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In the Shadow of the Qur'an: Recent Islamist Discourse on the United States and US Foreign Policy

SAMI E. BAROUDI

It is undoubted that the United States and its foreign policy figure prominently in contemporary Islamist and secular Arab nationalist discourse. In the post-Cold War era, America's greater international assertiveness and its growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs – in ways most Arab intellectuals and the majority of the Arab public disapproved of – triggered an avalanche of highly critical (even polemical) writings on the United States and its foreign policy.¹ While Arab intellectuals of both the secular Arab nationalist and Islamist currents championed the struggle against alleged American hegemony and imperialist designs, Islamist writers are characterized by their argumentation (or discourse) style that makes extensive usage of Qur'anic verses and the language and imagery of the Qur'an. As there are literally dozens of Islamist authors who are 'preoccupied' with the United States and its foreign policy (in the Arab world alone), it is practically impossible for this article to do justice to the entire body of scholarship they have produced.

Sacrificing breadth for depth, the core of this essay focuses exclusively on the published work of three Egyptian Sunni writers: Mohammad Moro, Mohammad 'Abbas and Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi. The three authors are not of equal stature. Qaradawi has achieved recognition thanks to his mastery of the Qur'an, Hadith and other aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, his sizeable and sophisticated intellectual output, and his effective utilization of the audiovisual and web-based media to reach an international audience.² It would therefore be unthinkable to conduct a study of this nature without focusing on Qaradawi. In contrast, Moro and 'Abbas, could easily have been replaced by other Sunni Islamist authors – such as Fahmi Huwaidi, Mohamed 'Imara and Mohammad Ibrahim Mabrouk – without fundamentally altering the article's argument.

Undoubtedly, we need more detailed and theoretically informed studies of the counter-hegemonic (not to say anti-American) discourse of Islamists. Broadening the compass to cover a larger number of Sunni Islamist authors, and to accord appropriate treatment to the growing contributions of Shiite Islamists (especially from Lebanon), is a worthy enterprise. This article is just the first stop on a long and challenging road to better comprehend and historicize the counter-hegemonic discourse of Islamists.

It is divided into three parts. Part one relates the discourse of Arab Islamists to its geographic setting by briefly considering how the United States is represented in the writings of a number of secular Arab authors.³ Part two provides a detailed treatment of the writings of the selected Islamist authors, focusing on how Qur'anic verses and the language and imagery of the Qur'an enter seamlessly and effortlessly into their discourse. Part three develops the article's core theoretical argument; namely that for Islamists the Qur'an is not a mere tool to propagate their message, but the principal medium through which they articulate their deepest thoughts about contemporary political and social realities, including international relations. In other words, the Qur'an is an integral component of the Islamist psyche. The conclusion makes the case for the treatment of Islamist discourse as counter-hegemonic.

Whether Islamist or secular nationalist (pan-Arabist), the great majority of Arab authors project a negative image of the United States, highlighting what is wrong with American politics, society and especially foreign policy.⁴ Due to limitations of space and because most authors make essentially the same arguments, only a sample of authors is considered here. I start with writers who criticize US foreign policy and America's domination of the international political and economic arenas, then consider works that are critical of US domestic politics and society, and conclude with the minority of authors who project a more balanced image of the United States.

The renowned Egyptian author Mohammad Hassanein Haikal is arguably the doyen of critical Arab writers on the United States. Due to limitations of space only two of his recent works are considered here.⁵ Haikal's critique of the United States rests on three core arguments. To start with, the United States is an imperial power that rose to international dominance through violence (including the annihilation of the Native American population), war and the snatching of the colonies of declining European powers (what he calls the Captain Morgan phenomenon).⁶ Second, American foreign policy is not driven by ideals and principles but by powerful economic interests, namely banks, oil conglomerates, other multinational corporations, and the arms industry. These moneyed interests are the principal advocates for (and beneficiaries of) the US imperial project.⁷ Last but not least, in order to maintain domestic support for this imperial project, its advocates rely on scare tactics heightening anxieties about external threats to America's security, core interests and values. In this context Haikal reiterates a classic argument in the repertoire of critical Arab writers; namely that the attacks of 9/11 on the United States provided the advocates of the imperial project with a pretext to galvanize the nation behind the 'war on terrorism', which in reality was a war on Arabs and Muslims. For those advocating an imperial foreign policy, the 9/11 attacks represented 'a gift from Heaven or from elsewhere', he notes sarcastically.⁸

Haikal has left a strong imprint on a whole generation of Arab writers, including Egyptian authors Ahmad Ezzeddine, Salaheddine Hafez and Osama Khaled. Ezzeddine accuses the United States of striving to incorporate the Middle East into its 'formal empire', while maintaining that its imperialism has degenerated into old fashioned colonialism which relies on military conquest and the annihilation of the subjugated populations.⁹ Hafez advances five arguments that are at the core of the

secular Arab nationalists' critique of US Middle East policy.¹⁰ First, America's special relationship with Israel has poisoned its relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds.¹¹ Second, Evangelical churches in the United States (which preach that the return of the Jewish people to Palestine is divinely ordained in order to prepare for the second coming of Christ) bear primary responsibility for America's wholehearted and uncritical support for Israel.¹² Third, the United States has greatly contributed to the growth of radical Islamist movements (particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan) by treating them as convenient tools to fight the Soviet Union during the Cold War era.¹³ Fourth, the US association of Islam with terrorism emanates from a deep-seated Western tradition of enmity towards Islam. Fifth, this association also reinforces the US (and Western) agenda of undermining Muslims' faith in their religion and their heritage in order to facilitate their subjugation.¹⁴ In addition, he asserts that the United States (like Israel) is a nation of immigrants who imposed themselves on, before exterminating, the original population.¹⁵

Writing in the wake of the war to liberate Kuwait, Khaled provides a perceptive analysis of the changing international environment since the end of the Cold War and the implications of these changes for the Arab world.¹⁶ The Gulf War, he argues, marked the shift to a new international order characterized by American dominance and the intensification of conflicts among the Northern industrial countries, and between the developed North and underdeveloped South.¹⁷ America's insistence on a military solution to the Gulf War, he notes, was meant to underline its resolve to use its superior military power whenever and wherever it deemed appropriate.¹⁸

Another vociferous critic of the United States and its foreign policy is the acclaimed Egyptian economist and social scientist Galal Amin. With a Marxian framework of analysis in the background, Amin attributes America's imperialism to the undemocratic and capitalistic nature of its politics and society.¹⁹ The substance of Amin's discourse is quite similar to that of Islamists, as he argues over and over again that the United States, especially since the attacks of 9/11, has been waging war against Arabs and Muslims under the pretext of fighting terrorism.²⁰ While this US campaign to subjugate the Arab and Muslim worlds is driven by economics, its intensity and the manner in which it is legitimated reflect America's deep-seated hostility towards (and myopic understanding of) Islam.

There is hardly a single aspect of US foreign policy that has escaped the critical pen of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss. Hoss' writings over the past 30 years are replete with references to a number of themes, chief among them the US dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, its uninvited military interventions in different parts of the Third World (Latin America, Korea, Indochina and Lebanon), its close alliance with Israel, and its hegemonic designs on the Middle East region.²¹ At the turn of this century, Hoss' anti-US rhetoric grew in intensity against the backdrop of the US 'war on terrorism' and the Bush administration's Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). In recent editorials, Hoss has accused the United States of being responsible for far more civilian casualties than all terrorist groups combined,²² and of seeking to redraw the political and cultural map of the Arab world under the false pretext of bringing democracy to its people.²³

Leftist author Salameh Kila argues that because of its 'narcissism and unshakeable belief in its inherent goodness', the United States could not see that the attacks of

9/11 were a mere reaction to its violent policies abroad.²⁴ This ‘narcissism’, he goes on to note, is indispensable in order to whitewash America’s ‘terrible atrocities’ and to enable it to avoid asking tough questions about its own conduct towards the rest of the world.²⁵ Another ardent critic of US Middle East policy is Yemeni author Mohammad ‘Ali Hawat, who accuses the United States of ‘instigating trouble and fomenting strife’ all over the Arab and Muslim worlds under different false pretexts, like fighting terrorism and promoting democracy and human rights.²⁶ Echoing a popular view in Arab intellectual circles, he maintains that America’s Middle East agenda is dominated by two goals: promoting Israel’s interests and securing US control over Arab oil. The attacks of 9/11 served as a pretext to advance this regional agenda. Palestinian author ‘Adel Bishtawi writes that America’s foreign military encroachments (which culminated in its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq) and the structural weaknesses of its economy have eroded the two pillars of its power: its military capabilities and the role of the US dollar as a universal currency.²⁷

While condemning the 9/11 attacks, Saudi author Mahmoud bin Mohamad Safar accuses the United States of unjustly blaming Arabs and Muslims for the attacks without possessing conclusive evidence about the identity of the attackers.²⁸ Avoiding the strong rhetoric of other Arab writers, he criticizes the United States for deliberately obfuscating the difference between terrorism and rightful resistance to occupation (as with resistance to Israel in Palestine and Lebanon),²⁹ terrorizing the civilian populations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the detainees at Guantanamo Bay under the pretext of fighting terrorism,³⁰ and failing to understand the centrality of Islam in the lives of Muslims which renders Western recipes for limiting the role of religion in public life totally inappropriate in Muslim societies.³¹

Of the authors who focus on US history, domestic politics, society and culture, Palestinian born Munir ‘Akash ‘documents’ the extermination of over 112 million native Indians (his figure) by the white settlers who founded the United States.³² The mass murders, enslavements, deportations and biological warfare carried out by the American state and the American people (*al-zanabeer* or WASPs – white Anglo-Saxon Protestants – as he pejoratively calls them) were tantamount to genocides of unprecedented proportions, he argues.³³ Khodr ‘Awarkeh,³⁴ Shadi Faqih,³⁵ Rida Hilal,³⁶ Khalaf al-Jarad³⁷ and Jihad el-Khazen³⁸ focus on how Christian Evangelical groups manipulate Christian religious symbols in order to garner unconditional US support for Israel and the Zionist movement.³⁹ Limitations of space do not allow a more detailed treatment of their works.

