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# Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi on International Relations: The Discourse of a Leading Islamist Scholar (1926–)

SAMI E. BAROUDI\*

The burgeoning literature on political Islam has paid little attention to how contemporary Islamists conceptualize international relations. By examining the public discourse on international relations of the Egyptian-born and Qatar-based Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi this article attempts to deepen our understanding of this key aspect of contemporary Islamist thought. Qaradawi was chosen for this study for four main reasons. First, he has produced an impressive body of work (in terms of quality and quantity), offering penetrating insights into the discourse of contemporary Islamists on international relations. Second, Qaradawi represents the largest denomination in Islam (Sunni Islam.) Third, he is a self-proclaimed ‘moderate’ advocating dialogue among Muslims of different denominations and beliefs and especially with the West. It is appealing to examine how this ‘moderate and balanced stance’ (*al-wasatiyya* in Qaradawi’s parlance) translates itself into Qaradawi’s perspectives on international relations. Finally, Qaradawi borrows heavily from the Qur’an in order to articulate and support his arguments on international relations. This study is motivated in part by a forceful urge to unpack and comprehend the complex and subtle ways in which the sacred text (the Qur’an) permeates the political discourse of Islamists; and to shed light on the significance of the sacred text to Islamists’ conceptualizations of current international realities which are often portrayed as profane.

The article seeks to highlight Qaradawi’s public views on a range of theoretical and substantive issues that pertain to international relations in the post-Cold War era, namely: (1) the underpinning principles of international relations; (2) *jihad* and its role in international relations; (3) the nature of the current (post-Cold War) international order and the role of the United States in it; (4) the relationship between the United States (and the West in general) and the Arab and Muslim worlds; (5) Israel and the Palestinian question; (6) Islamic unity; and (7) globalization. Methodologically speaking, the paper relies on textual analysis of the substantial oeuvre of Qaradawi over the past quarter-century; which includes books, editorials, public addresses, religious verdicts (*fatwas*), Friday sermons and transcripts of his interviews with al-Jazeera television. It must also be stated at the outset that the article is about the

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public discourse of Qaradawi, and not his personal beliefs (although I do not think the two diverge). With reference to Qaradawi's role in al-Jazeera, Lynch states: 'The public statements of an influential figure, delivered on a widely watched television station such as al Jazeera, matter far more than do his private beliefs, even were it ever possible to truly know such private beliefs.'<sup>1</sup> The above statement applies to all public intellectuals, and not just Qaradawi.

As for the organization of the article, first it offers a brief biographical sketch of Qaradawi, and then (the bulk of the paper) provides a detailed treatment of his views (or perspectives) on international relations, focusing on the aforementioned seven axes. The article then situates Qaradawi's discourse within its proper contexts by comparing it to the discourses on international relations of other Arab Islamists, secular Arab Nationalist writers, Third World critics of the prevailing international order and realists. The conclusion elaborates on the centrality of the sacred text for Qaradawi's conceptualization of international relations.

Born in 1926 to a poor Egyptian family and orphaned at the age of two, Qaradawi received a classic education at the *kuttab* in his home village and at the Azhar Institute in Tanta before joining the Faculty of Theology at the Azhar University in Cairo.<sup>2</sup> At a very young age, he became influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, leading him to join the movement in 1943.<sup>3</sup> As relations between the Free Officers who carried out the 1952 Egyptian Revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood deteriorated, Qaradawi was imprisoned twice between 1954 and 1956.<sup>4</sup> His stints in prison reinforced his opposition to Egypt's new rulers, who were brandishing a secular pan-Arab Nationalist ideology that clashed with Qaradawi's and the Muslim Brothers' Islamist stances. Qaradawi's troubled relationship with the Egyptian regime under President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir [Nasser] (1954–70) contributed to his decision to relocate to Qatar in 1961. From his new base in the oil-rich sheikhdom, Qaradawi embarked on a multifaceted career as a preacher, educator and consultant to Islamic financial houses. The advent of Pan-Arab satellite television and the internet in the 1990s greatly enhanced Qaradawi's access to Muslim publics worldwide. His name became closely associated with al-Jazeera, due to the immense popularity of the network's *al-Shar'ia wa al-Hayat* (Islamic Law and Life) programme, which featured Qaradawi as a regular guest. In addition to lending his name and providing moral support and guidance to the popular Islamic portal *Islamonline*, Qaradawi established his own website, *Qaradawi.net*, which provides detailed information about his life and activities and offers visitors free access to his recent *fatwas*, speeches, electronic versions of his books and transcripts of his appearances on *al-Shari'a wa al-Hayat*. Having spent almost his entire adult life in the public arena, Qaradawi (in his mid-eighties at the time of writing) is the embodiment of the Islamist public intellectual and scholar-activist. As a young man, he lobbied for reform of the curriculum at the Azhar, took part in the popular struggle against the British military presence in Egypt and was imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian authorities. Thanks, in main, to satellite television and the internet, the mature Qaradawi has been able to reach audiences worldwide. He organized protests against the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad<sup>5</sup> and the views expressed by Pope Benedict XVI in his 12 September 2006 lecture at University of Regensburg in Germany, which were considered offensive to Islam,<sup>6</sup> devoted considerable energies – especially through his presidency of the Islamic Union of Muslim

Scholars (IUMS)<sup>7</sup> and the European Council on Fatwa and Research (ECFR) – to help ensure that European Muslims integrate themselves into their societies while maintaining their Islamic identity; and in general campaigned tirelessly on behalf of Islamic causes from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya, to Afghanistan, Iraq and especially Palestine.<sup>8</sup> One cannot but agree with Graf and Skovgaard-Peterson's depiction of Qaradawi as a global phenomenon, for his influence transcends national borders, as does his conceptualization of Muslims as a single 'transnational community' or *umma*, irrespective of differences of geography, history, ethnicity and culture.<sup>9</sup>

Qaradawi's conceptualization of international relations forms an integral part of an Islamist worldview that Qaradawi and dozens of Islamic thinkers helped shape,<sup>10</sup> and that one may argue is immensely popular in the Arab and Islamic worlds. In reconstructing Qaradawi's narrative of international relations, I focus primarily on his scholarly works, which provide him with the space needed to properly develop his arguments and to ground them in the Qur'an, Sunna and his *wasati* (moderate and balanced) approach to Islam. The arguments made in these scholarly works appear over and again (albeit in a more condensed form) in Qaradawi's many sermons, fatwas and interviews. In a nutshell, a careful reading of Qaradawi's scholarly oeuvre provides ample understanding of his thinking on international relations, without engaging in the arduous task of reviewing his entire abundant discourse.

The quintessential Islamist, Qaradawi views international relations – and more generally political and social reality – through the lens of religion. Stated more dramatically, Qaradawi's cognition of reality derives from religion; for, as Melford Spiro noted some decades ago, 'every religious system consists . . . of a cognitive system'.<sup>11</sup> Qaradawi's discourse on international relations is anchored on three pillars: the Qur'an, the Sunna and *al-wasatiyya*, which Qaradawi champions as the correct approach to Islam. While the Qur'an is the irreducible core of Qaradawi's conceptualization of political and social reality, he treads in the path of traditional Muslim scholars who insist on the centrality of the Sunna for interpreting and supplementing (albeit never surpassing) the Qur'an.<sup>12</sup> Qaradawi's originality lies in introducing a third ingredient, *al-wasatiyya* or *al-khat al-wasati*, to understanding Islam. While it is well beyond the scope of this article to examine Qaradawi's extensive discourse on *al-wasatiyya*, suffice it to say that he defines it as the approach to Islam that: (1) appeals to human nature (*al-fitra al-insaniyya*) and human reason; (2) treats the Qur'an and the Sunna holistically; (3) avoids both excessiveness (*tashdid*) and laxity (*tafrit*) in interpreting the Qur'an and Sunna; and (4) addresses the spiritual and material needs of Muslim individuals and societies in a balanced way that takes into account variations of time and place.<sup>13</sup>

In *Fiqh al-Wasatiya al-Islamiya*, Qaradawi highlights the applicability of the *wasati* approach to international relations. Here, Qaradawi notes that Islam advocates a middle-ground approach to issues of war and peace that lies between the 'excessive pacifism' of Christianity and the 'cruelty and tyrannical and merciless violence' of Judaism.<sup>14</sup> While Islam 'legitimizes reciprocal treatment and meeting aggression with aggression, which is the state of justice', it also 'authorizes forgiveness and compassion when one is able, which is the state of providence and goodness', he adds.<sup>15</sup> Basing himself on Qur'anic verses 42:39–43, 2: 216 and 33:25, Qaradawi concludes that Islam favours peace over war; and while authorizing war

under certain circumstances, it establishes strict legal and moral codes for its conduct.<sup>16</sup>

In Qaradawi's religiously informed worldview, the political and social realms – including international relations – are governed by God-made laws (*sunan kawniya*) that are as immutable and universal as are the laws that govern the physical world. In *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd* (Islamic Awakening from Adolescence to Adulthood), Qaradawi presents four universal and immutable laws that govern the political and social realms, including international relations.<sup>17</sup> These universal laws apply to Muslim and non-Muslim societies alike.<sup>18</sup> The first law is causality; which means that all political and social phenomena – like natural phenomena – have causes and consequences. According to the second law, change is the norm in international relations; especially regarding the rise and fall of civilizations, states and societies. The third law attributes change in international relations to the work of internal forces operating in all civilizations, states and societies. In the parlance of Kenneth Waltz,<sup>19</sup> Qaradawi here subscribes to a 'second image' explanation, placing primary emphasis on internal attributes of states, societies and civilizations in accounting for change in international relations. The fourth law states that God only supports those who support Him (that is, those who fight for a just cause). Drawing on Qur'anic verses 47:7, 30:47 and 8:62, Qaradawi counsels 'believers [read Muslims] that God will not abet them unless they rally to defend themselves and to defend God's religion'.<sup>20</sup>

Qaradawi presents his fifth, and arguably most important, principle of international relations in a number of works, especially in *Fiqh al-Jihad*<sup>21</sup> and *Nahnu wa al-Gharb* (Us and the West).<sup>22</sup> Qaradawi derives this universal law of mutual restraining (*sunnat al-tadafu'*) from two Qur'anic verses 2:251: 'Had God not restrained mankind, some by means of others, the earth would have become chaotic. But God is gracious towards His Creation'; and 22:40: 'Had God not caused people to restrain one another, destruction would have fallen upon monasteries, churches, oratories and other places of prayer, where the name of God is often mentioned.' Noting that this is a 'law for the whole of humanity on which God established the world', Qaradawi writes: 'It is through this mutual restraining – whereby groups restrain one another – that God saves earth and those who dwell on it from tyranny. Otherwise, the oppression and injustice of tyrants would spread to the entire earth and the World would turn to a jungle in which the strong devour the weak.'<sup>23</sup> As will be discussed below, Qaradawi's understanding of the principles that govern international relations, especially his insistence on the universality of the law of mutual restraining, has much in common with realism.

