The European Union’s role in tackling the root causes of migration in Tunisia and Libya: Long Term Solution for a Migration Crisis?

By

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To my parents who guided me to where I am today
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Long Term Solution for a Migration Crisis?

Rayane Yaacoub

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has long been one of the most desired destinations for immigrants coming from North Africa and the Mediterranean countries. However, the recent trend of increased emigration from Southern Mediterranean countries to Europe is creating challenges for EU policymakers. Since the start of the Arab uprisings in 2010, the EU and its member states have been concerned with launching new programs to accommodate the massive number of refugees and migrants resulting from the political, social and economic upheaval. However, while the EU has repeatedly called for democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East, no significant policies or resettlement programs have been created to deal with this crisis of increased migration, leading thousands and thousands of migrants to seek to enter Europe illegally. Debate over how to better manage the increased flows of migrants is heated, but to date, only a minority of voices have called for EU policies to try to tackle the root causes of migration to the EU instead of focusing on denying migrants entry to the European Union. This thesis seeks to describe and analyze this debate and use Libya and Tunisia as case studies illustrating the challenges of addressing what many are calling the largest wave of migration in Europe since World War Two.

Keywords: Illegal migration, European Union, Root management, European Neighborhood Policy, Foreign policy, European External Action Service, Tunisia, Libya, Arab Uprisings, Push factors
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1- Importance of the Topic

The European Union (EU) has always been one of the most desired destinations for immigrants coming from North Africa and the Mediterranean countries. Emigration from Southern Mediterranean countries to Europe has been a trend which causes a constant challenge for EU’s policymakers. However, after the uprisings started in the Northern African countries and spreading through much of the Arab world, the national community has been concerned with launching new programs to accommodate the massive number of refugees and increased migrations that are resulting from these events. The EU has repeatedly called for democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East, yet no significant policies or resettlement programs have been created to deal with this crisis of increased migration, leaving space for illegal border crossings into Europe, especially to Italy, Spain, Greece and Malta who are mostly transit stations for migrants aiming to reach the richer northern European countries. The latest migration crisis was even described by CNN’s Christiane Amanpour (2015) as the largest wave ever since WWII.

In reality, migration has always existed and it has played an intensive continuous role in shaping and changing countries and continents throughout history. Europe and the Middle East have endlessly experienced migration movements especially from the
MENA region to Europe, however; in the past few years following the “Arab Spring”, these movements have been described as “Migration Crisis” especially with the rise of illegal immigration and border crossing that needs to be regulated and controlled. Certes, the Arab revolutions created a bigger burden on the EU and formed a pressuring tool on its political judgments and a necessity to formulate a solution that suits parties, the sending and receiving states.

From the start of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia in December 2010, a domino effect of revolutions in the MENA region has resulted in tens of thousands of migrants fleeing to the EU seeking survival and security. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria are the countries that underwent severe changes and tribulations resulting from popular revolutions and several coup d’état against autocratic decades long regimes. Obviously, each country has undergone different on-going confrontations, whereby in certain countries the ruling regimes reacted more violently and suppressed the protesting citizens. In most of the cases the turmoil pushed the Arabs and North Africans to search for a better environment for a better life and bigger chance of survival. The product of all these emerging happenings has alarmed EU policymakers because not only their neighborhood is in total chaos, but more importantly because of the resulting increased forced migrations that are causing massive inflows into their borders. In reality, EU policymakers found themselves facing a tremendous shift from cooperating with the current shaky or ex-regimes into applying weak strategies in support of new regimes and somehow unsuccessful political transitions. In reality, Diamantopoulos (2011) argues that Gaddafi knew EU’s weak point and fear and used that in his last speeches by noting that “We don't know what will be the reaction of the white and Christian Europeans
faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans” (Gaddafi, 2010). Gaddafi also asked the EU for money in return of controlling and managing his borders by limiting migrants trafficking. However, as the revolutions persisted, EU has increasingly lost its power to influence and create agreements with some North African countries, especially Libya due to the unpredictable series of events. However, my aim in this thesis is not to look at the usual solutions that have been discussed and researched the most, such as how to resettle the immigrants within the EU, but to examine another option that was proposed by some EU policymakers, which is the root management approach that works upon identifying the push factors of forced migration in the sending states and to work on them as much as possible through targeted programs and activities launched by EU’s foreign policy tools such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to analyze the following research question:

“How are the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which are EU’s foreign policy tools that enable it to have international and regional impact through its decisions and agreements, are addressing the root causes of forced migration in both cases of Tunisia and Libya? And are their implementations leading to any positive signs for a long term solution?”

The methodology used in order to answer the research question has been to read weekly minutes of meetings from the European Commission’s meetings held between 2011 till 2015 and tracking their feedback on the migration issue and their reflections on the
progress of the ENP’s programs targeting the push factors of migration only. Furthermore, reading all of the European External Action Service’s public statements and documents related to launching new programs to function in the sending states was also very beneficial for the thesis, especially the part where the ENP and ENPI’s results in North Africa, especially Tunisia and Libya, have been examined. Other than that, examining several think tanks publications and newspaper’s journals and articles that discuss the topic with opposing point of views have been very useful in formulating the answer to my research question.

It is apparent that until today the EU has been slow to respond to the crisis and seems to be paralyzed or incapable of finding a successful solution of monitoring and amending the increase flow of immigrations and trafficking nor limiting the devastating number of humans dying at sea. “The European countries have expressed their concern about the EU’s migration policy just after thousand of Tunisians reached the coast of the Italian Island Lampedusa” (Diamantopoulos, 2011). In reality, many analysts have blamed the dawdling response to the migration crisis that saw at the end of July 2011, 24,769 Tunisians and 23,267 Libyans reaching Italy (Diamantopoulos, 2011) on weaknesses of the EU. Therefore examining if EU’s foreign policy’s strategies in seeking to develop its Southern Neighborhood can be a long term solution for the migration crisis is a challenging and interesting subject to look at.

Italy, Greece, Spain and Malta have been the ones affected the most since they have the closest proximity to North Africa. There have been many complaints that these countries are incapable of holding the burden especially after the Euro zone crisis, which left these countries imbalanced from the economic, social and political sides. However it
is important to note that most of the immigrants targeting EU’s borders illegally aim to reach the richer northern countries, which has led to a tough reaction from policymakers in Italy, France and Germany demanding the reevaluation and amendment of the Schengen agreement. “We want Schengen to survive, but to survive Schengen must be reformed” stated Sarkozy (2011), while Berlusconi, previous Prime Minister of Italy, expressed the same that due to the exceptional waves bombarding the shores of EU, it is a must to consider some variations in the Schengen treaty (BBC, 2011).

In brief, EU policymakers are divided between two camps: one side supports the more open borders while the other favors closed borders and no immigrants. The European Green Party is one example of the camp that exceedingly supports immigration into Europe by having one of its main manifesto priorities “Avoiding Fortress Europe while making it a fair haven for refugees” (Debating Europe, 2014). Keller (2014) who was one of the candidates for the Green Party stated that migrants bring financial, cultural and economic wealth to Europe at the same time they increase creativity and productivity in the European countries. Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats call for legal migration into Europe that should replace the current irregular movements and human trafficking, they believe that Europe truly necessitate migration in order to economically flourish at the same time it should develop a Legal economic migration policy such as Canada, Australia and America (Verhofstadt, 2014). Many analysts have argued that what pushes illegal migrants to depart from Africa and the Middle East, to pay the smugglers fortunes to get them into furies while risking their lives at sea is that “they may not legally get on those planes and ferries”, therefore we should simply “Let them in” (O’Neil, 2015). Clearly, both camps are doomed to fail since the first camp is seen as
too utopian in front of the complicated situation, while the second does not really find a solution to the humanitarian crisis, keeping in mind the rise of extreme right movement in the EU that is influencing the foreign policy decisions on migration. Still, something must be done. “The irregular and mixed movement of persons across borders is arguably the most pressing international issue of our time, second perhaps only to terrorism” (Elliott, 2015). The importance of this topic was raised in most of the G-8 meetings from 2011 till today in which the severity of the crisis and its importance to EU leaders have been clearly revealed.

The significance of the issue has also been clearly exposed by the human rights organizations that have seen thousands of forced illegal migrants losing their lives in the Mediterranean Sea, which has become as a black sea where desperate human beings lose their lives on daily basis. The Mediterranean Sea has emerged to be the easiest way out for desperate Arabs and North Africans who are willing to sacrifice their lives in the hope of reaching Europe. According to the BBC News (2015), the number of illegal migrants initiating the deadly journey is rising; consequently the number of migrants reaching EU has not ceased to augment while the number of fatalities had climbed outrageously as well. 60,000 migrants have reached the EU in 2013 while more than 120,000 have survived the journey into Europe in 2014 however ever since the uprising started, the human rights organizations estimated the number of deaths in the Mediterranean sea could reach 30,000 by the end of 2015 (BBC News, 2015). In reality, 2015 has seen horrible tragedies at sea when on April 13, 400 migrants drowned and on 19th of April around 800 lives were lost at sea while the boat crashed after it departed from Libya. Some of the latest Shipwrecks also occurred on April 20th, 3rd of May and
5th of May which lead to the following “Malta’s prime minister warned after the Lampedusa tragedy that the Mediterranean was in danger of becoming a “cemetery” for desperate migrants” (BBC News, 2014).

Furthermore, due to the complexity of the European refugees’ policies and flaws in asylum regulations, the European transit countries, Greece, Spain and Malta are facing a big problem while they are still recovering from their own financial crisis. As a result, many analysts have argued that Europe’s role in tackling the massive refugees’ emigration movements has been unsuccessful, particularly after the series of human tragedies that occurred on the seashores of the small island of Lampedusa which, raised human rights and policy failure issues and debates throughout the international community. The European Union is clearly applying a strict border approach due to several reasons that relate to the economic (Euro zone on-going crisis of 2009, rise of unemployment), social (cultural identity) and security causes (terrorism, crime rates), pushing the EU countries to follow an enclosure strategy sometimes described as “Fortress Europe” leading the EU policymakers into a political dilemma in their attempts to solve the problem. Nevertheless, significant research and analysis has focused on how the EU should unify and amend its migration policies and resettle the immigrants within its borders or even how to rescue the drowning migrants and saving their lives at sea; but a lesser amount of attention has been given to tackling the root causes that pushes these people to flee their countries as a long term solution that profits both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, so solving the source problem in “the sending states” which are the third countries should be analyzed to see if it can be a long term solution for the migration crisis, which the EU is suffering from. Hollande (2013) stated “Nous
devonsagirsur les pays d'origine et de transit, notamment la Libye qui est "devenu'urgence” while researchers such as Mulder (2013) demanded that the EU must “address the root causes, such as third countries' political instability and poverty, and stop focusing only on its symptoms”. Thus, unlike statements from political leaders in the European Union, many critics have rejected the strategy of root management claiming it will not improve EU’s migration problem.

Keeping in mind that millions of people seek to escape their home countries due to poverty, insecurity and wars especially because of the uncertainty and danger of their future at home, it becomes clearer that if this situation continues then emigrants will continue to flee in massive amounts, risking everything they have even their lives. “We cannot absorb in Europe millions of refugees surging across the Mediterranean… You have to help on the ground, where the problems arise. We do that in an incompletely insufficient fashion” claimed Jean-Claude Juncker (2013), the prime minister of Luxembourg. His words clearly reveal two facts about the European Union’s position towards immigration. The first part of his statement indicates that the European Union’s decision makers solidly believe that the EU is incapable of absorbing a big number of refugees and asylum seekers. Whether it is true or not that the EU does not have the capacity to take in additional refugees is highly debated and questioned; however, this argument is highly present in the rhetoric of EU politicians nowadays, particularly because the EU has been accused of applying a double standard policy that contradicts its main objective as an International power which is “One of the EU’s main goals is to promote human rights both internally and around the world. Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights: these are the core
values of the EU.” (EUROPA, 2014) The most interesting fraction is the second part of Juncker’s statement, which highlights the need to intensify root causes management in the sending countries and the importance of tackling root causes of migration. Solving the root causes of migration has always been debated by EU policymakers as a possible long term solution for the migration crisis that is on an exponential trend especially after the Arab uprisings, however such a strategy is bombarded with challenges and limitations that question its success.

The magnitude of this topic has overwhelmed the media ever since “Arab Uprising” began in Tunisia reaching Syria today. Although the EU has established several programs that target the rescue of migrants at sea such as Frontex and Triton, they revealed to be very limited in scope and capacity and the need to find a short term solution is definitely urgently needed in order for the EU to return to its core value of human dignity, peace and freedom. According to Yardley (2015), “The rising death toll is renewing criticism of the European response, especially the Triton program, introduced in November to patrol the Mediterranean and rescue migrants. United Nations officials and humanitarian groups have argued that Triton is too limited in scope and resources and thus is placing migrants at grave risk”, not to forget Mare Nostrum, which was a successful Italian launched operation to rescue people at sea, that worked in the international waters not only 30 miles from shore like Triton, which was abolished and replaced by the latter due to an EU’s decision. In reality, there is no doubt that the topic of migration has been invading the discussions of the European Commission which holds meetings on weekly basis and on emergency needs. Furthermore, some of the European foreign policy programs play a big role in tackling the root causes of migration
at the sending states, yet their performance is debated on the latter. According to the European Union External Action Service, the European Neighborhood Policy’s (ENP) main goals are the following:

“Through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbors to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration. This goal builds on common interests and on values — democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The ENP is a key part of the European Union's foreign policy.”

Furthermore, the ENP focuses mainly on improving the economic situation in its southern neighborhood, it forms the tool that gives financial assistance to the developing neighbors and offers policy support for the needed troubled neighbors. Moreover, one of its objectives is “to make it easier to travel to the EU” (European Union External Action Service, 2015). My thesis focuses on only one aspect of ENP and ENPI’s programs, which relates to improving the troubled points in Tunisia and Libya, leading it to tackle the push factors that forces people to flee.

However the successful role of the latter is currently debated since it can be tool for a long term solution and definitely not for a swift resolution, the other question is how far can it impose its programs while it is overshadowed by political and economic benefits, especially within the European Union, whereby some states initiate independent foreign policies towards Tunisia and Libya that might clash with EU’s united foreign Policy. Definitely the big three in EU’s foreign policy are France, Germany and the UK
and they are the ones who have the power and resources to influence and act in other states through their own foreign policy “the Big Three are involved in shaping policies across a much wider range than other states” (Lehne, 2012). Out of the big three, France is the main actor that supports Europe’s unified foreign policy, but at the same time it doesn’t agree with “less France”. According to Lehne (2012), “The French president thus enjoys a greater foreign policy freedom of action than any other EU leader”. It is important to note that this fact definitely forms a challenge for the complete function of the EU’s foreign policy programs. As the European Commission (2015) describes it,

“The objective of the EU’s revised ENP is to support partners who undertake reform towards democracy, rule of law and human rights; to contribute to their inclusive economic development and to promote a partnership with societies alongside our relations with governments. The renewed ENP is strengthening cooperation in the political and security spheres, supporting economic and social development, creating growth and jobs, boosting trade and enhancing cooperation in other sectors.”

