



Lebanese militias: A new perspective

Marwan George Rowayheb

To cite this article: Marwan George Rowayheb (2006) Lebanese militias: A new perspective, Middle Eastern Studies, 42:2, 303-318, DOI: [10.1080/00263200500417801](https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200500417801)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200500417801>



Published online: 11 Aug 2006.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 323



View related articles [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)

Lebanese Militias: A New Perspective

MARWAN GEORGE ROWAYHEB

Most of the literature on Lebanon during the years of the civil war, saw militias or militiamen from a negative perspective. Militiamen were considered ruthless people who contributed substantially to the breakdown of the state in Lebanon and who used all kinds of violence against Lebanese civilians for the purpose of acquiring their private property and imposing their dominance over well defined geographical areas.¹

A few studies, however, have investigated the role of militias, but not from a purely negative view, such as that of Judith Harik.² Harik regarded militias as providers of public services for the Lebanese when the state was unable to provide those services during the years of the civil war.

This article intends to study militias from a different perspective – one that will shed light on positive aspects of the experience of militias in Lebanon and investigate how a number of Lebanese (specifically militiamen) were managed during the civil war so as to disregard their confessional background and achieve specified political objectives. This was in a period when people predicted that the Lebanese would not abandon their confessional identities since the Lebanese political system and the de facto situation imposed by the civil war made identification with one's confessional background valuable in acquiring political power or benefits.

In Lebanon confessional identities were and still are difficult to disregard in a social and political community. Lebanon's political system divided the Lebanese along religious and political lines so as to organize socio-political affairs. During the fifteen years of the civil war, this polarization was to increase dramatically. Thus, any group of Lebanese – like the militiamen who will be studied here – that challenged these circumstances would be of interest.

In Lebanon and during the years of the civil war, one can list two categories of militias in terms of the confessional composition of their members.³ The first group of militias such as Harakat Amal, Hizb Allah and Al-Murabitun attracted Lebanese of similar confessional backgrounds respectively. Each of these militias attracted Lebanese of the same confessional background who had no need to explicitly draw their ethnic boundaries on common cultural markers different from their confessional ones to ensure their militia's internal solidarity. In this case the militias represented explicitly the interest of members coming from the same confessional background.

The second category of militias included those whose members came from different confessional backgrounds. It is this group that has relevance for this article. Since the members of each militia came from different confessional backgrounds, it was necessary to construct a sense of group solidarity based on

non-confessional cultural markers. Therefore this study will investigate the following militias: al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima'i (the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party or SSNP), al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani (the Lebanese Communist Party or LCP), the Kata'ib (Kataib), al-Quwwat al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Forces), al-Jabha al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Front), and Tajammu' Rawabit al-Lijan al-Sha'biyya (The Association of Popular Committees).

The more intriguing question is how these militiamen to be investigated managed to mobilize themselves and cooperate in the face of the circumstances described above? As will be demonstrated, the internal solidarity of these militias was boosted not only by the organization, motivation, mobilization, resources, and ideology of its members but mainly by the ability of the militiamen to draw ethnic boundaries along non-religious cultural lines, and more precisely along Christian, Syrian, Arab and Lebanese cultural lines.⁴

Studying these selected militias will also shed light on two other major aspects not recognized in literature from the Lebanon. First, literature on Lebanon regarded the war mainly as one which took place between the Maronites, the Sunnites, the Shiites, and the Druzes. This article will show that the Lebanese with other religious backgrounds played a substantial role in the war through their contribution to the militias in this study.

Second, many Lebanese consider that some of these militias such as the SSNP and LCP were used by some Lebanese (such as the Greek Orthodox) as a disguise to mobilization on confessional grounds in order to gain political power. The members of these militias were not mobilized according to religious backgrounds but participated with other members of different confessional backgrounds in drafting the militias' political programmes, structuring and organizing the units of these militias, fighting within para-military units in the different military operations undertaken.

How is one to explain the ability of these militiamen to overcome their religious backgrounds and be able to claim to have another cultural feature in common with other fellow members of different confessional backgrounds for the purpose of strengthening the ethnic solidarity of their militias? The instrumentalist approach to the study of ethnic relations as defined by Fredrik Barth finds explanations for the case study presented here.⁵ This approach considers that ethnic groups are cultural groups constructed and reconstructed by people for the purpose of interaction.⁶

Some literature on Lebanon takes some ideas from the primordialist approach to study ethnic relations and rejects the applicability of the instrumentalist approach to the study of ethnic relations in Lebanon as will be seen in this article. A good example here would be Samir Khalaf's book *Lebanon's Predicament*.⁷ In general terms, the primordial approach to the study of ethnicity was first used by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, who identified certain types of social bond as primordial, sacred and civil ties.⁸ They both stressed the importance of cultural 'givens' such as religion, language, race, nationality and custom to which people assign 'primordial' attributes.⁹ They viewed them as 'overpowering' and 'infallible'.¹⁰

The primordialist approach to the study of ethnicity is criticized here for its inability to find explanations for the case of the militiamen studied here and more generally for its inability to find explanations for the malleability of ethnic identities in Lebanon. If, as claimed by primordialists, ethnic identities or groups are ineffable,

overpowering and coercive, why then did these militiamen not organize themselves according to the cultural markers from their religious backgrounds?¹¹

On the other hand, a number of scholars did not explicitly accept segregation of the Lebanese into ethnic groups. Many argue that ethnic groups are only biologically based and the Lebanese cannot be differentiated in those terms.¹² Whereas many others consider that in Lebanon there are no clear-cut cultural differences that will allow anyone to talk about ethnic groups having separate cultural bases.¹³

This article does not approve the arguments of the above literature. It strongly supports the view that ethnic groups are about differences, be they cultural or biological. Furthermore, this study considers that common cultural features or cultural continuity among the Lebanese do not necessarily lead to the formation of an extended cultural group that includes all Lebanese. It is not the number of differences or their nature that provides a base for the formation of ethnic groups but the way the individuals of these groups perceive these differences and use them to distance themselves from others for the purpose of drawing ethnic boundaries. Ethnic here is not restricted to biological characteristics but to any physical or non-physical characteristics that can allow members of a group to differentiate themselves clearly from members of another group.