Before concluding this section, and in order to avoid depicting the Arab intelligentsia as a monolithic anti-American or anti-Western group, it is important to refer briefly to the works of the minority of Arab intellectuals who offer a more balanced treatment of the United States. Chibli Mallat offers a succinct and objective account of the US domestic political system, which is quite accessible to the non-specialist without being over-simplistic.⁴⁰ Manar el-Shorbaji introduces the Arab reader to the all-important topic of US presidential elections, making ample references to pertinent literature published in the United States. Nonetheless, her central thesis – namely that the role of the American voter in deciding the outcome of presidential elections is peripheral to that of moneyed elites, the legal system and especially the media – is very much in line with the negative assessment of US democracy that most Arab authors offer.⁴¹ Syrian born and US based Mazin

Muwaffaq Hashim offers a succinct political history of the United States followed by some penetrating analysis of the principal cleavages within American society.⁴² Focusing on what he sees as the main religious and ethnic-based contradictions and tensions within American society and culture, Hashim emphasizes the role of political institutions and a pragmatic political culture not only in mitigating them but also in building on them to maintain a dynamics of change. In line with the rest of the work, the chapter on America's Muslims provides a dispassionate analysis of the main challenges facing the principal Muslim communities in the United States.⁴³ While Mallat, el-Shorbagi and Hashim merely restate in a condensed fashion well-known facts, concepts and theories about the American political system, their short books treat the subject matter in an academic manner. Ghassan Salame, a Professor of International Relations in Paris who has served in the past as Lebanon's Minister of Culture and as the UN Secretary General Special Representative to Iraq, stands out as a highly sophisticated analyst of American foreign policy. Basing himself on the works of prominent (and mainly American) International Relations scholars and on his personal contacts with US policy makers and academicians, Salame provides a critical appraisal of US foreign policy since 'the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the US ascendancy to the pinnacle of the international system'.⁴⁴ Although highly critical of the 'reckless course' of US foreign policy under George W. Bush and the 'neoconservative bunch', Salame remains confident that the United States, given its democratic system, can reverse the 'erroneous policies' of the Bush administration.⁴⁵ When this happens, the United States will 'regain its vigor and the World will once more come to see it as a source of good (*manhal khair*) that contributes to solving world problems rather than as a cause for fear and anxiety'.⁴⁶ Without slighting the important contributions of the aforementioned four authors (and undoubtedly a few more) their work does not constitute the dominant genre of Arabic-language writing on the United States; it is the more critical (and more polemical) writers who dominate the field.

Since Sunnis comprise by far the majority sect in the Arab and broader Islamic worlds, it comes as no surprise that Sunni Islamist authors have contributed more to the discourse on the United States than their Shiite counterparts.⁴⁷ This section offers a detailed treatment of how the language and imagery of the Qur'an enter the published work of the three selected Sunni Egyptian authors.

I start with Mohammad Moro, a vociferous critic of the United States, focusing on his two published works *Sira' al-Hadarat wa al-Harb al'Alamiya al-Rabi'a* (The Clash of Civilizations and the Fourth World War)⁴⁸ and *Al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid: al-Shu'ub fi Muwajahat Amrika* (The New Middle East: The People Confront America).⁴⁹ Like most Islamists, Moro views the struggle against the United States in religious and even existentialist terms; for he believes that the United States is working to destroy Islam as a religion and as a civilization.⁵⁰ For Moro, standing up to the United States can only bring victory or martyrdom, while accommodating it will lead to surrender and humiliation, and that is far worse than dying with dignity.⁵¹ The United States stands accused of waging war on Islam on the premise that following the collapse of communism, Islam has come to represent the only alternative to unregulated capitalism and the American (and more generally

Western) materialistic and purely individualistic ideology.⁵² Accordingly, America's war on Islam is motivated by the same forces of religious zeal, bigotry and materialistic greed that brought the Christian crusaders to the hinterland of the Muslim world in past centuries.⁵³ In other words, since the teachings of Islam provide Muslims with inspiration and sustenance in their battle to resist American and Western designs to subjugate and ultimately annihilate them, the United States is bent on perverting the Islamic religion and on pushing for a docile form of Islam (what he and others call American Islam) that does not challenge its imperialist designs.⁵⁴

Qur'anic verses enter Moro's discourse at critical junctures, lending support to key arguments and providing solace and reassurance in the face of deeply disturbing events. A few examples on the role of Qur'anic verses will suffice. In the opening pages of *Sira' al-Hadarat*, he quotes part of verse 2:217: 'They will persist in fighting you until they turn you away from your religion, if they can'⁵⁵ to support the work's central argument; namely that the United States and the West are waging war against Muslims in order to turn them away from their religion.⁵⁶ In referring to the killing of the spiritual father of the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, at the hands of the 'Zionist-American enemy', Moro invokes several Qur'anic verses including: 'He takes martyrs from you',⁵⁷ 'Wrongdoers will surely know what adversity they shall fall upon'⁵⁸ and 'When their time arrives they can neither delay it nor bring it forward, even by an instant'.⁵⁹ 'Jews and Christians will not approve of you unless you follow their religion'⁶⁰ is invoked twice: on the first occasion to sternly warn the Sudanese government of the perils of appeasing the United States and later to condemn US pressure on Syria to get the latter to end its support of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Iraqi resistance.⁶¹ 'But those who exerted themselves in Our cause – these we shall guide to Our ways'⁶² enters the discourse twice to implore Muslims to engage in *jihad* (broadly defined to mean all types of political, economic, military and scientific endeavours on behalf of the *umma*) in order to ward off the West and restore the Islamic civilization to its former glory.⁶³ In 'O believers take not Jews and Christians for allies; they are allies of one another',⁶⁴ Moro finds the explanation for the transformation of the attitude of Christians (read the West) towards Jews from one of historic enmity and persecution to one of close association and even identification with (*muwalat*). This recent attitudinal transformation, triggered in the main by common enmity towards Muslims, is viewed as nothing but a fulfilment of the Qur'anic prophecy found in the above verses.⁶⁵ Moro is quite selective in what he quotes, focusing on verses that are critical of the Israelites⁶⁶ (which he interprets as predicting the demise of the present state of Israel); verses that present Jews (or Christians) in a positive light appear sparsely in his works and in the works of most Islamists.⁶⁷

Qur'anic terms and imagery permeate Moro's work to an even greater extent. In *Sira' al-Hadarat*, *Jihad* and *mujahid* appear 17 times and *Nifaq* (hypocrisy) and *munafiq* (hypocrite) nine times, with President Bush pejoratively referred to as *al-munafiq* Bush.⁶⁸ Other Qur'anic terms include *madad*⁶⁹ (divine support), *yuhit* (besieges or surrounds), *farida* (ordinance), *al-janna* (paradise) and *al-akhira* (afterlife). The many references to *al-istikbar*⁷⁰ (arrogance) and *al-musta'dafin*⁷¹ (the helpless) demonstrate the influence of the Iranian revolution (which popularized these Qur'anic terms) on his work and the works of other Islamists, including Sunnis.

The sway of the Qur'an is also seen in the rich Qur'anic imagery that colours his works. The image of Allah, the Almighty, besieging the enemies of Islam (read Israel and the United States) emerges on many occasions,⁷² but is not as well developed as in the work of 'Abbas (see below). Moro also propagates and accentuates the Qur'anic portrayal of the Jews as a people who turned away from God, tampered with their sacred text (the Torah), and committed other sins against God, including the denial and persecution of the prophets He sent them.⁷³ Not found in the Qur'an, but probably taken from early Muslim authors, is the image of the Prophet Mohammad leading the Jewish prophets and Jesus in prayer at *al-Aqsa* Mosque before his journey to Paradise.⁷⁴ Like many Islamists (see for example Qaradawi below), Moro stresses that Jews lost their status as God's chosen people because of their many sins and transgressions against God.⁷⁵ If today there are indeed a special people, it must then be the Muslims who – ever since the prophecy of Mohammad – have been entrusted with keeping God's word and spreading His message.⁷⁶ Moro's theological rebuttal of the twin notions of Chosen People and Promised Land is necessary to gain the high moral ground in the existentialist struggle against Israel and its principal ally the United States.

Mohammad 'Abbas offers an even more vehement critique of the United States: its history, culture, society, political system and above all foreign policy. 'Abbas views the United States as a morally defunct, non-godfearing and oppressive nation that was built by destitute and cruel European immigrants on the suffering and indeed annihilation of other races.⁷⁷ Driven by imperialist designs and deep-seated hatred of Islam (a hatred it shares with all other Western powers including Russia), the United States has declared war on the Muslim world in order to detach Muslims from their religion and shatter what remains of the unity of their nation, 'Abbas argues over and over.⁷⁸

The influence of the Qur'an is evident from the work's subtitle, which identifies the United States as the 'empire of Satan': those who enter its 'paradise' perish, while those who resist and incur its 'hellish wrath' are saved.⁷⁹ Qur'anic verses enter 'Abbas' text sporadically but with a powerful effect, clarifying meanings and lending credence to arguments. A few examples should suffice. In concluding the discussion of why he refuses to join Arab governments and liberal/modernist Arab intellectuals in 'shedding crocodile tears' over the victims of 9/11, he quotes verse 109:1: 'I do not worship what you worship' to distinguish between his servitude to God alone and the servitude of Arab governments and liberal Arab intellectuals (whom he pejoratively refers to as Westernized enlightened modernists) to the 'idols in Washington' and to 'Bush the antichrist'.⁸⁰