The above quotation emphasizes the importance of the ENP role as an EU Foreign Policy instrument. In reality, the programs and activities of the ENP tackle 16 neighbors to the South and the East, and many of the North African and Arab countries which are in turmoil, including Libya and Tunisia, which are the first cases that saw emigration from their territories into the Mediterranean Sea in addition to the fact that they form today the main tunnels from the instable chaotic region into the EU.
Tunisia and Libya have experienced uprisings in 2011 starting with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia moving into the Libyan civil war at the same time both have experienced an outflow of emigrants. While Tunisia is part of the European Neighborhood Program (ENP) and has had close ties with the EU even before the uprising began, the presence of the EU in Libya emerged with its support during the conflict and after the revolution ended with the opening of its offices in 2011 at Benghazi and Tripoli. This is why the research question of this thesis seeks to examine European Union’s Foreign policy programs in Tunisia and Libya by focusing on the ENP and ENPI, in order to check whether these strategies are leading to any positive signs for the future.

1.2- Why are the Libyan and Tunisian Cases attention-grabbing?

1.2-1. Libya
The 2011 revolution in Libya lead to many variations on the international migration movements. It is important to know that ever since the 1960’s, Libya was known to be a major immigration country, especially between the countries of North Africa as in the Southern neighbors of the Europeans.

According to the Migration Policy Centre Research launched on June 2013, Libya was a manpower magnet since the discovery of its natural resources such as oil and hydrocarbons; at the same time it required foreign workers to launch several economic programs. Libya has been for so long famous for its inward migration flows between the MENA and the Sub-Saharan regions. However, in year 2000, Libya made several deals
with the EU on illegal immigration control in return of liberating itself from the embargo that was imposed upon it (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). The open door policy of Libya shifted dramatically as it started demanding visas for Arabs and Africans. In reality, Bredeloup and Pliez (2011) stated that the Libyan government reached the point where it has expelled many foreign workers exponentially from year 2000 till 2010. Moreover, and most importantly while Libya a significant immigration country in the Southern Mediterranean, it was at the same time an emigration country, whereby the mistreatment of the immigrants within its borders led it to be a transit station to many desperate migrants aiming to reach Europe.

Concerning the Libyans, they were never among those with high migration rates until 2011 and onward. In 2012 the International Organization of Migration (IOM) believed that most of the forced Libyan migrants returned to Libya; nevertheless Le Monde (2014) revealed that the number of Libyans who had fled their home country from 2013 till 2014 reached two million Libyans, who were dispersed between Egypt, Tunisia and the EU counties. The reasons why in 2013 till today, foreign migrants and Libyan citizens took off from Libya are the unstable political transition, deteriorating security apparatuses with the militias and armed groups in control, increase of attacks on foreign diplomatic assemblies and a weak judicial system and many others. According to the BBC News (2015), “The congress appointed a prime minister, Ali Zeidan, in October, who formed an interim government tasked with preparing the ground for a new constitution and fresh parliamentary elections. However, tensions between nationalists and Islamists (IS) have stymied attempts to produce a stable government, and in 2014
the country was riven by fighting between rival militias. Central government collapsed, and the United Nations has struggled to bring political factions together.”

In reality, the situation in Libya in the aftermath of the successful revolution has been catastrophic; it has remained a combat zone, which is the main reason behind the increase in illegal migration for both residents of Libya and transit migrants, mostly Syrians and Eritreans that target the deathly journey to the EU, in addition to the “Smuggling migrant” phenomenon especially through Libya that has been on an escalating pattern. “Many smugglers make unrealistic promises to migrants about the kind of lives that they may be able to have abroad. For migrants who do decide to hire the services of a smuggler, the road to Italy is a perilous one, and migrants are especially vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse throughout many points along their journey” (The Global Initiative, 2014).

The EU has always had accords with the Libyan Gaddafi regime, especially regarding migration; however, it intensified its foreign policy by assisting during and after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 by creating an EU special envoy to Libya and developing its programs targeting Libya through the ENP and the ENI (European Neighborhood Instrument). “The EU’s total program in Libya now stands at €108 million. It focuses on public administration, security, democratic transition, civil society, health, vocational training and education. This is in addition to the €80.5m disbursed for humanitarian assistance during the 2011 revolution” (European Union External Action, 2015). All of the above and several other factors make Libya a vital case to be analyzed on the migration Crisis level and on the EU’s foreign policy activity level.
1.2-2. Tunisia

Tunisia has always been an emigration state due to the high unemployment rate that affected most of the labor market even the most educated ones. Even though, Tunisia has had an economic growth for the past decade, this did not hinder the emigration flows. The Western countries were for so long the main target for most of the Tunisians looking for better opportunities, keeping in mind that France, Germany and Belgium were the favorable targets and most recently Italy and Spain are becoming the new European targets for Tunisian especially the illegal migrants (Migration Policy Center, 2013). However, as a consequence of the 2011 events leading to the Jasmine revolution; both legal and illegal emigration from Tunisia has significantly boosted. Concerning the inflow migration to Tunisia, it has never been an important immigration country, yet it has altered into a transit station for Southern African and Sub Saharans irregular migrants aiming to reach the EU, especially Italy. According to the Migration Policy Center (2013), in 2009, 83% of the Tunisian migrants were settled in the European Union. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2012, which was the period following the revolution, more than a double of the previous outward flows has occurred, whereby the number has jumped from 26,085 between 2005 and 2010 into 50,391 between 2011 and 2012 (Migration Policy Center, 2013). According to Boubraki (2013), “Soon after the flight of the former Tunisian president Ben Ali and the collapse of his regime, an unprecedented outflow of young Tunisian migrants began; migrants who for years had kept a watch for the slightest opportunity to head north.” In reality, according to Frontex (first quarter of 2011) 20,258 Tunisians have escaped Tunisia within three months’ time heading towards Lampedusa. Illegal and forced migration has been intensified during
this period; while the trafficking increased especially on the borders between Tunisia and Libya. In reality, after the fall of the Gaddafi’s regime, the situation in Libya had pushed the Tunisian citizens residing in Libya to sail the Mediterranean Sea heading towards the Italian island Lampedusa in search for a better life and job availability. “A European visa is perceived by all potential migrants as an insurmountable obstacle. It becomes the focus of frustration and resentment and consequently justifies illegal migration” (Boubakri, 2013).

Nevertheless, Tunisia is considered to be by many analysts as the only success story of the Arab Spring, however on March 18, 2015, the shooting at the National Bardo Museum of Tunis raised many questions on the security and stability aspects of the current situation in Tunisia. According to Klaas (2015), “Today Tunisia is tested, it is located in a very unstable neighborhood and this attack will most probably not be the last.”

In reality, Tunisia has always had close ties with the EU from the political, economic and social facets. It is part of the European Neighborhood Policy strategy and most significantly after the revolution through “The 2013-2017 Tunisia Action Plan for Privileged Partnership” (European Commission, 2015). Through this program and many others that were formed in the aftermath of the revolution, many funds were donated to Tunisia in order to enforce its civil society, human rights and economic challenges. According to the European Commission (2015), the EU doubled its funds which were allocated to Tunisia after 2011 for a period of years from €240 million to €445 million. All of the above and several other factors make Tunisia a very interesting case to
examine the effect of EU’s foreign policy on making a change that might reduce illegal migration to the EU.

1.3- Challenges and Contributions

While a substantial literature focuses on tackling the symptoms of migration to Europe, little has been written on new ways of working on the source quandaries, especially after the Arab revolutions that left the region in a muddled situation. Tackling the root causes of migration has been an ongoing debate between think tanks, whereby many see it as a failed attempt while other believe that it is the only long term solution. It is important to know that the EU launches several programs through its foreign policy instrument targeting the Southern neighborhood; however it is even more crucial to have a basic look at how these EU programs might influence the long term situation of the sending states at the same time attenuating illegal migration towards the EU border and aiding its neighborhood. During the past years, EU policymakers have been trying to find a way to solve the current crisis without affecting their global image as a powerful union based on democracy, peace and human rights especially after the large number of illegal migrants losing their lives at Sea. The latest EU decision occurred on May 2015 when EU foreign and defense ministers decided upon launching a “naval mission to prevent the inflow of illegal migrants and also tackling the problem of migration from the South” (Lithuania Tribute, 2015) in addition to deciding upon drafting an agreement between the EU members introducing quotas on how much each member should accept a certain number of refugees. Clearly, the latter is a short term solution for the migration crisis however the long term one is yet to be inspected.
1.3-1. Challenges

The reason why the EU is not succeeding in solving the migration crisis relates to the fact that it is a very complicated quandary that affects several agents and requires a lot of going back to the liberal aspect of the union that favors the absolute gains instead of relative gains. Seeking relative gains is when each state will seek its own self-interest, without aiding other member states; whereas seeking absolute gains requires cooperative behavior where both strong and less stronger states can achieve their goals together without applying the power game between each other. Solidarity is the fruit of these liberal values that should be applied in a cooperative and fairly manner between the member states of the European Union. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that the root management approach in general faces some major challenges that cannot be overlooked. One of these challenges is the Big Three’s independent foreign policies towards the Southern neighbors that might interfere with the ENP programs, but another important challenging factor as well is the internal factors within the targeted countries (in this case Tunisia and Libya). While the EU is tackling the push factors in the troubled countries, many other factors are going on around it and at the end of the day; one must look at these internal factors as well while examining the results of the ENP programs. Even though the foreign policy of the EU does matter in other states, but there are other internal and external dynamics at work that cannot be overlooked.

Recently, the migration crisis has invaded the European news which makes it a very important topic facing a load of challenges, consequently making the research upon it a challenging quest that is very essential to analyzing possible long term solutions such as tackling the root causes of migration and inspecting the work of the EU’s foreign
policy so far. The first challenge in this research is that a small amount of studies were conducted on the relation between solving the push factors and the decrease in illegal migration, the second challenge is that EU’s foreign policy is already losing grounds internationally as one sole actor, since most of the member states seem to have their own foreign policy and actions separately, the third challenge is the limited figures on the number of illegal migrants reaching the EU since 2011.

1.3-2. Contributions

The content of the thesis will be a contribution to the study of migration, especially regarding recent events related to the migration crisis facing the EU and its Southern neighbors. It will definitely be preliminary work that engages in the role of EU’s foreign policy on tackling the source problem in Libya and Tunisia, which opens doors for further explorations by political science students on other North African or Arab countries. Moreover, the research will tackle the long term solution of the migration crisis which is definitely less examined than the short term solution. In reality, the research will fill a major gap in the studies that seek to improve the human condition instead of only examining the warning signs. In other words, I believe that this thesis will shed light on the importance of looking at solutions for a better achievable future where “people migrate by choice and not by necessity”.

1.4- Map of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is an introductory one that goes into the details of the subject being analyzed and stating the research question along with
the aim of the thesis. It sheds light on the importance of the topic, which is all over the news lately and why were Libya and Tunisia chosen as case studies. Moreover, it states the challenges and contributions of the paper from different aspects. The first chapter will be followed by the second that goes through the securitization theory and how it affects EU’s foreign policy decisions which leads it to follow a double standard approach towards migration, whereby “Fortress Europe” has been created. The second chapter also elaborates on the formation and role of the EU’s main foreign policy tool that targets the Southern neighborhood including Libya and Tunisia which is the ENPI. Moreover, it analyzes the root management approach and its significance, by shedding light on the contradictory opinions towards it by stating the paradox and limitations surrounding it. The third chapter dives into the case studies, by focusing on Tunisia, starting by listing the push factors after the 2011 Jasmine revolution then listing EU’s root management actions in the country and stating some observational results by shedding light on the setbacks and challenges that EU’s external action has faced in Tunisia. In reality the third chapters ends by a paragraph entitled “Any change at All?” which sums up the results found on the effect of tackling the root causes of migration and if it furnishes any positive indications for the future. The fourth chapter is divided into the same categories as the third but focusing on the Libyan case after the anti-Gaddafi revolution instead. The final chapter, which is the fifth, summarizes the observations, reveals the disparity between the Libyan and Tunisian cases by relating it to the different conditions of each. It also examines the exterior factors that inhibit the EU foreign programs to fully succeed and concludes the thesis by giving some recommendations on EU’s foreign policy in tackling migration.
Chapter Two

From Theory to Application

This chapter is divided into six parts that examine first of all the available theories of migration, the second part sheds light on how the securitization theory is present in the EU and how it influences EU’s politicians in their decision making over migration by fortifying their foreign policy tools that tackle root causes of migration in their neighborhood. The second part reveals how the EU is following a double standard approach in dealing with the migration crisis through applying some strategies that contradict its own goals and values. Consequently, the second part leads to the third, which discusses EU’s foreign policy main instruments that deal with improving the situation in the southern troubled neighborhood. The ENP and the ENPI which are EU’s main tools dealing with this mission are also discussed in the third part of this chapter. Furthermore, The fourth chapter discusses the root management approach and how it engages in attenuating the push factors in the targeted countries while the last part of this chapter brings to light the contradiction and opposing views over the root management plan and why some believe it to be the ultimate long term solution for the migration crisis, whilst others consider it as a total malfunction.

2.1- Theories of Migration

Migration is the movement of humans from one country to another, either permanently or for a limited period of tie. Reasons behind these movements are numerous and vary
between simple job opportunities into fleeing persecution and threat of survival. In reality, several theories of migration exist and they present different frameworks on why humans move and leave their homelands.

One of the earliest models was presented by Ravenstein in the 1880s, entitled “Laws of migrations”. Ravenstein (1880) believes that most of the migrants prefer to travel short distances while only a fewer number of migrants seek to travel long ones. Ravenstein also believes that the major push factor for migration is the economic setback. However, Ravenstein’s theory has been largely criticized as outdated, especially the part where he states that the biggest part of migrants travel short distances only. Zipf’s theory that was advanced in 1946 reaffirms Ravenstein’s study that migration is connected to distance. According to Hagen-Zanker (2008), “In the 1950s migration theory moved from purely mechanical models to more sophisticated theories”.

