouse while there are others who end up obtaining citizenship as a result of extended residency in Europe while pursuing higher education or working. Especially in the Lebanese case, there are those who sought citizenship in a European country following their flight from their homeland during the 1975–1990 civil war. Also included on the spectrum of behaviours regarding the attainment of a second citizenship is the behaviour of investing financially in a European country in order to obtain its citizenship (Joppke 2010). For the purposes of this article, what links these disparate behaviours together is that the Lebanese in question remains in (or returns to) Lebanon following the awarding of the second citizenship; this non-residency as well as lack of ethnic belonging to the new country of citizenship flies in the face of significant portions of the literature on liberal democratic citizenship.

Liberal democracy holds citizenship – indeed the citizen – in fairly high degree, noting that the citizen has rights as well as obligations that should be met through interaction with the state and other citizens (see the seminal works of Hobbes (1962) and Rousseau (1973) as well as modern scholarship such as Brubaker (1992) and Soysal (1994)). While the assumption that an individual can hold only one citizenship at any one time – based on identity as well as loyalty – has been discarded by academics (Faist 2010) and many lawmakers (see *Traces* 1998), there are still aspects of 'belonging' regarding citizenship that continue to be debated in the literature (Portes 1996, Portes *et al.* 1999, among others) as well as in public (Dougherty 2003; *The Tribune* 2011). Residency in one's country of citizenship seems to be one such 'aspect of belonging' that while not absolute (the term 'expatriate' signifies a national living outside of his/her nation-state for an unspecified length of time) nonetheless seems to demonstrate a commitment on the part of the individual towards the state and his/her fellow citizens. Further discussion of how 'national belonging' might best be defined and how it interacts with (legal) citizenship will come later in the article.

Still, given that 214 million people are estimated to live outside the borders of their country of birth (International Organization for Migration 2013) from which the vast majority of us obtain our citizenship, and changes in laws governing multiple citizenship, growing numbers of individuals worldwide are finding themselves with dual or multiple citizenships at birth or obtain them through marriage, migration or political change. What does this mean for how citizenship in European liberal democracies<sup>2</sup> is understood, as well as rules, governing how and when citizenship is obtained and retained? Clearly, this is a phenomenon that goes beyond the Lebanese case to be truly global. However, given the paucity of scholarship on the topic – as noted above – it is best to start with the gathering of data; one such method for doing this is through the use of a single case study. Lebanon, for

the reasons stated at the outset of the article, provides a good opportunity to both gather data and analyse them for insight into where future research should go.

While a decent amount of scholarly research has been done to determine how Lebanese view citizenship in their home country (Joseph 1997, Maktabi 2000, Humphrey 2004) as well as the integration and (lack of) assimilation of Lebanese in Europe (Castles 1992, Clarke *et al.* 1998, Al Shahi and Lawless 2005), relatively little has been done on how Lebanese view these ‘second passports’ and, indeed, the actual citizenship that comes with them when they choose not to live in the adopted/host country but rather live in Lebanon. Thus, the article reviews the literature on the subject of dual citizenship including Lebanese before describing and discussing how those interviewed relate to their second passports.

This article seeks to tackle this topic through conducting and analysing interviews of 10 Lebanese citizens who hold a European Union (EU) member country citizenship and reside in Lebanon. Female and male dual-national Lebanese, aged 34–68, were interviewed (six women and four men) as well as individuals who were of various sect backgrounds (Sunni, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Shi’ia) and who had obtained citizenship in different European countries (Switzerland, France, Austria, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany). One limitation of the sample is socio-economic background (class), as, overwhelmingly, those interviewed were of upper- or upper-middle-class background; how this may fit into the topic at hand will be discussed in detail below. Due to the small sample, conclusions will be viewed as indicative rather than generalisable and hopefully lay groundwork for future research. How these Lebanese view their European citizenships – including how, when and why they obtained them – is also briefly described, compared and analysed. The article then turns to reviewing what dual citizenship means to the Lebanese interviewed and how this case might be generalised. Finally, the discussion concludes with looking on how the understandings of citizenship in liberal democracies in Europe on the part of citizens who normally reside outside of the state and who obtain (and retain) citizenship as a ‘safety’ option may affect the broader understandings of citizenship in these countries.

