STATE STRENGTH, PERMEABILITY, AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: JORDAN IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bassel F. Salloukh

A GROWING BODY OF LITERATURE IS ADVOCATING the utility of bringing the study of Middle East politics into theoretical debates informing contemporary political science.\(^1\) In an early formulation of this appeal, Lisa Anderson contended that if Middle East studies abandons its "traditional parochialism, . . . political science will find a challenging and illuminating area in which to develop and test new understandings of how politics work."\(^2\) Rashid Khalidi, in his 1994 presidential address to the Middle East Studies Association, argued that the only way to contest claims that "there is a dearth of theoretically interesting work in the Middle East field" is to demonstrate that "work of interest to the central concerns of [the social sciences]" is being done in this field.\(^3\) In the specialized disciplines of Middle East and comparative politics, both Anderson’s and Khalidi’s objectives may be realized by demonstrating the potential contributions of the study of Middle East politics to theory-building in the larger discipline of comparative politics. One way to achieve this is by revisiting specific cases whose theoretical value has hitherto been ignored by both regional specialists and comparative scholars. This essay attempts to demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by revisiting Jordan’s recent political history, specifically, the era extending from the mid-1950s until roughly the early 1970s.

Although a crucial period in the kingdom’s political history, students of Jordan have approached this era in a largely descriptive way.\(^4\) Hussein’s

Bassel F. Salloukh is a doctoral candidate in comparative politics at McGill University. The author would like to thank Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, Jennifer Draeger, and Tamer Anis for their critiques in the writing of this article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the support of the Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies (Montréal).
biographers have also romanticized this era by overemphasizing his personal qualities and prowess as salient factors enabling him to survive the myriad challenges upon his person and regime during those turbulent years. However such explanations of the Hashemite regime’s survival hinder attempts to demonstrate the potential contributions of Middle East comparative politics and foreign policy analysis to theory-building in similar sub-fields across other developing regions. Hence the need to revisit this definitive period of Jordan’s history and subject it to a scrutiny that, simultaneously, provides a better explanation of the regime’s survival and highlights its comparative theoretical implications.

A small state actor located in a permeable regional system and endeavoring to survive regional and domestic threats, Jordan lends itself to an exploration that underscores the domestic determinants of foreign policy behavior, and the relation between foreign policy behavior and regime consolidation, legitimization, and hence survival. Toward this end, this article reconstructs the Hashemite regime’s multi-level, interactive survival strategy (henceforth Husseinism) during the aforementioned period and places it within the preceding theoretical framework. In part, this study attempts to complement, but move away from, the two dominant intellectual traditions in the analysis of foreign policy behavior in the Middle East: the realist and the psychological/perceptual approaches. Instead of looking at states or the decision-making elite, this article looks into states, particularly at the domestic factors and political dynamics that constrain and determine foreign policy behavior, and consequently, at the instrumental use of foreign policy for purposes of regime legitimacy and consolidation.

The purpose of this article is to explain the success of Husseinism. “Success” (the dependent variable) refers to the ability of the regime to retain power and control over the political process, and to neutralize the disruptive effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic political arena. This article contends that the survival of the Hashemite regime in power, and the decline of an active Palestinian or Arab nationalist challenge, may be explained by four explanatory variables: a successful insulatory regional policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. The convergence of these factors enabled the Hashemite regime to restructure state-society relations to consolidate social control, mitigate the effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic arena, and achieve an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments of the society gaining the state allegiance from a sizable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population.

Since the study of Husseinism contributes to the theoretical debate pertaining to the strength and relative autonomy of the state, this article opens with a brief discussion of this debate. An examination of the salient domestic dilemmas in Jordan and the impact of transnational regional pressures upon the Jordanian domestic arena reveals the most prominent factors constraining and shaping the regime’s domestic and external policies. This paves the way for a
multi-level explication of Husseinism, followed by a detailed explanation of Husseinism’s “success.” The article closes by assessing the broader definitional and theoretical implications of this study to the fields of comparative politics and foreign policy analysis in the developing world.

THE STRENGTH AND RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE

In the Weberian tradition, the classification of states into “strong” and “weak” ones depends upon their approximation to the ideal-type “centralized and fully rationalized Weberian bureaucracy, supposedly able to work its will efficiently and without effective social opposition.” In this case, states are powerful, autonomous organizational actors possessing the ability to restructure society and politics through interventionist policies. Some scholars, such as Michael Mann, contend that states and state elites possess an “autonomous power” independent from other actors in civil society and, as Hamza Alavi opines, the state in post-colonial societies is “relatively autonomous” from other social classes. Others, such as Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol contend that “states may be autonomous actors. Whether or not they are depends on conjunctures of state structure, the relations of states to societies and transnational environments, and the nature of the challenges faced by given states.” An influential model for examining the strength or weakness of states in the Third World is presented by Joel Migdal. Though retaining the Weberian definition of the state, Migdal depicts the state as one, among many other, social organizations locked in “an active struggle for social control of the population,” in an “existing environment of conflict.” The state’s efforts at social control through a monopoly over the stipulation of social rules governing peoples’ social behavior is actively resisted by existing social organizations who control available resources and manipulate the symbols that make up peoples’ “strategies of survival.” In this environment of conflict, the strength (or weakness) of a state hinges upon its ability to execute state-planned social change aimed at enforcing state social control. The state’s capabilities include “the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.” Strong states possess high capabilities to achieve these tasks, while weak states have low capabilities. As the following analysis reveals, whether or not a state in the developing world is strong or relatively autonomous hinges upon specific definitional criteria and variables. But first, what salient domestic dilemmas prevail in Jordan?

JORDAN’S DOMESTIC DILEMMAS

Like many developing states, Jordan faces structural domestic dilemmas largely rooted in the kingdom’s historic process of state formation. In Jordan, this process has led to the creation of a plural society deeply divided along deep segmental cleavages. In the Emirate’s early years the segmental composition of the population was differentiated along four, significantly unequal, vertical
cleavages: the mode of life and economy, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and religion. By the early 1960s, as a result of the 1948 War and the subsequent annexation of the Transjordanian-controlled parts of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom, Palestinians represented 43 percent of the population of Transjordan, excluding the West Bank population. Moreover, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war caused around 300,000 Palestinians to move to the East Bank. The shift from a population characterized by a vast East Jordanian majority to one with a clear and potent Palestinian majority was effected. The resultant clash of interests and diversity in identities in the new polity engendered a structural transformation in the segmental composition of the kingdom. Henceforth, the most important segmental cleavage in Jordanian society was the sociopolitical and national distinction between the politically dominant East Jordanians and the refugee and immigrant Palestinian communities. As a result, the post-1950 social hierarchy in Jordan was composed of three main segments: the ruling Hashemites; a now expanded Transjordanian community which included, in addition to the indigenous Transjordanians, assimilated Palestinian, Syrian, and Hijazi communities that had moved to Transjordan before 1948; and a large Palestinian community whose loyalty to the kingdom has at times been suspect. This structural transformation in Jordan's segmental composition gave rise to Jordan's two salient, organically linked, and mutually re-enforcing domestic dilemmas.

The 'Asabiyya Dilemma.