Migration theories began by examining the rural-urban sector and then developed into macro theories such as the “World Systems Theory”, advanced by Wallerstein in 1974, which states that capitalism has lead to the increase in flow of migrants throughout the world. By capitalism, Wallerstein does not only refer to the economy and production, “but also to the culture and stronger transportation, communication and military links that penetrate peripheries” (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). On another hand, Zelinsky (1971) introduced the “Mobility transition theory” that classifies migration as part of the modernization process occurring around the world. Moreover, in 1966 the “Lee model” emerged by shedding light on the “Push-pull theory”. Lee argues that the push-pull factors are the main reasons behind human’s migration, sometimes they can be very intense that they lead to forced migration. According to Lee (1966), the push factors
aren’t only related to economic reasons, they can be high unemployment, job insecurity, poverty, persecution, weak healthcare system and other; while the pull factors that attract migrants into a country or continent can be related to better political conditions, human rights, freedom of speech and religion, strong healthcare system and security.

The push factors advanced by Lee in 1966 are the main focus of the European foreign policy tools that seek to improve the troubled reasons behind forced migration heading towards its shores.

2.2- Securitization Nourishing EU’s Neighborhood Foreign policy tools

In reality, securitization theory has clearly become a living reality in Europe. It is one of the theories in international relations that deal with the issue of security. In brief, securitization is a process whereby political leaders and state officials alter some issues into security threatening subjects, which makes any means acceptable, no matter how inhumane or unreasonable they are in order to reach the end target, protecting the security. Three constituents should be present in order for the theory to be applicable, the first one is that a securitization actor exists making all the public statements on security threatening subjects while the second one is the object which needs to be secured and the third is the listening public forming the main mark of the securitization actor that seeks to persuade the former (Van Munster, 2012).

The securitization approach indicates that the current EU policymakers are purposely increasing border control and applying draconian measures by indicating the heavy security risks that are associated with increased migration. “Scholars and
policymakers are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore assertions that a relationship exists between "the mobility of people across national borders" and "security" in an increasingly interconnected world." (Erdogan, 2009) Therefore, the securitization principle is constantly present in the rhetoric of EU politicians, who are concerned with security risks such as crime and mainly terrorism, which according to them comes along with the increase of migrants in the EU, not to mention the increase in illegal migration. According to Spencer (2008) “It has become widely accepted by politicians to view ‘immigration’ as an important tool in the ‘war on terrorism’. They have articulated a link between immigration and international terrorism which has found its way into government policies”. It is important to note that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, immigration has become a center of attention to most of the Western countries who are constantly obsessed with counter-terrorism, which lead governments to relate terrorist activities to immigration. Consequently, border control is becoming as a weapon for fighting terror and protecting internal security and thus according to Stoffman (2008) “The most effective way of keeping out unwanted immigrants would be through a reduction in the annual immigration intake”, which turned the EU into “Fortress Europe”.

In brief, the previous arguments have been used by EU policy makers to justify their securitization approach, especially after the disastrous 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings. However, this strategy is heavily criticized by scholars and political analysts who argue that the relationship between terrorism and immigration has been highly exaggerated and that there is no clear line between them. According to a study conducted on immigration in Spain by Maria Soledad Saux (2007), found that
“Immigration and Terrorism are a Constructed Connection”. Saux believes that “the danger of terrorism caused people to blame a certain group of people, designating them as the enemy and creating a division between “us” and “them”” (2007:57). In addition, other analysts such as Spencer (2008:9) have argued that it is dangerous to accuse immigrants of being a threat to national security since many foreigners can exist within a country under temporary visas and not in the form of immigrants and it is important to distinguish between both. Furthermore, according to Adamson (2006) relating terrorism to immigration increases the alienation and exclusion of migrants and it increases racial tensions towards immigrants, more specifically towards Muslims, which generates clashes in any society.

Looking at the European citizens’ opinions towards the issue of internal security, a survey conducted in 2011 by the Euro-barometer indicates that 34% of the Europeans in the EU27 believe that the financial crisis is the biggest challenge to the security of the EU while the second challenge is terrorism, which got 33%. Over and above, the importance of EU border security seems to be very relevant to the EU countries located on the edges of the continent, especially on the shores of the Mediterranean whereby 73% in Cyprus, 58% in Greece and 57% in the UK believe that EU border security is highly important. Clearly, the European public is concerned with security threats however the connection between migration and terrorism is still a heavily debated topic between different analysts. Finally according to the International Organization of Migration (IOM) “while immigration policy is not central to combating terrorism, it can contribute towards addressing it, particularly to ensure better application of law enforcement and intelligence measures” (2010:3).
It is important to note that the EU’s lean towards anti-immigration policies along with the fear of uneven sharing of migrants between the EU members has seemingly gone hand in hand with the rise of radical right parties across the member states. The process of securitization has been expressed in the discourses and speeches of right-wing parties that relate to national, economic, social and internal security. According to Orezim (2013), “The general picture in Europe shows that there is a remarkable and growing trend of casting role to migrants with security perspective and constructing the perception of migration by combining this phenomenon with anxieties of security.” Anti-immigration politicians have raised the fear of native cultures under siege, through speeches and slogans that have increased and agitated the growing ranks of doubters in the migration process while at the same time fueling racism and xenophobic feelings. The notoriously right-wing French politician, Marine Le Pen (2011) spoke candidly, noting that "immigration is an organized replacement of our population. This threatens our very survival. We don't have the means to integrate those who are already here. The result is endless cultural conflict." Marine Le Pen is one of the politicians that have bombarded their public with anti-immigration dialogues that have significantly influenced a large number of the French population, which was revealed during the French presidential elections of 2012, when Le Pen got between 18 and 20% of the votes (Willsher, 2012).

We can see a similar situation in Greece, where the Golden Dawn described by many analysts as a neo-Nazi party uses heavy anti-immigration rhetoric. The party got enough votes to be able to enter parliament in 2012. However, many other moderate European politicians have expressed their concern with letting in an increased number of
immigrants since the governments are still recovering from the global financial crisis and seem barely capable of helping their own citizens. Many surveys have been done during the past decade on European public opinion towards immigration. According to the Transatlantic Trends Immigration Report (2011) there was significant fear of an overflow of migrants resulting from the Arab uprisings is even as early as 2011 as 52% of the European citizens viewed immigrants as a burden to the society, while the UK scored the highest in having pessimistic overall opinions (68%). Furthermore, according to the Euro-Barometer Survey conducted in 2010,

“economic issues continue to dominate national concerns; immigration and terrorism have also gained ground”, in a single year, there was an increase of 12% regarding increased immigration”.

In reality, during the last decade many incidents have occurred in the European member states that made the local citizens fear the presence of a large number of immigrants in their country. In October and November of 2005 the suburbs of France were overwhelmed with violent riots largely conducted by Arab immigrants and North African immigrants that involved burning cars and public monuments in Clichy-Sous-Bois. These riots lead the parliament to announce a state of emergency on 8 November 2005. Similar riots have taken place elsewhere. In May 2013 in Sweden “Stockholm burned as rioters battled police after three days of violence in immigrant ‘ghetto’” (Evans, 2013) and in Italy on January 12, 2010, where increased racial tensions lead to violence (Faris, 2010).
As a matter of fact, European Radical Right parties (RRP) are not the only ones promoting anti-immigration policies as the Radical Left parties (RLP) are stuck in a dilemma of stands towards the migration issue. On one hand they support their own beliefs such as solidarity of the member states, accepting diversity and multiculturalism while on the other hand, in light of increased migration, they have found themselves sharing mutual positions and concerns with the RRP on this critical issue. Keith and McGowan (2014: 10) have described it as a “contagion trend” noting that “indeed, it could be argued that RLPs are caught between two key responses to the politics of migration related issues: they defend a universalist position of solidarity with often marginalized and oppressed communities yet they are wary of immigration as a manifestation of globalization at home, undercutting wages and job security.”

Since most of the European parties are affected with securitization obsessions and fear of economic setbacks especially after the Euro zone crisis and rise of unemployment in Europe and as current policies seeking to address unwanted migration do not seem to be working, there are some who have voiced the need to address the problems of migration at its roots. According to Gent (2002:6) “the post-Cold War political environment with its desire to control migration, rejection of claims of asylum seekers and the increasingly political role of immigration has created the context for the development of the root causes approach”. Therefore changing European Union’s policy toward North Africa and the Arab countries forming the Southern Neighborhood of the EU become the most relevant solution for policymakers that are unable to reject immigrants arriving at their borders due to the need and desire to preserving their commitment to liberal democracy, peace and respect of human rights. While ‘Fortress
Europe’ persists; the European Neighborhood Policy has set itself the role of strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of EU’s neighborhood (European Union External Action, 2004). The EU works on improving the situation in southern neighborhood which might decrease the possibility of return migration and decrease forced migration on the long run through different strategies such as economic and social development, conflict prevention and political intervention.

2.3- EU’s Double Standard Approach towards Migration – FORTRESS EUROPE

According to Dimitris Avramopoulos (2015), the European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, “when presenting a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration we have to think about all dimensions of migration – this is not about quick fixes; this is about creating a more secure, prosperous and attractive European Union”. EU policymakers are trapped between the need to preserve the image of the EU as “Global Europe” that spreads liberal democracy and respect for human rights and the weaknesses in its foreign policy decisions such as its failure to agree on a united policy on migration at the same time its desire to keep close economic ties with certain totalitarian regimes, such as Eritrea which has led to the loss of human lives at sea. The non-policy policy of the EU has been specifically criticized for its failure to tackle the root causes of forced migration, especially in Libya, “The EU has failed Libya and its people; but it has failed its neighboring countries too” (Psaila, 2015). On another hand, Stavros Lambrinidis (2012), a former MEP and foreign minister admitted that advancing human rights in the world and specifically in the EU’s neighborhood is becoming more complex especially when the EU prefers to preserve and cherish its trade and economic agreements with
numerous countries where human rights are not respected. “this double standards is not an argument or an answer against not applying human rights in other countries. In fact, to be able to discuss openly some of these issues is extremely lacking in many countries and this is unacceptable” (Lambrinidis, 2012). The non-policy strategy towards the migration crisis and human condition of the forced migrants and the continuous support for some totalitarian regimes in their southern neighborhood are clear evidences of the double standard approach applied by EU’s decision makers. Even though EU policymakers have been trying to abide by EU’s core values of human rights and spread of democracy, yet lately their contradictory stands are being rigorously questioned.

2.4- EU’s Foreign Policy Instruments Tackling the Root Causes of Migration

The Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) is the EU’s tool that enables it to have unified joint actions in the international community and world affairs. The CFSP deals with a range of issues such as humanitarian aid, trade, development aid and assistance as well as enlargement. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that focuses on strengthening the relations with the southern and eastern neighbors also play a significant role in encouraging them to democratize and achieve reforms. Furthermore, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was created to sustain the ENP and its main goal is to “support democratic transitions, promote human rights and the promotion of sustainable development” (European Commission, 2015).
Lately with the migration crisis, the EU policymakers have been examining how to improve the ENP in North Africa and the Middle East. In particular, the EU Home Affairs Policies aims to tackle the issue of migration and asylum in the EU by working with non-EU states on developing programs to solve root causes of migration, among other activities. It is important to highlight that within the treaties of the European Union exist the role of promoting democracy and conflict prevention in its neighborhood. According to *The Treaty on the European Union* (1992) the union has the responsibility to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders” in addition to “assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters” (Mix, 2013) In addition to that, most of the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) that work in parallel with the European External Action Service (EEAS) target third countries by contributing to security and peace and by examining and monitoring elections in order to promote democracy through fair and free elections.

Concerning the European public’s support for the Common Foreign policy of the EU, a 2010 Euro-barometer survey reveals that 69% of the EU population agree on the further development of the role of the common foreign minister who represents the union (La Rosa, 2011) In addition, in another survey, when the EU public was asked about the sectors that EU development aid should focus on, the result was very positive and in support of the aid, specifically regarding spending on human rights (34%), education (33%) and health (32%) (Euro-barometer, 2012). All of this is important, the
main EU Foreign Policy apparatuses for targeting the root causes of migration would be the ENP and the ENPI.

2.4-1. Formation and Goal of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)

The ENP is an EU foreign policy tool that was established in 2004 to intensify the ties between the EU and its neighbors, especially the eastern European countries which were still partially under the Russian sphere of influence. The ENP developed into focusing on the turbulent southern neighbors to include: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, keeping in mind that the implementation of the ENP targets needs the joint action of both parties, the neighbors and the EU. Although Libya is not part of the ENP, it does get funding and assistance from the ENPI. According to the PPRD East (2014) “the ENP seeks to contribute to stability and good governance in the EU’s immediate neighborhood and to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East and South of the EU with whom the EU can enjoy close and cooperative relations”. In 2011, the ENP was expanded and fortified intensively through a new program launched by the European Commission entitled “New and Ambitious European Neighborhood Policy” through “more funds for more reform” approach by increasing funds in return of reciprocal accountability. In 2006 in Brussels, during a communication from European Commission to the European Parliament and Council, the topic of how to react to the challenge of forced migration was conversed and more importantly the role of the ENP in this field whereby according to the assembly, ENP action plans are central tools in
tackling migration issues through funding assistance and intensified political dialogue to fortify the aptitude of the sending states to handle migration more efficiently.

In 2007 and after a European decision to reorganize the European Commission (EC) instruments, The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was created as a united apparatus replacing two old programs, one targeted eastern Europe (TACIS) while the others southern Mediterranean neighbors (MENA). The main goal of ENPI was to assist sustainable development, increase economic and political integration between the EU and its neighbors. In reality, the ENPI intensifies the existing ENP action plans. The main ENPI targets in the Southern Mediterranean are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt and according to Jean-Louis Ville who was the Head of Unit ‘Finances, Contracts and Audit Directorate Europe, Southern Mediterranean, Middle-East and Neighborhood Policy, the ENPI’s budget for 2007-2013 was € 11,181 Billion. It is important to note that according to Ville, the ENPI’s priority in the South region is to cooperate on areas of migration, security, justice and politics, which makes it an important tool in attenuating the effect of the push factors in the targeted countries.

2.5- The Root Management Apparatus - Push Factors as the Root Problems

Certes, the European asylum policies have been focusing on suppressing the migration flows that are believed to be a huge danger and risk to the internal security of the EU and mainly to the populist groups that are gaining grounds at the EU level. However, the shift of focus from tackling the symptoms of forced migration into managing the source quandary which are the root causes of migration is a new paradigm that has been
primary discussed in the Tampere European Council of 1999. According to Lindstrom (2005) “Although off to a slow start, the European Union Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument may become an institutional outlet to create a more normative framework for asylum and migration.” In reality, EU’s development policies targeting the third countries and especially North Africa has been the essence of EU’s external action in the region and this intention was clearly revealed in the Tampere European Council conclusions that stated the following “An integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling the root causes of illegal migration must remain the European Union’s constant long-term objective” (Carbone, 2013).