Qaradawi's understanding of *jihad* constitutes a key dimension of his conceptualization of international relations. The section below turns to Qaradawi's extensive discourse on *jihad* to answer four main questions.<sup>24</sup> First, what is the meaning of *jihad*, what main forms does it take and how does it relate to *qital* (fighting)? Second, what are the purposes of *jihad* as *qital*, and what are the principles that govern its conduct? Third, how central is *qital* to Islam and to international relations, respectively? Fourth, how valid is Qaradawi's claim to offer a fresh perspective on *jihad* that is lacking in other accounts?

Qaradawi derives the term *jihad* from its two related Arabic roots *jahd* and *juhd*, which mean exerting effort and energy; and enduring hardship.<sup>25</sup> Qaradawi divides

*jihad* into five principal categories. The first and most basic form is *jihad al-nafs* (the struggle to elevate the soul).<sup>26</sup> Based on the Qur'an, Qaradawi subscribes to a complex view of human nature. He sees humans as driven by contradictory impulses, due to their dual nature as clay and spirit. *Jihad al-nafs* lies in educating and disciplining the self so that, of its own accord, it reins in those impulses that can lead to evil deeds, while fostering and acting on those inclinations that result in good acts. Another inner struggle that every individual must engage in is *jihad al-Shaytan*, or the fight against Satan, who constantly tempts humans to err and veer from the straight path.<sup>27</sup> The struggle to reform society constitutes the third form of *jihad*. For Qaradawi, Islam is as much about society as it is about the individual; and every Muslim is religiously obligated to foster the 'Islamic way of life' in society.<sup>28</sup> Qaradawi notes that 'the believer cannot be content with reforming himself, but must work incessantly to reform others and to resist corruption in society. . .'.<sup>29</sup> He goes on to identify several sub-forms of *jihad* that fall under efforts to reform society; these include *jihad* in the scientific, economic, educational, health and environmental domains.<sup>30</sup> Spreading the message of Islam – using logical arguments, persuasion and gentle exhortation – comprises the fourth form of *jihad*.<sup>31</sup> Noting that this *jihad al-lisan* (*jihad* through speech) involves both oral and written communication, Qaradawi highlights the key role that broadcast media (mentioning his *al-Sharia wa al-Hayat* programme) and the internet (giving the example of *Islamonline*) can play in the global dissemination of the Islamic message.<sup>32</sup> The last form of *jihad* is *jihad 'askari* (military *jihad*), which he defines as *qital al-a'da'* (fighting the enemy) or simply *qital* (fighting).<sup>33</sup> While in this construal, *qital* is only one form of *jihad*, Qaradawi, in line with most Muslim scholars, uses the two terms interchangeably. It is only through a close reading of his texts that one can discern whether he is using *jihad* in the narrow sense to mean *qital*; or in the broader sense to mean all forms of *jihad*.

As a prelude to discussing the purposes of *qital*, Qaradawi distinguishes between two competing views held by Muslim scholars. The first view stresses the defensive purposes of military *jihad*. According to this defensive view, Muslims are required to: (1) defend their territory and expel invaders; (2) demonstrate military power and military preparedness in order to deter attacks; and (3) undertake pre-emptive attacks when absolutely necessary. Muslims are under no religious obligation whatsoever to initiate military action against non-Muslims who do not threaten them. The second (offensive) view posits that Muslims are commanded to initiate military action against non-Muslims (at least once a year according to some scholars) in order to bring them to Islam, or to subjugate them to Muslim power and require them to pay the *jizya* tax.<sup>34</sup>

Following an exhaustive review of the arguments of the defensive and offensive camps, Qaradawi unequivocally endorses the first (defensive view) of *qital*. With great effectiveness, Qaradawi refutes the claim of the proponents of the offensive view that the verse of the sword – commonly identified as 9:5: 'Once the sacred months are shorn, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, arrest them, imprison them, besiege them, and lie wait for them at every site of ambush' – abrogates all other Qur'anic verses that prohibit initiating unprovoked military action. Qaradawi's rebuttal is two-pronged. To start with, he notes that there is no consensus among Muslim scholars on the abrogation principle, although the majority of scholars accept it. Qaradawi himself accepts abrogation; albeit in the narrowest of senses.<sup>35</sup>



More importantly, Qaradawi questions how one or a few verses could have abrogated over 100 verses that preach dialogue, peace and tolerance.<sup>36</sup> Qaradawi justifies his embrace of the first (defensive) view primarily on religious grounds, pointing to: (1) the preponderance of Qur'anic verses that prohibit unprovoked aggression and the forceful imposition of religion;<sup>37</sup> (2) the example of the Prophet who only fought those who attacked (or threatened to attack) the nascent Muslim community; and (3) the intents (*maqasid*) of Islam; which are to spread peace, dialogue and justice and not war. In addition, Qaradawi maintains that at least two practical concerns reinforce his embrace of the defensive view. First, it spares Muslims the costs and dangers of being in a perpetual state of war with more powerful non-Muslim states and opens venues for mutually beneficial relations with them. Equally important, it signals to the international community that Muslims are compliant with international norms and conventions (in particular the UN Charter and UN-sponsored declarations on the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts) that prohibit unprovoked aggression and advance basic human rights (such as the ban on human trafficking).<sup>38</sup> For Qaradawi, advocates of the offensive view of *qital* unwittingly serve the agendas of western powers and orientalist who falsely accuse Muslims of being intrinsically aggressive and always awaiting the opportunity to wage war on others.<sup>39</sup>

The above discussion sets the context for Qaradawi's treatment of the lawful purposes of military *jihad*. To start with, *qital's* primary purpose is self-defence. Over and over again, Qaradawi argues that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to defend their lives, properties and land when attacked, irrespective of whether their attackers are Muslims or non-Muslims. In this case, *qital* is obligatory (*fard 'ayn*) on all able-bodied men, while women and children may partake in the fighting (or other resistance work) without the permission of their husbands and parents.<sup>40</sup> When a Muslim community cannot defeat its attackers by itself, it becomes incumbent on other Muslim communities to provide military assistance on the basis of geographic proximity, the nearer then the more distant.<sup>41</sup> While fighting in support of other Muslim communities is lawful *qital*, it is not incumbent on all Muslims; as long as sufficient numbers volunteer to effectively undertake this task of pushing back those who invade Muslim lands.<sup>42</sup>

A second purpose of military *jihad* is deterrence through developing sufficient military capabilities and demonstrating their possession, such as through military parades and exercises. For Qaradawi, weakness invites attack; as well as undue meddling in a one's internal affairs.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, it is the duty of a Muslim state to maintain strong defences, a professional and well-trained military and a reputation of military strength and effectiveness in order to ward off any potential attack. Repeatedly, Qaradawi warns the Muslim *umma* against 'complacency' and relying for its protection on 'international bodies like the Security Council and the General Assembly' rather than on its own power.<sup>44</sup> Qaradawi's extensive discourse on the development of a state's military capabilities addresses the issue of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; where Qaradawi distinguishes between developing such weapons (especially when other states have, or are developing, them), which he strongly advocates, and using them in a first-strike attack, which he categorically rejects.<sup>45</sup>

Pre-emption constitutes the third legitimate purpose of *qital*. For Qaradawi, not only does the Qur'an approve of pre-emptive attacks; but the Prophet Mohammad has personally engaged in both retaliatory and pre-emptive attacks. Qaradawi argues that whenever the Prophet Mohammad initiated military action he did so either in

retaliation to previous unprovoked attacks, or to pre-empt attacks on the nascent Muslim community that would have destroyed it and with it the new religion.<sup>46</sup> Qaradawi extends this argument to encompass the military campaigns of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and early Muslim rulers whose main purpose, for Qaradawi, was not conquest for its sake; but the establishment of a safe haven for Islam to spread within and beyond via peaceful means.<sup>47</sup> Qaradawi's broad construal of pre-emptive military jihad leads to a blurring of the lines between defensive and offensive *qital*.

