LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

DECISION MAKING:
A CENTRAL CONFLICTING POINT IN THE EU
UNIFICATION PROCESS

By

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A Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs

School of Arts and Sciences
September 2013
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
School of Arts and Sciences

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Decision Making: A Central Conflicting Point in the EU Unification Process

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Abstract

This thesis aims to show how decision making is a critical success factor in the European Union (EU) unification process. The research elaborates on the unique interests of European member states as they at times contradict EU’s general and common interests. Despite efforts to consolidate member states’ involvement in the EU, it is evident that national interests have dominated in the establishment of institutions that serve all EU countries. Such differences have continuously interrupted or slowed down EU decisions and foreign policy making.

The influence of national interest is demonstrated by the use of a newly introduced decision making concept known as Decision Making Factors (DMF). DMF highlights the importance of leadership psychology in politics. This is highlighted by conducting an in-depth comparison between the state and the individual using Maslow’s Pyramid of motivation as a framework to link and further develop the DMF model.

A specific analysis of the model is elaborated in the thesis via the study of two major components: European foreign policy and member states’ behavior. It is also exemplified by a case study that scrutinizes France’s immigration status, policies and behavior in respect to decision making vis-a-vis the European Union.
The thesis concludes by highlighting the impact of decision making on the EU status by outlining three causes for EU foreign policy fragmentation along with possible recommendations regarding the influence of decision making on EU’s slow progress in the area of foreign policy making, offering suggestions that could contribute to the improvement of the decision making process.

Keywords: Decision Making, EU, Conflict, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, Political Behavior, Leadership Psychology, Foreign Policy, State Interest, Migration in France, Individual Behavior
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Chapter**

I-Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1-7  
  1.1 Research Question .................................................................................................................... 4  
  1.2 Research Methodology ............................................................................................................ 5  
II-EU Foreign Policy and Decision Making ...................................................................................... 8-31  
  2.1 EU Foreign Policy and Decision Making ................................................................................ 8  
  2.2 The Decision Making Process .................................................................................................. 25  
III-EU Decision Making Factors (DMF) Model .............................................................................. 33-41  
IV-The DMF Model and Migration in France .................................................................................. 43-68  
  4.1 Migration in France & the Economic/Social factor (1st DMF Layer) .................................... 44  
  4.2 Migration in France & the Military/State Factor (2nd DMF Layer) ...................................... 48  
  4.3 Migration in France & the Cultural Factor (3rd DMF Layer) ............................................... 61  
  4.4 Migration in France & the Political Factor (4th DMF Layer) ............................................... 63  
V-Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 71-75  
VI-Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 78-79
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Economic and Social Factors Cycle ................................................................. 34
Chapter 1
Introduction

Throughout history, Europe has witnessed revolutions that lead to considerable political, social, and economic reform. The arising and ongoing conflicts – mainly due to Europe’s major role in the international arena – have slowed the unification process that has put Europe’s supremacy and credibility at risk.

To help strengthen European states’ unity France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands signed the Coal and Steel Agreement in 1951 and founded the “European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC”. The adoption of an independent economic authority was to cooperate and regulate the market. The success of this first step motivated member states to deepen European Integration.

Building on such efforts in 1957, the Treaty of Rome proposed to create an exchange in the number of resources, mobilization of people and development of nuclear fuel. As a result, two communities under the names of “European Economic Community – EEC” and “European Atomic Energy Community – EURATOM” emerged (Timeline of Key EU Events, 2007).

In the meantime, the European Union that originally included six members was expanding geographically with new states joining in. The number of member states today is twenty-eight. The expansion, which was both territorial and demographical, created an increasing mixture of diverse national interests. Consequently, based on the three communities mentioned above (ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM), the expansion resulted in the development of new procedures related to European Foreign Policy and Judicial matters and to foreign policies and security strategies.
The evolution of such procedures resulted in the organization of the modern European Union into three pillars:

- cultural exchange involving the different member states;
- external policy and judicial issues; and,
- foreign strategies and security policies (the latter arising from CFSP or Common Foreign and Security Policy) (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998).

What differentiates the first pillar cultural exchange – from the remaining two is that it has a supra-national character; where decision making is beyond the authority of the member state. External policy and judicial issues as well as foreign strategies and security policies require intergovernmental decision making.

The three-pillar composition of the EU affects decision making. It is essential to mention that decision making is also influenced by the behavior of each member country. The diversity of interests threatens the development and implementation of a unified decision making process. This is especially true with regard to supra-national objectives and the ability to align this diversity of interests among European member states in a unified European decision making process.

A look at European decision making points to the existence of two mechanisms; an internal mechanism whereby policy making faces a conflict among collective interests of member states, and an external mechanism that focuses on member states’ successful participation in the growth of EU external relations. This external mechanism is based on principles, laws and mutual areas of interest.

The clash between internal and external mechanisms or between national and supra-national interests is a constant factor that delays member states ability to find common ground regarding EU welfare. Instead, member states make independent and often contradictory choices affecting EU decision-making.
In addition to the above, the interlinked nature of decision making regarding foreign and security policies shapes it in a way that deficiencies in one leads to deficiencies in the other. Given that the process of integration has constrained security-related policies due to political fragmentation and decentralization, police force development and internal civil regulations have developed at a slow pace as a result.

In general, the difference among member countries’ contribution to the European security plan highlights the problems of forming a clear strategy that, so far, remains somewhat disorganized (Cottey, 2007).

Reshaping foreign policy would include coordinating and synergizing all the objectives and components of decision making such as: economic objectives, security measures, political, cultural, electoral, environmental, and social and foreign affairs policies. However, such an action would necessitate that the EU mainstreams collective and national interest in its foreign policy as it is one of the major areas in which the gap and discrepancies among EU members’ national interest and foreign policies are highlighted.

Another factor that hinders EU’s joint decision making is East European states’ belief that their participation in the difficult membership procedure may have its benefits in important economic and geographical areas. Nonetheless, their participation, until recently, has been less influential than that of Western European states and it reduces their autonomy to some extent (Cottey, 2007).

Furthermore, while Eastern Europe needs to comply with the EU’s requirements to join the union and submit to strict rules and regulations, decision making within the EU membership has still prevailed as a matter of pure national interest at the expense of a unified European foreign policy.
The greater centralization of decision making at the economic level, following the introduction of the single European currency, has unfortunately not been enough to overcome the more serious struggles that elevated the inequalities that exist among member states as described above, and this highlights the divergence in viewpoints among these states (Littoz-Monnet, 2007).

1.1 Research Question

The argument of this paper is that the lack of integration, conflicts over internal/external EU policy decisions and the difference of interests between member states contribute to the failure of common decision making. Reducing these conflicts by finding common ground to promote EU’s welfare might contribute to a more centralized decision making process and remedy the ongoing internal struggle among member states.

Moreover, establishing a strong and well integrated European state is a complex process that faces different challenges such as the lack of solidarity and loyalty to protect Europe’s welfare. Immigration in Europe is used in the paper as an apt illustration of the mismatch between EU foreign policy and member states’ individual foreign policies. Towards the end of 1980, migration became a growing concern for the EU governments as the end of the Cold War destabilized conventional post-war patterns of immigration. Despite such concerns, European governments have progressively acknowledged that Europe is a “migration continent”.

On the other hand, the last two decades have witnessed European Commission’s (EC) increased capability to instigate community legislation on migration and negotiate related agreements with third-world countries. Since 2000, The European Commission alone has put forward more than twenty pieces of legislation related to
migration and asylum, all of which return to EU member states. In addition to this powerful legislative agenda, member states have introduced new state migration legislation with surprising regularity; the UK, France, and Germany, the largest most established countries of immigration in the EU, have all enacted new primary legislation in this area every few years since 2000 not outshining by much the rest of the European members (Cottey, 2007).

It is within this framework that this research studies the outcome of decision making in Europe. EU’s foreign policy and other influential factors such as immigration, using the case of France, allow for the evaluation of decision making at the local, French, level and at the European level. The above discussion can be summed up by presenting the question that this thesis tries to answer, namely: “Is the decision making process inside of the EU a defining factor in the EU unification process?”

1.2 Research Methodology

The question will be discussed by studying the context of decision making in international relations through three major models: The Rational Actor Model (RAM)¹ based on a rational approach of decision making where leaders consider scientific and tangible facts to make their decisions. The second is known to be the Organizational Model which emphasizes that decision making bases itself on already established policies and procedures, as for the third model, the Bureaucratic Model relies more on group thinking and perceptions related to different players (Allison, 1979).

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¹ Graham Tillet Allison, Jr. (born 23 March 1940) is an American political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Who contributed in the 60’s & 70’s to the bureaucratic analysis of decision making, especially during times of crisis.
Thus noting that decision makers have rational, organizational and bureaucratic decision making models that shape their thinking process, they can indirectly impact their perception of a certain situation and actions (Jervis, 1976). An exploratory model of decision making called Decision Making Factors (DFM) is further used to answer the question. DFM highlights the importance of leadership psychology in politics. This is highlighted by conducting an in-depth comparison between the state and the individual using Maslow’s Pyramid of motivation as a framework.

The paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and draws the framework of the thesis. It further describes how member states have identified and promoted common interests through establishing communities that serve EU members and that despite the fact that members still maintain their own interests that often contradicts EU’s general interest.

Chapter 2 analyses the decision making process in the EU by looking at two major components: European foreign policy and member states’ behavior. The analysis is exemplified by France’s foreign policy decisions and actions within the Union.

Chapter 3 presents the decision making model by examining the factors that steer decision making.

Chapter 4 is a case study that explores how factors affecting decision making are applied to actual decision making in France. The study outlines the DFM Model in respect to decision making towards migration in France. It portrays the historical background of France’s contemporary decision making process and describes the process in its current state by looking at every factor in the DFM while linking it to migration’s status with regards decision making.
Finally, Chapter 5 sums up the thesis discussion by highlighting the research findings and conclusions and enables the author to elaborate from the state / individual analysis to the group of states / member of a union analysis, where we can observe how the factors of the DMF Model can align or diverge the interests of every state and impact the behavior and outcome of a group of states / member of union states.

In summary, the thesis raises arguments related to decision making and their impact on European integration and shows that this integration is torn between assimilation of states and conservatism. Decision making is thus a significant source of conflict in the regulation of states’ interests and EU’s general objectives.

The thesis development is guided by data review from various sources (books, DVDs, and websites) and supported by an in-depth analysis that allows for an overview and a direct assessment of the situation, in addition to recommendations related to the European current position.

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2 Conservatism in this paragraph implies preserving the state’s identity and cultural imprint
Chapter 2
EU Foreign Policy and Decision Making

2.1 EU Foreign Policy and Decision Making

In discussing EU foreign policy and decision making, it is necessary to consider Europe’s aim and status in relation to its objective of integrating EU states’ decision making as well as scholars’ views on decision making with regards to international relations theories. Assessing foreign policy is critical to the macro analysis of European Union’s behavior; and since foreign policy is also one of the pillars of successful integration, it will be a starting point of this chapter’s discussion. The main concern is to identify the ways in which foreign policy can be effectively formulated.

Knowing that International Relations theory entails the development of conceptual frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events in the world of politics, as well as the analysis of associated policies and practices, Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi emphasized three different views in their study of International Relations theory: Realism, Globalism and Pluralism. In realism, the state is a rational actor seeking to maximize its own interest and national objective in foreign policy, which can adopt what is known as Rational Actor Model (RAM) decision making, an approach related to scientific and rational way of making decisions, based on in-depth analysis and logical interpretation and assessment of expected outcomes (Becker, 1976). In pluralism, foreign policy making is a transnational process that involves compromise in where bureaucratic decision making has an imprint. Opposing the RAM model, it looks more at perception rather than common reason where group thinking and negotiation are general behaviors in
state leaders that shape the decision making process. As for Globalism, state and non-states actors operate as part of the world capitalist system, and International Relations are viewed from a historical perspective especially when it comes to taking decisions where a Standard Operating Procedure for decision making is adopted. This model is not very practical in changing situations as it doesn’t provide a framework for deciding in uncertain and non-tested conditions and consequently prefer to adopt a more tested and secured proven system while engaging decisions (P. Viotti & M. Kauppi, 1993).