### **Brief literature review on dual citizenship**

There is growing literature on dual citizenship, making up somewhat for a delayed response to the growth of dual citizenship in reality. Marc Morjé Howard (2003, 2009) has specifically sought to address the issue in the context of Europe through an examination of the policies that govern the status. Zappala and Castles (2000), Aleinikoff (2000) and Feldblum (2000) have sought to get a better grasp of the numbers involved worldwide, but note that accurate data remain elusive (Howard 2003). Thus, much of the literature has focused on the normative concerns relating to the desirability of dual citizenship as well as how it is actually lived (see, in particular, Hansen and Weil 2002). Literature describing and examining dual citizenship is fairly recent due to the fact that it has only been in the past 20 years (for the most part) that dual citizenship has been recognised and even less time

has passed since it became, if not desirable, than not anathema to states and their citizens alike.

As discussed by Howard (2003), as late as 1963, the Council of Europe felt that it is necessary to produce a 'Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality' (Council of Europe 1963). But even by the early 1960s, peace in Europe, the growing interaction of Europeans through the nascent European Community as well as other factors – not to forget the strengthening of the women's rights movement<sup>3</sup> – meant that in reality there were growing numbers of people (particularly children) who possessed dual citizenship. While I will not discuss the further development of dual citizenship in Europe as this is done elsewhere (see Howard 2003, 2009), I will point out that by the point in time when the Lebanese I interviewed were obtaining citizenship, that is, the 1980s and early 1990s, dual citizenship was generally assumed to exist on the part of their adoptive European states. Formal recognition of the legal existence of this status did not come until a bit later, following as part of repercussions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) as well as a reflection of changed the understandings of citizenship as formally acknowledged through the protocols of the Council of Europe in 1993 and then again in 1997, laying the groundwork for individual European states to formally accept dual citizenship if they so choose.

### **Reflections on Lebanese citizenship**

As noted in the Introduction section, significant literature describing and examining Lebanese citizenship exists and need not be described here. However, a brief discussion of the Lebanese context itself is helpful. As often noted when discussing Lebanon, the Lebanese state is generally regarded as 'weak', that is, it lacks the autonomy as well as power to effectively and consistently impose itself as the final authority in the realms of politics, society and even the economy. Research points to this weakness as resulting from the deliberate construction of a weak state through the privileging of group identities and interests over national ones (Anderson 1987, Moubarak and Mesara 1999, Hovsepian 2008), the relatively recent creation of the state of Lebanon (and the conflicts concerning its creation and borders) (Makdisi 1996, Traboulsi 2007) and recurrent – some might say, chronic – foreign interference in Lebanese state affairs (Seaver 2000, Gebara and Kibranian 2008, Geukjian 2008). All of these are not to say that there is no authority on the part of the Lebanese state but rather that the state is circumscribed in the areas and topics in which it can act autonomously in a unified manner.

The chronic weakness of the Lebanese state is also reflected in the construction of Lebanese citizenship. In short, to be a Lebanese citizen, one must also be a member of one of the 18 officially recognised religious sects<sup>4</sup>; there is no 'secular' Lebanese citizenship. Membership in a sect – while a formal requirement of citizenship – is not conferred by the state but rather by the various religious establishments that both constitute the state and are separate from it. This means that the so-called personal status issues (mainly marriage, divorce, child custody

and inheritance) fall under the purview of the sects – not the state itself – and can differ markedly based on the processes and religious laws practiced by the various sects. Thus, there is no one citizen–state relationship of rights and responsibilities; instead, there are many, based not only on sect but also on age and especially gender. While a Lebanese citizen may switch to another sect (not all sects are open to conversions, however), it involves real costs – financial and legal – in addition to identity and belief. Contrary to the Western liberal thought concerning religion, religion in Lebanon is a group culture and legal identity, not a ‘personal choice’.