In line with most traditional Muslim scholars, Qaradawi accepts or recognizes the legitimacy of offensive *jihad* (*jihad al-talab*) which he defines as seeking the enemy in its own land for lawful purposes. These include: (1) protecting the Muslim state and securing its borders; (2) guarding against present or future threats from enemy states; (3) removing obstacles to the peaceful spread of Islam; (4) coming to the aid of invaded or threatened Muslim states (or political communities); and (5) alleviating injustices inflicted on Muslims or any oppressed people.<sup>48</sup> The early Islamic conquests, which elsewhere in his discourse are treated as pre-emptive in nature, are also presented as prime examples of lawful *jihad al-talab*, since they aimed at freeing oppressed people from the yoke of the tyrannical Byzantium and Persian empires. In some of the most animated pages of *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Qaradawi compares the Byzantium and Persian empires around the seventh century to the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War: unjust and oppressive powers incessantly fighting with one another for global dominance.<sup>49</sup> Given the imperialist designs of the two (ancient) empires, their oppression of their people and determination to halt the peaceful spread of Islam and even to kill it in its bud – as well as the operation of the universal law of mutual restraining – the new Muslim state was bound to collide with them. For Qaradawi, the Islamic conquests 'liberated Egypt, North Africa and the Levant from Byzantium imperialism and Iraq from Persian imperialism, thus restoring to their people their freedom and right to set their own destiny'.<sup>50</sup> Qaradawi is thus unclear on whether the Muslim invasions of the Byzantium and Persian empires were a form of pre-emptive *qital* that aimed at protecting the new Muslim state from their imperialist designs, or 'humanitarian interventions' (in today's parlance) that sought to bring freedom and justice to their oppressed people. A careful reading of Qaradawi's discourse reveals that he believed both motives were at play.

Even when engaged in for lawful purposes, the conduct of military *jihad* is to be governed by ethical rules that are derived from the Qur'an and the Sunna. For Qaradawi, Islam offers a 'comprehensive code of ethics that encompasses situations of peace and war [and addresses] means and ends'.<sup>51</sup> Islam does not accept the 'Machiavellian dictum that the ends justify the means. The ends must be noble and the means must be clean', Qaradawi adds.<sup>52</sup> Military *jihad* should thus be conducted in accordance with ethical rules that prohibit the killing of women, children, invalids and prisoners of war, as well as the unnecessary destruction of property.<sup>53</sup> Elsewhere, Qaradawi writes that 'war like politics and economics should not be detached from religious and ethical values'.<sup>54</sup> In addition, the reasons for *qital* need to be communicated to the enemy, except in cases of clear aggression or when it is imperative to maintain secrecy for the success of a pre-emptive attack.

Qaradawi does not consider *jihad* as a pillar of Islam, although he sees some merit to how many Shia scholars treat it as Islam's sixth pillar.<sup>55</sup> Throughout his discourse, Qaradawi maintains that Islam is a religion of peace and dialogue; and that the



natural inclination of Muslims is to avoid fighting whenever possible, as in verse 8:61: ‘Should they incline to peace, incline to it also and put your trust in God.’<sup>56</sup> Military *jihad* does not emanate from Islam per se, but from the international environment that Muslims inhabit. In highlighting the role of the external environment in prompting military *jihad*, Qaradawi subscribes to a third image explanation (emphasizing the role of systemic influences) of the behaviour of Muslim entities in the international system. This contrasts with his second image explanation (emphasizing internal attributes) of the behaviour of non-Muslim entities, especially western powers. Stated otherwise, non-Muslim entities have always resorted to fighting primarily to establish empires, or to promote their strategic, political and economic interests. Muslim entities, on the other hand, turn to fighting primarily for defensive reasons; and only secondarily to remove obstacles to the peaceful spread of Islam. In a nutshell, Muslim entities are far less war-prone than non-Muslim entities. All historic facts that do not support this portrayal (such as the expansionist wars of the Ottoman Empire) are conveniently dropped out of Qaradawi’s narrative on *jihad* and international relations in general.

In his introduction to *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Qaradawi promises to present a fresh philosophy (*thaqafa jadida*) of *jihad* that differs from ‘inherited notions that came to be accepted by the Muslim public ... and which are taught by the different religious schools as established truths, despite their limitations and contradictions’.<sup>57</sup> Qaradawi partially delivers on this promise. To start with, he repudiates the claims of radical Islamists that war is the norm in relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, and that Muslims are divinely commanded to engage in military *jihad* against non-Muslims. Qaradawi demonstrates that these claims represent a highly distorted reading of the Qur’an and the Sunna and contribute to unnecessary and sometimes catastrophic international conflicts, while aiding those voices in the West that seek to portray Islam as a violent religion.<sup>58</sup> In this regard, Qaradawi criticizes the discourses of prominent radical Islamist thinkers, including Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1905–77) – founder of the Lebanese branch of *Hizb al-Tahrir* – and the renowned Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906–66). Qaradawi categorically rejects al-Nabhani’s assertion that it is lawful to use nuclear weapons in attacking unbelievers.<sup>59</sup> His critique of Qutb (whom he refers to as our teacher Qutb and the martyr Qutb) is far more nuanced but equally powerful. Qaradawi rebukes Qutb for subscribing to the view that the verse of the sword abrogates all other Qur’anic verses which call for peace and dialogue with non-Muslims, as well as for his harsh criticisms of all opposing points of view.<sup>60</sup> Qaradawi’s critique of the thought of Qutb undoubtedly contributed to his troubled relationship with radical Islamist movements which accord Qutb an almost iconic status. A more direct reason for this troubled relationship, though, is Qaradawi’s firm condemnation of the attacks of radical Islamists against government officials and citizens of states which in their view do not apply Islamic law.<sup>61</sup>

Secondly, Qaradawi’s reading of the works of classic Islamic scholars reveals that the latter did not advocate military *jihad* against all non-Muslims simply because of their unbelief. Qaradawi argues that the classic scholars had a far more nuanced, and more religiously grounded understanding of the lawful purposes of military *jihad* (and the norms and conventions that govern its conduct) than contemporary radical Islamists; thus undermining the latter’s claims of authenticity.<sup>62</sup> Last but not least,

Qaradawi's philosophy of *jihad* is highly compatible with modern, especially realist, conceptions of war and its role in international relations. Realists can easily relate to Qaradawi's discourse on the complex origins of war – in human nature, competition between societies and civilizations and the absence of international authority – and its inevitability, given the operation of the universal law of mutual restraining.

Despite these contributions, Qaradawi's discourse on *jihad* suffers from certain ambiguities, especially regarding the difference between *jihad* and *qital*, and offensive and defensive military *jihad*. Equally troubling is Qaradawi's insistence on the legitimacy of offensive *jihad*, although practically all the instances of lawful *qital* that he discusses can be explained in terms of defensive *jihad*. What could have rendered Qaradawi's philosophy of *jihad* truly original is a clear repudiation of offensive *jihad* on the grounds of it being neither necessary under Islam nor relevant in the contemporary international system. Our author is too much of a conformist, though, to initiate such a clear break with tradition. In sum, Qaradawi offers an adaptation to modern times of traditional treatments of *jihad*, and a firm religiously anchored repudiation of the radical Islamists' views on *jihad*, but falls way short of presenting a new philosophy of *jihad*.

Qaradawi's discourse includes many references to the Cold War era, its end and the emergence of a US-dominated international order as of the 1990s. For Qaradawi, the East–West conflict that defined the Cold War ensured that the rival capitalist and communist camps restrained one another, thus providing some room for manoeuvre to the Third World including the Islamic world. While professing neutrality regarding the East–West conflict, Qaradawi's writings reveal a slight preference for the US-led capitalistic camp over the Soviet-led communist one. This tilt stemmed from a number of factors, including western societies' greater toleration of religion and generally less oppressive nature, their better treatment of Muslim minorities and the greater compatibility of western democracies and capitalism with human nature (in contrast to totalitarian communism).<sup>63</sup> The end of the Cold War triggered contradictory reactions from Qaradawi. In *Ummatna Bayn Qarnayn*, Qaradawi attributes the collapse of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union to 'divine retribution' brought about by the crimes of communism which 'collided in a major way with human nature',<sup>64</sup> and the brutality of the Soviet Union which invaded Afghanistan and 'persecuted, slaughtered and exiled to the Siberian desert' much of its Muslim population.<sup>65</sup> A few passages later, however, he retracts, stating that 'the presence of the Soviet Union was a blessing for oppressed people and countries, for the struggle among the mighty always serves the interests of the weak'. He then adds: 'Our righteous predecessors had the following invocation: Oh God! Engage oppressors with each other and deliver us safe from amongst them.'<sup>66</sup>

The emergence of a US-dominated international order posed a number of practical and theoretical problems that Qaradawi had to grapple with. To start with, Qaradawi was worried that the United States would use its greatly enhanced international position to establish a permanent military presence in the oil rich Gulf Region, as well as impose its will on the Arab and Muslim worlds, especially regarding the Arab–Israeli conflict. Equally important, Qaradawi voiced the fears of Islamists that the United States would conveniently treat Islam as the new 'threat' – *al-khatar al-akhdar* (the green peril) in his parlance – in lieu of the defeated communism in order to galvanize the support of other western powers and thus legitimate its leadership of the western

capitalist world and its efforts to impose its hegemony on the international system.<sup>67</sup> It is in this context that Qaradawi reads America's multifaceted 'war on terrorism', which for him and most Islamists is a key dimension of US foreign policy in the current international order. Qaradawi's extensive critique of the US 'war on terrorism' revolves around three principal axes. First, the United States does not recognize the terrorism within its own borders (as with rampant shootings by teenagers) and especially the terrorism of the 'Zionist entity' (read Israel) which the United States 'implanted and continues to nourish'.<sup>68</sup> Second, the 'war on terrorism' unjustly targets Arabs and Muslims, subjecting them to persecutions, military strikes and full-scale invasions, as well as to a relentless campaign to undermine the Islamic bases of their societies and impose on them a docile and apolitical form of Islam.<sup>69</sup> Third, the United States adheres to a mercuric and self-serving definition of terrorism.<sup>70</sup> Qaradawi's discourse is replete with references to America's arbitrariness, despotism, refusal to be questioned or held accountable for its actions and its 'arrogance of power'.<sup>71</sup> Occasionally, Qaradawi traces America's despotism (*tughyan*) to its arrogant attitude towards other nations rather than to its power.<sup>72</sup> In general, however, he explains US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in a manner consistent with neoclassical realists, emphasizing (to use their terminology): (1) 'relative power distributions' (American preponderance); (2) 'domestic constraints' (economic interests and the power of the Zionist lobby and the Christian Right); and (3) 'elite perceptions' (namely that Islam, especially political Islam, is a strategic and even civilizational threat).<sup>73</sup>

Last but not least, the transition to a US-dominated international order challenged Qaradawi's allegedly universal law of mutual restraining. Qaradawi does not elaborate on how the United States will be restrained following the collapse of its main rival. The answer, which he does not properly develop, probably lies in his assertion that rival human collectives will realize the need to act in accordance to the law of mutual restraining, and will eventually rectify unfavourable international power imbalances.<sup>74</sup> Human agency is thus indispensable for the restoration of balance in international politics.