Moving to Margaret Hermann and Joe Hagan they have developed the “decision-units” framework, a model though which foreign policy decision making is made. It emphasizes the notion of a set of individuals that are prone to consider needed resources to make a decision when faced with a problem. The decision-units framework underlines what is called “the authoritative decision unit”, which emphasizes three types;

- the predominant leader;
- the single group; and,
- a coalition of autonomous actors.

Thus, a single individual who has the power to take a decisions alone, refers to the predominant leader; a single group is constituted of individuals who collectively choose a course of action after consulting with each other; and the collation of autonomous actors refers to a number of separate representatives operating in different organizations who join forces to take a decision.

In the case of a coalition of autonomous actors, no single constituent of the group has enough leverage to alone plan and implement the decision; a collective joining of the resources and capacity is needed (Herman & Hagan, 1998).
Views and theories on foreign relations base themselves on several factors, these theories may rotate around a common factor, which is that all relationships between countries constantly evolve and change. Most importantly we should consider the fact that leadership psychology can affect foreign policy in different stages in the policy-making process. Thus according to Jervis (1976), the major focus in this perspective is the impact of political psychology on foreign policy decision making which tends to be affected by the perceptions of different state leaders and thus lead to a less scientific and more belief oriented decisions with regards to international relations decisions vis-a-vis states’ national interests.

This aspect might highly influence the political culture and the course of actions specifically in the case of the EU’s foreign policy whose objectives vary among member states. Some states welcome a supra national foreign and security policy while others oppose it. For example, European policies on integration in the economic domain are usually emphasized by private businesses, whereas integration in security affairs are often emphasized by policy makers and intellectuals (Hermann, Risse & Brewer, 2004).

Examining the objectives of EU’s foreign policy today, the Official Journal of the EU – C2010 (2011), states that this foreign policy was formulated on July 8, 2010, in the presence of major figures in the European Parliament (EP), following an agreement to establish the European External Action Service (EEAS). The German Christian Democrat, Elmar Brok, and the Belgian Liberal Guy Verhofstadt highlighted the fact that EEAS is currently merely a structured body that is not to be considered as a unified policy.

Although building structures is important and when successful form the basis of effective processes and procedures, these structures can have a dual effect; they can
either facilitate these processes and procedures or disrupt them. Moreover, the most essential prerequisite for the realization of such processes and procedures is the goodwill to streamline national interest with European interest.

Regrettably, current member states’ attitudes have not been very encouraging in matters related to unified decision making. Indeed, the foundation of EEAS clarified that the mission of the united European foreign policy was deprived of any influence or ability to lobby in matters related to foreign affairs, since currently Europeans do not stand as one bloc on the level of international relations. The Commission’s concern, on the other hand, was that it will need to devote a great deal of attention to international affairs. The mission related to EEAS contradicted the Council’s objectives to preserve its institutional system by:

- Firstly, creating a new body that will focus on crisis management in order to solidify what already exists; and,
- Secondly, by establishing a planning and forecasting directorate so that it can later shift its focus on matters arising as consequences of external relations.

As a result of a desired flexibility in mobilizing national interest in favor of European interest, member states, i.e., key players in the foreign policy strategy, were not actually motivated to support or initiate efforts that solidify European foreign policy interests. In addition, member states as well as national governments would not want to give up their authority or autonomy in exercising their influence and decision making in areas that are critical to their national interests.

Nevertheless, the international arena cannot be neglected since Europe aims at influencing foreign relations and gaining credibility in handling external affairs. Therefore, these time sensitive issues require a decision making process that can be
adapted to the speed of foreign relations developments and that can help the EU take appropriate decisions that fulfill European interests.

Therefore, for an analytical understanding of decision making process in the EU we will be looking at Valerie Hudson’s decision making composition. Through this composition Hudson draws the line between actors involved in the formulation of decision making policies and structures who influence the behavior of these actors. Whereas structures are described of being highly influential among several parties and inquire a more subjective behavior in the decision making process.

Having looked at the structures we will be moving in this thesis towards a more personal approach related to decision making as explained by Jervis which accordingly will be studying and elaborating the context of convergence between actors and structures in decision making. The DMF Model will be portraying possible connections between these two elements building on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Based on the literature review, when one can conclude that Europe still needs to perfect and improve practices to reach a stage where it can operate as one bloc in matters related to foreign policy. In addition, Europe needs to elaborate on the study of European decision making by understanding its members’ interests and motives and reconcile them with European interest. In doing so, it can be perceived as applying Hudson’s decision making model on the actual process of decision making across the states.

Discrepancies in decision making are also reflected inside the European structure. For example, although the European Union’s CFSP is an approach that can be undertaken to improve decision making on matters of European foreign policy, so far it has not proved to have a high impact on the member states’ decision making process.
Consequently, member states have failed to form a solid and a unanimous base for a joint EU foreign policy. This is due to the fact that EU member states have their focus on resolving current matters so that their efforts result in a unified Europe that focuses on current European needs rather than a consolidation of EU’s vision and long term strategy. In doing so, member states ignore the importance of examining opportunities to achieve EU unification. A successful EU unification is beneficial in building a well-defined future and in drawing a route that enables the EU to tackle current and future EU interests alike.

As a result of the lack of consolidation of foreign policy among EU member states, what is perceived is that European foreign and security policy rotates today around a consensus between nation states, mainly known as “convenient” policy. This strategy occurs when there are no specific interests to a member in particular and when minor issues do not affect the common interests of Euro members. In such situations, the diverse national interests are perceived as a unified entity when in fact, a firm stance is not taken. In other words, a mere *De Facto* agreement does not add any value to the long term development or to the strategy of the EU. Also, decision making is based on the least agreed upon factor.

Therefore, to address this weakness, the “High Representative and Vice President of the Commission” uses negotiation skills to deal with each member state behind the scenes, since as previously stated, the gap between a state’s national interest and its commitment towards European interest is wide, and thus, requires effective facilitation from the High Representative side to reach a common ground in several areas. The aim here is to ensure mutual agreement on the interests that best serve the EU as a unified bloc, rather than facilitating the decision making process that ends up
serving only the interests of member states thus ignoring the vision of a stronger European Union.

To enhance coherence of foreign policy making among member states, EU objectives and outcomes need to be agreed upon. Similarly, structures used to design and implement such policies need to be further developed and strengthened.

European policies and procedures have operated in a dynamic but rather circular way. Although European interests have been pursued in a number of areas and foreign policy making has made significant progress, it remains that foreign policy has yet to be consolidated in one clear and agreed upon foreign policy.

A question that remains, is whether we should assess the current situation by comparing it to the previous two decades or if we should be examining the ways in which foreign policy objectives are set and implemented by evaluating their contribution to the future of the EU and its interests.

Identifying the success factors of joint European foreign policy decision making over the past decades and analyzing the current process can help us understand current implementation and operations of European foreign policy and processes.

At a first glance, one can pinpoint weaknesses in the past that may be exemplified by the title and role of the “High Representative” and the various union delegations that ought to be given unique names, names not similar to those of embassies.

It is clear that there is a good majority within the member states that resist the idea of having their own affairs and interests interrupted or delayed by foreign policy inquiries. To their convenience, member states would rather focus on national matters and not move forward issues related to European policies as it does not come
as a priority to their state’s agenda in where it would be essential to mobilize policies related to international relations and foreign affairs.

In this context, another significant indication in the Lisbon Treaty has been the removing of the EU hymn and flag from the “European Constitutional Treaty”. This illustrated the extent to which member states objected towards having a European Union founded on a common personality and a common identity that moves European citizens from national allegiances to European allegiances.

Just as the economic situation in the EU has witnessed a sudden collapse, member states need to acknowledge that the same scenario may also apply to foreign policy (Biscop, 2008).

According to Biscop (2008), even though major efforts have been made to record progress and improvements in foreign policy making, it is not easy to identify the opportunities where member states had a European joint position instead of pursuing their strict national interests in foreign policy. The examples are multiple and reflect major discrepancies within the Union. For instance, European member states’ reactions towards the American intervention in Iraq were not aligned as each country had its own perception on this intervention derived from its national interests.

Majone (2005), states that economics and foreign policy are tools that support the autonomy and independence of each state. In West, East and Central Europe, the European Union member states are either hesitant or oppose the delegation of the above mentioned powers to the headquarters in Brussels. Nevertheless, there are two factors that help European countries work towards matters related to unified decision making:

1. Germany’s loss of certain levers with the beginning of the monetary union:
   Germany was ready to make the sacrifices needed to secure successful
French-German re-unification. The German Chancellor believed that a common currency would help the members achieve a “point of no return” and enhance the development of European integration especially since the majority of the German population was more tolerant, at the time, of the idea of a unified Europe.

2. Economic improvement: Projected financial benefits were also factors that had quick, direct, and generally attributable consequences for the national citizen.

It can be argued that while mutual European cohesion and daily cooperation are in constant progress, no strategic vision has been drawn by the Europeans for the future of European foreign policy formulation towards a common European solidified structure and decision making process that can lead to more effective results.

Ironically, despite signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 which encouraged the cooperation between European countries by decreasing border control through the Schengen agreement and favoring cooperation in decision making, the employment of available policies and procedures did not lead to a successful development of a unified European foreign policy. Academics suggest that no such policy can be formulated unless a minimum form of “political will” exists.

This implies that European states have to “want” and not only “need” a unified, strategic world foreign policy. In order to achieve political unity within the European Union, the following major requirements need to be considered among others:

1. The growth of a genuine European civil society;
2. The development of frequent trans-national allegiance for the European Union; and, 

3. The acknowledgement that the issues of any EU country become the issues of the EU itself and thus the common policy and decision making will be affected.

However, this particular concept does not seem to be applicable in real-life situations where every state has the tendency to preserve and operate according to its own interest instead of a common European interest. For example, Houghes (2010) discusses interest divergence between member states and explains that we cannot expect the Spanish government to be implicated and knowledgeable about matters related to Russian Policy as the Baltic states governments would be. On the other hand, we cannot expect the Baltic states to be as implicated and concerned about the immigration and exodus from Africa as the Spanish government might be.

Nonetheless, and despite these idealistic aspirations to build a more cohesive European Union, significant incidents (such as the Greek economic crisis) reduced the ability of members to pull Europe together and agree on common policies in time of crisis and downfalls (Houghes, 2010).

One cannot deny the fact that this subject will not simply resolve itself. It can be perceived that the status of the EU is in a dilemma, it is difficult for Europe to step back from the idea of unification and at the same time, it is becoming increasingly challenging for Europe to take the next steps forward. Hence, as we can see today, the EU’s directions are oriented towards developing an ethnically diverse civilization with limited super-national ambitions and thus, restricting the level of soft influence to its member states only, leading itself towards an undefined future in the area of foreign policy and one may argue other areas of unification.
If the EU strategy does not change, history may remember Europe as having an ambitious dream to unify its member states, making considerable improvements to the European economy; yet failing in setting and determining long term objectives and aligning EU members’ vision with the ultimate goal of a unified Europe.

If actions need to be taken to resolve this situation, First one may need to study the roles of various institutions and positions such as: the European Parliament and the High Representative /Vice President together with the External Action Service as these institutions are able to bring changes and make a difference in the current European status.

Examining the role of the European Parliament (EP) by looking at Europe’s role in promoting external coalitions such as the EUROMED, highlights the fact that the Parliament’s role represents the core of the European philosophy of integration. Distant from Euro-skeptics groupings, EP members favor supplementary and deeper coherence and solidification within the member states in favor of Europe.

Since its foundation in 1979, the European Parliament’s impact has been characterized by its main objective of expanding influence and power to nearby regions. In its own understanding, the EP is the representative of Europeans; it embodies the right and duty to watch over and protect the path and growth of the European Union whereby its attention becomes focused on the internal EU-related process (Escoff, 2008).

