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Intervention in Libya:
A Case of Political Realism?

By

Joseph Kanaan

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Student Name: Joseph Kanaan  I.D. #: 200301621
Thesis Title: Intervention in Libya: A Case of Political Realism
Program / Department: International Affairs / Social Sciences
School: Arts and Sciences

Approved by:

Thesis Advisor: Imad Salamey
Committee Member: Sami Barone
Committee Member: Khalil Gebara
Date: 10 June 2014
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Intervention in Libya:
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Abstract

This thesis describes the new approach to the Arab Uprising through the case of Libya and the international intervention that had taken place. It entertains competing propositions and implements a rational choice analysis approach to analyze decisions of key actors, namely France and the US in their rapprochement towards military interventionism. It examines the idealist v/s realist theses regarding the nature of interventionism in Libya through the lens of Carnegie’s commission on preventing Deadly Conflict. Evidence points to a growing interventionism prescribed by United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that breaches state sovereignty while serving the interests of major powers through humanitarian pretexts. The thesis draws the conclusion that although the intervention in Libya is of a humanitarian face, critical power motives can be revealed through the lens of Realpolitik.

Keywords: Libya, Idealism, Realpolitik, Responsibility to Protect, Intervention
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Am</td>
<td>Pan American World Airways</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSO</td>
<td>ExxonMobil</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>International Peace Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIA</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTA</td>
<td>Union de Transports Aériens</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction

The year 2011 was a year in which the Arab World revolted, where demonstrations and protests took place in more than one Arab country, these protests forever changed the political landscapes of the region. The succession of protests that took place across the Arab world has become known as the “Arab Spring” or “Arab Uprisings”. The demonstrations started to call for a more democratic and just system where demonstrators filled the streets in an attempt to force those in power to step down and let the people start ruling thus giving way to the will of the people. It all began on December 17, 2010, 26 year old when Mohammad Bou Azizi set himself on fire in front of a government building in Tunisia. His act of desperation resonated with many fellow Tunisians and protests started appearing around the country forcing the 23 year rule of Ben Ali to come to an end and the holding of free elections to take place. The downfall of Ben Ali happened within a month of Mohammad Bou Azizi setting himself on fire. To date, the uprisings have caused the stepping down of rulers from Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Although most of the countries were filled with protests that tried to show civil resistance through campaigns, rallies, strikes and demonstration while using social media as a tool; however each country had its own conditions and factors that intermingled and played a role and which swung the revolution in its own path. Going forward one needs to understand how and why it happened. According to Lisa Anderson (2011) “in Tunisia, protesters escalated calls for the restoration of the
country’s suspended constitution. Meanwhile, Egyptians rose in revolt as strikes across the country brought daily life to a halt and toppled the government. In Libya, provincial leaders worked feverishly to strengthen their newly independent republic.” Therefore the patterns and the ways of the protest were different. The demonstration in Tunisia, the first of the countries to begin a movement, started in the countryside areas and spiraled towards the capital, finding common cause with a once powerful but much repressed labor movement whereas in Libya the demonstrations started from the repressed tribes.

1.1 Libya under the rule of Muammar Qaddafi

Muammar Qaddafi seized power in Libya in a bloodless military coup on September 1, 1969, replacing the ruling Sansui Monarchy. Qaddafi assumed a key position in the Revolutionary Command Council, and his powers gradually changed from being a revolutionary leader to becoming an authoritarian autocrat. Qaddafi consolidated his power by capitalizing on the nation’s oil reserves, and propagandized his revolutionary and social philosophy through the dissemination of his Green Book which he published in 3 volumes (Liolos, 2012). In 1969, and upon taking power, Qaddafi established the “Jamahiriya” (“state of the masses”) and declared the Libyan regime as that. The “Jamahiriya” is a personal creation of Qaddafi where Qaddafi based the regime that governed the country on himself only (Al- Qaddafi, M.). Studying Libya’s political regime can’t be feasible without passing through 42 years of Qaddafi’s leadership. Inspired by both the nationalist and socialist parties, Qaddafi published in 1976 the major book for Libya in that arena. The “Green Book” was created by Qaddafi stating out his own way of ruling and thinking. He described it as: “his own odd,
utopian philosophy of governance, thus his political system meant the direct rule of the masses, an ultimate democracy, or a “collective of republics” comprising people’s congress at the local and national level and in which the entire economy would be nationalized.” The “Jamahiriya” is governed by the “Green Book”, which is written in seven installments and published by Qaddafi as the rule of the nation. Although the formal institutions appear to be democratic and modern, it is usually not the case. Qaddafi’s ideas in making up his state and institutions are borrowed from great thinkers ranging from Plato to Mao as well as Prophet Mohammad and Nasser of Egypt. The institutions therefore include representatives that are elected, grass roots organizations, ministers, army, police, and bureaucracies where all formal political activity is to be conducted within a people’s Congress. The representatives of the formal institutions meet to develop and approve all politics. In his “Green Book”, however, Qaddafi stated that: “representation is fraud and that no formal political representation is to be allowed”. If within the “Jamahiriya” there is to be any attempt to establish political parties or to debate any points of view that are different to the point of view of the regime itself, it is to be considered as treason.

According to Paoletti (2011), there are “four overlapping power structures account for Libya’s endemic statelessness: Qaddafi and his family members; Qaddafi’s inner circle; the tribal system; and the formal structure of the state of the masses”. (p.315) This in itself tells us a lot about Qaddafi’s stated of the masses philosophy and the contradictions within.

Anderson (2006) believes that the publication of his philosophy allowed Qaddafi to, begin to implement its Utopian provisions, outlawing rental property, wage labor
and retail trade, and ensuring a house, car and other essentials for all Libyan families; “the combination of high oil prices and the Green Book's pre capitalist economics conspired to produce a unique political, economic and social system dubbed the Jamahiriyya, or "state of the masses," by its author” (p. 42). With his control solidified, Qaddafi ruled Libya continuously from 1969 until his overthrow and death in 2011.

The CIA fact book estimates the population of Libya to be around 5.6 million (July 2012 estimate) with a majority of Berber and Arab population forming around 97% and 3% other ethnic groups. Tribalism is still a huge part of the Libyan make where there are around 140 tribal networks in the country. Although Libya has an abundance of oil revenues, much of the Libyan population is poor. Corruption is rampant and people are brutally suppressed. According to Anderson (2011), “Libyans’ trust in their government and in one another eroded and they took refuge in the solace of tribe and family. Libyan society had been fractured and every national institution, including the military, is divided by cleavages of kinship and region” (p. 6).

Looking at Libya from an international perspective, it can be said that since the start of the Qaddafi regime, the relationship between Libya and the West has undergone many changes and have varied widely. Towards the end of the Kingdom of Libya, according to Maessen (2012), the United States had close relations with the country : “the Wheelus Air Force base, located in Libya, was a vital link in the US’ military strategy for the region, furthermore US oil companies, such as ESSO, made considerable profits through the exploitation of Libyan oil” (Maessen 2012, p. 15) . After the 1969 coup d’état, the relationship with the West steadily declined. There are many reasons that can be accounted for to explain the decline of the relationship
between Libya and the West, the most prominent of which is Qaddafi’s nationalization of the country’s resources in 1970s as well as his support for international terrorism, the increasing political and military alignment with the Soviet Union and his support of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. According to Kinsman (2011), “any internationally disruptive cause won Qaddafi’s favor – and finance and weapons from his oil wealth”... “he grew a kind of natural notoriety and the boost he gave to dictators”... “Supporting terrorism came naturally – Black September, the Red Army Faction and the IRA” (p. 83). When in 1979, the Libyan authorities did not protect the US embassy from being attacked by students during the Iranian hostage crisis, president Reagan believed that the Libyan regime had taken sides with Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and therefore started to systematically increase “diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on Libya” (as cited in Maessen, 2012, p. 16). In 1983, the US tried to assassinate Qaddafi and upon failing to do so continued to bomb Libyan centers in Benghazi and Tripoli in 1986. This led to an increase in the deteriorating situation and resulted in having the Libyan regime retaliate on December 21, 1988, with the ‘Lockerbie Bombing’ of Pan-Am flight 103 and with the exploding of a French UTA plane in 1989.

As a response to the terrorist attacks on the planes, France, The United Kingdom and the United States demanded that the Libyan regime extradite the suspects but to no avail causing the United Nations Security Council to pass resolution 748 in March 1992, imposing multidimensional sanctions on Libya further isolating Libya internationally.(UN SC Resolution 748, 1992). In April 1999, almost a decade later,
Libya finally agreed to extradite the two suspects allowing them to be judged under Scottish law in The Hague.