Relations between the Arab and Muslim worlds and the West are central to Qaradawi's discourse on international relations. Some of Qaradawi's best known works address the status of Muslim minorities in the West, offering them advice on how to live in accordance with Islam without compromising their belonging to their western societies.<sup>75</sup> Qaradawi's oldest and probably most quoted scholarly work, *Al-halal wa al-haram fi al-Islam*, addresses relations between Muslims and the West. Drawing on the Qur'an, especially verses 29:46 and 60:8, Qaradawi calls on Muslims to deal justly and gently with non-Muslims as long as the latter do not transgress against them. Qaradawi demonstrates that the Qur'anic verses which warn against Christians and Jews strictly only apply to the Christians and Jews who conspire against Muslims, try to do them harm, or seek to turn them away from their religion.<sup>76</sup> While noting that 'Islam does not prohibit Muslims to be kind and generous to peoples of other religions, even if they are polytheists', Qaradawi adds that 'it looks upon the People of the Book, that is Jews and Christians, with special regard, whether they reside in a Muslim society or outside it'.<sup>77</sup> In this work, and subsequent ones, Qaradawi advances the basic thesis that differences in religion do not in themselves lead to conflict and war within or between nations.

While suffering from many inconsistencies, the image Qaradawi projects of western societies is far more nuanced and positive than that of radical Islamists. Clearly,

the West does not exist in a condition of complete ignorance of God's guidance, as Qutb claimed earlier.<sup>78</sup> In particular, Qaradawi categorically rejects the view of certain medieval scholars that Muslims should not permanently settle amongst non-Muslims, not merely on the grounds of its impracticality but, more importantly, because Muslims can serve Islam by interacting with non-Muslims.<sup>79</sup> For Qaradawi, heightened interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims serve both groups when they are based on common interests and mutual respect.<sup>80</sup> Thus, in addition to finding gainful employment in the West (Qaradawi is very much aware of the economic motives behind migration) Muslims can learn from its scientific, technological and even legal and political achievements and pass that knowledge back to their original Muslim societies.<sup>81</sup> Equally important, Muslims should contribute to the betterment of their adopted western societies not simply by being law-abiding and productive citizens, but also by educating westerners on Islamic causes (such as the Palestinian cause) and on Islam through deeds as well as words.<sup>82</sup> While cognizant of the many challenges they face, Qaradawi pins high hopes on the Muslim communities in the West, ascribing to them lofty (and somewhat unrealistic) goals as facilitators of cross-cultural dialogue and ambassadors of goodwill.

Qaradawi's main problem with the West lies with the foreign policies of the United States and other western powers towards the Arab and Muslim worlds and more generally the Third World. While Qaradawi has always been critical of these policies, his critique intensified with the transition to a US-dominated international order, and especially following the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States. Qaradawi levels some serious charges against the United States and the West, including: (1) supporting the creation of the state of Israel on land that was 'stolen' from Arabs and Muslims;<sup>83</sup> (2) meddling in the internal affairs of Arab and Muslim states under lofty pretexts – such as promoting democracy, human rights and women's rights – but always with the aim of undermining the Islamic bases of these societies in order to facilitate their domination;<sup>84</sup> (3) supporting dictatorships throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds;<sup>85</sup> (4) stirring up conflicts among Arab and Muslim states (such as with 'trapping' Iraq into invading Kuwait in 1990) in order to weaken Arabs and Muslims and justify military intervention especially in the oil-rich Gulf region;<sup>86</sup> and (5) using the 'war on terrorism' to target Arabs and Muslims.<sup>87</sup>

The above charges notwithstanding, Qaradawi remains optimistic about the prospects of improving relations with the West through dialogue. Dialogue with the West is not 'only permissible, but required by our religion, for us Muslims are commanded to engage in dialogue', he states.<sup>88</sup> In support of this view, he quotes 16:125: 'Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and fair counsel, and debate with them in the fairest manner.' Qaradawi presents a fairly detailed agenda for dialogue with the West with well-articulated goals that include, first, dispelling western notions that Islam condones violence and terrorism, by explaining the true nature of Islam while listening to western concerns about their security and the status of their Muslim populations.<sup>89</sup> Second, allaying western fears about the domestic and foreign policy agendas of mainstream Islamist movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), by explaining the differences between these movements and the radical ones. Third, educating the West on the Arab and Islamic perspective on the Palestinian question, the religious significance of Jerusalem and why Arabs and Muslims can never have normal relations with Israel (which does not preclude the possibility of a long truce).

Fourth, drawing attention to the political, economic and especially human costs of western (especially US) military interventions in the Arab and Muslim worlds and how these interventions bring haunting memories of colonialism and the crusades. In general, Qaradawi supports dialogue with the West on the whole gamut of major international issues. At the turn of the twenty-first century, he identified Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Kashmir as spaces of mutual interest on which dialogue and collaboration with the West are warranted.<sup>90</sup> Qaradawi's unequivocal support for the Arab uprisings of late 2010 and 2011 (the so-called Arab Spring) has clearly created more room for dialogue with the West, which has adopted a generally positive attitude towards the Arab Spring. Qaradawi had no qualms about western military intervention in Libya, and would probably back similar action in Syria, in light of his vehement denunciations of the Assad regime and criticisms of the Russian–Chinese veto in the UN Security Council.<sup>91</sup>

Nonetheless, Qaradawi's uncompromising stances on the Arab–Israeli conflict, his defence of targeting NATO and US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, his vehement denunciations of the cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad and his support of the right of Muslim women to wear the veil in public spaces (even when secular laws oppose this) have rendered him a *persona non grata* in many western countries. A case in point is the recent decision of the French authorities to ban him from entering France, even when he was invited by a European-based Islamic group.<sup>92</sup>

Qaradawi is an ardent advocate of Palestinian rights<sup>93</sup> and a vociferous critic of Israel – or the Zionist entity in his parlance – which he often describes as a 'satanic tree' that the West implanted at the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds.<sup>94</sup> This is not the place to review Qaradawi's extensive discourse on the Arab–Israeli conflict, or the cause of Palestine, to use a term that is dear to his heart. Instead, the section below focuses on Qaradawi's answers to four pivotal questions: first, how is the struggle against Israel to be carried out? Second, what role should the Muslim *umma* play in this struggle? Third, what are the prospects for peace with Israel? Fourth, what explains Israel's expansionism and its 'aggressive behaviour'?

To start with, Qaradawi is adamant that only by turning to Islam will the Palestinians be effective in their struggle against Israel. In line with Islamists, he highlights the religious element of the struggle over historic Palestine.<sup>95</sup> Qaradawi maintains that the 'Zionist project', while colonial and imperialist to the core, was always legitimated in terms of Judaism; and could not have succeeded had it not been for its effective exploitation of religion.<sup>96</sup> He shuns Palestinians and secular Arab nationalists who emphasize the nationalist element over the religious one in the struggle against Israel. For Qaradawi, only by understanding that their struggle against Israel is a religiously mandated *jihad*, necessitated by the reality of occupation, will the Palestinians be able to prevail. Qaradawi explains that while the battle for Palestine is a 'battle for land, it has its religious motives and its religious goals'. He then states: 'Every battle that a Muslim enters into to defend rightness, resist falsehood, establish justice, or revolt against oppression is a religious battle, because it is a battle in the cause of God', before quoting 4: 76: 'Those who believe fight in the cause of God, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of idolatry.'<sup>97</sup> In another work, he notes: 'They entered the battle [for Palestine] as Jews, but we did not enter it as Muslims. They turned to the Torah, but we did not turn to the Qur'an . . . They said the Temple, but we did not say al-Aqsa . . . they won because they used religion, we lost because we excluded religion.'<sup>98</sup>



The great disparity in material power between Israel and the Palestinians legitimates the latter's resort to unconventional warfare, including suicide bombings.<sup>99</sup> It is in this context that Qaradawi approves of suicide attacks, calling them 'martyr attacks' and noting that they are 'among the greatest forms of *jihad* in the way of God and a legitimate form of striking fear in the enemy as called for in the Qur'an'.<sup>100</sup> Qaradawi cautions, nevertheless, that 'martyr attacks should only be carried out after examining and assessing their advantages and disadvantages', adding that 'they should not be decided on by a single individual due to their consequences for the community and its future'.<sup>101</sup>