The first of these dilemmas may be called, borrowing from Ibn Khaldun and Albert Hourani, an 'asabiyya dilemma: a condition where society is composed of different segments, each with its own 'asabiyya (solidarity) and its specific vision and definition of the territorial entity. The 'asabiyya dilemma is a primary security imperative constraining and shaping the regime's survival policies. A better appreciation of the political and security implications of the 'asabiyya dilemma may be attained by examining the challenges facing a state lacking a single, over-arching, 'asabiyya.

'Asabiyya is a conscious or unconscious social-psychological bond uniting a group together; moreover, this unity is most manifest and strongest at times when the group, or its members, are threatened by external danger. In fact, this explains why Ibn Khaldun continuously couples 'asabiyya with aggression, for a group's 'asabiyya is catapulted to the fore only when the group's shared material and economic interests are threatened. Hence, 'asabiyya plays a pivotal functional role in the protection of a group or state against external aggression. States lacking a dominant 'asabiyya will have difficulty defending the polity against external intervention or manipulation. As a result, a state's domestic arena is exposed to external intervention and manipulation. Ibn Khaldun's notion of 'asabiyya is also relevant to the debate about strong or weak states.

According to Ghassan Salamé's Ibn Khaldunian analysis, there are two components to a state's strength: "the actual capabilities of the state and, . . . the recognition by others of these capabilities." A strong general (or common)
'asabiyya and a ri'asa (leadership) over people are two necessary conditions for a strong state. Ri'asa – and hence mulk (kingship) – require the ghulb (superiority) of the leader's 'asabiyya over all other individual 'asabiyyas, and the formation of a general 'asabiyya under the new leadership. However, as Salamé notes, this "is not sufficient to build strength. Following that, the whole society must be coalesced (iltham) in accordance with the new authority." Iltham derives from the peoples' recognition of the state's capabilities and strength, it is manifested by political loyalty to the possessors of these capabilities, and it is "the ultimate form of hegemony in its insistence on social integration by and around the ideology professed by the ruling 'asabiyya." It follows, then, that the "larger the new iltham the stronger the state."19 Jordan's 'asabiyya dilemma, manifested in the lack of iltham among different social segments, undermines the regime's ri'asa and exposes it to threats from its domestic opponents. It directly leads to Jordan's second domestic dilemma: the "insecurity dilemma."

The Insecurity Dilemma.

Students of the "insecurity dilemma" argue that in many developing states the "sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats to and from the regime in power," rather than of external threats to the existence of the nation-state.20 In the context of many Third World states, competing social organizations carry competing notions of national or state security. The result, according to Brian Job, is the "insecurity dilemma" whose defining features are: "(1) less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population, (2) less effective capacity of centralized state institutions to provide services and order, and (3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside powers."21 Jordan's insecurity dilemma also exposed the regime to domestic and external security threats.

JORDAN AND THE ARAB STATE SYSTEM: REGIONAL PERMEABILITY AND DOMESTIC VULNERABILITY

The exposure of the domestic arena to external (and internal) manipulation is not only a consequence of Jordan's domestic dilemmas, but also of the kingdom's regional environment. Specifically, the permeability of the Arab state system, best exemplified in the spill-over effect of transnational appeals such as pan-Islamic and pan-Arab ideologies across state borders, rendered Jordan's domestic arena vulnerable to external (and internal) manipulation, especially by aspiring regional powers.22 Hence, in addition to the distinction between "strong" and "weak" states, in the Arab system it is also therefore possible to distinguish between "hard" and "soft" states where the "hardness" or "softness" of a state varies with the degree to which state-society relations demonstrate extensive transnational characteristics.23 Transnational regional permeability was most acute in the 1950s and 1960s, when political allegiance in the Arab World tended to oscillate between the simultaneous obligations of the sovereign territorial state and
the imperatives of pan-Arabism. The existence of a set of "all-Arab core concerns" forced upon states a certain level of scrupulousness toward these concerns in the formulation of their domestic and foreign policies. Throughout the period under review, Jordan fell victim to the transnational influence of Nasserite Arab nationalism (and, to a lesser extent, Ba'thism). Often, regional imperatives constrained foreign policy behavior. Other domestic imperatives had a similar constraining effect on foreign policy behavior.

Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy.

In the Arab system, the domestic environment plays an important role in shaping a state's foreign policy "behavior." A state's foreign policy options are either enhanced or constrained by the specificities of its domestic environment. In Jordan the 'asabiyya dilemma may be considered a primary domestic determinant of foreign policy behavior. It often required of the regime to pursue (or look to pursue) an "honorable, just solution" to the Palestinian problem, sensitive to Palestinian domestic public opinion. Beyond the Palestinian problem, the regime has generally attempted to avoid a foreign policy that might antagonize the domestic Palestinian community. Moreover, in addition to constraining foreign policy behavior, the 'asabiyya dilemma compounds the regional permeability predicament by facilitating external (or internal) manipulation of the domestic arena. Other domestic factors have also either constrained or enhanced Jordan's foreign policy options.

The lack of natural borders and a geographic location between contending regional aspirants (Iraq, Syria, and Israel) has often exposed Jordan to the pressures of regional powers, constraining the country's foreign policy options. The lack of a strong economic base, due to the paucity of natural resources, has had a similar constraining effect. As a result, Jordan is heavily dependent upon regional and international aid. On the other hand, and despite its negligible ability to help implement the regional objectives of Jordanian foreign policy, the role of the Jordanian army as a staunch defender of the regime has at times allowed it to take unpopular foreign policy decisions when its existence was in peril. The same effect has resulted from the kingdom's hierarchic, autocratic, control-modeled political system and its concentration of legal and practical power in the superordinate segments of Jordanian society composed of the Hashemites, the Transjordanians, and coopted Palestinian notables and their families. In this system the post-1948 Palestinian community is the subordinate segment.

HUSSEINISM: A MULTI-LEVEL, INTERACTIVE ANALYSIS

Husseinism developed in response to external and domestic challenges to the survival of the Hashemite regime. It is a multi-level, interactive strategy that exhibits the role of domestic determinants in shaping regime foreign policy and, consequently, the regime's instrumental use of extra-regional and regional policies to consolidate and legitimize its rule. This allows the regime the necessary
domestic space to launch interventionist policies aimed at integrating an otherwise deeply divided society. In the following discussion, an explication of Husseinism’s different levels will be separately undertaken.

The Extra-Regional Umbrella: Protecting the Hashemite Kingdom

An important component of Husseinism has been the reliance, in times of acute crisis, on extra-regional intervention or support to protect the state from the threat of regional military intervention. By protecting the state from regional military threats (or potential threats), and by restraining domestic opponents of the monarchy, the extra-regional deterrence umbrella provides the regime the cover and support to clamp down on domestic opposition, often fueled and manipulated by regional states. Moreover, state protection provides the regime a breathing space to consolidate its domestic position. This latter objective may be achieved in different ways: by strengthening the army to deter future regional or domestic threats, by developing the economy to provide material incentives and rewards in exchange for loyalty to the regime from the social segments most susceptible to foreign manipulation, and/or by fostering a sense of Jordanian nationhood through different interventionist state policies. To be sure, dependence upon extra-regional protection has exposed the regime to criticism from domestic and regional foes. However, the imperatives of survival made extra-regional protection a necessity rather than a luxury. As the following analysis will demonstrate, extra-regional support or intervention provided Jordan protection from external intervention on more than one occasion. Who then was responsible for the provision of extra-regional protection and why?

