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The U.S. Mediator Role
in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict

By

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Dedication

“Praise be to God, who has not rejected my prayer or withheld his love from me!” (Psalm 66:20).

Second, to love; you shall never know true happiness until you have truly loved.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents. To my mother Evist Gheri (my friend, my right arm, love, protector, and guide), who taught me that even the largest task can be accomplished, if it is done one step at a time. The person who taught me that the only obstacles, are the ones we place ourselves, and that there was nothing impossible for me, if God was along my side. The person I first see during my difficulties to encourage me and during my happy times to celebrate. To my father Rommel Gonzalez (my hero, my love, my support, my protector, my source of courage), who is always by my side, who taught me that the best kind of knowledge to have is that which is learned through your efforts and who encourages me to be as big as possible. Who taught me that knowledge is something needed to be great, and finally, a tutor who was available every day to help me work on my thesis draft.

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The U.S. Mediator Role in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict

Ailyn Gonzalez

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to examine the distinct U.S. administration policies in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the creation of the latter. It details how successive administrations have helped, or not helped the countries move towards a solution of the crisis. In particular, the thesis looks at what the U.S. has done to promote peace in order to assist specialists make necessary reforms for success in their negotiations and peace talks. However, since it is really difficult to cover and examine each characteristic of a successful mediator, as well as relating it to the role of each administration, this research will focus on the commitment of the U.S administration as primary mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The research is organized as follows: Chapter One introduces the main research questions and argues the importance of this investigation. Chapter Two reviews the literature in reference to the effectiveness of international mediation and the United States of America's role as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Three aims to establish the United States of America's participation during the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while Chapter Four examines the U.S.'s mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Five discusses the current status of the U.S. as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Six

reviews some reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from active mediation. Finally, Chapter Seven reviews some obstacles and opportunities for the American role of mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The conclusion answers the main research questions laid out above, by asserting that the United State administration should take a more active and dominant role, and avoid withdrawal under frustrating circumstances. History suggests leadership, commitment, and a culturally sensitive approach should be maintained to further mediation and peace talks, instead of pushing for a solution that is not ripe. This would be more useful as compared to using Western mediation approaches, which are often not compatible with the Middle East region and their cultural situations. All of these factors have been deemed as necessary requirements for any international mediator to succeed.

Keywords: Mediation, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, US foreign policy, Mediator role.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The narration of war patterns behavior in the Middle East suggests that prevention and management of conflict strategies remains an obstacle for peace in the region. The unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine has been approached by many; however the recurrence of failure and outbreaks of violence needs more attention when considering legitimacy and rights as important elements constructing solid bases for an Israeli-Palestinian long-lasting peace.

As of today Israelis and Palestinians have not been able to agree on what constitutes a legitimate status quo, (meaning, what they can do, want to do and what they are going to do) and on the rights of both people. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deeper than this, since it is not an interstate conflict but also a conflict between and within two civil societies. This is the reason why this research aims to answer the following questions.

1.1 Major Research Questions

This thesis will examine the role of the United States as a primary mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and at what point the United States of America has intervened as a mediator in the conflict. In addition, the thesis will seek to assess how and when has the U.S. role as mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict helped improve or worsen the situation? As will be demonstrated in the thesis, the

level of commitment of the US president to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict affects the success of the US as an international mediator in this particularly intractable conflict.

1.2 Methods and Sources

This thesis will analyze the literature regarding what makes a successful third party mediator in international crisis. Also, the thesis will describe the U.S. mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, paying particular attention to how the U.S. role as mediator has helped improve or worsen the situation. In this context, the paper will explore negative and positive impacts of their role as well as its overall commitment to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, within a constructivist framework, supported by evidence from scholarly books, research papers, dissertations, and journal articles on the issue.

For Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructivism “is a set of assumptions about the world and human motivations”, creating alternatives for other theories of international relations. Citing Wendt (2000) she sustains that “in this particular framework, the variable of interests in contrast, such as international institutions or domestic preferences, are not relevant for its objective facts about the world, but rather due to its social meanings” (Slaughter, Anne M 2011, p.19). And again, in (1995), adding that “this meaning is constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms as well as beliefs...which scholars must understand if they are to explain states’ behavior” (Slaughter, 2011, p.4)

Constructivism deals with a set of propositions on how the International System works. The paradigm on conflict, its causes and its possible ways of transforming are rarely mentioned as roots of problems and / or its answers to a solution. Culture, knowledge, ideas, norms as well as values are human motivations, sources of an ideational agenda which define, states' foreign policies, and how material resources, their importance and actor dispositions are perceived. Therefore, constructivism is a relevant approach to use if mediation efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are to succeed.

1.3 Importance

There are several reasons that make the U.S.'s commitment to peace promotion a priority in the foreign policy. Why should the U.S. promote peace among Israelis and Palestinians? First, this conflict triggers frustration and resentment that fuels the enemies of America today, supporting the justification of war with the U.S by extremist groups.

Second, this conflict weakens the U.S.'s moderate Islamic alliances, an important resource for bandwagoning against the enemies of American allies and friends, the moderates in the Islamic world, who are trying to fight American enemies (Riedel, 2011). Although the promotion of peace to eradicate extremism is a solution, history suggests that some do not want a lasting peace, but to eliminate Israelis (Fendius, 2012). For the US, it seems that its primary goal is to isolate extremism in the Islamic world and to strengthen the moderates, who are fighting

for peace and for the two state solution. It almost goes without saying that the U.S. also retains a strong commitment to Israel and its continuation as a sovereign state.

Finally, the U.S., as a powerful actor in the international system, is well-placed to act as mediator; though whether it is committed to acting as such remains in question. But, the American academic circle, particularly speaking about the ones specialist in the Middle East has been of relative benefit. There has been a lack of promotion on public political debate about the Arab Israeli polemics, partly because those who are allowed a forum took almost identical pro-Israel positions. Therefore, some enhancement towards broadening the Middle East policy making process should be procured (Hudson, 1996).

The importance of the United States as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is beyond any doubt in most of the Washington policy circles for years. The US leadership has played a significant role in negotiations in the past and the US is trying to continue to be the most important actor in bringing both of these arch-rival parties to the negotiation table. A fruitful peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis is an essential strategic interest of the United States. If such an agreement is really possible then it would contribute not only to the regional stabilization of that part of the world but also resolve the resentment of the US policies across the Middle East. This resentment is in fact encouraging the terrorist recruiters and it is also hindering and restricting the US regional policies. But it's true that in spite of all the efforts of the sole superpower of the world, Israeli occupation is further entrenched each year, the people of both Israel and

Palestine are continuing to suffer, and the obstacles to peace are growing more and more difficult.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict encompasses many factors that need attention in order to come up with better conflict management and conflict resolution approaches. This literature review aims to embrace some concepts and use them as a starting point for this thesis. Some of these concepts are the definition of international mediation as a form of conflict management, and those characteristics which are important elements of a successful international mediation.

It is also considered relevant for purposes of this thesis to establish a position in reference to the topic of international alliances and their compatibility with their mediators' role during an international dispute, since research suggests that it is not alliances that are the most important element for purposes of successful mediation, as some authors allege, but the commitment of the mediator. Also, there are some positions that refer to international mediation within a domestic mediation framework, which establishes that a mediator must be neutral. This is contrary to some theories of international relations discussed herein. In order to make this point, it is important to explore: the origin of the practice of mediation in Western as well as non-Western cultures, discussing the role of culture as a neglected factor in international mediation; the conceptualization of the practice of international

mediation; and some characteristics identified as relevant for a successful mediation.

Finally, it is also important for the purposes of this thesis to establish the different theoretical approaches regarding mediation, such as realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and the trust oriented approach, in order to be able to take a specific approach that support this work.

Gulliver (1979) sustains that “the practice of settling disputes through third parties intervention has had a rich history in both, Western and Non-Western cultures”, as well (Bercovitch, 2011, p.35). But while the use of this particular conflict management tool began to be implemented in the 20th century, its qualitative study dates back only to the 1960’s (Schro & Gerner, 2001). “Mediation is not a random process. Mediators make choices that maximize the likelihood of achieving outcomes given their situation. Developing a better understanding of the processes that link mediator attributes to conflict management outcomes allows us to understand the madness behind the method of mediation” (Bercovitch, 2006, p. 323). Mediation in foreign affairs also has a long history and, similar to the progress of the nation-state system, has been employed increasingly. Diplomatic practitioners have come to contemplate mediation as part of their commodity, while some of the first experiences in this practice have been influential references to their personal experience and knowledge. International mediation in the political sphere is increasingly accompanied by the intermediary activities of several actors at the mid- and grassroots levels in societies experimenting intense violent clashes. A

mediator that intervenes in an international dispute may be categorized in different ways: A prominent personality (e.g., former U.S. President Jimmy Carter), a coalition of states (e.g., The Quartertet), small states (e.g., Norway) or an international organization (e.g., the U.N.) and more recently, international mediation is frequently done by a formal, regional organization, the United Nations, or representative of a state. At the same time, informal mediation by respected persons and religious figures acting as mediators, have come to be of increasing relevance in international mediation. A clear illustration for this scenario is the intervention of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the low-profile, private negotiations of the Quaker community.

In addition to dealing with the distinct measures, essential to achieving a mission or organizational objectives, these practitioners frequently find that they must involve different parties as part of this conflict resolution dynamic in order to meet their goals, such as maintaining a ceasefire, providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, or dispensing health care to vulnerable populations. “Recent manifestations of ethno-political conflict and the international community’s reaction to these have thus raised additional challenges for the theory and practice of mediation as a form of third-party intervention” (Fisher, 2001, p.6).

Some of the components important to be present in order for international mediation as a form of international conflict management to occur are: “(1) A prolonged conflict, (2) reconciliation efforts made by individuals or actors involved have reach an impasse, (3) neither actor is able to face further costs or escalation of

the dispute, and (4) all parties involved agree to some forms of mediation and are ready to engage in direct or indirect negotiation” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p. 13).

Mediation is “deemed to be partially successful when it has initiated negotiation and a dialogue between the parties. It is defined as being of limited success when it has achieved a cease fire or a break in hostilities only,” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p.7). Bercovitch (1991) contrasts this with a second finding, category failure, which is defined as “occurring when mediation has had not obvious or documented influence on the dispute, or the parties’ behavior” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p.6).

Some authors such as Bercovitch and Houston (2000) and Irani (1999) define mediation as “a specific type of political activity, which highlights the role of a third party, in facilitating a negotiation process. This third party may be a government official whose country is not a direct party in the dispute, someone associated with an international body like the United Nations, or unofficial diplomacy, representatives of a non-governmental organization such as the Quakers, or an individual such as Jimmy Carter, who may or may not be a citizen of one of the conflict states” (Gerner and Schrod. 2001, p.1).

Gelpi (1999, p. 108) also defines mediation as, “any attempts by third parties to produce a negotiated settlement, such efforts could involve anything from offering ‘good offices’ through official attempts at mediation or arbitration to direct forcible intervention”.

Marieke Kleiboer (1998, p.6) maintains that in international mediation in contrast to the traditional concept of domestic mediation a mediator only assist disputants in making their own decisions, although considerable pressure on parties is exerted occasionally in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Different to arbitration or adjudication, mediation is not binding unless the involved parties choose to make them so.

In contrast, “according to Fisher and Keashly, mediation at the international level involves pacific interventions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working towards a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives and in some cases the application of leverage” (Joao Gomez Porto, 2012, P.4).

2.1 Characteristics of Successful International Mediation

Kleiboer (1996) argues that mediation research pays particular attention on three main characteristics of a dispute that affects the results of mediation. These characteristics are: 1) conflict ripeness; 2) level of conflict intensity; and the 3) nature of the issues in conflict. On the other hand the characteristics of a successful international mediator proposed by Kleiboer are impartiality and motivations to mediate, leverage and status, they are discussed below

2.1.1 Conflict Ripeness

Proper timing of mediation initiatives as a relevant element to succeed has often been discussed. “It is assumed that conflicts pass through a life cycle that

encompasses a number of distinguishable phases, and that certain stages are more amenable to outside intervention than others” (Young 1967, p.19-20).

The assumption in particular is that in order for mediation to be effective it needs to begin at such *ripe moments*. Conflicting opinions exist, however, in reference to what constitutes such moments (Kleibore, 1994).

Many argue that a conflict is ripe when: a mutually hurting impasse occurs, marked by “a recent impending catastrophe occurs marked by a recent or impending catastrophe” (Zartman 1983, p.85; Modelski 1964, p.43; Pruitt 1981, p.17; and Assefa 1987, p.195). The efforts of both parties to impose unilateral resolutions are neutralized and bilateral solutions turn out to be possible leading opponents to perceive a workable alternative to war, and a power balance is altered affecting negatively the other party. The advantageous side starts perceiving weakness.

According to Kleiboer (1994) other authors argue that the length of conflict is directly related to the persistence or change of attitudes of the adversaries toward the conflict.

The classical view that endorses late involvement is that mediation has often seemed most effective when failure to reach an agreement is triggering a crisis, a perception of an emergency will intensely stimulate the motivations of the recalcitrant parties to moderate their inflexibility as well as reconsider their demands (Northedge and Donelan 1971; Frei 1976; Rubin 1981; Moore 1987; Koh 1990). But Edmead (1971) argues that mediation needs to begin at an early stage, which is well before any cycle of violence arises.

In contrast to the classical approach, in his research study of 257 international mediation attempts, Bercovitch found that “the longer a dispute lasts, the less amenable it is to mediation” (Kleibore, 1996, p 363). On the other hand, “mediation efforts initiated between twelve and thirty-six months have proven more successful,” (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991, p.22).

Kleiboer (1991, p.363) and Stedman (1996) see ripeness as a “function of internal political changes within groups in conflict, such as the emergence of new leaders, divided leaderships or a split in a government, previously unified in its war aims”. And, a crucial element for the appearance of such ripe moments is “the developments within contending parties”.

2.1.2 Level of Conflict Intensity

The meaning of level of intensity remains ambiguous according to Kleiboer (1996, p.363). However, this author identifies this characteristic as the second in importance, “frequently alleged to affect mediation outcome”. The greater the intensity, the more the risk of polarization of positions among the disputants, causing a “greater predisposition to reject any mediation offer,” (Modelski 1964; Frei 1975, Brockner 1982 in Kleiboer 1996, p.363).

On the other hand, in his research on intensity, where “the number of fatalities experienced by each disputant is a variable”, he achieves empirical support for the hypothesis that: “as the number of fatalities in an armed conflict increase,

the likelihood that mediation will become successful suffers a consistent decay” Bercovitch, (1991, p.23). Therefore, the author suggests a different approach.

Kleiboer (1996, p.364) argues instead that according to Jackson (1952) and Young (1967, p. 68) “the greater the intensity of a conflict, the higher the likelihood that mediation will be both accepted and successful as a method of minimizing losses”.

Assefa (1987, p.194-195) asserts that “while the level of intensity continuously increases rather than stabilizes as war continues”, this however, is not an obstacle for the achievement of a mediated settlement. This author concludes that even deep conflict should not be disregarded as a candidate for mediation.

2.1.3 The Nature of the Issue

A last characteristic of the debate over the importance of various factors tied to the effectiveness of mediation concerns the nature of the issue. Bertcovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, p.14), for instance differentiate between five issues:

- “Sovereignty: involving players with contrasting claims to specific territory,
- Ideology: focusing on the nature of a political system, basic values or beliefs,
- Security issues: concerning frontiers, borders and territories,
- Issues of self-determination,
- National selfhood,
- Independence conflicts and a residual category of other types of conflicts”.

Their research findings on this particular topic are that among the conflicts most amenable to successful mediation, the issues of territory or security are more important than ideology or independence.

Fisher and Rubin adopt the idea that, “even if conflicting issues appear to be entirely zero-sum, it could be helpful to redefine or divide it into negotiable separate issues and to try to substitute those against one another” (Fisher 1971, p.141-2; Rubin 1981, p.30). Druckman, Broome, and Korper (1988) “demonstrated that separating issues may be useful, if interests are decoupled from values. But, when conflicting issues at stake are originated from core value disagreements, disputes are challenging to settle” (Kleiboer, 1996, p.364). They also mention that other authors identify additional and relevant characteristics of a successful international mediation such as the dynamic between parties.

For Kleiboer, academic debate in reference to mediation success and parties involved, it is emphasized by six characteristics: 1) parties identification, 2) cohesiveness, 3) type of regime, 4) motivation to mediate, 5) the distribution of power among them, and 6) previous and ongoing relationships. On the other hand according to Maria Carmelina Lodoño Lazaro in *Effectiveness of International Mediation* (2003, p. 328), argues that factors “related to their level of power, their political regime or previous relationship between the disputants” are critical to successful mediation. These characteristics are important to recognize, because they will help practitioners of foreign affairs and conflict resolution as well as other related scholars, mediators and other professionals involved in the Israeli-

Palestinian mediation to understand how the dynamic of effective international mediation works in order to apply it successfully in the field.

Identification of Parties

The parties' characteristics can be recognized in many ways; what is contested is which characteristics are tied to greater mediation effectiveness and how to anticipate effective mediation outcomes.

For Kleiboer, in theory, consensus exists about that mediation would only be effective, if the disputing parties are explicitly classified and distinguishable by group's characteristics and limitations. However, "this is problematic in practice" as stated by Kleiboer, and explained by Assefa (1996, p.365).

Assefa (1987) observed that predominantly in situations of impromptu partisan violence, like uprisings or civil wars, the group's identity of at least one of the players is often indescribable. "In these particular scenarios, there is no one to settle with" (Modelski, 1964, p.142).

Another common issue, according to numerous historical cases of international mediation, is that "it is rather obvious to a third party who the disputants are, even though the parties themselves are refusing to identify and grant recognition to the opposite group as a legitimate participant whose needs and interests, as well as values, have to be taken seriously into consideration" (Hare 1992, p.58). The Palestinian case has been often pointed to as an example of this phenomenon (Gazit, 1983). Kleiboer adds that, "even when disputants might be

clearly identified, these groups might often not act as an organized group, or not be recognized as such” (1996, p.365).