The chronic weakness of the Lebanese state, among other less key factors, has seemingly led to not only an acceptance of Lebanese citizens having other citizenships but also changes in official processes to reflect this. For example, a Lebanese with dual citizenship can enter and exit the country with his/her *foreign* passport as long as it is accompanied by an official form of Lebanese ID.<sup>5</sup> While the Lebanese case might not be wholly unique, it is noteworthy in its official acknowledgement of the practical limits of its sovereignty as demonstrated by its tolerance of foreign-issued documents in Lebanese official dealings.

Thus, possession of European citizenship will be different from the beginning for an individual who was Lebanese from birth as a political/legal identity is tied to the European citizenship but membership in a religious and/or sub-national identity is not required nor tied to the political/legal identity. I want to argue that the lack of definiteness of Lebanese citizenship and the strength of sub-national loyalties such as family, sect and region (Joseph 1997, Maktabi 2000, Humphrey 2004) combine to both make it easier to take on formal citizenship somewhere else and in many cases subordinate the second citizenship to providing security and not investing significant identity in it.

As is discussed at various points in this article, the Lebanese state is notorious for its limited capacity to protect its citizens (e.g. the July 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel). Thus, Lebanese reflections on Lebanese citizenship as ‘unable to protect our rights . . . indeed our persons’ is highlighted again and again. This is in stark contrast to European citizenship and its perceived and seemingly actual ability to offer physical as well as economic (though not really social)<sup>6</sup> protection.

Given the precariousness of Lebanese citizenship, it is therefore not surprising that many Lebanese who can obtain second passports, do obtain them– often from European countries, given their geographical proximity and historical ties. The discussion now turns to how these Lebanese view these passports.

### **Reflections on European citizenship as the ‘second citizenship’**

As mentioned in the Introduction section, chief among the reasons given by my Lebanese interviewees for pursuing a second passport is security. This desire for security is multifaceted – physical, economic, religious, social and, above all, practical. Among the practical aspects of European citizenship are (except for the UK, Irish and Cypriot nationals) borderless travel through the Schengen area of

Europe. This freedom of movement – for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is for business advantage – was repeatedly mentioned by interviewees.

Before I got the [French] nationality, I couldn't advance in my company. Other guys with less experience were able to fly off to London, Geneva, and other cities at the last moment. I need at least two weeks to get a visa for even a short trip . . . . Getting the nationality was for me a necessity. (Bachir, 52)

Yet, despite the advantages of having European citizenship, a number of those interviewed spoke about feeling 'excluded', never being fully integrated into the nation-states in which they had citizenship. One interviewee (Shirine, 40) noted that during Ramadan, she would need to set the alarm on her mobile phone to know when she could break the fast as there was no public muezzin's call.<sup>7</sup> While this type of experience could well be common for a number of Muslim immigrants throughout the world, the fact that this Lebanese and Swiss national was in Switzerland – where minarets are now banned – highlights that even if there were a concentration of Muslims, there could be no group public display of the non-Christian religiosity.

For Lina (42), being a Maronite Lebanese seemingly had the effect of making her feel 'part of' predominantly Catholic French society (she said that her 'Lebanese-ness' was not something that helped her feel at home), but she would sometimes notice the lack of a true feeling of 'being part of the group . . . . Growing up Maronite in Lebanon, you know, you feel being a Maronite . . . . In France, religion for most of my friends just wasn't that special'.

What is the cause and what is the effect here, however? Has exclusion and discrimination led to a lack of engagement on the part of those Lebanese interviewed (again, non-resident dual nationals) or has the prioritising of Lebanese identity (though as earlier described, most likely not formal Lebanese citizenship) meant the marginalisation of European citizenship to the realm of practicality, not identity?