The Libyan decision to finally extradite the suspects of the Pan-Am Flight 103 bombing, was seen by many members of the international community “as a major turning point in Libya's relations with the rest of the world” (as cited in Maessen 2012, p. 16). In the years that followed, Qaddafi had a major change in his foreign policy particularly in his condemnation of the 9/11 attaches and showing sympathy to the victims. Qaddafi started to respond and work with the West in their “war on terror” and in 2003 and 2004 agreed to have Libya take responsibility for the bombings on the Pan-Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 to the extent that he agreed to pay the sum of $2.7 billion and $170 million to compensate the victims’ families.

Moreover according to Maessen (2012), in December 2003, Libya proclaimed that it had decided on its ‘own free will’ to abandon all unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons eventually leading to the removal of American bilateral sanctions and the removal of Libya from the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism.

Therefore, by the time of the crisis in Libya, it seems as if Libya had regained its positive relationship with the West with political relations normalized and oil exports from Libya on the rise.

1.2 The Factors that played a role in the Uprising in Libya

As mentioned earlier, the tribes of Libya played a role in Qaddafi’s political system. It is worth taking time to see how the tribes themselves played a role in the
uprising especially in a country like Libya where demographic diversity doesn’t play a huge role and where religious segregation does not affect the political system of the country. Tribes and their identity do have a role. Libya is considered to be a large country were most of this society is homogenously compatible i.e. they are Sunni Muslim. Libya consists of other minorities such as “Berbers 5%, Africans 3% and Tuareg 1 %” (Najm. 2008). As pointed out before, Libya in itself is a weak state with a powerful leadership and therefore it is important to note that if Qaddafi were not in power, looking at the tribes would not have been as important. In order to stay in power, Qaddafi understood the important nature of the tribes and in controlling them.

According to Khallen Collins (2004), a researcher in political studies, when trying to define the Libyan case “clans or tribes become increasingly important politically within weakening states.” An important characteristic of tribes is their loyalty and their main objective has more to do with the building of their own society and networking (Collins, 2004). Therefore, Qaddafi tried to link his own tribe to the major tribes in the country and as mentioned before he allowed them to play a huge role in many sectors including economic, military and political.

Furthermore, Qaddafi established “social people’s leadership” which is mainly based on the tribes and their networks. This was one of the major tactics that Qaddafi tried to play in order to control any movements. The tribes in Libya were empowered by the regime itself to solve their conflicts and help build their own society. In doing so, Qaddafi wanted to show that he was not an authoritarian ruler since an authoritarian ruler would not try to jump to any institutional approaches; however although his empowerment was to show democracy or the will of the people, it was in reality one of
the strategies he used to remain in power and control. Tribes were therefore, the major actors in the political system that Qaddafi used as a fence for his regime.

Moreover Qaddafi’s appearance in his tents with his advisors (the men of the tent) and not in normal palaces as other regime leaders, gave him a point of attraction in the whole words. (Anderson, 1990.) The main power of government took place mainly in the presidential tents that are mainly composed of Qaddafi himself, his advisors, his trusted confidents, comprising member of the Qaddafi family and his tribe. This network mainly determined Libya’s fate, power and strategy on different levels, i.e. military, economy, and political.

“The revolutionary committees’ movements” is another of Qaddafi’s committees appointed to ensure his maintenance of power. Historically these committees were created in the 1970s after the revolution and their major role is to be a “safeguard” for the revolution. Their main objective is therefore to spread the regime ideology by mobilizing people and creating loyalists for the regime. Those committees are directly linked to Qaddafi giving him absolute authority and hindering the establishment of institutions.

To meet their objectives and mission, the revolutionary committees established their own media and press room in their own regions and areas. Furthermore, these committees had another role to oppress all movements against the regime. They can arrest students, protestors, and any person whom they believe is disloyal to the regime. Even in some cases they have to power after consulting with Qaddafi to execute people whom are believed to be opponents to the regime. Basically these committees were
essential tools for Qaddafi’s regime and mainly they played a critical part in ensuring its continuation.

1.2.1 Libyan oil and outside interference

Qaddafi ensured that he kept his power intact by capitalizing on the nation’s oil reserves, and propagandized his revolutionary and social philosophy through the dissemination of his *Green Book* which he published in 3 volumes (Liolos, 2012). According to Anderson (2006) “the combination of high oil prices and the Green Book's pre capitalist economics conspired to produce a unique political, economic and social system dubbed the jamahiriyya, or "state of the masses," by its author” (p. 42). Although Libya has a large amount of oil revenues, much of the Libyan population is poor.

Although Qaddafi used those oil revenues to finance some improvements in public services, further to some investment at the infrastructure level in order to promote some development and “outright repression in the name of revolutionary unity.” The Libyan citizens still believed and proclaimed that a huge part of the oil revenues was allocated to finance Qaddafi’s dream and “adventures” outside the “Jamahiriya” and have not any benefits to the society. Being part of the OPEC Libya played an instrumental role on the oil price. Thus, at the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973 Qaddafi used oil production as a weapon towards the western county. (Calhoun.2012).

The conflict in Libya while being one in which the Libyan people are leading the uprising, had the backing of the international community where the UN Security Council issued resolution 1973 allowing a no-fly zone and military interference in the
conflict, less than a month after it started. Etzioni (2012) questioned the military interference which had its main argument according to the international community be as one that was strictly humanitarian and was don’t in order to prevent Qaddafi from his threat against the rebels. Yet this was not the only goal. According to Etzioni (2012) the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a change in regime which was seen as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal as well as to fulfill the imperial project in both North and West Africa. To understand this concept better we must therefore look at the strategic position that Libya plays in this project. Libya occupies a strategic position since it is located on the North African coast that is very important to defend European borders from African immigration. Another factor to look at is an economic factor based on oil and energy demands which is an important dimension to address. Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer and the third largest in Africa. It also has the largest oil reserves in Africa (and significant natural gas reserves). It is important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is also the center of oil production and refining. Bush et al (2011) state that the “opposition in Benghazi offered Washington the opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to install a Tripoli government that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the opening of Libya’s oil and gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically crucial part of Africa” (p.360).