Cohesiveness

Kleiboer identifies cohesiveness in two ways. The first one refers to the “stability of the parties’ internal power structures (i.e., whether an identifiable leader or representative exists who has full authority to negotiate)” (Assefa, 1987, p.13).

Also cohesiveness is “associated with the nature and quantity of the domestic constituency. This is particularly critical when a representative needs to deal with concessions without losing any of the constituencies; and create a need for mediation to take place not only among the adversarial parties but also among factions within the parties themselves” (Kleiboer, 1994, P.365).

A particular scenario proves this argument. “When mediating the 1973 Middle East crisis, Kissinger had to win over Sadat on the Egyptian side, whereas on the Israeli side he had to not only convince the Prime Minister, but the cabinet, the opposition and the press as well” (Kalb and Kalb, 1974, p.502; Rubin 1981, p.15).

Also, leaders within the non-cohesive side “are [often] more hostile and ready to provoke or escalate conflict with out-groups” (Bloomfield and Leiss 1969, p.27; Rabbie and Visser 1972; Fisher 1989). “The presence of constituencies may provide for negotiators, who are recalcitrant to compromise, an opportune pretext

for resisting any mediation efforts to generate movement” (Kressel, 1981, p.231). Hoffman (1968) argued that “the greater the number of said constituencies, the easier it is for negotiators to invoke them to justify intransigence”, defined as “blackmail of weakness” (Kleiboer 1994, p.366). This scenario is well illustrated by the United States’ mediation efforts in 1982, between Israel and Lebanon, on an Israeli withdrawal. “Lebanon could credibly threaten the collapse of the country to avoid the need to make concessions” (Inbar 1991, p.81), a continuous blackmailing from the Israeli side it is also alleged by Marwan Bishara, in his book *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid Occupation, Terrorism and the future* (2002), or reflected by Ussamma Makdisin in his book, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of the U.S. 1820-2001*, (2010), who pictured a different scenario when Israel’s complained a blackmail from Palestinians to later seized 450 Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza. This research tried to identify academic opinions or allegations of Palestinian blackmail; however this is not officially documented.

Type of Regime

Regimes are frequently differentiated in terms of democratic versus authoritarian systems. Among others, Maoz and Abdolali have argued that “democratic states may be as prone to conflict as any other type of regime” (Maoz and Abdolali 1989, 3-35). This proposition has found also a place in the mediation literature, alleging that mediation is mostly effective in conflicts affecting democracies.

In his research of 206 conflicts between two states, Raymond (1994) found that those of democratic systems were more predisposed than other type of dyads to trust mediators with judicial competence to mediate their conflicts (see also Dixon 1993-94).

Taking in consideration international sources, Bercovitch, Anagnosor, and Willie (1991, p.10) distinguish between five regime types: 1) monarchies, 2) one-party states, 3) military regimes, 4) multiparty states, and 5) a residual category, as being an important factor in effective mediation. Findings concluded that multiparty states, which are the most democratic type of regime, were somewhat with more disposition to mediate than non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. In addition, it was found that “35% of the mediation efforts involving multiparty states were successful, in comparison with 6 % of the attempts involving one party state dyads” (Brecher 1993, p. 241-46).

Motivation to Mediate

Kleiboer maintains that the type of regime is not necessarily the most important variable for mediation. The degree of legitimacy may vary among regimes. Therefore, cohesion cannot be automatically conditional from regime type. However, the degree of acceptance as well as autonomy to maneuver that political leaders possess is, she argues, the most important characteristic.

Balance of Power

In reference to this element, Kleiboer illustrates how there is no consensus about the nature of the effect on power parity between the disputants as asserted by some authors according to her. She adds that there is a diametrical opposed claims in reference to this in order to establish a clear parameter on this particular characteristic. In this sense, many (Young 1967, p.43-4; Zartman 1984, p.150; Kriesberg 1982, p.274; Toval 1982, p.9), argue that “anobvious power imbalance will strength the stronger party’s perception on the ability to ensure achievement of total victory, while reinforcing its unwillingness to mediate”. Modelski (1964, p.149) adds “the risk of a stronger party to use the mediator as an instrument for facilitating surrender, shown by Bertcovitch, Anagnoson and Willie” (1991, p.11). On the opposite side, Deutsch (1973, p.46), argues that “mutual recognition of differential power and legitimacy is what matters in conflict management”.

Finally, in the same analysis made by Kleibore, (Organski, 1960, p.293; Wright, 1965, p.441-2), claim the danger of power parity as this might lead to competition and escalation of conflict during attempts to recover power balance.

Parties in an Ongoing Relationship

Kleiboer (1996) sustains that parties are “far more interested and open to invest to preserve this relationship than those parties that have only a short term relationship” (Rublin 1981, p.38) and on the other hand, “parties with a history of friendship or cooperation will also approach emerging conflicts more cooperatively” (Deutsch, 1973). As Kleiboer agrees, Yakamoto (1990), identifies friendship as an impediment for serious negotiations.

In contrast to Yakamoto's argument, Bercovitch (1989) supports both assertions while his study indicates that the nations' previous relationship influences the development of a conflict, however it only has a minor effect on its result.

2.1.4 Characteristics of a Successful Mediator

The mediator is always expected to play a relevant beneficial role, therefore, their characteristics play an important role in a successful international mediation (Londono, 1991)

According to Maria Londono Lazaro (2003), as for Kleiboer, the mediator's characteristics considered in her study as the most vital for the successful outcome of international mediation efforts are the characteristics a successful mediator should possess: 1) Impartiality, 2) Leverage, and 3) Status (Kleiboer, 1994). These characteristics are "necessary for a mediator to be accepted by the disputing parties, which in turn, is seen as vital for the successful performance of his functions as a mediator" (Susskind and Babbitt 1992, p.35). Even when "acceptability is portrayed as the characteristic that will differentiate mediation from other form of intermediary intervention in international conflict" (Mitchell and Webb 1988 p.4.), "the relationship between mediator/mediation acceptance by its participants, and its success, is more often postulated than empirically established" (Kleiboer, 1996, p.369).

Impartiality

The question over mediators' impartiality has induced strong debate among scholars of mediation in foreign affairs. Theoretically, this is a complicated characteristic that often leads to misunderstanding or misperception since neutrality either refers to intention, appearance, or consequence (Kriesberg, 1982).

Also, it is often linked to a mediator's approach towards the conflicting nations, (Bjereld, 1995), or to the mediator's stakes in particular scenarios in conflict, or to both (Princen, 1992).

There is one thing in which some analysts agree: "Impartiality is systematically a matter of perceptions of the parties in conflict" (Toval, 1975, p.55; Yarrow 1978, p.164; Bailey 1985, p.209-10).. The main debate on impartiality does not only refer to theoretical concerns, but focus on the consequences of impartiality on the outcomes of mediation.

During the development of the debate in reference to impartiality, some analysts maintain that mediators' success is not just conditioned upon impartiality. Some have examined whether additional mediators' attributes such as the ones discussed in this thesis are more relevant in order to obtain more successful outcomes. Under the premises that a mediator employs a behavior designed to gather information and stimulate change of behavior on parties in order to reach agreements. In contrast to Kleiboer, who suggest that there is not conclusive results on the effectiveness of a bias or unbiased mediator, Zartman and Toval (1985), as well as, Bertcovitch (1986), Princen (1992) and Savun (2008) maintains that the success of a international mediation does not necessary lies of an unbiased mediator, but on

resources capable to persuade one or both parties in conflict. In other words, it is not impartiality, but leverage that should be considered when assessing success of mediation. This idea is supported by empirical evidence from some authors such as Frei (1975, p.78) and Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, p.14-5) (cited in Kleiboer, 2012).

Leverage

Leverage is one of the most ambiguous components of mediation. Its ambiguity makes it difficult for researchers to conceptualize but also to determine the importance of its role in a successful mediation. Some analysts go into too much detail on the definition of leverage, but overall, it seems to refer to a mediator's capability to persuade on one or both of the conflicting parties to agree to a settlement proposal. This assumes a mediator has the leverage to bear on the parties. However, it is inconclusive which means are critical in order for the strategy to succeed. Some “analysts distinguish between sticks (negative sanctions) and carrots (positive sanctions)” (Touval and Zartman 1985, p.13), and between material aspects (such as the possibility to withhold or supply economic aid) and immaterial aspects (the possibility to use moral or psychological pressure) (Princen, 1992, p.167).

Lacking effective methodical assessment tools to measure the influence of these different means, there exist disagreements in the literature referent to the role of leverage in positive mediation's results. According to some authors, “leverage is a necessary condition for mediation success” (Cot 1972, p.12; Brookmire and

Sistrunk 1980, p.326; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, p.15; Touval 1992, p.233). Still, these scholars, according to Pruitt's findings in 1981 have proven in their empirical study that "leverage is essential to influence conflicting parties to make concessions or for ensuring that disputants adhere to their agreements" (Kleibore, 1996. P.371). Perhaps, "Kissinger's successes in the Middle East are a good illustration of the importance of being powerful" (Pruitt 1981, p.142).

Status

The formal rank of the individual in his or her organization, acting as mediator, expertise in negotiation and knowledge of the issues as well as its historical and political causes are among some of the important elements that measures a mediators' status (Pruitt, 2002; Svensson, 2009).

Kleiboer offers two different hypotheses about the relations between this mediator status and positive mediation results. The first one discusses the extent of status required for effective mediation. Specialists affirm that the higher the mediator's status, the higher the probabilities of success in mediation.

In a second proposition regarding the mediator's relative status (the equilibrium between mediator and representatives), scholars maintain that in order for mediation to succeed it is vital that the mediator's relative status be present, meaning that both, the representative and mediators, must be attuned. On the other hand, according to Wolfers "it may be as problematic when the mediator's status is higher than the status of the representatives of the disputants" (Wolfers, 1985, p.185-86).

According to Maria Carmelina Londono (2003) It is necessary to assess a mediator's influence in the success of a mediation to evaluate the "mediators' skills, behaviors and attitudes, directly related to his/her role in the process of mediation" (p.33). In reference to the main characteristic of a successful mediator, chosen to be assess in this thesis, the literature reflects the following:

"The more committed a third party appears to be in fulfilling its promise to verify or enforce, the more likely the combatants are to sign and implement peace treaties" (Walter, 2002. p.166). "Current attempts at theorizing international mediation are problematic in various ways and recourse to more empirical analysis is insufficient to solve difficulties" (Kleiboer, 1994, p.11). According to Kleiboer third parties can play important roles in dealing with international disputes, both as crisis managers and conflict resolvers. According to this author several characteristics of successful mediators have been identified by some scholars, such as Mitchell (1981) which are communication skills, flexibility in their thinking, judgment and knowledge about the conflict. But, Kleibore sustains that "these are not the only preconditions for mediation success. The Mediator needs other critical properties. Particularly, he or she needs a commitment to peace and Justice" (Kleiboer 1998, p.54-56) .

For Susan Allen, Nan Zacharian, Cherian Mampilly and Adrea Bartoli (2012), the key to the acceptance of a mediator is the credibility on the mediator's role as intermediaries. But, this credibility is "often based on a sincere commitment" (p.187) among other elements not relevant to this research. According to these authors " in contrast to other peacebuilding NGO's, the community of Saint Egidio, has accumulated

significant political capital related to its capacity to accurately understand events, in light of decades long patterns, an advantage largely due to its commitment to peace work (p.119).

“A commitment to long term investment has allowed the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to engage in a proactive manner” (Griffiths, 2005), through “long term, rigorous and continuous engagement on the ground, cultivating and developing its reputation with relevant actors” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).

Bercovitch (2002) sustains that “successful mediators engage properly in an intractable conflict setting while serving with commitment, persistence and experience” (James, 2012, p.119).

As discussed previously, impartiality, as well as previous and ongoing relationship, are important to take in consideration when discussing any international mediation performance. Therefore, the influence on alliances to the role of mediators it is intrinsically necessary to be analyzed in this literature review in order to assess its fitness on a particular scenario related to the commitment of the United States as a successful mediator of this conflict.

2.2 Influence of Alliances in International Conflicts Mediators' Role—a Theoretical Approach

The theoretical core of this literature places alliances as an influential element on states' behavior. This framework describes the capability aggregation model, which explains the causes and effects of alliances. Institutional theories, on the other hand, have instead focus on the impact the institutions has on the behavior of the members themselves neglecting the most important institutions which address security issues of alliances.

In contrast, "Realist theories of international relations have frequently denied that international institutions have any independent influence on state behavior. Therefore, as an alternative, one set of security institutions that scholars have paid attention to is alliances" (Gelpi, 1999, p.107).

Gelpis' findings indicate that realist and institutionalists propositions about the impact on alliances complement one another as the bases of effective mediation. Second, he explores the effect that alliances ties to the mediator have on the fact that the opponent nation will succeed in 117 of international crises scenarios. His findings challenge the hypothesis that the most successful mediators are weak neutral parties that abstain from using in coercive mechanisms.

In this sense this author discusses three hypotheses: There is a direct link between an unequal alliance and the probability of mediation failure. The more unequal the more likely the probability that mediation will fail. On the other hand, in contrast to Gelpi who disagrees, Kleiboer maintains that there is a common

argument in the mediation research which suggest that weak states or weaken actors will be the most successful mediators. Additionally, Bercovitch and Houston (1996, p.27) found that ‘both the leaders and representatives of large states fare rather worse than expected as international mediators’.

The legalistic view of mediation disagrees on coercive tactics, simply because they are a violation of the international law, which according to this perspective discussed by Gelpi can encourage agreements and peace. In this sense he adds that, from a legal perspective, small states are expected to be successful mediators especially because of their weakness. According to this view, the most dangerous threat to diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution “is the illegal and illegitimate use of force” (Gelpi, p. 113) and small states mediators cannot use hard diplomacy and thus, the probability that they will stick to legal precedent is higher, making then the most suitable to mediate. Similarly, he discusses the trust oriented approach to mediation which views force as damaging since it weakens trust and breaks communication between disputing parties and the mediator. Therefore, small states should be more effective in facilitating trust and communication when they refrain from threatening either party.

A second assertion made by this author is (Gelpi, 1999, p.113) is that those mediators, who possess higher military capability, will be more ineffective in their roles as mediators. The greater the mediator’s military capability, the lower the probability that mediation will be successful. In addition, a common argument in

the mediation literature is that coercive tactics by the mediator will reduce the probability of mediation success”.

Similarly, Brouillet writes that the “mediators’ mission should be an endeavor to achieve a rapprochement” (1988, p. 171)

Additionally, Gelpi adds that “The trust oriented approach emphasizes the loss of trust, increase of suspicious, and misperception which results from coercive tactics” (1999, p. 113). These theorists do argue that directive strategies are more successful in mediating agreements, than just consultation and facilitation of communication.

Gelpi (1999) Agree with Princen in the argument that that active involvement by the mediator in diplomatic crises contributed to mediation success, but the use of direct intervention and low or high coercive tactics by the mediator instead of moderate tactics, will be negative and lead to missed opportunities for peaceful settlement of disputes. Gelpi concludes with the argument of the existence of a curvilinear relationship between the coerciveness of the mediators’ strategy and mediation success. Furthermore, with the fact that a combined strategy of facilitation of an, open communication, with a moderate pressure to settle, are highly probable effective tools, while coercive tactics are ineffective. The result, neither extremely weak nor highly coercive strategies will be successful. However, the result of the third proposition, according to Gelpi, is a minority opinion that does not reflect the broad literature on international relations, but could be

important to analyze in future research in order to prove the effectiveness of this strategy in international mediation.

Bercovitch (1996), Carnevale and Arad for example suggest that biased mediators will actually be more effective than neutral mediators. Toval (1982) and Princen (1992) also suggest that large states such as the United States could be successful mediators because of their capabilities to manipulate elements that could influence the disputants to settle.

Despite these exceptions, Gelpi (1999, p.114) believes that hypotheses one through three reflect the expectations of the majority of the literature on international mediation. Moreover, they reflect the legalistic and trust based oriented framework that explicit or implicitly underpin much of the work on mediation.

Realism had approached alliances as counterbalance of power and neutralization strategies against external threats, an aggregating military capability model, focusing on the external function of these institutions. In this sense, Gelpi has constructed a theory, incorporating realist as well as institutional theories of alliances, identifying them as intra allied control (Gelpi, 1999, p. 107).

Realists' notion that alliances are used as military power and control mechanisms Gelpi findings suggest that realist theory sees alliances exclusively thru the lenses of the capability aggregation model, used to "predict initiation, escalation and outcome of war" (Gelpi, 1999, p.109) and argues that the role of alliances is not limited to this perspective, but it extends to several tasks as security

management institutions, while at the same time, these findings validates complementing with institutionalism's argument about the role of these institutions.

Additionally, this author examined the relationship between alliances and their roles as mediators in 117 international crisis cases between 1918 and 1988, his analysis revealed "direct evidence that alliance ties can be used to restrain alliances partners in these scenarios" (Gelpi, 1999, p.108). Also, he was able to prove the accuracy of realism argument which asserts that "the role of power and military capabilities in making credible alliances commitments, effective in altering state behavior and that they can be used as capability aggregation and deterrence strategies. Also, the effect that alliances have on the likelihood that the opponent will prevail as demonstrated in those same 117 international crises (Gelpi, 1999). These results show direct evidence that alliance ties are useful to contain allies in international crisis, but it also may be useful for other purposes not limited to the realist approach.

For the above author, realism approach, which focus on these institutions through the lenses of the capability aggregation model, starts with the hypothesis that the states's main goal of forming an alliance is so that the allies can use their military capabilities to deter external threats, is correct when emphasizes the benefit of alliances as capability aggregation and deterrence tools, as well as, the role of military capability and leverage in, promoting credible alliances commitments, successful in influencing states' behavior.

Within this context, scholars use alliance formation to predict the initiation, escalation and outcomes of wars. Some have used game theory models to explore the deterrence capability of military alliance. Additional recent research has used related game theory models to define intervention in ongoing wars and to predict these conflicts outcomes.