2.5-1. The Push Factors as the Root problems

According to Gent (2002), “Root Management focuses on identifying causes of forced migration and attempting to modify them through activities in the countries of origin”. It is important to highlight that the main goal of applying root management would be to shift the focus from tackling the symptoms of migration into handling the source quandary that if successfully resolved might decrease the migration pressure on the EU as well as increase the number of immigrant returnees, at the same time creating a better humanitarian condition for the people in their own homelands. However; in order to engage in fixing the reasons that drive people to flee their homelands and their comfort zones, a deep knowledge and analysis of the push factors should take place. In reality, economic and security reasons are the most significant factors that motive emigrants to leave their countries in order to merely survive. The economic weakness of a certain country leads to lack of jobs and in some cases severe poverty, “half of the total
population of current international migrants, or about 100 million migrant workers, have left home to find better job and lifestyle opportunities for their families abroad” (International Labour Office of the Director-General, 2008) In reality, the immense salary gaps between the sending and receiving countries can also be a cause of emigration. However, it is important to note that highly skilled labor that decide to move to Europe have a greater opportunity to be admitted since EU policymakers realize the benefits and need of maintaining the brain drain strategy. “…Ensuring that those who do come here are the brightest and the best, the people we really need, with the skills and entrepreneurial talent to help create the British jobs and growth that will help us to win in the global race, this is about building the aspiration nation that I’ve been speaking about.” (Cameron, 2013) Many EU politicians share the same opinion as David Cameron, therefore the bigger dilemma exists with the unskilled labor immigration. Nevertheless, the major push factor that exists today and that had increased with the Arab uprisings from 2011 and onward is the Security one, whereby migrants are impelled to leave their homelands due to civil war, political or religious persecution or unsafe conditions, these type of migrants are willing to risk everything in order to seek shelter and hope. Furthermore, in the case of security reasons, the migrants are usually considered asylum seekers or refugees in the receiving countries, according to the Geneva Convention of 1951 “A refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.

2.6- Paradox surrounding the Root Management Approach
Clearly, aiming to solve root causes of migration is a big challenge that influences trade and development, labor markets, democratic transitions and human rights advancement as well as the role of the security and foreign policy of the European countries. This multidimensional effect of solving forced migration has led many political analysts to refute the strategy of root management and criticize it as being ineffective. According to Gent (2002), it is very difficult to separate between the asylum seekers who were not granted it in Europe and thus are forced to migrate illegally for pure survival reasons and other types of migrants. In reality, Gent believes that political refugees are hard to determine which undermines the root management approach. In addition to that the latter believes root causes management approach can be criticized from three different angles: political, empirical and structural. Gent (2002) considers the political quandary resides in the fact that most of the developed countries including those of the EU have the urge to solve migration crisis, but very few have the will to intervene in another state politically and economically just in order to inhibit “refugee-producing situations”. On the empirical perspective, Gent (2002) states that according to many political scientists, identifying the push factors in the sending states is a very difficult procedure that becomes unsolvable whenever the situation is more complex, yet many proposed solutions seem to be very broad and inaccurate as in the case of democracy building “The root causes are generally agreed to include conflict and oppression and its relation to economic development, governance and human rights (and the solutions are seen with a very broad brush to be ‘development and democratization’ ” (Gent, 2002). Concerning the Structural problem, Gent believes that there is a certain double standard approach from the developed countries towards the underdeveloped ones, whereby the prior one demand changes from countries of origin while perpetuating conditions, which
encourage migration and that Gent describes as “The internalist/externalist debate”. In addition to that, one of the common criticisms is that the root causes approach fails to understand migration and its complexities, as Gent (2002) described it “It encompasses some misconceptions of the reality of migration which undermines its raison d’être as well as its strategies.” Moreover, many critiques of the approach claim that even though most of the developed states are highly concerned with migration and its repercussions, yet very few have the will and intention to intervene in another foreign sovereign states, just in order to avert them from causing refugee flows. Furthermore, Weiss and Zolberg have argued that it is a mistake to assume that all types of conflict prevention are good for societies, since they hinder ‘social and political change and thus might affect the chance for a better regime or governance. “Even conflicts have a role to play in certain circumstances and not all conflicts can or should be prevented” (Weiss, 2001) consequently, “violent change may be a necessary path towards a more just social order” (Zolberg, 1989).

It is true that the root management approach is still a very utopian aspiration to many political analysts, yet this strategy is being heavily discussed by the EU policy makers as being one of the most fundamental tool for the European Foreign policy, since while it decreases the pressure of illegal immigrants on the borders of the EU, it creates at the same time a humanitarian improvement in the sending states where most of the emigrants flee in order to survive, therefore it permits citizens of the sending states to “emigrate by choice and not by necessity”. On another hand, it is true that certain conflicts and civil wars are necessary for social and political change and history is a solid proof of that fact, yet looking at the events of the Arab uprisings today which is
leading to a nonstop escalation of emigration from the Southern Mediterranean countries to the North, one must question the role of EU’s Foreign Policy in being able to pressure the governments or influence the course of action in the path of democratization and peace building. For many analysts, tackling the root causes of forced migration is an ambitious humanitarian goal, which results prevail after a long period of time; it is definitely not a short term solution but prosperous long term one for the future of the migration crisis. According to Hall (2000) “If the EU wants to reduce migratory pressure, it will have to provide more development aid, debt relief, and fair trade, and it will need to be better equipped to prevent conflict and keep the peace in trouble spots around the world. These objectives lie at the heart of the EU’s common foreign and security policy”.

On 11 May 2015, Federica Mogherini who is the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy addressed the member states by stating that there is no one solution for the migration crisis: however, the first step would be to save lives at sea and amend the resettlement programs within the EU countries; while the following strategy would be to address the root causes of migration in the sending and transit states mainly Libya. In reality, many European politicians hold up root causes management as a desired long term solution for the increase in forced migration. “We present today concrete proposals for its implementation, with one main aim: quickly save lives and provide protection in the EU for people in need, be they at sea, in the EU or in third countries. For this reason, we are intensifying our cooperation with countries of origin and transit and with countries hosting refugees, not only to support asylum and migration capacities, but also to tackle the root causes that force
people to escape and migrate: poverty, wars, persecutions, violations of human rights and natural disasters”. (Mogherini, 2015) Furthermore, during the European Parliament Plenary Debate on Migration, the commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos (2015) stated the following: “We need to improve the link between the EU’s internal and external policies and putting emphasis on the need to adopt a long-term approach that addresses the root causes of migration. In this vein, we should try not only to respond to immediate emergency situations but also to work on a comprehensive and structured”.
Chapter Three

Source Control
After The Arab Uprising -
The Case Of Tunisia

Even though Tunisia seems to be the only success story of the ‘Arab Spring’, yet in the aftermath of the revolution, it remained a huge emigration country, from where numerous Tunisians and foreign illegal migrants are departing. EU’s foreign policy tools have been working on attenuating the source problems in Tunisia with promising signs due to the cooperation of Tunisian’s officials with EU decision makers. The degrading security condition followed by several terrorist attacks in Tunisia along with a sustained high level of unemployment, raises a question mark regarding the limitations of the long term EU’s root management approach.

This chapter begins by describing the series of events preceding and following the Jasmine revolution of 2011 and how it was paralleled with a huge number of illegal desperate migrants heading towards the European Union. The first part reveals the long existing close ties between the EU and Tunisia and how the Tunisians were always fund of European policies. The second part of this chapter reveals the push factors in Tunisia that are forcing people to flee, which are mainly economic setbacks and high unemployment rate, especially of high degrees graduates, however during 2015, the fissured security system and rise of terrorism have also been important reasons for losing hope within the Tunisian population. Consequently, EU’s instruments used to tackle the troubling factors in Tunisia are introduced and analyzed and then evaluated in the part entitled ‘Observational Results’. The latter gives some promising signs for the root
management approach in Tunisia, but with constant limitations, noting that close cooperation and serious agreements between the EU and Tunisia makes it easier for the approach to function positively.

3.1- The Tunisian Case

The Jasmine revolution was the first dot in the chain of uprisings that invaded the Arab countries in 2011; yet it has been one of the rare success stories. It all started in 2011, when the Tunisian public expressed their discontent with the autocratic rule under president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. However, although there were crackdowns of the public’s movements, the demonstrations that filled the Tunisian avenues in 2011 impelled president Ben Ali to step aside, instigating the domino effect of revolutionary movements in the MENA region. Several reasons were behind the Jasmine revolution, the main ones are economic causes starting with the increase of unemployment, rise in food price and corruption along with “the graft and nepotism practiced by Ben Ali’s family are among the main causes of anti-government anger” (Andrew-Gee, 2011). In addition to that, economic stagnation and the ascend in youth unemployment have made it difficult for Tunisians to buy basic products such as food. According to Andrew-Gee (2011), most of the unemployed are young graduates of fine Tunisian schools and universities, that are left with high level of education but no jobs to make a living, “as we know, unemployed intellectuals make problems”. Moreover, the autocratic regime of Ben Ali had control all over the press, limiting its freedom; which increased the need for rebellion against the existing system. After Ben Ali Flew Tunisia, Mohamed Ghannouchi was assigned as acting president and a temporary unity government was
formed, which included members from the RCD party, causing several protests among the public and other parties leading to the dissolution of the party. In 2014, a new Tunisian constitution was drafted and adopted few months before the national elections, ending the post-transition phase in Tunisia. Accordingly, a Tunisian secular party won the majority of seats which lead to the current president, BéjiCaïdEssebsi to triumph the presidency. Yet, “Although many Tunisians are proud of the country’s progress since 2011, public opinion polls also show anxiety over the country’s future. Tangible improvements in the economy or government service-delivery are few, while security threats have risen” (Humud, 2015). Not to mention the continuous high level of unemployment rate along with the continuing lingering economic setbacks.

Concerning Tunisian unemployment rate’s trajectory, according to the Annual Report of the Labor Market in Tunisia (2013), unemployment rate in 2011 was 18.3%, it decreased to 16.7% in 2012 then went on a rise again reaching 72.2% in 2012 among the youth who are aged between 15 and 29 years old. Furthermore, Tunisian politicians have been trying to fortify counterterrorism endeavors since post-2011 witnessed several terrorist attacks at the same time many Tunisian citizens got involved in terrorist actions abroad. “Tunisians reportedly constitute one of the largest contingents of Islamist “foreign fighters” in Syria” (Humud, 2015), while Tunisia also suffers from struggles between Secularists such as the NidaaTounesy party from one side and the Islamists through Al Nahda party on the other. Even though Tunisia is still recovering from the difficulties that surfaced after the 2011 revolution, yet it remains one of the most stable countries in North Africa, which lead it to have very close ties with the European Union throughout history.
In 1969, a first agreement was signed between the European Economic Community and Tunisia, which expanded into a number of agreements between both parties under the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1976. Furthermore, according to the European Commission (2011), “following the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, established in Barcelona in November 1995, Tunisia was the first country to sign an Association Agreement with Europe”. The latter accord comprised several partnerships on the economic, trade, social, security, cultural and migration aspects.

After 2004, EU-Tunisian relations were expressed in the EU-Tunisia Action plan within the ENP programs and even after 2011’s revolution the EU maintained its correlation and support to Tunisia. However following the uprising, 28,057 forced Tunisian migrants reached Lampedusa in 2011 compared to only 1,702 between 2000 and 2010 (Migration Policy Centre, 2013), which jolted EU policymakers. keeping in mind that copious agreements regarding irregular migration exist between Tunisia and the EU member states, such as Tunisia-Italy (1998), Tunisia-France (2008), EU-Tunisia Association Agreement (1995), Palermo Protocols (2000) and EU-Tunisia Action Plan (2013-2017), knowing that Tunisia has always been an emigration country, especially to the EU whereby “Migrants to Europe accounted for 63-67 percent of all Tunisian migrants. “Now 80 percent of Tunisians residing in France and Italy are believed to be irregular” (Sika,2009), nevertheless, Tunisia is considered by many political analysts as a potential success story of the root causes management conducted by the EU on its territories.

3.1-1. Push Factors in Tunisia following the Jasmine Revolution
The push factors in Tunisia rely heavily on the huge economic setback and job insecurity especially because of the high youth unemployment rate, which are desperate to find a decent job that fits their university degrees. The security’s breakdown is an additional reason behind forced migration while some illegal migrants who had long existing dreams of migrating to Europe, profited from the uncontrolled borders and weak governance to bring their dreams to life.

According to Sika (2009), the push factors in the Northern African countries had increased the pull factors in Tunisia, especially because of its closeness to the European borders. The latter means that Tunisia is somehow unwavering compared to its neighbors at the same time it is becoming a transit station to Europe. However; why the young Tunisians kept migrating after the downfall of Ben Ali although they could have stayed to enjoy the freedom they fought for? Why did they decide to remain heading towards Europe?

In reality, before the 2011 revolution, based on the appliance of EU Immigration policies, Ben Ali’s regime restrained illegal migration and controlled the Tunisian borders, which gave fruit to a decrease in illegal Tunisian Migrants landing in Lampedusa between 2009 and 2010. However according to Boubakri (2013),”The successive migratory “crises” of winter and spring 2011 have deeply upset the migration balance in the region, in Tunisia and Libya in particular”. The migration hub of Tunisia was formed in the South Eastern Region (ports of Zarzis) close to the Libyan borders by which in the first 15 days of the Jasmine revolution, 6,300 Tunisian departures were recorded, “This was an average of 400 departures per day” (Chouat, M. &Liteyem, B. 2011). However what elucidated this shocking occurrence? First of all, security downfall after the fall of the authoritarian regime resided over Tunisia, the police stations and
national security apparatuses were totally deserted, leaving the army the sole actor in the field; consequently illegal migrants with long existing intentions of heading towards the EU profited from the circumstances and the loose borders opportunity to transport their dreams into reality. The second main reason is the wrecked Tunisian job market which left a bulk of unemployed university graduates helpless and desperate for a decent career, not to mention the school graduates who are suffering from job insecurity. “The unemployed university and school graduates that suffer from job insecurity are not ready to accept difficult and demeaning daily work in exchange for wages that do not allow them to live decently or to provide for the needs of a family” (Boubakri, 2013). As a matter of fact, the situation has intensified to the extent that according to many social analysts, many young Tunisians have suspended their desire to have and raise a family from the start. In addition to that, those who already have jobs mainly in business and economic sectors are subject to constant pressure and agony because of their CDI (Contrat à durée Indéterminée), as in limited duration contracts, whom according to Boubraki (2013), “have been the main victims of the world economic crisis, triggered in 2008, which has particularly undermined EU’s economy, the principal partner of Tunisa”.