Elsewhere, he notes sarcastically that while the Qur'an informs Muslims that 'Whatever the Messenger bestows upon you accept it; whatever he disallows, desist',⁸¹ global media networks and 'their tails in the Arab and Muslim worlds' tell them: 'Whatever Bush bestows upon you accept it; whatever he disallows, desist'.⁸² Verse 3:28 'Let not the believers adopt the unbelievers as allies in preference to the believers' is invoked to discredit Arab and Muslim governments that allied themselves with the United States in its war on Afghanistan.⁸³ Most significantly, verse 8:60, 'Prepare against them whatever force and war cavalry you can gather to frighten therewith the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them whom you do not know but God knows', provides the backdrop for a vehement

denunciation of US cultural imperialism. ‘Abbas accuses the United States and its ‘tails in the Arab World’ (read Arab governments and liberal intellectuals) of propagating the term *irhab* as the proper translation of terrorism – instead of *tarwee*, which he argues is the correct translation – in order to discredit the Qur’an, since verse 8:60 (above) refers to *li-turhibu* which shares the same Arabic root with *irhab*.⁸⁴ ‘Abbas is on very shaky ground here for he too uses the term *irhab* to refer to indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Turning to polemics, he notes that the problem with Arabs and Muslims is that they did not use *irhab* on a large enough scale to deter the United States and other Western powers from terrorizing them.⁸⁵

‘Abbas draws on a vast repertoire of Qur’anic terms and expressions, rendering it both arduous and unnecessary to list them and the frequency with which they appear. Some of the most emotionally charged (but still eloquent) passages in his work are essentially woven from the language of the Qur’an, like the one below:

Oh lord, the subduer, the all mighty, the humbler, the knower of the unseen;⁸⁶ your enemies, fire-wood for hell.⁸⁷ writers, court jurists and politicians want us to have absolute faith in America ... to believe that America has knowledge of the unseen,⁸⁸ so what it says is true even when not supported by a shred of evidence. ... Concurrently, they want us to disbelieve in you; otherwise we will be brandished terrorists. They fought us,⁸⁹ pronounced us guilty, besieged us, and fabricated lies about us because we say that is what God says and we say that is what the Prophet said. For they want us to slavishly repeat behind them: Bush said, Powell said ...⁹⁰

Loaded with Qur’anic terms and imagery, the above passage tells volumes about ‘Abbas’ disdain towards Arab and Muslim governments that support (or acquiesce to) the US ‘war on terror’, as well as towards liberal Arab intellectuals; a disdain which even surpasses his intense hostility towards the United States. A few lines further, and still leaning on Qur’anic (and at this juncture) Biblical language, he writes: ‘To be considered civilized or even human, you have to start every conversation by offering sacrifices to the idols in Washington and to its antichrist (read George W. Bush) ... in the form of condemning the terrorist attacks of September 11.’⁹¹ Perhaps most significantly, both the United States and its Arab allies are given Qur’anic epithets: the United States is thus the ‘empire of Satan’,⁹² or simply ‘Satan’,⁹³ while Arab governments and modernist intellectuals (the alleged instruments of the US war on Islam) are the ‘fire-wood of hell’.⁹⁴

Qur’anic images appear primarily in the context of explaining the 9/11 attacks. Denying that Osama Bin Laden was behind them, ‘Abbas uses a considerable amount of ink identifying different groups that had the motives and resources to carry out the attacks.⁹⁵ For ‘Abbas, and regardless of the group that actually perpetuated the attacks, they were the natural outcome of America’s criminal conduct. ‘Abbas sees in the attacks divine retribution for America’s oppression of Muslims and other nations and peoples. His portrayal brings to mind eerie and intended similarities with Qur’anic imagery concerning the people of Noah⁹⁶ and the inhabitants of ‘Ad, Thamud and Midian⁹⁷ who were punished by God for their

wickedness, tyranny and blasphemy. In fiery language, he describes his reaction to hearing the news of the attacks of 9/11:

I sat in front of the television with tears filling my eyes. Not out of pity or sympathy, but out of awe of God . . . and how He effaces away the tyrants at the moment when their insolence has reached the point they think they have become the earth's possessors and hold total power over it.⁹⁸ God effaces them after engulfing them from where they did not anticipate.⁹⁹

No English translation can render full justice to the power of the above passage, particularly its last line, which recalls Qur'anic representations of *Allah* (as well as Talmudic images of Yahweh) as the Almighty punishing the wicked and the unbelievers instantly.¹⁰⁰ Qur'anic imagery of Pharaoh's insolence and his oppression of the Israelites¹⁰¹ provide the backdrop for 'Abbas' depiction of the United States as a latter day Pharaoh: 'insolent, unjust and treacherous; its pride, inequity and wickedness will turn other nations, and will turn God, against it'.¹⁰² Playing masterfully on the Qur'anic narrative that highlights how 'Pharaoh's minions' pressed their suzerain not to release the Israelites, 'Abbas notes that the 'Zionist gangs' (read the pro-Israel lobby in the United States) will strive to ensure that the United States persists in its oppression of and aggression against Muslims.¹⁰³

Equally powerful is his portrayal of the grim fate that awaits Muslims who fail to confront the United States. Leaning heavily on Qur'anic imagery of the suffering of the unbelievers in the afterlife, 'Abbas resorts to 'scare tactics' with his reader, as can be seen from the lines below:

When God will ask you, what was your stance from the war on Islam and what did you do [to defend it]? . . . None shall answer on your behalf . . . None shall shoulder your burden but you¹⁰⁴ . . . None shall be bounded but you . . . None shall be tormented but you¹⁰⁵ . . . So turn to God.

The discourse becomes more intense and more personal with 'Abbas pleading with the reader to 'stop the barrage of questions' on how to confront the United States.¹⁰⁶ With language woven from the Qur'an, he writes:

I have no time to answer your questions for I am too preoccupied with trying to save my soul from the oppression of this world and the humiliation of the afterlife; [to lift it] from the shame of this existence to the glory of eternity. I am searching for a path through which to escape to God shouting: [save] my soul, my soul, my soul.¹⁰⁷

Overflowing with Qur'anic terms and imagery, the above passage and many others demonstrate how 'Abbas delves effortlessly into the world of the Qur'an to draw support against a mighty foe whom he believes is targeting him personally, simply because he refuses to submit to the United States: an unjust and oppressive earthly power. The intensity of the polemics that he and other Islamists direct at the United States is a reflection of their personalization of the fight against it. What is more disturbing than 'Abbas' polemics (and he is very polemical) is his

unshakeable belief in predestination in international relations, as can be seen from the lines below:

Had God intended for America to fare well, it would have desisted [from oppressing Muslims and other peoples]. But America will not desist and will not turn back. It will increase its oppression and its tyranny; and this will raise the incentive for waging Jihad against its oppression.¹⁰⁸

In a nutshell, ‘Abbas argues that the rise of the United States from a small and insignificant nation to the world’s most influential power, its oppression of other nations and peoples (but especially of Muslims) and its eventual annihilation have all been ordained by God who had decided from the beginning of time to elevate and then bring down the United States in order to teach humanity (and in particular great powers) a lesson about the consequences of wickedness, tyranny and oppression.

The third Sunni author this paper focuses on, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, offers a far more nuanced although equally critical reading of the United States and its foreign policy. A renowned religious authority, especially in the Sunni world, Qaradawi has written extensively on a wide range of spiritual, political, economic and social issues.¹⁰⁹ The United States and its relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds figure prominently in his political writings. Due to limitations of space, I consider only five of his works which appeared since the turn of this century, and discuss them in chronological order. Written on the eve of the third millennium, *Ummatna bayn Qarnayn* (Our Nation between Two Centuries) provides an overview of the achievements and failures of the Muslim nation during the twentieth century and the challenges that Muslims will be facing in the new millennium.¹¹⁰ In its opening chapter, the work provides a critical appraisal of Western societies, with most examples drawn from the United States. Qaradawi praises Western societies for institutionalizing periodic and free elections, holding politicians accountable and ensuring they operate within the bounds of the law, and respecting the basic political and legal rights of the individual. Nevertheless, he criticizes them vehemently for equating freedom with license, which brings them to allow, indeed legalize, all kinds of immoral and even unnatural individual practices (e.g. adultery, prostitution and same-sex unions).¹¹¹ Equally important, he attacks Western governments (and in particular the United States) for not practising what they preach when it comes to the Arab and Muslim worlds. The United States thus backs Arab dictators even when they annul the results of free elections (as in Algeria), while providing unconditional support to the state of Israel in its aggression against the Palestinians.¹¹²

The last and arguably most interesting part of the work focuses on the globalization challenge. After dwelling on the origins of the word ‘*awlama*’ (globalization) and how it is different from ‘*alamiya*’ (universalism), Qaradawi draws a sharp contrast between the universalism of Islam (‘*alamiyat al-Islam*’) – which is based on God’s compassion towards, and indeed exaltation of, humanity as revealed in verse 21:107, ‘We sent you not but as a mercy to mankind’, and verse 17:70, ‘We honoured the progeny of Adam’ – and today’s globalization (*al-‘awlama*) which he sees as the imposition of ‘US political, economic, cultural and social hegemony’ on

the entire world.¹¹³ Globalization is thus nothing but the Westernization, or better, the Americanization of the world, he notes.¹¹⁴ Further developing this idea, he writes:

Globalization is a gentle term for new colonialism . . . Globalization means the imposition of US hegemony. Any state that rebels or sings to a different tune must be punished with blockades, military threats, or direct attack as happened with Iraq, Sudan, Iran and Libya.¹¹⁵

Globalization also means imposing 'US preferred economic policies through US dominated international organizations' and America's 'specific culture which is based on materialism, self interest, and unrestrained freedoms', he adds.¹¹⁶ While US-led globalization strives to erase the distinct features of non-Western cultures and societies, Islam recognizes and celebrates diversity not only among humans but also in the animal kingdom. To support this view, Qaradawi cites Qur'anic verse 6:38, 'There is not an animal in the earth, nor a flying creature flying on two wings, but they are peoples like unto you', as well as a Hadith of the Prophet: 'Had not dogs been a nation among nations [read a species] I would have ordered their extermination.'¹¹⁷ Qur'anic terms and imagery dominate Qaradawi's concluding remarks on globalization, as can be seen from the powerful passage below:

[Globalization] is old colonialism with a new face and under a new name. For colonialism changes its colours like a chameleon, its skin like a snake, its face like an actor and its name like a scoundrel, but it remains the same even in its new form and under its new name. It is unjustified arrogance . . . it is the conceit of Pharaoh dividing [his] people into sects and then persecuting one of them [read the Israelites]. But this new colonialism, which spreads conceit and corruption over the whole earth, does not persecute one sect; it persecutes all the people on earth for the benefit of a tiny minority.¹¹⁸

Qaradawi offers a more positive image of US domestic politics and society than of American foreign policy. In *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin wasat al-Mujtama'at al-Ukhra* (The Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: The Lives of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies) he makes the case for a strong Muslim presence in non-Muslim, and especially Western, societies. Western societies should not be left to the influence of Zionist groups; if there were not already a Muslim presence in literally every Western country (including the United States) then every effort should have been made to establish such a presence, he argues.¹¹⁹ Quoting extensively both the Qur'an and the Hadith to highlight the universality of the Islamic message and the duty of Muslims to spread their religion by dialogue, persuasion and good example, Qaradawi is adamant that Muslims residing in Western societies must not practise withdrawal, but should strengthen their interactions with non-Muslims and with the political authorities in order to protect and advance their political, economic and cultural rights, defend the causes of oppressed Muslims in other parts of the world (e.g. the Palestinians and Chechnyans suffering from Israeli and Russian occupation respectively), and most importantly explain the message of Islam to non-Muslims by good practice and not just by word.

Unlike communist regimes that oppress their populations (especially religious minorities),¹²⁰ liberal democracies (including the United States) are based on open political systems and respect for the law.¹²¹ Muslims should avail themselves of these features of Western democracies in order to participate effectively in the political, economic and social spheres to their own benefit, the benefit of Muslims elsewhere and especially to the benefit of the Western societies where they reside.

Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd (Islamic Awakening from Adolescence to Adulthood)¹²² provides further insights into Qaradawi's thoughts on international relations. Basing himself on the Qur'an, Qaradawi notes that God's universal laws (*sunan Allah*) govern the rise and fall of civilizations and of nations and determine the winner in war.¹²³ Equally important, the division of the world into nations is divinely ordained. Although war is inevitable it ought to be fought in accordance with set rules that prohibit the killing of women, children, the elderly, and monks, the mutilations of the bodies of fallen enemy fighters and the destruction of crops and property.¹²⁴ Like other Islamist writers, Qaradawi derives these 'Islamic' rules of warfare (or engagement) from the Qur'an, the Hadith and the practices of the Prophet and his companions. Qaradawi vehemently denounces Western countries (specifically mentioning the United States) for violating these rules, especially by pursuing 'scorched earth' policies. Thus, he writes:

Unfortunately, the West has pursued this [scorched earth] policy in all its wars, especially during World War II in which tens of millions were killed. The United States gave itself the right to attack the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, even after Japan surrendered.¹²⁵

In this work, and elsewhere, Qaradawi calls for dialogue between Muslims, Jews and Christians. Quoting verse 29:46, 'Do not argue with the people of the Book except in the best manner, save the wicked among them, and say: "We believe in what has been sent down upon us and sent down upon you. Our God and yours is One God, and to whom we submit"', he proceeds to highlight the common denominators between Muslims and 'People of the Book'. The Qur'anic term 'People of the Book' is intended to soothe Jews and Christians and bring them closer to Muslims, he adds.¹²⁶ With extensive references to the Qur'an, Qaradawi strongly rebukes militant Islamist groups that advocate violence, while denouncing Western governments and Western media that falsely depict Islam as a 'religion of the sword'.¹²⁷

Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama (Our Islamist Discourse in the Era of Globalization) opens with a scathing attack on the United States for calling on Muslims to 'revisit their Islamist discourse', while it is Muslims who should insist that the United States change both its discourse about Islam and its policies towards the Arab and Muslim worlds.¹²⁸ Turning to sarcasm, he writes:

These days the radical Christian right leads America and guides its policies . . . Bush junior represented this rightwing radicalism. Among what he said is that God commanded him to attack Bin Laden, so he attacked him! And God commanded him to attack Saddam Hussein, so he attacked him! Is he now a prophet receiving revelations from God!¹²⁹

The discourse gets even more impassioned, with Qaradawi condemning the ‘radical Christian right’ for backing the Zionists in their aggression against the Palestinian people. It is really Bush and the Christian right who should revise ‘their visions and their interpretations [of Christianity] that led them to support aggression and the aggressors, while turning a blind eye to the harm and suffering inflicted on the Palestinians’, he adds.¹³⁰

The aptly titled *Nahnu wa al-Gharb* (Us and the West) represents the culmination of Qaradawi’s thoughts on war, peace, relations with the West and international relations in general.¹³¹ Stressing the centrality of peace to the Islamic message, Qaradawi notes that *salam* (peace) and Islam derive from the same Arabic root and that in verse 2:208, ‘O believers! Enter the fold of peace, all of you. Do not follow in the footsteps of Satan, for he is to you a manifeste enemy’, the word *salam* may refer either to peace or to Islam.¹³² He proceeds to quote almost every Qur’anic verse that refers to peace, briefly explaining the meaning of each. Qaradawi, however, makes it abundantly clear that while Islam cherishes peace and abhors war, it is often incumbent upon Muslims to engage in war. He views wars as arising from what he calls *sunnat al-tadafu’* (the universal law of mutual restraining), whereby groups restrain one another by God’s will. His theory of war, which derives from the Qur’an, is stated below:

Islam does not desire war for its own sake, and Muslims fight only when war is imposed on them as God says ‘Fighting has been prescribed to you, although it is a matter hateful to you’ [2: 216] ... Accordingly, Muslims engage in war and fight when this is made necessary by the universal law of mutual restraining – a law for the whole of humanity – on which God established the World. The Qur’an refers to this universal law in two of its suras ... *The Cow* [2:249–251] and *The Pilgrimage* [22:39–40] ... It is through this mutual restraining – whereby groups restrain one another – that God saves earth and those who dwell on it from tyranny. Otherwise, the oppression and injustice of tyrants would spread to the entire earth and the world would turn to a jungle in which the strong devour the weak.¹³³

This law of mutual restraining bears major resemblance to ‘balance of power theory’ (which Realists also claim to be a universal law) as it depends on groups checking the powers of one another; but Qaradawi dissents from Realists in assigning primary importance to the intangible of having absolute faith in the cause one is fighting for in determining the outcome of war. There are a few, albeit very important, direct references to the United States in *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*. In the introduction, the United States is censured on two principal grounds: first, for depicting Islam as the new enemy of Western civilization, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the major role that the Muslim *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan played in hastening the fall of the Soviet empire; and second, for using the attacks of 9/11 to wage war on Islam, under the pretext of fighting terrorism. Qaradawi does not mince words when he notes that America’s war on terrorism is indeed a war on Islam as a religion and as a nation, fought in order to impose on this nation ‘how to think, how to speak, how to work ... and indeed how to interpret its religion and how to live it’. He goes on to note: ‘They [the Americans] even stated bluntly that they want to rewrite for

Muslims their religion; that is, to design an American Islam in lieu of the Qur'anic Islam or the Islam of Muhammad.' As for President Bush's 'slip of the tongue' when he called the war on terror a crusade, Qaradawi notes that slips of the tongue reveal what people believe deep inside. In support of this, he quotes a saying of the fourth Caliph 'Ali: 'the deceit that is in the heart shows on the face and in slips of the tongue', noting that right after saying this 'Ali recited verse 47:30: 'If we wish to do so, We can point them out to you and you will recognize them by their visage; and you will indeed recognize them by the allusive manner of their speech.' In the work's conclusion Qaradawi adopts a more conciliatory tone, condemning in no uncertain terms the 9/11 attacks and noting that he was among the first to call on Muslims to donate blood for those injured in the attacks. Making ample references to Qur'anic verses that specifically prohibit taking retribution on some people for the errors of others and to one *Hadith* clarifying that in Islam the end does not justify the means, Qaradawi notes that attacks on innocent civilians are 'sinful, criminal and oppressive', irrespective of the national or religious creed of the attacked.¹³⁴

In sum, five main themes dominate Qaradawi's discourse on the United States and its foreign policy. To start with, the United States does not persecute Muslims within its territories. Thus, and despite certain well documented cases of discrimination, there is no systematic campaign to take away or undermine the political, economic and social (including religious) rights of Muslims residing in the United States.¹³⁵ Qaradawi appeals to Muslims to take advantage of the open nature of US, and more generally Western, societies in order to strengthen their bonds to their governments and societies, without sacrificing their Islamic identity.¹³⁶

Second, America's commitment to democratic and liberal values stops at the shoreline. In its foreign policy, and especially in its policy towards the Arab and Muslim worlds, the United States behaves as an imperial power. Resisting US imperialism is incumbent on all societies that encounter it. For Muslim societies, effective resistance entails the following: 1) a high level of coordination, culminating in some form of political and economic union among Muslim countries (i.e. following the European Union model),¹³⁷ 2) a firm commitment to economic, political and social development along Islamic lines;¹³⁸ and 3) an unshakeable resolve to reject foreign dictates.¹³⁹ As for armed resistance, it is lawful, indeed required, where the United States is in occupation of Muslim lands, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁴⁰ To remain legitimate, however, such resistance ought to strictly adhere to the Islamic rules of warfare, which prohibit the killing of civilians and prisoners of war. Consequently, attacks on the United States proper, and on US interests and installations outside zones of combat, are both unlawful and detrimental to the interests of Muslims.¹⁴¹

Third, while the entire Muslim world is obliged to support the Palestinian resistance, this struggle is to be carried out exclusively on the territory of historic Palestine and under no circumstances to be extended to 'America, Europe, Asia, or Africa'.¹⁴²