Until the mid-1950s, Jordan’s extra-regional protector was Great Britain. In 1955, Britain attempted to include Jordan in the Baghdad Pact. At the outset, Hussein was willing to join for the right amount of aid. However, ensuing riots against the Baghdad Pact in the West Bank entailed a change in policy. The final decision not to enter the Baghdad Pact was largely due to genuine domestic opposition fueled and manipulated by regional powers seeking to distance the Hashemite regime from Britain. A sign of the further erosion of Britain’s position in Jordan came on 1 March 1956 when John Glubb Pasha was expelled from Jordan. Britain’s formal exit from Jordan was concluded when in March 1957 the cabinet of Suleiman al-Nabulsi abrogated the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Henceforth, the task of providing an extra-regional umbrella for Jordan increasingly shifted to the United States.

On 5 January 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine was enunciated. Its objective was to fill the power vacuum resulting from the decline in French and British influence in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis. Although Hussein declined to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, he made effective use of its anti-Communist rationale to mobilize American support during the crises of 1957 and 1958. In fact, the Eisenhower Doctrine “was instrumental in leading Hussein onto an anti-Communist track, which did much to ‘sell’ him to the American public as a client in whose survival it was worthwhile to invest.”

32
Economically, this meant that America replaced Britain as the external financier of the Jordanian treasury. In 1958 America began subsidizing Jordan at the annual rate of forty million dollars. Of equal importance to the future survival of Hussein's regime was the military and political support provided by America and Britain during the 1957 and 1958 crises. A study of these crises will demonstrate the Hashemite regime's use of extra-regional support, alongside the loyalty of the army's Bedouin regiments, to ensure its survival.

The dismissal of the Nabulsi cabinet on 10 April 1957 triggered a crisis in Jordan that continued until martial law was imposed on the twenty-fifth of the same month. The climax of the crisis was the confrontation at the Zerqa military camp between Bedouin troops and officers and the hadari, non-Bedouin, nationalist officers who were inspired and supported by their mentors in Cairo and Damascus. The loyalty of the Bedouin officers and soldiers was pivotal to the regime's survival. The April crisis illuminates an important components of Husseinism: the use of extra-regional support to protect the state from the threat of military intervention by regional powers, thus enabling the army's loyal regiments and the regime's security services to suppress domestic opposition.

During the April crisis the regime elicited American support by depicting the genuine domestic opposition as a mere product of Communist penetration in Jordan. This also ensured the support of the Saudi regime whose Islamic conservatism loathed both revolutionary Communism and radical Arab nationalism. America's commitment to Jordan was overtly manifested politically, militarily, and economically. America declared the integrity and independence of Jordan as vital to the United States, dispatched units from the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and dispatched a ten million dollars in special aid to Jordan. This American stance constrained Jordan's regional rivals. Most importantly, it deterred Syria from intervening militarily in Jordan.

Diplomacy was also used to neutralize both Syria and Egypt during the crisis. Hussein convinced the leaders of both states that his actions against the nationalist politicians and officers in Jordan were not aimed against the Arab nationalist camp. This policy won the regime a measure of restraint from Nasser and Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli. Once the domestic arena was secured, the regime went on the offensive against Egypt and Syria, in June 1957, and the propaganda war was resumed. Finally, the timely American aid, added to the funds received from Saudi Arabia, was used to pay the salaries of the loyal Bedouin troops. With its borders and finances secured, the regime was able to crush the domestic opposition and to oust the anti-regime officers from the military.

The 1958 July crisis in Jordan was another instance where the Hashemite regime found itself beleaguered by internal and external enemies working in tandem to overthrow the monarchy: A military putsch was planned by anti-monarchist officers in the army. Once the putsch was uncovered, the regime sought military help from the Hashemite regime in Iraq. The help from Iraq did not materialize since the Iraqi regime was overthrown by a military coup on 14 July. Threatened from within and without, Hussein appealed for American and British military intervention on the evening of 16 July. The rationale for inviting
Western troops to Jordan explicitly illuminates the extra-regional dimension of Husseinism. Hussein argued that the decision was meant "to have the military cover of friendly countries . . . and to protect Jordan's frontiers from its surrounding enemies so that the country might gain the breathing space needed to stabilize the domestic front, build up its army, [and] strengthen its economy . . .".34

On the night of 16 July the last of the anti-regime conspirators were rounded up. However, the danger to the regime was not over. The arrival of British troops in Amman on the evening of 17 July deterred any external intervention and discouraged potential attempts to storm Basman Palace where Hussein and his aides were entrenched, guarded by loyal Bedouin and Circassian troops. Once the kingdom was protected from external threats the regime moved against its domestic opponents. The officer corps was purged of anti-monarchy elements; the loyal Bedouin troops and security services effectively suppressed republican feelings and support in their ranks, in government institutions, and in society. Thus the regime's survival hinged not only on the loyalty of its troops and security services, but also on direct extra-regional intervention. Yet the support of an extra-regional ally was not always successful in protecting Jordan from foreign intervention in a crisis situation, as the Syrian intervention during the 1970 "Black September" demonstrates. However, this does not mean that Jordan's extra-regional ally did not play a pivotal role in enabling the regime to cope with its domestic crisis, which all along was the objective of extra-regional intervention. An examination of America's role during the 1970 crisis may help clarify this contention.

Throughout 1968 and 1969, disagreement between the Palestinian commandos (fedai'yun) and the Jordanian authorities over commandos' activity within Jordan and across the River Jordan augured ill for the regime. By mid-September 1970, the situation had reached crisis proportions. Hussein, wary that the deteriorating situation might undermine his control over the army, let alone the survival of his regime, gave the army approval to crush the commandos. As the army's predicted swift victory proved elusive, the regime became worried of an external military intervention, especially from Syria and Iraq.35 Yet there was no lack of extra-regional support. As early as 10 September, in response to PFLP plane hijackings, the United States had placed some American forces on semi-alert and sent an aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean. On the evening of 17 September, President Nixon declared that the United States was "prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against Government forces loyal to Hussein."36 Nixon's declaration followed the dispatch of more aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean. But this did not deter the Syrians, who on 19 and 20 September sent Syrian troops and a Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) brigade across the border into Jordan. In response to Hussein's calls for help, the American Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean in a visible show of force aimed at forcing the Soviet Union to restrain its Syrian ally. More importantly, the American administration coordinated a contingency plan in which Israel was to intervene to force a Syrian withdrawal from Jordan if such a need arose. By 22 September, the Jordanian
army, supported by the Jordanian air force, had gained the upper hand in the battle. In the evening of this same day, the Syrians began withdrawing from northern Jordan. The external threat contained, the regime could concentrate its attention on the domestic front and the battle against the Palestinians. What, then, was the role of Jordan's extra-regional ally in September 1970?