I came to Austria when I was a baby. I grew up there . . . my life was there. I started university there . . . in German. When I reached 18, I had to choose between the Austrian and Lebanese citizenships; I chose the Austrian for security. But we always emphasized our 'Lebanese-ness' at home . . . my parents worked hard at that. (Nour, 36)

In discussions of when and why these naturalised Europeans returned to Lebanon, family reasons as well as feelings of discrimination or not really 'fitting into European culture' came to the fore. For some interviewees, they could never 'look' (northern) European due to dark hair and olive complexions; for others, perceptions that Islam was increasingly viewed negatively by Europeans made it difficult for them to feel 'at home' in the adopted country even when they spoke the language and had obtained formal citizenship. This is a particularly striking aspect of the present research because we are dealing with individuals who seemingly

had adapted and had integrated into their new European homes – at least externally. All of those interviewed spoke the language of their second citizenship and were formally educated in it. All held jobs at the professional level in their ‘adopted’ countries. What seemed clear in the interviews, however, was that many of these individuals did not really feel a part of their new countries and when the opportunity presented itself, chose to return to Lebanon.

For some of those interviewed, taking on the European citizenship was done at a point in time when the future of Lebanon still seemed quite bleak – either still in the midst of civil war or in the 1990s during the continuing Syrian occupation. Thus, again for reasons of practicality but also for building a viable future, these Lebanese pursued European citizenship while concurrently pursuing higher education in the ‘adopted’ country. These Lebanese dual nationals only came back to Lebanon when they met their future Lebanese spouse or when the security as well as economic situation was perceived to have improved.

My parents were overjoyed when I decided to marry another Lebanese and that we were going to live in Lebanon . . . My father regretted that I had to leave my job at the UN but he was really happy that I was going to go back [to Lebanon]. (Nour, 36)

Ironically, it was my [French] wife who wanted to go back to Lebanon. She had liked life better there than she did France . . . she felt we had more of a real life here. (Adam, 68)

But not all of the interviewees emphasised feelings of exclusion in Europe nor identified them as the primary cause for their returning to (or staying in) Lebanon. Some emphasised the ‘pull’ of Lebanon rather than the ‘pushing out’ of Europe.

My children reached the age when if I wanted them to speak Arabic – and not just to chat with *Jiddo* and *Teta* on the phone – I needed to bring them back to Lebanon to really learn the language. (Mona, 40)

As Mona noted above, some of the interviewees – perhaps all of them – felt a desire to live in Lebanon; as long as they did not have to give up the benefits that they had gained from obtaining a second citizenship. A strong theme that emerged from the interviews was a comparison of the ‘standard of living’ that could be had in many European countries versus that which my interviewees could have in Lebanon. Again, class comes to the fore as all those interviewed were of upper- or upper-middle-class background in Lebanon and had the means – education, family connections, inherited family wealth as land, apartments and so on – to live well in Lebanon. To them, this meant having live-in domestic help, an apartment in Beirut and a house or *chalet* in the mountains and their children being in the ‘best’ schools. This type of lifestyle is only available to the wealthiest in most of Europe. Thus, at least for my interviewees (and others similar to them), they could hope for a higher standard of living – in part through education and connections forged



while abroad – in Lebanon. This calculation reflects very practical deliberation about how they would manage the key aspects of their lives.

The ‘pull’ of Lebanon was also felt by some who thought it their ‘duty’ to return to their homeland with the skills and experience they had acquired in order to develop the country. Rim (39) and Maroun (41) each used the word ‘duty’ more than once and tied this concept to tangible aspects such as taking care of parents as well as less tangible goals of ‘developing the country’ and ‘rebuilding’ Lebanon from the ravages of its long civil war.

More apparent in the academic literature on the subject rather than in my interviews – at least at first glance – is the issue of ‘righting the moral wrong’ done by colonialism as well as the luck of place of birth (see Shachar (2009) for a full discussion of this) regarding citizenship. In other words, as Lebanese – most, if not all – feel that as their *formal* citizenship (again, national belonging are quite different issues in Lebanon as well as other countries) offers them little in the way of rights and especially protection from the state, why not seek to ‘redress’ the historical wrong done by colonialism (which weakened and some would argue continues to keep the Lebanese state weak) as well as the distribution of power in the international system which privileges ‘the West over the rest’, by taking on a ‘developed world’ citizenship (Interview, Lina, 42).