Fourth, Muslims have no problem with the American political system as such, or the American people; their problem is with specific aspects of US foreign policy. Clearly, the American people should not be harmed as retribution for the unjust actions of their government in line with verse 53:38, 'That no soul burdened shall bear the burden of another'.¹⁴³

Fifth, while dwelling at length on US imperialist designs on the Arab and Muslim worlds, Qaradawi does not refer to the United States as forming part of *Dar al-Harb*. In fact, he does not subscribe to the classic theological distinction between *Dar al-Silm* and *Dar al-Harb*. Thus, even when his anti-US rhetoric is at its peak (as in the opening pages of *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama*), Qaradawi refrains from depicting the United States as Satan, or referring to its president as a hypocrite. Such Qur'anic epithets – which are at the core of the discourse of 'Abbas, Moro and most Lebanese Shiite Islamists – are nearly absent from that of Qaradawi. Equally important, he strongly objects to labelling Americans and Westerners infidels (*kuffar*), arguing instead for using the far more neutral term of non-Muslims.¹⁴⁴

Qaradawi offers a more nuanced image of the United States than most Islamist writers. In his analysis of troubled US relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds, he highlights the political and economic dimensions of the conflict over the religious one (without completely ignoring the latter). Furthermore, he recognizes the need for dialogue with the US government, and more importantly with American intellectuals and organizations that object to their government's imperialist agenda. As for Qaradawi's style of writing, it is considerably less colourful and impassioned than that of 'Abbas or Moro. While quoting extensively from the Qur'an and the *Hadith*, Qur'anic terms and imagery – particularly those that refer to God's retribution – permeate his text to a far lesser extent than they do those of Moro and Abbas. The section below will include more references on Qaradawi's discourse style.

Before concluding this section, let me consider in great brevity the works of three Lebanese Shiite authors who – just like their Sunni counterparts – engage in powerful critiques of the United States, while drawing on the Qur'an (as well as on the sayings of Shiite Imams, particularly Imam 'Ali).¹⁴⁵ In *Uful Naghm al-Imbraturiyya al-Amerkiyya, Bayn al-Tawarut al-'Alami wa al-Qiyada al-Munfarida: Bidaya Zhuhur al-Qutbiyya al-Thuna'iyya* (The Demise of the American Empire, between International Entanglements and Unilateral Leadership: The Emergence of Bi-polarity), Sheikh Ja'far Hassan 'Atrissi provides a sweeping one-sided overview of US history, politics and society.¹⁴⁶ Noting that the United States was born out of violence and territorial conquest, he portrays its politics and society as based on the domination and exploitation of the many by the few, racism and religious intolerance. Most importantly, he argues that US international dominance will end during the first quarter of this century, as a result of the deteriorating American economy, growing tensions and divisions within American society and the rise of other centres of power, particularly the European Union, Russia, China, Japan and Iran.¹⁴⁷ In the highly polemical *Hezbollah yaghur 'arabat al-Tarikh* (Hezbollah Driving the Wagon of History), 'Atrissi celebrates the demise of US power and the emergence of Iran as the new regional power, which he affectionately describes in Qur'anic language as 'that faith-based power whose sun now shines over the horizon and in the hearts, carrying the torch of a grand moral discourse'.¹⁴⁸ The language used in *Al-Harb 'ala al-Islam: Al-Khusuma al-Tarikhiyya bayn al-Gharb wa al-Sharq* (The War on Islam: The Historic Animosity between the West and the East) is equally strong and infused with Qur'anic terms and imagery. Placing the conflict with the United States in an historical context defined by Western animosity towards the Muslim East, 'Atrissi notes that George W. Bush was right in calling 'the war he launched to redraw the face of the Muslim East' a crusade. This war, or crusade,

which 'started in Afghanistan and is continuing in Iraq may last longer than the two world wars', he adds.¹⁴⁹

In the introduction to his *Al-Islam wa al-Irhab wa al-Salam* (Islam, Terrorism and Peace), Mohammad 'Ali Berro al-'Amili rebukes the United States for using the attacks of 9/11 to slander Islam by falsely associating it with terrorism, whereas 'Islam is the religion of love, peace and brotherhood among humans, irrespective of their creeds and their forms of government'.¹⁵⁰ Al-'Amili's preoccupation with demonstrating the centrality of peace to the Islamic message leads him to quote literally every Qur'anic verse that refers to peace. Whereas Moro and 'Abbas argue that the United States will persist in its oppression of Muslims (and will thus bring divine retribution upon itself) al-'Amili sees hope if America heeds the call of God and embraces Islam. Thus he writes:

No doubt the United States today is close to and worthy of receiving the message of Islam, for the United States is the World's pioneer in civilization, science and progress, so why should she not enter Islam and become its standard bearer, this is not difficult for Allah to achieve. Tomorrow is near for those who await it.¹⁵¹

In more than one way, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah is the Shiite counterpart of Qaradawi. A prolific scholar and eloquent speaker (especially when delivering his weekly Friday sermon), Fadlallah (like Qaradawi) is extremely well versed in the Qur'an, *Hadith* and Islamic jurisprudence. As '*alammah* (jurist), Fadlallah is held in great esteem by Shiites, especially in Lebanon, as well as by many Sunnis throughout the Arab world. Like Qaradawi, Fadlallah advocates a moderate line of Islam (*khat wasati*), highlighting: the importance of a sustained dialogue between Muslims and the West that takes into account the common interests of both sides, while recognizing their political and cultural differences;¹⁵² and the need for Muslim minorities to participate more constructively in the lives of the Western societies where they dwell, but without losing their Islamic identity.¹⁵³ Avoiding the temptation of delving into Fadlallah's extensive oeuvre, I limit myself below to a brief overview of his critique of the United States, as conveyed in his recent work: *Ida'at Islamiyah* (Islamic Enlightenments). Drawing on Qur'anic terms popularized by the Iranian revolution (namely: *istikbar*, *mustakberun*, and *mustad'afun*)¹⁵⁴ Fadlallah's critique centres on debunking the arguments advanced by the United States to 'legitimate' its Middle East policy. Fadlallah first takes on the argument that the United States wants democracy in the Arab world. America is not a 'charitable society', he notes, and has backed Arab dictatorships that toed its line for decades.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, the United States must be aware that democratic governments, which are responsive to their people, will resist its policies. Its rhetoric about democracy is thus intended to serve more pragmatic (even sinister) goals: namely dominating the Middle East region and ensuring that Israel is fully integrated into it.¹⁵⁶ With even greater vigour, he refutes the argument that America's invasion of Iraq in 2003 aimed at ridding the Iraqi people of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. The United States had backed Saddam in his war against Iran and provided him with intelligence information that helped him crush the 1991 Shiite rebellion, Fadlallah notes. It invaded Iraq because it saw an opportunity to

further its economic and geo-strategic interests in the region; the oppression of Saddam Hussein and his alleged unconventional arms programme were mere pretexts to invade and occupy.¹⁵⁷

Most of this section focused on the discourse of Sunni Islamists; however, towards the end I provided a quick overview of the works of three Shiite Islamists, if only to demonstrate that drawing on the Qur'an to represent the United States is not a peculiarly Sunni phenomenon.

Thus far, this article has demonstrated the centrality of the Qur'an to the discourse of Islamists and has identified the different ways in which the Qur'anic (or sacred) text permeates Islamists' discussions of present political realities. This section elaborates on precisely how and why the Qur'an enters into such discourse. Although the invocation of Qur'anic verses (or parts of verses) represents the most visible evidence of Qur'anic influence, this influence can also be seen in the very rich repertoire of Qur'anic terms and Qur'anic imagery that Islamists employ. Below, I briefly examine how the Qur'an weaves into the discourse of the selected authors.

Of the three Sunni authors, it is Qaradawi who infuses his text the most with Qur'anic verses, which is to be expected given his background as a religious scholar. Qaradawi's discourse is unfussy and dignified, featuring well articulated arguments that are (in general) based on empirical evidence and a fair amount of logical reasoning. While Qur'anic verses are ever present to buttress whatever argument is being made, the argument stands on its own and can be properly understood without reference to the Qur'anic text. Nevertheless – and regardless of how robust the argument is – it is always buttressed by at least one Qur'anic verse. As a consequence, the secular text and the sacred text stand side by side; and while the latter lends support to the former it is not (generally) part of it. A few examples will illustrate this point.

In *Ummatna bayn Qarnayn* Qaradawi documents the emergence of an Islamist response to Western cultural imperialism. Referring to literally dozens of writers from different Arab countries who challenged Western claims (and the claims of Arab secular writers) about the responsibility of Islam for the backwardness of Arab and Muslim societies, as well as to an equally impressive number of writers who, starting from Liberal or Marxian backgrounds, ended up embracing Islam, he concludes (quite logically) that there are manifest signs from all over the Arab world of an 'Islamic awakening', and that the tide has finally turned against those plotting to deceive Arabs into believing that their attachment to Islam is the reason for their problems.¹⁵⁸ Although one may take issue with this specific argument, it is a reasonable one and is properly supported with evidence. While the argument stands well on its own, Qaradawi still feels the need to reinforce it by invoking the pertinent part of verse 8:30: 'Yes they plotted but God also plotted – and God is the best of plotters!'

In *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslimima* verses 20:107, 'We sent you not but as a mercy to mankind', and 25:1, 'Blessed is He who sent down the Criterion upon His servant, to be a warning to mankind!', announcing the universality of the Islamic message, serve as the introduction to a number of well-articulated arguments on why Muslim minorities need to immerse themselves in the political and social lives of the Western

societies where they reside (especially the United States), without losing their Islamic identity. While the arguments presented are quite plausible and stand well on their own, a Qur'anic overture is felt necessary to prepare the audience to hear them.