Over and above, the security challenge facing the country is encouraging the anxious migrants to illegally cross over the Mediterranean Sea towards the EU, keeping in mind that the legal route towards the EU has become extremely limited. The terrorist attacks on Bardo’s Museum on March 18, 2015 and on the seaside resort hotel that killed at least 38 people on the beach on June 26, 2015 have affected the Tunisian Tourist industry upon which Tunisia is so heavily dependent. In reality Tunisia is facing a political, economic and social crisis till today. Nevertheless, applying EU’s strategies
that tackle the root causes of migration for a long term possible resolution to the crisis is easier applied in Tunisia than any other North African country for the reason that close cooperation and serious agreements between the Tunisian and EU authorities was present throughout history up till today and their connection was described by The European Commission (2011) as a “long Standing Relationship”.

3.1-2. **EU’s Intervention Programs in Tunisia**

In the wake of the revolution, EU policymakers intensified their visits to Tunisia in order to tame the chaotic state of affairs, the latter was displayed on February 2011 when Catherine Ashton who was back then the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy along with President Barrosso who was the president of the European Commission and European Parliament’s preceding president Buzek visited Tunisia. Consequently, increased European financial, technical and humanitarian assistance was contributed to Tunisia, the number of funds was intense since according to the European Commission (2011), “For the period 2011 - 2013 indicative figures were raised from €240 million to €400 million (an increase of €160 million or over 60%)”. Since the biggest quandary facing the Tunisian people is the economic catastrophe, the biggest amount of European funds was de facto allocated to support and revive the economic sector in the country, followed by the donations to sustain the services sector as well as the democratic transition, by decreasing the risk of unfair elections and social inequalities, at the same time empowering civil society and “micro-finance institutions” (European Commission, 2011).
Concerning the ENP missions in Tunisia, they are based on “Tunisia and the EU want to give a new dimension to every aspect of the Association Agreement through the deepening of their political, economic, social, cultural and scientific ties and cooperation on security and environmental questions” (EU/Tunisia Action Plan, 2011). The bilateral agreements and EU programs conducted and approved by both parties encompass conflict prevention and resolution actions as well, with the aim of inhibiting any future clashes or hindrances that impoverish the stability and security of the country as well as its neighborhood. What differentiates Tunisia from other North African countries is its continuous foreign policy choice of harmonization with the EU at the same time protecting its national identity. Trade, investment, employment, reduction of poverty is also included in the Action plan, which assist in “the long-term objective of sustainable development” (EU/Tunisia Action Plan, 2011). Furthermore, given that Tunisia has been the first Mediterranean North African country to sign on the Association Agreement with the EU in 1995, the latter lead to obtain a Free Trade Area between both parties making Tunisia one of EU’s central trade partners. According to the European Commission Trade (2015), "In 2012, the EU was Tunisia’s first trading partner with a total trade accounting for 62.9% of Tunisian Trade". Whereas in 2014, € 2.1 billion was the total trade amount between the EU and Tunisia, more precisely Tunisia benefitted largely from the exports to the EU, which was divided according to the following “EU's imports from Tunisia are dominated by machinery and transport equipment (38.1%), textile and clothing (24.9%) and fuels and mining products (14%)” (European Commission Trade, 2015).

One of EU’s External actions in the aftermath of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, was the formation of the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreements (DCFTAs)
targeting several countries recovering from the Arab revolutions, undoubtedly Tunisia was one of them. DCFTAs aims at ameliorating the investment environment as well as facilitating the market access with the intention of supporting the economic restructure in Tunisia. According to the European Commission (2015), DCFTAs goes beyond the limits of the Association Agreement by including “government procurement, investment protection, competition, intellectual property rights and trade in services”. Evidently, all of EU’s economic assistance and creation of opportunities is bringing the Tunisia closer to the EU’s single market. Concerning the evaluation of the DCFTAs results, a study was conducted in 2013 to test the latter, the Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) proved to have a positive long term effect which will boost Tunisian’s National income gain, with a 7.4% alteration in GDP resulting in €2,5 billion. With reference to imports and exports, short run results for Tunisia’s imports seem to have increased by 13.9% while the exports 17.7% (TSIAs, 2013). Concerning the outcome of the DCFTA’s programs on poverty and income dissimilarity in Tunisia, short term results were minor, however long term results are seen to be very encouraging, as it believes that wages will start to increase gradually limiting the poverty ratio in the country. DCFTA’s role targets mainly the economic and trade sectors in Tunisia as a development mission which benefits both the Union and Tunisia. Furthermore, as part of the ENP’s agenda, the Single Support Framework for 2014-2015 (SSPF) was created in order to support and fund all types of socio-economic reforms, strengthening democracy building and prolong development. In 2014, EU’s funds were apportioned accordingly: “economic recovery (€ 100 million), the reform of justice (€ 15 million), strengthening the audiovisual media sector (€ 10 million), the promotion of gender equality (€ 7 million), the development of neighborhoods (€ 28 million), border management and international protection of
migrants (€ 3 million), as well as support to the Association Agreement (€ 6 million)” (European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, 2015). The SPRING program for the period between 2011 and 2013 was also an additional program targeting the hold up for Tunisia’s reforms and growth with a € 155 Million total budget and which was developed into the Umbrella program for the period of 2014-2020 to insure long term successful consequences, €50 million was given to Tunisia in 2014 under the program (European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, 2015).

On the other side, empowering Tunisia’s Civil Society has been one of the main ENP goals in the country, the increase in support of local and international NGOs as well as managing some of the latter has been one of EU’s foreign policy tools in this regard. As per the European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations (2015), “Under thematic programs, the EU Delegation is currently responsible for a total of 54 projects worth €16 million, funded by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the Non State Actors program (NSA) and the Civil Society Facility and the ENPI/ENI instruments ” Combating for Human and Women’s rights, rejection of violence and torture, freedom of speech as well as domestic assurance of fair elections have been some of the European supported NGOs curriculum. The PASC is also an established program by the EU with a €7 million budget to support Tunisia’s Civil Society, but more specifically armoring it for the democratic transition struggle in the after effects of the revolution. Moreover, EU’s External Action was also behind the creation of an online platform entitled “Jamaity.org platform”, encompassing 1,600 Tunisian Civil society organizations according to the European Neighborhood Policy &Enlargement Negotiations (2015), which facilitates the interaction and communication between them on any projects,
gatherings or events, funding openings and many other options, systemizing the sharing of ideas as well as joined actions between them. Nevertheless, the funded civil societies are being constantly evaluated by the EU’s foreign policy, whereby annual progress reports should be submitted for the EU-Tunisia Sub Committee.

Regarding ENP’s sustainment for the Tunisians education and training, Tunisia has been for so long included in the EU’s cooperation programs towards the Southern neighbors through Erasmus Mundus for higher education, SIGMA relying on exchanging expertise and NIF which targets the infrastructure as well as supporting SME companies and energy management. Migration has also been of the main accord points between the EU and Tunisia as several bilateral agreements were agreed upon since 1998 till today, the EU-Tunisia Action plan for 2013-2017 was the latest one that encompasses the need to fight illegal migration as well as the development of readmission programs. In brief, EU’s foreign policy action plan has intensified its liaison with Tunisia after the uprising of 2011 with the aim of creating a safer southern neighborhood and fortifying the bilateral relationship between them, “La révolution qu’a connue la Tunisie en janvier 2011 a introduit des perspectives radicalement différentes dans les relations avec l’Union européenne… L’adoption d’un nouveau plan d’action PEV portant approfondissement des relations au sein d’un partenariat privilégié constituera une étape importante dans les relations bilatérales” (PEV Rapport, 2012).

3.1-3. Observational Results
According to the Progress Report of the ENP (2015), which examines the latest contributions of the ENP programs throughout 2014, the relationship between the EU and Tunisia has been ascending even though many eternal factors and tribulations have influenced the end result of some of the ENP’s end results. The 2013 Tunisian National Dialogue conveyed some progress on the political and institutional aspects, especially with the adoption of the new constitution that emphasizes human rights, liberty of speech as well as equality of all citizens in the eye of the law with no discrimination. At the start, Tunisian authorities had asked the EU for expertise mainly for election’s monitoring and observation, at the same time to protect the democratic behavior according to international standards, “Les membres de L’ISIE” were responsible of managing the electoral process. The successful organization of the electoral process has led to an increase in voters inscriptions by 1 million compared to 2011, whereas the number of female representatives in the new Assembly had reached 70, compared to 59 in 2011 (La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, 2015).

In reality, in most of the EU’s Commission and External Action Services websites and reports, Tunisia was characterized as one of the few North African countries that cooperate voluntarily and straightforwardly with the EU’s action plans, which makes it easier for the ENP to pertain its ambitions, “La Tunisie s’est ainsi engagée dans une dynamique démocratique volontariste caractérisée par l’adoption de la nouvelle loi électorale et la tenue d’élections législatives et présidentielles libres, transparentes et inclusive” (La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, 2015). Furthermore, an EU-Tunisian mobility pact has been signed and launched in addition to finalizing the final touches on
the full and deep free trade zone agreement entitled “ALECA” between both parties. The 2015 Progress Report affirms that the main ENP points that showed improvement in Tunisia were in the following domains: evaluation of fiscal politics, financial governance, intellectual property, statistical governance, support for the SME enterprises as well as reforms in the transport sector and renewable energy. In addition, the ENPI played a major role in strengthening Tunisia’s civil society through the “Neighborhood Civil Society Facility”, which had a limited timeframe from 2011 till 2013 and which targeted the neighboring countries of the European Union by promoting the importance of the civil society’s actions in generating major changes and democratic reforms. The budget of the latter was “€26.4 million in 2011 for both Neighborhood East and South; 2012 - 2013: €22 million for the South as in €11 million each year” (EU Neighborhood Info Centre, 2011). The Neighborhood Civil Society Facility starts by examining the civil society’s capacities in Tunisia, initiates capacity-building activities to such as seminars, exchange of ideas, trainings and workshops together with supporting the civil society’s organizations and fortifying their relationship with international actors and partner countries with the aim of formulating two-sided missions.

However, in 2014, Tunisia was victim of terrorist attacks targeting the security forces followed by the attack on the Bardo museum of March 18, 2015 causing a death toll of 17 European tourists and 24 injuries (The Guardian, 2015) preceding the terrifying Sousse’s terrorist attack on 26 June 2015, killing 38 tourists. In addition to that, the uncontrolled situation of the next door neighbor, which is Libya is intensifying the security challenges of Tunisia, at the same time, the increased number of Tunisians joining terrorist groups in Tunisia and in other Arab countries is definitely one of the
setbacks of finding a prompt solution to the security struggle in the country. The EU through the ENP and several other instruments is determined to assist Tunisia with fighting terrorism not only through political dialogues, but also with concrete projects, “I spoke to President Hollande, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Michel of Belgium over the weekend and we agreed to work together to help Tunisia strengthen its security. Our ambassadors met with the Tunisian authorities yesterday to put that into action, including by strengthening the protective security arrangements at coastal resorts” (Cameron, 2015). The latter ambitious project is yet to be evaluated in the few years to come; meanwhile the EU is working with the Tunisian Minister of Interior on amending and improving its security sector. On the economic side, it has been continuously damaged after the Jasmine revolution due to the challenging political transition that it underwent in conjunction with an unpleasant environment surrounding it, such as the euro zone crisis, inflation of prices at the same time a high level of unemployment. All these grounds made it harder for the ENP to touch on timely results on the economic aspect, yet the EU’s assistance made it possible to limit the budget deficit of the country supported by a “stand-by” agreement with the IMF as per La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité (2015).

Concerning migration, the « Déclaration conjointe établissant un partenariat pour la mobilité entre la Tunisie et l’UE et des États membres » was signed on 3rd of March 2014, for which its application has started beginning of 2015, with the main goal of nourishing the authorities’ capacity as well as Tunisian civil society in developing return migration and aiding them in the reintegration progression. Furthermore, several EU’s initiated programs encompasses Tunisia within its collaboration,
such as “Euromed Migration III, nouveau projet Frontex5 / European Asylum Support Office and EASO” ((La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, 2015).

On the educational and health parts, Tunisia is part of Erasmus Mundus as well as Tempus program. eTwinning Plus is also an additional program that develops schools and instructors with 34 schools and 87 instructors enrolled ((La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, 2015). Furthermore, Tunisia has been very committed to any type of dialogue and conferences relating to the medical programs financed by the EU, for example: “La Tunisie a également participé au développement du programme méditerranéen de formation à l'épidémiologie d'intervention (MediPIET), financé par l'UE et mis en œuvre sous la direction scientifique du Centre européen de prévention et de contrôle des maladies (ECDC)” ((La Haute Représentante de L’Union Européenne Pour Les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, 2015).

3.1-4. Promising Signs with Constant Limitations

From a global point of view, Tunisia has made some remarkable advancement in light of the ENP action plans as well as EU’s foreign policy collaboration, yet this evolution has been felt in some fields more than the others.

The development in the democratic transition, the improvement of the civil society’s functions, the success of the legislative and presidential elections which were marked by the transparency and inclusiveness of all Tunisian citizens has caused the post 2011 transition to have a positive spot in the history of the country. However the
limitations of the ENP has been demonstrated in the continuous weakness of the financial and economic governance whereby the unemployment rate remained high at 15.20% in 2014 (Trading Economics, 2015). Above the challenging economic setbacks, the increase in terrorist attacks targeting tourists in Tunisia has even made it harder for its recovery “On March 19, the local stock exchange dropped by 2.5 percent and tour operators and cruise companies started cancelling trips to and stops in Tunisia. The launch of an international campaign titled “I will go to Tunisia” is an encouraging reaction. But will it suffice to mitigate the impact on the economy?” (Ghanem, 2015).

In reality, Tunisian youth forced migration will not cease anytime soon if the economic situation keeps deteriorating and here lies the main test for the ENP and EU’s foreign policy. Ghanem (2015) adds the following “Strengthening the economy is fundamental to lift people out of poverty, open a new front against extremism and ultimately fight terrorism”, therefore even though the Action plans had tremendous influence on the democratization process and the building up of Tunisian civil society, yet the essential push factors for migration still need a long term blueprint.
Chapter Four

Source Control After The Arab Uprising - The Case Of Libya

This chapter begins by revealing the influence of the latest North African and Arab revolutions on the rise of illegal migration to Europe. The second following part dives into the Libyan case, by listing the series of events of happened during the anti-Gaddafī revolution and how Libya have seen itself in total chaos in the aftermath of the uprising. The third part of this chapter sheds light on the push factors in Libya after 2011 and then examines EU’s foreign policy instruments used to tackle these source problems. Last but not least, observational results are presented, which leads to the limitations and challenges of the ENP and ENPI’s role in Libya. In reality, the Libyan case discloses the limit of EU’s root management strategy in a country which is as chaotic as Libya.