1.2.2 Education and Economic Opportunities:

As mentioned before, there are many different factors and instabilities that had infiltrated the Arab regimes, bringing rise to the uprising. Basing ourselves on The Economist’s report published in 2011, these factors include “years in power of the
incumbent; size of the youth population cohort; democracy, corruption press freedom, and GDP per capita as a summary measure of economic performance.” Moreover, we have to take into consideration that any protest or movement that can play a role in bringing about political change or the rise of a new regime is usually due to other factors that can be combined with the economic challenges. These factors include for example, youth improvement, and social media and of course education or schooling. For instance, some scholars studied the empirical relationship between education and high standard of schooling and political participation. In their study published in 2012, Sondheimer and Green demonstrated the correlation between those two variables and the influence of this major player in the political movement, i.e. education. Their argument was based on the assumption that for nations to improve and for democratization to occur, an improvement in the quality of education and the availability of schooling must take place. On the macro level, this would mean that the higher the person is educated, the greater is his/her response and involvement in political activities. Political activities in this case would vary from participating in elections, demanding public reforms or even taking part in political movements such as demonstrations. This assumption was scientifically proven by a research done and published in 1995 by Putnam in which he justified that the level of educations is “the best individual –level predictor of political participation.” Furthermore, one has to also consider that economic development and improvement in the level of education will also become a threat to any authoritarian regime. This is also reflected in Huntington’s discourse published in 1968 which asserts that: “the higher the level of education of the unemployed… the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results.”
The quality of Education and the level of schooling have been major factors that have been improved in the last decades in the Arab region. We would therefore like to talk a little about this improvement in education and schooling opportunities that happened in the Arab region. In 2011, Robert Barro and Jong Lee published a study entitled “A new Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World” in which they provided quantitative information about the Arab countries and the level of education. The study reflects an analysis of 146 countries not only in the Arab world but also in Europe and Asia. The main distinguishing factor of this publication is that it calculated the average of total years schooling in the population above the age of 15 years old. In that regard, if we look at the level of education in Libya for example, we would see that as a country it had in 1980 a 3.26 percent increase in schooling reaching in 2010 a total of 7.85 percent with an average yearly increase in schooling of around 4.59 percent. Strangely enough is the fact that Libya preceded France in that ranking as well as Spain which had a 4.22 percent of increase. In that same regard, even Tunisia presented an increase in its educational attainment however was not as high as that of Libya scoring a 4.07 percent increase in years of schooling. Looking at the numbers and percentages presented, we can argue that the development of the education level of the Arab states has mainly targeted the new sector called “poor labor market prospects”. This development influenced in a way the trajectory of the movements or protest. It can be seen as a sign of political instability that may have emerged in any of Libya or Tunis as a result of the increase in schooling and educational attainment, thus proving that there is a correlation between one’s education and their involvement in the political life. Furthermore when analyzing the increase in the level of schooling and education in the
Arab region vis-à-vis the labor market, one can easily deduce that this increase in schooling presented a real dilemma at the level of the labor market which is normally weak. Laborers who have become educated and skilled people wanting to join the work force and enter the labor marked only to realize the reality of the situation where the labor market is weak, making it difficult for them to be part of it. Employment therefore becomes a major need in their life and in they would start looking for ways to tap the market which causes political instability. Here the major question would be asked: “why is it that a large expansion in schooling coupled with weak prospects for the workforce opens the door to political instability?” The major instruments that education provides the new generation with is learning, giving them the skills to analyze, research and problem solve. Thus they start to learn about their political system and researching the political system of other countries that are more developed and are able to offer their citizens good prospects in the labor force and high economy. This allows them to question, and aspire to be more like these countries. In the late 1980s, a huge part of the population in the Arab world was below the normal norm of education. This allowed the thriving of Arab regimes where the political leaders can be considered to be ideal. They are considered to be the only educated person and of course the most knowledgeable ruler. However as the population started to become more educated and the field of education and schooling developed, the middle lower class of society have been given the opportunity to better understand their regime and the “mechanism” of the state. This may lead to an interpretation that “in the absence of democratic mechanisms for regime change, the societal pressures that had been building up in the Middle East against incumbents were pent up and eventually found expression in
popular outburst of protest.” (Chor, 2012) Having said that, this motive toward political involvements in the youth sector and a view of an absence democracy may lead to a shift toward protests in which it starts in a peaceful way. In that direction a simple hypothesis may be concluded namely that economic pressure may lead to employment gaps in the process of an education improvement and schooling increase will determine an uprising or any regime change under other terminologies.

Initial protests in Libya started in mid-January however quickly turned violent. According to Bellamy & Williams (2011), this was partly because of the regime’s suppression and partly because of the establishment of an armed opposition group under the Interim Transitional National Council (TNC). Anti-government protests started in Libya on February 15, 2011 after the government had arrested a human rights activist. It escalated after the funeral of one of the victims that fell in the protest. Within 3 days, the opposition movement controlled most of Benghazi which is considered to be the second largest city in Libya. On February 20, protests spread into Tripoli despite warning from Saif Al Islam Qaddafi, Muammar Al Qaddafi’s son that the country can fall into a civil war. The Libyan protests started out peacefully however Qaddafi violently opposed them. Qaddafi’s army clashed with the opposition leading to battles which left thousands of people dead and brought about international condemnation. The opposition forces set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel Qaddafi’s rule however despite their initial success, the government forces were able to regain control over much of the Mediterranean coast. Furthermore, Qaddafi was heard speaking on a radio show where he vowed “We will come house by house, room by room…. We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity” (as cited
in Bilefsky & Landler, 2011). Qaddafi, in an interview with ABC (Australia) also told the world that “officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches” and “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed” (as cited in Ballany & Williams, 2011, p. 838). This resulted in the resignation of a large number of Libyan officials and diplomats one of whom is the Libyan Ambassador to the United States Mr. Ali Aljuali.

The Libyan opposition requested that the International community stand up and take action asking for a no-fly zone and immediate assistance. On the 22nd of February, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on the Libyan authorities to end the violence against the demonstrators which he believed may amount to ‘crimes against humanity’. On February 25, 2011; Libya’s UN Ambassador Mohammad Shalgham spoke against Qaddafi who he had previously considered a friend. According to Powell (2012), Shalgham explained that while he initially “could not believe” that Qaddafi’s troops were firing on the protesters, he had then actually seen Qaddafi call for the protests to be put down by force. Shalgham was therefore urging that the United Nations impose sanctions. Justifying his change of heart, he noted that those in the opposition “are asking for their freedom” and “are asking for their rights.” At a Security Council session in which his own deputy wept, Shalgham pointed out that initially the opposition “did not throw a single stone and they were killed,” and then stated, “I tell my brother Qaddafi: Leave the Libyans alone.” Shalgham said that the United Nations must intervene by imposing sanctions against Qaddafi, members of his family, and the military (p. 311). A day later, on the 26th of February, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 which imposed sanctions on
Libya that includes an arms embargo, travel ban, and an asset freeze in addition to appointing the International Criminal Court to look into the Libyan situation. At this point the UN however did not authorize the use of force; however what Resolution 1970 did, was it led to the issuing of a number of critical statements from key regional and multilateral organizations echoing the need to end the conflict in Libya. Russia on the other hand argued that the settlement of the conflict in Libya can only be done through political means. In a public statement, Russia confirmed that “… that is the purpose of the resolution… which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures with regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However, it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could make the situation worse” (as cited in Bellany & Williams, 2011, p. 840). It is thought that China, India, and Brazil shared that same view at the time which made it difficult to adopt more forceful measures.

In a Statement by NATO’s Secretary General, he urged the Libyan authorities to halt the repression of its people. The European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, delivered a declaration that condemned the violence in Libya and the hundreds of civilian deaths. The African Union supported the Libyan people and declared that their aspirations for freedom, democracy, peace and justice are legitimate while the Gulf Cooperation Council demanded that the Security Council take extreme measures to end the violence taking place in Libya asking for a no-fly zone. According to Powell (2012), it was the call of the Arab League that “turned the tide” in their statement that:
called on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States[.].” (as cited in Powell, 2012, p312).

The Arab League’s statement asserted that the League would cooperate with the Transitional National Council of Libya that represented the Libyan opposition. This was a drastic change in the way the League did things as it was the first time that it has ever sided with one regime over the other nor has it ever invited military intervention to protect the civilians of an Arab Country.

Following the Arab League’s statement and call, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted a Security Council resolution 1973 to authorize a no-fly zone over Libya and to take all necessary steps needed to protect the civilians. Following the resolution on March 19, 2011 international intervention mainly from France, the United States and the United Kingdom took place to support the opposition against Qaddafi forces. To support the efforts by France, the US and the UK, a coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East joined the intervention aiding the opposition to capture tens of towns across the coast of Libya where most however were recaptured by the government. Bitter fighting continued across the country mainly in the west until finally in late August 2011, the opposition fighters were able to capture Tripoli marking the end of Qaddafi’s 42 years in power. Qaddafi however, was not yet
ready to admit defeat and regrouped his governmental institutions to Sirte which he declared to be Libya’s new capital. On October 20, 2011 fighters were able to take over Sirte and kill Qaddafi in the process.

Without the massive support and military intervention in Libya by the international community, the Libyan people would not have been able to succeed in their uprising and be able to end the ruling of Qaddafi. According to Hasler (2012), “the international intervention, based on United Nations (UN) Resolution 19736, happened after an extraordinarily fast decision-making process. Humanitarian reasons were the decisive arguments of the participating nations and NATO for intervention.”

1.3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In their article “Humanitarian Imperialism” Bush et al (2011) state that the UN intervention in Libya specifically Council Resolution 1973, called for a cease fire in Libya as part of the 2005 UN World Summit which claimed that the international community has a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) civilians.

The 2011 intervention in Libya is the first time ever that the United Nations Security Council has implemented the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle thus transforming the international law’s approach to sovereignty and protection of civilians from a basic right to a responsibility. This intervention was motivated by a huge Libyan mass movement which in turn led the international community and the Security Council to act and protect the people of Libya from Qaddafi’s threat to “slaughter” his own people. R2P assumes that states have the main responsibility to protecting its people while the international community only has a minor responsibility to protect mainly
preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Using military intervention based on R2P is usually as last resort where all other measures must have failed. Powell (2012) asserts that it was the Libyan people through their opposition movement who have demanded the Security Council’s intervention to bring about effective civilian protection.