Shachar and Hirschl (2007, p. 254) again reflect on this point by stating that ‘citizenship is acquired for most as a “form of inherited property”’. This is where Lebanese can become quite annoyed – indeed incensed – by many Europeans’ expressions of entitlement vis-à-vis their citizenship and all of the benefits that result from it when the French (in the case of the Lebanese), the British and other countries’ citizens have benefitted directly and indirectly from their past colonial empires. Yet, ironically, Lebanese dual nationals can also benefit from having two or more citizenships when living in Lebanon – beyond the security offered by being European nationals – in ways such as being able to forgo mandatory Arabic courses at the university level or being able to take the International Baccalaureate (IB) or French Baccalaureate (the ‘Bac’) rather than being compelled to take the Lebanese one in order to enrol in a university in Lebanon at the sophomore level. This discussion in the interviews brings again to the fore the strategies involved in taking on dual citizenship on the part of the Lebanese, echoing the literature on dual citizenship that points to this type of strategic decision-making.

My children used to ask me why they needed to speak Arabic [in reference to poor grades in Arabic at school] if they were really French citizens . . . My reply that they were Lebanese too didn’t seem to affect them too much . . . maybe because the discussion was taking place in French and not in Arabic. (Lina, 42)

Lina and a few others noted that they felt that if they really wanted to impart a feeling of ‘Lebanese-ness’ to their children, they were going to have to live in Lebanon at least long enough for their children to feel comfortable speaking, reading and writing in Arabic as well as feel a sense of belonging to their home villages, Arabic

culture, the climate and so on. Shirine and Nour confessed that while they had always felt to be Lebanese while growing up in Europe, their lack of fluency in Arabic and their lack of familiarity with a number of aspects of popular Lebanese culture had made them feel 'inadequate' and 'not truly Lebanese'. Shirine went on to say that she 'didn't want [her] kids to feel the same way'.

Still, despite all the discussion about 'good' and 'bad' citizenships, there is ample literature that focuses on 'the end of citizenship' through globalisation (Isin and Turner 2002, Smismans 2007) and the development of post-national conceptions of citizenship (Sassen 2002, Brysk and Shafir 2004, Spiro 2008). Key to this argument is that the forces of globalisation are weakening not only the state overall but also the aspects of the state that heretofore seemed quite immutable to change, for example, citizenship. One can view the strategic 'shopping around' for second citizenships through the prism of globalisation, but (as one anonymous reviewer alluded to) this phenomenon can also be viewed as the continuation of long-standing transnational relationships in which the people of the eastern Mediterranean have been embedded for centuries if not millennia. But while advances in communications technology and transportation make even the most distant homelands closer to émigrés and the state does seem to be losing direct control over many aspects of society and the individuals and families that compose it, Lebanese – much better than most – know how important 'the state' is, as they have too often not had a functioning one in Lebanon.<sup>8</sup> Again and again in my interviews, the European–Lebanese dual citizens talked about the horrors of civil conflict as well as the dehumanising effects of living in a weak state that could never really protect you – from disease (poor public health care system), accident (safety regulations largely go unenforced) and war (civil conflict as well as external invasions). As de la Paz (n.d.) notes, 'citizenship is a legal status and an identity. Thus, there is an objective dimension of citizenship: specific rights and obligations which a state invests in its members, and a subjective dimension: a sense of loyalty and belonging'. Therefore, for those interviewed (though I would imagine for most Lebanese with European passports), taking on a European citizenship and yet living in Lebanon offers the opportunity to gain the benefits of objective citizenship (through the European passport) as well as *modified* subjective citizenship (through the Lebanese nationality even in the face of a weak state), that is, a feeling of belonging.

In the literature, most have concluded that given the 'lightening' of citizenship throughout liberal Western democracies, 'the value of an immigrant visa by far surpasses that of formal citizenship' (Joppke 2010, p. 12). While this conclusion may well be correct in most cases, in the case under investigation in this article – Lebanese citizens who have taken on European citizenship but reside in Lebanon – it is not. This is due to the incontrovertible fact that an immigrant visa<sup>9</sup> – while offering almost all of the rights (since in liberal citizenship there are no longer substantive *obligations* that differ from those of aliens, i.e. paying taxes) – does not offer the *protection of the state for its citizens who live outside of the national borders*. This is the key for many Lebanese who have sought the second

passport in the first place and then endeavour to retain the citizenship for their children.