In September 1970, "American diplomacy, through a mixture of subtlety and restraint combined with visible force, had helped to create a situation in which Jordan was able to cope with its own problems." The American show of force in the eastern Mediterranean, in addition to the Israeli mobilization through American coordination, may have been a determining factor in Hafiz al-Assad's decision not to commit the Syrian air force to the battle. Without air cover, the Syrian forces were left at the mercy of the Jordanian air force which inflicted heavy damage on the Syrian ground forces. Perhaps more effectively, it was the commitment of the United States and Israel to support Hussein that prompted the regime to engage the Jordanian air force in the battle. The air force was ordered into action on 22 September only after American and Israeli assistance was guaranteed.

By the end of September 1970, the Hashemite regime had survived yet another challenge, partly through extra-regional help, but mainly due to the strength and loyalty of the Jordanian army. The extra-regional component of Husseinism was essential to its survival. The regional component of the strategy played an equally important role in the survival of the regime.

The Regional Diplomacy Of Survival: Between Accommodation And Confrontation

Throughout most of the period under study, the main regional threat to the survival of the Hashemite regime was revolutionary Arab nationalism, spearheaded by Nasser. Jordan's 'asabiyya dilemma, and the resultant permeability to external manipulation, facilitated Nasser's ability to foment domestic upheavals in Jordan. Throughout these years, it was Nasser who set the nature and tone of the relationship between most of the "revolutionary" Arab nationalist states and Jordan.

Until 1970, the Hashemite regime's regional policies were largely reactive. Not that it did not initiate policies; this it sometimes did. However, its maneuvers were always within a context already dominated and determined by Nasser. Nevertheless, when the political and polemical battles between Cairo and Amman were joined, the regime played its part with vigor and aggressiveness, never satisfied with responsive tactics. At times of confrontation, it capitalized on every opportunity to discredit Nasser's prestige and undermine his stature as the paramount champion of Arab nationalism. It aimed at undermining Nasser's appeal in Jordan and, consequently, the vulnerability of Jordan's domestic arena to foreign manipulation.

In general, the regime's decision to confront or accommodate the regional hegemon was governed by the intensity and the origin of the threat to its survival:
An accommodationist policy was chosen when the regime faced grave domestic threats, exacerbated by foreign manipulation, to insulate the domestic arena and enable the coercive agencies to restore domestic control. Regional confrontation, on the other hand, was often chosen in reaction to a similar policy by the regional hegemon, usually—but not always—when the regime felt domestically secure.

A number of features characterize the regime's regional policies during the period under review. Primarily, regional diplomacy was geared toward building alliances with like-minded conservative regimes—such as Saudi Arabia—to balance the threat posed by regional challengers. At times when regional accommodation was sought, cooperation with the regional hegemon entailed certain concessions, be it with respect to regional relations or domestic policies. Moreover, Hussein attempted to cast himself as the mediator among contending Arab states and as their spokesman—a role he played only briefly after the 1964 Arab summit—to mitigate the effect of hostile pressures on the kingdom from its neighbors. The final feature of Husseinit's regional component was the tendency to appoint prime ministers identified with particular regional (or extra-regional) policy stances in the service of consolidating or improving the regime's regional position. How then were these tactics employed between 1955 and 1970?

The decision to stay out of the Baghdad Pact marked the beginning of the regime's "forced accommodation" with Nasser. Then followed a series of accommodating decisions taken to consolidate domestic control and insulate the kingdom from regional manipulation. These included the expulsion of General Glubb, Jordan's entry into the Arab Collective Security Pact, and the termination of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. By July 1957 the regime was confronted with overwhelming domestic and external threats to its survival, and the symbiotic relation between the two forces was at its highest. Convinced that its regional enemies were intent on overthrowing it, the regime decided to end regional accommodation. On 7 July 1957 the Egyptian military attaché in Amman, Major Fu'ad Hilal, and the Egyptian consul general in Jerusalem, Brigadier Muhammad Abdul 'Aziz, both charged with fomenting subversive activities among the officer corps and the general population, were expelled from Jordan. What ensued was a period of confrontation with Nasser and the other Arab nationalist states lasting until the fourth week of May 1967, punctuated with intervals of détente and accommodation. An examination of this period may provide a better understanding of Husseinit's regional component.

Regionally, 1957 witnessed the formation of an alliance between the Jordanian regime and the conservative Saudi monarchy. In the same year the regime survived the April crisis. The confrontation with Nasser continued into 1958. On 1 February 1958 Syria and Egypt formed a union, the United Arab Republic (UAR). In response, the regime joined the Hashemite regime in Iraq to form the Arab Federation on 14 February. But the bloody republican coup in Iraq on 14 July brought the Arab Federation to a premature end. On the morrow of the July crisis in Jordan a fragile détente between the UAR and Jordan developed, largely due to Nasser's desire to consolidate his regional gains accruing from the
union with Syria. Hussein demonstrated his desire to mend fences with the revolutionary Arab camp by replacing Samir al-Rifai'i in May 1959. Rifai'i had been critical of the Arab League, rightly claiming that it was an Egyptian tool. His replacement may be interpreted as an attempt by the regime to demonstrate its desire for a rapprochement with Nasser. Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Jordan, on 15 August 1959, took place only because Nasser required Jordan’s and Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in the Arab League to isolate Iraq whose president, ‘Abdul Karim Qasim, was waging an anti-Nasserite campaign in Iraq.

The rapprochement between Nasser and Hussein sustained several setbacks in 1960. An interruption in the war of words and deeds occurred in 1961. At the time, Nasser was preoccupied with internal problems, the growing restlessness in Syria, and his feud with Qasim, and so a truce with Jordan was welcome. Again, Nasser had the last say in shaping the nature of the relation with Jordan. The relaxation of tensions between the UAR and Jordan came to an abrupt end in September 1961. After the secession of Syria from the UAR on the morrow of the Syrian army coup on 28 September, Hussein immediately recognized the new secessionist Syrian government of Ma’mun al-Kuzbari. It was yet another example of his tireless attempts to exploit any opportunity to undermine Nasser’s Arab nationalist credentials, and hence, his ability to manipulate the Jordanian domestic arena. Nasser retaliated by breaking off relations with Jordan, and a new era of confrontation began between Jordan and Egypt. Nasser’s decision reflected the new orientation of the Egyptian regime toward the rest of the Arab World: “It reversed the course of moderation that it had cautiously developed since 1959 and assumed the stance of the militant revolutionary, uncompromisingly dedicated to the overthrow of all its conservative neighbours.”

The same characteristics of past confrontation periods surfaced anew. After the propaganda war was resumed, relations with Saudi Arabia were consolidated. In September 1962 Jordan and Saudi Arabia declared immediate “complete military union” between the two kingdoms and “coordination . . . in foreign and inter-Arab policies.” The outburst of the Yemeni civil war in September was an occasion for the Hashemite regime to challenge Nasser’s hegemony. It sided with the royalist camp, providing them aid and support. The talks in Saudi Arabia, and the support to the royalist Yemeni regime, was aimed at consolidating Jordan’s relations with an allied regional power to balance the threat of another, and at reciprocating confrontation aggressively albeit reactively. But the regime’s fortunes soon changed.