Finally, in *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'awlama* verse 14:4, 'We sent no Messenger except with the language of his people, that he may enlighten them' paves the way for making the (quite logical) argument that the message of Islam is best served when Muslim preachers (*du'at*) adapt their discourse to the realities of the twenty-first century and tailor it in such a way as to take into account the educational, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds of their audiences.¹⁵⁹ Verses 17:53, 'Tell my servants to say only what is right and proper, for Satan stirs dissension among them; assuredly Satan is to man a manifest enemy', and 29:36, 'Do not argue with the People of the Book except in the best manner, save the wicked among them, and say: "We believe in what has been sent down upon us, and sent down upon you. Our God and yours is One God, and to Him we submit"', bracket the equally plausible argument that Muslim preachers will make no headway with Christians and Jews if they keep on referring to them (or viewing them) as *kufar* (infidels), while dwelling at length on what is wrong with their religious beliefs.¹⁶⁰

The continual movement between the sacred text and the non-sacred (or secular) text is a hallmark of Qaradawi and a testimonial to his effectiveness as a writer; as he shifts so effortlessly from one type of text to another, injecting motion into his discourse without distracting the reader from the arguments being made. Rather unwittingly, Qaradawi establishes a delicate balance between the sacred and the non-sacred in his discourse, aligning both texts, as if building well-connected (and mutually reinforcing) rooms with each maintaining a distinct identity. One should caution though that there are notable exceptions to this pattern; for we do encounter some passages in his works that are essentially woven from the language of the Qur'an and which overflow with Qur'anic images.¹⁶¹ On a few rare occasions, Qaradawi reads just like 'Abbas or Moro.

While 'Abbas and Moro incorporate Qur'anic verses into their texts, they do so with lesser frequency than Qaradawi. What really sets their discourse apart is its permeation with Qur'anic terms and Qur'anic imagery. The ease with which Qur'anic verses, terms and imagery flow into their discourse indicates that these stem from a deeply internalized repertoire of meanings that is at the core of the thought processes of Islamists. Stated otherwise, the Qur'an is the principal medium through which Islamists, like Moro, 'Abbas, al-'Amili and 'Atrissi, articulate and communicate their ideas about contemporary political and social reality; it is their indispensable tool of analysis when it comes to the political and social arenas, especially international relations. The more disturbing the external political reality is (e.g., America's rise to global dominance and its alleged plans against Arabs and Muslims, especially under the rubric of the 'war on terrorism') the greater is the urge to revert to the Qur'an to explain this reality (to the self and to others) and to develop strategies to counter it. As I have tried to show earlier, both authors draw heavily on Qur'anic terms and imagery, especially when it comes to conceptualizing the United States and representing it to the reader. Even more than Qaradawi, they view the United States through the prism of the Qur'an, their indispensable tool of analysis. It is part of their psyche that cannot but be reflected in their discourse.

As noted by Kenneth Cragg, 'the Qur'an ... [is] the crucial text in which to encounter Islam in its own recognisances'.¹⁶²

For most Islamists, writing about the United States is more of an emotional than a rational endeavour. It is a way of giving vent to strong feelings about the world's most powerful nation which stands accused of waging war on Islam. Because the conflict with the United States is felt at a personal level, it elicits very strong feelings; and there is no better medium for translating these feelings into language than the Qur'an. It is this article's argument that the Qur'an offers more than a shared language (or 'inter-subjective understandings' in constructivist parlance) between author and reader. It is the principal medium through which Islamist authors articulate their deepest thoughts about the external political and social world, and is at the very core of their psyche. The fact that a broad segment of the Arab public consciously or subconsciously relies on the same medium (i.e. the same set of 'inter-subjective understandings') to articulate its thoughts contributes to the wide appeal of Islamist discourse, without being the only reason behind it.

The discourse of contemporary Islamists bears hardly any resemblance to the body of knowledge produced by early Islamic and medieval scholars (primarily in the form of commentaries on the Qur'an and compilations and interpretations of Hadith) and is barely connected to it.¹⁶³ Moro and 'Abbas, for example, make absolutely no references to the works of early and medieval Islamist scholars; and while Qaradawi cites a large and diverse number of scholars (such as al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim), his references to their huge scholarly oeuvre are pretty marginal. When it comes to the substance of their discourse, today's Islamists share far more in common with secular Arab nationalists and other contemporary critics of the United States than with early and medieval Islamic scholars. Animated by deep-seated opposition to US international conduct, especially when it comes to the Middle East, their discourse is best characterized as one of counter-hegemony or anti-imperialism. Contributions to this highly popular genre of writing (often referred to by its critics as anti-Americanism¹⁶⁴) come from all over the Third World (especially Latin America and the Middle East¹⁶⁵), Europe and the United States.¹⁶⁶

Painting with a broad brush, one may argue that the discourse of Islamists represents the latest wave in the global reaction to the rise of American power and its projection abroad. This response emerged in Latin America in the nineteenth century with the Independent Nationalist Movement sparked by Simon Bolivar and the writings of political thinkers such as José Martí,¹⁶⁷ grew more intense and geographically dispersed in the twentieth century as a result of America's swelling economic and military dominance and its growing encroachments, and peaked in the post-cold war era with the rise of the United States to a position of international pre-eminence. The discourse of Islamists thus forms an integral part of how the Arab world (intellectuals, governments and lay publics) has reacted (and is reacting) to US Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era, especially since the attacks of 9/11. America's victory over Iraq in the second Gulf War (which coincided with the end of the Cold War) ushered in an era of unprecedented US military presence in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which Islamists¹⁶⁸ and secular Arab intellectuals strongly resented. Equally resented were the diplomatic forays of the Clinton administration

which aimed at settling the conflicts between Israel and Jordan and Israel and the Palestinians; Islamists (as well as secular intellectuals) viewed these initiatives as fundamentally flawed as they favoured Israel at the expense of the historic and religious rights of the Arabs and Muslims in Palestine. From the perspective of Islamists, and the majority of Arabs and Muslims, the twenty-first century brought even more menacing developments: President Bush's promise to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that under any settlement Israel would maintain its Jewish character (which Arab intellectuals interpreted as a new Balfour Declaration),¹⁶⁹ the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 'war on terrorism', which at its mere mention triggered images of wanton destruction and suffering in Afghanistan and Iraq and of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib. It is within this setting that one should read the charges of Islamists that US conduct, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, was tantamount to a 'war on Islam'. Now, history informs us that in other parts of the world that witnessed similar US onslaughts (once more Latin America comes to mind) – or onslaughts by European powers (e.g., France in North Africa and Indochina) – the local intelligentsia responded by engaging in anti-imperialist (or counter-hegemonic) discourse directed at the imperial or neo-imperial power and its local collaborators. In terms of the charges levelled at the United States, there is very little to differentiate Islamists from secular Arab nationalists.

In conclusion, the counter-hegemonic discourse of Islamists is a response to the recent (and not the distant) past, despite the repeated references to the crusades and the expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. Its high pitch is a reflection of the magnitude of the perceived threat not only to core interests, but also to core values and way of life. What sets Islamists apart from other contemporary critics of the United States is not the substance of their discourse, but its style, whereby the sacred is constantly invoked, wittingly or otherwise, to comprehend and represent worldly or profane reality.¹⁷⁰ In other words, the distinctive feature of their discourse is the way it is framed within the sacred Qur'anic language. This anchoring is an indication of the centrality of the sacred text to how Islamists articulate and convey their ideas, especially about deeply disturbing external developments like the 'profane' conduct of the world's only remaining superpower.

Notes

1. For one recent analysis of the problematic relationship between Arab intellectuals and the United States see S.E. Baroudi, 'Arab Intellectuals and the Bush Administration Campaign for Democracy: The Case of the Greater Middle East Initiative', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.61, No.3 (2007), pp.390–418. There is ample evidence of US unpopularity with Arab and Muslim publics, particularly since the US war on Iraq. According to the PEW 'Global Attitudes Project', 'the US draws its most negative assessments from Muslim nations, with Jordan at just 21% favorable and Turkey and Pakistan at 23%', <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID&=801> (accessed 8 December 2008). Recent studies on negative popular attitudes about the United States in the Arab and Muslim worlds include: S. Faath (ed), *Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2006).
2. For many years, Qaradawi had a weekly show on the pan-Arab television station *al-Jazeera*, and has an official website: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/index.asp?cu_no=2&temp_type=44.
3. While the distinction between secular nationalists and Islamists is important, it should not be exaggerated. Both groups are equally critical of the United States. Furthermore, most secular authors