Consistent with Gelpi's assertion that alliances performance is not limited to the capability aggregation model, Paul Schroeder describes alliances as tools to control their alliance partners. In this same context, "James Morrow has argued that it may involve an exchange of resources between allies rather than an effort at sharing capabilities". (Gelpi 1999, p.109). He argues that "weaker states may trade their foreign policy autonomy for the security that a powerful ally may provide" (Gelpi, p. 110-111). However, most of these arguments do not focus on the influence of alliance as deterrence mechanisms, but, on the impact these alliances have on states' relations. Therefore, in order to predict any behavior deemed to persuade allies' behavior, Gelpi maintains that interaction between state's alliances in scenarios where their interests are not compatible must be explored.

One such set of circumstances to be study according to Gelpi, is the scenario in which the mediator of an international crisis is allied to one of the states in conflict. In such case he sustains that because the main goal of mediation in order to succeed is to find a solution to the dispute acceptable to both parties, the two allies will experiment conflicting interests. For those supporters of impartiality as an important characteristic of an international dispute's mediator, the problem is that if

the disputants' ally shared and supported the disputant's interest entirely, this mediator will not act impartially, jeopardizing its role of neutral. Moreover, Gelpi adds that it is also possible, that an ally could simulate impartiality in an effort to persuade to guarantee a settlement by one of the parties in conflict. If the parties are aware of this it may affect their behavior, since they will only accept the mediation efforts if they share at least some interests. Therefore, when the mediation efforts of allied states are welcomed by the parties it is assumed that there exist at least a combination of compatible and incompatible interests between both nations. For said reason the author investigates whether allied to at least one of the nations in a crisis are more effective in influence the parties to settle.

Even more, according to Gelpi's research, when the mediator is a great power, however, far from being detrimental when there exists a power imbalance between the ally nations (mediator-disputant), this has a powerful influence on mediation success. Similarly, "a great power with ties that are two levels stronger to one disputant than the other is 18% more likely to be successful than a great power with alliance ties that are only unequal by one level. Great powers, with equal ties to both parties, are successful in mediating international crises only 31% of the time" (Gelpi, 1999, p.134).

Finally, great powers which share a defense pact with one of the disputants and have no alliance with its opponent, are an additionally 14% more likely to be successful in their mediation efforts (Gelpi, 1999). The overall impact of alliance ties on the success of great power mediators is quite remarkable. Great power

mediators which have no alliances with one party, but have a defense treaty with the other, have a 81 % effectiveness on this role (Haftendorn, Keohane, & Wallander, 1999).

Apparently, alliance ties facilitate the use of persuasion by great power mediators, intervention threats on unallied disputants and of abandonment of allies, asides from other advantages of security management.

In this same source, Gelpi examines the impact that alliances ties to the mediator have on the probability that the challenger will prevail in the above 117 scenarios. His analysis reveals direct evidence that alliances can be used to restrain allied partners in international crises, since allied can credibly threaten to punish their allied disputants if the settlement is violated. This author adds that these mediators shall be more competent to solve commitment problems of their allies, who are the disputants in the mediation. However, the United States commitment is being assess in this research which might negatively impact their efforts to influence their allies to mediate and commit to the process.

In a different approach Stephen John Stedman, in Brown and de Oudraat (1996) argue that mediation efforts in intra-state disputes are resolved successfully only part of the time. He maintains that in the international arena the chances of success of mediation are greatest, first of all, when mediators have a clear strategy. Meaning, having: First, a “clear sense of what their political objectives are; Second, a plan for attaining these goals, and finally, international consensus of the vision” (Brown, 2001, p. 170).

However, sometimes they lack of a coherent plan. By not having a clear strategy, lack of focus prevails, jeopardizing their commitment and the outcome of the process by the change of their foreign policy as a result of the natural alternation in the administration, in the case of democratic state mediators as the case of United States. Also, for Stedman, a barrier for a clear strategy is, in some cases mediators act under the need to assist participants to avoid a humanitarian crisis and loss of innocent lives.

Second, mediation efforts must be timed to coincide with moments when at least one and preferably all of the parties to a conflict prefer talking to fighting.

Third, mediators need to have leverage over disputants, the more the better. Finally, at a minimum, mediators have to be willing to walk away from the mediation table. They need to convince their interlocutors that they will be left to their own.

According to Wanda (2010), in his paper *The Contribution of Social Constructivism*, for Realism, the popularization of world affairs has been a crucial element of its success for the last fifty years. However, the fall of the Soviet Union, led to the end of the Cold War era in the late 1980's, impacting, without question, the credibility of Realism. Smith has claimed it is due to the theory's descriptive power, mainly assumed that the stability of the by-polar system is an enduring characteristic of global politics, evidenced by the failure of President George W Bush realist foreign policy.

Fukuyama in 1992 also “illustrates that according to realism, friends and enemies must to be chosen mainly on the basis of their power rather than on basis of the internal fiber of the government, something that social constructivism challenges and seek to correct in political science” (Wanda, 2010. p. 5) . Waltz identifies instead the unit of analysis for constructivism theory as the individual (Waltz 1998, p.38), while Wendt (1999) identifies the main unit of analysis for constructivism theory in international relations as the state.

“Constructivist approaches are unique in that they occupy a middle ground between rationalist/positivist and idealist/interpretive approaches to the study of international politics” (Adler, 1997, p.319). Social Constructivism is a newly born paradigm that has been developed due to the need to either explain certain scenarios or filling the existent gaps, that other theories of international relations such as realism, liberalism has failed to explained as a result of its rigidity because of their oath of alliances to their discourses, a need that emerged as a result of a constant changing world.

2.3 Culture—A neglected factor

This section seeks to address the neglected factor of culture as it pertains to mediation, particularly by focusing on comparing between the effectiveness of American, Israeli and Islamic mediation techniques.

In a study on the efficacy of the three international mediation approaches, Bercovitch offers a statistical analysis in support of the directive strategy as the

most effective conflict resolution tool in foreign affairs to mediate international disputes. His findings demonstrate that even when the communication facilitation strategy is the most frequently implemented in these cases is not the most effective one (Haixia 2007). However, according to Haixia, one weakness in Bercovitch's study is its failure to compare communication, facilitation and procedural strategies, he simply takes for a fact that that the communication-facilitation strategy is the least effective one.

For Haixia, the effectiveness of mediation does lie in parties' consent to the mediator's plan of action for conflict resolution efforts and not on mediator's efforts per se. He adds that the level of intervention theory also neglects a solid base to measure the real costs providing only a subjective determination of a mediator's level of intervention making Bercovitch's classification of the different approaches not necessarily accurate. In addition, Bercovitch's statistical analysis does not establish strong evidence for this idea. While, statistical results definitely show that the directive strategy is most effective, there is a problem concerning the relationship between variables. The entire analysis of Bercovitch fails to explore the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Therefore, his results lack of evidence to support his claim.

Another theory among literature on this subject is that of the causal mechanism. According to Qi Haixia in his article *A Comparison of the Effectiveness of International Conflict Mediation Strategies* (2007), the supporters of this theory sustain that it is the causal mechanism linked to the three distinct strategies

(procedural, communication and facilitation) that dictate which is most successful. Even when, this author mentions some of this theory contribution, he does not clarify who are the supporters of this last statement and the research made for this thesis, did not find any support for this. However, Haixia mentions Elster (1989, 1999); Stinchcombe (1991); Bunge (1997); Hedström and Swedberg (1998); Steel (2004); Mayntz (2004); Gerring (2008, 2010); Falleti and Lynch (2009); Hedström and Ylikoski (2010); and Grzymala-Busse (2011); as international relations scholars who have made important contributions to this theory.

Additionally, Haixia maintains in the same article that the efficacy of the procedural strategy and the communication facilitation strategy is impacted by three variables: the situation, the intensity, and the extent of the conflict. These two last strategies are comparatively more effective in short term disputes, where the parties are not strongly balanced with one another than when trying to resolve protracted and intense conflicts. But, the directive strategy is evidenced to be the most effective of the variables discussed herein.

Mediation in some of the Middle Eastern conflicts between Israel and Arab countries, according to this author were selected for analysis in this research by Bercovitch, in order to determine the relationship between strategy and outcome. Findings indicate that “the Kissinger diplomacy remained effective for thirty three years, suggesting the long term effectiveness of the communication facilitation strategy. The effectiveness of Carter’s Camp David accords maintained during

twenty eight years, proves moderate efficacy over the long term of the procedural approach” (Haixia, 2007, p.620).

Haixia’s study found that over the short-term these three strategies’ effectiveness is placed in the following order: directive, communication-facilitation, and procedural. And, in the long-term, the order switches to communication to facilitation and finally directive. In this study game theoretical analysis and a prisoner dilemma were the main tool applied to simplify the research. Much work remain to be done with respect to this subject, the analysis need to be developed and enhanced upon through the implementation of a broader range of tools.

Further research need to be done in order to be able to outline in more detail the circumstances under which one strategy demonstrates to be more effective than other. However, some limitations exist; uncertainty encompasses the norms and responses to conflicts. The lack of consensus about world order and normal conduct within it, besides confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits of deviant behavior, have given rise to conflict in the new era. In reference to the level of commitment of mediators as a vital element for success, there exists an important gap in research, making difficult to persuade the foreign affair community of the need of it for mediation success.

Spoiler Management

A key element to contemplate in the establishment of durable peace for Evan Hoffman (2009) is the management of spoilers.

Stedman (1997, p.5) defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiation threatens their power worldview and interests, as well as use of violence in order to undermine attempts to achieve it.” Furthermore, he identifies three major spoiler management approaches to consider: a) complying with spoilers’ demands and giving the spoilers what they want, b) modification of spoiler’s behavior changing the behavior of spoilers and/or c) coercion or punishment. As Walther argues (1997, p. 18)

“The policy and academic literature houses two very different views about the kinds of diplomatic strategies most appropriate for dealing with Hamas. One school of thought stresses the complexity of the heterogeneous social movement. Its decision making process between hardliners and moderate leaders and their internal rivalries portrays Hamas as a pragmatic organization not committed to violence by nature, a social movement that can be included in negotiation. The second school labels the group as a terrorist organization whose desire for the elimination of Israel and embracing of violence pose an obstacle to the peace process.”

He goes on to say that

“the policy implication for the first school of thought is that Hamas cannot be reformed into a political party and will continue to use violence. Therefore must be neutralized in order to achieve any progress in the peace process, a recent policy followed by the quartet, implemented by the use of isolation and proven to

be insufficient to deal with Hamas. A second school of thought focuses on Hamas' ability to learn and develop new strategies, and its perilous ability to maintain a powerful position that is based on public support" (p. 22).

Former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, who headed a team of international election observers, in 2006, criticized the Israeli methods, sustaining that they would present: "significant obstacles to the effective governance of the Palestinian territories", and adding that "efforts by Israel or the U.S. to undermine Hamas would only bolster its standing both domestically and internationally" (Young, 2006, p. 15).

The U.S. is seeking different approaches to promote a credible democratization agenda while dealing with Islamist militant groups. According to this author some critics of Western policy state that there are many apparent contradictions and inconsistencies such as: How Western policy can ask and claim for pluralism if they keeps ignoring, such as Hamas which has wide popular support? One question that should be asked concerns pluralism as Western policy.

He also describes some other weaknesses of Western policies, such as neglecting the fact that Hamas is a "mass political movement with large-scale and growing popular bases, a reason why Western policies have not succeeded in their intention to weaken Hamas" (Tossi, 2007, p.1). Rather than weaken Hamas, such policies have entrenched its popular legitimacy (Carter, 2006).

Alastair Crooke, the Director of Conflicts Forum and a former EU negotiator with the Palestinian factions maintains that Hamas has a pivotal political legitimacy,

more than any other ruling government in the Middle East. Also, he asserts that “the hostility and negativity towards the outcome of the elections will seem very perverse” (Smith, 2011, p.15), coloring as well as hindering engagement in the Middle East. However the Obama team had indicated that the possibility of a dialog with Hamas is not null. “The incoming Obama administration moved to abandon George Bush's doctrine of isolating Hamas by establishing a channel and open contacts with Hamas, which could be initiated through the US intelligence services, would represent a definitive break with the Bush presidency's ostracizing of the group” (Mirault, 2010, p.44). “The collapse of the Oslo accords and the effective absence of other diplomatic efforts also helped bring about the Islamists change of heart. Hamas could enter political institutions without fear of endorsing a process that would profoundly divide the movement and force it to re-examine basic tenets.” (p. 50).

One can argue that the reasons why Hamas changed its opinions and decided to participate in the elections can be reduced to four main factors. The first one is international pressure. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, Hamas is under American pressure as well as international pressure. The EU listed the movement as terrorist, like Israel and the United States.

The second relevant fact relates to the capacity and power of Hamas. Its leaders are conscious of their power. This enables them to take part in the political process. They lack this power ten years ago. A last argument is the war led by Israel for three years against Hamas, which enormously weakened the movement (Mirault , 2010).

For Marc A. Walther (2010, p. 429) “in general the situation leaves politics with three options. The first one is the rejection of Hamas as a political adversary and the attempt to marginalize or even eliminate it by isolation and military means”. For this author, military “force can contain, but not neutralize Hamas and the same account can be given to the isolation approach used from 2006-2008, both attempts proved to be unsuccessful”. Moreover, he asserts that the supporters of the above mentioned approaches sustain that political participation of Hamas will not succeed unless the group is refuses the use of violence. Finally, he asserts that as his analysis shows, this assessment seems to be incorrect.

The author alleges that current research show that inclusion can moderate extremism, even in non-democratic systems. While this does not mean that a movement experiences a full complete conversion at once, it shows that the process can succeed. A second option for Walther is Hamas’ acceptance in the political system, and negotiations without preconditions, a strategy to encourage Hamas to abandon its violent resistance methods, since these are more difficult to justify while involved with political participation, The risk of this option for Western mediators to negotiate with Hamas, lies in “the difficulty of contradicting agreed upon political decisions, countering lobby groups which pressure for option one, while at the same time the risking lack of guarantee that Hamas will stay peaceful” (Walther, 2010, p.139).

As a third possible alternative that Walther recommends in his thesis, including Hamas in an indirect approach “[aims] to create conditions that make it strategically

attractive for Hamas to abandon violence and accept a two state solution, giving the group an incentive to redefine violence toward political opposition” (Walther, 2010. p139-140).

The following chapter moves from an overview of the relevant literature to describe and assess American involvement (or lack thereof) in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Chapter Three

The United States of America and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

3.1 Historical American-Israel Ties

A press release penned by White House Press Secretary Charles G. Ross (1945-1950) documents that in 1917 “Chaim Weizmann, a scientist, statesperson, Zionist movement leader in Germany, and first president of the State of Israel, influenced the British government to issue a statement supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The speech, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, was, in part, compensation to the Jews for their endorsement of the British against the Turks during World War I. After the war, the League of Nations endorsed the declaration, appointing Britain to rule Palestine in 1922” (Ross, 1978, p. 469). This story, in addition to many others, suggests significant historical ties between the United States of America and the State of Israel.

This chapter focuses on the creation of the State of Israel, as well as the impact of U.S. administrations from President Woodrow Wilson through President Harry Truman over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A final subsection will cover a domestic level of analysis, a bureaucratic perspective of the U.S. administration during this period in the conflict’s development.

The article Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration, written by Richard Ned Lebow (1968), documents the active role played by the U.S. in the

creation of the State of Israel. According to this author, President Wilson had two major reasons for endorsing the Balfour Declaration which was proposed by British Secretary of State Balfour: 1) Sympathy for the Jewish peoples' suffering, and 2) A calculation of strategic benefit; in other words, the more allies in the area, the better.

On the other hand, President Wilson was concerned with the fact that the United States had never had a confrontation in the area and he believed that making the endorsement public might jeopardized its relationship with Turkey. Therefore, President Wilson offered his support to the Balfour Declaration, with the pre-condition of not making this move public.

According to Isserof in the same edited article (2003-2009), a demonstration of about 100,000 Jews gathered at the doors of the Consulate at Odessa, in support of President Wilson because of the rumor of his endorsement of the British proposal to make Palestine into an independent Jewish state, which led to President Wilson finally being persuaded to break his silence on his support to Zionism, and to admit the world of his endorsement of the Balfour Declaration on August 31, 1918.

Wilson's approval of the Balfour Declaration and his subsequent stand on his promise greatly strengthened the hands of the Zionists and were significant in securing the final settlement. Finally, Isserof maintains that without the American Presidents intervention, the Zionists' expectations would not be fulfilled and they could receive much less than they did. For all the reasons mentioned above, Lebow placed the name of former President Woodrow Wilson among the fathers of the State of Israel.

Other motivations for support of the creation of Israel have been mentioned by some authors, including Grose (1988). First, American support greatly strengthened the determination of the Jewish community in Palestine and a Jewish lobby around the world to pressure for the statehood solution. Second, it seriously jeopardized any resolution on the part of the other triumphant great powers at the moment (Britain and the former USSR), to impeded such a solution in Palestine.

Based on the Jewish Virtual Library (2011), there is lack of historical data in regarding the State of Israel's creation and its impact on the Palestinians during the administrations of former Presidents Warren Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). However, their pro-Israeli attitudes are reflected in two main quotes:

President Harding (Bard, 1991, p.1) said "it is impossible for one who has studied at all the services of the Hebrew people to avoid having faith that they will one day be restored to their historic national home and their input on an new and yet greater phase of their contribution to the advance of humanity."

Calvin Coolidge in the same article and page expressed his "sympathy with the deep and intense longing which finds such fine expression in the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine. Palestine which, was desolate for centuries, is now renewing its youth and vitality through enthusiasm, hard work, and self-sacrifice of the Jewish pioneers who toil there in a spirit of peace and social justice."

According to Grose (1988), U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) was a big supporter of a Jewish state since the beginning of World War II until almost the end of his life. He maintains that Roosevelt expressed support for removing all Arabs from the land to create a Jewish State in Palestine, by what this Grose called the use of bribes and physical force, transforming the former presidents' rhetoric and policies into what is called now Zionism.