On the other hand, EUROMED is an example of the external façade of Europe. For instance, if we examine the Barcelona process that was launched in 1995, it can be observed that the process became the general framework of cooperation among European Union members reflecting internal cohesion and external ties with south Mediterranean countries. This structure was enhanced in 2002 by adding the Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) that incorporated a new dimension to European Integration. Consequently, the European Commission, pursuant to a decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the EU, decided to start on a new cooperative agenda to tackle matters of justice, migration, and security (Escoffe, 2008).

Thus, reflecting European unity, EUROMED is acting to empower the member countries’ ability to better control their borders. For example, following the first EUROMED Migration I Project (2004-2007), the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Europe Aid Development Cooperation founded EUROMED Migration II (2008-2011) with a budget of five million Euros. The project aimed at strengthening collaboration in migration management so as to build the MEDA (Mediterranean countries) partner’s ability to offer a valuable, targeted and all-inclusive solution for the diverse forms of migration. The objective of the cooperation is to encourage migration partnership between the north and south and boost intra-regional relations, thus enhancing and promoting international affairs (Escoffe, 2008).

The EUROMED example shows that the EP’s decision making process has promoted its regional success in matters related to social affairs. As a result of this successful venture set by the EP, the EUROMED Partnership (EMP) has achieved three core points:

1. Strengthen political and security dialogue in order to describe a common area of peace and stability;

2. Establish an economic and financial partnership, in addition to an ongoing free-trade area in order to build a zone of shared proprietary; and,

3. Create a social, cultural, and human partnership to boost understanding and unity between cultures and between people (Escoffe, 2008).
Concluding on the above discussed matter, the EMP holds various advantages in comparison to other European Union’s foreign policy. First, it is an important interface between members of the EU and the Mediterranean namely, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey (as EU candidate country), Malta and Cyprus, and original EUROMED Partners and EU member states. Second, the EMP lays its mission on three major aspects: political, economic, and cultural. These aspects provide a strategic position to strengthen the relationship based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity on keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighborhood and history”. Also an advantage to the EMP mission is that the “Madrid Peace Conference for the international relation among MENA and the EU” settled the following three objectives as primary goals for the EMP.

The first objective is to strengthen political discourse through political and security partnership. This may be achieved by observing the essential principles of international law, and reaffirming common objectives in matters of internal and external stability (Escoffe, 2008).

EMP members decided to proceed in adherence to the “UN Charter” and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” to guarantee, in addition to regional and international agreements, an efficient and true practice of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression and freedom of association. These practices serve peaceful purposes, such as freedom of thought, and conscience and religion not only for the individual, but also for members of the same groups, and finally elimination of racial, national, linguistic, religious, and sexual discrimination (Escoffe, 2008).

Moreover, one of the main objectives was to develop autonomy and independence for every country which gives every member state the flexibility to
formulate their own rules and systems, including the promotion of democratic values in their policies. In addition to that, the spread of cultural diversity and its evident importance in terms of representing various cultural backgrounds and cohesion will help minimize racism since discrimination goes against the “UN Charter” (Escoffe, 2008).

The second objective is to empower financial partnership which represents the economic situation and social wellbeing of the EU member whereby EMP parties aim at creating development opportunities to ensure balanced economic progress and to promote local and foreign investments.

This can be achieved by establishing a free trading system by, for example, encouraging an environment where internal saving is essential for investments and a direct external investment that calls for regional cooperation targeting socioeconomic progress.

Furthermore, the financial partnership acknowledges the important role of energy and the contribution of resources to some EMP members which are linked to infrastructure and modernization as well as to other areas such as information and communication technology. The member states highlight the importance of having the EU’s support along with the “European Investment Bank (EIB)” that provided large scale funds to promote free trade and assist enhancing socioeconomic welfare among members.

The third objective is to integrate cultural interactions using accessible networking tools and promoting appreciation of diversity through mobilization of Europeans in the Mediterranean and vice versa.

The participating countries acknowledge that diversity brings a wider impact to human development and therefore, promote dialogue and exchanges among these
countries through various interactions such as youth dialogues, work force and the like. These elements are helpful in promoting diversity awareness in gaining profound and accurate insights of the media, especially since the latter plays an influential role in shaping cultures’ perception of the process of integration. As a result, matters like civil society and growth of human capital are being addressed through several advanced training, simulation dialogues, conferences, and exchange programs. The purpose is to empower and develop the intellectual and psychological awareness of cultural differences as their impact on society is characterized by such benefits as social cohesion and reduced acculturation tendencies.

The significance of these acquisitions is to expand the civil society’s impact to operate more effectively as independent institutions in member states. This process is a constructive factor in financial and economic maturity as it helps reduce the number of illegal migrants by focusing more on the admission of migrants coming from EMP members on European states borders (Escoffe, 2008).

In addition, EMP members agreed to prevent as best as possible illegal activities (illegal trafficking of women, children and other illegitimate resources etc…) and to collaborate against international crimes and other forms of illegal activity. These EMP actions had positive implications on matters related to foreign policy and security; the EP capability and authority progressed gradually from one treaty to another. The recent condition was determined by the Lisbon Treaty which started to be implemented on December 1, 2009. The Treaty encouraged “the Commission, the European Parliament” to aspire for an increase in power over external relations (Hughes, 2010).

As noted earlier, another achievement of the EP was the establishment of “EEAS – European External Action Service to serve as an external diplomatic representative
of the EU”. The main purpose of the European Parliament was focused on the incorporation of the EEAS in the Commission. This would increase EP’s control on European affairs since it will gain both foreign policy and security mechanisms and limit the Commission’s role. In other words, the EP will have control over issues that were formerly under the monopoly of the European member states.

Ingeborg (2009) states that the EP’s objective in integrating the EEAS was not attained and thus, as an alternative, the EEAS, operates today as an independent functional body of the European Union separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission and thus it has the necessary privileges to take actions and achieve its objectives.

Yet, benefiting from the personnel’s capabilities and budget flexibility, the EP was successful in various significant aspects; mainly, it gained total control over the budget over the External Action Service. It has been able to establish that employment “be based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender balance.” To ensure that the EEAS is respected, the decision was that “prominent officials of the European Union need to represent at least 60% of all EEAS staff” (Ingeborg, 2009).

On the other hand, the EP failed in reaching a mutual agreement with the High Representative, concerning the placement of staff in key posts within EU Delegations, it was approved that there will be a possibility of inviting appointees for a discussion (a practice that is not common in EU foreign services). In that matter, the Official Journal of the European Journal (2010) has stated that with respect to strategically important countries and organizations, the High Representative will consider the European Parliament’s requests of appointing new Heads of Delegations
when they appear before the AFET ("Affaires étrangères") committee for an exchange of view before taking their posts.

It is also predicted that the High Representative/Vice President will maximize the chances of Heads of Delegations, EUSRs, Heads of CSDP missions, and senior EEAS officials to appear in relevant parliamentary committees and sub committees where they can share their comments and discuss their issues. It has been confirmed that the treaties signed by the European Union are to be taken into consideration and consulted by the EP in order to abide by them.

On CFSP (Common Foreign & Security Policy), the HR/VP mentioned that they will look for the views of the European Parliament on the major aspects and essential choices of this strategy in compliance with “Article 36.” The HR/VP expressed commitment in making sure that the views of the EP members are aligned with the article and that the documents of the CFSP are well classified and well documented by the admission of the EP members (Ingeborg, 2009). On top of fiscal and governmental rules, “Article 14 of the Lisbon Treaty” states that the EP “shall exercise functions of supporting control and consultation” because there will be more influence in this area.

The Parliament’s position, on the other hand, is highlighted through the Lisbon Treaty, (2007) whereby the High Representative will take into consideration previous information, consultations, and agreements in its relationship with the European Parliament and will adjust such engagements based on the latter’s political role.

As such, the EP improved its role and influence in the area of foreign policy. The liability and pressure was on the HR who, as an affiliate of the Commission, showed reliance on the financial plan of the EEAS. With the EEAS, the European Parliament can expand in representing the European position in the world, in
increasing consciousness of this role by developing and portraying policies that would boost the impact of the parliament, and therefore increase its influence and create a major difference for European interests.

2.2 The Decision Making Process

Given the above it can be stated that the major reason behind the current status of foreign policy is that decisions are overwhelmed by several minor initiatives dispersed at the international level in the absence of common objectives, goals, and interests among Europeans. This situation complicates the process of decision making as there is no commitment initiated by the states to define world European strategy. Instead, the process is often interrupted and limited to serve the interests of each state and its leaders.

Thus, if we are to examine how the actual decision making process takes place we are to consider how the study of FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis) is understood. It is mostly grouped into two main sections, the first known as actors and second known as structures. These two sections shape the fundamentals of rational decision making. (Hermann, 1978) The actors are composed of lower level domestic and international players in shaping decisions with regards to foreign policy such as the individual and group decision level, whereas the structures are composed of the more general and abstract levels such as state, states relation and cultural levels. According to Valerie Hudson, 2007, there needs to be a link between the structures and the actors as it is important not to relate to them as two different entities while studying the decision making process. Here, scholars study policy making with respect to decisions, considering a behavioral approach to the process. The following approach consists effectively of three dimensions: intentional, dispositional and structural dimension. (Carlsnaes, 1992 : 2002) Accordingly, the startup point in the foreign
policy decision making process would be to consider the intention and the goal of the action to be taken within a given foreign policy. Thus, in this model, the follow up dimension would be more a cognitive approach or what is described to be dispositional dimension which expresses underlying values, beliefs and motives in performing certain actions to reach the goal that was outlined in the intentional dimension. According to this approach, these two dimensions shape the third dimension named structural dimension where several factors (economical, social, cultural…) are being perceived and resolved or dealt with in the decision making process based on the actors perception, values and intentions as described in the previous dimensions.

Thus in reference to the above mentioned decision making process actors and structures are portrayed as being two different entities of studies. What this paper will be developing with respect to the decision making process and factors is how a possible link can take place between the actors and structures considered in the FPA and decision making.

Further scrutiny into the decision making process entails the study of several attributes that are related to decision making and that influence policy making. These attributes may include related issues, objectives, facts, ideas/alternatives, values, interests, and time frames.

These attributes form, directly or indirectly, a process and drive the decision makers to dwell on them considerably. The process thought of by the decision maker may vary depending on the situation being a common decision making situation, a risk-taking situation, an innovating situation, or other more complex situations.
Thus having looked at Jervis’s theory on perception and to Herman & Hagan “decision unit” framework, we can explain that different components may have a critical role in influencing decision making behavior:

1. The Issue: The relevance and importance of the issue in question is one of the components on decision maker’s mind. The issue’s relevance, importance, level of priority, and what potential might emerge from dedicating effort to that issue will no doubt affect decision making. Definitely, perception plays an important role in assessing the issue and its qualifications and what might seem as interesting and challenging to one decision maker might be perceived as non-urgent or non-challenging to another.

2. The Objective: Identifying the decision’s objective is undoubtedly a key factor in decision making so much that if no common objective exists, one has to be created based on the SMART Objective concept defined as follows: Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Timely (Doran, 1981). Decision makers must have in mind the focus of the decision to be taken and the issue previously set for the decision. This will ensure submitting decision with clear directions and understanding. Establishing a SMART objective is to draw a vision and provide guidance that inspires decision making behavior.

3. The Facts: Having the issue assessed and objectives set, decision makers can examine the available resources – tools that help develop analytical thinking for decision making – that shape the situation. To shape or frame the situation, decision makers may use question words such as what, why, where, who, when, and so on.

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4. The Situation/Ideas or Alternatives: The thinking process may vary based on the situation. For example, if we are to take a problem-solving decision, we will first need to pinpoint the facts and then move to finding the faults and the root causes for the problem. Accordingly, we will assess the situation and recommend possible solutions. Another example of situations is one that requires looking at matters from different perspectives where generating ideas or alternatives will be required. Decision makers are much likely to behave differently from one another when it comes to looking at alternatives and ideas; some may want to look at opportunities, while others are concerned with possible obstacles. Although obstacles help in beneficial risk analysis, it may block challenging and inspiring opportunities.