- view the Islamic religion and Islamic civilization as being at the core of the Arab world, and as such they subscribe to the notion of an American war on Islam that (in their view) is designed to dominate and subjugate the Arab people by undermining their attachment to both Arabism and Islam. This paper argues that what sets Islamists apart is not the substance of their discourse about the United States, but its style.
4. Baroudi has coined the term 'rhetorical offensives' to capture this genre of polemical writing on the United States. See S.E. Baroudi, 'Countering US Hegemony: The Discourse of Salim al-Hoss and other Arab Intellectuals', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.44, No.1 (Jan. 2008), pp.105–29.
 5. M.H. Haikal, *Al-Zaman al-Amriki: min New York ila Kabul* [The American Era from New York to Kabul] (Cairo: al-Misriyya lil-nashr wa al-tawzee', 2002); M.H. Haikal, *Al-Imbraturiyya al-Amrikiyya wa al-Ighara 'ala al-'Iraq* [The American Empire and the War on Iraq] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2003).
 6. Haikal, *Al-Imbraturiyya al-Amrikiyya*, p.23; Haikal, *Al-Zaman al-Amriki*, p.39.
 7. Haikal, pp.249–60.
 8. *Ibid.*, pp.285–6.
 9. A. Ezzeddine, 'Asr Inhitat al-Impiryaliya: al-'Awda ila Mantiq Mawazeen al-Qiwa al-'Askariya [The Age of Decline of Imperialism: The Return to the Logic of Military Balances] (Cairo: Maktaba Madbouli, 2006), pp.11–12, 27, 44, 65.
 10. S. Hafez, *Karahia Taht al-Jild: Isra'il 'Uqda al-'Alaqaq al-'Arabiya al-Amrikiyya* [Hatred that Goes Beneath the Skin: Israel the Irsome Issue in Arab–American Relations] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2003). The book was prefaced by Haikal.
 11. *Ibid.* See, in particular, pp.27–33.
 12. *Ibid.* See, in particular, pp.53–72.
 13. *Ibid.* See, in particular, pp.16–18, 77.
 14. *Ibid.* See, in particular, pp.18–23, 101, 104.
 15. *Ibid.* See, in particular, pp.67–70.
 16. O. Khaled, *Al-Mustaqbal l-Arabi fi l-'Asr al-Amriki* [The Arab World's Future in the American Era] (Cairo: Markaz al-Qada lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr, 1992).
 17. *Ibid.*, pp.7–21, 65, 75, 111.
 18. *Ibid.*, pp.131–65.
 19. See, in particular, G. Amin, 'Awlama al-Qahr: al-Wilayat al-Mutahida wa al-'Arab wa al-Muslimoun Qabl wa ba'da Ahdath September 2001 [The Globalization of Oppression: The United States and the Arabs and Muslims before and after the Events of September 2001] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002), esp. pp.97–127; and G. Amin, 'Asr al-Tashhir bi al-'Arab wa al-Muslimin: Nahn wa al-'Alam ba'ad 11 September 2001 [The Era of Maligning Arabs and Muslims: Us and the World after 11 September 2001] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2004), esp. pp.5–42.
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. Since the late 1970s, Hoss has penned hundreds of editorials criticizing US foreign policy, which he compiled into no fewer than seven anthologies. See, inter alia, *Nafidha 'ala al-Mustaqbal* [A Window to the Future] (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayeen, 1981); 'Kullahum Irhabiyoun wa-Akbarahum Akhtarahum' [They are All Terrorists: The Greatest among them is the Most Dangerous], included in *Niqat 'ala al-Huruf* [Dotted the i's and Crossing the t's] (Beirut: Al-Markaz al-Islami lil-'Ilam wa al-Inma', 1987); 'Usara al-'Umr [Summary of Life] (Beirut: Sharika al-Matbu'at lil-Tawzee' wa al-Nashr, 2004); *Ta'alu ila Kalima Sawa'* [Come to Concordance] (Beirut: Sharika al-Matbou'at lil-Tawzee' wa al-Nashr, 2006).
 22. See, inter alia, 'Al-Irhab Wujha Nazhar' [Terrorism as a Point of View], *Al-Safir*, 9 April 2004, reprinted in *Sawt bila Sada* [A Voice Without Echo] (Beirut: Sharihaal-Matbu'at lil-Tawzih wa al-Nashr, 2005), pp.371–5; 'Ay Salam?' [What Peace?], address made at the opening of the 'axis for peace' conference in Brussels, Belgium, 17 Nov. 2005, published in *Ta'alu ila Kalima Sawa'*, pp.161–7; 'Difa'a 'an al-'Uruba' [In Defence of Arabism], *Al-Hayat*, 18 Jan. 2005, reprinted in *Ta'alu ila Kalima Sawa'*, pp.397–401.
 23. 'Hal al-Umma' [State of the Nation], public address made at the opening of the Arab National Conference, Beirut, 19 April 2004, published in *Sawt bila Sada*, pp.353–9.
 24. S. Kila, 'Ma Ba'da al-Hadi 'ashar min Auloul: 'Asr al-Imbraturiyya al-Jadida' [After September 11: The Era of the New Empire] (Damascus: Dar al-Takwin lil-Nashar wa al-Tawzi', 2003), p.11.
 25. *Ibid.*, p.12.

26. M.A. Hawat, *Al-'Arab wa Amrka min al-Sharq Awsatiya ila al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Kabir* (The Arabs and America from the idea of a Middle East until the Greater Middle East [Initiative]), Cairo: Maktaba Madbouli, 2006, esp. pp.10-11.
27. A.S. Bishtawi, *Tarikh al-Zhilm al-Amerki wa Bidaya al-Uful al-Imbraturi al-Madid* [The History of American Oppression and the Beginning of the Irreversible Imperial Decline] (Beirut: al-Mu'asasa al-'Arabiyya lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 2007), pp.9–28, 150–57.
28. M.b.M. Safar, *Al-Islam wa Amrika wa Ahdath September: Risala ila man Yahumuhu al-Amr* [Islam, America and the September Attacks: A Message to Whom It May Concern] (Beirut: Dar al-Nafaes, 2004), pp.13–17, 130–33.
29. Ibid., pp.159–64.
30. Ibid., pp.141–7.
31. Ibid., pp.34–7, 124–47, 166–91.
32. M. Akash, *Haq al-Tadhiya bi al-Akhar: Amerka wa al-Ibadat al-Jama'iyya* [The Right to Sacrifice the Other: America and Genocides] (Beirut: Riad al-Rayyes Books, 2002).
33. Ibid. See, in particular, pp.11, 15–51.
34. K. 'Awarkeh, *Al-Suhuouniya al-Masihiya min al-Dakhil: Amrika wa al-Raqs 'ala Iqa' al-Khwarafa* [An Inside Look at Christian Zionism: America and Dancing to the Tune of Myth] (Beirut: Sar al-Hadi, 2006).
35. S. Faqih, *Man Yakkum Amrika: Al-Lobiyat al-Hakima wa Aliyat Sun' al-Qarar* [Who Governs America: Dominant Lobbies and the Mechanisms of Decision-making] (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam Lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 2005).
36. R. Hilal, *Al-Masih al-Yahoudi wa-Nihayat al-'Alam: Al-Masihiya al-Siyasiya wa al-Usuliyah fi Amrika* [The Jewish Christ and the End of the World: Politicized and Fundamentalist Christianity in America] (Cairo: Maktaba al-Shuruq, 2001).
37. K. al-Jarad, *Ab'ad al-Istihdaf al-Amirki* [The Dimensions of the American Targeting] (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2004).
38. J. el-Khazen, *Al-Muhafizoun al-Judud wa al-Masihiyoun-Al-Sahyounitoun* [The Neoconservatives and the Christian-Zionists] (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2005).
39. For a more detailed discussion of the works of these authors and others see Baroudi, 'Countering US Hegemony'.
40. C. Mallat, *Al-Dimuqratiyya fi Amerka* [Democracy in America] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2001).
41. M. el-Shorbagi, *Al-Dimuqratiyya al-Muqayyada: Intikhabat al-Ri'asa al-Amrikiyya* [Bounded Democracy: Presidential Elections in the United States] (Cairo: Dar Misr al-Mahrussa, 2004).
42. M.M. Hashim, *Amrika Balad al-Mutanaqidat* [America: The Country of Contradiction] (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2007).
43. Ibid., pp.337–446.
44. G. Salame, *Amerika wa al-'Alam: Ighra' al-Quwa wa Madaha* [America and the World: The Temptation of Power and its Limits] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2005), p.9.
45. Ibid., p.33.
46. Ibid., p.42.
47. Nevertheless, in the last few years (especially following the July–August 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah), we have witnessed an upsurge in highly critical writings on the United States, by Lebanese Shiite Islamists.
48. M. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat wa al-Harb al-'Alamiya al-Rabi'a* (Cairo: Dar al-Rawda, 2004).
49. M. Moro, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid: al-Shu'ub fi Muwajaha Amrika* (Cairo: Maktaba Jazeera al-Ward, 2005).
50. See especially Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, pp.5–9.
51. See especially ibid., pp.91–4, 227–35; and Moro, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid*, pp.3–4, 67–8, 101.
52. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, pp.5–9.
53. Ibid. See, in particular, pp.7, 36, 230.
54. Ibid. See, in particular, pp.37–8.
55. All translations of Qur'anic verses are from T. Khalidi, *The Qur'an: A New Translation* (London and New York: Penguin Classics, an imprint of Penguin Books, 2008).
56. Ibid., p.7.
57. Verse 26:227.
58. Verse 2:227.

59. Verse 7:34.
60. Verse 2:120.
61. Moro, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid*, pp.62, 101.
62. Verse 29:69.
63. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, p.207.
64. Verses 5:51–2.
65. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, p.147.
66. For example, he quotes verses 17:4–7. *Ibid.*, p.159.
67. Qur'anic verses that portray Jews in a positive light include 44:31–3 and 5:20; there are even more verses that praise Christians, including verses 3:113 and 30:1–5.
68. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, p.221.
69. *Ibid.*, p 232.
70. *Ibid.*, pp.136, 187, 190; Moro, *al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid*, pp.3, 67, 100.
71. Moro, *Sira' al-Hadarat*, p.130.
72. *Ibid.*, p.77.
73. *Ibid.*, p.114.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*
76. *Ibid.* Moro, however, stops short of calling Muslims God's chosen people.
77. M. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam* [It is Indeed a War on Islam] (Cairo: Dar al-Qalam lil-Tina' wa al-Nashr was al-Tawzi', 2005). See especially pp.118–65.
78. *Ibid.*, especially pp.119, 165, 174–5.
79. This main theme is repeated several times in the text. See, for example, pp.100, 119.
80. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, pp.27, 71–4.
81. Verse 59:7.
82. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, p.85.
83. *Ibid.*, p.288.
84. *Ibid.*, p.93.
85. *Ibid.*
86. These are four of God's 99 names mentioned in the Qur'an.
87. Verse 72:15: 'But the transgressors shall be fire-wood for hell'.
88. Only God has knowledge of the unseen. Verse 11:123: 'To God belongs the Unseen in the heavens and earth'. 'Abbas is accusing Arab government and liberal Arab intellectuals of assigning attributes of the Divinity to the United States, which is tantamount to *shirk* or associating other gods with God.
89. The 'us' here no doubt refers to Islamists.
90. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, p.73.
91. *Ibid.*, p.74.
92. *Ibid.*, book cover and pp.103, 163, 216, 287.
93. *Ibid.*, pp.92, 118, 119, 121, 169.
94. *Ibid.*, pp.73, 108, 139.
95. *Ibid.*, pp.31–71.
96. Verses 11:25–49.
97. Verses 11:49–95.
98. Only God holds total power. Verse 11:4: 'To God is your return – and he holds power over all things.'
99. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, p.22.
100. See, in particular, verse 2:19: 'Or else like a torrent from on high, with layers of darkness, thunder and lightning. They press their ears from the peal of thunder, fearing death. But God engulfs the unbelievers'; and verse 16:26: 'The roof above them collapsed and the torment seized them from where they had not expected'.
101. Verses 7:103–41.
102. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, p.26.
103. Pharaoh's oppression of the Israelites is a popular theme with contemporary Islamists who view the United States as a latter day Pharaoh. Basing herself on the Qur'an and the Hebrew Bible, Shiite author al-Mou'min provides a vivid account of the encounter between Moses and Pharaoh. In order to problematize the notion of a 'Jewish people', she attests that those who fled Egypt with Moses