4.1- Liaison between the Domino Effect of the Revolutions and the Migration Waves towards the EU

In 2010, the revolution in Tunisia had begun when a Tunisian vendor set himself on fire on one of the Tunisian streets and few months later, thousands of migrants started to flee Tunisia by sea aiming to reach Europe. This was the start of a new chapter in emigration from North Africa and a new type of crisis for the European Union. The domino effect of the “Arab Spring Revolutions” (which have seemingly morphed into an “Arab Winter”) meant that many Arab and North African countries followed the path of the Tunisian revolution, revolting against autocratic governments. Tunisia was followed by
Egypt, then Libya and Syria today. Some uprisings resulted in severe civil wars that generated horrific damage and loss of life that ruined some countries’ economies, politics and security, whilst in other cases crackdowns on protests hindered the freedom of speech and lead to tremendous turmoil in the whole region. According to Diamantapoulos (2011), “In most cases such unexpected turmoil pushed many of the unemployed or underemployed, war-ridden Arab citizens to look for a better future in the neighboring EU”, which frightened European policy makers because of the sudden increase of illegal migration traffic heading towards its coasts. The emergence of concerns and contradictions from the behalf of European policymakers were clear after the first wave of Tunisian migrants reached Lampedusa in 2011 (Boubakri, 2013:2), especially with the breakdown of previous bilateral migration agreements between the EU and the North African countries due to the political instability of the latter (Migration Policy Center, 2013). According to Frontex (2014) “Detections of illegal border crossing at the EU external borders increased sharply in 2013, rising to over 107,000 from 75,000 in 2012”. In 2014, the number of illegal migrants that entered the EU was above 276,000, according to the European Commission “which represents an increase of 155% compared to 2013” (European Commission, 2014). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) declared that until mid-April 2015 (2010), more than 21,000 illegal migrants had reached the European coast. The main reasons behind the increase in migration flows from 2011 till today is first of all the on-going war in Syria, the autocratic regime in Eritrea, the deteriorating situation in Libya whereby it has been exponentially falling into lawlessness and ruin, which makes it the main transit station for all South African and Arab migrants heading towards the Italian coast, not to forget EU’s constant struggle with finding a way out of the migration crisis.
Libya is a very crucial case to be looked at when it comes to finding a solution for the migration crisis, not only because it is an emigration country, but also because it is the main transit station to all Africa aiming to reach Europe by sea keeping in mind that its deteriorating situation is affecting the whole region.

### 4.2- The Libyan Case

In 2011, anti-Gaddafi movements took place bringing an end to over 40 year Gaddafi era in Libya. On February 2011, and following the domino effect of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, riots surfaced in Benghazi and expanded to several other Libyan regions. These protests were faced with crackdowns and violent clashes between the rebels and the security forces. Following the brutal events, the UN Security council imposed a no fly zone above Libya while NATO conducted air strikes against the Gaddafi forces; under the principle of managing the revolutions while Boots off the Ground. On July 15, 2011 the international community identified the National Transitional Council as the rightful government of Libya which was followed by the detention and death of Gaddafi. In 2012, chaos started overwhelming Libya again; clashes erupted between the previous forces of Gaddafi and the new government, since the former expressed its discontent with the latter’s governing style. Consequently, the government gradually started losing its influence and control over the militias and tribes and soon witnessed the emergence of *Ansar Al Sharia* (an Islamist militia). Libya now finds itself caught up in a civil war that has become a key push factor for Libyan migration to Europe.

According to Chhor (2014:1), “the battle between secular and Islamist militias in Libya – including the Islamic State group – is helping fuel a migrant exodus from the
North African nation, which has descended into chaos since the 2011 ouster of former leader Muammar Gaddafi”. Furthermore, several political analysts stated that the main migration problem today is neither poverty nor underdevelopment, rather it is the collapse of Libya. The abandonment of Libya by Europe after the NATO bombing campaign and the ouster of Gaddafi is one of the key explanations given for the chaotic situation in Libya today. According to Applebaum (2015), “if there was a moment when Europe, whose leaders led the effort to get rid of Muammar Qaddafi, might have made a difference to Libyan reconstruction, the moment has passed. Instead, Libya disintegrated into civil war—and disappeared from Europe’s political agenda altogether... But now Libya has reappeared in the context of another story: The desperate mass movement of migrants across the Mediterranean”.

4.2-1. The Push Factors in Libya after the 2011 Revolution

In reality, there are multiple reasons in Libya that drive its citizens to emigrate, but in addition to the push factors, Libya is the key transit station to all North and Sub Saharan Africans seeking to reach Europe (Hamood, 2006:18). Since the revolution of 2011, Libya has been characterized by weak Governance, instability, unsatisfactory Human Rights conditions, and the absence of the rule of law. Schmidt (2015:5) argues that

“If states are oil-providers such as Libya, the major partner in internal and external trade is the state and its authorities. An influential middle class is hindered to come into existence. So frustration is rampant among the younger active population. In general, one can assume that the current political turmoil
North African states tied up with periods of economic stagnation will generate emigration flows”

It is important to note that after the uprisings in Tripoli succeeded, a big cloud of uncertainty and lack of security resides the economic and political transition phase in Libya. Some of the major setbacks in the transition were the delay of drafting a new constitution for the country which was the result of deep political disagreements; the public institutions were weak and couldn’t provide the basic needs, in addition to the disturbance in the export of oil. Furthermore, the internal security of Libya after 2011 has been on the rocks, since the country is known for having a large number of militias and armed groups fighting over main cities and oil riches. “The government’s priorities announced in the 2013 plan and budget include restoring national security, reconciliation, disbanding armed militias, promoting economic recovery, decentralization and improving basic services at the local level, combating corruption and promoting transparency” (The World Bank, 2013).

Another additional problem facing the Libyan society is a high youth unemployment, which was recorded as 20% in 2012 (World Economic Forum, 2012). Since added to this is Libya’s high population growth (Otman, 2007), very poor infrastructure, and poor water resources as well weak healthcare and education systems. The education system in Libya is a key push factor for the youth, as it is widely known to be of poor quality, which makes the Libyan graduates not only unemployed but “unemployable” (Otman, 2007) either in the local nor in the international market. The flaws in the Libyan education system are due to poor foreign language teaching as well as lack of modern teaching techniques and knowledge about global issues. Post-crisis
Libya is still recovering from severe underdevelopment and struggling with a big inflow of migrants, which affected its economy and infrastructure. Nevertheless, most of the migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa or other Mediterranean countries have moved to Libya earlier seeking better job opportunities, but are now in the hunt for escaping the violence and lack of security there. Consequently, the push factors in Libya have affected the Libyan citizens as well as the migrants residing in Libya.

Consequently, Libya has become a major emigration country in addition to being a transit station to Europe, making Libya a great taboo for EU decision makers. “Boats full of migrants who start their journey from Libya on to Europe are often seized by European authorities or found capsized with extensive loss to the lives of those who were en route to Europe in search of a better life” (IOM, 2012). The increase of the number of human traffickers in Libya is, according to many politicians the main reason behind the migration crisis. Thus, it is incorrect to increase the number of rescue missions at sea as it will only form a “pull factor” for irregular migrants and smugglers. “We should put the blame squarely with the criminal human traffickers who are the ones managing, promoting and selling this trade, this trade in human life,” British Prime Minister David Cameron stated to The Guardian in 2015; however the latter statement got a harsh respond from the Human Rights Watch Executive Director, Kenneth Roth, who replied with the following “No, Cameron, the problem isn't "human traffickers." Most of these migrants flee persecution. Push factors are the only reasons behind the increase of emigration and one of the latest push factors in Libya is the mount of ISIS.
According to CNN (2015), “ISIS also recently took control of at least two cities along Libya’s Mediterranean coast since seizing territory in Iraq and Syria last year, and there are now some 75,000 ISIS fighters countrywide. Militants across Libya have pledged allegiance to ISIS in recent months and have formed chapters in Sirte, Benghazi and even the capital Tripoli”. In addition to that, ISIS claimed its responsibility of several attacks launched upon Libyan hotels and foreign embassies in January 2015 as well as beheadings of Christians.

In reality, ISIS’s increased strength in Libya is leading the country into further chaos and closer to a failed state. The disordered situation of the country is making Libya a vulnerable territory for the rise of terrorists and extremists groups, exponentially weakening the creation of a unity government and the rule of law “Since August, Libya's internationally recognized government has been based in the eastern city of Tobruk, after a rival faction known as Libya Dawn (which is broadly Islamist) seized Tripoli in August and established their own administration, the continuing political deadlock matters. The longer it goes on for, the worse conditions for normal Libyan citizens are, and the more powerful militant groups such as Islamic State become” (Shackle , 2015). Furthermore, according to Shackle, the dreadful situation had led 10,000 Libyans to flee the country each year in search for a better stable and secure life, not to mention the decline in fuel and electricity, proliferation in arms and weapons as well as the boost in crime rate in front of broken law and order. The disturbance in oil production and exports due to “workers strikes and blockades of oil terminals” (European Commission, 2014) has caused Libya to have a budget deficit and undergrowth in 2013. According to the UN (2015), the number of armed citizens in Libya has increased from 30,000 in 2011
uprising into 300,000 today. In brief, if the Libyan political parties remain incapable to negotiate and find a solution to the crisis, this only means that the country will keep on deteriorating, creating a growing danger to its neighbors, risking collapse, and remaining an emigrants factory.

4.2-2. EU’s Root Management in Libya

In general, EU’s foreign policy in Libya has been working on improving the push factors that are abolishing the country’s recovery and development. These push factors have increased the load on EU’s borders through the large amount of forced migrants resulting from the chaotic current state of affairs in Libya. Therefore, EU’s foreign policy instruments such as the ENP and the ENPI have been launching programs to build up these troubled spots and to establish a safer neighborhood. EU’s main programs targeted economic, social, election, health, education, investment and migration issues, not to mention the large number of financial aid that were given. This chapter lays out all the major EU programs that worked upon tackling these weak points.

‘Source control’ measures relate to different approaches such as conflict prevention, development assistance, trade partnerships and greater political communication, which are intensively used in order to tackle root causes of migration, consequently decreasing the migration pressure on the borders of the EU and making the immigration as a choice not a need. However, how is the European Union applying those strategies in Libya? The European Union has assisted the Libyan citizens during the conflict, yet its challenge has been to keep up the aid after the uprising ended, which lead it to open two offices on the ground in 2011, the first in Benghazi and the other in
Tripoli increasing its presence inside the territories. The European Union External Action stated that “our commitment to the Libyan people is an investment in the future, as cooperation with Libya will strengthen both Libya and the EU. Moreover through mutual trade, cultural exchange and cooperative approaches on migration and security we will help maintain the momentum and support the transition to democracy” (EEA, 2013).

In reality the EU, has supported the Libyans at the beginning of the transition process towards democracy and peace through its institutions based in Libya. The European Union Election Assessment Team Libya 2012 is the team that was invited by the Government of Libya to evaluate the National Congress Elections in 2012. The team was formed from 21 members whose main role is to make sure that the elections occur democratically by abiding the laws of the Libyan Government in addition to several other tasks such as assessing the electoral process before hand, analyzing the legal and electoral framework, the degree of respect to freedom of opinion, civil society and political campaigning, equality between the genders along with the procedure of voting and afterwards counting the votes. The members of the team were dispersed into many regions in Libya and they played a big role in aiding the success of the free elections in Libya. This team is definitely part of the EU’s foreign policy tools, since it tackles a cause that is outside the borders of the EU. After the elections ended, Catherine Ashton, then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced “I wish to extend these congratulations to the Libyan authorities and more particularly to the High National Election Commission and commend the professional way in which they are conducting the electoral process. The EU Electoral Assessment
Team (EU EAT) has assessed that the processing of results at the Tally Centre in Tripoli has been transparent and fully open to observation” (Ashton, 2012).

Conditionality has been a strategy used by the EU policy makers in order to enhance human rights in Libya, since after the revolution ended in Libya, the EU promised to fully support it in its transition phase including state building if it respects human rights. According to the European Commission (2014),” in the area of stability and security it involves addressing the root causes of conflict, supporting State's security institutions, while tackling illicit trafficking. The EU is also promoting the integration of Libya within the region”. However, clearly the situation in Libya today is far from the objectives set for it by the EU and the previous desire of Libyans to participate in fair elections in 2012 has been replaced with sense of insecurity and dissatisfaction.

According to the ENP (2014), its main programs targeted the following factors that are underdeveloped in Libya: Economic and Social issues (employment, health, education, corruption) Trade issues (EU as main trading partner, new structure for the oil and gas segment, investment) and Migration. Concerning the EU funds for financial or even methodological aid to Libya during and after the revolution, the numbers were revealed by the European Commission in the ENP package such as the following: €80.5 million in 2011 reaching €130 million in the years to follow (European Commission, ENP Package, 2014). According to the European Commission (2014), the purpose of these funds was to help in developing a democratic government through credible national elections, enforcing civil society, establishing security, improving medicine and health facilities, building up education and managing migration.

In addition to that, in most of the EU official sites, it is stated that the EU’s foreign policy has a main target of covering the crisis cycle in Libya, which involves
“conflict prevention, crisis response, crisis management, longer term recovery and stabilization of the situation, reconstruction, development” (EEA, 2013) in order to reach peace and stability. Consequently, the main ENP programs targeting the security apparatus are “EUBAM Libya” and “Security and Justice Support Program”, the former with a budget of €30 million was launched in 2013 after the request of the Libyan authorities to rebuild post-conflict Libya, according to the European Commission, ENP Package (2014), “The strategic objective of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term, and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in the long term.” Concerning the “Security and Justice Support Program”, it was constructed as a tool that develops justice and power of the police groups by sharing expertise, counseling and even training the constituents of the justice sector. Actually, the budget for the latter was €10 million.

In like manner, the ENP has instigated several other programs that were not named in the public statements, embarking upon capacity building of the Libyan authorities to identify any threats from terrorists’ plans and to administer their weapons in the proper manner as well as controlling their border in order to handle illegal migration. “Other programs are building the Libyan Authorities’ capacity to identify security threats, clear explosive remnants of war, exercise effective national control over their conventional weapons and ammunition, tackle irregular migration and illicit trafficking by strengthening their maritime border surveillance systems.” (European Commission, 2014). Conjointly, the ENP had declared that ongoing mediation and tools for conflict resolution are intensively practiced in the Libyan society and between different parties. Regarding the programs that deal directly with migration, the ENP is
handling six programs whereby they assist the government to create a legal skeleton with reliable and applicable policies in conjunction with helping the migrants in the Libyan centers and developing the returnee programs, the set budget up till 2014 for this mission was €30 million (ENP Package, 2014).