Barth stressed that any individual can lay claim to a cultural feature for the purpose of drawing ethnic boundaries and organize his or her political or non-political interaction accordingly. Thus the flexible nature of ethnic boundaries becomes a fact hard to disregard when studying ethnic relations. Ethnic groups become in Barth's terms 'highly situational, not primordial'.¹⁴ These boundaries classify militiamen and other Lebanese under 'us-versus-them'. In this way, ethnic boundaries organize and structure interaction between militiamen and their human environment by distinguishing Lebanese within the drawn boundaries of a designated ethnic group from those who are not members of the same group.¹⁵ The emphasis on ascription as the critical feature for the appearance of ethnic groups means that the ethnic boundaries that define the group, and not the cultural stuff that these boundaries enclose, become the major and critical focus for investigation.¹⁶

Can a confessional group in Lebanon be considered an ethnic group? Yes it can. Many cultural differences are perceptible when comparing confessional groups in Lebanon. Thus, being ethnic, confessional groups are constructed or deconstructed for the purpose of political interaction. In that perspective confessional identities are not primordial but situational. Their use for social or political interaction is situational, instrumental and dependent on the interest they guarantee to the people they claim to hold. In that regard, individuals and in this case militiamen are free to 'pick and mix' from a 'variety of ethnic heritages and cultures to forge their own individual or group identities'.¹⁷ These boundaries classify militiamen and other Lebanese according to 'us-versus-them'. In this way, ethnic boundaries organize and structure interaction between militiamen and their human environment by differentiating the Lebanese within the drawn boundaries of a designated ethnic group from those who are not members of that group. Thus, the critical feature in the appearance or disappearance of ethnic groups becomes self-ascription or ascription by others:¹⁸ 'only in so far as individuals embrace it, are constrained by it, act on it, and experience it will ethnicity make an organizational difference'.¹⁹ Ethnic boundaries that classify ethnic groups appear as a result of interaction between militiamen.²⁰

This article will investigate the way the militiamen in each of the militias under consideration drew ethnic boundaries and the way they moved about within these militias. The drawing of ethnic boundaries will be studied by investigating the different cultural features they claimed to have in common with other militiamen. On the other hand, the mobilization of these militiamen within these militias will be investigated in terms of their contribution to the founding of these militias, to the decision-making process, to setting the agenda of these militias, to their military activities and to the conflicts within these militias.

The Lebanese Communist Party (*al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*) was established in the 1920s as part of the Lebanese Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon. This was achieved by the joint effort of a number of Lebanese and Syrians such as Fuad al-Shimali, Khaled Bikdash, Nicolas Shawi and Youssef Yazbik.²¹ In 1964, the Lebanese section of the Party split and became independent, calling itself the Lebanese Communist Party.²²

Prior to and during the civil war, the party attracted Lebanese Greek Orthodox, Shi'is, Maronites and Druzes.²³ For example, during the fifth Lebanese Communist Conference, the confessional composition of the Party's delegates was as follows: 41 per cent Shi'is, 19 per cent Sunnis, 17 per cent Greek Orthodox, 9 per cent Druzes, 10 per cent Maronites, and 4 per cent others.²⁴

Most members of the LCP held the view, as all communist-oriented parties did, that they belonged to the Lebanese working class. In general, they regarded the civil war in Lebanon from the perspective of 'class struggle' and resulting from a conflict between what they referred to as 'the Lebanese political confessional capitalistic feudalistic class' and 'the secular poor working class.'²⁵

Another feature that the LCP identified with explicitly during the civil war in order to draw ethnic boundaries was the Arab cultural markers. This was to contradict the stand taken by the party's founder on the matter of identifying with Arab identity. Regarding the Arab cultural feature, the party members who considered themselves to be Arabs regarded all people speaking the Arabic language and residing in Arabic-speaking areas as one people.²⁶ They also believed that the Arabs as a people constituted a nation before the coming of Christianity or Islam. However, many Arab nationalists accepted the fact that the coming of Islam had a great impact on Arab culture and added many features to its repertoire.²⁷

However, when it was founded, the LCP was unconcerned with what the Arab nationalists were calling for and it did not show support for their 'cause'.²⁸ However, from the mid-1960s, things started to change pertaining to this issue. A number of Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Druze, Sunni and Shi'i, members of the LCP central committee, did not approve of the founders' policy, and accordingly started to identify explicitly with what they called 'their Arab identity'.²⁹ From 1968 onwards, this faction started to plan for a take-over of the party's command.³⁰ This faction included the following: George Hawi (Greek Orthodox:), Khalil al-Dibs (Greek Orthodox), Antoine Madoiyane (Armenian Catholic), Nadim Abd al-Samad (Druze), Kamal Mrua (Shi'i), and Mahmud Abu Shakra (Druze).³¹ They had taken full control of the party by the end of the 1970s.

When the war erupted in 1975, the LCP was not ready to get involved militarily.³² However, in the years that followed, Hawi's faction (Hawi at that time was the secretary general of the Party and held this position till the late 1980s) started to establish the Party's militia units.³³ This process was referred to as being 'for the construction of a fighting party' and was completed by the end of the 1970s.³⁴

Looking at the names of LCP members who died during the different military operations undertaken by the Party, it can be seen that people from different confessional backgrounds are included.³⁵ From these military operations some examples can be listed. In the first years of the civil war, they fought side by side with the different militias of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) against the Lebanese Forces in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. In the 1980s, the LCP's members – Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Shi'is, Druzes and Maronites – participated in Lebanese resistance to the Israeli Army which entered Lebanon in 1982.³⁶ They also fought against the Lebanese Army and government forces for the cancellation of the Israeli–Lebanese agreement of 17 May 1983.³⁷

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP (*al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri al-Ijtima'i*) was established by Antun Sa'ada (Greek Orthodox) in 1935.³⁸ With Sa'ada, a number of Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Maronites, Shi'is and Druzes contributed to the founding, development and structuring of the party. Of these Abdallah Sa'ada, Jibrān Jayj, George Abd Humsi, Assad al-Ashkar, Abdallah Kubursi, George Abd al-Masih and Ibrahim Yammūt can be mentioned.