By the end of his presidential term Roosevelt seemed to turn anti-Zionist, following a meeting with King Ibn Saud during the Conference of Yalta. Apparently, Roosevelt was completely touched by the arguments against the Zionist by the ruler and informed his change of policy to the U.S Congress in March, 1945 in a speech that "sent shivers down the spines of American Jews, and stunned even his own advisors" (Grose, 1988, p.37).

After his meeting with King Ibn Saud, President Roosevelt was convinced that his plans for Palestine would end in significant bloodshed between Arabs and Jews. He took a neutral position by handing over such responsibility to the then recently created United Nations, under the argument that resolving the Palestine issue, was not in control of the United States and Great Britain and that such responsibility instead lied with said international body. This created confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits of deviant behavior.

Grose sustains that according to many authors, the Holocaust obviously also played an important role in the creation of Israel, by generating a sympathy for the Jewish suffering, as well as Jewish determination to get their own land and survive.

In 1941, during U.S participation in World War II, Franklin Roosevelt, in his own words, said that “Palestine should be made into an exclusive Jewish territory” (Grose, 1988, p. 39), transforming his rhetoric and policies to be almost wholly pro-Zionist .

With the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the Arab League held a series of meetings concluding with the resolution to encourage Arab armies to invade Palestine in order to protect its territory and people, which led to the first Arab- Israeli War of 1948, resulting in the division of Palestine, with an important part under seized by Israel, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, under Jordan’s control, while Gaza strip by Egypt (Grose, 1988).

This course of events gave hope to Zionist Jews about the possibility of the establishment of their own state, encouraging the mass immigration of many Jews from around the world to Palestine, particularly Germans running away from the Holocaust, raising Arab’s concerns. This triggered guerrilla attacks leading Britain to take the decision of restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1939. Jews interpreted this act as a betrayal, creating resistance to the policy and the intensification of seeking for support from the United States.

While President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a sympathetic perception to the Jews for their struggle, his non-intervention promise to the Arabs, and prior consulting both affected people and triggered public concerns about his administration’s ‘real’ policy towards the issue.

Finally, Ami Isserof (2003) added a third reason for American support for the Balfour Declaration: the decisions taken by an inexperienced Vice President Truman, who became president just as a result of political pressure after the passing of elected President Franklin D Roosevelt.

The Truman administration policy supported the idea, arrived at through situational analysis, that the Jews were oppressed people in need of a homeland. Throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the Departments of War and State, under the suspicion that there was a possible Soviet-Arab alliance which might potentially affect U.S interests by restricting the supply of oil to the U.S., recommended to the U.S. a policy of non-intervention in favor of the Jewish people.

Reactions to the policy in question on the side of the Arabs, Jews, and British did not wait. The British role was antagonized as a result of Jewish terrorism and by 1947 Arab-Jewish relations had broken. This turn of events lead Great Britain to request on April 2, 1947 for the U.N. to intervene by creating a Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Once the committee was formed, it recommended an autonomous (without a British mandate) two-state solution. A decision that was hardly rejected by top ranking U.S. Department of State officials, since it was taken unilaterally without any prior consultation by President Truman. On May 15, 1948, the first year for the independence of the State of Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian war began with the invasion of Israel by Arab armies.

History shows that, besides Wilson's lack of knowledge and experience in foreign affairs, consistent with Zartman's theory, as well as the lack of commitment

from the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, and finally an unexperienced Vice President Truman, who became president by accident, was among the most important reasons for failure to prevent conflict.

3.2 The U.S. Recognition of Israel—A Domestic Bureaucratic Perspective

A domestic level of analysis on the U.S. recognition of Israel and the role of President Truman during the event which directly impacted the conflict is made by Nilay Saiva (2005) who states that “American foreign policy is not the product of reactions to foreign affairs, but, a result of process”. Foreign policies arise from an interaction between diverse organizations, rival interest groups, and perceived roles in administration giving. Due to these competing bureaucratic pressures President Truman had no option but to make, the decision to recognize or not to recognize Israel, being probably the most important decision during his presidential period.

While pressured by George Marshall and Loy Henderson key persons within the State Department at the time not to compromise the U.S status in the Middle East. Furthermore, Marshall and Henderson as well as other key advisor’ biases were obvious, when expressed the concern on a possible threat from the Zionist movement communist and socialist in nature. However, the real problem the U.S. faced in bipolar world, where the competition with the Soviets was high, was the URRSS was open to recognized Israel and intervened on their behalf while the United States remained apathetic. They justified the decision based on national

interest in terms of both U.S status before the international community and domestic interests. .

On the other hand, the president faced the challenge of political liability at home for not recognizing the state, Jewish lobby pressure from both within and outside the White House and finally a continuous barrage of Jewish lobbyists demanding the creation of a Jewish state.. Besides Truman's own Zionism' support, additional inside lobby from aides like Clifford, Niles and Lowenthal worked hard to support the cause.

Truman's decision rose from bureaucratic politics with contrasting concerns directing the White House and the State Department over Palestine. The lack of consensus and clashes led to an unclear and at times incoherent Middle East policy, while under the predicament of having to consider reports from Niles, Clark, and Lowenthal, against recommendations from Marshall, Forrestal, Acheson, and Henderson. Besides, he needed to deal with the Defense Department, Department of State, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency, to, finally, had to hear requests from the Jewish lobby and the Washington oil lobby as well.

The administrative disaster mirrored the struggle in the Truman administration, when even the own Truman, admitted the perception he had, of a conspiracy against his administration's policy. He also went further to recognized that a partition plan was not the solution to the ongoing battles in Palestine, but at the same time he wanted to prevent blaming on him for disengaging from mediation efforts for what he fought hard. But, his argument is challenged by Villanova

(2004), who argued that Truman's decision to recognize Israel, was not more than a protest to domestic pressure on him, specifically from the Department of State.

This bureaucratic instability caused by the U.S. recognition of Israel originated from the different conflicting risks, interests and perceptions of its participants. And the problem continued "as career officials and political appointees continue to resist presidential decrees, modern presidents have responded by seeking to accumulate and centralize power in the White House. This problem is summarized in Truman's memoirs" (Villanova, 2004, p. 18).

It seems like the Truman administration's main challenge was bureaucracy, one in which many career officials picture themselves as devoted to government management and policymaking, challenging the President, who has to deal with many trying to bypass their policy, something achieved by the bureaucrats, often by persuading the key officials, appointed by the president to take the responsibility of policies' implementation. According to Truman, this is illustrated in the own generals and admirals of the War and Navy Departments at the time. For him, the main obstacle to making foreign policy was that, frequently career men instead of implementing the administration's policies, they usually sought to impose their own visions. They succeeded in having the Secretaries act for and under the bureaucracies, as he experienced with the Department of State. Bureaucracy was definitely an issue for President Truman, creating an inconsistent policy condemned to failure.

For the reasons given above, President Harry Truman failed to follow the advice of almost every foreign policy expert within his circle of influence at both the domestic and international levels. They had predicted a disastrous result for such a move. What follows in the next chapters endorses the prediction of Truman's advisors.

Chapter Four

The U.S. Role and Status as Mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

4.1 The Effectiveness of International Mediation

Before identifying the U.S. role as mediator in the conflict, it is important to explore what a good practice constitutes as well as establish the parameters of success in international mediation. This chapter will discuss this, and apply it to the roles played by various U.S. administrations in this international dispute between 1950 and 1970.

For Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat, even when some policymakers see mediation as a panacea, the fact of the matter is that mediation efforts in intra-state disputes are successful only part of the time. For these authors, there are some preconditions in order for mediation to succeed.

First, mediators should have a clear strategy, meaning having specific political objectives, a plan for attaining these goals, and an international consensus of their vision. Second, mediation efforts should be ripe, meaning they should coincide with moments when at least one and preferably all of the parties to a conflict prefer talking to fighting. Third, mediators need to have leverage over the disputants. Finally, opportunities for success increase when mediators are in a

position to offer an inducement if a settlement is reached, and to use hard diplomacy if not.

As discussed in the literature review, Stedman's argument coincides with that of Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat, that in the international arena the chances of success of mediation are greatest when mediators have a clear strategy. However, this author specifies the meaning of clear strategy, which is having a clear sense of what their political objectives are, a plan for attaining these goals, and international consensus of the vision. On the other hand, Maria Londoño agrees with Kleiboer in that, "the mediators attributes considered in the literature as the most important for the success of mediation are: impartiality, leverage and status" (Maria Londoño Lazaro 1991, p.331).

For Susskind and Babitt "These characteristics are usually held responsible for a mediator becoming accepted by the disputing parties, which in turn, is seen as vital for the successful performance of his mediator functions" (Kleiboer, 1996. p, 368)

4.2 Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1950-1970)

During this period, U.S. participation was via joint effort rather than as a main protagonist in mediation. By 1950, intense clashes had occurred among infiltrated and displaced Palestinians and Israelis, leading to several Israeli casualties. In the middle of such heat the United States efforts along with Britain and France focused on monitoring and control arm shipments to both sides as

conflict prevention measure while also proposing peace talks under the Anglo American initiative.

“During the 1950s and 1960s, the structural asymmetry between the two parties became an extremely relevant characteristic of this conflict. While the state of Israel was able to build the strongest and best-equipped army of the Middle East, the Palestinians could only create armed groups that carried out resistance actions, sometimes of a terrorist nature, both inside the territory of Israel and against Israeli (but also Jewish) targets abroad” (Gallo and Marzano, 2009.p. 43).

A major initiative during 1955 and 1956 was Project Alpha, a joint U.S.-British comprehensive peace proposal that would comprise agreements between Israelis and Arabs, the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem and diplomatic exchanges. However, this effort failed, ending in a revival of violence, mainly due to Israel’s domestic political instability, and sanctions were placed against Israel by Egypt creating a blockage that intensified Arab border strife.

The following period left an opening for the United States to take the lead in mediation efforts.

4.3 Timeline of U.S. Administration Mediation Efforts

4.3.1 Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration (1953 – 1961)

During this administration, the Jewish American community’s contact with the White House was very limited. According to a political historian of the

University of California, Steven L. Spiegel, “his administration considered Pro-Israeli pressure an obstacle to overcome rather than as a factor in formulating policy” (Verbeeten, 2006, p. 39) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was particularly firm in ignoring the pressure exercised by Jewish groups.

Between 1953 and 1956 the administration’s perception of Israel was negative, despite the efforts made by the Israel’s sympathizers. Different presidential documents such as debate conversations, reports and memos, by U.S. officials, illustrated that the Jews and not the Arabs were the main obstacle to peace. U.S.-Israel relations were characterized by tension and disagreements. Both nations felt their national interests were different. While the United States expected Israel to concede territory, cease raids, restrict immigration, and accept the return of refugees, Israel refused to do so.

The Eisenhower administration was aware it had an unbalanced policy toward Israel. However, it did justify its position under the argument that closer ties with the Arab states was among its interest in the region.

The British decision to disengage created the risk of a vacuum, and sharpened the United States’ desire to merge the Arab world into its standards. But, it refrained to do so, in order to avoid any policy that might justify the Arabs who were obsessed by the perception of U.S. preference towards Israel.

Calculating that Israel would make broader shifts to the Gamma and Alpha plans, facilitating a land bridge between Jordan and Egypt by ceding Negev territory, Eisenhower’s administration denied Israel arms, and threatened the

country with economic sanctions. Furthermore, neither Kenen's objections to President Eisenhower's policies nor AIPAC (American Israel Political Affairs Committee, a key pro-Israel lobbying group) were able to influence the general orientation of Eisenhower's policy.

A significant policy of President Eisenhower was his focus on not getting the country involved with becoming Israel's major supplier of armament. The administration wished to avoid this in an effort to maintain some independence from Israel and attempt to serve as an honest broker for peace.

The Eisenhower period was the low water mark for U.S.-Israel alliance. The president was guided more by issues of international politics and containment strategy than he was to domestic pressure even within his own political party. One of his advantages was his lack of political vulnerability which had hampered Truman. He did not need the Jewish vote in order to win the elections. However, the U.S. facilitated a French-Israeli alliance that promoted the acquisition of armament for Israel, as well as intelligence sharing that later became fixtures and in large part shaped the subsequent relationship between Israel and the United States.

An important event that shows this administration's leverage was the capture by Israel of the Gaza territory. President Eisenhower was facing important domestic as well as international pressure, due to election campaign and the Hungarian revolution. The opportunity arose for Israel in a coalition with France and Britain, to seize the Gaza strip.

But, instead of using the tactics of economic sanctions or any other manipulations, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned the attack before the United Nations, where France and Britain held veto power in the Security Council, in conjunction with some emerging third world governments. The matter was taken to the General assembly which approved resolution after resolution calling for a ceasefire and then withdrawal of the aggressor. After a series of pressure tactics from the U.S., the occupation of the Gaza strip came to an end.

It was not until 1960 that the United State intervened directly for the first time with its mediation efforts as conflict was escalating.

4.3.2 Peace Efforts of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations (1960-1971)

During this period, many scholars contend that the Americans' impartial approaches toward Arab Israeli conflict's resolution were neutralized by domestic politics in the United States, domestic ethnic politics, Middle East big power's competition and the growing distrust between Arabs and Israelis. President Kennedy, like several other American presidents, stressed the importance of the Arab refugee problem, but his efforts to break the impasse did not succeed. As Drucks wrote "while Kennedy administration supported Israel, it did not wish to provide Israel with a bilateral alliance since it might only serve to bring Arab states such as Egypt closer into the soviet orbit" (2001, p.6).

After the failure to avoid the outbreak of the June 1967 war, President Johnson efforts were focused on preventing a super power impasse thru direct negotiations with Russia to find a solution to the conflict. The basic elements of Johnson's approach to the crisis of May 23rd were to persuade Israel to avoid war, and to refuse support of any the territory captured as a result of war (Peretz, 1972).

However, records show that U.S commitment problems to prevent and manage the Israel-Palestinian conflict began during this administration, as then President Johnson was prioritizing his domestic interests, and the Vietnam War became the number one priority. Once the Six Day War began, sympathy for the Jewish people, and the desire to avoid damaging America's image in front of some pro-Western oil-rich Arab countries as well as the extremely pro-Israeli tone of American public opinion helped make Johnson turn into a cautious, reluctant leader in the crisis. However, the efforts to implement what became policy in the U.S. the Council Resolution 242 were undermined by the continued attacks in the area, by the Arabs resisting to negotiate a peace with Israel and in the area, and finally, by Israel's refusal to desist its occupation from Palestinian territory under the argument of their right to protect themselves from further aggression.

According to Peretz, the Nixon administration continued to approach the resolution efforts similarly to Johnson's administration, but its passive style to break the impasse were unsuccessful. By 1967 the conflict experienced a new phase centering on the assessment of a possible exchange of captured territory for ceasefire, this time in the absence of an active role by the U.S. However, this new

initiative also failed, increasing tension among rival Palestinian factions leading ultimately to a civil war mainly mediated by Anwar Nasser, President of Egypt at the time, followed by UN efforts which were rejected by Israel as infringing on its sovereignty.

The Rogers' Plan, Nixon Administration (1969)

On December 9, 1969, in an effort to reach a settlement of the conflict, American Secretary of State Rogers under Nixon administration, made a public statement suggesting the possibility of peace by granting recognition to Israeli sovereignty in exchange of return of all seized territory to the Palestinians. On August 7, 1970, following the announcement of the Rogers plan, Israel started a cease fire which was quickly broken. As the Roger plan did not materialized, it was evidently a failed concept. "The Roger's plan demonstrates how moderate the short term effectiveness of communication facilitation actually is, as the plan could not proceed without Israel's participation in the peace negotiations .(Haixia, 2007, p. 613).

4.3.3 Carter Administration (1977- 1981)

Clyde R, Mark (2002) from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) described the Jimmy Carter's administration as a very dynamic one, referring to its involvement as a mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing as a consequence some disruption in the U.S – Israel bilateral relation. However, the Middle East Policy Council suggest that President Carter's efforts to reach a

comprehensive resolution since 1997, did not only experimented some setbacks, but also advances in the process.

The Camp David Accord

The Camp David Accord was an effort to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and it was held between July 11 and 25, 1978, at Camp David near Washington, DC. It was the result of fourteen months of diplomatic efforts concentrated on planning a comprehensive settlement to the conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries. The resolution consisted of three parts, being the establishment of an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as negotiations to solve the Palestinian problem (Stein, 1999). This process created a mixture of reactions, some in Israel perceived it as a U.S. strategy to pressure Israel to return the seized territories and to sacrifice something in good faith in the name of peace, in contrast President Carter's endorsement to the Palestinian homeland and political rights triggered some friction with Israel, but for others the agreement simply reduced the need for commitment of Israel to negotiate with Palestine. This process was viewed by some in Israel as creating U.S. pressure on the Jewish state to withdraw from captured territories and to take risks for the sake of peace. Some others argue that the concluding version of the Camp David Accords denoted Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's success in limiting Israel pre-conditions to go to the negotiation table with the Palestinians.

However, for Yoav Tenembaun (2002), a lecturer at the University of Tel Aviv, the Camp David summit did not present a blue print for peace or specific

terms for an agreement. Instead it provided for active mediation between the parties, which was in contrast to Kissinger bargaining triad and partial strategy, an approach, failing to make progress.

Finally, Carter experimented with a bargaining triad, leading to the successful Camp David Accords. This accords, for Lt. Col. Richard C. Crotty, U.S. Army (2003, p.1), “has been extremely successful and productive for twenty three years”. According to this author the Accords established the basis for peace by encouraging negotiations concerning Palestinian statehood. However, efforts by the U.S. and Israel to follow through on this agenda were unfruitful. .

During Carter’s administration, peace was achieved through the Camp David Accords, ending a state of war between Israel and Egypt, providing the foundation for an outline to a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proposing the creation of a Palestinian state. According to this framework, parties shall agree to establish self-governing authorities, define and their powers and responsibilities.