The Ba’thi coups in Iraq, on 8 February 1963, and in Syria, on 8 March, paved the way for unity talks between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq culminating in the proclamation of a new United Arab Republic on 17 April. Anticipating the effect of the unity talks on the domestic arena, the regime altered its position from regional confrontation to accommodation. The decision was followed by a number of conciliatory measures. When the unity talks commenced Hussein expressed his readiness to cooperate with the prospective union, but made it clear that he was not considering joining it. The radio attacks on Egypt were abruptly
ended. Wasfi al-Tall, the staunch anti-Nasser prime minister, was replaced by Samir al-Rifa‘i. The unity declaration triggered mass rallies in Jordan in support of the new union. On 20 April the rallies had turned into mass demonstrations against the government. By accommodating its regional enemies, the regime gained some time in anticipation of the domestic explosion. On 27 March a new government staffed with members whose loyalty to the regime was proven was appointed. Soon after the rioting began, the army was sent in to clear the streets, swiftly restoring order.

The regime’s regional realignment in 1963 was not only tactically wise, it was also timely. The new union proved stillborn. At the same time, Nasser’s regional fallout after the collapse of the projected union and in Yemen, compounded by domestic problems and a cooling of relations with the United States, forced a change in tactics. By December, the Cairo regime was leaning toward the belief that “positive influence over other governments’ policies may be obtained more easily by conciliation and tolerance than by threats or abusiveness.” Nasser made use of the first Summit of the Arab head of states in Cairo in January 1964 to correct his relations with the conservative monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia who gladly accommodated him. The 1964 Summit ushered forth two years of peaceful coexistence between the “conservative” and the “revolutionary” regimes.

The peaceful coexistence between the Amman and Cairo regimes was violated by the former in January 1966 when it sided with Saudi Arabia in the nascent struggle between two emerging contending camps: the revolutionary and the Islamic. This round of confrontation continued until Hussein’s visit to Cairo on 30 May 1967 and the signing of a bilateral defense pact with Egypt. Hussein’s defensive step along the slippery slope leading to the 1967 war reflected his intent to give up his partnership with King Feisal in exchange for Nasser’s patronage. There was no other alternative. Refusal to join Egypt in the battle against Israel was bound to enrage the regime’s domestic (and regional) foes, and might have cost Hussein his throne. In retrospect, active accommodation of Nasser cost Hussein half the kingdom, but the throne was saved.

The 1967 war exposed the bankruptcy of the revolutionary camp’s vituperations against Israel. Now Hussein and Nasser shared similar objectives: regime survival and the recovery of the territory lost in the 1967 war. They also shared a common threat to the realization of these objectives: the Palestinian commandos, whose agenda differed from that of most Arab leaders. The Khartoum summit of August 1967 was the occasion for Nasser’s formal reconciliation with Hussein. Yet Hussein was cognizant of the tactical nature of his alliance with Nasser after the 1967 war: Nasser needed him as a link with the United States and as an intermediary between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Hussein made use of this alliance in his struggle against the commandos in September 1970. Once Nasser accepted the Rogers initiative on 23 July 1970, he had no other choice but to favor his alliance with Hussein over that with the Palestinians. The commandos had become an obstacle to the regional settlement desired by the Arab regimes rather than a tactical lever used to strengthen the Arab position. Hence,
in September, Hussein did not heed Nasser's warning not to "liquidate" the commandos.\textsuperscript{51} Nasser's stance during the crisis and in the Cairo summit convened to resolve the crisis vindicated Hussein's reasoning: Throughout the crisis Nasser's criticism of Hussein was restrained, and the summit failed to elicit any formal censure against Jordan. With the death of Nasser on 28 September a turbulent era came to an end in Jordan's regional politics.

Between 1955 and 1970 the Jordanian regime's regional policies played an instrumental role in the survival of the Hashemite throne. By the end of 1970 the threat from Cairo had been successfully contained, and Nasser's prestige was used in the September conflict with the commandos. In November 1970 Hafiz al-Assad seized power in Syria. To be sure, Syrian interests in Jordan persisted, especially after 1974, when Damascus developed its Eastern Front strategy. However, in its relations with Jordan, Assad's regime proved to be wiser and more cautious than its predecessors. The \textit{modus vivendi} developed with Israel since King Abdullah's days was respected, with one fatal exception. In 1971 the army eliminated the remaining threat from the commandos in Jordan. The regime could now claim victory over its rivals. To fully appreciate this victory, it is essential to undertake an examination of Husseinism's domestic component.

\textbf{Domestic Sources Of Survival: Symbols, Techniques, And Coercion}

The domestic arena is where the state (or regime) intervenes to restructure state-society relations to guarantee its survival. There is a need, then, to examine the symbols and techniques employed by the regime to legitimize its rule and to integrate an otherwise deeply divided society. Symbols and techniques, however, do not always guarantee survival. Brute force, deployed selectively but effectively, saved the regime on numerous occasions.

\textit{Neo-Patrimonial Leadership}

Hussein has effectively used traditional, religious, and pan-Arab symbols to consolidate and legitimize his rule. He perceives and presents himself as "the head of a family as much as the king of a country."\textsuperscript{52} As the head of the extended family that is Jordan, Hussein has employed the existing patriarchal social structure to rally support from the traditional sectors of the society, specifically from the Bedouin tribes. The Hashemites' direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and their historic role as Guardians of the Holy Places appeals to the religiously conservative Bedouin and the tribes. In their turn, the Hashemites have cultivated strong personal ties with the Bedouin and the tribal chiefs. In addition to the symbolic appeal of Hashemite descent, the regime has generously lavished material and political rewards to gain the loyalty of the leaders of the traditional segments of Jordanian society. In turn, the support of the tribal sheikhs has enabled the regime to secure the loyalty of the Bedouin and the tribal population. Prominent Bedouin tribes and clans are represented in the Royal Hashemite Diwan to ensure the loyalty of their constituencies. The Tribal Council, a department of the Diwan, also serves
to promote the loyalty of the Bedouin to the monarchy and maintains the monarchy in close touch with the rural areas of the East Bank. In terms of political patronage and access to government or military posts, the regime has maintained a balance of power and positions among its tribal supporters. Clemency vis-à-vis the regime's enemies is another feature of Hussein's paternal rule: One time conspirators are later pardoned and appointed to non-sensitive posts in the kingdom.

Political-Legal Techniques

The survival of the Hashemite regime has been predicated upon its ability to appeal to the other two main segments in the kingdom: the Transjordanian and the Palestinian. Since the creation of Transjordan, and especially after 1948, the regime has secured the loyalty of the Transjordanians by fully integrating them into the ruling establishment, the decision-making bodies, the public sector, and the military institutions of the kingdom. The regime's main challenge has been to integrate and control the Palestinian segment. It has employed an array of political and legal measures to constrain the political activities and opportunities of the Palestinian (subordinate) segment in Jordan.

Until 1967, the regime concentrated its energies on restricting the activities of the opposition parties and inhibiting the emergence of a united, effective political leadership, representative of Palestinian opinion in the West Bank. The most effective legal measures in this regard were the Emergency Defense Regulations, the Political Parties Law (1954), and the Anti-Communist Law (1953). These laws empowered the regime to suppress any form of political activity and dissolve or prohibit any form of political organization, that threatened (or was felt to threaten) the survival of the regime. This amounted to a legal intervention by the regime to structure the opposition's political organization. In April 1957, all political parties were disbanded making political activity almost impossible. In the long run, this created a political vacuum within the Transjordanian community that left the monarchy as the sole focus for its loyalty and the main institution around which it could rally.