On a different note, the economic factor had a big role as well in the EU foreign programs towards Libya, the “Technical Vocational and Education and Training program (TVET)” with a € 6.5 million account (ENP, 2014) seeks to decrease unemployment and prepare the graduates to fill up the demands of the Libyan labor market. The amount set for Educational and Health missions was equal to €10.9 million, "Better quality education and increased inclusiveness for all children Program” provides high quality education for Libyan children even the ones who have special needs or were traumatized by the atrocities of the war whilst “The Libya Health Systems Strengthening Program (LHSS)”, focuses on improving the health facilities and services in Libya.

Furthermore, from the public administration part, the European Union Election Assessment Team Libya 2012 is the team that was invited by the Government of Libya to evaluate the National Congress Elections in 2012. The team was formed from 21 members whose main role is to make sure that the elections occur democratically by abiding the laws of the Libyan Government in addition to several other tasks such as assessing the electoral process before hand, analyzing the legal and electoral framework, the degree of respect to freedom of opinion, civil society and political campaigning, equality between the genders along with the procedure of voting and afterwards counting the votes. The members of the team were dispersed into many regions in Libya and they played a big role in aiding the success of the free elections in Libya. This team is definitely part of the EU’s foreign policy tools, since it tackles a cause that is outside the
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The ENP programs that also target the Libyan institutions were declared to a €4.5 million EU funding, not to mention the €26 million that were allocated for fortifying the civil society sector and freedom of speech (ENP, 2014).

According to the ENPI’s 2014 support of the ENP, it has set a € 50 million budget segregated between “Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Employment”, “Protection of vulnerable people in Libya” and "Support a rights-based migration management and asylum system in Libya" programs (European Commission, 2014).

In truth, Conditionality has been one of the strategies used by EU policy makers in order to enhance human rights in Libya, since after the revolution ended, the EU promised to fully support it in its transition phase including state building if it respects human rights. Furthermore, it is important to note that a €25 million package was given to Libya in order to support the transition phase by focusing on four aspects: Education, healthcare and security and rule of law (EUROPA, 2012). Consequently, the EU’s Foreign policy has heavily focused on enhancing and elevating the educational level in Libya, which is very essential for keeping the youths in their homelands and comfort zones. The ENPI associated with the UNICEF examined the quality of the entire teaching system, but
more specifically the existing teachers. In reality, some of the tasks include calculating
the needed number of teachers by avoiding their surplus, creating a modern friendly
educational environment, improving the curriculums and teacher development,
according to Natalia Apostolova who is responsible of this EU-Libyan project “The
European Union is very pleased to be a partner in this effort, given that quality education
is key to human capital development” (EuroMed, 2013). In 2012, the ICEF Monitor
indicated that Libya’s education system is drifting its way to the international education
scene.

On another hand, the EU Libya Health Systems Strengthening Program (EU-
LHSS) is one of many programs conducted by the EU foreign policy to target the Health
care system in Libya, the EU-LHSS main mission statement entitles that its role is to
empower strategic planning and management of providing an appropriate quality of
health care delivery. Moreover, the EU focused tremendously on solving the migration
problem and border control in Libya; first of all there have been numerous agreements
between both parties over the management of border crossing into Europe by illegal
migrants and smugglers. According to Thomas (2014), “Libya is calling for assistance
from Europe to help stem the flood of migrants through its territory, many of whom,
when captured, are detained in poorly regulated detention centers or at the hands of
militias and smuggling gangs.” In the last years, the problem of increased influx to Libya
is creating a problem to its internal economic condition as well as a security threat to the
EU, since most of them are illegal immigrants seeking to reach Europe, yet many of
them are being victims of smugglers and are being detained in inhuman conditions. The
European Union is one of the contributors to aid Libya on better managing the
resettlement of the immigrants in its country along with improved sanitary and
humanitarian conditions at the same time it advices Libyan officials on how to control the borders with other African countries and to amend the policies that deal with immigrants, given that the Libyan government does not recognize the legal status of a refugee.

The European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) is one of EU’s foreign tools allocated to tackle the migration crisis in Libya which is specialized with offering techniques and advices, but the Libyans themselves are responsible of implementing it. Many critiques have accused the EU of applying such a strategy in order to merely relief itself from the burden of immigrants reaching its borders regardless of their need for survival or protection; however, looking at the nature of immigrants entering the Libyan territories, some military militias are taking the advantage of the loose borders of entering Libya while creating a security threat in the country that is already suffering from its own divisions and armed groups. For example, in the report of the UN Security Council on Libya headed by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon the following was stated “the impact of the military intervention in northern Mali on stability in southern Libya and elsewhere has been highlighted by growing fears that a potential influx of rebels and other groups fleeing from Mali to Libya could render an already fragile security and political situation considerably more unstable” (Ban Ki-moon, 2013).

However, the majority of the immigrants reaching Libya plan either to live there or to continue their horrible path in the sea towards Europe, these people are kept in smugglers farm houses or in areas close to the port under awful conditions, many of them are from the Sub Saharan countries, yet numbers have been reported on immigrants from Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Ghana and Nigeria as well who crossed the Sub
Saharan African countries to reach Libya. In this area, the EU is concerned with fighting against criminal networks involved in the trafficking and smuggling of migrants; however the main problem with the Libyan government and the reason why it needs an external help is that it is incapable of distinguishing between illegal immigrants and refugees who are victims of wars and terror, since both categories are treated the same through “retention and expulsion” (EUROPA, 2014). In addition to that, Libya is one of the countries that heavily relies on foreign workers and this fact is being used by the EU programs in order to create job opportunities for the job seeking migrants, which can benefit both sides at the same time. Anyhow, the migration agreements between the EU and Libya is always being monitored by human rights organizations in order to make sure that the migrants are treated fairly with respect of human rights calibers, “The EU and individual member states must ensure that human rights are at the core of any agreement with Libya and that every agreement recognizes explicit rights for migrants,” (Amnesty International, 2010). Nevertheless, no one can deny that the EU considers Libya as a central country which the External Action Service should focus upon and this has been proven with the large amount of funds handed to the programs tackling the root problems. According to the European Union External Action (2014), the Indicative allocation for 2014-2020 is between €126,000,000 and €154,000,000.

4.2-3. Observational Results

According to the observational results, EU’s root management in Libya has been fragile in light of the large challenges facing the country. The main problem facing EU’s foreign policy is that it is finding no one to cooperate with from the Libyan’s side, which
has lead to the stoppage of several programs. Another observational remark is that the Libya’s security status is restraining the possible long term success of EU’s programs, as it is exponentially deteriorating, causing continuous damage to the country. Furthermore, the remaining weak economic situation reveals the limitation of the huge funds and instruments given to tackle the latter. However, EU’s foreign policy has succeeded in raising the educational level in Libya, which definitely gives positive signs for the long run, especially on retaining the youth.

One of the goals set by the EU Foreign Policy programs towards assisting in the transition phase of Libya at the same time tackling the causes of migration has been debated, many would argue that the EU was unsuccessful in reconciling the opposing parties in Libya due to the abundance of tribes and armed militias in the country, along with fragile law and order system. The Kidnapping of the Libyan PM Ali Zeidan in 2013 is a solid proof of the chaotic situation that still resides till today, since the army is practically absent and deeply inexperienced. In reality, during a joint communication in 2014 discussing the results of the ENP implementations in the targeted countries during 2013 between the European Commission and the European Council, the policymakers admitted that the results were uneven due to many rationales, one of them is that the efficiency of the ENP programs relies heavily on the pledge and dedication of the government in the neighboring states and their willingness to commit to the execution of EU activities. “The ENP has faced some challenges in steering partners towards adopting policies that would bring more security and more democratic and economic reform in moments of abrupt change and rupture of political and social stability” (EC, Brussels, 27 March 2014).
Libya has proven to be one of the toughest platforms to apply ENP’s objectives. According to the meeting, Libya still faces drastic security challenges, which is influencing the whole North African region, the latter was officially stated by the report deducted from the joint meeting of March 2015 between all EU branches discussing the results of ENP in 2014, “In view of the civil war in Syria and the deterioration of the security situation in Libya, it would be unrealistic to expect any progress on the EU agenda in these two countries. The impact of these conflicts on neighboring countries must also be taken into account.”

The situation in Libya has reached the point where EU policymakers are left with no one to communicate with from the Libyan side, even the EUBAM program had been shuffled to Tunisia after the deterioration of the security and stability. Furthermore, in the Joint Staff Working Document (2015) consequential from the meeting in Brussels, Libya was always listed along with Syria as an unpromising place compared to the rest of the Arab and North African states that had a slight economic recovery from their uprisings and experienced an economic growth in 2014, “Economic activity in Libya was expected to contract sharply as a result of the renewal of armed conflict and the breakdown of the political and security situation, Libya’s economic situation continued to worsen, with the fractured and unmanageable political situation in the country disrupting its oil exports.” (Joint Staff Working document, 2015).

On another hand, regarding the educational programs, the ENP had somehow succeeded by making a positive change since according to statistics, the enrolment rates of students from the primary up till the higher education became pretty elevated, “Libya achieved a gross enrolment ratio of 110.3% in primary schools, 93.55% in secondary
schools and 55.7% in higher education.” (Human Development Report, 2011), the latter even affirmed that the rates in Libya were even higher than Tunisia and Egypt. Furthermore, the development of the learning system in Libya had led the literacy rate to rise into 88.9% and an illiteracy rate of only 2% (Human Development Report, 2011). In reality, before the 2011 revolution, the Libyan General People’s Committee was responsible of all the educational apparatus in the country, however after the revolution, one of the EU’s foreign policy goals was to amend the Libyan curriculum and enforce the General People’s Committee that converted into employing qualified teachers, building new educational monuments with modern learning equipments, in addition to facilitating the educational loans for the parents” (Rezk & Katarina, 2012).

Simultaneously, the EU and the UN had been working together on mediation and peacekeeping in Libya, according to The council of the European Union (2014), “The EU welcomes the UN facilitated dialogue between members of the House of Representatives initiated in Ghadames on 29 September and continued in Tripoli on 11 October in presence of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki – moon and the Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini. It calls on all parties to fully cooperate with the UN-led initiative by engaging in a peaceful political process to resolve the ongoing crisis, abstaining from actions that risk undermining it”. However how successful are these negotiations and conflict resolution deeds being? Clearly they have generated very few constructive outcomes mainly because of the troubled tribal negotiations and the complexity resulting from the numerous armed parties involved, whereby there is political disorder in Libya with the absence of a unified government and army.
Furthermore, the EU has even attempted to train paramilitary Libyan forces in order for them to impose their control in Libya. “Projects include: training 60 Libyan BG officers at Italy's Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Vicenza; teaching 65 Libyan infantrymen at Italy's Army Infantry School in Cesano; training 280 Libyan military police in Tripoli; and teaching another 150 civilian police in using anti-drug sniffer dogs and in forensic crime scene investigation” (Rettman, 2013). However a lot has been debated over the triumph of such programs, since some trained Libyans returned to join their own militias instead of joining the army, which was the initial target. Furthermore, Germany is working on hindering the possibility of Libyan nuclear fuel gets in the wrong hands; it has donated €600,000 on discarding chemical weapons and €800,000 on protecting Libya’s anti-aircraft missiles. However, no matter how hard are the efforts or how gigantic are the funds, the EU’s endeavors are becoming paralyzed in front of the political fissures in Libya. According to Banco (2014) “It is hard to breathe life into something that has been defunct for so long."

4.2-4. Setbacks and Challenges

Tackling the root causes of migration directly or indirectly through EU’s foreign policy tools that target the push factors and points of tribulations in the Southern Mediterranean states is definitely the perfect long term solution to minimize the migration load on the EU’s borders; however the Libyan case reveals some limitations of such a technique which is bombarded with bigger challenges that restrain its performance.

One of those setbacks is the EU’s unwillingness or incapacity of influencing the political situation in a way that improves the lives of third country nationals so that they will want to remain in their homelands. In the case of Libya the EU foreign policy is
powerless in front of the chaotic political circumstances alongside the numerous armed militias and tribes at the same time the rise of the Islamic state in the country making the uncertain future of the situation in Libya a huge inhibitor for any long term missions. The EU’s foreign policy in Libya is aware that no communication or settlements can be made currently with any party from the Libyan’s side; therefore it is focusing more on tackling irregular migration by increasing EU border control through Frontex and other similar programs rather than relying heavily on root causes management. The latest decision made by EU policymakers was to launch a military action against traffickers in Libya, “In addition to beefing up an existing search-and-rescue operation in the Mediterranean, leaders backed military intervention against the traffickers, who are suspected of having links with armed militias, including ISIS, now running fiefdoms in lawless Libya” (Kington, 2015). While it is critical for the EU to address how to reduce the horrible death of migrants at sea and the traffickers, as well as prevent ISIS members from reaching Europe, they are just short-term solutions. More effort should be made on solving the deep long term solutions which rely on improving the foreign policy programs as well as solving the obstacles facing the ENP’s agenda and the EU’s External Action Service in Libya. In brief, the main obstacles facing the EU’s Foreign policy programs in Libya are: the battlement in Libya between two governments at the same time the rise of ISIS, which obscured the state of affairs, the total disarray that permits the rise in traffickers exploiting desperate migrants with no intervention from any local powers to end it and EU’s failure in settling a political agreement with the existing political parties as well as the total rejection of sending Boots on the Ground to Libya.
Chapter Five

Analysis and Conclusion

The challenge of solving the problem of illegal migration from North Africa to the European Union in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions has been making the headlines during the past few years. It is definitely a significant topic to be looked at as the absence of a remarkable solution is leading a large number of desperate migrants to flee poverty, war and execution by risking their lives at sea in order to have the slightest opportunity of building a better future. Europe’s struggle with the migration crisis has revealed some weaknesses in EU’s strategies applied to manage the problem, especially as the latter has been following an enclosure policy (Fortress Europe) in front of the refugees and asylum seekers which is leading to an increase in irregular migration. Several reasons lay behind EU’s obsession with border control—the economic setbacks it is facing because of the euro zone crisis is one of them—while the core explanation is that the topic of migration has been securitized inside of the European Union. The EU’s foreign policy has been playing a significant role in trying to attenuate the push factors that force its southern neighbors to flee their countries through the root management strategy applied by the ENP’s and ENPI’s instruments.
In answering the central research questions: “How is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which are EU’s foreign policy tools that enable it to have international and regional impact through its decisions and agreements, are addressing the root causes of forced migration in both cases of Tunisia and Libya? And are their implementations leading to any positive signs for a long term solution?” the cases of Tunisia and Libya, which are two examples of sending states targeted by EU’s root management, reveal how the strategy’s achievement differs from one case to another while exposing its setbacks. Nevertheless, this does not obstruct the possibility of its achievement for the long run, especially in Tunisia, where the ENP and ENPI have had better results than in Libya. Tackling the root causes of migration directly or indirectly by the EU is an ambitious long term plan that benefits the sending states and lessens the burden on the EU, however the Libyan case proves that the root management approach is faced with a bulk of challenges and limitations that hinder its smooth and efficient performance. Not to forget that there are some external and internal factors in the targeted countries that influence the plans of the ENP and ENPI by limiting the accomplishment of their goals. At the same time, EU’s double standard towards the sending states and the contradictory movements that exist within the union, whereby some EU countries launch independent foreign policy that might go against the united EU’s foreign policy tools also distract EU’s root management approach.