Since its establishment, the SSNP membership composition in terms of confessional backgrounds had fluctuated, but in general its main support came from the Greek Orthodox, Shi'is, Druzes, Sunnis and Alawites who, decades before the outbreak of the civil war were mobilized collectively in order to promote the Party's policies.³⁹ This was apparent in the Party's attempts to topple the Lebanese government in 1949 and 1961.⁴⁰ Looking at the SSNP members who were detained or imprisoned by the Lebanese security forces during these two failed coups, it is clear that they included party members from each of these faiths.⁴¹

The drawing of common ethnic boundaries between the Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Shi'is, Druzes and Maronites was pointed to in the SSNP's ideology. This ideology is clearly and comprehensively addressed in a document that includes the basic and reform principles of the SSNP. This document originated as a pamphlet written by Sa'ada while he was in prison, and was later elaborated and developed to its final shape in a document presented in 1947.

In brief, the ideology of the SSNP was and still is composed of three parts: the basic principles, reform principles and its aims. The eight principles of the SSNP incorporate the doctrine of Syrian nationalism. According to Haytham A. Jaber, 'they proceed in a logical order from a declaration of the existence of the Syrian nation, to an identification of the character of its cause, to a clarification of its genesis, and its homeland. The basis of national unit, the sources of national character and the consciousness and the guiding principles of national militancy are then defined.'⁴² The major objectives, behind which the Party was established, also targeted changes in the social, economic and political life of the Syrian people.⁴³

Accordingly, the party's ideology defined the Syrian features according to which party's members should draw the ethnic boundaries that differentiate them from members of other ethnic groups.⁴⁴ Syrian features refer to those features that Syrian nationalists considered common to all the people living in what they termed Geographical Syria (*Suriyya al-Kubra*), which included Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Palestine.⁴⁵ Members of the SSNP claimed that the people living in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq were Syrian regardless of their faith, and that they should be regarded as one nation.⁴⁶ A nation, to Syrian nationalists, was defined as 'a group of people living together in a defined region in the world separated from other regions by natural boundaries but joined by common material and spiritual interests and common destiny.'⁴⁷

During the civil war, members of the militias of different creeds were mobilized with others with the aim of imposing control over well-defined geographical areas and formulating the Party's claims and policies. Members who died in the military clashes that the SSNP was involved in included Greek Orthodox, Druzes, Sunnis, Shi'is and Maronites as indicated by the party's list of martyrs.⁴⁸ From these clashes some examples may be listed. In the first years of the civil war, the SSNP participated actively in the military clashes that took place between the militias of the Lebanese National Movement and the PLO on one side and the militias of the Lebanese Forces on the other. The SSNP contributed significantly to the military operations of the Lebanese National Movement by providing it with fighters.⁴⁹ Another example was in the mid-1980s when members of the SSNP were active in the resistance movement against the Israeli Army.⁵⁰ The first suicide attacks against the Israeli Army in Lebanon were executed by a group of SSNP members of different faiths.⁵¹

Members of the SSNP also fought under the umbrella of the military coalition that was formed in 1984 to end the Lebanese Army's and the Lebanese Forces' presence in West Beirut. Another example was 1985 when the SSNP conflicted with Amal and al-Tawhid in Beirut and Tripoli respectively. This conflict led to a number of military clashes in which the Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Druzes, Shi'is and Sunnis of the SSNP fought side by side to end al-Tawhid's control over Tripoli and Amal's and Hizb Allah's control over West Beirut.⁵²

Lebanese of different religious backgrounds were present within the highest units of the SSNP.⁵³ According to Hana Nashif, a member of the SSNP Council of Deans in 1995, the party included members from all confessional groups.⁵⁴ However, Nashif insists that the faiths of the members are not to be disclosed.⁵⁵ He claimed that there are no statistical surveys on the religious composition of the Party's members.⁵⁶

The party's leadership was monopolized by Sa'ada until his death.⁵⁷ In the years that followed Sa'ada's death, a number of members with different religious backgrounds managed to occupy the presidency and key positions within the SSNP. For example, between 1974 and the middle of 1987, three people occupied the presidency successively: a Greek Catholic – In'am Ra'd, a Greek Orthodox – Abdallah Sa'ada, and a Shi'i – Issam Mahayri.

Since this change came into effect, the High Council has never come under the control solely of members of the same religion. For example, in the 1984 election of the High Council, the members elected were Issam Mahayri (Shi'i), Daud Baz (Greek Orthodox), Hafiz Sayigh (Greek Orthodox), Marwan Faris (Greek

Orthodox), Mahmud Abd al-Malik (Druze), In'am Ra'd (Greek Catholic), Issam Shatila (Sunni), Zahir al-Hakaym (Maronite), Mas'ad Hajal (Greek Orthodox), Wassim Sa'ada (Greek Orthodox) and Yusuf Sa'ada (Maronite).⁵⁸ Thus, this dismisses any claim that the Party was under the sole control of either Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Druzes, Shi'is or Sunnis, whether individually or collectively.

Members of the High Council of different faiths joined forces to draw up and define the Party's policy during the civil war. The faction within the High Council of SSNP that made a substantial contribution to the formulation of the political and ideological orientation of the Party included Abdallah Sa'ada, Yusuf al-Ashkar, In'am Ra'd and Wassim 'Iz al-Dine, each of whom had a different religious background.⁵⁹

Another indicator which demonstrates that the members of the SSNP were mobilized according to Syrian criteria rather than their belief was their reaction to the major splits that took place among Party members. The first occurred during the first year of the civil war. When the war broke out in 1975, a conflict arose between Party members. The first faction was headed by In'am Ra'd and included Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Sunnis and Druzes. The other faction was headed by George Konayzih and also included Party members from different confessional backgrounds. The major source of conflict between the two related to the entry and involvement of the Syrian Army in Lebanon and what the Party's reaction to this entry should be. At that time, Ra'd's faction took the same position as the Lebanese National Movement regarding Syria. During the first years of the civil war, the militias operating under the umbrella of the LNM did not approve of Syria's intervention in Lebanon, claiming that it gave advantage to the Lebanese Front militias. When the war started, Syria's main interest was not to allow any change in the balance of power to take place among the contending militias. When the LNM was on the edge of defeating the Lebanese Front's militias, Syria sent al-Saqiyya to deter the major offensive of the LNM militias against the areas controlled by the Lebanese Front. However, after 1978, when the relationship between Syria and the LNM improved, the source of conflict between both factions disappeared and the party was reunited.