Featuring strong religious undertones, Qaradawi's discourse on Palestine is almost identical to that of Hamas. His categorical rejection of the 1993 Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was not shared by other leading Muslim clerics, including the late Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Baz, who in the early 1990s issued a fatwa implicitly endorsing the Oslo accord and the ensuing peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).<sup>102</sup> More recently, Qaradawi's unequivocal backing of Hamas in its conflict with the PA – as well as his fatwa advising Palestinians against travelling to East Jerusalem as long as it remains under Israeli occupation – damaged his relations with the PA, resulting in mutual recriminations between the PA and Qaradawi.<sup>103</sup>

A hallmark of Qaradawi's discourse on Palestine is his insistence that its future – especially that of Jerusalem – is of utmost importance to the entire Muslim *umma*.<sup>104</sup> Qaradawi maintains that 'Jerusalem is not the exclusive property of the Palestinians, it belongs to all the Muslims ... and to all the Arabs, Christians and Muslims',<sup>105</sup> while warning that Israel is a 'threat to the whole *umma*, to the Arabs and to the Muslims and indeed to the entire world; a political, economic, military, cultural and religious threat'.<sup>106</sup> Qaradawi has been extremely critical of the unwillingness of the governments of Arab and Muslim countries to provide more effective political, economic and military aid to the Palestinians; and their compliance with US and western demands to normalize relations with Israel. A recent case in point is his denunciation of the conduct of Arab and Muslim governments during Israel's major military offensive against Gaza in winter 2008/9 (Operation Cast Lead). Qaradawi, in particular, lashed out at the Egyptian authorities for allegedly participating in the siege of Gaza by closing the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza and building a concrete wall to halt the smuggling of goods (and weapons) to the zone.<sup>107</sup> Qaradawi's jubilant response to the fall of the Mubarak regime was no doubt partly triggered by his intense hostility to its approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Dismissing out of hand all US-led and international efforts to settle the Arab–Israeli conflict on the ground of them favouring Israel (the victimizer) over the Palestinians (the victims) and denouncing the peace treaties between Israel and both Egypt and Jordan and the 1993 Oslo accords, Qaradawi does not offer his own blueprint for peace. Instead, he advocates a resistance strategy that incorporates military and civil *jihad* (the latter including boycotting Israeli citizens and officials and Israeli and American products, and providing financial support for the Palestinians),<sup>108</sup> while warning that the struggle will be a long and costly one. Qaradawi, nevertheless, does not rule out entirely the future possibility of a long truce with Israel if the latter: (1) withdraws from all the territories it occupied in 1967 including East Jerusalem; (2) recognizes an independent and sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; (3) compensates displaced Palestinians and their descendants for decades of suffering (without this entailing a renunciation of their right to return),<sup>109</sup> and



(4) relinquishes control over al-Aqsa Mosque and its environs, which should be exclusively under the authority of Muslims.<sup>110</sup>

Qaradawi is under no illusion that Israel is likely to fulfil any of these conditions. In his introduction to *Fatawa min Ajl Philastin*, he writes: 'peace with Israel is like a mirage: the parched person thinks there is water, but upon getting there finds nothing'.<sup>111</sup> For Qaradawi, as long as the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims are disunited and economically and militarily weak, they will be dealing with Israel, and its western backers, from a position of weakness. What the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims should focus on in the foreseeable future is to unify their stance on Palestine (especially Jerusalem); this should take absolute precedence over the pursuit of peace with Israel.

Under the heading of 'knowing one's enemy', Qaradawi discusses five attributes of the Israeli state: racism; proneness to violence and aggressiveness; expansionism; immorality; and stinginess and worship of money.<sup>112</sup> Thus, for Qaradawi, immorality (as with denying the historic rights of the Palestinians), aggressiveness (as with killing and uprooting the Palestinians, and later on besieging the West Bank and Gaza) and expansionism (as with the occupation of Arab lands in 1948 and 1967, and the settlements policy) are immutable features of Israel's foreign policy and of its politics and society. To highlight the imperialist nature of Israel's foreign policy, Qaradawi, obviously borrowing from Lenin, phrases a new cliché: 'Zionism is the highest stage of imperialism'.<sup>113</sup> Beyond the polemics, Qaradawi offers a straightforward explanation of Israeli foreign policy. While western backing and the disunity and weakness of Arabs and Muslims facilitated a colonial and expansionist foreign policy, the origins of this policy are to be found in the nature of Israeli society, its Zionist ideology and the personalities of its leaders. Alternative explanations that highlight the importance of the regional environment of insecurity or which treat Israel as a mere instrument of the West are not even contemplated.

While claiming to distinguish between Israel (which is an occupying and alien entity) and the Jewish people (who are People of the Book and ought to be treated with respect),<sup>114</sup> Qaradawi's discourse on the latter suffers from some racial undertones; as he makes a number of controversial assertions. To start with, Qaradawi claims that the Jews distorted the Torah in order to sanction hostility and aggression towards non-Jews, while asserting that the Qur'an is superior to the Torah because it is free of all human distortions.<sup>115</sup> More importantly, Qaradawi claims that throughout history Jews have acted with enmity towards Muslims and that they are untrustworthy because they consistently break their promises.<sup>116</sup> What exacerbates this serious charge is that Qaradawi grounds it in the Qur'an (quoting at least 12 verses that he asserts condemn the Jews)<sup>117</sup> and one Prophetic *Hadith*.<sup>118</sup> Most importantly, Qaradawi dismisses out of hand the notion of a Jewish people (or nation) despite the emphasis he places on the role of religion in the construction of identity. If Islam is the basis of the Muslim *umma*, why cannot Judaism likewise be the basis of the Jewish *umma*? Obviously, Qaradawi has no answer to this question, which is too troubling in its implications for him to even consider.

For Qaradawi, the Muslim *umma* includes all individuals who pronounce the two testimonials of Islam. Qaradawi identifies four principal characteristics of the Muslim *umma*: (1) it is divine in origin and orientation and brought to existence by God for a specific reason; (2) it is an *umma* of moderation and balance; (3) it is an *umma* whose mission is to spread God's message; and (4) it is a single (or united)

*umma*, despite being formed of many 'races, colours and classes' which Islam blended together, tying them with an unbreakable bond (*al-'urwa al-wuthqa*).<sup>119</sup> Historically, the presence of a centralized political authority, represented by the Caliphate, was the principal means of preserving the unity of the Muslim *umma*. In contradistinction to Shias and certain Sunni sects, Qaradawi recognizes a continuous line of legitimate (or divinely sanctioned) Islamic authority that stretches from the first Muslim community in Medina to the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early twentieth century.<sup>120</sup> In Qaradawi's view, the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate represented a 'historic calamity the like of which the *umma* has not seen throughout its history', that was brought about primarily by Zionist and European intrigues, resulting from colonial interests and the Ottomans' refusal to facilitate the Zionist project in Palestine.<sup>121</sup> His discourse includes vague references to the importance of resurrecting the institution of the Caliphate; and in this respect Qaradawi is a traditionalist. What is consequential, however, is whether Qaradawi really insists on the resurrection of the Caliphate as the only means for achieving (or restoring) Islamic unity, or does he envision other means for bringing about Islamic unity. The latter stance is much closer to the truth. Without explicitly renouncing the idea of resurrecting the Caliphate, Qaradawi's discourse on the future prospects of Islamic unity offers a plethora of political, economic, cultural and especially legal proposals to foster such unity that fall short of creating a single political unit. Thus, and in line with most contemporary Islamist thinkers (such as the late Shia scholar Sayyid Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah), Qaradawi envisions Islamic unity primarily in terms of unity of action in pursuit of common Islamic goals that encompass: standing up to the West; repelling Israeli 'aggression' and Israel's attempts to change the Arab and Muslim character of Jerusalem; and confronting the challenges of globalization, particularly through strengthening political, economic and cultural ties among Muslim countries (such as through creating a common market and an Islamic Court of Justice).<sup>122</sup> Throughout his discourse, Qaradawi has shown considerable scepticism regarding the prospects of achieving Islamic unity even when such unity is conceived of in terms of unity of action. Qaradawi attributes this failure in part to strong western and Zionist opposition to Islamic unity. But more importantly, he blames the authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Muslim worlds which showed no interest in unifying their stances on important international issues. Qaradawi is yet to properly address the implications for Islamic unity of the coming to power of Islamic movements in predominantly Sunni countries such as Turkey, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.<sup>123</sup> Here, it must be mentioned, even if in passing, that some of Qaradawi's associates who share his vision for Islamic unity, especially Ghanushi in Tunisia, are now in positions of power, which may rekindle Qaradawi's hopes for Islamic unity.

The starting point for Qaradawi's discourse on globalization is the distinction he draws between the universalism of Islam (*'alamiyat al-Islam*) and western-led globalization (*al-'awlama*). Qaradawi writes that there is a 'major difference between the universalism that Islam brought and the globalization that the West, especially the United States, advocates today'.<sup>124</sup> With great passion, he goes on to state:

Globalization, in its clearest manifestations today, means westernizing the world or in other words Americanizing the World. It is a polite term for new imperialism, which shed its old garments and abandoned its old ways in order to impose a new reign of hegemony under this gentle title: globalization.<sup>125</sup>

Elsewhere he warns that ‘globalization will consume us if we [Muslims] remain solitary, scattered and dispersed’.<sup>126</sup> Qaradawi’s critique of western or US-led globalization is threefold. To start with, globalization is tantamount to establishing American hegemony on the world. Countries that defy the United States are subjected to economic sieges, threats of military attack and actual attacks.<sup>127</sup> Second, globalization entails forcing countries to follow the economic model and policies that the United States favours, through US control of international economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.<sup>128</sup> Third, globalization is a vehicle to promote the American culture which is based on ‘materialism, utilitarianism, and excessive freedom’. Qaradawi accuses the United States and western countries of using UN bodies to push their cultural agendas, while resorting to all sorts of ‘threats, intimidations, as well as promises and inducements’ in order to promote these agendas that run counter to the teachings of Islam, and indeed of Christianity.<sup>129</sup> In this context, he denounces the UN-sponsored ‘Population Conference’ that was held in Cairo in 1994 and the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, focusing on how the United States and western countries exploited both forums to pass resolutions in favour of ‘permitting abortion, permitting same-sex marriages, sexual freedoms for minors . . . and other matters that violate all religions and violate the norms and conventions of our [Muslim] societies’.<sup>130</sup> Qaradawi concludes that globalization does not respect the specificities of different countries and cultures, while Islam does. For Qaradawi, there is an alternative to globalization: the universalism of Islam. He is under no illusion, though, that the dominant powers are ready to embrace this more inclusive and humanistic alternative.