According to R2P, each state has primary responsibility to protect its own inhabitants, but when a state is not willing or able to meet its own responsibility to protect, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be (as cited in Powell, 2012, p. 299)

Therefore the ceasefire in Libya was called for to bring an ‘end to the current attacks against civilians’, which might constitute ‘crimes against humanity’. Bush et al (2011) question the resolution, however, by stating that “R2P was used in the Libyan case as a pre-emptive rationale for intervention to prevent greater loss of civilian life after some had died in state violence, while in Syria thousands of civilians have actually been slain by security forces and repression in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has reinforced state power against demonstrators calling for political reform” (p. 358). The question here mainly is why is it that the R2P was used only in the Libyan case?

According to the Executive Summary of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), there are two approaches that can be used to prevent violence:
the operational prevention which is used in the face of immediate crisis and structural prevention which is used to make sure that there is no conflict that will arise in the first place or if it has arisen that it would not recur. In the case of the Libyan conflict, ending it was the main concern of the international community.

The idea of “responsibility to protect” comes as a result of the 2005 UN summit in New York. As mentioned before, its main goal is to protect civil populations from: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If any of the principles are being violated, the UN is empowered to take collective action to save civilians. http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/fact_sheet.pdf (accessed May 8, 2013).

1.4 Why R2P in Libya?

If we are to compare the international intervention in Libya with the treatment of the different conflicts elsewhere particularly with the treatment of the conflict in Syria, the response of the global community was unique and surprising. The revolution and the suppression/attack of the Libyan people by Qaddafi’s troops was only in its 32nd day when the international community took action and authorized a military intervention; however, the revolt in Syria has been taking place since March 15, 2011 and as of yet no international military intervention has taken place after over 2 years on the start of the revolution. If we are to look at this from the perspective of a purely humanitarian intervention that the international response in the two conflicts can be thought of as inexplicable and wrong especially since the movement in Syria is looking
for very similar demands as that in Libya – namely the need for more democracy, a higher standard of living and a better standard of life.

There are many different opinions and speculations as to why a military intervention in Libya has taken place where as it almost impossible to happen in Syria. However one of the most prevalent arguments as to why there has been a distinction in both cases and therefore a difference in the responses according to Hasler (2012) is mainly due to 2 events: “the publicly launched threats against the protestors of Qaddafi for the Libyan case, and the two-time Chinese and Russian rejection of any resolutions at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the Syrian case.”

The key question that this paper is trying to address is why have international forces interfered in the Libyan uprising? Why did the UN authorize a military intervention in Libya which is something that is unprecedented since its inception? What was the main purpose behind such interference and does it really fall under the reality of a humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to protect, or is there something else? According to Kinsman (2011) “the UN ordered international military action against a member state to prevent an expected massacre of civilians within its borders, rather than after a mass atrocity had occurred” (p.82). Yet if one is to look at the statement and claim from another angle, one can only ask why has this intervention taken place in Libya and not in Syria which is undergoing not only an uprising but also a start of what can be called a civil war within the country itself with hundreds of thousands of Syrians dead, internally displaced or forced out of the country altogether.
It is true that there have been grave human right violations in Libya and thus one can argue that the intervention in Libya falls under a “humanitarian intervention" and "responsibility to protect,” driven mainly by humanitarian concerns over vulnerable populations subject to genocidal campaign; however arguably one can see that a realist perspective provoked by a power struggle could have been a major factor in the intervention.

In order to examine the above hypotheses, this thesis implements descriptive and analytical research methodology that examines the factors that have led to the putting of an end to the Libyan crisis and the humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the thesis follows a comparative approach – at times comparing the situation in Libya to what is currently taking place in Syria to find a pattern and an explanation for the lack of action in Syria and potentially a more valid explanation to the intervention in Libya.

The thesis explores the idea that unlike what has been outwardly expressed that the intervention in Libya was mainly a humanitarian intervention, the main reason behind this international intervention is in essence based on the balance of power approach and looking at the realpolitik of the situation/crisis where the international community has been trying to gain power over Qaddafi and thus be able to control Libya which is not only strategically located but also rich in resources.

The research question is vital on an international level. The new interference or dominance of the major powers in the third world countries presents an interesting case to study and analyze. Hence, this thesis reflects the major points and interferences in addition to the ways that they have been used in order to legalize the intervention in Libya. The Security Council resolution that was adopted and that permitted the NATO
military intervention presents a real case to monitor in the presence of the Arab Uprising and the new waves of democracy in the Middle East.

To fulfill its purpose, the thesis is therefore divided into 5 main sections: an introduction, a literature review, methodology, analysis, and conclusion. While this chapter being the introduction deals with a brief history of Libya, the Libyan uprising and the nature of the intervention, chapter 2 places the intervention into theoretical perspective particularly looking at the 2 main opposing theories of international relations namely that of humanitarian intervention and realism which are to be discussed throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 offers an overview of the methodology used in the paper leading us to chapter 4 where an analysis of the intervention in light of the theoretical framework provided in the second chapter. Finally chapter 5 concludes the thesis and offers recommendations.
Chapter Two

Liberal Realism versus Idealism

Intervention: theoretical perspectives

The United Nations was established in 1945 as a means to counter the atrocities that happened in World War 2 and to prevent the occurrence of a third world war. It is “committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights.”

According to the United Nations Charter, the main purpose of the UN is:

1. To maintain international peace and security,
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,

The United Nations can be argued to follow both an idealist and liberal realist approach to International Affairs. Idealists believe in the natural goodness of humans and that there are international moral principles which govern the way the world works. They believe in civil and political liberties, human rights, democracy and
protection from arbitrary power. The UN can fall under what is called “liberal institutionalism” which believes in cooperation between states and nations to achieve the “absolute gain” for all. These gains include peace and security, economic growth, as well as social and cultural gains. As Nurruzman (2006) puts it “Mutual interests of states minimize differences, pave the avenues for cooperation. States become willing to cooperate once institutions (sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity and shape the expectations of actors) are seen as beneficial. States are rational actors; they maximize absolute gains through cooperation and are less concerned about relative gains made by other states” (Nurruzman, 2006, p. 242).

However if one is to look at the UN and the way it functions from another angle, the UN system is not as simplistic and “humanitarian” as its charter puts it out to be. The way it functions with 5 permanent members representing the World’s largest powers having the decision making power for global cooperation or negligence can itself be argued through the realist ideas of power balance.

2.1 Liberal Realism

Realism argues that all nation states are motivated by one and only one thing: their national interest which can only be defined in terms of the nation’s power. According to Morgenthau (1978), there are six main principles that political realists adhere to. The first main principle states that in order to improve society, one has to know the laws that govern it. This means that one needs to see the history of how the country was and from that one can deduce how it will be. The second main principle of political realism is that of interest defined as power. Statesmen act on their own interests to assume power. This allows one to predict the past, present and future of
politics. Thirdly, the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. 

Forth and in contradiction to liberal idealists, political realism holds a lot of significance for moral action. An individual may think of doing justice and letting all else perish yet as a state this cannot happen since a state is responsible for all those in its care. In the fifth principle Morgenthau states that “political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry.” Finally the sixth principle of political realism emphasizes the autonomy of the political sphere. In other words the political realist is not unaware of the existence of other schools of thought yet, takes issue with the “legalistic-moralistic” approach to international affairs. Political realists stand their ground in interests defined by power and nothing else.

Therefore, as can be deduced from above, realism is not a theory that can easily be defined as it is based on a set of different assumptions and propositions which formulate a way of thinking or orientation rather than a definition itself. It is more of a philosophy of international relations which follows a trend more than anything else. Box 1.1, taken from Donelly 2000, p 6-7; outlines some basic trends when defining realism.
Box 1.1. Representative definitions of realism
(The following passages are direct quotations or very close paraphrases.)

1. The state’s interest provides the spring of action.
2. The necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states.
3. Calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interests.
4. Success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state. (Waltz 1979: 117)

1. Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.
3. Power and interest are variable in content.
4. Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states.
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
6. The autonomy of the political sphere. (Morgenthau 1954: 4–10)

1. The international system is anarchic.
2. States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
3. No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability.
4. The most basic motive driving states is survival.
5. States are instrumentally rational. (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 9–10)

1. The fundamental unit of social and political affairs is the “conflict group.”
2. States are motivated primarily by their national interest.
3. Power relations are a fundamental feature of international affairs. (Gilpin 1996: 7–8)

1. The state-centric assumption: states are the most important actors in world politics.
2. The rationality assumption: world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility.
3. The power assumption: states seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power. (Keohane 1986b: 164–165)

1. Realists assume an ineradicable tendency to evil.
2. Realists assume that the important unit of social life is the collectivity and that in international politics the only really important collective actor is the state, which recognizes no authority above it.
3. Realists hold power and its pursuit by individuals and states as ubiquitous and inescapable.
Box 1.1 (cont.)