Another split within the Party took place in 1987. The first sign of this appeared in 1984 when two factions were formed within the Party after the election of Issam Mahayri as president on July 8, 1984. Both factions included Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Shi'is, Druzes and Sunnis. The first one, headed by Issam Mahayri himself, included Greek Orthodox such as Abdallah Sa'ada and Mas'ad Hajal and a number of Maronites Druzes, Sunnis and Shi'is from whom Habib Kayruz (Maronite), Hiyam Muhsin (Shi'i), Mahmud Ghazala (Shi'i) and Yusuf al-Ashkar (Maronite) can be listed. This faction supported Syria's role in Lebanon and wanted the SSNP to seek Syria's assistance. Furthermore, they called for a close co-ordination with Walid Jumblat. The second faction, headed by Jibrán Jayj, rejected what they claimed to be the party's dependency on Syria and called for a closer relationship with Iraq.⁶⁰ In addition, they denounced the other faction's relationships with Jumblat. They accused Jumblat of causing the split within the SSNP.⁶¹

In 1985, the Dean of Defence, Muhamad Salim, was assassinated.⁶² This triggered several armed clashes between the two factions. As a reaction, and in order to bring the situation under control, some members formed a committee to mediate between

the two contending factions. This committee included members of different religious backgrounds such as Marwan Faris, Daud Baz and Abdallah Sa'ada. Again they cooperated with others members from different confessional backgrounds such as Assad al-Ashkar, Tufik Muhana, Jihad al-Mu'alim and Issam Mahayri to solve the dispute and reunite the party.⁶³ However, this committee broke up and the Party split into two separate parties in 1987. The first faction under the leadership of Mahayri was referred to as al-Tawariq, while the other under the leadership of Jrayj called itself the Highest Council (al-Majlis al-A'la).⁶⁴

The Kataib party was established in 1936 by five individuals who were mainly Maronites: Charles Hilu, George Nakashe, Chafic Nasif, Emile Yard and Pierre Gemayel.⁶⁵ The latter was elected president, and held this position until his death in 1984.⁶⁶

One of the major aims behind the establishment of Kataib was to challenge the calls by some Lebanese (mainly Syrian or Arab nationalists) to include Lebanon in a larger entity (either Syria or a pan-Arab state, respectively). These calls were very much heard during the years of the French mandate and the years that followed. Kataib claimed that 'Lebanon is a separate nation with a separate and a distinct destiny different from its Arab surroundings.'⁶⁷ Kataib's view of Lebanon as a unique and separate entity was influenced by thinking that defined Lebanon within 'Phoenicianism' or 'Mediterraneanism'.⁶⁸ Phoenicianism as advocated by Iskandar Riayshi considers that 'the modern Lebanese' are descendants of the Phoenicians who lived on the Lebanese coast centuries ago.⁶⁹ The other school of thought, 'Mediterraneanism', did not stress the historical roots of Lebanon. Instead it emphasized Lebanon's physical and cultural place in the Mediterranean basin.⁷⁰

The Kataib Party not only emphasized a distinct Lebanese culture. It was also to identify with the Christian. Christian characteristics were also features that the Maronite members ascribed to themselves in order to move with other Lebanese whom they considered Christians like themselves.⁷¹ As did many Maronites, a number of Lebanese Christians such as Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox joined Kataib after its establishment and during the years of the civil war. However, those members did not have a substantial impact on the founding of the party, on its development, or on the formulation of its political or ideological orientations.⁷²

Karim Pakradouni (Armenian Orthodox), a member of the Political Bureau of Kataib during the 1980s, explained the Christians' attraction to the Kataib as the result of the Kataib's strong stand towards protecting 'the Lebanese nation and the independence of Lebanon.'⁷³ He ventured to say that 'the Christians by their nature are more Lebanese while Muslims are more Arab'.⁷⁴ The Christians affiliated to the Kataib Party generally claimed that the special character of Lebanon was Christianity.

Between the 1970s and 1980s, all the Political Bureau members (the highest authority within the Party) were Christians with more than 80 per cent Maronite.⁷⁵ The Political Bureau was the main policymaking and executive body in the Party, and was commanded by the president, vice-president and secretary general. These positions were most of the time occupied by Maronites with the few exceptions of Elie Karama (Greek Catholic) and Karim Pakradouni (Armenian Orthodox).⁷⁶ Before the death of Pierre Gemayel, the authority of the party was vested in him and no

decision could be taken without his approval.⁷⁷ After his death, the party's leadership went to Elie Karama, George Sa'ada (Maronite) and Karim Pakradoni successively.

The influence and participation of other Christians members such as the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox within the Kataib was more substantial when it came to the militia units. The Party's lists of martyrs contain mostly Maronites, with a few Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox.⁷⁸ This list also confirms that they participated in stopping the military offensives of the Syrian Army, PLO and the militias of the LNM against the Eastern Sector.⁷⁹ Furthermore, a great number of them were killed on the demarcation lines separating the two sectors of Beirut.⁸⁰ For example, the Greek Orthodox of the Ashrafiyya area of Beirut constituted most of the fighters of the Kataib militia units operating in East Beirut.⁸¹

The Lebanese Front, al-Jabha al-Lubnaniyya, was established by a number of Maronite leaders when the civil war erupted in 1975. They gathered in the presidential palace in B'abda, at a meeting sponsored by the Lebanese President Sulayman Frangiyya. The people at this meeting were all Maronites. They were Kamil Shamun (Maronite and leader of al-Ahrar), Pierre Gemayel (Maronite and leader of the Kataib), Abbott Bulus Na'man (head of the Permanent Congress of the Lebanese Maronites Monastic Orders) and Ityan Sakr (Maronite and head of Guardians of the Cedars).⁸² However, the Front did not fully materialize as an organization until 1976 when the same people met again and officially announced its establishment. At this point, they also extended membership to include Charles Malik (Greek Orthodox), Fuad Ifram al-Bustani (Maronite), Sa'id Akl (Maronite) and Marun al-Khuri (Maronite and head of the Lebanese Youth Movement).⁸³

The members of the Lebanese Front explicitly declared that the Front was an organization that represented the interests of all Christians of Lebanon during the civil war. For such a purpose, it was called the 'directory council for all Christian leadership in Lebanon.'⁸⁴ However, the Front, like the Kataib, was a clear example of ethnic mobilization taking place according to undeclared cultural markers. The confessional composition of the Front's leadership and the confessional composition of the militias grouped under its umbrella, reveal that the majority of its members were Maronite.