However, following the ratification of the Camp David Accords, the Israeli government came under intense domestic and international pressure to abort the plan for a Palestinian state. Then the U.S-Israelis were disrupted immediately by differences on the timeline to interrupted Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Consequently, the peace process that showed to be promising for the region, and the Palestinians, failed by 1980 leading to the 1980’s Palestinian uprising known as the first intifada, followed by a second uprising. Haixia (2007) findings show that the

effectiveness of Carter's Camp David Accords ranks second at twenty eight years, indicating "moderate effectiveness over the long term of the procedural strategy". (p.620)

4.3.4 Reagan Administration (1981 – 1989)

During the Reagan administration Israelis supporters were alarmed during the first Reagan term about potential frictions to the U.S.-Israel relations in part because several presidential appointees were related to key Arab nations. However, "President Reagan's personal support for Israel and the compatibility between Israel and Reagan perspectives on terrorism, security cooperation and the Soviet threat, led to dramatic improvements in bilateral relations" and in 1981 both nations signed a cooperation agreement to enhance their national security.(Canfield, 2001, p. 20).

In November of 1983, the two sides deepened their ties by forming a joint political military group to implement most provisions of said alliance and planned joint military exercises and facilities to stockpile military equipment in Israel. According to Bard Mitchell in his article, "Reagan's Legacy on Israel" (2004), policy differed during 1982, when Reagan did not hesitate to publicly punish Israel, after Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, suspending the strategic cooperation agreement and the delivery of F-16 jet fighters to Israel after the raid on Osirak, penalties that were put in place only temporary in both circumstances. As noticed herein, this did not impact the administration's partiality for Israel and the weight it placed on Israel's importance to the United States.

U.S.-Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term, which included the grant of aid to Israel and a free trade agreement signed in 1985. However, while Reagan was an important ally to Israel, his administration also engaged in the most public criticism of Israel.

On September 1, 1982, Reagan expressed his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, while supported the idea of self-government under the control of Jordan. He maintains the idea of an undivided Jerusalem, but suggested a negotiation on the final status, settlement freeze and disregard any suggestions on the return to the 1967 borders, a proposal rejected by Begin since it opposed and deviated from the Camp David Accords, totally disappointing president Carter.

“In March 1985, President Reagan was on record saying, that the United States did not want to participate in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, despite the Camp David commitment for the United States to be a full partner in subsequent phases of the peace talks” (Quandt W, 2001 p. 262). In this particular quote. Quandt sought to emphasizes the need for a serious commitment from the United States to facilitate a two state solution.

4.3.5 Bush Sr. Administration (1989-1993)

The Bush administration exemplified a relevant ideological perpetuation of the previous eight years. However, he wanted to play a much audacious role than the preceding administrations towards peace in the Middle East, especially one that could guarantee Israel’s survival while providing a home to the Palestinian at the same time. But, he had to deal since the beginning of his presidential period with a

series of setbacks in the peace process, particularly the U.S. relation with Palestine as a result of his harsh policy referring Palestine when approaching the violence of the intifada. Kathleen Christison (1999), a Middle East analyst for the CIA during Bush administration , compared Bush and Reagan's policies on this issue and she maintains that the reason why both differed diametrically, was the fact that Bush administration policymakers were not as Pro Israeli as Reagans and she highlights the neutrality of his approach not out of sympathy but, due to a lack of a clear strategy in the Middle East, especially at the beginning of the period, Christison is cautious to clarify that this was not due to any sympathy for the Palestinian suffering in the intifada, but to the lack of a strategic vision the Bush foreign policy team had for the Middle East, after a cold war era.

Another relevant factor in the pragmatism of the Bush administration was the bureaucratic influence of a Israeli lobby, especially within the close circle to his Vice President Baker whom feared that an Arab lobby within the U.S Department of State and within the rest of the bureaucracy could succeed in the shifting of the current policies at the time for one that would be more convenient to the Arab people, The consequence was the relaxation of the pressure mechanisms on Prime Minister Shamir and the ruling coalition, neglecting Israel expansion policy over the territory.

Although a lack of a clear strategy was a reality for the Palestinian question right away, Secretary Baker presented one over the first ninety days of their administration outlines in the April 12, 1989 memorandum to the president. Even

though the content remains classified, the National Security Council cover sheet shown that the new administration's policy in the region would be generally consistent with what Baker and Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning for the State Department, pictured. According to Enrique Arduengo, (2009, p.4) “Baker was determined to resist the siren call of Israel and its Arab neighbor particularly when it seemed that neither side was interested in considering the delicate political choices necessary to create a real process”.

In Baker’s view, a final settlement should include an autonomous democratic Palestine, monitored for security purposes by the UN or any other international force. The reaction from high Israeli officials was much curter, perhaps Moshe Arens, the Israeli foreign minister, expressed serious frustration with the content and tone of the discourse.

According to Thomas L. Friedman (1989), in an article for *The New York Times*, “although the Secretary of State’s remarks were consistent with longstanding American Policy in the Middle East, they nevertheless were a departure from the Reagan administration in both tone and structure”.

- **The Madrid Peace Conference Effort**

A conflict resolution effort led by the United States, and hosted by Spain in Madrid on October 30, 1991, was aimed at establishing a peace plan between Israel and its neighbors. It included a plan for Palestine self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza, which would later “become permanent regional concerns such as: The fate of the Palestinian Refugees” (Ceri, Av, 1991, p.1).

The conference did not meet the aspirations of substantial agreement and failed to build strong domestic coalition to support its strategy. However, it represents a huge step to the broker role of the United States of America. It reunited for the first time Israelis and PLO negotiators, giving them the opportunity to experience independent negotiation, which finally resulted in the Oslo Accord.

After the Madrid Conference in 1991, bilateral and multilateral negotiations were launched. However, for Scott Lansenky in his article *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace; American leadership in the Middle East, election years in Israel and the United States*, the Bush Sr. administration's ability to play an active third party role was limited as evidenced by Secretary Baker's lack of involvement in the process following the Madrid negotiations, documenting one more time a serious commitment problem on behalf of the U.S in their mediator role

On March 6, 1991, President Bush outlined a framework for peace which was grounded in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of *territory for peace*. On March 6 1991, President Bush suggested a new proposal for peace, contemplating both sides, the recognition of Palestinian political rights as well as Israel's national security grounded in U.S S.C Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as the principle of land for peace. Also, Secretary Baker delivered non-binding letters of assurance to all parties that were not officially released.

Baker apparently agreed with Israel's opinion that SC Resolution 242 was subject to interpretation, asserting that the U.S would give considerable weight to Israel argument that the Golan Heights was an essential element for its security and

stated that the United States would not endorse the creation of an autonomous Palestinian State. Finally, he assured the Palestinians that the United States support the idea of legitimate political rights for Palestinians, opposing Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem to their territory. The process experienced a setback; negotiations froze, breaking down on the issue of sovereignty. Palestinians wanted territorial sovereignty that Israel refused, but, the U.S. was willing to support. Therefore, the U.S. used financial leverage to stop settlement.

Prime Minister Shamir's obstinacy with regard to the peace process directly impacted the following election and the Labor party returned to power. Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister of Israel in August 1992, and assured President Bush that he was determined to make real progress in the peace process; The Bush administration did not vacillate in granting the guarantees that had so evaded Shamir over the course of the year. The Middle East team at the U.S. Department of State immediately got the impression that Rabin was needed for conflict resolution efforts to move forward.

4.3.6 Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

President Clinton opinion is that "only the region's leaders can make peace, and vowed to be their partner" (Migdalovitz, 2002, p.5). However, in her issue brief for U.S congress this analyst affirms that after the Hebron protocol was implemented the U.S played a key role facilitating the Israeli-Palestinian talks. President Clinton back then mediated the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States assumed the coordination of its implementation. These negotiations

were personally handled by President Clinton in 2000 at Camp David. Clinton supported peace efforts during his first term, although his direct involvement did not become a major factor until his second term. During the Clinton presidency, the United States won enhanced status in the region as well as on the international arena, sharing a common commitment, building a diverse and solid domestic coalition to endorse U.S. leadership in the mediation efforts, contrary to the George W Bush administration. However, some weaknesses found in the Clinton's administration approach were less discipline and fewer strategies, lacked of focus and follow up.

The Clinton Administration left in place a bilateral negotiation structure, which had run its course the previous year, and invested little in multilateral negotiation on an arena that had brought substantial Arab state support and involvement to the peace process for the first time. The administration was aware about this but basically ignored it and thus neglected the importance of shaping the secret contacts between Israel and the PLO resulting in the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Process

The Oslo Process was a series of bilateral agreements signed in Washington following negotiations brokered by the Norwegians. Parts of them were clandestine meetings between Israel and the PLO. Its main goal was Israel's withdrawal from the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip, in order to allow the establishment of a Palestinian Authority for an interim period until permanent arrangements could be established.

Under this agreement the following goals were temporarily reached: Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate Palestinian representative, and the PLO renounced the use of violence as well as recognized Israel right to exist and finally, on 2000, both agreed to recognize an autonomous in Gaza and West Bank. But, there is a question which might be important to answer, if answers wants to be given that might lead to the improvement of the international mediator's performance in this conflict. Why has the Oslo Process not succeeded? Imbalance of power, lack of consensus about final goals, lack of focusing on short term agreements and, lack of commitment are the most important reasons, as the PLO accepted the agreement only as a desperate measure for preserving survival.

On the Israeli side a debilitating economic situation was the reason to accept the terms of the Oslo Process. By securing a peaceful settlement with the PLO, Israel could ensure its economic livelihood, which was doing well until this point. The Arab market was closed to Israel due to the hostilities associated with the conflict. Additionally, when the negotiations leading up to the accords are examined, they were lacking in qualitative substance.

For Sadat, the outstanding issues were caught up in the formalities associated with typical U.S. sponsored negotiations. In this sense, there are two fundamental characteristics that Oslo negotiations needed for success.

- a) Under certain circumstances private talks (caucuses) might be more effectives than bilateral discussions and,

b) Balance of power need to be assured due to the recognition of Israel as state.

For Avi Shlaim (2005), one possible answer is the Oslo Accord was condemned to collapse from the beginning since it did not address any of the core issues in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. However, findings from his research suggest a different answer, suggesting as a main reason the fact that Israel, under the leadership of the Likud, reneged on its side of the deal. By resorting to an outbreak of violence, the Palestinians contributed to the diminishing of trust. Without any trust political progress was impossible, but more determinant was the Israeli policy on settlement expansion at the West Bank carried out under Labour as well as Likud administrations. According to this author this policy precluded the emergence of a viable Palestinian state without which there can be no solution to the conflict.

Finally, for Gallo and Marzano (2009), there were two mistakes involved in the Oslo agreement failure. The first mistake, coincide with Avi Shlaim, in reference to improper approach to core issues. The second is the miscalculation by Israel, which intended to negotiate with a weaker party. Both impacted the future of the conflict and the failure of negotiations.

The Oslo Process as a Case Study for the Limits of American Intervention

The financial aspect, have been identified as an important element of international crisis negotiations. However, Scott Lanesky, in his article “Paying for

Peace: The Oslo Process and The Limits of American Foreign Aid” maintains that “while aid from the United States represents the tangible expression of U.S. political and security guarantees, endorsed peace is not the same as buying peace”(2004, p. 213), and should not be confused, he argues. In his opinion America’s role is not just limited to provide security and political encouragement, which should not be restricted to the development of dollars or F-16’s, but to the reliability and tangible profits of building a constructive relationship. .

According to Lasensky history suggest that it is not aid what establishes leverage power in a crisis, the incentive approach have been experimented by the U.S. in diverse situations, proven to be an effective tool, in scenarios such as of the peace agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, but without of question unsuccessful in preventing collapses during Israeli-Palestinian mediation efforts. Lasensky argues “that the more than one billion dollars America has spent on Palestinians since 1994 has been wasted” (Ghassan, 2007,p. 24). However, his position is clear that the Oslo years are an example of circumstances in which aid was an imperative U.S. mediation tool. It improved the relationship between Israel and Palestine at the time, opening doors for a possible settlement. This was a fruitful effort made by the United States, the only thing to wait on, was the Israeli-Palestinian’s reaction in order to assess the possibility of a ripe moment to use strategies that will impulse serious negotiations since “then the U.S. will be in a position to use its political, security, and economic muscle to underwrite a stabilization and disengagement package” (Lasensky, 2004, p.210), which will

include perhaps, the negotiation of Israeli settlements, as well as, the building of stronger Palestinian institutions among other issues in the best interest of peace. What followed next, serves as case study for foreign affairs academics, to research deep into the limits of aid in international mediation in order to research on and suggest alternatives as well as best practices in using aid as a successful mediation strategy or to disregard it and seek some others more effective.

Historical records suggest hegemony by the United States or any other state in the Middle East triggers resistance, a reason why hegemonies have implemented from time to time the strategy of involving external players such as European countries, Japan and even Russia in regional issues, in the particular Israel-Palestine conflict scenario the Quartet is an example. However, the Quartet option endorsed by the U.S, even though it was of limited use, it lacked of formal structure, it failed to maintain balance of power, interest and composition, as well as consensus, demonstrating one more time that surrendering the mediator role to an international institution has not been successful so far.

Even so, after the Oslo process was signed in a White House sponsored ceremony, the United States played a very small role for almost two years, leaving the hard bargaining to the parties. Washington declined to settle disputes or monitor performance. The administration's eleventh hour intervention in mid – 1995 did help to finalize the short-term agreement, known as Oslo II, which set out the nuts and bolts of Palestinian self-rule and committed Israel to a series of withdrawals

from Palestinian territory. However, there was not real engagement from Clinton administration until very late in the process.

The Wye Summit (1998)

The October 1998 Wye Summit in which Clinton brought Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat together to rescue the process from collapse, represented a different, more activist approach with the United States taking on the role of arbitrator and moving the parties to adopt a U.S. bridging proposal.

However, early inaction by the Clinton administration along with the failure to hold Israelis and Palestinians accountable to the agreements they had signed, were to have far reaching negative consequences for the peace process and for U.S. policy. The Clinton team focused intensely on keeping the Israeli Palestine track alive and maintaining momentum in the talks, but at the expense of debilitating actions by the parties which included Palestinian violence, Israeli settlement expansion, corruption within the Palestinian Authority and backsliding by both sides, that finally defeated the process. Camp David II talks collapsed with no agreement after two weeks.

A contributing factor to failure was a limited policy process which neutralized the progress of U.S. positions on the core issues. The U.S. was unprepared to put policies together on complex issues such as Jerusalem borders. The Clinton stipulation that the initiative would expire at the end of his term was intended to pressure the parties but predictably had the opposite effect. Bureaucracy

and confrontation between Republicans and Democrats within U.S. Congress often spilled over into foreign policy, including the Israel-Palestine conflict.

At certain moments, particularly when questions of settlement, were debated, the lack of bi-partisan support was a drain on U.S. peacemaking efforts. However, Clinton's leadership on the issue, especially his constant courting of Jewish-American interest groups, gave the administration a strong base of domestic support. A president who lays the proper ground work at home enjoys much more room to maneuver abroad.

The Middle-East Peace Summit at Camp David (2000).

The Camp David Summit was a formative event in the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations and possibly in the contemporary history of the Middle East as a whole. It constituted the first attempt ever to reach a comprehensive solution to the protracted conflict. It not only ended in failure, but immediately led to an unprecedented outbreak of violence that lasted until 2005.

For Shimon Shamir (2003), there was a significant gap between the ways the two parties conceived the purpose of the Camp David Summit. This Israeli perspective asserts that the conceptual gap hurt the unfolding of events far more than the mutual mistrust, or any of the mistakes made by either side. While he maintains that the blame for the failure should be put on Arafat, there are some lessons that should be learned. In order to get supportive public opinion, attention must be paid to each side's perceptions, not just the objectives desired.

However, careful thought must be given to the question of process management. The facilitator hosting the summit got off to a good start. The summit began with an orderly procedure of presenting positions, defining interests, and then giving each side its respective assignments. But there was lack of follow up. The process became unclear as well as disorganized and there was no realistic American contingency plan ready, patterns that should be avoided in any peace efforts to follow.

In this conflict the issues are all interrelated. Therefore, it is not possible to isolate any single issue from the other, but nothing was considered by the Israelis to be binding until everything was agreed. The agreement might emerge in phases, but the shape of the permanent status agreement was not to change substantially from discussions during negotiations. The lesson? When such time comes, the process will be back to where it stood at Camp David.

Finally, Quandt (2005) cites Gilead Sher, who asserts that there is one relevant consideration that must be kept in mind. Approach to easier issues, prior to difficult ones, will definitely create a rigid position with which the mediator will have to deal. The overall framework agreement on the permanent status should provide a solution to certain issues that could be implemented immediately, along with a method to solve future issues, on which the parties could not fully agree at that point.

In contrast, Munther S. Dajani (2005) provides a Palestinian perspective based on the fact that the parties did not put enough intention into settling.

However, he agrees with the U.S. position that agreements could have and should have been reached on the more technical issues, paving the way for addressing successfully the more difficult ones. A second issue is the lack of understanding between the mediator, the U.S. and one of the parties in conflict, the Palestinians. Finally, the Americans believed in Palestinian ripeness, a miscalculation for this author.

The failure generated intense debate over the timing of the summit, the intention of the parties, the adequacy of preparation, the efficiency of the negotiators and the way the summit was concluded. The Taba negotiations on September, 2000, following the Camp David failure were a final initiative that aimed to discuss territorial, refugee and, security concerns. However, again with the U.S. lack of involvement due to elections coming, and the change over its leadership, the initiative failed to crystalize.

The negotiation was characterized by aggressive political strategies of the Clinton administration on terrorism and rogue states issues, in part apparently with the purpose of gaining domestic electoral support as well as maybe reflecting protest for a fundamentalist Iran.. The non-relevant areas of policy for this administration, such as Islamism, democracy promotion, and economic improvement appear to have been assigned to middle level officials. But the big issues such as Israel, belonged to the President himself and his immediate entourage which included his domestic political advisor, his special envoys for the mediation process as well as his National Security Advisor.