In reference to Robert Jervis who looked at leadership psychology in decision making it is important to note the perception & misperception of governmental decision makers while taking their decisions concerning foreign policy strategies with concerned parties. Jervis developed his study by stating that many governmental personnel have taken critical decisions in the matter of national and foreign policy depending on the misperception of various issues that are already developed cognitively on bias opinion which lead to several divergences and possible interpretations when it comes to political outcomes, which brings his interpretation close to the Bureaucratic approach in decision making that stresses less rational thinking and more interpretation of a political situation discussed collectively with leaders involved in the process. Jervis’s reasoning follows more a flexible and wider approach that leaves the possibility of identifying new opportunities to look and consider in the decision making process (Jervis, 1976).
If several decision makers are involved, they may want to engage in meetings and group discussions to share viewpoints and recommendations of several ideas worth taking action upon and thus deciding on effective implementation methods. This phase is known as the “effective” selection phase and it involves highlighting the element of interest for each decision maker and defining how well that element would serve the interest and the need of the decision maker. In that respect, the discussions and meetings between decision makers might either succeed or fail based on alignment of interest in the alternative they want to select and consider for implementation.

At this stage, the European Union can be seen as having the interest of the countries rarely aligned with those defined as the European set of objectives. That being said, we can affirm that the transition from objectives to alternatives followed by unified action and finally implementation (i.e., the selection behavior) vastly affects the decision making process in the EU.

As the selection process is finalized and decisions are taken to start implementation, a new important behavior is emphasized: Action Plan Drawing. Since most action plans do not usually follow a systematic process of steps and methods, it is necessary that the implementation is subjected to a small scale pilot exercise before actually launching it. The pilot exercise will ensure that the foreseen implementation is feasible and appropriate for the situation. There have been many cases where tests proved the selection of alternatives to be inefficient as it tangibly showed how it may affect other decisions, factors, and interests related to the situation. Therefore, another important behavior to be considered in the decision making process is the on-the-ground application and testing of the approved solution (Osborn & Parnes, 1967).
Now that the alternative has been successfully tested and approved, the behavioral process of decision making enters the phase of organizing the methods of implementation including setting time frames, deadlines, defining the actors and major players involved, and defining and monitoring allocation of resources to make sure that requirements are met and that there are no shortages (Osborn & Parnes, 1967).

Henceforth, the next phase, Production Phase, which may be regarded also as the actual implementation of the decision is put into action. Implementation is often subject to procrastination and delays due to unexpectedly arising issues and thus shifting decision makers’ attention to new areas that will need new decisions. Many lose interest at this phase and seek new opportunities. Although finding new opportunities and resolving other issues/alternatives is important, failing to reach an effective production and implementation will imply that the decision to “decision making” has not been completed.

In consequence, decisions and decision makers have to make an effort to become result oriented and look at the achievement and practice of what they have preached; otherwise, if the execution and the result of the ideas did not show an effective improvement from the previous situation and status, all positive intentions to take fair decisions and supportive actions would be in vain. In order to improve and change, we have to take different decisions however with the same actions and method so that we can add value to the situation.

Following implementation, an evaluation of the outcomes and results of decision is required whereby decision-makers measure and evaluate the consequences of their action. The importance of evaluation lies in finding out whether the results that were
delivered met the standards that were expected when decision makers first set their objectives (Osborn & Parnes, 1967).

Based on the feedback and on the evaluation results, decision makers can study their options to improve the attained results. Successful decisions, where actions are considered as important as the timeframe within which they were implemented, may be set as role models for similar situations. It thus can be noted that the formal rule of decision making in the European Union is faced with a number of challenges as there is most of the time the will to move toward the EUROPA state yet not enough scrutiny on how things can be done differently.

Of course there is no right or wrong decision but one that is most appropriate to the situation and to the factor that influences the decision making process be that socio-economic, military, demographic, electoral, political, or foreign policy.

To sum up, it is very important to emphasize the difference between policy making and decision making, in where policy makers are not necessarily the ones who take the decisions and implement actions on the ground. This is why the above described process aims at establishing a link between these two elements in order to avoid the gap between the ideas, objectives of policies and the way they are produced and applied. Accordingly, the decision making behavioral process can be summarized as follows:

| Issue/Situation | Objective | Facts, Resources & Tools | Finding Faults (depending on the situation) | Alternatives Expressed | Selection according to Interest | Organization | Implementation | Evaluation | Innovation/Maintenance |
Having looked at and defined the different behavioral steps that form the decision making process, we can now discuss how decisions are being made. The model discussed in this next section uses a case by case approach and helps map out, study, and analyze the European Union’s decision making behavior focusing on the behavior of the state and that of the state leaders.
Chapter 3
EU Decision Making Factors (DMF) Model

Based on several writings on decision making behavior in international relations, I have developed a model that outlines decision making factors. Previous scholar’s writings talk about 3 major systems when it comes to decision making, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational & Bureaucratic (Allison, 1979). The RAM Model is based on the notion that leaders consider scientific and rational elements to come up with conclusions. Actors chose a course of action that is consistent with their goals, likewise they search for goals and rank them according to priority, identify options for reaching the goals, predict consequences, evaluate the options & select the one which maximizes their goal. RAM focuses on processing information according to the rules for optimizing rational actions. (Becker, 1976)

Organizational systems, are represented through large organized governmental groups which seek to reach a decision through intra-governmental and bureaucratic political factors, this type of decision making demands the use of standards operating procedures (SOP) and day-to-day operations, and is linked to financial funding with its goals and objectives well established. The advantage it presents is that it emphasizes practical tested solutions in constraining circumstances. (Allison, 1979)

As for Bureaucratic decision making it results from a political bargaining process among key players which could contribute to satisfying group thinking where a decision is the result of a mutual consensus in perception between several players involved in decision making, it emphasizes more the points of view and analysis of the players then concrete facts which may not always lead to a measurable output or a systematic way of reaching a decision (Allison, 1979).
The decision-unit framework, as developed by Hermann and Hagan, includes three stages through which the decision making is developed; from the inputs as representing a foreign policy problem, to the emergence of an authoritative Decision-Unit, and through the outcome exemplifying the process outcome, and finally to the foreign policy action.

Drawing from the above, if we look at the below figure that I have designed with regards to the factors that influence decision making, we can see that the core of the circle represents the economic and social factors which are the primary and fundamental needs of survival. The layers escalate to what may be categorized as accomplishments and impacts.4

![Figure 1: Economic and Social Factors Cycle](image)

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4 The DMF Figure is an illustration of the Decision Making Behavior Circle, which represents the major factors that shape and influence the decision making process inspired by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and motivation. The small circle represents the core and primary need and as the layers spread it reflects the escalation beyond human needs.
If we are to compare the above drafted circle to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and motivations, we will see that the economic and social needs occur on Maslow’s hierarchy’s physiological level and thus, it is described as essential for the survival of an individual; any shortages or disturbances at this level destabilizes the foundation of Maslow’s pyramid and makes it subject to collapsing at any time. Also, if we try to understand the economic & social level from the state’s perspective, we will appreciate the necessity of affording and providing for basic human requirements that ensure citizen’s good health and development.

The economic and social needs can therefore be described as the state’s primary interest. It is of note that the survival of a state is related to the economic development and to the social welfare it provides to its citizens. The core of the state's interests is to maximize and boost their economy and guarantee wealth, two aspects that help strengthen the state’s foundation and consequently, enhance the state’s authority and influence.

To understand the level of Military and State, we need to discuss safety and security issues; the two powerful dimensions that were, most of the times, provoked by the element of fear, the fear of losing property, economic wealth, or power (such as being attacked or taken by surprise). Inevitably, insecurity circles every individual’s/citizen’s mind and therefore exists in every state, though to varying degrees. The level of insecurity in the states depends on the extent to which the core of the circle is strong; i.e., the solidity of the economy and existential needs everything else being equal. It is not to be taken for granted though that feelings of insecurity are decreased with a steadier provision of basic needs. It is needless to say, that a weak economy and poor social needs delivery leaves the state in precarious conditions causing high levels of insecurity.
Most individuals or states that lack the power to fulfill their economical/social/material and existential needs, give full attention to preserving what they already possess. These states, in most cases, are not able to climb to the wider layer of the embedded circles, and hence remain trapped at the level of providing basic needs. This would mean that their level of motivation is restricted by having to secure the physiological aspects, properties, territories and similar needs. Whereas, states that have more solid foundations at the base, benefit from the opportunity to manifest their desire to reach a higher stage of motivation and move to the next level of hierarchy, that of military and state.

At the third level, members express desires to build connections and effective relationships and to gain popularity due to their need for belonging.

Most individuals need to be socially interactive, share perceptions, and gain recognition, communicate, debate, and enjoy the basic principles of exchange. This need is key to openness and development; it is a transition point in the entire pyramid of Maslow and is the basic link between the lowest and highest levels of the embedded circles.

As mentioned above, all individuals have the ambition to grow economically and to secure their physiological needs since these are at the heart of interests of every individual and of society in a state. Interaction amongst individuals secures mutual interests and builds trustful relationship between them. When the circle of trust includes two or more individuals, teams are formed and the number of participants sharing the same purposes increases thus encouraging individuals’ needs of boosting their self-esteem driving them to seek high profile statuses and strive for leading positions.
This discussion of social and cultural needs is essential in that individuals face several differences and challenges related to demographical factors. For example, Europe is composed of twenty-eight member states where each state has its own cultural and ethnic dimensions. However, how these twenty-eight states work as a team and aspire to solidify their ambitions and common interests is an example of their need to have an identity and a culture that they would fight for and preserve. What motivates them to this endeavor is their unanimous feeling of belonging to Europe and respecting individuals of other states; add to that, their belief that joining as a team helps them benefit from each other’s past experiences of loss and gain and hence, better serve their economic wellbeing.

It is also this need of love and belonging that is sometimes used by highly motivated individuals as an influencing technique to mobilize other individuals’ feelings and emotions towards actions and behaviors that serve their purposes. It is from this need that Human Rights and sister movements have emerged and have motivated individuals to join communities they believe will protect them and will guarantee the individual rights they hold.

This particular level on the circle of hierarchy is transitory and motivational and connects the layers of the circle together.

In cultural and social integration, the implication of the incorporation in the European Union has shown a greater willingness of the states to be tolerant toward immigration through Europe’s internal open borders and other immigration policies. However, the concern is finding out the extent to which immigration and cultural mixture do not clash with other needs and do not affect the states’ core interests.

In our discussion of the European Union, we have already demonstrated that the national interest of each county dominates the common European interest. This
conflict validates the analysis that even if member states are economically stable and aware that they need to unite their efforts to preserve their interests and needs, they might still fail to overcome their feeling of self-interest. Therefore, although the consensus and the needs to belong to a certain identity exist, the implementation and integration remains fragile and leads to the stagnation of the development of the state of Europa.

At the fourth level, individuals tend to develop their self-esteem, build confidence, and gain the respect of others. This is the level of esteem seen in our model as the motivation to acquire political powers.

It is essential for individuals to feel appreciated and valued. To keep being appreciated, they tend to continuously evaluate their achievements and set new goals and objectives; they take pride in their success and emphasize their self-image and aim to gain recognition. With their efforts to gain such acknowledgment, individuals develop the fear of losing the power they have gained and be tied up in humiliation and failure.

To avoid loss of power, individuals are motivated to establish processes and procedures that can make their resources and connections exposed. These individuals not only set important standards, but also evaluate these standards and work to get other individuals to become involved and motivated to follow and implement the newly established systems and procedures. In this sense, as individuals become role models to many others, their need of esteem becomes amplified. Henceforth, elections and political positions turn out to be of interest for them, especially since such positions manifest feelings of confidence and self-esteem.
As parties are formed to symbolize respect and adherence to the principles and values of the individual and the leader, leadership psychology starts to play a significant role. Similarly, state leaders start establishing institutions, alliances, and rules that enables them to guide and monitor the set plans and strategies.