The article now turns to an analysis of how the existence of non-resident, naturalised European citizens may affect the understandings of citizenship in Europe more generally.

### **How is citizenship understood in Europe?**

Of course, understandings of citizenship even within liberal Europe vary significantly; one must therefore analyse various understandings of citizenship. ‘In France, for example, [citizenship] implies active participation in the body politic, while in the UK it is a passively received legal categorization’ (Cohen 1994 as cited in Clarke *et al.* (1998)). In fact, in the past decade, there has been an increasing amount of literature on citizenship in Europe (e.g. Soysal 1994, Painter 2002, Faist 2007).

As previously noted, in European law, dual citizenship was formally restricted in the 1963 Convention on the Restriction of Dual Nationality only to be opened up with the 1997 Convention on Nationality (Clarke *et al.* 1998). For the acquisition of citizenship, mandatory periods of residency have largely decreased but there is significant variety by country and type of applicant (Clarke *et al.* 1998). Knowing the language and demonstration of ‘good character’ is also often a prerequisite for naturalisation.

As Clarke *et al.* (1998) and Bauböck (1995) rightly note, ‘in many countries of immigration an importance is attached to the formal distinction between citizens and aliens’ (Clarke *et al.* 1998, p. 44). But, in the case of non-resident, naturalised citizens, does this group really fall with ‘citizens’ or should another category be created? A number of scholars have sought to create a system of categorisation that better describes reality, such as ‘citizens, “denizens” or permanent residents, and “hots” or “margizaens” who lack the formal recognition of the two previous categories’ (Clarke *et al.* 1998, p 45).<sup>10</sup> But again, the specific group under study in this article – non-resident, naturalised citizens – seems to beg for a new category.

I’m really always in-between . . . I’m not European enough when I’m there, though I went all through school in Europe – and yet when I get back here, I’m sometimes told that I’m not Lebanese enough. (Tanya, 39)

It is clear that the Lebanese-type case is therefore not *the* but rather *one of* the factors contributing to the weakening – or in the words of Joppke (2010) and others, the ‘lightening’ – of citizenship in the liberal Western states. After all, the instrumental use of European citizenship exhibited by many Lebanese dual citizens is a reflection of the reality that European citizenship has in many ways been forced to cave into economic realities and become not a symbol of national belonging but rather an economic club kept alive by extending preferential membership to talented foreigners. This conception of citizenship in liberal Western democracies as ‘a club’ has been discussed by Kolb (2008) and Walzer (1983) among others

and in many ways provides a good, though imperfect analogy; the weakness being that while a club is voluntary (to a significant but not complete extent) in its membership, in reality very few of us get to decide which 'club' (i.e. citizenship) we want to join and cannot leave the 'club' that we were born into unless a new club takes us as a member.

For the Lebanese I interviewed, however, European citizenship as 'a (economic) club' has had numerous benefits. Highly educated and speaking three languages fluently (at a minimum) and seemingly at home in Western culture as well as 'Eastern' (read: Arab and/or Muslim) societies, these Lebanese can readily 'pose' as ideal new members of 'the European club'. A perfect example of this is a man in his early 50s who took on French citizenship after living in the country for almost 10 years. A graduate of the *Lycée Français* in Beirut as well as of Beirut University College (now Lebanese American University) with a degree in Business, he had 'the look' as well as the knowledge of and experience with French culture, politics and so on, to make an 'ideal' new French citizen. The only 'fly in the ointment' as it were, was his name (recognisably *not* French and to many, recognisably 'Arab') and his religious identity, Muslim. This paradox came out again and again in the interview: this man was European, specifically French, in many ways – according to him – but also, he ruefully conceded, he never felt truly accepted and seriously doubted that he could ever be truly accepted as a French citizen due to his Lebanese and Muslim backgrounds. This is all the more notable given that this man, though having a Muslim identity, was and is not particularly religious or observant.