Overall, the Clinton administration's commitment and his personal dedication to the Palestinian-Israeli process gave him lasting popularity throughout the region, demonstrating the desire for maintain U.S. involvement in the process. However lessons from Camp David should not be neglected if peace is to occur. According to Dr. Ron Pundak (2001) an Israeli historian and journalist, there were other main obstacles that U.S. mediation failed to be address in order to succeed. There was weak implementation during Netanyahu's administration, and the complex management of permanent status negotiations under Barak. Finally, the damaging impact of anti-Israeli propaganda by the unexperienced and negligent Palestinian political system , besides the employment of a double discourse were two factors which lead the situation to deteriorate into a new cycle of violence.

The American press has given former President Clinton almost all the credit for his role in the success of Oslo Accord. However, historical evidence suggests that credit should be given to President George H. Bush for his crucial role in removing the main obstacles to peace process during that period.

On the other hand, that Bush administration failed to do everything that could possibly do for purposes of promoting relations with the Palestinians. It used American leverage to serve the interest of peace, under the argument of having to avoid imposing peace in the Middle East. Despite the lack of leverage to encourage peace, the first Bush administration made relevant progress towards the goal of conflict resolution.

4.3.7 George H. W. Bush vs. Bill Clinton Administration

Contrary to the Clinton Administration, which was especially characterized by being influenced by domestic pressure, bureaucratic obstacles, and political opposition, the Bush administration allegedly sought the creation of U.S. Hegemony during the 1990's. Bush's Secretary of State Baker is identified by Quandt as responsible for defeating bureaucratic and domestic obstacles to reach the administrations' goals, particularly during the Madrid Process and other U.S. policies in the Middle East. In contrast, Hudson (1996) argues that Clinton and his close circle gave the impression especially in an election year of being passionate and loyal to American interests, particularly when dealing with the Jewish identity predicament similar to Truman and Johnson administrations. Perhaps, the Bush and Clinton administrations were accurate in asserting that the Arab Israeli Peace Process during their terms were an historic diplomatic accomplishment. Certainly, the U.S. was instrumental in the inducement of the process through the Madrid Conference of 1991, but has been ineffective in maintaining or securing progress since then.

4.3.8 The George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)

The George W. Bush second administration initially pursued a more discreet role for the U.S. as the prime mediator in the long-standing conflict. Like the Clinton administration, President Bush also envisioned Middle East peace as part of its legacy.

Unlike in the Clinton era, he let his Secretary of State take the lead, refraining from robust personal involvement. Even with Hamas ascendant and

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas nearly powerless in the West Bank, the Bush administration pushed forward, but, Secretary of State Powell did not assigned any special Middle East envoy and justified the decision by saying that “the United States stands ready to assist, not insist.” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p.2), denoting an internal inconsistency of intentions and approaches within Bush administration.

However, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, the administration re-approached the peace process strategy, partly to gain endorsement from the Arab community. But, the political fallout from the sharp disagreements with the Yitzhak Shamir administration, particularly over settlement and the White House’s decision to take a firm stance against their continued expansion, had a searing effect that outlasted the Bush administration, it reverberated well into the Clinton and Bush years and caused the next presidents and their administrations to overcompensate in a way that created a different set of problems. “The Bush 41 administration deserves credit for taking a firm stance on settlement expansion, an issue that had long undermined Arab trust in the peace process and increased Israel’s own vulnerabilities.

However, by carrying over this policy disagreement into an all-out confrontation with the organized U.S. Jewish community, the administration weakened its ability to play an active role later on.” (Ibid 2002, page 17). The Bush administration’s approach to the conflict lacked both commitment and a sense of strategic purpose, damaging its perception of being engaged in the peace process. In November 2001, the primary focus of the Bush administration was the war in

Afghanistan. According to the then Britain Ambassador in Washington, Christopher Meyer, the U.S Secretary of State at the time Colin Powell was pressuring to make a policy statement on the issue, planned since the Saudi intervention. However, according to Meyer, President Bush's aversion towards Arafat was obvious, while Powell supported a more consistent U.S engagement in the mediation of the conflict, he was relatively isolated. Once the Iraq War was in progress, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, continued pushing the U.S for greater commitment on the peace process. During a meeting in Ireland on April 9, 2003, then President Bush gave his British counterpart hope by assuring that he was willing to commit to the process as Blair was, however, as then U.S National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, later admitted such level of commitment on U.S side was not possible to honored since the administration was in need to remained focused on the Iraq war, during Bush first term.

In 2003, major initiatives such as the Road Map Peace plan were not aggressively pursued, nor supervised, and again lacked sustained diplomatic commitment. Abbas repeatedly asked for more tangible support to strengthen his hands for internal Palestinian decision making and create more political stages to engage Israel. The administration did not respond in a meaningful way. In fact the constant emphasis on Palestinian institution building rather than the political process appeared to some as a substitute for active engagement in conflict resolution.

As a response to the escalation of violence at the beginning of 2003, on April 30th diplomatic efforts resumed, the Quartet, which included U.S. participation offered a proposal to the parties, a Performance-Based Roadmap to reach a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, known as the Road Map. This was a three phase plan, based on the grounds set by the Madrid Conference, and Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), and 1397 (2002), agreements previously reached by the parties. This proposal was by Palestinians and Israelis, albeit the last one with some mistrust accepted as the foundation and reference point to conflict resolution efforts. Beginning on 2002 the Quartet met at a series of meetings at a principal and envoys' levels under the facilitation of Gaza-based United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

On June 2, 2003 The U.S. President George Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the newly Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas met in Aqaba, Jordan and Abbas expressed his concern for the armed intifada, insisting the need for a cease fire and mediation of the conflict to reach an agreement that will lead to the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territory and avoid further suffering of the Palestinian people. Also, Primer Minister Sharon expressed his assurance to the Palestinian people their understanding of the importance of territory contiguity in the West Bank for a two-state solution to be possible, guarantying the dismantlement of unauthorized and illicit settlements. The meeting was welcomed and supported by the Quartet, as far as it tied parties tied to their commitments.

The leaders met one more time in Jerusalem on July 1st to follow up progress made in Road Map's application and in a news conference held prior to the meeting the Prime Minister Abbas welcomed Israel's withdrawal from the northern Gaza Strip, referring to it as an important advance.

However, while President Abbas expected to reach an agreement to create a committee that would impulse the Road Map's implementation Primer Minister Sharon's main concern was Israel's security, in a scenario of extra judicial killings, bombings suicide attacks, and separation barriers building that jeopardized the negotiations and the prospect for peace and condemned by the General Assembly.

In November 2003, some progress was made, the Security Council adopted resolution 1515, which demanded the cessation of provocation and all form of violence, reaffirming the commitment to the two state solution vision, and emphasizing the need for a comprehensive peace plan and finally endorsing the Quartet's efforts while reminding the parties the need to fulfil their commitments (UNSC 1515, 2003), while Prime Minister announced the unilateral disengagement from Gaza strip. In November, 2003, the Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1515, ratifying the Road Map strategy. Prime Minister Sharon, in the meantime, announced a plan for the unilateral disengagement of Israeli armies and settlers from the Gaza Strip. Later, an unofficial negotiation was made in December, 2003, between Israeli and Palestinian representatives of the civil society, headed by Yossi Beilin and Yasser Rabbi, former secretaries of Israel and PA impulse a new

detailed plan to end the conflict addressing final issues, the Geneva Initiative, which count with Israeli and Palestinian public support.

Following a gathering of the sponsors of the initiative in New York on December 5th, Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintained that the Road Map was the *key instrument* to make progress, and that the impetus required for peace in the Middle East must emanated from those putting their efforts together for change.

During 2002-2003, the Israel pattern was to divide Palestine in order to mediate with the weaker party. This contributed to the further escalation of the conflict in 2004, creating again a power imbalance that interfered with the efforts. In the meantime, outbreaks of violence intensified with the killing of some soldiers the two top leaders of Hamas, Shaikl Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the attack of Israeli Military vehicles in Gaza strip. According to the United Nations report of 2008, Israel launched a large operation along Gaza's border in an effort to reduce the incidence of cross border infiltration as well as alleged arm smuggling, in this operation according to the report Palestinians houses were demolished, and Palestinian civilians were killed, which raise serious concerns. In a period of just a month, a series of suicide bomb attacks which involved children, victims of these, happened in retaliation for Israel's actions triggering Israeli occupation which also caused the loss of many lives including of Palestinian children.

On November 11, 2004, at the age of 75, after months of health deterioration, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was buried after an official state funeral amidst important demonstrations of mourning and grief among Palestinians.

Diplomatic contacts marked the start of a new era in 2005. In February Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, now the head of an Israeli *unity government*, met at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, with Mahmoud Abbas, popularly elected to replaced Yasser Arafat as President of the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat's decease generated a new Palestinian leadership under Mahmoud Abbas whom oppose violence and gave all instructions to make peace efforts on reasonable terms. A Palestinian sponsor for peace seemed to be in place and once again, the two leaders agreed. The Palestinian leader announced the end of violence and Israeli Prime Minister expressed the intention to release nine hundred prisoners as well as the withdrawal of its troops from Palestinian territory. However, the vicious cycle would not end, and within days the planned agreement would failed when a suicide bombing killed five civilians at a Tel Aviv nightclub.

In March during an international conference promoting the endorsement of Palestinian institution building, the Quartet took the opportunity to issue an statement to welcome a new intent of Israel to withdraw from Gaza strip. However, reiterated that in order to succeed these efforts should be made through genuine commitment. While consistent with the Road Map's parameters, highlighting that a partial withdraw will not work. But, Israel only withdrew from Jericho and Tulkarn, West Bank towns, after UN Secretary General furthers talks. .

By April, the Quartet, appointed James Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank, as its special envoy for Gaza disengagement's efforts, part of his responsibilities were to facilitate the handover of economic assets, which included

agricultural greenhouses in the evacuated Gaza settlements, by May, Israel released four hundred Palestinian prisoners and finally in June, after Israel and Palestinian Authority leaders Sharon and Abbass met in Jerusalem, the Quartet intervened again and insisted both parties to prevent any escalation of the conflict. These series of events that clearly show an indirect participation of the U.S as a member of the Quarter, and its inconsistent role as mediator of the conflict.

Also, the George W. Bush administration was characterized by its strong support for Israel. The Bush administration wanted Palestinian leadership to renounce terrorism as a resistance mechanism before initiating new peace efforts, upsetting Arab leaders in the region. “Arab sympathizers viewed U.S. policy as exhibiting a double standard, antagonizing the Arab world, while ignoring Israel’s refusal to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 242” (Crotty, 2003, p 5).

Furthermore according to Daniel Pipes, a foreign policy expert, on the Middle East the roadmap was vague about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinians and sanctions for non-compliance (Crotty, 2003, p. 10), leading to conflict escalation. To make the conflict more intractable, during this two decades illegal settlements behind the green line increased nearly twice between 1993 and 2000 (Gallo, 2009), making the notion of a Palestinian state with a national stability and clearly delimited borders practically unachievable.

Israel efforts undermined the PA, and did not respect the content of the Oslo agreement. This ended up dividing Palestinian political civil society to the detriment of both sides. For Gallo and Marzano (2009), fifteen years prior to 2009,

the power balance decreased starting with the Oslo phase and ending with the Fatah-Hamas conflict in 2006, leading to a more powerful Israel.

According to the structure of asymmetry theory discussed by these Gallo and Marzano, low power balance and scare conflict awareness meant a very unrealistic opportunity for reaching a lasting peace. Their proposition is that unless the power balance increases and there exist mutual recognition at its own level in terms of status, rights and needs, there is a slight opportunity for reaching a substantial peace settlement. In this sense, when addressing distribution of power between the parties and spoiler management, Stedman (1997) argues that in order for balanced agreements to be possible, power balance must be present between the parties, during mediation efforts. In addition, these balanced agreements are vital for reducing the possibility that spoilers will appear, and finally, if spoilers are already exist, he suggest, then they must be managed by the mediator—something the United States decided not to do, withdrawing from its commitment to mediate anytime negotiations involved Hamas.

Regardless, diplomatic efforts to create a national unity between Fatah-Hamas, the groups were far from reaching a true understanding, making the separation between Gaza and the West Bank deeper, and affecting the balance of power and fueling the conflict as described above.

According to Gallo a miscalculation on the side of Israel by provoking a division of Palestine as strategy for negotiation, and U.S. failure to follow ripeness and commitment during Fatah-Hamas conflict as documented below was the main

weakness of Bush administration a great opportunity for spoilers such as Hamas.

Among this events are:

4.3.9 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and emergence of Hamas (2005-2006)

In August, regardless pressure from Israeli bureaucracy, Prime Minister Sharon ordered the removal of all civilian settlements in the Gaza Strip and some in West Bank , a month later Gaza Strip, plus Israeli settlement were free from Israeli military presence, a move that would mark the first Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory since June 4, 1967, Prime Minister Sharon in an address to the General Assembly, expressed the acknowledgement of the Palestinian people's right to a free and sovereign state, while retaining control over, air space, territorial waters and Gaza's border due to alleged security concerns, and maintaining his position in reference to an undivided Jerusalem.

In January 2006, two events would seriously impact the dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would be left incapacitated when he suffered a stroke. In addition, while the Bush administration pushed hard for Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, they ended up surprised by the Hamas victory in elections for a new Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas had by this point already been designated by the U.S as a terrorist group, and continued to resort to violence, and it did not recognize Israel, nor accept previous agreements. Via the party's election victory, it was now legitimated when it won a majority of seats. Moreover, President Abbas invited the Hamas leader, Ismail

Haniyeh to join in a new Palestinian Government, while almost at the same time, Ehud Olmert was elected as Prime Minister of Israel.

In response to the Hamas election victory, the U.S. along with the EU and Israel applied economic sanctions such as withholding of financial assistance from the Palestinian Authority to be resumed only if the Hamas led government committed to the preconditions to negotiate the recognition of Israel, recognize previous agreements including the Road Map, and finally refrained from using violence as a resistance method. To relieve the Palestinians from the humanitarian crisis and suffering the Quartet approved the transfer of funds for this purpose, directly to the Palestinian Authority government. As efforts continued to reduce the humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territory, and Palestinian leaders came together to the negotiation table to reconcile the Fatah and Hamas factions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict turned bloody. The Security Council gathered at the behest of the United States, met in July but the vote of a permanent member blocked the possibility to adopt a resolution to release an Israeli's war prisoner and prevent the use of Israel's disproportionate use of force.

In the second half of 2006, Gaza residents were living in a war-like environment, with almost daily firing of Palestinian rockets into Israel, and Israeli military strikes occurring from land, air and sea, during three months approximately, that cost the lives of two hundred and 61 Gazans, including children, while two Israelis and fifteen were injured by homemade rockets fired from Gaza strip (UN Report, 2008).

By September 2006, the formation of a Palestinian Unity Government was frustrated by intra-state armed conflict among Palestinian factions in Gaza and Israeli forces. Israel bombed Beit Hanoun for six days, which cost the lives of a number of civilians. A whole family was killed in an incident attributed to a technical error by the Primer Minister, who publically apologized. The Security Council failed to agree on a condemning resolution, though the Human Rights Council convened to set a fact finding mission, as did the Security Council. A truce, non-related to this international bodies' response, was reached, though by the time this happened many civilian lives had been lost. New reconciliation efforts marked the beginning of 2007. The White House sought to undermine the Hamas government and opposed all attempts to form a Palestinian unified government.

4.3.10 George W. Bush Administration Reaction to the Palestinian Unity Government as a result of Saudi Intervention

According to Paul Morro (2007) in a report to the U.S. Congress, the newly established Palestinian Unity Government only complicated U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Peace Process.

In response to Hamas victory in 2006, the Bush Administration in conjunction with Israel and the Quartet, removed financial assistance as well as contact with the PA. The administration wanted to neutralize Hamas using isolation as well as other methods, while endorsing moderates in Fatah led by President Mahmoud Abbas. Instead of weakening Hamas' power, international sanctions

provided an opportunity for Iran to strengthen its influence among Palestinians. Hamas' legitimation through elections made it even harder to isolate them.

For Daniel C Kurtzer, and Scott Lasensky (2008), the lack of active U.S. engagement during the Fatah-Hamas conflict and its failure to engage and moderate the actions of all parties, including extreme Islamists, led to failure to reach a durable solution.

Under the sponsorship of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Hamas and Fatah Saudi met in Mecca in February 2007 as an alternative to U.S mediation. They reached an agreement to form a power sharing government within the Palestinian Authority, and in March a Palestinian national unity government was formed, including members from Hamas and Fatah as well as independent members. Its program reflected the intention to honor the agreements signed by the PLO and also the decision to seek international legitimacy. But still did not meet the major Western donors' standards of recognition for Israel, besides the commitment to non-violence. Thus, this alternative was opposed by the U.S. and donor restrictions on funding for the Palestinian Authority remained largely in place, amid opposition from some Western governments whom decided they will continue to assist Hamas members of the Palestinian government.

In March, a summit meeting of the Arab League in Riyadh agreed to support the Saudi Plan adopted in 2002, an agreement that included the recognition of Israel in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and normalization of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

In April new meetings between the Palestinian and Israeli Prime Ministers occurred in Jerusalem, in order to discuss security and humanitarian concerns, and in an effort to build confidence. The Quartet welcomed the initiative and initially support the Arab Peace initiative, but again the inter-factional aggression again intensified, threatening the prospect of peace. During this period of time, there was still U.S. intervention, including the Road Map initiative. However, the United States failed to pressure the parties to settle, as division among Palestinians and Israelis deepened. .

4.3.11 Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip and its Aftermath (2007-Present)

To worsen the situation, despite diplomatic efforts to establish a unified Fatah-Hamas government, Hamas violently took control of the Gaza Government in June of 2006. President Abbas declared a state of emergency, while creating an emergency cabinet and dissolving the Palestinian National Unity Government, a decision that the U.S., along with the European Union, supported by renewing direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

With the purpose of encouraging the peace process' development to a durable solution the Quarter appointed former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as its representative, expressing endorsement for a U.S.-proposed international meeting to facilitate the negotiation of a two-state solution; the strategy failed.