It is needless to say that the RAM factor has an influential role when it comes to assessing deliverables and outputs that were put forward in the agenda, especially translated through public opinion’s decision to test the credibility of the plan previously built. This rational approach in decision making needs to be considered in ideas and ideals of the party; in order not to lose popularity in upcoming elections, they need to be well defined, soundly studied and effectively implemented. The failure or success of these plans and ideas, the impact of strategies, depend on decision makers and rulers and their level of material and existential needs and ambition as these are the needs that drive people to either seek growth or maintain and consolidate their status quo.

The need to bring changes to the state through the establishment of new rules and regulations, plans and strategies lead individuals to the broader and final circle on the hierarchy, i.e., the circle of challenge, change, creativity and development. This encloses the vision and strategy of the person and state, and is known as Self-Actualization. It is within this need that individuals pursue meaningful and purposeful matters of life, and focus more on themselves and on happenings around them. This would mean that individuals will want to experience concrete changes and will try their best to point out the ways in which they can contribute to the world and leave a positive impact.
Focusing on this bigger picture instead of daily routines is one of the criteria of self-actualization; self-actualization is mainly characterized by drawing a plan and a vision and defining the time frame within which they should be accomplished.

At this stage, individuals can take control and head towards self-actualization in the presence of other players also looking for their own self-actualization. Attentive individuals will seek ways to make a difference and a way to add value to their growth without sacrificing their own interests. Besides their personal endeavors, individuals need to be aware that openness towards other states, proof of credibility, and demonstrated leadership should be part of their daily achievements and anticipated standards. Also to be considered at this stage is that individuals and states have the chance to show their achievements’ impact on the international arena; the more they add to the state, build connections, preserve its interests, and aid other states, the more credibility, reliability, and trustworthiness they will gain.

Any setback or failure leads to fear of losing position, trust of others, and credibility that may eventually lead to the individual and state’s immobilization. When successful states/leaders start taking control and affect the international arena, they gain access to the higher ladder on the circle – that of foreign policy – where their contribution to formulate a policy for all contributing states becomes possible.

Foreign Policy is considered at the top level of the hierarchy since it requires a solid and a stable base that eventually leads to a stronger self-actualization characterized by high impact and proof of presence. The European Union experienced significant drops in its decision making priorities and shifted its focus from the outer circle to the inner circles to tighten its focus on handling, once again, the physiological needs and re-establishing its economic stability.
The next section directs the focus on the formal rule of decision making and its effect on the European Unification Process. Thus, the section elaborates on decision making by itself as a key to action and to change.

According to TMSDI (Team Management Systems Development Internationals), there are two dimensions that explain how people make decisions, that which is based on facts and that which is based on intuition or feelings. Individuals who usually base their decisions on facts are more analytical; they are motivated by research, case studies, statistics, and look for an already established set of information so that they base their arguments and decisions accordingly. People, who take decisions based on feelings are usually belief-oriented, they are motivated by intuition, emotions, and superstition, and develop a certain set of beliefs to which they refer when wanting to make decisions.

Taking these two dimensions in the political sphere, leaders tend to build their credibility based on analytical skills. However, knowing that people usually follow their emotions and tend to overlook the facts when they want to vote, leaders mobilize and communicate their interests via sophisticated speeches that affect individuals’ emotional level; they introduce facts and information in bits and pieces and on only as indirect messages guiding individuals systematically to take decisions based on their intuition.

Most of the facts and the actions that need to be taken are overlapped by feelings and emotional statements i.e., by needs of love and belongingness. Decisions at this level are motivated by feelings, and as previously mentioned, are the link between

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5 “Over twenty-five years of validated research has created an integrated suite of profiling tools known as Margerison-McCann Team Management Systems (TMS). The Profiles offer a unique approach to maximizing human performance. They are used by learning and development professionals working in public and private sector organizations worldwide. TMSDI accreditation programs give access to the Margerison-McCann Profiling system.” (tmsdi.com)
the lowest and highest level of the hierarchy. Similar repetitions of actions develop into a belief pattern (preceded by analysis) upon which people act.

Thus, it is important to draw from the above that understanding what shapes state decisions can be complemented with how state leaders themselves relate to the above mentioned layers through these two dimensions as state leaders and officials working towards a certain vision and a potential result. Consequently, leaders need to be able to distinguish and detach themselves from their personal beliefs when it comes to taking decisions concerning states’ macro level issues and to relate to the state’s needs as an important factor in their decision making process.
Chapter 4
The DMF Model and Migration in France

This chapter takes a practical approach to studying the decision making factors at the EU level and national level with a focus on the issue of migration in France. Joining Germany’s initiative to establish the “Coal and Steel” agreement, France has continued to play a decisive role in establishing institutions that are exposed to foreign affairs such as EUROMED, an institution that has definitely affected foreign policy formulation.

We will be looking at how every layer in the DMF Model plays an important role in decision making, and consequently impacts France and the EU’s course of actions. We will begin by studying the impact of “immigration choisie” on the economic and social factor in France. The “immigration choisie” policy is known to be the major channel of legitimate immigrants and is mostly focused on family reunifications, with a restriction of workers which is leading to the elimination and degradation of the migration of qualified and skilled migrants.

Next, I will focus on the Security & State factor known as the second layer in the DMF Model and divergences faced when it comes to matters related to security among European Union and order control. Moving to the third DMF Factor we will then look at the cultural element and portray its repercussions on decision making in the case of French migrants. As for the fourth layer in the DMF Model (self-esteem / political) we will be going through the consideration of migrant’s role in influencing the election process in France and decisions in this matter accordingly.
4.1 Migration in France & the Economic/Social factor (1st DMF Layer)

With the economy being the primary factor in the decision making model, we look at the massive influx of migrants and injection of cultural diversity. The central strategy in France is to improve labor immigration throughout the execution of targeted rewards that motivate and retain specific immigrants. The strategy is to facilitate the entrance and admission of migrants and provide them with stable and momentary residence and a selective liberalization of labor markets in sectors with significant labor scarcity (Economic Migration, 2009).

Some of these measures have already been used between 1998 and 2004. One example is the change of labor market conditions that requested new approaches via the IT sector. This was initiated after the ministries of Labor and Interior responded and disclosed through the “IT Professional Organization”, that IT experts are highly requested to set up computerized systems for the “New Millennium”, this was in part done to simplify the migration process. This flexibility is reflected by the simple fact that IT migrant labor force came to France either under temporary residence or under the permanent residence permits, while market demand was only around requested IT workers that were needed in reference to the approximate calculations of the “Syntec Informatic” professional organization (Economic Migration, 2009).

The procedure has witnessed more adaptability since March of 2004, when the Ministry of Labor issued a new decision that facilitated and shortened the entire operation for foreign “white collars”, and proposed a particular representation quota for local employers and foreign workers and staff. According to these new measures, new migrants are allowed to start working in France without the need for a formal
work permit. In addition, accompanying spouses will be entitled to a work permit if the migrants’ monthly income is over 2000 Euros (Economic Migration, 2009).

The “immigration choisie” framework is a selective opening of labor markets provided for labor migration. However, starting in 2006, the framework came in interference with the wider scale of the European Union when administrations decided to repress the restriction of employment conditions for predetermined lists of employment vacancies. This reminds us of the impact that the economic and social factors can have on decision making, mostly while looking at the difference between French National Interest in “Immigration Choisie” and the European approach towards a less restrictive selection process of migrants.

In May 2006, a particular path was reserved for national citizens of the new European Union members. The above mentioned, which consists of several occupations, was expanded by a verdict in December 2007 and it corresponded to forty per cent of labor markets. This careful opportunity of French labor market produced low results. Taking into consideration that between July 2006 and June 2007, following the undertaken measures, the French labor market had a remarkable growth in specialized labor supply. And while we can say that there was a considerable increase in the market in comparison to the previous year. However, it is still far beneath the original targets (Economic Migration, 2009).

From a different perspective, during the same period, labor migration from third world countries that were not related by previously stated measures augmented. The same verdict defined an additional list of professions that were open for third country nationals (SP.fr, Contrat d’Acceuil et d’intégration, 2009).

The Algerians nationals and Tunisians are disqualified from these measures since they are part of a bilateral agreement; an agreement that has not been revised since
2000. Bilateral agreements with countries from West Africa defined new “deals” according to the 2006 law for the migrants of the related countries, giving them the right of entry to other definite vacancies in France.

The second factor we are to discuss in this sections and that is considered as important as the economic factor, is the social conditions that have dominated France.

Looking at the French society and its extensive migrant mobilization, several measures have been taken into account to micromanage the influx of the residents to the country, balancing the will to control it with the flexible values of liberalization. From one side, there is a leading tendency in the French policy to stop family movement, particularly after the 2007 law, which requires having certain standards of French language testing for applicants seeking a French visa since these candidates seem to support the core of the French constitution. The DNA test for questioned families’ joint candidatures is an obvious illustration of the latest tendency “verifying before allowing rights” (SP.fr, Contrat d’Acceuill et d’intergration, 2009).

In 2003, a concept known as the “Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration” (CAI – reception and integration contract) was developed among immigrants and State, based on identical criterion which verifies traits of the migrant's incorporation into the French culture.

From another perspective, there is a rising concentration on “family migrants” that may include a pool of skilled workers essential to the working force in France mainly, in social services that relate to disabled persons, young children, or the elderly. In the early period of 2008, the “Ministry of Immigration” announced the design of a “passeport” (MIINCD, 2007) by which immigrants who are by now
residents in France, will have the capacity to practice the French language using official assessment and this passport will be a major selection criterion or a requirement designated by employers Office Francais de L’Intégration et L’Immigration (OFFI), le CAI “Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration”).

With regards to the CAI, which also delivers a degree from the ministry of “National Education” to new migrants, there is duplication among identity-based measure, which is “integration as a pre-condition for obtaining a visa and a residence permit” and functional measure which is “enhancing prospects of employability of family migrants in France” (Ministry of employment and social cohesion, 2007).

Using this grouping of security-based and practical foundation of “immigration choisie”, the subjects related to rights are very delicate as they are not present in the policy outline. The status remains that third world country migrants and residents do not have political rights, unlike EU citizen in reference to the eighth article in the “Maastricht Treaty” (Ministry of employment and social cohesion, 2007).

The only medium to gain political right is by accessing French citizenship and the legal ways of obtaining it are either, by marriage, by descendent, by birth, or by naturalization verdict. Recent French citizens instantly achieved all the rights linked to citizenship, in addition to eligibility. This was perceived not as a promise of loyalty, but as a ceremony that allows dual citizenship and emphasizes the importance of racial and religious discrimination against French citizens of different backgrounds; it stresses the pursuit of becoming an effective part of the French nation.

The legality and period of the migrants’ residence in France is one of the major conditions that facilitate access to social benefits (Ministry of employment and social cohesion, 2007). The officially permitted migrants, with an access to work, have the
privilege to benefit from all the social rights, including the right of employment, family benefits and health care. However, these conditions are not relevant for legal migrants who do not possess a working permit, and therefore are not allowed to professional vacancies by the “national employment administration” or to social insurance.

The weakest groups of migrants are the fluctuating and unstable national migrants (who were originally immigrants, and got the French citizenship at a later stage) who, through “L’Aide Medicale d’ Etat” AME, have access to urgent situation lodging, admission to schools for their children, and access to national indemnity. These groups also include the elderly who are granted a special ten-year residence permit, and hold a special residency card that allows them to enter the French territory at any period of time over duration of one year. Thus what we can conclude from the above is the fact that economic interest plays a base role in shaping decisions regarding immigrants in France confronted between a selected type of immigrants for labor force and a need to boost economic welfare through skillful migrants and attract resourceful and diverse individuals thinking to enrich economic sustainability.

4.2 Migration in France & the Military/State Factor (2nd DMF Layer)

In the following section, we will discuss the second layer in the decision making circle which is directly linked to the need of security and is translated as the military and state factor. We begin our analysis by discussing the military and security dimension and then move to discussing the need for and role of state institutions in decision making.
So far, we have looked at how economic and social factors affect decision making. In this section, we will discuss the State factor starting with the idea that issues of security are projected directly into established norms known as state laws and regulations.