As a means to consolidate its domestic position and guarantee its survival, the regime effectively utilized what Donald Horowitz calls "structural techniques," particularly that involving the reshaping of electoral arrangements. Often, electoral arrangements were shaped to ensure the election of loyal candidates to Parliament and to strengthen "parochial-local interests against all-West-Bank aspirations." Election results were manipulated by giving soldiers the right to vote wherever they were stationed on election day, and by restricting suffrage to persons who paid taxes on some form of asset. The former ruse guaranteed regime candidates substantial votes in the West Bank, while the latter worked in favor of the traditional property owners to the detriment of the emerging opposition figures.

Furthermore, the party system was structured to over-represent the sparsely populated, pro-regime, southern region of the East Bank. The loyal ethnic and religious Transjordanian minorities were also over-represented in Parliament.
Similarly, in the West Bank, districts loyal to the regime were over-represented in Parliament.59

The success of the regime in constraining the political activities and opportunities of the subordinate Palestinian segment of society also hinged on its ability to manipulate this segment's existing internal cleavages and fragmentation. Electoral arrangements were shaped to emphasize parochial allegiances, exacerbating relations between the different Palestinian groups. In the traditional Nashashibi-Husayni conflict, the Hashemites relied on their clients the Nashashibis. Hashemite supporters among the Palestinians were favored by the regime in the distribution of economic resources, creating tensions between those who opposed the regime and those who were willing to benefit from it. Furthermore, Palestinians residing in Jordan and benefiting from continued Hashemite rule felt threatened by the wave of separatist Palestinian nationalism of the late 1950s and 1960s. The regime favored these Palestinians, and cultivated their loyalty by bestowing political patronage upon them. Finally, until 1957, the incessant competition between political parties in Jordan served to weaken their ability as an effective opposition, facilitating the regime's efforts at undermining their activities through the security services.

Political co-optation was another tool used by the regime to extend its authority over the Palestinians, and to elicit a degree of legitimacy from its large Palestinian population. The practice of "selective appointment" of members of the Palestinian elite to senior government positions began before the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and continued in later years.60 Influential Palestinian notables not associated with the Husayni faction in Jerusalem were appointed to the Senate, to cabinet posts, and to governorships, and the election of their followers to the lower House was arranged by the authorities. Moreover, "Palestinians whose influence derived from their former positions in the British Mandatory civil service, were immediately integrated into the upper echelons of the Jordanian bureaucracy."61 Especially after the failure of the union attempt of 1963, the regime was effective in neutralizing Palestinian nationalist opposition figures through co-optation, usually by offering them non-sensitive ministerial or ambassadorial posts.

Socio-Economic Policies

The Hashemite regime has used social and economic policies to promote allegiance to the regime and an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments in Jordan. The regime’s main tactic in achieving the political integration of the Palestinian refugees was granting them Jordanian citizenship. By so doing the regime sought to dilute Palestinian identity, suppress separatist Palestinian feelings, and incorporate them into the institutions of the kingdom. Citizenship was also a source of material benefits for the refugees who, as Jordanian citizens, could travel in search of work in the Arab World. Thus economic benefits were linked with political rights to facilitate the refugees' absorption into the new polity.62
Education and enrollment in UNRWA’s (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees) Work Projects were other means to integrate the refugees into the new polity. Vocational training and education prepared the second generation refugees for participation in the life of their new state. The regime supported integrative schemes such as the resettlement of refugees through agricultural projects and the building of proper dwellings to replace existing tents. These schemes gave the Palestinian refugees a sense of permanency in Jordan, and the regime hoped that better living conditions would accelerate their integration into Jordan. The regime’s integrative schemes were somewhat successful. In the process, the regime has gained the respect of the refugees who, until the 1960s, were not interested in organizing themselves as a distinct group.63

The selective distribution of economic rewards, or “distributive policies,” has been a cornerstone of the regime’s strategy to co-opt both its Transjordanian and Palestinian subjects.64 Since the creation of Jordan, the regime has depended on foreign (British then American and Arab) to offer its subjects viable “strategies of survival” in exchange for loyalty, or at least, acquiescence to Hashemite rule. For example, between 1967 and 1972, external aid was utilized to support an expanding public sector, an important source of employment in Jordan, with government expenditures representing about one third of GDP.65

The promise of economic felicity was instrumental in procuring Palestinian acquiescence to Hashemite rule. By providing its Palestinian subjects the opportunity to benefit materially as Jordanian citizens, the regime hoped to demonstrate the economic benefits of Hashemite rule. In the 1970s, socio-economic planning aimed at increasing work opportunities in the hope that material incentives would gain the regime allegiance from the Palestinian segment. Moreover, the dependency of West Bank Palestinians on the regime in Amman was heightened by the regime’s deliberate policy of inhibiting the independent development of the West Bank economy, ultimately leading to its dependence upon that of the East Bank and Israel.66 By the 1980s – when Jordan’s economy was reaping the benefits of the oil boom, the relocation of many Arab and foreign companies from Beirut to Amman, and the activity at the port of Aqaba due to the Iran-Iraq war – Palestinians were playing the dominant role in the economy, holding the highest positions in the business and financial sectors.

Jordan’s position as an indirect beneficiary of the Arab oil economy led to the emergence of an externally financed neo-patrimonial political economy centered around the Hashemite monarchy that contributed to the regime’s survival. Consequently, the material satisfaction of large segments of the population muted pressures for democratization, at least until the late 1980s. Jordanian rentericism, an indirect beneficiary of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 world oil price hikes and the Arab oil economy, placed huge economic resources at the disposal of the regime. The regime distributed these resources in the form of material rewards that enhanced the stability of the regime. Loyal tribal leaders were major recipients of financial and material rewards from the regime, which made them dependent on the regime to retain their social power. State resources were mainly targeted at the loyal Transjordanian elite and population. “State investment funds often seemed
disproportionately directed toward the provision of services and infrastructure to those areas of the country predominantly populated by Transjordanian rather than Palestinian citizens.” The regime bartered employment for support from the Transjordanians; around three quarters of the Transjordanian labor force was employed in the expanding public sector. The Palestinians also benefited from Jordanian rentierism. Palestinian entrepreneurs excelled in the trade, service, small and medium scale manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, Jordanian citizenship enabled a great number of Palestinians to migrate to the Gulf states in search of work. The remittances of these migrants were an important source of income for many Palestinian families in Jordan. Ultimately, Jordanian rentierism “played a key role in national integration, knitting together an otherwise deeply divided population ... around the central core of the Hashemite monarchy.”

The Role of Coercive Institutions

The regime has relied on coercive measures to strengthen its control over the domestic arena and secure its survival. At times of open domestic confrontation (1956-57, 1958, 1963, 1966, and 1970-71), direct military action was taken by the loyal Bedouin regiments of the army. The Bedouin dominated officer corps and the elite Royal Guards – often drawn from loyal minorities – shielded the monarchy from many coup attempts. On most other occasions, the regime resorted to more subtle coercive measures against the domestic opposition. The security services, especially the General Intelligence Directorate (Mudiriyat al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma), were successful in suppressing political activity deemed threatening to the survival of the regime. Preventative measures are often taken against undesirable political activists to ensure central control: official papers and the certificate of “good behavior,” the latter essential for employment, are withheld by the authorities to pressure and constrain the activities of some individuals.