The embodiment of the public intellectual, Qaradawi speaks to multiple audiences: Muslims of different backgrounds, nationalities, sects and persuasions; Arab secularists; and especially the West. Qaradawi’s discourse lies at the nexus of at least four intersecting spheres. To start with, it is at the core of the Islamists’ project to construct an image of international relations that is grounded in Islam, and especially the Qur’an. Qaradawi’s contribution to this project is immense. His discourse on international relations is far more extensive than that of fellow Islamists (such as Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa, Rashid al Ghanushi and Fahmi Huwaydi)<sup>131</sup> and is firmly anchored in the Qur’an, the Sunna and Qaradawi’s *wasati* approach to Islam. Among contemporary Arab Islamists, only the discourse of the late Sayyid Fadlallah matches that of Qaradawi, in terms of both quantity and quality. It is well beyond the scope of this article, though, to conduct a comparative analysis of the voluminous discourses on international relations of the two scholars. Suffice it to say here that Fadlallah addresses in great detail each of the seven themes presented in the preceding section; offering rich grounds for comparison.<sup>132</sup>

Second, Qaradawi’s discourse is not that different in terms of substance from the discourses of secular Arab nationalists, like Mohammad Hasanayn Haykal, Galal Amin and Salim al-Hoss (just to name a prominent few).<sup>133</sup> Qaradawi shares the secular Arab nationalists’ apprehensions about the grave implications of globalization and American hegemony for the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as their opposition to Israel and the US and western policies towards the Middle East (especially the ‘war on terrorism’ and the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan). Like them, he also envisions Arab and Islamic unity in terms of unity of purpose and action, and

primarily as a tool to combat Israel and American and western designs on the Middle East.

Islamists like Qaradawi (and Fadlallah) steal the ground from under the feet of Arab nationalists by addressing their grand causes, albeit from a religious vantage point. In their discourses on international relations, particularly Palestine, Islamists effectively blend religious and nationalist themes, thus offering, to quote Mohammed Ayoob, a 'heady brew that can mobilize populations simultaneously for God and Country'.<sup>134</sup> The greater willingness of Islamists, especially Qaradawi, to criticize authoritarian Arab regimes for their failures to provide venues for meaningful political participation and gross violations of basic human rights (as well as to highlight the link between authoritarianism and subservience to western interests) enhances their lure for Arab publics.

Third, Qaradawi's discourse on international relations forms an integral component of the response of Third World intellectuals to global developments that include: (1) post-Second World War western dominance over the international political and economic orders, which was only reinforced by the end of the East–West conflict; (2) US exploitation of its international position to promote an agenda that defied the wishes of many in the Global South (especially in the Muslim world);<sup>135</sup> (3) rising disparities between the North and South not only in socioeconomic terms but also in terms of levels of political participation and degrees of freedom; and (4) globalization. Qaradawi brings to the discussion of international relations notions of justice and morality (which for him are divine in origin) in order to challenge gross disparities of power and wealth in the international system; and question the judgments and decisions of the mighty, particularly the United States. While firmly grounded in religion, Qaradawi's discourse is counter-hegemonic, or anti-imperialist, par excellence. It comprises powerful critiques of the prevailing international order; US and western policies towards the Third World; the conduct of authoritarian Arab regimes; and globalization. These themes figure prominently in the writings of Third World intellectuals, such as Richard A. Dello Buono<sup>136</sup> and Samir Amin.<sup>137</sup> Dozens of western scholars have also contributed to the critique of the prevailing international order and America's role in it, including Andrew Bagevich,<sup>138</sup> Mel Gurtov,<sup>139</sup> Chalmers Johnson,<sup>140</sup> Joseph Stiglitz,<sup>141</sup> Stephan Zunes<sup>142</sup> and especially Naom Chomsky.<sup>143</sup> In a nutshell, it is more fitting to compare the discourses of contemporary Islamists, like Qaradawi, to the discourses of Third World and western critics of the prevailing international order than to the works of early and medieval Islamic scholars.

Last but not least, Qaradawi's discourse on international relations is, on the whole, in line with the realist tradition, broadly construed. The assumptions he invokes about the conflicting tendencies within human nature, causality, the centrality of conflict and power to international relations and the absence of an international authority to restrain powerful actors are all consistent with realism. Most importantly, though, Qaradawi's 'law of mutual restraining' corresponds to realist balance of power theory. Lobell *et al.* note that all variants of realism subscribe to 'three first principles and core assumptions', namely: 'First, human beings cannot survive as individuals, but rather as members of larger groups . . . Second, politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups . . . Third, power is a necessary requirement for any group to secure its goals.'<sup>144</sup> If one is to adopt this very broad construal of the realist tradition then our author belongs to it.

Qaradawi, however, deviates from the precepts of realism in at least four major ways. To start with, Qaradawi's principal units of analysis are not states but civilizations, and in particular the Muslim *umma* – a community based on religion that transcends state boundaries – and 'the West'. To be more accurate, Qaradawi views international relations as a dense nexus of conflictual and cooperative relations involving individuals, groups, states, transnational movements (particularly Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood) and especially civilizations.

Second, Qaradawi assigns major weight to religion as an independent and systemic influence in international relations. For Qaradawi, units construct their identity primarily in terms of a hegemonic religion, or in terms of a hegemonic ideology that opposes religion (that is, secular and atheist ideologies). In the parlance of constructivist theory, religion (or opposition to it) is a constituent element of the identity of states and other actors on the international arena. To paraphrase Fiona Adamson, religion, for Qaradawi, is a 'global ideological structure' that influences agents' behaviour, as does the international distribution of power or capabilities.<sup>145</sup> Qaradawi's views on the centrality of religion to international relations and its systemic nature draw him (on this point) closer to the camp of social constructivists than to that of realists.

Third, while Qaradawi's construal of war as a 'necessary evil' – that emanates from the operation of the law of mutual restraining – is very much in line with realism, his views on the distinction between just defensive wars and unjust offensive wars – and his insistence that all wars ought to be fought for lawful purposes, and in accordance with strict moral and legal codes – hark back to medieval Christian notions of just war. They are also similar to the views of Christian realists, especially Reinhold Niebuhr.<sup>146</sup> Fourth, Qaradawi views victory in war as resulting from both material and immaterial forces, and in particular the belief in the justice of one's cause and total faith in God.<sup>147</sup> The considerable weight that Qaradawi places on the intangible of religious faith in achieving military victory sets him apart from most realists.

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to dwell further on the realist elements in the international relations discourse of Qaradawi and how his discourse compares to different strands of realism. A few final remarks should suffice. To start with, Qaradawi is obviously not a structural realist (neorealist), for he assigns major weight to the role of domestic forces in explaining the behaviour of the United States, other western powers and Israel, without neglecting the importance of external variables. Second, Qaradawi's great interest in explaining the foreign policies of states (in light of systemic and societal variables simultaneously) draws him near the camp of the neoclassical realists. Most importantly perhaps, his conceptualization of international relations bears certain affinity to the views of righteous realists, especially Reinhold Niebuhr, the founder of Christian realism.<sup>148</sup> Joel Rosenthal characterizes Niebuhr as such: 'A man of considerable intellectual range and gifted with a great facility in using both the oral and the written word, Niebuhr excelled as a popular social critic as well as a political philosopher. It seemed no issue escaped his purview or eluded his grasp.'<sup>149</sup> Such a description could also be used to express the characteristics of Qaradawi.

Beyond the obvious similarity in their religious backgrounds and careers as preachers and public intellectuals, Niebuhr and Qaradawi subscribe to similar notions about human nature, the centrality of power and the importance of taming it through principles derived from religion, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force, and the limited usefulness of weapons of mass destruction.

This comparison should not be pushed too far though. For, while voicing many apprehension about American foreign policy in the post-Second World War era, Niebuhr and the righteous realists would not accept Qaradawi's (and the Islamists') depiction of the United States as an arrogant, oppressive and immoral power. In a nutshell, a comparative analysis of the international relations narratives of Islamists, like Qaradawi and Fadlallah, and different variants of realists (especially righteous realists) is a worthy enterprise.

This article has provided detailed treatment of Qaradawi's views on the underpinning principles of international relations, *jihad* and its role in international relations and a range of other issues that are at the core of international relations in the post-Cold War era. While Qaradawi does not suggest a general theory of international relations (and is not an International Relations scholar in the academic sense), his extensive discourse offers penetrating insights into how contemporary Islamists conceptualize international relations. An in-depth analysis of Qaradawi's texts also opens gateways to comparing the discourses of Islamists to those of secular Arab nationalists, Third World and western critics of the prevailing international political and economic orders, and realists.