To discuss the State factor, several dimensions are to be taken into consideration. For example, if we look at the difference between border policies and migration policies, we realize that even though they are correlated, they still diverge in several aspects. In migration policy, several criteria of the overall immigration strategy are set to define individuals that can be admitted to become legal residents in the country. The border policy, on the other hand, deals with the enforcement mechanism that tackles specific issues at the entry point of the state. Overall, the development of immigration policies takes place in governmental fields where they undergo an extensive process that identifies the global guidelines and thus, define the required procedures for migration. Decision making related to Border Policies, however, is determined by applying more critical rules and via using a radical case by case approach of admission that may result in either positive or negative outcome (Ingeborg, 2009).

The difference between the two policies is simple. For instance, the same announcements that may be seen as an obstacle for migrants to reach the country, do not affect border policies, which means that the migrant/individual can still cross the bother without necessarily facing any problems.

Moreover, although the border policy has, in the past, focused on the migrants’ exceptional cases at the borders, its control has extended to include many other entry points of the country such as airports and seaports. Other criteria such as country of origin, employment position, and social status may also be taken into consideration.
In general, the management of border polices and their implementations have deeply focused on detailed verification of the migrants’ information and background check. However, due to the large influx, this task has faced some difficulties since it imposes several restrictions, and therefore complicates the entry process throughout the EU.

Yet, the EU states showed more interest and attention to the issue of integrating migrants. Therefore, they delegated the management of entrance to border authorities transforming the frontiers into a network that operates with admissions of migrants. As such, decision making regarding the authorization of migrants takes place at the border instead of having the massive influx of migrations cases concentrated in one place (Raizon, 2006).

Studies on the issues related to border control have emphasized on problems linked to political and legal matters which is an interest of liberal states, to ensure that the fluctuation of immigrants is well monitored and controlled.

Even though existing policies can be less extensive when decisions become more effective in court operations or administration, avoiding a legislation which controls migrant fluctuation is easily subject to change (Raizon, 2006).

Several trials to control immigration, amid the migrants who enjoy the privilege of “cross national boundaries” rights and who majorly locate themselves around
European border district, have regularly induced sharp discussions among divergent political interests.

Issues in this regard can highlight the discrepancies in decision making between the state level and the European level such as:

- The inquiries related to migrants’ admissions and monitoring borders to assess immigrants’ eligibility with respect to what identities this nation aims at maintaining. This action continues despite the fact that the concept of immigration control is weakened via several international advocacies related to collective rights (Raizon, 2006).

- The diagnoses of international constraints on state’s capacity towards direct immigration are highly overrated, as argued by Christian Joppke, this is either because they are based on faulty assumptions of strong sovereignty that didn’t take place, or because the limits on frontier controls are more clearly domestic than international.  

Consequently, the conditions where the policy of immigration is being developed and executed nowadays are enforced as a result of the present globalization and human rights accords including at the EU level. These procedures may have a strong point; however, this does not imply that they are put into practice effectively. This is why monitoring and controlling the borders have a low probability of being fully implemented; the rights of migrants’, who are internationally supported via several movements and organizations, create a kind of dilemma that hinders the practice of the above mentioned enforcing mechanisms, which comes as a contradiction to the perception of European States (Ingerbourg, 2009).

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Linking this to the status of the European Union, we can state that there are several implications whether or not the EU Unification process reduced the EU states’ potential and flexibility to handle their borders when it comes to the issue of immigration.

Within Europe, the matter of national sovereignty has become complex, particularly with the inclusion of the Convention of Schengen. State members took several initiatives to improve the transfer of migrants and reduce the restrictions between borders. Nevertheless, these laws were not given sufficient time and attention to be elaborated and developed, and kept the issue of “Third Countries Nationals” (TCN) aside.

Rey Koslowski\(^7\) argues that if there is determination to reach harmonization, this will automatically transform the border controls into a more flexible process. From one side, as a consequence of reducing the control of borders between the members states of the EU that are in the Schengen Zone, entrance to the EU is faced with several entry points that are not under strict control and thus allow an easy access to the European Union. This resulted from the lack of a standard procedure of entry among EU members which can be of harm to some EU countries.

Even amongst states that have strict conditions for migrant’s admission, implementing policies varies from one country to another. Whereas access for migrants in Netherlands and the UK (until 2004) is known to be very strict, the process has been neglected by several EU governments where many migrants’ were mainly left without any records and no action was taken to archive and hold provided information. Therefore, with Austrian and French regulations, immigrants who do not have an official status of permission are not expelled if there is existence of

\(^7\) Rey Koslowski is a leading academic authority in the field of international relations dealing with international organizations, European integration, international migration, information technology, and homeland security, with a strong background in transatlantic and European policies.
family in the state. Under German rule, however, they cannot be moved without the required and appropriate travel papers. In both states, Germany and the UK, illegitimate migrants have a tolerated status (Shweiger, 2007).

The development of the European Union has created an increasing interdependence among the member states. The execution of Schengen was discussed as being a burden on the major Latin European countries, i.e., Spain and Italy; it made it hard for them to conform to the existing rules despite the opposing regular and daily governmental operations that control immigration through their borders. Based on the French experience that dates back to 1993, the agreements became elements of internal procedures that governments benefit from to uphold their plans (Shweiger, 2007).

To sum up on migration issues, synchronization tends to empower governments, and increase their capability and influence to organize migrants and keep the flexibility they need.

The regulation of migration is becoming highly incorporated in the system of both international and European players who are facing a dual behavior between policies that are flexible but also constraining, not to add the fact that the number of migrants fluctuates from one area to another thus challenging the internal political players and leading them to modify their internal “rapports de force”. It is of note that state rules and laws are in constant change and revisions to maintain the core interest. A big contribution is the demographic changes that are not necessarily controlled under a direct decision making process but have an informal way of imposing changes and influencing decisions.

The “immigration choisie” policy questions not only the number of migrants that will enter France, but also the type of immigrants who seek to obtain French
citizenship and privileges. With the procedures involved, laws and restrictions have clearly shown that the progress of the migrant’s status of integration in French society is very slow.

Labor immigration has witnessed much instability when it comes to determining the major components to be measured in playing an influential role in the French policies. The roles are realized via voting and making a statement or, creating positions for themselves on the 8th decision making factor (foreign policy). The latter would create internal French disagreement and mark the French position as undetermined and delicate facing its EU Partners. For example migrants’ movement was boosted at the end of the 1990s and between 2001 and 2004. Then again, after 2005, an increase was claimed for the regime as the first accomplishment of “immigration choisie” guiding principle. It was evident in the number of recorded entries that this development accelerated after 2006 (from 4,532 entries for the 1st 6 months of 2006 to 7,245 in 2007). However, a good percentage of labor migrants’ entries do not relate to the concept of “direct migration to French territories”. In fact, the applications returned to foreigners who were already settled in France and were benefiting from the “immigration choisie” success policy, so as to penetrate the market through various job opportunities; mainly, these included students who received work permit visas (Data Projection M, 2006).

In these circumstances, debates on the strategy of “immigration choisie” focused on the intensity of migration needed on the long run and on measuring methods. The policy of figures was linked to anti-immigration policies dating back to the 1980s. The popular attitude remains as a restriction upon the “immigration choisie” procedure with regard to the level of redundancy of two populations in France, the French and the migrants.
The number of migrants (one-hundred thousand) per year validates the credibility of the immigration policy with regards to the available annual levels of stable migration in the 2000s. Also, it is approximately the same number as the estimated migratory balance (DPM, 2006) that results in contributing to the reinforcement of the legality of the “immigration choisie’s” predefined goals. The goals are to maintain the same levels of entries and function on the qualitative selection of migrants depending on the impact they will have on the French economic and social growth.

Therefore, the demographic & security factors have influenced the decision making behavior in terms of how to facilitate border control of specific immigrants, because of its direct impact on the French economy.

Thus the fact that decision making with regards to security has a tendency to predominate the current interest at the expense of long term and longer consequences of these decisions when it comes to status of migrants in France is also reflected at the Macro level of the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first to include elements related to the EU’s tasks of integration involving its security and including the formation of a common European defense policy. The Treaty placed these tasks as components of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy”. It pictured that the EU lacks military presence and abilities to become independent and operate on its own, and will demand the WEU (Western European Union) to develop and produce planned military measures on behalf of all twenty-seven EU members.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam integrated the Western European Union's "Petersburg tasks". The tasks, which were eventually merged into the European Union Treaty, rotate around several aspects in the field of peace keeping,
humanitarian and rescue, and crisis management. This placed the foundations of the treaty for the operational growth of the ESDP (Biscop, 2008).

In December 1998, at the “St Malot Summit”, French and UK leaders agreed on the need for a "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces" (Biscop, 2008).

On June 3, 1999, at the “Cologne” summit, European leaders settled a common military strategy. Their attempts to include the latent WEU into the EU was successfully achieved in November 2000 in the “Marseille” Declaration.

Amendments which reflect the operative development of the ESDP as an independent EU plan were integrated on February 1, 2003 through the Treaty of Nice. At the time, the fifteen EU state members decided formally to form a “Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) composed of 60,000 men at the European Council” (Biscop, 2008).

To initiate a step further towards European military consolidation, “The Defense Working Group of the European Convention” suggested the construction of a “European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency (EASRA)” that would fit in faster, to the existing methods of collaboration already present in the armament fields of some member states.

On April 29, 2003, during a small summit, the Leaders of Belgium, Germany, France & Luxembourg aimed at shaping a plan to discuss military alliances. However, this attempt has been perceived by the majority as an imbalanced division and spread of power that will put Europe in different growth and influential dimensions (Biscop, 2008).

The plan to reconsider the “2003 European Security Strategy (ESS)”, put ahead particularly by Nicolas Sarkozy and Carl Bildt (Swedish Foreign Minister), did not
motivate the collective interest. Whereas not everyone was persuaded that the ESS needed updating, many doubted that disrupting arguments will take place and that the European Union would end up with a more provocative than a constructive document. Thus, the principle aim of the carefully expressed mandate given to HR Javier Solana by the European Council on December 2007, was to ensure implementing the Strategy and propose amendments that may improve the process.

In 2008, the review of the European Security Strategy (ESS) generated vast ambitions towards the EU unification vision, even though it was by no means the December 2007 mandate specified to Javier Solana by the European Council. This by itself proved to be a topic of high importance to the European Council’s December 2008 meeting, especially following the Georgian crisis where the EES reflected more of a presence than a threatening force (Hughes, 2010).

Again the EU’s strategy has been very much focused on daily operations rather than long term vision and implementation plan. In addition, implementation by member states does not reflect a complete dedication to the EU global mission.

Although the dominant concepts and issues tackled in the ESS contain more about energy and climate changes, adding up some critical European Security situations to it or having minor amendments on paper is not what really counts to make a difference. It is, in fact, the practical approach and transfer of intentions into implementation and actions that will produce results and create the difference. As a confirmation, the Georgian crisis has proved that the EU strategy is more directed towards involving international players, such as Russia, by dragging them towards a multilateral decision framework and regional system. Therefore, it is essential to draw the attention at the difference between having a strategy and formulating a strategy, in order to have sufficient, independent, result-oriented vision and process.

This is a result of jumping to conclusions and judging from the EU’s actions and results. More efforts are needed to fully implement the ESS and to prove its potential (Hughes, 2010).

Hence, Solana took a more constructive action by disallowing the debate to be focused on recent European action plan. The plan can be perceived as a more positive approach by illustrating that the strategy should not only be a result of past consequences or predict short term outcomes of present situations, but also further emphasize the focus on laying the pillars and building the foundations of solid interests and principles that are aligned with long-term objectives. The following would necessitate more political bravery, in addition to effective “sub-strategies” for the ESS.