What has yet to be discussed in this article is what would be the benefits and drawbacks of European countries of having non-resident, naturalised citizens living abroad. While non-resident, naturalised citizens may indeed call on the adopted country to provide security of one type or another while residing outside of the adopted country's borders (assuming a level of power to indeed respond to such a call), might not these adopted countries also call on their non-resident, naturalised citizens to further various 'national' goals – political, social, economic and religious – in these dual nationals' homelands? Among the most adept at this seem to be France, in the case of European countries, as well as the United States, Canada and Australia. In this light, the 'soft power' of the French so often discussed in Lebanon must be seen to include French–Lebanese dual citizens as well as the many more Lebanese who have been educated in French language schools and continue to use French in their daily lives. This type of relationship can be understood to further blur the borders dividing the world into nation-states and indeed provide support to those who see the increase in the existence of dual citizenship as movement towards transnationalism (Bloemraad 2004, Faist 2007).

## **Conclusion**

'The rallying cry of interior ministries from The Hague to Canberra is that citizenship is to be more difficult to attain and more highly "prized" than in the past' (Joppke 2010, p. 14). Yet, while revised naturalisation exams, investigations into

the ‘character’ of the applicant and longer residency periods prior to being eligible to apply for citizenship continue to be implemented throughout Europe, it remains that ‘EU citizenship is entirely built around the fact of immigration, or what in Europe is referred to as “free movement”. It is Roman to the core, providing rights of free movement within Europe, and giving short shrift to the Greek package of politics, democracy, and duties’ (Joppke 2010, p. 19). In some key ways, how my Lebanese interviewees regard their European ‘second passports’ is how EU citizenship is already viewed today and individual European nation-state citizenships may be viewed in the not-so-distant future. For my interviewees, the European passport is security, access to the rule of law and opportunity for economic gain; this seems much the same for other citizens of the EU (Soysal 1994, Bloemraad 2004, Joppke 2010).

At the start of the research, it was anticipated that findings would include that individual factors such as class, gender, age and the level of education contribute to facilitating and/or pushing Lebanese to pursue obtaining European passports; this was demonstrated by the small interview sample but needs further research. In addition, an emphasis on the practicality of having a European passport in addition to the Lebanese one was anticipated to be almost as important to most individuals as is the promise of security, should political strife (again) break out in Lebanon; this was demonstrated repeatedly in the interviews as well.

We are thus forced to come back to the question of ‘what does citizenship mean to Europe’? This article has attempted to describe and discuss how one group of European dual citizens not currently residing in Europe feels about their European citizenship as well as how European citizenship – particularly dual citizenship – is currently understood in the literature. Still, such discussion warrants ‘closing the loop’ by analysing how the existence of non-resident, naturalised citizens (again, in this case, my Lebanese interviewees) impacts the understanding of citizenship in Europe. Given the multiplicity of understandings existing in the literature, one can only assume that such variety exists in regard to this question as well, in the form of country, class, religion and possibly profession.

It remains, however, that while these Lebanese dual citizens may not be the stereotypical ‘burden’ on their adopted countries as portrayed in the media<sup>11</sup> or a spoiler of the ethno-religious unity of the imagined ‘nation’ – in contrast to growing populist sentiment in Europe about *resident* immigrant populations – the fact remains that these citizens minimally participate in the life of the countries of which they possess citizenship. What does this mean? Few pay taxes (unless they own property – but this would be the same for any property owner, citizen or alien) and few vote. Thus, the question that must really be posed seems to be whether their physical *absence* from the nation-state but their ability to call on the resources of the state when needed creates a burden for the adopted country?