4. Realists assume that the real issues of international politics can be understood by the rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power. (Smith 1986: 219–221)

1. The centrality of states.
2. The world is anarchic.
3. States seek to maximize their security or their power.
4. The international system is mostly responsible for state conduct on the international scene.
5. States adopt instrumentally rational policies in their pursuit of power or security.
6. The utility of force. (Frankel 1996: xiv–xviii)

1. The international system is anarchic.
2. Nation-states pursue their own national interests defined primarily in terms of power.
3. Skepticism toward international laws, institutions, and ideals that attempt to transcend or replace nationalism.
4. Primacy of balance of power politics. (Wayman and Diehl 1994: 5)

1. Humans face one another primarily as members of groups.
2. International affairs takes place in a state of anarchy.
3. Power is the fundamental feature of international politics.
4. The nature of international interactions is essentially conflictual.
5. Humankind cannot transcend conflict through the progressive power of reason.
6. Politics are not a function of ethics.
7. Necessity and reason of state trump morality and ethics. (Schweller 1997: 927)

1. History is a sequence of cause and effect, whose course can be understood by intellectual effort, but not directed by “imagination.”
2. Theory does not create practice, but practice theory.
3. Politics are not a function of ethics, but ethics of politics. (Carr 1946: 63–64)

1. Groups (states) consider themselves to be ultimate ends.
2. Any measure required for state self-preservation is justified.
3. Law and morality have a subordinate place in international relations. (Schwarzenberger 1951: 13)
Looking at the above box which includes the representative definition of realism one can see a pattern in terms of the assumptions that realism puts forth.

The most important three assumptions about realism according to Maessen (2012) are:

1. The state-centric assumption; i.e that states are the most important actors in the international system,
2. that they act in such a way as to maximize their national interest, the rational-actor assumption,
3. and finally that the international system is in a state of anarchy (p.7).

Realists believe and emphasize egoism and self-interest in international politics. Because of those self-interested passions, realists believe that conflict is inevitable and is constant. This state of anarchy or conflict allows for and actually encourages the worst in human beings. To realists, it’s always about power, self-interest and balancing the power dynamic in order to serve one’s (or a state’s) interest.

2.2 Liberal Idealism

There have been many definitions of humanitarian intervention. Intervention as seen by Terry Nardin is “the exercise of authority by one state within the jurisdiction of another state, but without its permission” (as cited in Lang, 2009, p.134). For Nardin and Williams (2006), the intervention would then be seen as humanitarian if it is aimed to protect the people who are “not nationals of the intervening state from violence perpetrated or permitted by the government of the target state”. Another definition of humanitarian intervention is put forth by Oppenheim who defined what it means to intervene and thus hold an intervention generally as "dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of maintaining or ordering the actual
conditions of things.” (as cited in Ocran, 2002, p. 8). According to Ocran (2002), humanitarian intervention has been defined as "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice." (p.8) whereas Jeff Holzgrefe argues that it is “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (as cited in Lang 2009, p.134).

There are many ways in which countries provide humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention can be given out in the form of material assistance through relief and aid such as food, medical supplies etc… or even in the form of sanctions which would affect the country and exert nonmilitary pressure to try and prevent abusive practices that are happening in the country. Finally, humanitarian intervention can take the form of military intervention that would forcefully stop the human atrocities that are taking place. This military armed response can be done by both outsiders and compatriots only at times when the acts that are done “shock the moral conscience of mankind.” Therefore these acts include:

(1) genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities involving loss of life on a massive scale; (2) interference with the delivery of humanitarian relief to endangered civilian populations; and (3) the collapse of civil order entailing substantial loss of life, in situations
where it is impossible to identify any authority capable of granting consent to international involvement to help restore order. (Ocran, 2002, p. 9)

2.3 Responsibility to Protect

Upon authorizing the Security Council Resolution 1973 under the responsibility to protect, the United Nations argued that it was done more as a humanitarian intervention. It is still to be determined whether or not it is really done for humanitarian purposes. However what is a humanitarian intervention and how can one place Responsibility to Protect under that framework? This section will delve deeper into the United Nations’ “responsibility to protect” and its claims on how it falls into the bracket of humanitarian intervention. It will also look deeper into the concept of Realism and balance of power as a relevant argument and theoretical perspective that could be adopted in the case of the Libyan intervention.

According to Evans & Sahnoun (2002), using an alternative language from the “intervention” to “protection” comes as a way to move from the term humanitarian intervention and the debates that have come on whether it is legal or not. This change in terminology leads to a conceptual shift regarding the essence of sovereignty and from “control” to “responsibility” thus changing the dimension of security to become more encompassing of a global community and not that of individual states. The idea of state sovereignty has always been the state’s ability to make authoritative decisions regarding its people and resources. This principle of sovereignty is protected in the UN charter in Article 2 section 1 just like nonintervention is embedded in article 2 section 7: “a sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and total
jurisdiction of its territorial borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in its internal affairs.” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 101). However, over the decades since the signing of the UN Charter in 1946, there has been many instances in which countries have had to interfere in other country’s sovereignty for human security purposes and to protect the livelihood of the people. This is a huge contradiction to the concept of sovereignty and what is actually practiced in the world. It has led to a need to change in the understanding of the concept of sovereignty from one where the state holds absolute power to do whatever it wants to its people and within its’ state boundaries to one that holds more of a dual responsibility. This dual responsibility is characterized by the need to respect the sovereignty of other countries on an external level and internally to respect and protect the rights and dignity of all its people within the state. Although this “new” principle of sovereignty is not part of international law, however among international human rights covenants and UN practice, “sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content for good international citizenship” and is recognized as the “responsibility to protect” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102).

In December 2011, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which was endorsed by the 2005 UN World Summit. Articles 138 and 139 of the summit’s outcome document stated:

*Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This*
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (as cited in Bellamy, XXX, p. 104)

The responsibility to protect includes three different dimensions:

- The responsibility to prevent
- The responsibility to react, and
- The responsibility to rebuild
Therefore R2P implies that there is duty to react to situations in cases where there is need for human protection. These measures are preventative and should be taken to ensure protection. If however preventative measures fail, then coercive measures such as economic, judicial or political should be followed through and if those fail then finally military measures could be taken in extreme cases only. However what are the extreme cases and how can they be justified? According to Evans & Sahnoun (2002), there are 6 principles that need to be justified if one is to follow through with a military intervention. These principles are the following:

1. The “just-cause threshold” mainly encompassing the fact that there is a large scale of loss of life or a large scale ethnic cleansing.

2. The presence of the right “intention” that is to say that intervening states are taking part in the intervention to halt or avert human suffering. This can be measured by the extent to which the people themselves are with the intervention and support it.

3. The intervention should be a “last resort”: military intervention can only be justified if and only if all other options and strategies for solving the crisis have been exhausted and tried.

4. The means of the intervention should be “proportional” meaning that planned military intervention should be done in such a way that it is the minimum needed to secure the protection and safety of the people.

5. The intervention should be based on “reasonable prospects” that is to say that the chances of carrying out the intervention and having it succeed to alleviate or halt the suffering of the people is reasonable.
6. The intervention should be called for and carried out by the “right authority” namely called for by the Security Council.

The concept of responsibility to protect has been reaffirmed in the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674), however there has been difficulty in its implementation and in translating the international support of this concept on the ground. This is mainly due to the fact that many countries thought of it as just another way to justify humanitarian intervention. Therefore, there is a main confusion happening between the relationships of R2P with non-consensual military intervention.

Prior to 2011 and since its recognition as important in the realm of protection and security; the idea of R2P has only been mentioned in documents and never acted upon. However this changed in the case of Libya, where for the first time responsibility to protect was implied in Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973: “recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” and “…to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country”; respectively.

2.4 Realism and the Responsibility to Protect

When defining the two terms realism and responsibility to protect, one can notice that they are two very contradictory terms. The concept of the responsibility to protect challenges the basics of realism. It assumes that states have an ethical obligation to protect the people of other countries if their own country is not able to protect them and thus countries have the right and obligation to interfere in the sovereignty of other countries justifying it through an ethical perspective. Realism on the other hand assumes that no country or state would interfere in another country unless the
interference in beneficial to the country. The basis of realism looks at the question of “what’s it in for me?”, rather than looking at the global good.