5.1- Observations
There are many reasons behind the EU’s obsession with border control in the face of the influx of immigrants resulting from the Arab uprisings. The weak economic condition of many European member states is hindering policymakers and the public’s views toward immigration. Also, cultural and security reasons seem to play a significant role in influencing the judgment of the Europeans in any topic that relates to immigration; many desire increased assimilation and uniformity due to the fear from ‘aliens’ who according to them cause threats to internal stability and the security of current citizens. Many human rights organization, political analysts and scholars have objected to the harsh measures applied by the EU towards refugees and asylum seekers who are victims of conflict and violence in North Africa and the Middle East. Clearly there is a will to change the current immigration policy of the union, which is one of the goals set by the European Commission as well as the European Parliament, yet the process of amending the “policy failure” has not yet started and the reason behind this lateness is still a gray area for many analysts. Some believe that many of the EU decision makers are not enthusiastic towards a change and facilitation in influx of immigrants, while others feel that the unification of the immigration policy is not a trouble-free process, since it challenges the sovereignty right of states to control their own borders.

Thus EU policy remains quite muddled despite the clear importance of the issue of migration to many different actors. What is clear, however, is that ‘Fortress Europe’ is not able to control migration. Thus, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union long ago initiated external action plans in the eastern and southern neighbor in order to improve the environment of the union from the security and economic aspects, at the same time empowering it as a global actor and preacher of
peace and human rights. A variety of foreign policy tools were used to tackle the push factors in the targeted countries such as Tunisia and Libya, which might affect the long term trend of irregular migrants heading towards the borders of the European Union; the ENP and the ENPI apparatuses are the main programs produced to handle such missions. The dilemma lies in the sufficiency of such programs while the Libyan and Tunisian case studies reveal that the strategy of root management is faced with a lot of external and internal limitations that delay its smooth and efficient progress, nevertheless this does not barricade the possibility of its achievements for the long run.

5.2- Disparity between the Libyan and Tunisian cases – Assessing the different conditions

As of summer 2015, Libya is in chaos, overshadowing the results of the ENP program and EU’s foreign policy as a whole, which are eclipsed by the challenging political and economic situations as well as the absence of someone to cooperate with from the Libyan’s side. On the other side, Tunisia seems to be positively responding to the EU’s foreign policy in North Africa and might turn out to be the success story of the Arab Uprisings. The external actions plans of the EU that existed in Tunisia for so long seem to have flourished in several ways such as democratic and civil society’s accomplishments; yet their limits in light of current economic problems is terrifying, especially that most of the forced immigration are caused by the dreadful and brutal unemployment rate.

One of the lessons learned from the analysis of the Libyan and Tunisian cases regarding the effect of EU’s foreign policy on the long-term flow of irregular migrants
from the related countries is that conclusions on each case study should be analyzed separately to avoid generalizations on the role assessment of the EU’s external action programs targeting unrest countries. The European Union seems to have made a slight advancement on aiding Libya throughout the revolution, yet a much weaker role in managing the post revolution phase. This highlights the EU’s malfunction in solving the root causes of irregular migration in Libya, which remains to be the biggest transit country from North Africa of the forced migrants who are struggling with poor environmental conditions and are subject to victimization and manipulation by smugglers. However, the thesis has revealed that the majority of Libyan emigrants who fled the country in 2011 have returned to their homeland. This is due to their desire of involvement in their state building, but also we can’t deny the other essential reasons that enhanced their return, which relate to the formation of a government by fair elections, the improvement of the education and healthcare systems, empowerment of civil society and the role of the media in addition to better management of the borders with other African states. Nonetheless, the severe distress and chaos in Libya is revealing the main weakness of the ENP programs and the ambition of improving the push factors for the citizens in a country similar to Libya, most importantly because of the uncontrollable political and security anarchy within the borders of Libya after the fall of Gaddafi with the militias taking over the country and getting in the way of any beneficial decision making, not to mention the deteriorating economic and human conditions in the surrounding countries as well as the absence of any reliable bilateral desires to have the EU interfere in Libya, in reality the Libyan’s decision makers are not being fully supportive of EU’s interventions, not to mention that the EU is unable to establish a somber dialogue with any effective representative from the Libyan’s side.
Furthermore, Libya was one of the countries that witnessed severe brutality during the revolution and human rights violations while Tunisia witnessed the least amount of violence during and after the Jasmine revolution.

“Tunisia was and remains, until this day, the exception among countries of the Arab Spring” (Mirza, 2014). Tunisia’s key success and distinction from its neighbors is the communicated bilateral agreements established with Europe and its true desire to flourish the relationship with the West at the same time improve its internal situation. In Tunisia, the power of the gun was replaced with politics and dialogue—unlike Libya—which makes it easier to deal with. According to Mirza (2014), Tunisia has “a strong civil society, a liberal cultural heritage and a harmonious social identity that have all concurred in excluding elements of contradiction within the broad pool of opposition forces.” Yet, emigration from Tunisia will never diminish unless the economic and security problems improve over the long run and here lies the limitation of the ENP program in Tunisia, very few promising signs are established in the economic and unemployment sector while the security factor remains to be analyzed in the few years to come.

Certainly, EU’s foreign policy missions targeting the push factors and root problems of North African countries heavily rely on the host country, how much is it willing to welcome foreign programs in its country? How close are its ties with the European Union? How far is it able to cross in order to save its country and improve its living standards? How far is the corruption and self-interest integrated in the society and among its politicians? But most importantly to what extent is it willing to cooperate with the EU, whereby the EU provides aid in return to some demands? In addition to all of
this, one should not ignore the exterior dynamics that might restrain external action programs such as the ENP and ENPI from fully succeeding.

5.3- Analysis of Exterior Factors that Inhibit these EU programs to Fully Succeed

Unlimited exterior factors can inhibit the full function of the EU programs targeting push factors in EU’s neighborhood countries. First of all, “there is the risk of bowing to the preferences of other actors on the international scene, if it fails to develop and pursue its own” (Guner& Mattes, 2006). If the latter influences the target of EU’s external aid and programs then this will lead to a collapse in the missions’ goals and objectives. On another side, EU’s soft power should have different strategies to address case by case challenges within its Southern Neighborhood and to enlarge its security belt; one strategy that fits for all conditions is certainly not the correct way to tackle root migration problems in the sending states. One additional inhibitor is the absence of the parties’ willingness to work together on improving the internal situation of a certain country. Moreover, the European citizens’ satisfaction with and conviction that external action services will improve their own security and well-being is a must in order to boost support and funding for the programs since the augmentation of anti-root management supporters leads to a decrease in policymakers willingness to act outside their territories. Another interesting challenge is the lack of support from other major international actors that search for their own benefit while the EU pays the repercussions. At the same time, EU’s double standards approach towards certain North African countries such as supporting autocratic rulers for its own advantage is definitely attenuating the
constructive outcome of the ENP’s agenda. Additionally, the global situation of the targeted region, which in this case is MENA and North Africa, plays a big role in the long term outcome of the root management approach. If the entire region is overshadowed by dark clouds and thunders then this factor also influences the speed of results.

5.4- Conclusion and Recommendations for EU’s Foreign Policies on Tackling Migration

In conclusion, the European Union won the Nobel Peace Prize of 2012 for playing a major role in the spread of democracy and human rights standards, therefore one cannot but have faith that they will find a solution for the migration crisis they are facing in a way to satisfy the member states as well as the refugees, which is shown in the words of the European Parliament president: “Of course Europe cannot save everyone, and cannot take in everyone. But we are the richest continent in the world. We can do more, particularly if we act together, if we look together for solutions, and shoulder our responsibilities together” (Schulz, 2013).

The importance of solving the push factors that relate to forced migration, which presses people to flee as a survival instinct and not by choice is a peacemaking strategy that works on a long period of time, yet it fosters peacebuilding and stability. Many would criticize the approach as being too ideal and unrealistic, yet the EU is constantly applying these programs with the hope of aiding citizens to live properly in their homelands by lessening the opportunities for violence and corruption in the MENA region and creating a better neighborhood for the EU.
The management of root causes of migration is a goal for EU policymakers who seek to improve the situation of their neighborhood in order to rise as an international diplomatic actor at the same time to increase the security within their borders and the *bien-être* of their public. Moving on from this point, it becomes evident that the EU cannot be prosperous as long as its larger region is in flames, therefore the results of EU’s Foreign Policy and external actions reflect positively on the welfare of its citizens, “Defining the priorities for EU’s foreign policy and external action can make a tangible contribution to the welfare of Europe’s citizens by, for example, improving security in the neighborhood, regulating international finance and mitigating climate change” (Grevi and Keohane, 2013). Unfortunately, the European Union’s Foreign policy instruments tackling the root causes of migration in Tunisia and Libya reveal some limitations to the strategy in both cases, and a lesser amount of optimistic results in the Libyan case; while it is the only human solution to enhance the Southern neighbors at the same time protecting the borders through soft power strategy.

5.4-1. Recommendations

After examining copious amount of academic journals that sheds light on the role of the European CFSP, focusing on the role of ENP and ENPI programs targeting the push factors in North African countries, more precisely Tunisia and Libya, some recommendations surfaced that were presented by several political scientists analyzing the related topic as well as European politicians who are deeply concerned with the situation of the EU facing the migration crisis and struggling to protect its image as a global actor. Marc Pierini (2015) recommends that “recent developments in the
neighborhood of the European Union, render the EU’s traditional model and methodology largely ineffectual”. Certes, the ENP and ENPI programs seem to have got some optimistic comments; nonetheless no one can deny that they are bombarded with internal and external limitations to their success in all the allocated criteria that persuade irregular migration. Therefore, the traditional model of the EU in managing its foreign policy towards its Southern neighborhood should be amended with the aim of achieving supplementary long term improvements.

Primarily, the EU should be faster in adjusting its policies and action plans in parallel with unexpected circumstances and crises, such as the migration crisis. The EU’s foreign policy tools shouldn’t also apply the same menu for all the North African countries since each case should be studied and analyzed separately, same as Tunisia and Libya, tailor made engagement should take place. The EU should promote EU values within civil societies of the marked countries, “combine the promotion of EU values—where relevant—with a more assertive defense of EU interests” (Pierini, 2015) since the nature of governments might vary from dictatorships to liberals throughout the years, but the civil societies remain the only assets and best ventures for the future. Furthermore, the ENP and ENPI should double their counter-terrorism cooperation more than ever with the official representatives of the targeted countries such as Tunisia and Libya, especially after the rise of ISIS. Concerning migration policies, the EU should certainly carry on with the expansion of its rescue missions on its Mediterranean borders in order to save lives at sea as much as possible; however, it should keep in mind that one of the reasons why the number of irregular migrants reaching Europe today has not tripled, is due to the high fees they pay in order to embark on that fearful journey in search for
survival. Therefore, trying to solve the issue by limiting it to rescuing people at sea is not enough to face the bigger challenges of the current migration crisis.

In contrast, Lehme (2014) argues that “the EU should strengthen the ENP’s political leadership… whereby, EU member states should more actively participate in running the new policy”. Certainly, the ENP should progressively become more emphasized upon as well as given elevated consideration in order to develop its long term engagement tools and sophisticated approach to preach democratic values. In addition to that and especially in the migration arena, the EU’s foreign policy should intensify its dialogue with other influential international actors, especially the United States, which is EU’s most significant partner due to its high level of influence.

5.4-2. Recommendations for Libya

Most importantly, Libya should be given more international attention and the EU has to play a bigger role in revealing the security risks that it faces if the situation in Libya keeps deteriorating. EU’s foreign policy should work harder with the Libyan authorities through dialogue and reconciliation processes between the different parties on establishing a strong unified cooperative Libyan government, which is able to face the challenges in the country, especially with the rise of ISIS and communicate with the international actors, especially the EU. The leading government should establish strong security forces and increase its bilateral agreements that deal with migration and border control. Moreover, tackling the economic factor is crucial since it is the main reason behind the presence of smugglers communities, they should be able to understand that humans are not for trade. The second target for the EU’s foreign policy is to work on
increasing the schools, universities and institutions that preach democratic values at the same increase the level of education in the country in order to enable the citizens to work in the international market and insert multinational organizations within the country. Finally, the main solution for the migration crisis in Libya is to reverse the priorities of the EU on the latter subject, the EU should address Libya first then this will ease the way to address migration and not vice versa.

5.4-3. Recommendations for Tunisia

Improving the economic situation and decreasing unemployment while working harder on fighting the rise of terrorism that is affecting the tourism sector are the main factors upon which EU’s foreign policy tools should focus. Even though the situation in Tunisia is much better than in Libya, thus far it still needs a lot of improvement, since Tunisians irregular migrants are still seeking to escape the country to have decent jobs and salaries. EU should intensify its missions to Tunisia since it might be their only success story in the Southern neighborhood and their only reliable partner in North Africa for the time being. Greater focus must be placed on the creation of jobs and the provision of career advice as well as economic reform and funds with which to do it. Furthermore, the EU should assist Tunisia in controlling its borders with Libya in order not to spread the disarray into its territories. However, most importantly, the EU should be consistent with its support to the Tunisian authorities in order to aid with the development of a better living standard for all Tunisian citizens.

5.4-4. Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the study of migration and to other scholarship that aims to develop knowledge on the root management approach launched by the EU. This research is an examination of EU’s foreign policy tools targeting the push factors in Libya and Tunisia, which leaves space for other political science students to examine additional North African countries and reach a firmer stand towards the topic and the limitations of the root management approach. This thesis contributes to the literature that examines the role of EU’s foreign policy in attenuating the push factors in North Africa while shedding light on the setbacks and challenges that face such a strategy. Even though the topic of this thesis is a complex one, especially that it is hard to isolate the progress (or lack thereof) of the ENP and ENPI’s programs from all the internal and external influencers, it focuses on a challenging and humanitarian problem that deserves examination.

In conclusion, EU’s foreign policy tools targeting the push factors in the troubled countries of North Africa facilitate the way for a long term state and civil society building that might decrease the load of irregular migrants reaching EU’s border; but unfortunately the internal and external influential factors are still hindering their smooth and productive process that enables them to reach their ultimate beneficial goals. The ENP and ENPIs programs need to be further developed and tailor made for each country while international support from other global powers is definitely needed to pave the way for better mutual conditions to the citizens in the disturbed countries and to the European citizens as well.
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