It is not enough to say that the Maronites constituted a majority, within the Front or any predominately Christian militia, since there were twice as many Maronites as other Christians in Lebanon at that time, and one would therefore expect them to constitute a majority in any organization representing a Christian activity. What can be said in addition to the Maronites' quantitative advantage in the Front was that their influence was disproportionate. The balance of power among its members was always in favour of the Maronite members. In the 1970s, Pierre Gemayel and Kamil Shamun were the actual leaders of the Front. In the mid-1980s after the death of these two leaders, the composition of the membership remained the same and in favour of the Maronites, and the balance of power and authority was also to be kept in their favour. Kamil Shamun was succeeded by his son Dany. Samir Ja'ja' (also Maronite), the new commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Forces, became a member in the 1980s.

Although it was dominated by the Maronites, the Lebanese Front witnessed one Greek Orthodox contribution in the role of Charles Malik. Malik held the explicit

view that the 'Greek Orthodox should identify themselves as Christians in the first place and that their interest was directly linked to the interest of the Christians in general and mainly the Maronites.'⁸⁵ Furthermore, he believed, as has been traditionally claimed by Maronite politicians and thinkers, that 'Lebanon is a place of refuge serving to protect and safeguard the Christians of the East.'⁸⁶ He rejected the idea that 'the Greek Orthodox cause' should be separated from 'the overall Christian or Maronite project in Lebanon.'⁸⁷ He explicitly called on the Greek Orthodox to join with with the Lebanese Forces, the Kataib and other militias operating under the umbrella of the Lebanese Front.

Malik contributed substantially to drafting the political programme of the Lebanese Front with other Maronites such as al-Bustani and Na'man. The thinking of those three members was apparent in two Lebanese Front declarations or documents. The first document was prepared after a conference held in January 1977 and attended by all members. This document was known as the document of Saydat al-Bir. The major points expressed in it did not include any explicit confessional identification. However, it did express the major policy – orientations of the Maronite members during the Lebanese civil war.⁸⁸ The main points of this declaration were that Lebanon's sovereignty should be preserved and its independence should be protected and that if the Lebanese political formula was to be reformed in any way it should preserve the pluralistic character of the country by applying either a decentralized or a federal political system. The document emphasized that 'Christians' socio-political rights 'should not be less than those given to the 'non-Christian in any future political reform.'⁸⁹ This could be achieved, according to the document, by giving each 'cultural group' or 'confessional group' autonomy in managing its own culture, education, financial and social affairs.⁹⁰

In the 1980s, the Lebanese Front made another declaration, The Historical Document (al-Wathiqah al-Tarikhiyya).⁹¹ Malik contributed substantially to its drafting.⁹² In this document, the Front explicitly referred to 'the Christians' as a 'national community.'⁹³ The Front demanded an end to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and rejected the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees within Lebanese territories.⁹⁴ They abandoned their support for the 1943 National Pact formula and called instead for reform of the Lebanese political system following a federal or confederate structure instead of a highly centralized system.⁹⁵

After the civil war started in 1975, the Lebanese Front (al-Jabha al-Lubnaniyya) and The Lebanese Forces (al-Quwwat al-Lubnaniyya) had a very close relationship. The Lebanese Forces was formed as a loose coalition of militias of the Kataib, al-Ahrar, Guardian of the Cedars and other Maronite paramilitary units not affiliated to any political party or militia.⁹⁶ The main objective behind its establishment was to unify all militias affiliated to the Lebanese Front under a single military command. The Lebanese Forces were expected to deal only with matters of a military nature while the Lebanese Front was to take care of all non-military issues.

The Lebanese Forces, attracted a number of Christians with different confessional backgrounds, as did the Lebanese Front. It is important to mention that the Lebanese Forces when established was headed by William Hawi, a Greek Orthodox who was also head of the militia units of the Kataib party. However, Hawi was killed

during the fighting that took place at the beginning of the civil war. He was succeeded by Bashir Gemayel (Maronite). After Hawi, no Greek Orthodox occupied such a position again. As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese Forces was established to take care of the military affairs of the Lebanese Front and did not have any independence. However, Bashir Gemayel was able to liberate the Lebanese Forces from the control of the Lebanese Front after several military clashes with the different militias operating under its umbrella. This resulted in him being able to bring all these militias under his centralized command.⁹⁷

The Lebanese Christians such as Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox, who sought recruitment among the Lebanese Forces military units, fought alongside the Maronites during the military clashes that took place in Beirut, Mount Lebanon and the North of the country.⁹⁸ The list of martyrs of the Lebanese Forces during that period includes a number of Greek Orthodox as well as large numbers of Maronites and Greek Catholics.

The Association of Popular Committees (Tajammu' Rawabit al-Lijan al-Sha'biyya) was formed in 1975 by a number of individuals (mainly Sunnis and Greek Orthodox) who seceded from the Ba'th (Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi).⁹⁹ The cultural feature that was mostly emphasized in the ideology and political programmes of these committees was that of a common Arab identity.

According to Ma'n Bashur (Greek Orthodox), one of its founders, these committees had a number of political and social objectives.¹⁰⁰ He claimed that they wanted to represent the interests of the 'grass roots' regardless of their confessional affiliation, to provide public services supposed to be provided by the Lebanese State, and to assist (mainly) the population of West Beirut in facing difficulties resulting from the civil war.¹⁰¹ The Association's political programmes were drafted with the contribution of both Greek Orthodox and Sunnis. Of these, Ma'n Bashur, Khalil Barakat (Greek Orthodox), Ghazi Adhami (Sunni), Husayn Usman (Sunni), Abu Imad Itani (Sunni), Habib Zughayb (Greek Orthodox) and Bishara Murhij (Greek Orthodox) can be mentioned as being the most prominent. The main points of the political programme of these committees were a call to replace the Lebanese confessional system by a 'secular political system, 'close co-ordination not only between Lebanon and Syria but also with Iraq, support for the Palestinian cause, and liberation of the country from Israeli occupation.¹⁰²

Members of the militia units of the Association who were coming from different confessional backgrounds, fought alongside other members during the military operations against the Lebanese Front and its militias in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁰³ For instance, both Greek Orthodox and Sunnis participated with Druzes of the PSP against the Lebanese Forces in the Mount Lebanon war of 1983. They also fought alongside other militias, such as Amal, SSNP, PSP and LCP, against the Lebanese Army in the military clashes of 7 February 1984 which led to the withdrawal of the Lebanese Army from West Beirut.