Furthermore, one can argue that the responsibility to protect is a Western idea that serves the interests of the West in order to impose its liberal values and ideas on other countries and thus serving its own interests which would then mean that the idea of the responsibility to protect is but a reinforcement of realist ideals and ideas serving the interests of the major Western countries.

2.5 Placing the intervention in perspective based on the theoretical framework

2.5.1 The humanitarian approach in the Libyan Crisis

If one is to look at cases of international humanitarian crisis and the theories that govern them and the interventions that take place one can find that there are many debates taking place on whether these interventions fall under the category of being legitimately humanitarian and desirable or if they fail to do so. One criterion to assess the “humanitarian” aspect of an intervention is identified by Michael Walzer as an intervention that comes in response to actions “that have shocked the conscience of mankind” (as cited in Maessen, 2012, p. 17). Under these criteria, then the intervention would fail to fall under a humanitarian one as it took place before Qaddafi was able to shock mankind; it actually took place to prevent Qaddafi from doing so.

On the other hand, Fernando Tesón’s has a different understanding of human rights and the liberal approach. Tesón argues that for a humanitarian intervention to be thought of justified, the intervention should be one that “aims at ending severe tyranny or anarchy (...) this standard does not necessarily require that genocide or a similar
massive crime should be afoot” (Tesón, 2011, p. 194). If one is to look at this as a criteria, then the intervention in Libya can be justified as a humanitarian intervention since Qaddafi had announced several times that he was looking to “clean the dirt and scum” referring to the people of Libya that were rebelling against the regime.

Finally, Nicholas Wheeler, takes an approach that is permissive of preventive humanitarian intervention linking the intervention to the hope of saving lives that could not be saved if an outside intervention does not take place or even addressing genocide or mass murder. To Wheeler, the intervention should come as a last resort and all decision makers should be convinced that the outcome is humanitarian. Looking at it from Wheeler’s perspective, the Libyan intervention would also be highly justified especially taking into consideration Qaddafi’s March 16 speech in which he said, “We will march to clean Libya, inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alley by alley, person by person…”

2.5.2 R2P in the Libyan Crisis

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has put forth guiding principles for humanitarian intervention under the responsibility to protect. If one is to argue for the responsibility to protect as a legitimate action and driving force behind the intervention, three main principles must be satisfied: large scale loss of life, either actual or intended which comes as a result of direct state action or neglect or inability to act; the intention of the intervening states is to ‘halt or avert’ human suffering; the intervention is done by the right authorities. Looking at those principles that have been set by the ICISS, one cannot argue that the intervention was not legitimate as Qaddafi had threatened his people, the intention was to halt or avert
human suffering – at least on the short term – and the UN can be seen as an appropriate authority to carry out such an intervention. However, there are critics to this.

According to Pattison (2011), it is true that the situation in Libya was in need of an intervention particularly due to Qaddafi’s threatening of his people, however what is not justified is the “forcible regime change by an external party in support of a rebel movement” (p.272). Pattison challenges the intent of the intervention on whether it was to protect the civilians or to overthrow Qaddafi citing the fact that forced changes in regime have historically proven to do more harm than good.

Furthermore, according to Allin and Jones (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 21), “the Libyan intervention is seen as illegitimate because the United States, France and Britain are not also intervening in states such as Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria and Saudi Arabia where authoritarian regimes and violations of human rights are also clearly present.” The decision not to intervene in these countries as well although the situation there is as equally serious as Libya, is evidence that the primary motive of the intervention isn’t based primarily on a humanitarian motive.

The concept of responsibility to protect emerged in 2001; however since its emergence no real interventions have taken place under this concept. It is only until a decade later, in 2011, that the intervention in Libya was called for under the principle of the responsibility to protect the people of Libya. Hasler (2012) argues that “R2P represents more of a normative idea and argument than a mandatory rule, policy or strategy. The normative power of R2P shapes its importance within the discussion about interventions and their rationale” (p.46). Having said this, what were the real reasons
and motivations for the intervention in Libya? Were they based solely on humanitarian factors?

### 2.5.3 Idealism in the Libyan Crisis

The Libyan crisis has been characterized by gross violations of human rights. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Qaddafi himself had announced that he will show “no mercy” to the Libyan rebels. In his speech of February 22, 2011 Qaddafi said that he would rather die a martyr than step down urging his supporters to attack “the cockroaches” (that are his people) and “cleanse the houses” one by one until all protestors surrendered. These statements are ones that could be interpreted as beginnings of genocide which in themselves are justifications for an idealist intervention in the country. In this case, R2P is used to prevent large scale loss of life the Qaddafi has been threatening to abolish.

### 2.5.4 Realism in the Libyan Crisis

Looking back at the Realistic approach to international affairs and its defining principles, one can see that when it comes to state of anarchy in world politics, states do not intervene if they could not gain anything from the process. There always is a hidden “what’s in it for me?” benefit. States only intervene if they could gain more influence, or power – maybe not in the country itself but over other countries that could be seen as competitive. According to Hasler (2012), realism as a theory includes aspects “postulating that an action is good only if it produces certain desirable outcomes.” (p.48).
It is true that states have a responsibility to protect based on humanitarian principles and concepts, however rarely does the humanitarian aspect of things motivate states and countries to intervene. The moral/ethical dimension of protection is always overshadowed by hidden purposes and global interests. Countries do not intervene on their own accord or when the intervention does not serve their interests regardless of how big the atrocities are especially since the countries themselves have a responsibility to the protection of their own people and to ensuring their wellbeing/ interests whether on an economic, political or security level.

When it comes to Global Power interests, one of their main concerns is the gain of resources. In this respect, Libyan oil played a major role in the decision to intervene in the country. Moreover, another interest would lie in the political homogeneity of the countries namely between the US and Libya especially when it comes to an agreement on Israel and its future within the new Arab Spring. And finally the relationship of the countries with the Qaddafi regime especially when it comes to the negative relationship Qaddafi had with the US, France and Arab countries also played a role in the intervention.

Hence this thesis argues that although the intervention was authorized under the concept of responsibility to protect, the global powers would not have intervened if their interests would not have been served. Their interests served as the main drive to the intervention while using R2P as a cover.
The coming chapters will examine the motivations behind the interventions – whether idealist or realist in nature and thus will reveal in light of the findings what could be done in other countries such as Syria.
Chapter Three

Methodology

The main aim of this research is to determine whether the intervention in Libya was driven by liberal idealism or realism. The chapter describes the qualitative research methodology that is used to achieve its purpose. The purpose of this study is to explain the different factors that have accompanied the intervention. In order to ascertain one hypothetical proposition or another, it implements a rational choice analysis approach to the key actors namely France and the US in their rapprochement towards military interventionism placing it in the framework of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. These concepts guide chapter 4’s findings on how the intervention in Libya was governed by political interests based on realism.

3.1. Research Questions:

The purpose of the research questions is to analyze the conflict from a political level. The importance of the research questions is to allow us to triangulate the content.

- Why has the UN authorized military interference in Libya?
- How is the Libyan conflict connected to power struggles of the international community particularly for France and the US?

The very crucial factors that have led to the development of the military intervention in response to the conflict in Libya are based on the assessment that the international community has done with respect to the national interests that they hold. There are 3 different factors that have led to the intervention in Libya:
• An economic factor based on oil and the interest in controlling the oil in Libya
• Qaddafi’s political affiliation and his viewpoint of World politics particularly when it comes to the Israeli – Arab Conflict
• Qaddafi’s relationship with countries of the West – namely the US and France who have readily supported military interference in Libya as a means to their own political interests

3.2 Research Design:

As mentioned above, this thesis uses qualitative analysis in its design. One of the most well-known qualitative means of analyzing data is through the use of a case study. Being flexible in its design, the case study is the best method to describe how realpolitik underlies the nature of the intervention in the Libyan conflict especially since the data is not quantifiable through a survey or any other means. This case therefore reaches the conclusion through triangulation - a method used by qualitative researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analyzing a research question from multiple perspectives (Guioin et al, 2002).