At the Global level of crisis management, European Union states were not reluctant to send and organize their armed forces, however, most of these forces are located in the Balkans, where they understandably feel a sense of duty, and in Afghanistan and, for a long time, in Iraq, and yet today their views are still diverged in the matter of Syrian intervention.

Military involvement is increasing and each mission is becoming more controversial, with self-protection as a motivational status. This returns to the fact that decision making at the security level is more focused on serving state’s nationalistic ambitions rather than a common European Security policy which is composed of diversified interests. In turn, diversified interests are not always aligned and need to be joint to promote the image of a European Security Strategy.
The majority of the EU states put their forces in defense to protect their nation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. So far, even though the EU Petersburg responsibilities officially embrace missions of aggression at the field level, at the political level, the twenty-eight European states are still enormously detached in terms of each country unifying its forces under the EU flag and having a joint army.

The young ESDP has to legitimize itself, which explains the possibility of opting for missions with a high probability of success. To a certain extent, the criticism explains that the European Union, while responding to a conflict, handles significant but frequently “less difficult” missions in the post-conflict stage. This critical perception can be definitely applied to the worldwide community. Nonetheless, one has to inquire if European members are willing to accept the implication of providing “responsibility to protect” European diplomatic support, in case it occurs in armed contexts through complex military methods that are not highlighted in the “ESS/responsibility to protect”.

The European Union has become a reference for all European countries; it has an important influence in matters related to decision making in terms of their performance and it is through the European Union that they decide whether or not an action is to be taken in a given condition, thus, EU countries have to select the most suitable organization (NATO, ESDPE, or the like) depending on the current situation. NATO’s role during the Georgian crisis, for example, was a clear evidence of that trend (Hughes, 2010).

If the EU elevates its dedication to establishing and maintaining international peace and security, the Europeans will have to handle the burden of various crises
and conflicts; that will likely affect the European Union positively as the EU leaders would prove their world leadership positions.

However, European Union member states would stretch themselves militarily if they were to provide additional troops, knowing that they have dedicated forces to each of the above mentioned entities which in turn have different objectives and serve various interests that do not at all times align with one another.

What is needed is for members to have unified aspiration and objectives that move around organizational issues, even if they are performing via ESDP, NATO, the UN, or another alliance of minor importance. The European Union must make a decision on a policy for ESDP; a ‘white book’ that will complement the strategy of the ESS (Biscop, 2008).

Similarly, several points are to be developed in sub-strategies including the number of troops that the twenty-eight European Union member states can assemble for different types of crisis and situations, and the plan to allocate forces for the proper missions thus reserving the necessities and capabilities that will ensure territorial security.

Developing an ESDP policy will necessitate methodical arguments. The European Union is clearly extremely devoted to its neighboring area, where it aims at promoting several improvements on different levels: political, economic, and social. It ought to be a main concern for ESDP if peace in the “Neighborhood” is at risk, as the cases of Georgia and Lebanon may show. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, is ESDP’s significant region of focus until today, and most probably will remain so, as only few other exterior actors show the willingness to have a say in the African crisis-management.
All twenty-eight European states should put aside national interests, join forces, and seek to develop together in order to become more capable of having a greater global influence on international relations. According to the Lisbon Treaty, a firm selection for pooling, by minimizing intra-European replications, can create greater deployable abilities inside the current combined defense financial plan, particularly in the structure of “permanent structured cooperation” (Lisbon, 2007).

4.3 Migration in France & the Cultural Factor (3rd DMF Layer)

Moving to the circle’s intermediate or linking level i.e., emotional needs or the cultural factor, we can notice this level plays a critical role in the decision making process as it challenges rational decision making and directs it towards an intuition/belief-oriented behavior.

Governmental officials in the “Ministry of Culture” gathered regularly with their corresponding person in “the Social Action Fund (FAS)” in order to explore ways that give migrants and their children opportunities to communicate their multicultural background through multiple expressive ways, for example, art (Richard, 2004).

They decided that given its importance, communication between elements of diverse cultures should be highlighted. They were seeking to depart with the incorporation form that prefers only interaction with French natives and traditional values. Moreover, they took significant steps to pass cultural guiding principles to migrants who only concentrated on components related to their ethnical and cultural origin. In general, they allowed migrants to integrate their own cultural component to French arts and fabrics. As a result, they settled the opportunity stating that supported artistic inventions can mirror the diversity within the French culture (Richard, 2004).
The fact that the integration system of the 1991 French model describes the progress mentioned earlier should be emphasized. First, it discards the process of acculturation associated with the post-colonial era. Second, it holds an initiative in alignment with the 1970’s “model of insertion” which stressed that migrants can preserve their various cultural expressions within the French civilization, linked to the strategy of returning. This is expressed as follows: “Integration is not a middle-way in between assimilation and insertion but a process where the active participation in the national society of varied and different elements is encouraged” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). The most recent description given in 2005 by the “High Council for Integration” is framed within the same structure: “Neither assimilation, nor insertion, integration refers to the participation of all French people along with French people of immigrant descent, in the public space of the national community.”

The French “model of incorporation” holds the heritage of long periods of rule-making instead of being inspired from principles that lay at the essence of the republican model. Opposite to this, rule makers came up with decisions following thoughts such as their favoring South European migrants over North Africans with the need to direct migrants coming from previous colonized territories via social simulations. However, the republican legend of nationality has been consequently brought up to give good reasons for the French “model of integration”. As a result, main divergences existed among those with a political preference to preserve the code of equality and to exert less effort in favor of recognizing diversity, and government officials who have resorted to such precise behavior when dealing with various matters connected to migration (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).
Analyzing real cases related to French cultural policies, gives the opportunity to redirect the focus on the meaning of the “French model of integration”. The model is a projection of the dilemmas faced by administrative and governmental personnel in tolerating the variety of the French culture. This debate highlights the elements related to the previous decisions regarding the integration in French culture. What is emphasized is basically past experiences and concrete examples rather than motivation instigated by a wide range of ideas. Moreover, it stresses on the importance of separating from the concept of the French “natural product” and leaning towards a more blended process of French cultural cohesion (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). The above demonstrates how assorted beliefs can play a role in the shaping of decisions, as matters related to ethnicity, culture and integration are most of the time critical topics that can influence and change the perception of a so called rational issue and a may change the results of a predefined outcome.

Thus with respect to “Immigration Choisie”, it imposes a sort of contradiction in where the selection of migrants is becoming less selective due to family allowances and at the same time crucial for the several economic needs such as labor force. This situation imposes indirectly its weight on the status of migrant’s decision making since it can not only be looked at from and economic and security perspective (workforce & border control) but has now to consider the management and inclusion of these new identities and culture into French society.

4.4 Migration in France & the Political Factor (4th DMF Layer)

In the following section, the study exposes how political elections and parties within a state feed into the 4th layer of the DMF Model.
On May 6, 2007, France elected UMP (Union pour le Movement Populaire) candidate Nicolas Sarkozy as the state President against PS (Parti Socialiste) candidate Segolene Royal. Both candidates had attempted to guarantee the reforming of French politics and considered immigration a major element in their proposal. If we are to look from the DMF Perspective, we can note that the reason behind migration being considered in their proposal is a way to mobilize the thinking process and status of these foreign identities to win the elections and be favored as parties in French society. Thus, empowering what can be identified as “self-esteem” and status in French society using speeches and reforms or drafted decisions to also engage the mass in the decision making process.

The latest elections were held amid major transformations in the French strategy and in the viewpoints related to migrants’ cultural blending.

Thus, in order to monitor the migration flux, France is measuring permanent immigrant movements by enumerating arriving migrants who are aiming to stay for more than one year; migrants who want to legalize and/or modify their residence status to permanent.

If we look at the ethnical identity and origins of the migrants to France in 2005, we will see that 70% of family immigration originated from Africa (Maghreb, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) who constituted, by themselves, more than half of family migration.

France has motivated foreign immigration to its country by trying to catch the attention of executives and highly qualified foreigners. Its strategy was to release them from several slow administrative arrival paperwork and procedures. Looking into the facts, foreigners with seniority in work experience and work status had the
privilege to start immediately or as soon as they step into the French territory without waiting for their work permits to be legitimized and available (Tanaka, 2007).

The facilities mentioned above motivated young generations to look for growth opportunities on French soil. Thus, the past ten years witnessed a massive increase in the number of foreign students from countries outside the European Economic Area (EEA).

As of 1998, the French regime has taken several measures as retention strategy to maintain the influx of youth to France. These measures included soothing financial resources and facilitating admission labor working fields. Consequently, the annual student flow grew between 1995 and 2004, before reaching a stable number in 2005 (Tanaka, 2007).

As a consequence of this retention strategy, foreign immigrants found themselves having more opportunities in the matter of labor employment than the French citizens. This has affected the social status of France between 2003 and 2005; L’Elan (2007) documents the following statistical numbers: French native citizens had an unemployment rate of 9.1 %, foreign-born French citizens had a 15.6 % rate, and non-French foreigners took a share of 26.2 %.

Linking these events to the presidential elections and how the concept of migration is being used to mobilize people’s decision making, the 2007 Presidential candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal formulated their positions in direct connection with the immigration strategy (Tanaka, 2007).

Former Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy has played an influential role in passing two significant laws that have shaped a new course for the French migration policy. The first, being “MISEFEN Law” that was approved on November 26, 2003. Its purpose was to control the immigration flux, manage the stay of foreigners in
France, and regulate the procedure to obtain citizenship. The decline in the flow of
student-migrants between 2004 and 2005 is the result of the easy entry of foreign
students coming from new European states. Since the European Union Enlargement
in 2004, France has witnessed a transformation in its students’ migratory statistics
that gained a new title known as “EU Nationals” and were no longer considered to be
distant of French citizenship. Another justification is the fact that universities
started following a “semester-based” system, which gives students the opportunity to
reside on French territories through a three to six month visa permit and study
without registering as students (l’Élan, 2007).

Sarkozy’s highest effort to turn France into a highly skilled migration country
was through “Law II” established on July 24, 2006. As it is known, the following
law was oriented towards reducing illegal immigration, restricting family migratory
integration, and promoting cultural blending in French society.

In addition to this law, in 2006, Sarkozy proposed a process that will investigate
every single detail related to the migrants and identify legal/illegal migrants. The
following process is named ELOI (which is a key term for removal or “Eloignement”
in French). Thus, bringing vital intelligence to the administrations to give a higher
impact before the 2007 elections, Sarkozy barred some legal and all unofficial
immigrants from a new social right that secures a shelter for the homeless and
immigrants with deteriorating conditions inclusive of cases such as poor workers and
single mothers.

Regardless of ELOI, Sarkozy engaged into various religious dialogues with the
Muslim community which represents the highest rates of the migrants’ religions.
Sarkozy has enrolled in what we call “Contre – Culture” or “Choc Culturel” in a
country known for its firm partition between the church and the state (Tanaka, 2007).
In addition to that, Sarkozy went through serious negotiations on strategies in order to promote and improve the integration of the migrants and their families at the socioeconomic level. This resulted out of interest in organizing a Muslim advocacy group that empowers and markets a French brand of Islam that will implicitly assemble followers and supporters to his side. As a result of this will, Sarkozy played an important role in establishing the “CFCM (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman)” in contradiction with his severe position on maintaining “la laïcité Française” known as French secularism, knowing that Sarkozy highly supports “the 1905 law” that emphasizes on having a clear separation between state and church. The law is more coherent to act in response of the evolving requirements related to the migrants who are mainly Muslims and represent the second largest foreign group in France. Therefore, Sarkozy encouraged the Muslim community to become more independent in France by promoting the grant of funds by the state and having the Mosque maintained (Tanaka, 2007).

As a final point, in contradiction with his party associates, Sarkozy would present legitimate migrants who lived on French territories for at least ten years, the right to participate and represent their public opinions by voting in municipal elections. During the 2007 election campaign, Sarkozy presented six solid principles related to immigration known as the creation of “Ministry of Immigration and National Identity” to consolidate issues related to the integration of migrants and their cohesion in a single ministry instead of having separate entities. A pre-requisite standard for migrants’ admission to emphasize on the “Welcome and Integration” contract (CAI) values thus mastering the French language before arriving in the country in order to promote and preserve the values and customs of the Republic of France was set.
An example is constricting regulations for family reunification by requiring from inhabitants to hold financial resources that are enough to supply their family without referring to the French state for support.