Some important factors were neglected in the pursuit of a successful outcome. First, re-centralization of presidential powers, and a notable absence of

liability as well as transparency in the Palestinian Authority's financial management caused unease among foreign donors and potential and actual mediators. Second, the U.S. failed to hold Israel responsible for its legal obligations. Finally, the absence of commitment and pressure by the U.S. for an effective Palestinian government facilitated the increase of criminal gangs and extremist Islamic groups, who actively neutralized attempts by Hamas to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, including the U.S.

According to Muhammad Muslih (1999), U.S. policy towards the Palestinians has sought to promote a political answer to all outstanding issues, especially the final status issues of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, water and settlements. For him the big key is to generate movement toward an agreement on a *context* for settling these issues.

Assuming that there exist moderate elements inside Hamas, it would be advantageous if U.S. policymakers promoted the participation of these elements in PA institutions. Particularly, "they should counsel the PA and Israel to find ways to involve moderate Hamas elements in negotiations of final status issues. Indeed, their involvement will likely provide a wider base of support for any agreement on the issues" (Muslih, 1999, p.44) consistent with the U.S interest of creating a permanent solution for all outstanding issues of the Palestinian question.

Hamas policy during 1996- 1999 was characterized by survivalist behavior more than by ideological motivation. Perhaps, when the PA condemned Hamas military actions against Israel, Hamas took a soft approach of reconciliation rather

than confrontation, as a preventive measure against any possible retaliation against their movement, moving towards a push to update their policies.

Furthermore, Muslih, (1999) suggested two available strategies were available to reach the goal of putting in place U.S policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first is the participation of Hamas moderates in U.S. sponsored people-to-people programs, bringing Palestinian and Israelis together for constructive dialogue and mutual cooperation activities, as well as public speeches by senior U.S. officials showing American interest in working with both individuals and groups, including Hamas members, committed to renouncing violence, and supporting the peace process, would be effective.

It would be beneficial if the U.S. administration could more clearly identify and classify Hamas members who support violence and discourage as well as obstruct any reconciliation with Israel, and those in the group open to promoting and engaging in constructive Palestinian-Israeli discussion. However, the possibility for the escalation of conflict while using such strategies should be taken into consideration and private diplomatic strategies should be planned as effective encouragement tools.

Second, U.S. diplomats should suggest to Israel and the PA that they consider the benefits of engaging Hamas moderates, emphasizing the positive link between the gradual participation, encouragement, and endorsement of Hamas moderates and long-term stability in the conflict resolution scenario. In brief, instead of advertising Hamas as a terrorist movement or Islamic radicals,

Washington should dedicate more energy to formulating innovative policies that would encourage their participation in the peace process as well as to engage in mediation for the promotion of the legitimate national goals of the Palestinian people.

Thirteen years later, Chuck Hagel, Secretary of the Department of Defense of the United States under the first Obama Administration sustained that the current American Policy towards Hamas had failed, and needed to be changed in the best interest of Israel. He argues that “if talking to Hamas is bad, not talking to Hamas is worse” (Wazman, 2012, p.1). He argues that to ignore or try to change the fact that, like it or not, Hamas has actively and legitimately participated in government since the 2006 elections, is ineffective and counterproductive.

The attitudes and actions of the U.S. have had a relevant impact on the participation of Hamas in peace negotiations. Hamas is labeled as a spoiler in negotiations as it is—to date—focused on rejecting any settlement with Israel. However, U.S. policies as well as some other Western policies have been unsuccessful in their goal to overthrow Hamas, something that is contrary to their own goals, has infringed on the popular legitimacy of voters, and has had deeply negative consequences for the mediation process.

4.3.12 Consequences of U. S. Withdrawal

According to Sherif Hafez, Political Science Professor of the University of Cairo, interviewed by “Open to Question”, a Nile TV program (January 19, 2010), having Saudi Arabia as mediator will probably guarantee the safety of the process.

According to him, the Saudis are better able to reconcile Hamas with Fatah as the Middle Eastern states have always been involved in the conflict (Egypt, Syria, Iran). While the Obama Administration has pushed for peace, Hafez maintained that Netanyahu has signed for peace before, and that if he still wants peace, he would probably sign again. If the Saudis reach the goal of persuading many radicals to change their views as they have done before, there is no reason for failure. However, this seems a rather minority his view, as it is not well supported by the Mecca Agreement negotiations, which failed.

Deutsch (1973, p. 5) and Bercovitch (1989, p, 290) support the claim that the parties' previous and present relationship can impact the development of a dispute. In contrast, Yakamoto (1990) argues that friendship can generate excessive confidence. Perhaps, the Saudi-brokered deal largely spoiled U.S. efforts to get the Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table.

In an effort to recover the peace process, the U.S. convened a meeting in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 27, 2007, of key regional members (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), as well as other members of the international community, that produced a joint understanding between the two leaders to launch good faith bilateral negotiations to reach a peace agreement which resolved core and outstanding issues, without exceptions as previously agreed, before the end of 2008. The Joint Understanding that resulted is an agreement to form an American-Israeli-Palestinian strategy, under the leadership of the United States, to apply the

Road Map. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas also agreed to bi-weekly meetings to supervise the process.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the Joint Understanding, but asserted that the U.N. has been involved for the last sixty years, (Partition Plan, and Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515), and that now a days, it had higher priorities. Still, he demanded more support from the U.N for this renewed effort.

Even though the conference resulted in an understanding, an element which often contributes to failure—that of a weak mediator—was observed. The U.S. made too clear that it has other priorities, as stated by its own representative, and thus demonstrated a lack of commitment. Therefore, this event clearly sustains the hypothesis that not having a real commitment and support of other parties to take the lead, is not a good practice when it comes to international mediation. This is also consistent with Bercovitch's, Touval's, Zartaman's and Kleiboer's assertions in reference to the negative impact of a lack of commitment of an international mediator in a conflict that "international organizations have commitment problems when attempting to try to manipulate disputing parties because of their inability to guarantee security or certain payouts over the long term, largely because such organizations lack the clout that state actors have" (Bercovitch 1997, Touval and Zartmann 1985, Kleiboer 2002, p. 34). This strengthens the assertion that states remain the best potential mediator due to their ability to leverage other states and interests .

The Annapolis Conference draws the international attention and support for the efforts of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to achieve a justified and comprehensive peace settlement. The Roadmap as presented by the UN Security Council points out the obligations which both of the parties are required to implement as early as possible and definitely in parallel. The Palestinians makes an immediate implementation of their obligations on security as mentioned in the Roadmap, and it reflects their commitment to the peace settlement. For Israel, the implementation of its obligations shows its seriousness and intentions toward a really credible peace process. Thus, as this thesis tries to argue, the U.S and not the United Nations should maintain its commitment as mediator of this conflict in order to achieve peace.

4.3.13 Obama Administration (2009-Present)

According to William B. Quant (2013), recent Arab Israeli events have led to a fundamental adjustment of American policies in the Middle East. Quant argues that Obama got off to a good beginning in January 2009 by supporting the plan of engaging with the opposition and appointing former Senator George Mitchell to supervise the progress of the Administration's Arab-Israeli policy. As the national security advisor he named General James Jones, an officer with substantial expertise in reference to the Palestinian question, also demonstrating initial commitment to seeking a peaceful solution.

In public speeches, Obama also made clear his determination to generate movement towards the Arab-Israeli peace efforts, taking a firm position on an issue

particularly sensitive to the Palestinians, the stop of settlement buildings in occupied territory.

While all of these initiatives raised optimism that U.S policy was shifting to a revised and more active stage, there also existed some doubts that circumstances which included a global economy crisis and President Obama's own domestic political agenda might force the new administration to lower their expectations

In the Middle East, Benjamin Netanyahu was re-elected prime minister. In the past, he has firmly resisted U.S. mediation efforts to make progress on the negotiations. President Obama did succeed on persuading Netanyahu to show support for the two-state solution proposal, but was not successful in stopping building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Altogether, during the first part of 2010, poor progress was made. On the other hand envoy Mitchell's style was so low key, that any gains obtained were barely perceived. President Obama and Netanyahu however met the same year for a cautious reconciliation meeting as a strategy on the domestic arena.

The upcoming Congressional elections pressured President Obama to act cautiously not to give the impression that he was excessively tough in its approach to Israel. What happened there it is unclear. Apparently, Netanyahu was able to persuade the U.S. to support Israel in confronting Iran in exchange for entering in to direct negotiation with the Palestinians without any preconditions. As the suspension of the West Bank settlement building truce deadline approached, the U.S. pressured for the re-initiation of Israeli-Palestinian's negotiations. Several

meetings did take place, however, commitment in both sides was not real, and as soon as the moratorium expired the Palestinians suspended their participation in the negotiations. By late 2010, the negotiations had reached an impasse; clearly ripeness was not present at the time.

According to the same author, there have been some weaknesses of the Obama Administration approach that could have been avoided. First, President Obama's administration miscalculated Netanyahu's resistance intentions. When Obama was seen to withdraw on the first issue, this damaged his strong leader status.

Second, all prior U.S. successes in Israeli-Arab diplomacy had involved a strong president and an empowered Secretary of State who worked together well. This strategy worked for Nixon-Kissinger, Carter-Vance and Bush I-Baker. However, the Obama administration selected a low key expert to work with, an official of tremendous ability, but lacking involvement and identification with President Obama.

Also, as U.S.-Israeli relations deteriorated, the U.S. went back to an undefined role for some aspects of Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. Moreover, it was not clear which of the many of the president's advisors were key to his plans of reengaging Israelis and Arabs into the peace process.

A third miscalculation by the administration was to identify the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a conflict that could best be settled by the

implementation of direct negotiations, neglecting the ripeness element of the conflict.

Finally, the president's soft mediation approaches and lack of leverage had a negative impact on U.S. national interest, weakening moderate forces in the region and empowering radicals, making it harder to deal with emerging spoilers such as jihadi extremism, i.e., Hamas.

Leverage is a vague element of mediation. It is not clearly defined and there are inconsistent findings concerning its relevance for positive mediation outcomes. Absent systematic research on the impact of these various types of resources, there exists disagreement in the literature as to the influence of leverage in securing positive mediation's results. According to Cot (1972, p. 12), Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980, p. 326), Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, p. 15), and Touval (1992, p. 233), "leverage is a necessary condition for mediation success" (Kleiboer, 1996, p.371). These authors have proven in their empirical investigation that leverage is essential to induce disputing parties to make concessions or for securing agreement's compliance. Pruitt (1981) highlights Kissinger's success in the Middle East, as an illustration of leverage's relevance in international mediation. In his book, *Shattered Hopes: The Failure of Obama's Middle East Process*, Josh Ruebner, the National Director of the U.S. campaign to end the Israeli occupation, lays out his argument. He maintain that the Obama administration's approach, by failing to involve Palestinians in the process, blocking of international efforts to hold Israel accountable for its violations, failure to recognize the asymmetry of

power between the parties in conflict, as well as failure to create incentives for Israel to sincerely commit to a peace process, remains an obstacle for his administration to succeed as broker of the conflict.

For Warren R. Phillips (1978), the perspective of ‘prior behavior’ as an explanation of foreign policy contends that the foreign policy behavior of a nation can be effectively explained by considering both the types and amounts of foreign policy behavior that the nation receives from other nations as well as the nation’s own prior foreign policy behavior. Nations develop routines or standardized procedures for dealing with each other.

McClelland (1961, 1966), one of earliest international interaction advocates, sustains that interaction analysis has a primary concern tracing patterns of demand and response between nations. He suggests that nations have access to only a limited inventory of responses in coping with the situations produced by system disturbances. How the government of a nation tends to select types of actions from the inventory to meet different kind of no routine international situation provides evidence of the government operational code of international politics.

Moreover, he argues that many of current problems experienced to find answers to policy weakness, stem from the lack of formal explanation, of the patten of interaction between nations.

Kleiboer (1996) offers two different proposals about the link between mediator status and successful mediation results. The first one explores the extent of status. She suggest that the opportunities to succeed in international mediation

efforts increases, when the mediator possess a high status. In a second proposition concerning mediator status analyze the level of rank. She suggests that the status of the mediator as well as the status of the representatives of the nations in conflict must be balanced. She maintains that the status of the mediator should never be lower than the mediating parties in order to be able to remain in control of the process, since otherwise, the process might not be taken seriously.

As of today the conflict remains unsolved. On November 25, 2013, the UN General Assembly, in open debate on the Question of Palestine, called on all parties in the dispute to “refrain from actions that obstruct negotiations” (UN Department of Public Information, 2013). In this sense on same assembly report the representative for Pakistan, Massood Khan, expressed that four obstacles impeding the success of Israeli-Palestine peace shall be removed in order to move forward: Jerusalem, illegal settlements, 1967 borders, and refugees.

With this said, the Obama Administration should make the mediation process as a high priority, and at the same time, recalculate strategies using a more hard bargaining approach such as, pressures and inducements to obtain real commitment from parties, besides changing its perceptions on its status.

In reference to Israeli lobbying, if President Obama wanted to succeed and honor Cairo Speech, he should follow Theodore Roosevelt or Carter's policies in reference to Israel lobby. Dan Flesher argues that there exist two important venues that might be effective in order to deal with Israeli lobby as needed, if peace is

wanted to be reached. First, broaden the debate and stop worrying excessively about the community.

There exist comparatively more questions among Americans in reference to the understanding of U.S. government passivity in the face of Israeli settlement expansion as well as some other troubling policies and actions, translating into a political scenario that encourages the new administrations, to protect Israelis and Palestinians, while promoting and pressing them to make painful compromises, but necessary for peace.

Moreover, the undermining of the democratic processes, as perceived by some Palestinians as a retaliation for their political choice, and the imposition of sanctions have acted to discredit the legitimacy of U.S. policies in the peace process (Austin, Hoffman, Goddard and Gray, 2011). These policies have failed to achieve either defeat or moderation of Hamas.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration's lack of leadership in the process can be perceived as lack of commitment. The role shifting between President Obama, Hillary Clinton, Chuck Hagel and finally the recently appointed Secretary of State John Kerry in negotiating the peace process, plus the lack of a strategic plan for mediation, the difficulty to show leverage over Israel, the lack of political support for a prolonged confrontation or move towards punitive measures against Israel, remains an obstacle for peace. This is especially true, in reference to the illegal settlement impasse.

For Hoffman, Goddard and Gray, history warn us that this impasse could lead to new violent uprisings , and more than ever, there is a pivotal to explore new reconciliation efforts mechanisms.

This chapter, based on events, clearly supports the thesis of Michael E. Brown and Chantal De Jong Outdraat, Kleiboer and Londoño Lazaro that a clear strategy, ripeness, leverage and status are key elements for successful international mediation.

Chapter Five

Obstacles and Opportunities for U.S. Mediators'

Role in the Conflict

Certain obstacles remain that impede the success of U.S. mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The interactions and behavior of the United States are the central sources of such obstacles, identifying them would facilitate the work of researchers, mediators, personnel, and other actors involved to improve their approaches in order to succeed in the resolution and prevention of further escalation of the conflict.

Some of the relevant obstacles to be discussed in this chapter are the different approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mediation applied by the different U.S. administrations since its involvement as mediator of the conflict, especially the ones that might frustrate the process, such as lack of commitment to their mediator's role. Also, some relevant incompatibilities on mediation techniques based on cultural diversity, and finally, the opportunities available in order to improve such weakness will be discussed.

5.1 Obstacles

Charles F. Hermann and Maurice A. East. (1978) identify seven different perspectives that may help to develop explanations for why nations act. They are:

the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders; Decision Structures and Processes; Political Features of Regimes; National Attributes of Societies; Properties of the International System; Prior Foreign Behavior and Transitory Qualities of the Situation.

Some of these perspectives are indeed an obstacle for the success of U.S. mediation of the conflict. Even though the U.S. Role has been without question, active and pivotal in the dynamic of this conflict throughout. The following paragraphs clearly answer this thesis' main research questions: What is the level of commitment of the United States as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? At what points has the United States of America intervened as mediator? Also, how and when has the U.S. role as mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict helped improve or worsen the situation?

As of today, the Obama administration, different approaches sometimes inconsistent and definitively lacking of a real commitment as some of the previous administrations, has created a series of successes and failures during the process. Among the best practices according to the analysis of historical data, are commitment, strong leadership, leverage, and proper management of bureaucracy which different U.S administrations have neglected during the mediation process are an obstacle for peace.

A vicious cycle among U.S. administrations of maintaining the same weaknesses in its performance as a mediator since the beginning of the Israeli Palestinian conflict have prevented a better outcome in U.S. mediation efforts.

When the records of the different administration's involvement in the process are analyzed, this research finds the following obstacles for a successful performance of the U.S as mediator of the conflict. Beginning with President Wilson's lack of experience, commitment and domestic pressure as well as the continuance of the Wilson policy by President Truman to finally withdraw have been obstacles to being a more effective mediator. In addition, handling over the responsibility for mediation to the then-recently created UN, as a national interest strategy to neutralize a possible Arab-Soviet Union alliance, as well as a preventive measure to possible restrictions on oil supply, by pro-Western Arab countries have also weakened the role of the U.S. as a mediator. Passive U.S. intervention, in a bi-polar superpower competition, and finally, Truman's administration's incoherent Middle East policy, due to lack of consensus, represented the disaster of policy during his administration.

On the other hand, a strong leverage position and extreme intransigence as a miscalculated neutrality strategy during President Eisenhower's administration neglected the possibility of an Arab-French alliance which resulted in the sharing of intelligence and armament that fueled the conflict.

But it was not until twelve years of intense conflict had past, that the United States of America formally intervened as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1960. The Kennedy administration was pro-Israeli. However, that administration avoided a bilateral alliance in order to avoid an antagonist Soviet-Arab alliance.