Although the debate on having a humanitarian intervention is common and is found in extensive literature, books and articles, the information on the intervention in Libya and the outcome of this intervention is still lacking in the scholarship realm. Therefore to assess and evaluate the processes that have led to the way that the states dealt with the developments and outcomes in Libya this thesis relies on:

(1) Articles, reports, journal articles and newspaper analyses
(2) Foreign policy statements and interviews with politicians and witnesses of the process taken from media sources

(3) Reports from open media sources;

(4) Data from open sources, required for verifying the analysis

Furthermore the study looks at formal political theory at both the domestic and international levels to reach its conclusion. Looking at political theory allows us to have a more in-depth understanding of the conflict. The theory is then assessed through the framework of the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict. By triangulating the date derived from using observation and formal theory, conclusions can be derived more accurately.

3.3 Methodology:

The sampling undertaken for this study includes various actors from within Libya and other regional and international actors. It analyzes both what was happening in Libya on an internal level as well as the responses on an international level. The importance of looking at both the local and international levels is that it allows us to have a more in-depth understanding of the power struggle taking place – thus applying the rational choice of the key actors in Libya – namely for the purpose of this paper: France and the US. According to Lovett (2006), Rational Choice Theory is an approach that can be characterized by three core assumptions. The first is that every individual’s or collective’s actions are purposeful. No action takes place without purpose and without deliberately selecting one or more courses of action. The second assumption that the theory is based on is that of utility. The purposeful act that is chosen is based on its functionality and needs to give maximum service to the individual or collective.
Finally, the third assumption is that decisions taken are based on *rationality* and thus are well thought of and balanced. In the case of countries and nations, the Rational Choice Theory can thus be argued to include actions that come as a result of National interest which according to Gruenwald (2011), can be defined as the interest of the state, interpreted by the government, as what is best for the nation itself and its relationship with others. Gruenwald goes further to explain that national interest could be described in terms of 3 interconnected ideas: national security, increased economy (prosperity) and prestige (country’s image held by nations and the global society). The significance of looking at the rational choices of the key actors is to explore the realpolitik dimension of the conflict.

### 3.3.1 Further Methodology

As mentioned above, the methodology chosen for this case study is Data Triangulation. Data triangulation involves the use of different sources to come up with the conclusion. This thesis relies on observation and formal theory to reach its conclusion – the role that realpolitik played in the intervention.

Point A in the triangulation is namely the observation of actions that led to the intervention in Libya. This observation point is conducted through content analysis – reviewing primary and secondary sources on the Libyan conflict and the intervention that took place. The publications include but are not limited to op-eds, official statements, data surveys, and daily periodicals.

Point B explores the formal theory that evaluates both the domestic and international powers. Question 1 looks at the factors that have allowed the interference
in Libya while Question 2 analyzes the gains that both the US and France have at stake if the intervention were not to take place. The major theoretical principals are sued to explain the positions of the US and France with respect to the Libyan conflict and the intervention that resulted.

Furthermore an examination of the rapprochement of military intervention in Libya through the lens of Carnegie’s commission on preventing Deadly Conflict is used in order to better study the idealism v/s realism debate that governs it. The Carnegie Commission on preventing Deadly Conflict was established in May 1994 to address the “looming threats to world peace” through the use of violence as a means to end intergroup conflict. Through studying of various conflicts around the world, the Commission sought to find effective ways to prevent violence and to identify solutions.

The Commission on preventing deadly conflict provides an ideal analytical framework for looking at the conflict and its responses based on the situation
governing it and assessing the countries’ national interests in that regards. The significance of the Commission’s work is that it underlines the effective preventative strategies needed to ensure the end of violent conflict and for constructive humanitarian intervention to take place. In analyzing the responses and factors that came into play to end the conflict through military intervention, through the lens of the Carnegie framework, the political underpinnings are highlighted.

Finally and in conclusion, the paper briefly attempts to explain why despite the large humanitarian crisis that Syria is currently facing, military intervention has taken place in Libya and not Syria by also looking at the national interests of the key actors involved.
Chapter Four

Analysis of the International Intervention in Libya

According to the Executive Summary of Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), there are two approaches that can be used to prevent violence: the operational prevention which is used in the face of immediate crisis and structural prevention which is used to make sure that there is no conflict that will arise in the first place or if it has arisen that it would not recur. In the case of the Libyan conflict, ending it was the main concern of the international community. Operational prevention according to the report mainly relies on early communication and engagement that can help come up with the conditions that are needed for leaders to resolve the conflict. Four key elements exist in such a situation:

1. A lead player usually an international organization, country, or important individual who works to mobilize preventative efforts.
2. A coherent political-military approach that is designed to stop the violence, address the humanitarian needs of the situation and integrate all political and military parts of the problem
3. Enough resources to support preventative engagement to stop the conflict
4. A plan to restore the country’s authority

The Libyan crisis is one that threatened the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Libyans and predicted a humanitarian crisis similar to the one that happened in Rwanda. From a humanitarian perspective, this crisis had to stop. Below is a description of the
different strategies/factors that helped put an end to the conflict in Libya. However, as is noted in the section below, the factors did help end the conflict yet the ending of the conflict was not purely motivated by humanitarian concerns, rather interests played a role in the decision to ending the conflict.

4.1 The Role of the Leaders

According to the report, “effective leadership derives from a special relationship or capacity that makes an organization, government agency, or prominent individual the logical focal point for rally the help of the international community… in most cases, the active support of the UN Security Council – especially the permanent members – is important to success.” (p.xx)

On February 22, 2011; Qaddafi spoke to his supporters from an old bombed residence of his in Tripoli that was hit by U.S. airstrikes in the 1980s and left unrepaired as a symbol of defiance. In that speech Qaddafi was heard saying: "Libya wants glory, Libya wants to be at the pinnacle, at the pinnacle of the world," he proclaimed, pounding his fist on the podium. "I am a fighter, a revolutionary from tents ... I will die as a martyr at the end," he said, vowing to fight "to my last drop of blood." (CBS Interactive, 2011). Although having his aircrafts bomb Benghazi, Qaddafi lived a stage of denial in which he asserted that he had never ordered a single bullet fired till that day, warning that if he had done that then everything would burn. Furthermore in the same speech, Qaddafi said that if protests didn't end, he would stage a "holy march" with millions of supporters to cleanse Libya....."No one allows his country to be a joke or let a mad man separate a part of it”.... It is Qaddafi’s provocative speech that left the
international community including his own diplomats fear the start of crimes against humanity and call for a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and a decisive humanitarian intervention.

As noted earlier, it is the courage of senior Libyan diplomats in standing up against Qaddafi that helped move the normative focus from the conventional state-centered notion of sovereignty to the more fundamental, democratic question of who bears sovereignty (Powell, 2012, p.311). In a statement in front of the Security Council, Libyan Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Shalgham told the Council “Please, the United Nations, save Libya. Let there be no bloodshed, no killing of innocents…. We want a decisive, rapid and courageous resolution from you” (AFP, 2011).

If it were not for the Libyan diplomats who had changed direction from advocating the regime to asking for help from the international community, or for Qaddafi’s radical speeches, it would have been much more difficult to get the international community to advocate for military intervention especially under the umbrella of R2P. For R2P to be considered legitimate it needs the backing of the people of the country. The Libyan diplomats’ position in the Security Council paved the way for the intervention. Yet again, was the intervention really done only for humanitarian purposes?

4.2 The Role of the United Nations, International Community and Security Council

Before military action is taken, the international community works on trying to at least restore the country’s authority through looking at early warning signals, using
preventive diplomacy, economic measures such as sanctions and inducements. If all else fails then comes the use of force which is the last resort to solving the conflict. Is that really what the international community did?

The first start to preventing a deadly conflict is the use of early warning signs and early response. According to the report, “indicators of imminent violence include widespread human right abuses, increasingly brutal political oppression, inflammatory use of the media, the accumulation of arms and sometimes a rash of organized killing.” (p. xxi) During the early stage of the crisis, policy makers and the international community usually are attentive to the situation and how it might worsen. They become alert of the different opportunities that could help avoid violence. One of the most disruptive things that could happen is early action which is usually avoided through preventative diplomacy. For successful preventative diplomacy to take place, there are a number of steps that can be taken. The first is for states to resist the urge to suspend diplomatic relations. Instead, there should be a strengthening of communication with the leaders and groups in crisis. Second governments and international organizations must express in clear ways the interests that are at stake. As a third step the crisis must be put on the agenda of the UN Security Council or relevant bodies so as to keep track of the developments in the crisis and the different updates and finally there is an imperative that there must be a broadening of the multilateral context of an unfolding crisis where governments need to be attentive to all opportunities that arise and can support quiet diplomacy and dialogue between the leaders in the crisis. Thus comes the role of special envoys or representatives of key states or regional organizations to demonstrate their case in the early stages of a crisis (the role of mediation in the Libyan...
conflict will be discussed in the coming section). Another very powerful tool that the international community holds when it comes to a conflict is the forcing of a number of economic measures one of which is the use of sanctions. According to the Executive Summary of the Preventing Deadly Conflict Report, “sanctions serve three broad policy functions for governments: to signal international concern to the offending state, to punish a state’s bad behavior, and to serve as a precursor to stronger actions, including, if necessary the use of force” (p. xxiv).