Another example is forbidding the re-entry of unofficial immigrants who were sent back to their countries by French authorities for a period of five consecutive years from their dismissal date.

In contrast with Sarkozy’s plans, Ségolène Royal, the candidate of the Socialist party running for presidency, and previous Vice-Minister are known to have a more flexible position on migration. She had suggested inspecting regularized submissions in a very close up case-by-case approach, based on the person’s residence period in France.

Royal’s migration strategy is different from that of Sarkozy. Sarkozy’s main focus was to encourage the “crème de la crème” known as the bright, skilled, and professional migrants and he curbed illegitimate and family migration. On the other hand, Royal has stressed on the joint link which connects immigration to development. In order to tackle the causes of French immigration, she affirmed that she will be directing her focus on methods of cultural developments, specifically aiding countries from Africa to reduce their poverty as it will, in return, contribute automatically to the growth of France’s economic status.

Royal disagreed with Sarkozy’s strategy to form a “Ministry of Immigration and National Identity”. In her opinion, migrant labor and foreign students add value to the economic status in France and never caused disturbance to the French values and identity. In order to reflect patriotism, Royal has drawn a variety of voters in the primary round, yet, she alluded to French identity when suggesting that true French
families need to be in possession of a French flag and sing La Marseillaise on the memory of revolution day or “Bastille Day”.

Because in 2005 Sarkozy referred to demonstrators in the periphery of France as “scum,” a huge number of the youth from under-privileged districts rallied to argue against the objective and agenda of his presidency. Royal, on the other hand, highlighted the inadequate rule enforcement in those areas and recommended having district policing in order to build relationships and promote trust among the police and local inhabitants (Tanaka, 2007).

To sum up, both migration and integration made it to the front of French public policy negotiations and decisions. Most of the recent governmental agencies and establishments with the “High Authority for Fighting Discrimination and for Equality”, the “National Agency for Welcoming Foreigners and for Migration”, and the “National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities” were founded during those last years to help immigrants and the under privileged to become integrated into the socioeconomic foundation of France.

What we can deduce from this study is that state’s behaviors are closely linked to individual behavior (as per Maslow’s hierarchy) when it comes to interest, yet it is the decision making structure that varies between a player and another depending on the situation. Thus, based on the state’s need and interest in every layer of the DMF, the state’s perception is formed while deciding on a certain outcome knowing that the perception of decision makers is of high importance to these factors because it will have an important imprint in studying a particular issue mostly when other parties with different interests and perception are involved. Therefore, when it comes to the EU, the motivational interest between a state and another differs highly making it very critical and challenging for all member states to discard their current
status quo regarding national interest, and able to align their motivational level of interest to form a strong EU Political framework and centralized decision making regulations impacting both the internal and external European Relations.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

The debate on EU decision making and foreign policy shows that different factors and facts of history have produced continuous changes in procedures and processes leaving decision making and foreign policy formation indecisive.

In conclusion of this thesis, we look at the different factors that affect decision making behavior to state that France is an example that illustrates the probability of having the remaining twenty-eight states show a similar behavior demonstrating that nationalistic interests dominate European interests.

Having assessed the decision making process, we deduce that states’ decision making behavior in the “selection and implementation” parts of the process (previously outlined in Chapter 2), applies to the interests of the member states and those of the European Union.

Having looked at how the need of a state on a macro level can be identical to the need of an individual, we can elaborate the study further by observing a group of individual / group of states’ behavior. Assuming that the European Union operates as a team, we can see that there are clear symptoms that indicate the team’s failure in fulfilling the desired goals and objectives.

In order to achieve a certain target, it is important that the team members have a common and a unanimous goal with all parties’ consensus and the will to dedicate their time and resources to achieve this goal.

Also important, is for the team needs to have several alternatives that outline the process of reaching the goal and to have a structure that defines the policies and procedures that are required to achieve the desired results.
Another essential mater to consider is the data and resources that are made available to the team, and then how data interpretation takes place. Furthermore, one has to understand the perception of each party and highlight their interests and line of thoughts.

A good relationship and trust among team members boosts chances of success in this endeavor. In politics, these elements are substituted by interests, so even when the common goal is established, personal interests are always emphasized and often inhibit teams’ attempts of realizing the end goal.

The team members’ relationship needs to be concomitant with cross-functional work that takes a collectivist and autonomous approach. However, we are not to forget that the leadership of the team and its decisiveness, influence, delegation of tasks, and, most importantly the level of motivation that the members have are part and parcel of the whole work cycle and directly affect the target.

Observing the current status of Europe, we may say that the EU integration process is facing some challenges. The recent Economic crisis may be announcing a possible important failure to come. The root cause lies within the fragile commitment of the European team members that will result in various clashes of various viewpoints on the direction that Europe needs to take as a consequence of the crisis.

Pierre Jouyet who has a positive overview on how things may unfold, has mentioned that ironically a Political Europe will be imposed by the financial markets. On the other hand, the Eruseptic Jaques Mayard predicts a more catastrophic result stating that the 20th century is diseased by the desire to build systems that allows us

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8 “Jean-Pierre Jouyet is chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Aspen Institute France. Before being appointed as Chairman of the Autorités des marchés financiers (the French securities regulator) in December 2008, Jean-Pierre Jouyet was Minister of State responsible for European Affairs (2007-2008). In this function, he was responsible for the preparation of the French presidency of the European Union.”
to evade integrating reality; this desire, however, according to Mayard will not be fulfilled and the European leaders will only be buying time. The Euro will need to let the European economies converge, since the markets are implying a devaluation of the economically badly managed countries that lost their competitive advantage in relation to Germany, thinking that they were protected by the Euro (Mayard, 2011).

This gives us a better understanding of the composition of the EU as a team and that it has more focus towards behaviors related to developing, researching, innovating, and promoting functions rather than the organizing, producing and inspecting functions. The above statement returns to the fact that parties involved in the EU decision making process and foreign policy have successfully managed to create the idea and set the prototype for the state of Europa, but have had a harder time setting meaningful objectives and deadlines for achieving certain key aspects of the EU integration process. This has led towards an imbalance in European working resulting in several drawbacks, one of them illustrated in the economic choc that took place in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, and others). Thus, as described in Chapter 2, what can help consolidate the EU is the link between policy makers and those who implement the decisions on the ground.

However, Paris and Berlin have a strong interest in preserving the Euro, knowing that they are historically the main founders of the European agreement, and currently seeking a boost to address the current economic crisis. France has much to risk as it has been seeking to spread its influence within the EU for the past 60 years, and with this crisis, it is in a dual position with its neighboring member states known as “Latin Europe” which involves, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and its primary partner Germany. Germany has a lot to risk too. As an independent power in the heart of Europe, Germany realizes that it cannot detach itself from the neighboring countries;
its dilemma is carrying the financial burden on the one hand, and imposing certain restrictions and regulations on the Union on the other. The recent plan has proved that even with the material and existential needs being met, when there is an absence of motivation and movement in the upper layer of the hierarchy, the states and the teams will collapse. Therefore, the Greek economic crisis has led the entire zone into a gloomy phase. As a result of the chaos, Germany will enforce a right to intervene on the funds and managements of budgets of the other European countries. In that case, EU’s internal gap and dissatisfaction between the Latin Europe and Germany will increase since it made the euro zone lose its competitive edge. If we are to interpret from the DMF angle, we can see that one of the major reasons that the EU was not able to really rally itself as one bloc, is the fact that at the macro level it is still fragile at the economic level and has to work on empowering its economic base to be more solid in growing successfully through the Malsow hierarchy and become more influential at the “Foreign Policy” level.

The crisis caused by Greece reopened the room for debate and reflection over the politics of Europe due to a transfer of sovereignty to the EC (European Council), mainly during the elections where the budgeting is monitored. Though the current procedures are suffering democratic legitimacy, decisions are taken by unanimity by the euro zone leaders and ratified by the national parliaments. However, France is arguing that instead of having a European big cop, a more tactical approach is to have a decision making process that takes place on an independent level within the countries themselves and that promotes integration, rules, and strict and directive budget constraints in every national European member country.

With this split and divergence between the main leaders of the European team, the EC (European Commission) looked powerless. In fact, the EC has already been
weakened by the 2007 Lisbon treaty which decentralized decision making and enabled a high degree of intervention by the national states thus giving EC a minor role in the process. The EC has also been weakened by the reputation of being inefficient and incapable of handling and controlling situations. For example, today Since Brussels has not been able to assert itself in the international policy arena, internal European discrepancies and differences have become more visible.

At the end of September 2011, politicians in Strasbourg had an attacking position to claim the following: “Some intergovernmental institutions attempts and tendencies are trying to lead the European Union, the union that we want”, and still missed the opportunity to rally themself to the European Parliament in order to counterbalance the weight of the national states. As a consequence, some euro deputies were agitated and threatened of encountering the president of the EC to accuse him of being detached and disrespectful towards the communitarian principles (Smolar, 2011).

The above discussion shows how various needs of different states within the EU create an imbalance in Maslow’s pyramid of Motivation. Each of the states has its own motivation and therefore creates a wide gap between the Union members. Moreover, some member states want to jump to the level of self-management even before consolidating and having a solid leadership set at the European level. In short, as the examples and facts prove few of the components that help a team succeed (defined above) are seen as present to help the Union strengthen its decision making processes.

In addition, when it comes to the decision making models defined by Allison, the EU Proves to be close to the Bureaucratic decision making model, where there is wide room to discuss and debate perceptions, and have a collectivist approach in
making decisions. Though, in contrast, when it comes to every state within the EU its
tendency leans more towards RAM decision making, being focused in a scientific
thinking on the calculation of the direct state interests making it not very compatible
to have these discrepancies in approaches between national member states and
European states.

Furthermore, as we noticed, the decision making behavior in the EU is
decentralized and fragmented. Its fragmentation can be categorized into three
directions:

1. Multiple players are involved in the decisions making process of every single
   issue. Therefore, the central unity is absent at all times. Also, the players
   involved have different centers of power: European Institutions, European
   Parliament, European Commission, and European Member States.

2. East Europe, Central Europe, Latin Europe, and other zones are divided.
   These zones, suffered imbalances, historical differences, and economic
   conditions that inhibit the standards of the European Union to be met. If
   these standards are met, they are not easy to sustain.

3. Two key players, France and Germany have shown an incline for hegemony.
   With London applying Hobbs’s perspective of “rule of the jungle” where the
   strongest has more power and influence over the other parties concerned.
   Furthermore, Maslow’s hierarchy becomes limited to only the physiological
   and security needs level, making the remaining motivational layers fragile
   desires.

Therefore, a new dimension to look at with regards to decision making is related
to the Psychology of state leaders, where we identify how the needs of each
European state are satisfied and how the discrepancies are removed. In addition to
psychological leadership which measures the behavior of the leaders in particular situations and how they affect the current trend of the EU, it is important to focus on political perceptions and influences, and on what triggers their reactions and their political behaviors, especially during the election period.

The European Union is forced to decide on the option of moving forward. As mentioned previously, it cannot go back and surrender to the economic crisis, or create a domino effect that makes the union collapse. Instead, it should benefit from what has happened to learn and develop new strategies on how it can better align its interests and positions to continue to grow into a strong, economic, cultural, and political bloc, because as demonstrated in the French case study with regards to the practicality of the DMF Model, we can conclude that “immigration choisie” which emerged from an economical need to select the types of migrants based on workforce demand of specific expertise and later on grew through Maslow hierarchy / DMF model to contribute in decisions related to security such as border control, then cultural such as integration in French society to reach an influential role in the state / self-esteem level where migrants are included in matters related to public decisions and decision making at the French “political level”. These would extend to the contribution of France at the EU level and in decisions related to subjects like the EUROMED policy and cultural exchange.
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