- were a mixture of oppressed Egyptians and Israelites. M. al-Mou'min, *Banu Isra'il wa al-Hadara al-Misriya* [The Israelites and the Egyptian Civilization] (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2007), esp. pp.193–230.
104. Verse 16:25: 'So let them shoulder their burdens in full on the Day of Resurrection'.
 105. Verse 89:26: 'That Day none shall torment as He torments! None shall bind as He binds!'
 106. The idea here is that Muslims who preoccupy themselves with questions about when, where and under what circumstances to confront the United States are merely coming up with excuses not to do so.
 107. 'Abbas, *Bal Hiya Harb 'ala al-Islam*, p.174.
 108. *Ibid.*, p.27.
 109. Many Sunni Islamists – such as the renowned Egyptian writer Fehmi Houeidi – hold Qaradawi in great esteem. One secular writer, however, has vehemently attacked Qaradawi, questioning his claim to be a moderate figure. 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Eid, *Yusuf al-Qaradawi Bayn al-Tasamuh wa al-Irhab* [Yusuf Qaradawi between Tolerance and Terrorism] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali' a lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr, 2005).
 110. Y. Qaradawi, *Ummatna Bayn Qarnayn* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2000).
 111. *Ibid.*, pp.22–39.
 112. *Ibid.*, pp.24–5.
 113. *Ibid.*, pp.231–5. Lebanese Shiite Islamist, 'Ali Hassan Tah, draws the same distinction between the Universalism of Islam and the Western-led globalization, as can be seen from his book's title. A.H. Tah, *Mujtama'na bayn 'Alamiya al-Islam wa al-'Awlama al-Gharbiya: Buhuth wa-Hulul* [Our Society between the Universalism of Islam and Western-led Globalization: Researches and Solution] (Beirut: Dar, al-Hadi, 2007).
 114. *Ibid.*, p.232.
 115. *Ibid.*
 116. *Ibid.*, p.234.
 117. *Ibid.*, pp.223–4.
 118. *Ibid.*, p.235.
 119. Y. Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin wasat al-Mujtama'at al-Akhra* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001).
 120. Qaradawi's deep seated hostility to communist regimes and to communist ideology shows throughout his political writings. See, for example, Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Hulul al-Mustawrada wa Kayf Janat 'ala Umatna* [Imported Solutions and How They Harmed Our Nation] (Beirut: Mu'asasa al-Risala, 1988), esp. pp.142–366.
 121. Qaradawi, *Ummatna Bayn Qarnayn*, pp.37–8.
 122. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002).
 123. *Ibid.*, p.115.
 124. *Ibid.*, pp.289–91.
 125. *Ibid.*, p.289. It is extremely unlikely that Qaradawi does not know that Japan surrendered after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and not before them as he claims.
 126. *Ibid.*, p.133.
 127. *Ibid.*, pp.277–332.
 128. Y. Qaradawi, *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2004), pp.12–13.
 129. *Ibid.*, p.13.
 130. *Ibid.*
 131. Y. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*. Since, I could not obtain a hard copy from any library or bookstore, I have relied on the electronic version as published on Qaradawi's official website: <http://www.qaradawi.net>.
 132. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4534&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=1 (accessed 6 Dec. 2008).
 133. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/static.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4534&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=1 (accessed 6 Dec. 2008).
 134. *Ibid.*
 135. Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima*, esp. pp.30–35.
 136. *Ibid.*, p.35.
 137. Qaradawi, *Ummatna Bayn Qarnayn*, pp.148–51, 199–216.
 138. *Ibid.*, pp.172–5.
 139. Qaradawi, *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama*, pp.164–5.
 140. *Ibid.*, pp.168–70.

141. Ibid., pp.158–62.
142. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4568&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=1.
143. Ibid.
144. *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama*, pp.44–6.
145. The paper's original plan was to provide equal treatment to the works of Lebanese Shiite authors. Doing that, however, would have added considerably to the paper's size without altering substantially its core theoretical argument.
146. J.H. 'Atrissi, *Uful Naghm al-Imbraturiyya al-Amerkiyya, Bayn al-Tawarut al-'Alami wa al-Qiyada al-Munfarida: Bidaya Zhuhur al-Qutbiyya al-Thuna'iyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Mahaja al-Baida', 2005). A highly prolific (albeit not original) author, 'Atrissi has written extensively on international relations, Israel, and the United States in the last few years. Other works by 'Atrissi include: *Amrakat al-Umam wa Sira' al-Hadarat* [The Americanization of Nations and the Clash of Civilizations] (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2002); *Bayn al-Sharq wa al-Gharb: al-Islam huwa al-Hall* [Between East and West: Islam is the Solution] (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2007); *Al-Hadara al-Muntahira: Qati'at al-Insan lil-Sama'* [Suicidal Civilization: Human Detachment from Heaven] (Beirut: Mu'assa al-Blagh lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 2007).
147. 'Atrissi, *Uful Naghm al-Imbraturiyya al-Amerkiyya*, pp.242–394.
148. J.H. 'Atrissi, *Hezbollah yaghur 'arabah al-Tarikh* (Beirut: Dar al-Safwa, 2007), p.7. 'Atrissi revisits this theme in *Iran al-Nawawiyya wa al-Nizam al-Awsati al-Jadid* [Nuclear Iran and the New Middle East System] (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2006).
149. J.H. 'Atrissi, *Al-Harb 'ala al-Islam: Al-Khusuma al-Tarikhyya bayn al-Gharb wa al-Sharq* (Beirut: Mu'assa al-Blagh lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 2007).
150. M.A.B. al-'Amili, *Al-Islam wa al-Irhab wa al-Salam* (Beirut: Dar al-Mahaja al-Baida', 2006).
151. Ibid., p.338.
152. M.H. Fadlallah, *Ida'at Islamiyyah* [Islamic Enlightenments] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar lil-Nashr, 2003), pp.37–44.
153. Ibid., p.44.
154. Ibid., pp.80, 85–6, 110.
155. Ibid., pp.25–9, 47–52.
156. Ibid., pp.61–5.
157. Ibid., pp.47–55.
158. Qaradawi, *Ummatna bayn Qarnayn*, pp.90–95.
159. Qaradawi, *Khitabuna al-Islami fi 'asr al-'Awlama*, p.31.
160. Ibid., p.45.
161. As in the above quoted passage from *Ummatna Bayn Qarnayn*, p.225 where the United States is compared to Pharaoh; and in his reference in *Nahnu wa al-Gharb* to Israel as a 'diabolic tree' implanted by imperialism that is constantly plotting against Muslims: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/static.asp?cu_no=2&lng=0&template_id=256&temp_type=42&parent_id=12.
162. K. Cragg, *The Qur'an and the West* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p.6.
163. To borrow the terminology of Ron Geaves, our authors are 'orthodox Muslims' who go direct to the Qur'an and the Sunna in juxtaposition to 'traditional Muslims' who acknowledge the body of work developed by early and medieval scholars. See R. Geaves, *Aspects of Islam* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p.6.
164. Works on anti-Americanism include: B. O'Connor and M. Griffiths (eds), *The Rise of Anti-Americanism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); P. Hollander (ed.), *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004); and J.-F. Revel, *Anti-Americanism* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003).
165. For a survey of Arab secular writers who subscribe to counter-hegemonic discourse see Baroudi, 'Countering US Hegemony: The Discourse of Salim al-Hoss and other Arab Intellectuals'. For references to counter-hegemonic discourse, see, inter alia, L. Roniger and C.H. Waisman (eds.), *Globality and Multiple Modernities: Comparative North American and Latin American Perspectives* (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2002).
166. See, inter alia, A. Bacevich, *The Roots of American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); J.B. Foster, *Naked Imperialism: The US Pursuit of Global Dominance* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 2006); C. Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*:

- Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); C. Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); see especially N. Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins, with New Foreword by Howard Zinn* (New York: New York Press, 2002), and N. Chomsky, *Middle East Illusions* (Lanham, MD: Bowmann & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).
167. See, in particular, J. Marti, *Inside the Monster: Writings on the United States and American Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).
168. It is worth mentioning here that it was the US military presence in Saudi Arabia which set Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement on a collision course with the United States.
169. See, in particular, A. al-'Al al-Baqouri, *Wa'd Bush Wa'd Balfour al-Jadid: al-Hisad al-Murr lil-Sadatiya al-'Arabiya* [Bush's Declaration ... the New Balfour Declaration: The Bitter Harvest of Sadat's Arab Policies] (Damascus: al-Dar al-Watniya al- Jadida, 2005).
170. While I could not resist the temptation to use the term 'profane', I do not wish to open the discussion of the appropriateness of Durkheimian notions of the sacred and the profane to Islamist discourse. For further discussion of the sacred–profane duality, see, inter alia, E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. by C. Cosman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. from the French by W.R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959).