The coercive institutions have also played an important role in state-building and national integration. The Arab Legion (later the Jordan Arab Army, JAA) was a primary medium for the integration of the Bedouin into the state. By offering economic aid, education, and opportunities for employment during the crisis years of the 1930s, the army secured the Bedouin’s acceptance of, and loyalty to, the central government. Eventually, the Bedouin dominated the officers corps and the mobile strike forces. By the 1970s the JAA was basically a tribal army, largely based on and reflecting the social structure of the main Bedouin tribes. Members of the military establishment enjoy wide social and economic privileges. The military establishment ultimately became a major employer in the Jordanian economy, and the sole source of income for many Bedouin and rural families. In 1976 conscription was introduced in Jordan, partly to provide the kingdom a reserve force, and partly to integrate the kingdom’s youth at a formative period in their lives, thus serving the regime’s nation-building objectives. Yet conscription has reduced the Transjordanian character of the army, particularly its lower ranks, with future consequences that are difficult to predict.
Explaining Husseinism’s “success”

The Jordanian regime’s ability to retain power and control over the political process, its ability to neutralize the malignant effects of trans-national ideologies on the domestic arena between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, combined with the emergence of a sense of Jordanian statehood and nationhood, is indicative of the success of its survival strategy. Husseinism’s “success” is largely rooted in the positive contribution of every component of the strategy to the overall survival strategy, and in the mutually reinforcing interaction among the three components. Specifically, four explanatory variables may be advanced to explain Husseinism’s “success.”

The first variable pertains to the regime’s ability to insulate the domestic arena from regional manipulation by an accommodationist regional policy. Albeit selectively and reactively employed in reaction to Jordan’s ‘asabiyya dilemma, accommodation of the then regional Arab hegemon (Nasserite Egypt) was relatively successful in partly insulating the domestic arena from external (and domestic) manipulations when the regime’s survival was acutely threatened. The extra-regional umbrella also protected the kingdom from external intervention and helped constrain the domestic enemies of the regime. Both factors enabled the regime to effectively deploy the state’s coercive resources against the domestic opposition and regional aggressors at times of open confrontation. However, the analysis of Husseinism suggests that insulation is a necessary, but insufficient condition for the success of the survival strategy. Hence, “success” should be explained by reference to other variables.

One such variable is the historical process of state formation in Jordan. This variable is closely linked to the state’s (or regime’s) ability to secure a relative degree of autonomy from existing social organizations which, in turn, enables the regime to successfully implement its integrative social and economic policies. The process of state formation in Jordan, and the concomitant institutionalization of the segmental cleavages in a hierarchic, controlled political system, ensured the regime a high degree of political autonomy from society. Consequently, the state was able to penetrate society and regulate state-society relations through an array of economic, social, and political policies that strengthened its social control. This latter objective was facilitated by the regime’s ability to undermine and neutralize the (subordinate) Palestinian segment, mainly through “structural techniques,” “distributive policies,” manipulating its internal cleavages, co-opting Palestinian opposition politicians, and brute coercion or intimidation.

The availability of economic resources under state control also contributed to the success of Husseinism. The subsidies paid by Jordan’s extra-regional and regional allies compensated for Jordan’s paucity in natural resources. Combined with Jordan’s hierarchic political structure and the loyal coercive agencies, these economic resources allowed the regime a high degree of political and economic autonomy from society. The regime appropriated these resources to finance a neo-patrimonial political economy and an expanding public sector that helped win the allegiance of the regime’s Transjordanian pillars and supporters.
The regime’s control of the distribution of economic rewards and sanctions, and the provision of an environment conducive to productive economic activity, contributed to the success of its integrative policies and created support for Hashemite rule from strategic sectors in the Palestinian community, especially the upper-middle classes. The same policies and techniques were used to promote legitimacy for the regime and an acceptable level of national integration among the different social segments. External subsidies also freed the regime from the need to rely on heavy direct taxation of the population to generate government revenues to finance the different integrative socio-economic policies. Such an economic obligation might have otherwise disrupted the regime’s integrative policies and alienated strategic social segments from the regime. Beginning in the 1970s, Jordanian rentierism contributed to the success of the regime’s integrative socio-economic policies. Jordanian rentierism placed huge economic resources at the disposal of the regime. The regime used these resources to strengthen the loyalty of its Transjordanian subjects and harness within the Palestinian segment a vested interest in the perpetuation of Hashemite rule.

The final variable contributing to the success of Husseinism pertains to the coercive resources available to the regime, including the regime’s ability to utilize these resources without hindrance from external or internal actors. By establishing loyal coercive agencies – such as the Bedouin-dominated mobile strike forces and the intelligence services – the Hashemite regime was able to monopolize coercive capabilities throughout the realm. This enabled the regime to use its coercive resources effectively and freely against domestic and regional foes. The protective umbrella provided by Jordan’s extra-regional ally served a similar purpose. This, of course, shielded the regime from its domestic and regional enemies and ensured its physical survival on many occasions.

DEFINITIONAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The analysis of Husseinism exposes the lack of a definitional consensus on what constitutes a “weak” state. In the theoretical literature pertaining to state strength, at least two broad definitional criteria utilized to judge the strength (or weakness) of a state may be discerned: an Ibn Khaldunian criterion, and the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion. Ibn Khaldun relates state strength to the degree of social integration and ʿillah (coalescence) among the different social segments around the ʿasabiyya propagated by the ruling regime. Consequently, as noted earlier, the larger the ʿillah the stronger the state. On the other hand, according to the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion, the strength of a state hinges upon its capability to execute state-planned social change aimed at enforcing state social control. The higher the state’s capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways the stronger the state. While Ibn Khaldun emphasizes ʿillah, Migdal focuses upon the capabilities of the state.

This study demonstrates that states considered “weak” by one definitional criterion (the Ibn Khaldunian) may be “strong” according to another (the Neo-
Jordanian State Strength in Theoretical Perspective

Weberian Migdalian). Jordan, a “weak” state according to the Ibn Khaldunian criterion since it suffers from an 'asabiyya dilemma, is at the same time a relatively “strong” state when the Neo-Weberian Migdalian criterion is applied. Despite competing segmental visions and definitions of the common territorial entity, the success of Husseinism is indicative of the high capabilities of the Jordanian state to penetrate society, regulate state-society relations, and appropriate state resources in a manner conducive to the consolidation and legitimization of Hashemite rule. To be sure, the Jordanian case is exceptional at least in one important way: Extra-regional and regional financial support compensated for the regime’s weakness in extracting resources from society. Nevertheless, a typology in which states are differentiated with respect to their strength or weakness and the degree to which state-society relations exhibit transnational permeability (i.e., “soft” or “hard” states) yields two possible scenarios. In a four box matrix crossing soft/hard states with (Neo-Weberian Migdalian) strong/weak states, Jordan occupies the soft/strong box. However, in a similar matrix crossing soft/hard states with (Ibn Khaldunian) strong/weak states, Jordan occupies the soft/weak box. Naturally, this definitional disarray in the literature on state strength hampers efforts at comparative theory-building.