This article has demonstrated the possibility of overcoming confessional polarization in Lebanon by studying the experience of a number of militiamen who drew

ethnic boundaries on either, Lebanese, Christian, Arab or Syrian features. Thus, confessional identity in Lebanon cannot be considered as given in the primordialist sense. It is constructed or deconstructed for political purposes depending on the willingness of the people to do so. The militiamen studied may be considered a sample of a population in Lebanon that might be willing to identify itself in terms other than their confessional backgrounds and challenging the socio-political environments imposed by the Lebanese political system and the civil war that made confessional identities valuable tools to acquire political power in Lebanon.

The militias studied can be divided into two categories relating to the confessional composition of their members. The first such as the SSNP and LCP attracted Lebanese from different faiths. Ethnic boundaries were based on Arab or Syrian features. These two militias never had men, belonging to the same confession, who outnumbered other members of other confessions. These militias were not established solely by the initiative of members of one confession and their leadership was not occupied by members having the same confession.

The second category of militias such as the Kataib, the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Front were dominated by a significant majority of Maronites. These militias represented the covert confessional interests of a group of Maronites. These militias were established solely by the initiative of Maronites, their leadership was monopolized by Maronites, and these militias attracted mostly Maronites. The fact that Maronites in these militias did not explicitly draw ethnic boundaries on based of faiths indicates they intended to attract the support of other Lebanese of different Christian confessions.

It can also be concluded that among Lebanese militiamen any individual can claim to be a member of a particular group if he/she claims to hold the cultural features of that group. Such claims will not have a significant impact on the individual unless other members of the group approve an individual's claim and include him within the designated ethnic boundaries.

Notes

1. See Georges Corm, 'The War System: Militias Hegemony and Re-establishment of the State', in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp.215–30; William Wilson Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars and Global Extensions* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997); Kamal A. Beyglow, 'Lebanon's New Leaders: Militias in Politics', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XII, No.3 (1989), pp.34–36; 'Document – L'Argent des milices', *Les Cahiers de l'orient: revue d'étude et de réflexion sur le monde arabe*, No.10 (Deuxième Trimestre, 1988), pp.217–87.
2. Judith Harik, 'The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias', (Paper on Lebanon 14, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994).
3. Confessional backgrounds are not to be regarded simply as a background that differentiates a Lebanese Christian from a Lebanese Muslim, but a background that differentiates a Lebanese Shi'i (*Shi'i*), from a Lebanese Sunni (*Sunni*), or a Lebanese Maronite (*Maruni*) from a Lebanese Greek Orthodox (*Rum Orthodoxi*), etc. In that regard, faith or confession is related to a particular religion (be it the Shi'a religion, the Sunna religion, or the Greek Orthodox religion, etc). On the other hand, non-confessional cultural features here are those based on Arab, Christian, Lebanese or Syrian ones.
4. Culture is defined as a human phenomenon and consists of symbols, values, customs, traditions, norms and patterns of behaviour that differ from one ethnic group to another ethnic group. Culture includes here, within its boundaries, religion and religious practices, common geographic location, history, etc. The cultural markers that were emphasized by the militiamen were Arab, Christian and

- Syrian. This definition is based on the study by Robert Borofsky, 'Introduction', in Robert Borofsky (ed.), *Assessing Cultural Anthropology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp.1–22; see also Richard A. Barrett, *Culture and Conduct: An Excursion in Anthropology*, 2nd edn. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991).
5. Fredrik Barth, 'Introduction', in Fredrik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisations of Cultural Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).
 6. Ibid.
 7. Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.104.
 8. Taken from John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, (eds.), 'Introduction', *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.8.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Taken from 'Theories of Ethnicity', in Hutchinson and Smith, p.33.
 11. Taken from 'Introduction', Hutchinson and Smith, p.9.
 12. George Corm, *Géopolitique du conflit Libanais: Etude historique et sociologique* (Paris: La découverte, 1986), pp.161–5; Khashan, *Inside the Lebanese*, Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); and Iliya Harik, 'The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No.3 (1972), pp.303–23.
 13. Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p.4.
 14. Fredrik Barth, 'Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity,' in Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (eds.), *The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994), p.12.
 15. Barth, 'Introduction', pp.13–14.
 16. Ibid.
 17. Taken from John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 'Introduction', in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.9.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Ibid.
 20. Richard Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p.10.
 21. Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949–1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp.108–110; Sami Zubayan, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya: al-Madi wa al-Hadir wa al-Mustaqbal fi Mandhur Istratiji* (Beirut: Dar al- Masira, 1977), pp.159–64; and Nuhad Hashisho, *Al-Ahzab fi-Lubnan* (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya wa al-Buhuth wa al-Tawthiq, 1998), pp.83–90.
 22. 'Background to the Lebanese Communist Party', *Middle East Reporter* (12 Dec. 1987), pp.13–16.
 23. Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, p.109; Michael W. Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp.77–9; Antione Nasri Messarra (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques au Liban: Engagement et stratégie de paix et de démocratisation pour demain* (Paris: Actes d'une recherche collective et de deux séminaires organisées par la fondation libanaise pour la paix civil permanente, 1996), pp.237–54; *Al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis lil- Hizb al- Shuyu'i al-Lubnani: al-Muhamat al-Rahina wa Afaq al-Mustaqbal* (B'aqlin, 3–6 Feb. 1987), p.79; Tareq Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, *The Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon* (Tallahassee, University of Florida, 1998), pp.81–100', 101–32; Hassan al-Sabi', Saker Abu Fakher, and Ghassan Mikahal (eds.), *1924–1993: Al Hizb al Shuyu'i al Lubnani*. (Beirut: Markaz al-'Arabi lil-Ma'lumat, 1993), pp.20–90.
 24. *Al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis lil-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*, p.79; and Al-Sabi', Abu Fakher, Mikahal (ed.), *1924–1993: Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*, pp.20–90.
 25. Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, pp.109–15; Suleiman, *Political Parties*, pp.79–91; Messarra (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques*, pp. 237–53; and Al Sabi', Fakher, and Mikahal (eds.), *1924–1993: Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*, pp. 20–90.
 26. On the way Arab nationalists perceived the Arabs, see Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation State*, 3rd edn. Parts I to IV are based on the translation by Marion Slugett and Peter Slugett (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), *Arab Nationalism: An Anthropology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Riva S. Simon and