One thing that seems clear to this researcher is that this type of debate seems to be one that will happen sooner or later in a number of countries, particularly following ‘crises’ and/or when money to fund government services becomes tight. At that point, the debate will arise as the following: Should countries in Europe

that do accept dual citizenship continue to do so or return to the practice of only allowing one citizenship, as is still the case with a handful of countries such as Austria and Germany? Moving further with the latter choice, should a case be made for the basis of, until recently, long-held views of dual citizenship as being security hazards during times of war when such nationals could not be trusted to be loyal to their adopted state (Faist *et al.* 2004)? Perhaps then one can conclude with a question that still lies at the heart of citizenship theory: Not only what does the state owe the citizen but what does the citizen owe the state?

Perhaps the best conclusion that can be reached at this stage is that the Lebanese citizens also holding European citizenship may be examples of a time of transition. Transition between citizenship that is predicated on 'national belonging' and one which is based on residency and a contract between the individual and the state and may or may not include feelings of national belonging (e.g. European citizenship). As we have seen, while 'Lebanese-ness' can be tied to formal Lebanese citizenship, *muwatana* (national belonging) need not be tied to *jinsiyya* (legal citizenship), and often is not in the Lebanese case overall. While this transition phase seems relatively stable at this point in time, it should be recalled that a number of scholars point to how recently the existence of dual citizenship has been acknowledged, never mind accepted (Howard 2003) and how developments in citizenship constructions in liberal Western states may work to make citizenship increasingly based on residency and participation rather than 'national belonging' (Joppke 2010;) or indeed attempt to move back towards national belonging being the bedrock of citizenship (Bloemraad 2004). The latter would of course force the Lebanese dual nationals to assimilate in the adopted country or renounce the adopted citizenship; the former development would compel them – as in decades past – to choose between their 'homeland' and insecurity, on the one hand, and a new and alien, but secure, country, on the other hand.

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### **Notes**

1. Names of all interviewees have been changed in order to afford them greater freedom to say what they think.
2. The discussion will only focus on 'liberal democracies' as the differences in how citizenship is conceived of in other systems differs significantly. One could even go so far as to say that in many, if not all, non-democratic systems, the citizen qua citizen does not exist. The inclusion of 'liberal' is also purposeful in order to differentiate between systems – liberal democracies such as France, Canada and Argentina and illiberal democracies such as Russia, Peru and the Philippines (see Zakaria 1997).
3. For much of the modern nation-state era, citizenship was patrilineal and thus when women married, they forfeited their citizenship of birth and took on that of their husband. Minors – in a similar category to women and wives – were given the citizenship

of their fathers. Today, few countries worldwide still solely follow citizenship via patrilineal descent – one of these is Lebanon (see Joseph 1997).

4. They are Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic, Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Isma'ili, Jewish, Maronite, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Sunni, Shi'a, Syrian Catholic and Syrian Orthodox.
5. This was confirmed to the author by the local *mukhtar*. Translated as 'mayor', the *mukhtar* is in reality the lowest level civil servant who deals with all official personal and family identification papers, for example, *Tazkarat Al Hawiya* (personal ID). The *mukhtar* is an elected official.
6. While I do not have the space to get into this discussion here, by 'social' I mean, protection from ethnic and/or religious discrimination in the adopted European country. While the rule of law will of course offer some basic protections, actual integration into the society is never assured (see Ireland 2004, among others). This is related as well to 'national belonging' which is discussed elsewhere in the article.
7. Switzerland banned the construction of minarets and the public call to prayer through referendum in 2010.
8. As an aside, a joke currently circulating in Lebanon is the following: How do we know that Adam and Eve were really Lebanese? They lived in a place with no government and no electricity and yet they thought they were in paradise.
9. Immigrant visas in Europe vary tremendously. The EU has recently rolled out the BlueCard as a means of unifying immigrant visa regimes in the union as well as to compete with America's hugely popular and successful Green Card program for attracting skilled immigrants.
10. One anonymous reviewer recommended a category of 'mercantile citizenship', noting the emphasis on financial considerations as key to why the second citizenship was obtained. This economic focus is appreciated by the author.
11. See *The economist debate on immigration* [online]. Available from: <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/730> [Accessed 1 October 2011] and Boeri, T. It is migration, stupid, *VOX* [online], 23 June 2009. Available from: <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3688> [Accessed 6 October 2011], among many others.

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