The broader theoretical implications of this study for other plural, permeable, developing states are not difficult to discern. States suffering from an 'asabiyya dilemma, existing in a permeable regional system, are precarious, but not necessarily unviable. To be sure, the continued existence of these states is often guaranteed by international law. However, their future viability may also hinge on the regime’s (or state’s) ability to execute successful integrative survival strategies that guarantee the regime’s survival and achieve an acceptable level of national integration providing the state allegiance either from a sizable number, or from strategic segments, of the population. The analysis of Husseinism suggests that the success of an integrative survival strategy depends on conjunctures of a successful insulatory foreign policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. In constructing a successful survival strategy, the regime’s tactics are constrained by the socio-political effects of the historical process of state formation and by the availability of economic resources under its control. Similarly, its ability to employ its coercive resources without hindrance is not always guaranteed. On the other hand, the regime may orient its foreign policy in any manner conducive to the success of the survival strategy.

A successful insulatory foreign policy enables the state to neutralize challenges emanating from the trans-national (and domestic) environment, and allows the state the domestic space necessary for a sustained state- and 'asabiyya-building effort. Of course, the state can also benefit from extra-regional protection to bolster its position vis-à-vis domestic and regional challengers. In any case, as this study indicates, the success of the state’s integrative survival strategy also hinges on the degree of political and economic autonomy enjoyed by the state, and its ability to use its coercive resources effectively and without hindrance.
Once it successfully insulates the domestic arena from trans-national ideologies, in developing societies, the state’s ability to secure a degree of political and economic autonomy is a consequence of the historical process of state formation and the availability of economic resources under state control. The historical process of state formation, and the resultant institutionalization of the cleavages in a particular political system, determines the political structure through which the state acts and the political environment in which the state initiates its interventionist policies. Whether or not this context will be advantageous or disadvantageous to the success of state policies depends on the particular political system and environment. The historical process of state formation also shapes the nature of the social challenges facing the state as it attempts to restructure state-society relations through socio-economic intervention. The state’s ability to replace existing social organizations depends on how entrenched, institutionalized, and effective these organizations are in offering symbolic and material sustenance to the population. The availability of economic resources under state control determines whether or not the state is capable of undertaking integrative socio-economic policies to consolidate its social control. Moreover, as this study suggests, a state can use its extra-regional and regional alliances to compensate for the lack of a viable natural economic base, and hence, finance its integrative socio-economic policies.

Finally, as a result of contending conceptions of national security entertained by different segments of the population and by the ruling regime, the insecurity dilemma faced by many developing, plural societies, exposes the state to external and domestic threats to its survival. To ensure its physical and political survival, hence any hope for the success of its integrative policies, the state must monopolize coercive capabilities across the country and secure the ability to use its coercive resources effectively and without hindrance from internal or external powers. The role of an extra-regional ally may prove instrumental in enabling the regime accomplish this latter task. By furnishing a protective umbrella at times of crisis, the support of an extra-regional ally may facilitate the coercive agencies’ task of securing regime control over the domestic arena.

One final comment should be added to the preceding definitional and theoretical implications of this study. The analysis of Husseinism highlights the theoretical efficacy of studies that emphasize domestic determinants and internal political dynamics in explaining foreign policy-making, -taking, and behavior in the Middle East. These studies help complement the existing literature on foreign policy analysis that emphasizes either the systemic balance of power (realist approach) or the individual beliefs of the ruling elite (psychological/perceptual models). On many occasions, domestic (or internal) sources of security threat to regime survival dictated foreign policy behavior. In Jordan, the ‘asabiyya dilemma, and the resultant lack of political and social unity, was a primary domestic determinant of foreign policy behavior; the lack of a viable domestic consensus over the regime’s regional or extra-regional orientation constrained the regime's foreign policy options. Similarly, an accommodationist policy toward the regional hegemon was pursued to mitigate the effects of the “insecurity dilemma,”
and hence the vulnerability of the domestic arena to external manipulations. Moreover, foreign policy was not only shaped by domestic dynamics, it was instrumentally used to serve the regime's integrative domestic policies and regime maintenance, legitimization, and ultimate survival.

The regime's regional policy swings from confrontation to accommodation were predicated by the need to accommodate the regional hegemon to face overwhelming domestic challenges to regime survival. At times of acute domestic crisis, the regime had to accommodate the regional Arab actor wielding the greatest influence over the domestic arena to insulate the kingdom from regional manipulation and, consequently, enable the coercive agencies to restore the regime's domestic control. Evidently, without its ability to secure survival in power the regime could not launch successful long-term integrative policies.

The definitional and theoretical implications generated from the analysis of Husseinism should not be restricted to the study of Middle East comparative politics and foreign policy analysis; rather, they may contribute to theory-building in similar sub-fields across other developing regions. More importantly, this study underscores the instrumental role of interventionist state policies in securing regime survival. Successful interventionist state policies play a pivotal role in the success of the larger multi-level, interactive survival strategy designed to maintain, consolidate, and legitimize regime rule. By creating domestic conditions conducive to the successful execution of interventionist policies, foreign policy behavior plays an equally important role in regime survival.

NOTES:


5. Representative of this approach are the biographies by Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography (New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1972), especially 251;

6. For a critical discussion of these approaches see Brynen, "Between Parsimony and Parochialism," 3-6.


19. All preceding quotations from Salamé, "‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ States," 32. Last emphasis added.

Jordanian State Strength in Theoretical Perspective


29. A case in point is Hussein’s dismissal of Suleiman al-Nabulsi’s government on 10 April 1957 at the height of the nationalist tide, the appointment of a military government, followed by an army clamp-down on dissident elements in the country.


31. In reality, these categories are not as water tight as they are presented here.  They should be considered as ideal-type, though reductionist, conceptual categories. Transjordanian opposition to Hashemite rule has not been absent, nor are all Palestinians poised against the regime.

32. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge, 47.


34. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge, 91.
35. An Iraqi force was deployed around Mafraq in northern Jordan. It later withdrew eastward on 19 September in a move coordinated with the Syrian forces poised to enter Jordan.


37. Ibid., 113-14.

38. Another factor may have been his rivalry with Syria’s strong man at the time: Salah Jadid.


41. The term is borrowed from Nassif Hitti, *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimension* Papers on Lebanon No. 9 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1989), 13. The other foreign policy options enumerated by Hitti on pages 12 and 20 are: “confrontation,” “passive preventive accommodation,” and “active preventive accommodation.”

42. See Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge*, 106.


44. Ibid., 25.

45. Quoted in Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge*, 124.

46. See the classic study of the unity talks in Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 44-76. For excerpts from the talks see Muhammad Hasanayn Heikal, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan: Hab al-Thalathin Sana (al-Juz' al-Awal)* (The Effervescent Years: The Thirty Years War [part one]) (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr, 1988), 689-699.


48. See ibid., 128.


54. Habis al-Majali, Abdullah Tell, 'Ali Abu Nuwar, 'Ali al-Hiyyari, Sadeq Shara, and Suleiman al-Nabuls, one time conspirators against the regime, were later pardoned and offered employment by the regime.
59. See *ibid.*, 106.
63. See *ibid.*, 40. For UNRWA’s role see 62, and 70-71.
73. The lack of a regional hegemon may complicate the regime’s insulatory policy. In this case, small, weak states may become pawns in the struggle for regional hegemony.