- Muhamad Muslih (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
27. Ibid.
 28. *Al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Khamis lil-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*, p.79; and Al-Sabi', Abu Fakher, Mikahal (eds.), *1924–1993: Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani*, pp. 20–90.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Ibid.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, p.111.
 33. Interviews with members of the LCP who as other members of other Lebanese militias refused to give the author authority to disclose their names. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.87–9; Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, p.111; Messarra, (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques*, pp.237–53; and Zubiyan, *Al-Haraka*, pp.180–5.
 34. Interviews with members of the LCP who as other members of other Lebanese militias refused to give the author authority to disclose their names. Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, p.114; Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.87–9; Sulauyman, *Political Parties*; and Messarra (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques au Liban. Acte d'une recherche collective*, pp. 237–53.
 35. The author has checked the different lists of martyrs of the militias in order to determine whether Greek Orthodox names were included. This is an indicator of the mobilization of the Greek Orthodox with other members of different confessions. However, not all militias allowed access to their lists of martyrs lists or they only allowed the author to have a look at them, but did not allow any photocopying or borrowing. The author only had permission to photocopy the lists of the Lebanese Forces and the LCP. The other lists were studied under the restrictions mentioned above.
 36. Sami al-Bana, 'The Defence of Beirut', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.5, No.5 (Spring 1984), pp.105–15.
 37. See Hanf, *Coexistence*, pp.282–93; Hiro, *Lebanon*, pp.94–110; George Hawi in *An Nahar*, (Beirut), 22 Nov. 1983, and refer to list of the LCP martyrs, 1975–1988.
 38. It was first established under the name Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi.
 39. Most literature on Lebanon has attested to this fact. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.10–17; Richani, *Dilemmas*, pp.115–20, Suleiman, *Political Parties*, pp.100–103; Messarra (ed.), *Partis et Forces Politiques au Liban*, pp.204–6; and Michel Saba'a, *Al-Suriyya al-Qawmiyya wa Thira' al-Dam: Antun Sa'ada al-Orthodoksi*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 1999). See the memoirs of George Abd al-Masih, *Min Yaumiyyat* (Beirut: 1985), and Abdallah Kubursi, *Abdallah Kubursi Yatazakar. I: Ta'sis al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri al-Ijtima'i wa Bidayat Nidalih*. (Beirut: Mu'asasat al-Fikr wa al-Abhath wa al-Nashr, 1982).
 40. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.10–17; Zubiyan, *Al-Haraka*, pp.299–305; Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, pp.116–17, and Suleiman, *Political Parties*, pp.96–100.
 41. See Mahmud Shouraih's list of names in his book, *Khalil Hawi wa Antun Sa'ada: Rawabit al-Fikr wa al-Shi'r fi Lubnan*, (Beirut: Dar Nelsen, 1995), pp.110–11.
 42. See Antun Sa'ada, *Nush'at al-Ummam* (Beirut, 1938); Antun. Sa'ada, *The Principles of the Syrian National Party*, Engl. edn. (Beirut, 1949); Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.10–16; and Saba'a, *Al-Suriyya al-Qawmiyya wa Sira' al-Dam: Antun Sa'ada*.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Ibid.
 45. For more information see the following references, Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis* (Cambridge MA: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University Press, 1966); Sa'ada, *Nush'at al-Umam*; Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب Fi Lubnan*, pp.10–16; and Michel Saba'a, *Al-Suriyya al-Qawmiyya wa Sira' al-Dam: Antun Sa'ada al-Orthodoksi*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 1999).
 46. See Sa'ada, *Nush'at al-Umam*.
 47. Michael W. Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), p.103.
 48. Martyr's list of those clashes kept by the SSNP.
 49. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, pp.10–17; Zubiyan, *Al-Haraka*, pp.311–14; and Richani, *Dilemmas*, pp.118–120.
 50. Martyr's list of the Lebanese National Movements between 1975–1981. See Sami al-Bana, 'The Defence of Beirut', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.5, No.5 (Spring 1984), pp.105–15; and Hisham Ali

- Muhsin, Hazim al-Arabi, Hussam Sa'ad, and Ruad al-Amlī, *Al-Muqawimat al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya: Intilakatuha, Waqi'uha wa Afaq Tatawuruha* (Beirut: Al-Dar al-Lubaniyya, 1987).
51. Ibid.
 52. See Elizabeth Picard, *Liban: Etat de discorde: Des fondations aux guerres fratricides* (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), p.210; and Frederick Schiff, 'The Lebanese Prince; The Aftermath of the Continuing Civil War', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No.3, (Spring 1989), pp.7–27.
 53. Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, p.116; interview by Antione Attallah with Hana Nashif in Antione Nasri Messarra (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques*, p.205; and Saba'a, *Al-Suriyya al-Qawmiyya wa Sira'*, p. 205.
 54. Ibid.
 55. Ibid.
 56. Ibid.
 57. Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University Press, 1966), p.125.
 58. This information was collected from different Lebanese newspapers published the day after these elections.
 59. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, p.13; and Zubiyan, *Al-Haraka*, pp.302–03. The policy of the SSNP called for reform of the political system along secular lines and called for a ban on clerical interference in the political affairs of the country.
 60. Zubiyan, *Al-Haraka*, pp.302–303.
 61. Ibid.
 62. Ibid.
 63. This committee included Issam Mahayri (Shi'i), Marwan Faris (Greek Orthodox), Tufik Muhana (Maronite), In'am Ra'd (Greek Catholic), Habib Kayruz (Maronite), Labib Nassif (Greek Orthodox), Daud Baz (Greek Orthodox), Jihad al-Mu'alim (Sunni), Assad al-Ashkar (Maronite), Abdallah Muhsin (Sunni), Ilyas Jayj (Greek Orthodox) and Abdallah Sa'ada (Greek Orthodox).
 64. Al-Tawariq included Issam Mahayri (Shi'i), Abdallah Sa'ada (Greek Orthodox), Habib Kayruz (Maronite), Mas'ad Hajal (Greek Orthodox), Usama Sam'an (Greek Orthodox), Hyam Muhsin (Sunni), Mahmud Ghazala (Shi'i), Antoine Khalil (Maronite), Nasri Khuri (Greek Orthodox), Yusuf al-Ashkar (Maronite), Abas Yaghi (Shi'i), Mahdi Sulayman (Shi'i), Mayz Shahbandar (Druze) and Ra'fat Abu al-Husun (Sunni). The Highest Council included: In'am Ra'd (Greek Catholic), Daud Baz (Greek Orthodox), Hafiz Sayigh (Greek Orthodox), Abdallah Kubursi (Greek Orthodox), Fares Sa'ad (Maronite), Salah Deba (Sunni), Jamil Baydar (Sunni), Shawki Risha (Maronite), Mahmud Abd al-Malik (Shi'i), Mustafa Darwish (Sunni), Mahmud Khalidi (Sunni) and Ilyas Sam'an (Greek Orthodox).
 65. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, p.61, Messarra (ed.), *Partis et Forces Politiques*, Suleiman, *Political Parties*, pp. 232–236; and Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy*, pp.123–6.
 66. Taken from Messarra, ed. *Partis et forces politiques*, pp.143–153; Joseph Abu Khalil, interviewed by Antione Attallah in *Partis et forces politiques*, p.73.
 67. Iskandar Riayshi, *Al-Ayam al-Lubnaniyya*; and Michel Chiha, *Le Liban d'aujourd'hui* (Beirut: Les Conférences du Cénacles, 1949).
 68. Ibid.
 69. Riayshi, *Al-Ayam*, p.73; Fuad Afram al-Bustani, *De l'erreur du Grand Liban* (Beirut: University of Kaslik Press, 1978); and Jawad Bulos, *Les racines du nationalisme libanais* (Beirut: University Kaslik Press, 1970).
 70. See on this Chiha, *Le Liban d'aujourd'hui*; and Michel Chiha, *Visage et présence du Liban* (Beirut: Les Conférences du Cénacles, 1964).
 71. Bernard Heyberger, *Les Chrétiens du Proche-Orient: au temps de la réforme Catholique* (Syrie, Liban, Palestine, XVII–XVIII siècles), (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1994), and Jean Pierre Valognes, *Vie et mort des chrétiens d'orient: des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), pp.21–232 and pp.636–97.
 72. See also Entelis, *Pluralism*, p.101–125, *Tarikh al-Hizb al-Kata'ib*; Pierre Gemayel, *Mawaqif wa Araq: 1975–1980*, Suleiman, *Political Parties*, pp.236–42, and Jacques Nantet, *Pierre Gemayel* (Paris: Clattes, 1986).