An underlying theme of this article is the centrality of religion to Qaradawi's conceptualization of international relations. Religion enters Qaradawi's discourse in two distinct ways. First, he sees it as a systemic influence on international relations, helping shape actors' identities and foreign policies. Second, it is his indispensable tool for comprehending and transforming international relations. To put it in plain language, religion is the lens through which Qaradawi views political and social reality, including international relations. While quoting dozens of *hadiths*, and leaning on the works of classic and contemporary Islamic scholars as well as the intellectual produce of non-Islamic (including western) authors, it is the Qur'an (the sacred text) that forms the irreducible core of Qaradawi's conceptualization of international relations. The fully internalized Qur'an is part and parcel of Qaradawi's psyche; it is the built-in compass with which he navigates the turbulent waters of international politics. On one level, and to use constructivist terminology, the sacred text is the most authoritative set of 'shared ideas, beliefs and values' that binds Qaradawi to his Muslim audience.<sup>150</sup> At a deeper level, though, it is the medium through which he articulates his thoughts on international relations.

Stylistically speaking, the Qur'an flows effortlessly into Qaradawi's discourse, with the sacred text blending seamlessly with the non-sacred text. Qur'anic verses are regularly invoked in order to shed light on all the topics that have been considered. While Qaradawi's arguments are logical and supported by evidence, they are invariably buttressed by the authority of Qur'anic verses. In addition, Qur'anic terms and imagery permeate Qaradawi's discourse, leading to a sophisticated amalgam of sacred and non-sacred text. A few examples will help illustrate this last point. First, the struggle for Palestine is invariably portrayed as *jihad* in the path of God, the religious significance of Jerusalem is underscored by invoking the Qur'anic bond between the Sacred Mosque in Mecca and al-Aqsa Mosque, as in verse 17.1: 'Glory be to Him who carried his servant by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Furthest Mosque';<sup>151</sup> and today's Jewish people are compared to the Jews as depicted in the Qur'an.<sup>152</sup> Second, US conduct is conceptualized in the context of the Qur'anic notions of *istikbar* (arrogance), *isti'la'* (haughtiness) and *tughyan* (oppression); and



the United States is visualized as a latter-day pharaoh. Finally, the Muslims are invariably referred to by the Qur'anic term *umma*, and their present divisions are contrasted to the unity of the *umma* that the Qur'an called for, as in verses 21:92: 'This is then your community, a single community', and 23:52: 'This, your nation, is a single nation'.<sup>153</sup> In sum, Qaradawi's discourse is framed within the sacred language of the Qur'an. This anchoring signifies the centrality of the sacred text for how Islamists, like Qaradawi, formulate and convey their thoughts about disturbing aspects of international politics, such as the gross inequalities in the international distribution of power, wealth and technology as well as the 'profane' conduct of the United States, other western countries, Israel and authoritarian Arab regimes.

### Notes

1. M. Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq: Al-jazeera and Middle East Politics Today* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.28.
2. B. Graf and J. Skovgaard-Peterson, 'Introduction', in B. Graf and J. Skovgaard-Peterson (eds.), *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf Qaradawi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp.1–17. Qaradawi talks extensively about his education at al-Azhar and his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood in his memoirs, especially vols.1 and 2. Three volumes have been published already, covering his career until 2002. Y. Qaradawi, *Ibn al-Qarya wa al-kuttab* [Son of the Village and the Kuttab], Vols.1–3 (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002, 2004, 2006). Al-Khatib also offers a detailed intellectual biography of Qaradawi. M. al-Khatib, *Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Faqih al-Sahwa al-Islamiya Sira Fikriya Tahliyya* [Yusuf Qaradawi: The Jurisprudent of the Islamic Awakening: An Analytical Intellectual Biography] (Beirut: Center for Civilization for the Development of Islamic Thought, 2009).
3. Qaradawi, *Ibn al-Qarya wa al-kuttab*, Vol.2, p.124. Skovgaard-Peterson notes, however, that Qaradawi joined the Movement in 1941. J. Skovgaard-Peterson, 'Yusuf al-Qaradawi and al-Azhar', in Graf and Skovgaard-Peterson (eds.), *Global Mufti*, p.32.
4. Qaradawi devotes about half of the second volume of his memoirs to discuss his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood and the troubled relations between the Movement and the new regime in Egypt after the 1952 revolution. Qaradawi, *Ibn al-Qarya wa al-kuttab*, Vol.2, pp.13–209.
5. See inter alia Qaradawi's interview with *al-Shari'a wa al-Hayat*, 24 Feb. 2008, <http://qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/843.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 12 April 2012).
6. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Baba wa al-Islam* [The Pope and Islam], <http://qaradawi.net/library/82/3994.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=> (accessed 23 April 2012).
7. For information about the IUMS, see <http://islamopediaonline.org/websites-institutions/international-union-muslim-scholars-dublin-ireland> (accessed 12 April 2012).
8. Graf and Skovgaard-Peterson, 'Introduction', p.8.
9. *Ibid.*, p.12.
10. Examples of such thinkers would include the Egyptian Muhammad al-'Imara, Mohammad Abbas, and Fahmi Huwaidi, the Tunisian Rashid al-Ghannushi and the Lebanese Shiite cleric Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. For an analysis of Islamist views on international relations, see, inter alia, S.E. Baroudi, 'Islamist Perspectives on International Relations: The Discourse of Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010)', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.49, No.1 (Jan. 2013), pp.107–33.
11. M.E. Spiro, 'Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation', in M. Banton (ed.), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), p.94.
12. In Qaradawi's words, the Sunna 'functions as the practical exegesis of the Qur'an' and is indispensable for comprehending the Qur'an. Y. Qaradawi, *Approaching the Sunnah: Comprehension and Controversy*, translated by J. Qureshi (London and Washington, DC: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2006), p.1.
13. See, in particular, Y. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Wasatiya al-Islamiya: Ma'alem wa Manarat* [The Jurisprudence of the Islamic Moderate and Balanced Approach: Landmarks and Signposts] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2010).

14. Ibid., pp.54–6.
15. Ibid., p.55.
16. Ibid.
17. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd* [The Islamic Awakening from Adolescence to Adulthood] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002), pp.114–15.
18. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad: Dirasa Muqarna li-Ahkamimih wa Falsfath fi Daou' al-Qur'an wa al-Sunna* [The Jurisprudence of Jihad: A Comparative Study of its Rules and Philosophy in Light of the Qur'an and the Sunna], Vol.2 (Cairo: Wehbe Press, 2009), p.853. See also Y. Qaradawi, Friday Sermon, 27 Sept. 2002, <http://qaradawi.net/component/content/article/18/1081.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=> (accessed 23 April 2012).
19. K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
20. Qaradawi, *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd*, p.115.
21. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.1, pp.443–4 and Vol.2, pp.854 and 865.
22. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*, <http://qaradawi.net/library/80/3948.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=> (accessed 12 April 2012).
23. Ibid.
24. This section relies primarily on Qaradawi's *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vols.1 and 2; and Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf: Nazharat Ta'siliyya* [Islam and Violence: Some Fundamental Views] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2007).
25. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.1, p.65.
26. Ibid., pp.159–169.
27. Ibid., pp.171–84.
28. Ibid., pp.185–209.
29. Ibid., p.185.
30. Ibid., pp.223–39.
31. Ibid., pp.225–9.
32. Ibid., pp.228–9.
33. Ibid., pp.241–51.
34. For the discussion of these two perspectives on *jihad*, see mainly, *ibid.*, pp.257–439.
35. Ibid., esp. pp.285–333.
36. Ibid.
37. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf: Nazharat Ta'siliyya*, p.912.
38. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.1, pp.263–70.
39. Ibid., esp. pp.499–504.
40. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf*, p.31.
41. Ibid., pp.31–3.
42. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.1, pp.125–7.
43. Ibid., pp.553–611.
44. Ibid., esp. pp.547–8.
45. Ibid., esp. pp.612–25.
46. Ibid., pp.359–84.
47. Ibid., p.385–91.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp.388–9.
50. Ibid., p.389.
51. Ibid., p.623.
52. Ibid.
53. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf: Nazharat Ta'siliyya*, pp.25–6.
54. Qaradawi, *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd*, p.289.
55. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.1, p.76.
56. Ibid., pp.262, 286.
57. Ibid., p.11.
58. Ibid., pp.269–72.
59. Ibid., p.620.
60. Ibid. pp.415–24.

61. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.1121–70; and *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf*, pp.27–9.
62. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al Jihad*, Vol.2, esp. pp.819–26.
63. Qaradawi's hostility towards communism shows in the statements he makes in *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima*, where he pronounces that a communist should not be allowed to marry a Muslim woman, and if he is married to one he should be separated from her so that his children do not grow up as communists. Finally a communist who dies in his belief should neither be given an Islamic burial, nor be buried in the graves of Muslims. Y. Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin Wasat al-Mujtama'at al-Ukhra* [Regarding the Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: The Lives of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001), p.90.
64. Y. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnayn* [Our Umma between Two Centuries] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2000), p.45.
65. *Ibid.*, p.44.
66. *Ibid.*, p.56.
67. For references to America's exploitation of the green peril see, inter alia, *ibid.*, pp.244–5; and Y. Qaradawi, Friday sermon, 20 Sept. 2002, <http://qaradawi.net/component/content/article/18/1080.html> (accessed 26 March 2012).
68. Y. Qaradawi, *Khitabna al-Islami for 'Asr al-'Awlama* [Our Islamic Discourse in the Era of Globalization] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2004), p.162; and *Al-Sharia wa al-Hayat*, 2 June 2005, <http://qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/761.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 12 April 2012).
69. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnayn*, pp.78–82.
70. Qaradawi, *Khitabna al-Islami for 'Asr al-'Awlama*, p.158.
71. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Sharia wa al-Hayat*, 25 Feb. 2003, [http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu\\_no=2&item\\_no=3009&version=1&template\\_id=105&parent\\_id=16](http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=3009&version=1&template_id=105&parent_id=16) (accessed 7 July 2010).
72. *Ibid.*
73. The terms in quote marks are the labels used by neoclassical realists. J. Talliaferro, S.E. Lobell and N.M. Ripsman, 'Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy', in S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman and J.W. Talliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.20.
74. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.853–61.
75. See, in particular, Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima*; and Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Halal wa l-Haram fi l-Islam* (Beirut, Damascus and Amman, Al-Maktab al-Islami, n.a.). For convenience, I rely on the English translation. Y. Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, translated by K. el-Helbawy, M.M. Siddiqui and S. Shukry (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2006). For western intellectuals' views on the importance of this controversial work, see, inter alia, O. Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p.150.
76. Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, pp.335–43.
77. *Ibid.*, p.336.
78. S. Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus: Dar al-'Ilm, undated), pp.10–13.
79. Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima*, pp.38–9.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
81. *Ibid.*, p.35.
82. *Ibid.*, p.33.
83. See, inter alia, Y. Qaradawi, Friday Sermon, 13 July 2001, <http://qaradawi.net/component/content/article/18/1045.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=> (accessed 10 July 2011).
84. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnayn*, pp.244–5.
85. Y. Qaradawi, *al-Sharia wa al-Hayat*, 25 Feb. 2003.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Qaradawi, *Khitabna al-Islami for 'Asr al-'Awlama*, p.126; and Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.1176, 1186–8.
88. Qaradawi, *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya min al-Murahaqa ila al-Rushd*, p.219.
89. *Ibid.*, p.220.
90. Qaradawi, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqaliyat al-Muslima*, p.69.
91. For Qaradawi's support of the NATO operation in Libya see, inter alia, 'Outspoken Cleric Guides Arabs on Revolution', *Financial Times*, 8 Dec. 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96a52b92-21a7-11e1-a19f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1qDEjCzZW> (accessed 28 March 2012). For his denunciation of

- the Assad regime in Syria see, inter alia, <http://qaradawi.net/articles/1-2009-12-12-10-32-02/5740-2012-04-05-07-30-12.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 5 April 2012); and <http://qaradawi.net/news/5473-2011-12-31-14-05-43.html> (accessed 26 March 2012).
92. For coverage of the ban on Qaradawi's travel to France see, in particular, 'Abd al Bari 'Atwan, 'Sarkozy wa Man' al Qaradawi' [Sarkozy and the Travel Ban on Qaradawi], *al-Quds al-'Arabi* (London), 30 March 2012, <http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=data\2012\03\03-30\30z999.htm> (accessed 4 April 2012).
  93. Qaradawi states that the Palestinian cause has been constantly in his thoughts since he was 14 years of age. Y. Qaradawi, Friday Sermon, 5 Feb. 2010, <http://qaradawi.net/component/content/article/18/4850-2010-02-08-03-20-49.html> (accessed 21 June 2011).
  94. Qaradawi, *Nahnu wa al-Gharb*.
  95. Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.1207-8.
  96. See inter alia Qaradawi's interview with *Al-Shari'a wa al-Hayat*, 6 Feb. 2005, <http://qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/761.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 4 April 2012).
  97. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Quds Qadiya Kul Muslim* [Jerusalem: the Cause of Every Muslim] (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 2000), p.45.
  98. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnayn*, p.132.
  99. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf*, pp.33-9.
  100. Qaradawi, *Al-Quds Qadiya Kul Muslim*, p.31.
  101. *Ibid.*, p.45.
  102. A renowned Islamic scholar of the Wahhabi sect, ibn Baz (1910-99) was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1992 until his death. In the early 1990s, and in the context of the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians, Ibn Baz wrote that it is religiously permissible to pursue peace with Israel if the latter shows an inclination towards peace. Qaradawi gently, but firmly, rebukes ibn Baz for this position, which was an implicit endorsement of the Oslo accords. Qaradawi insisted that Israel remains a hostile and occupying power which prohibits any peace talks with it. For the exchange of fatwas with ibn Baz, see Y. Qaradawi, *Fatawa min Ajl Philastin* (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 2003), pp.7-30.
  103. For the conflict with the PA, see <http://qaradawi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/4835-2010-01-26-07-14-52.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 5 April 2012).
  104. Qaradawi, *Al-Islam wa al-'Unf*, pp.32-3.
  105. Qaradawi, *Fatawa min Ajl Philastin*, p.53.
  106. Y. Qaradawi, Friday Sermon, 8 Oct. 2010, <http://qaradawi.net/component/content/article/18/4789-2009-12-14-16-13-17.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=> (accessed 30 March 2012).
  107. For Qaradawi's criticisms of the Egyptian authorities during and after the Gaza offensive, see, inter alia, Y. Qaradawi, Friday Sermon, 1 Jan. 2010, [http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu\\_no=2&item\\_no=7449&version=1&template\\_id=104&parent\\_id=15](http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=7449&version=1&template_id=104&parent_id=15) (accessed 29 June 2011).
  108. Qaradawi characterizes his personal contribution to the Palestinian struggle as a civil *jihad*, since it primarily involves the collection of donations to support Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, through the International Conference for Jerusalem which he heads.
  109. For the inalienability of the 'right to return', see, inter alia, Qaradawi, *Fatawa min Ajl Philastin*, pp.57-62.
  110. *Ibid.*, p.56.
  111. *Ibid.*, p.5.
  112. Qaradawi, *Al-Quds Qadiyat Kul Muslim*, pp.104-21.
  113. *Ibid.*, p.121.
  114. Qaradawi argues that in terms of their religious beliefs (rejection of the trinity) and rituals (circumcising boys, avoiding intercourse with women during their monthly period, and not consuming pork), the Jews are closer to the Muslims than are the Christians. *Ibid.*, pp.37-42. See also Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.1203-5.
  115. Qaradawi, *Al-Quds Qadiyat Kul Muslim*, pp.85-90.
  116. *Ibid.*, pp.42-4.
  117. *Ibid.*, pp.85-8.
  118. Qaradawi accepts as *sahih* (correct) the *Hadith* that there will come a time when Muslims will hunt down the Jews and the latter will take shelter behind rocks (or trees in certain versions); but the

- rocks (or trees) will speak as such: 'Oh slave of Allah, Oh Muslim: this is a Jew behind me come and slay him.' Qaradawi, *Fatawa min Ajl Philastin*, pp.118–19.
119. Y. Qaradawi, *Kayf Nata'amal Ma' al-Qur'an al-'Azim* [Approaching the Magnificent Qur'an] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1999), pp.109–14.
  120. Y. Qaradawi, *Tarikhna al-Muftara 'Alayh* [Our Slandered History] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2005). Most Shia scholars reject this view of Islamic history. See, in particular, A.R. al-Nafis, *Al-Qradawi: Wakil Allah Am Wakil Bani Ummaya??* [Al-Qaradawi: The Deputy of God; or that of the Umayyads??] (Beirut: Dar al-Mizan, 2006).
  121. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnaym*, pp.128–30. See also Qaradawi's interview with *Al-Shari'a wa al-Hayat*, 6 Feb. 2005, <http://qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/761.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 4 April 2012).
  122. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnaym*, p.149; and *Fiqh al-Jihad*, Vol.2, pp.1098–9.
  123. Qaradawi has been especially critical of the secular regimes of Turkey and Tunisia, authoring a volume on the subject. Y. Qaradawi, *Al-Tataruf al-'Ilmani fi Muwjaha al-Islam: Nnamuzhaj Turkiya wa Tunis* [Secular Extremism Confronting Islam: The Models of Turkey and Tunisia] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001).
  124. Qaradawi, *Khitabna al-Islami for 'Asr al-'Awlama*, p.122.
  125. *Ibid.*, p.123.
  126. Qaradawi's interview with *Al-Shari'a wa al-Hayat*, 13 May 2002, <http://qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/4/709.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=> (accessed 12 April 2012).
  127. Qaradawi lists all the US military attacks on Muslim countries from the mid-1980s until the invasion of Afghanistan. Qaradawi, *Khitabna al-Islami for 'Asr al-'Awlama*, p.123.
  128. Qaradawi, *Umatna Bayn Qarnayn*, p.233.
  129. *Ibid.*
  130. *Ibid.*
  131. Browsers provides a good general overview of the discourses of these prominent Islamists. M. Browsers, *Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. pp.19–20, 48–9, 58–9, 63–7, 70, 80, 115, 153.
  132. See, in particular, Baroudi, 'Islamist Perspectives on International Relations'.
  133. For the international relations discourses of secular Arab nationalists, see, inter alia, S.E. Baroudi, 'Countering US Hegemony: The Discourse of Salim al-Hoss and other Arab Intellectuals', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.44, No.1 (Jan. 2008), pp.105–29.
  134. M. Ayooob, 'Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide' *International Studies Review*, Vol.9 (2007), pp.629–43.
  135. There are several studies on the negative perceptions of the United States in predominantly Muslim countries. See, inter alia, G. Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), especially pp.94–5 and 125.
  136. R.A. Dello Buono and X. de la Barra, *Latin America after the Neoliberal Debacle: Another Region is Possible* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
  137. See, inter alia, S. Amin, *Global History: A View from the South* (Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and Oxford: Pambazuka Press an imprint of Fahamu, 2011); and *Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism* (Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and Oxford: Pambazuka Press an imprint of Fahamu, 2010).
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