Presidents Johnson's and Nixon's approaches were soft, merely persuasive, in an effort to avoid war. Domestic priorities and Vietnam War issues neutralized any intervention by these administrations. Among the barriers for Johnson to use leverage or hard diplomacy when needed, were the needs to maintain the pro-Western Arab-U.S. alliance, sympathy for the Jewish's cause, and an extreme pro-Israeli American public opinion. On the other hand, President Nixon decided to withdraw and left the efforts under the leadership of his Secretary of State Rogers, who opted for a communication facilitation strategy that failed, since Rogers' Plan demonstrated the short term effectiveness of communication facilitation.

In contrast, Carter's administration, by being actively involved, led to U.S.-Israel friction. But his administration generated an agreement, identified by some authors in this research as extremely successful and productive for a long term period of twenty years helping to improve the situation. At the same time and for the first time, he promoted a dialogue under the mediation of the U.S. Thereafter, the Reagan administration was credited with the birth of the U.S.-Israel alliance, deviating from David's agreed principle, which led to a refusal of his proposal for peace. The Bush Sr. administration played a crucial role in removing obstacles for peace. The Madrid Peace Process, under Secretary of State Baker's direction, promoted for the first time direct negotiations among the parties in conflict, and also overrode substantial bureaucratic and domestic opposition.

Similar to Eisenhower's policy, years later, President Bush Sr.'s harsh policy against Palestine, even though more moderate than Reagan's pro-Israeli position did

yield some benefit. Nevertheless, a general absence of personal involvement, lack of a strategy as well as an excessive lack of leverage due to domestic pressure from Israeli and Arab lobbies under the excuse of respect for self-determination, and failure to build solid domestic alliance to support its plan for its implementation, paved the way for U.S. failure one more time.

Contrary to the previous administrations, and similar to the Carter administration approach, even with a limited policy that obstructed the development of U.S. policies on the core issues, among other domestic barriers such as bureaucratic confrontation which damaged foreign policy, President Clinton's commitment built a strong domestic coalition.

One more time George W. Bush incurred in the same mistakes of some predecessors, with the exception of former President Carter. His lack of personal involvement, negligence on power imbalance, lack of commitment or sense of strategic purpose damaged perception of engagement. The Road Map was vague on the rules of game to be imposed on the Palestinians and sanctions for noncompliance, leading to conflict escalation.

After escalation occurred, failure to follow ripeness and lacking of commitment to intervene during the Fatah-Hamas conflict, miscalculation and neglect of the cultural factor, when empowering Palestinian for elections without anticipating the results, paved a road for spoilers to strengthen. What followed the above miscalculations was Hamas' elections victory in Palestine, and after that, U.S. poor intervention and use of leverage, an isolation strategy that led to the absence of

U.S. engagement during Fatah-Hamas civil war, and failure to involve Hamas moderate officials, resulting in a conflict prevention and management disaster. Moreover, the Bush administration failed to hold Israel responsible for its legal obligations and to pressure for an effective Palestinian government. Finally, after the prior events described, the Annapolis effort failed due to a weak mediator proposed by the U.S. administration, who abandoned its role as mediator, opening opportunities for new conflict managers. There are also important lessons that need to be considered. In order to transform conflict management into conflict resolution, when the time becomes ripe to address a final status negotiation, evidence suggests a realistic approach based on the conditions on the ground must be developed. The levels of friction and the resistance to peace need to be neutralized and decreased substantially as possible.

Also, the fact of alternation of administrations and its policies changes as well should be taken into consideration and moderated by using some instruments created to promote, to some extent, uniformity and commitment to a stable strategy on the Israel-Palestine mediation policies to deal with the conflict. This is key to preventing escalation or regression of the peace process, and the negative effects of delegating the mediator role on U.S. officials, providing them with a lineament on strategies, instead of using the trial and error technique, often as a result of lack of experience or expertise in this unique and complex conflict.

But, the change of administration is not the only barrier, the United States of America as any other nation possesses national interests. A strategic vision of

conflict resolution should be established as a U.S. policy, and its modification should be regularly reviewed and adapted, taking in consideration lessons of the past in order to avoid lack of consistency in U.S mediator's role. Conflict management and resolution mechanisms as well as spoiler management strategies should be carefully evaluated it, in order to be able to prudently accommodate those which interfere with the U.S. national interests, including peace in the Middle East for purposes of National security.

Discussing the Domestic Politic Model, Michael E. Hudson argues that Quandt disagrees with those radical positions that U.S. Policy in the Middle East is mainly the manifestation of the Israel Lobby or the Oil Lobby, even though this is the analysis made by some analysts.

According to Hudson, it is accurate to just say that both of these lobbies have significantly impacted some governments and parties, sometimes mutually neutralizing each other. Yet, it is important to highlight the fact of the imbalance of power since the Pro-Israeli lobby is a stronger one in comparison with others, even within the U.S Congress and the White House, succeeding in pivotal issues such as recognition of Israel, diplomatic support as well as economic and military support against strong opposition among some within the international community condemning the creation of the state of Israel.

According to Waltz and Mearsheimer (2006, p. 2), extensive reasons exist for "U.S. leaders to adopt a Middle East policy that is more consistent with wider U.S. interests". In particular, using U.S commitment and leverage to obtain a fair

peace between Palestinians and Israelis would facilitate the wider goal of combating extremist. However, these authors are pessimistic that such goals can be achieved any time soon. They maintain that the Israeli lobby, by sabotaging U.S. leaders from compelling Israel to make real efforts on settling, has also made it difficult to end the war, giving extremist a powerful recruiting tool and contributing to global Islamic radicalism. They attribute that the lobby is being successful in transforming the U.S. into a de facto indirect contributor for Israeli expansion in the occupied territories

Finally, one can argue that the lobby's influence has been bad for Israel, since it has discouraged Israel from seizing opportunities rather using its abilities to influence Washington to support an "colonialist agenda" (i.e., discouraging a final execution of the Oslo Accords), empowering extremist movement such as Hamas, and reducing the possibility of a real disposition for Palestinian leaders to accept a full settlement and implement it. Israel would probably strengthen its capacity to safeguard its national interest for survival by neutralizing excessive intervention by the Israeli lobby, and the U.S. could increase its mediator's role by enhancing its policy and commitment to their intervention in the process.

For national security purposes the United States should maintain some level of leadership or hegemony. However, for Christopher Layne (2009), the U.S. can successfully prolong its hegemony on international politics by reverting to multipolarity. The truth is, either in a unipolar or multipolar world, the U.S. should work on taking the lead in institutional reforms in order to retain its credibility and

legitimacy to maintain leverage, an important element needed to succeed in their broker role in any international conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian one.

Other factors present in the failure of this mediation process lead by the United States are:

5.1.1 Incompatibility on Conflict Perception and Conflict Resolution Approaches

For Stephen John Stedman (1991), in some cases, mediators act to assist participants to avoid a humanitarian crisis and loss of innocent lives. Moreover, unfortunately sometimes they lack of a coherent plan. By not having a clear strategy, a lack of focus prevails, jeopardizing the outcome by the change of their foreign policy as a result of the natural alternation in the administration, in the case of democratic state mediators as the case of United States leading to sometimes an involuntary lack of commitment in their role as mediators.

Second, mediation efforts must be ripe or timed to coincide with moments when at least one and preferably all of the parties to a conflict prefer talking to fighting. Third, mediators need to have leverage over disputants, the more the better; this remains a key reason why active involvement on the part of the U.S is necessary for success

The George W. Bush administration reflected a lack of consistency in their commitment as mediators of the conflict. According to this research, sometimes this comes as a result of frustration due to incompatibilities between Western and non-Western approaches to conflict perception, and conflict resolution strategies as well

as lacking of proper approaches to deal with different cultures to the Western, as in the case of the Palestinians. Even though this is not the main focus of the research, this author consider relevant to dedicate a section that could promote the interest of further research as an important element to be considered in order to improve international mediation techniques by the United States, especially in order to avoid withdrawal as mediator as a result of frustration and inability to properly understand culturally different spoilers and deal with them.

5.1.2 Western and Non- Western approaches on Conflict Resolution. A neglected perspective

While conflict is inherent in relations between humans, the nature of conflict and the methods of conflict resolution differ from one socio-cultural context to another.

“Conflict is commonly perceived as a symptom of the need for change. While conflict can lead to separation, hostility, civil strife, terrorism and war, it can also stimulate dialogue to promote a fairer and more socially just solutions leading to stronger relationship and peace” (Irani, 1999, p. 2).

Irani argues that a core belief of western conflict resolution academics that it is possible to reach a final and full settlement in a conflict and that as a matter of fact all conflicts can and should be fully settled. This philosophy is not compatible with views of other cultures, particularly non-westerners. For Irani, some conflicts, irrespective of their nature, may be intractable, sometimes developing through periods of hostility and escalation as well as periods of calm and a return to the

current vicious stage. This scenario can be particularly observed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is the reason why this author takes the idea of conflict prevention and management to illustrate the processes of bargaining and compromise in the Arab-Islamic practice.

Irani maintains that, a relevant assumption on U.S. approach to conflict resolution is that conflict generally breaks out due to different understandings regarding facts, concerns, beliefs, comforts and relations. According to well-known anthropologist Laura Nader, conflict is the result of rivalry between two parties or more. These conflicts are caused by incompatibility of expectations or intentions, and based on its length it may be differentiated from friction or heated clashes triggered by temporary escalations.

In western interpretations conflict may also have a positive aspect, acting as catharsis to re-approach the interaction between parties facilitating the exploration of possible settlements. Many of the most vicious conflicts comprise longstanding cycles of persecution, abuse and retaliation, with racism and ethnic cleansing as some of the most dramatic expressions of this dynamic, having risky political repercussions for the situation.

During the last few years, analysts have been addressing the need to take into consideration acknowledgement and forgiveness as necessary elements peacemaking efforts. Moreover, “in some countries of the Middle East, the teaching and practice of conflict resolution is still a novel phenomenon. Conflict resolution is viewed by many as a false western panacea, a program imposed from outside and

thus insensitive to indigenous problems need and political processes. Indeed, many people in the Middle East view conflict resolution as a fictional scheme created by the United States which primary goal is to facilitate and accelerate the processes of peace and normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors” (Irani, 2000, p.1).

During years of research, and while assessing the probability of successful application of Western mediation models in non-Western societies, scholars and specialists have found that is necessary to acknowledge the need to be sensitive to indigenous patterns of behaviors (thinking, feelings, rituals) when trying to prevent or manage conflict. In order to succeed in mediation in the Middle East, perhaps the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, diplomatic efforts should be complemented by other mediation techniques with a wide and real exploration and consideration of fears and mistrust resulting from a vicious cycle of years of aggression and retaliation.

Middle East mediation has been a slightly artificial phenomenon meaning that diplomatic settlements have not trickled down to the grassroots. Peace agreements reached exclusively through coercion, political-economic incentives, or merely strategic considerations cannot endure if they are not complemented by an open and deep assessment of the fears and mistrust resulting from a vicious cycle of years of victimization and retaliation.

For Irani, if peace efforts are to succeed in the Middle East, policymakers have the responsibility to foster and encourage an understanding that takes into consideration indigenous processes of reconciliation. In this sense, R.B.J Walker argues that in order to explain the relative neglect of culture in foreign affairs and to

understand why the term causes so little theoretical controversy in this context, the same philosophical questions are asked about the concept of culture itself. The problematic nature of the conventional answers to these questions remains obscure

However, while this issue is significant, instead of broad references to culture, there is a particular concern with the problem of values or ethics, which might involve the absence of moral standards in the behavior of foreign affairs.

The implication is that while values may be appropriate within a sovereign community, they are more difficult to justify in relations of power between states. Thus, in foreign affairs, order takes priority over justice, being understood as resulting from the needed use of force. Culture is thus not only excluded from the realm of realpolitik, except as propaganda, but is likely to be indicted as a hindrance to the special responsibilities of nations struggling to maintain order in a realm tragically devoid of ethical standards.

In this context, there remains a need to analyze the special force of the conventional debate between realists and idealists in the theory of international relations. The main argument is about the dangers of transposing values appropriate for sovereign political communities into a realm characterized by competition between sovereign communities. Culture dissolves into cultures, translating into values, raising the issue of relativism rebound all this into a clash of power politics.

This leads straight to a third aspect of the relative neglect of cultural processes in the analysis of international interaction. For Walker, if culture can be resolved into the categories of political community, and into exclusionist distinction

among cultures, then it becomes nothing but an affirmation of the most basic conventions of the theory of international relations as these have risen since the early modern era. When questions focus on sovereignty and national identity, then two interesting issues to explore and overcome are found: Culture as a deeply fractured character of human communities, and the way such divisions have in fact been resolved by the fragile accommodations of statesmanship. If academics and researchers refuse to reduce cultural differences to the mapping of state boundaries, then how do the dynamics of eruptions of ethnic violence make sense?

Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat (1996), argue that reaching a negotiated settlement is only the first step, since many solutions fall apart in the implementation phase of the process. Some of the problems that tend to occur at the implementation stage are bad faith on the side of parties when heading to the negotiation table, a lack of interest in negotiation, and using the process in order to buy time.

Second, local leaders often overestimate their popularity and their opportunities in election, after a settlement is reached. Third, there is usually dishonesty at the time of the implementation of the agreement, with the parties to the conflict preferring the resumption of warfare, and finally it is difficult to control spoilers in any conflict.

On the other hand, scholars such as Jonathan Austin, Benjamin Hofmann, Beatrice Goddard and Hannah Grey (2011), sustain that Western policies, including sanctions, only promote empowerment of intense currents within Hamas and

intensification of intra-Palestinian confrontations, evidenced by Hamas-Fatah civil strife, concluding in June, 2007 with Gaza's takeover and the dissolution of the NUG. A good example of a U.S administration that improperly handled spoilers, withdrawing from their responsibility as mediator of the process in order to avoid escalation of the conflict, was the George W. Bush administration. Its strategy was to direct all reconciliation and reconstruction efforts to the West Bank, basically in an effort to build a Palestinian state, ignoring Hamas in Gaza strip (Webster, 2009). The Bush policy of isolation failed and Hamas did not soften its position towards Israel, and Hamas also did not collapse as predicted under the economic pressure exerted by the sanctions. Rather, contrary to what expected sanctions strengthened its domestic support (O' Donnell, 2008), a lesson consistent with the trust oriented approach mentioned on the literature review.

5.2 Opportunities

The solution, in order to improve such weaknesses is to create more open debates and a sincere dialogue about U.S. policies in the region and commitment to their mediator's role in the Israeli-Palestinian process. It is also vital to take into consideration the role of the lobbies in obstructing such commitment and strategies to deal with this conflict.

Brown and de Jonge Oudraat, suggest that in order to succeed, mediation should not be used as a placebo by the U.S. Instead it should be seen as a policy instrument, and used judiciously and under circumstances that encourage success, in order to increase credibility of future mediation efforts.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This research suggests that the United State administration should take a more active and dominant role as the primary mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, avoiding withdrawal under frustrating circumstances, which includes the suggestions mentioned above. For Neumann (2009), President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, “engagement need not be viewed as surrender”. Other strategies including pressure should be combined to secure U.S. policy goals. For Neumann, “the notion that the U.S. must choose between negotiation and the use of force is a false dichotomy”. Remaining involved in this most complex situation will give Washington the options and information it needs in order to succeed as a broker that if it disengages, it will not have.

History suggests, commitment, leadership, and a gradual approach should be maintained rather than pushing for a solution that is not ripe. Unilateral reciprocal measures should be increased considerably. This is a necessary requirement for the success of the international mediator role.

The alliance dynamic should be reassessed, designing new strategies that are more consistent with the leadership role the United States is trying to maintain in the best interest of its nation, while interacting under the game rules of an anarchic

world. These approaches will facilitate the work of promoting international order in conjunction with international institutions, and will reduce antagonistic resistance.

At the same time, promoting a better order of alliances that fits U.S. national interests in the Middle East, without giving the impression of relying on a sole nation for security and other purposes in the region, or of vulnerability in the world, and allowing a different balance or re-equilibration of power as Michael Sheehan in Klieman suggests (2000) will probably be a better option for the U.S. to successfully fulfil its role as a mediator. This will definitely safeguard the strategic alliance of the U.S. and Israel under a more safe approach for both nations and contribute to US strength as a hegemon, whether in a unipolar or multipolar world. While the U.S. can never hope to fully control the conflict or mediation dynamic a sole nation is not able to control a hundred percent, but is able to control their opportunities for success as a leading nation, and within the present international dynamic by avoiding spoilers to use what history suggest is a fallacy in reference to U.S.-Israel alliance, a spoilers' strategy to obstruct U.S. status as international mediator and sabotaging peace in the Middle East.

For national security purposes the United States should maintain some level of leadership. However, the country should work on taking the lead in institutional reforms in order to keep the authority and legitimacy to retain leverage, an important element for success as a mediator of any international conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian one.

If peace in the region is to be achieved, the United States needs to take an active role, as well as revitalize an aggressive policy which has the internal political drive to enforce the suggested long-term policy for achieving peace in the region. The U.S. must stimulate secret talks, as needed, between the Israelis and a legitimate Palestinian representative to mediate an end to the hostilities and the recognition of Israel's right to exist as well as the State of Palestine sovereignty. Israeli's settlements within Palestinian territory must stop, and border passage should be arranged and an active role in this issue by the U.S must be present in order to bring peace.

As Stedman asserts, spoilers may be active or emerge as a result of unbalanced agreements among other reasons. It is crucial that in either scenario, mediators manage spoilers, in order secure the success of the mediation process instead of refraining from intervening regarding this issue.

An international standard that takes in consideration different values should be promoted along with efforts for its acceptance by the majority of the nations that have values that are different from Western values. However, while this goal is being achieved, mediation tools should be adapted to meet the needs of nations in conflict and an improved policy that secures U.S commitment to intervene in these circumstances should be discussed

Finally, the position of the United Nations as well as some others clearly shows that a lack of consensus about world order and normal conduct within it, besides confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits on deviant

behavior, has given rise to conflict in the new era. It would be beneficial to promote within constructivist supporters the increase of research on international mediation methods that include mediator commitment as an essential element for successful mediation, in order to create a uniform model which improves performance.

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