73. Taken from Nader Muhamad Moumneh as an interview with Karim Pakradouni, Nader Muhamad Zouheir Moumneh, 'The Emergence and Transformation of the Lebanese Forces in Wartime Lebanon (1975–1988)', (MA thesis, American University of Beirut, July 1996), p.58. From an interview with Joseph Abu Khalil done by Antione Attallah and published in Messarra (ed.), *Partis et forces politiques*, p.144.
74. Taken from Moumneh, 'The Emergence', as an interview with Pakradouni, p.58.
75. Moumneh, 'The Emergence', p.60, John P. Entelis, *Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: al-Kata'ib, 1936–1970* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974), p.110, and Karim Pakradouni, 'Structures des Kataib', (MA Thesis, Université St. Joseph, Beirut, 1960).
76. Suleiman, *Political Parties*, p.238. See also Entelis, *Pluralism*, pp.84–125.
77. See also Entelis, *Pluralism*, pp.101–25, *Tarikh al-Hizb al-Kata'ib*. Tom I and Tom II: 1936–1940. (Beirut: Dar al-'Amal, 1979), Jacques Nantet, *Pierre Gemayel* (Paris: JClattes, 1986), and *Pierre Gemayel: Mawaqif wa Araq: 1975–1980* (Beirut: Dar al-'Amal, 1982).
78. Ra'if Akl, interview by author, 2 June 199, Beirut, handwriting, and Jibran Tuwayni, interviewed by author, 14 Aug. 1997, Beirut, handwriting. This was also confirmed by looking at the different Martyr's lists of Kataib during the civil war.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. For the enlargement of the Lebanese Front see Ghassan Salame 'En mal d'identité: conflits et passions au Liban', *Monde Arabe: Maghreb Machrek*, No.110 (Oct.–Nov.–Dec. 1985), pp.13–19.
83. Ibid.
84. Snider, 'The Lebanese Forces', p.134.
85. Charles Malik, *Wakalat al-Anba'* (29 Oct. 1985).
86. Phares, *Lebanese Christian*, p.122.
87. Ibid.
88. See Snider, 'The Lebanese Forces', p.136, and Grimaldi Fulvio and Ghilan Maxim, 'In the name of the Fathers . . . The Sons . . . and the Holy Spirit', *Middle East*, No.147 (Sept. 1987), pp.14–18 and pp.23–30.
89. Ibid.
90. *Lebanon we Want to Build*.
91. *Historical Document* ('Awkar, Lebanon, 1980).
92. Ibid.
93. Phares, *Lebanese Christian*, p.130, and *Historical Document*.
94. *Historical Document*.
95. *Historical Document*. For information on the National Pact see Walid Khalidi, 'Lebanon: Yesterday and Tomorrow', *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.43, No.3 (Summer 1989), pp.375–87.
96. Lewis Snider, 'The Lebanese Forces: War Time Origins and Political Significance', in Edward Azar and others (eds.), *The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality*, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p.131, Marie-Christine Aulas, 'The Socio-Ideological Development of the Maronites Community: The Emergence of the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall 1985), pp.1–27; Selim Abou, *Bashir Gemayel ou l'esprit d'un peuple* (Paris: Edition Anthropos, 1984), and Percy Kemp, 'La Stratégie du Bashir Gemayel', *Herodote*, No.29/30 (1983), pp. 55–82, and Walid Pharis, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
97. See Nasr, *Chronique d'une occupation*, pp.596–646, Snider, 'The Lebanese Forces', p.136; and Fulvio and Maxim, 'In the name of the Fathers . . . The Sons . . . and the Holy Spirit', pp.14–18 and pp.23–30.
98. Jibran Tuwayni, interview by author, 14 Aug. 1997.
99. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, p.22, Al-Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi included a number of Greek Orthodox. However, it will not be studied here since the Greek Orthodox members did not make any substantial contribution during the civil war.
100. Ma'n Bashur, interview by author, 20 Aug. 1998, Beirut, handwriting.
101. Ibid.
102. Bashur, interview by author, 20 Aug. 1998, and Bishara Murhaj, interview by author, 15 Aug. 1998, Beirut, hand writing.
103. Hashisho, *Al-Ahزاب*, p.22.