4.2.1 The Role of the Security Council

On February 26, 2011, the Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1970. This resolution came welcoming of all previous statements and stances taken by the international community from the Arab League, to UNHCR, and the Arab Union and was mindful of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It therefore called on and urged the Libyan authorities to stop the violence and ensure access to international human rights monitors. Furthermore, the resolution brought about sanctions to Libya which included an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze. The resolution also referred the case of Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is important to note that Resolution 1970 is only the second time the Security Council has asked the ICC to investigate a situation (Dunne & Gifkins).

Furthermore, on March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) called for a ceasefire in Libya and an ‘end to the current attacks against civilians’, which might constitute ‘crimes against humanity’. The resolution imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, sanctions against the government and authorized ‘all possible
force’ to protect civilians. The resolution was adopted by 10 in favor, none against and with abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation).

Security Council Resolutions are very important in resolving conflicts yet one can argue that both resolutions in the case of Libya did not help in putting an end to the conflict in the most efficient manner.

If we are to look only at Resolution 1973, we can say that this is based on the “responsibility to protect” since it focuses mainly on the ‘protection of civilians and civilian populates areas’ without seemingly choosing sides. Yet, the 2001 ICISS report also talks about the “responsibility to prevent: to address both the direct and indirect causes of the internal conflict” (ICISS, 2011, p.7) and therefore one can make the argument that in this case, it is very difficult to address and look at the root causes of the conflict without taking sides and having the intervention that is dictated to take sides.

Furthermore, Resolution 1973 worked on imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its civilians. However, according to Maessen (2012), “considering that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine attaches great value to both national sovereignty and proportional means, stating that ‘the scale, duration, and intensity of planned military intervention should be at the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective’, it is hard to think of a way that intervening militarily would fit better within the responsibility to protect framework; having no boots on the ground minimizes both the breach to Libyan territorial sovereignty and the intrusiveness of an intervention” (p.33).
When it comes to the authorization of the international criminal court, it can be argued that this authorization has undermined Libyan efforts at liberation. In an article published by Al-Jazeera on March 20, 2011; Bali and Abou Rish argue that the first priority that the Security Council should have looked at was to negotiate an exit strategy for Qaddafi and his family similar to what had been done for Ben Ali and Mubarak before him. Instead however, the ICC referral signaled to Qaddafi that neither he nor his family will be able to find refuge thus increasing his resolve to fight to the very end.

On March 21, 2011, the International Peace Bureau (IPB) strongly condemned the "no-fly zone" in Libya. If one is to compare the previous experiences in Iraq 2003, a better option would probably have been to actually continue the sanction process a bit further rather than rush into military intervention not even a month after the resolution 1970 was in place. Adhering and respecting the cease-fire agreement coupled with negotiations may have given a better outcome in Libya. Furthermore, in an article entitled “Attacking Libya and International Law” written for Al Ahram newspaper on March 24, 2011, Doebbler argues that the Security Resolution 1973 does not come in line with international law. According to Doebbler, perhaps the most fundamental principle of international law is that no state shall use force against another state. This principle is expressly stated in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter. No state can violate this principle of international law. While the UN Security Council can order the use of force in exceptional circumstances, according to Article 24(2) of the UN Charter, the Council "shall act in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations." This means, at least, that when peaceful means of dispute resolution are still possible the options for authorising the use of force are extremely limited. In the present
case, the Security Council appears to have rushed to use force. Narrow exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force are found in Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The latter provisions, especially Article 42, allow the Security Council to take action that "may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Both resolutions 1970 and 1973 state that they are being adopted under Chapter VI; neither, however, meets the requirements of Article 42 that a determination has been made that "measures not involving the use of force" have failed.

In the same article, Doebbler (2011) goes on to say that a fact finding mission sent by the UN Human Rights Council and Security Council would have been important if one is to determine the need for the use of force yet this has not been the case. Moreover, the international community had not given the Libyan authorities a chance to comply with Resolution 1973 despite Libya announcing that it would respect the resolution: “in an unprecedented show of diplomatic intolerance, and without confirmation of the facts on the ground, Western leaders called the Libyan leader a liar”. In doing so, they laid the ground for the intervention, however was it really necessary to take up military action so quickly? Or were there underlying agendas in play?

4.2.2 NATO versus Russia and China

When looking at the intervention in Libya, one can say that the country views were divided across two camps when it comes to the adoption of resolution 1973: those who are with the intervention and those against it. The main countries that were with the intervention are basically France, the UK, and the US supported by the UN secretary
general Ban Ki-moon whereas those that were against the intervention comprised of Russia and China.

Both Russia and China were against the intervention, continuously emphasizing the right of the Libyan state for sovereignty and the importance that other countries should place on that. If it were not for the Arab League supporting the intervention and asking for a no-fly zone, both Russia and China would have not been convinced of the importance of such and intervention. One must note however, that although the African regional organizations had asked for a no-fly zone, they had asked that it be limited in scope and that it be removed immediately after there is no direct threat to Libyan civilians.

On the other hand, the countries that were with the intervention seemed not to care much about the sovereignty of Libya as a country. The countries had explicitly said that Qaddafi must go thus choosing sides in the intervention something that is against the Responsibility to protect doctrine. Let us take the time in this section look at the interests those countries specifically France and the US who are with the intervention have in overthrowing Qaddafi.

4.2.3 The US’s interest in Libya

Prior to the conflict, the relationship between Libya and the US has been unpredictable and unreliable. Libya got its independence in 1951 supported by both the UN and the US. In 1954, the US established an Air Force Base in Libya – namely the Wheelus Air Force Base. When oil started to be extracted from Libya in 1959, the US established close economic ties with Libya so as to benefit from the oil. However, after
the coup-d’état that took place in 1969 led by Qaddafi, the relationship between the US and Libya worsened quickly: in 1970 the air base closed down and the relationship between Libya and the US oil companies became weak and the oil companies lost influence. The cooperation between Libya and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as well as Qaddafi’s idea of Islamic socialism, his attempts to establish weapons of mass destruction and his support of international terrorism were the main factors in the weakening of the relationship with the US.

The levels of the negative attitude between both countries kept varying until 2006 where there were attempts to overthrow or kill Qaddafi by the US as well as classifying Qaddafi as the “mad dog of the Middle East”. Most of the resentment came from the attack on the Pan Am plane by terrorists supported through Libya. Furthermore Economic ties have been banned with Libya from 1986 to 1993. After accepting the responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and stopping its attempts to create weapons of mass destruction in 2003, the relationship between the US and Libya improved allowing for US Libyan relations to normalize in 2004.

According to Hasler 2011, “in 2011, on the eve of the Libyan uprising, the political relations between both countries had generally normalized, but tensions about human rights, democracy and the mutual behavior in the past still existed. Finally, the relations were ‘free of the formal constraints that once precluded cooperation,’ but ‘the relationship remains relatively undefined after decades of tensions’.” (p.58)

Economic ties between Libya and the US were almost not existent due to 24 years of the embargo but the US was interested in the oil industry and the oil sector.
Although after the massacre in Rwanda and the US policy to prevent another massacre to take place suggests that the US foreign policy and interference in Libya was to prevent the massacre from taking place and to ensure the protection of the civilians, there are other reasons that come into play for the US.

In May 2010, the National Security strategy for the US was issued highlighting the important role that the US foreign policy plays in terms of ensuring the safety and security of its American people, strengthening the US economy, and maintaining the US military authority. The strategy clearly pinpoints the following approaches:

- *The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;*
- *A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;*
- *Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and*
- *An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.* (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 98)

The US has placed itself in a position of the enhancer of the universal values which include those of human rights as well as a main player in international cooperation and overcomer of challenges when they arise. When it comes to the Libyan
case, Obama’s remarks said on March 28, 2011 and addressed to the Nation on Libya describes the US’s approach to the crises:

American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well, to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 101)

The US has militarily taken part in several conflict in Muslim countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan and it needed an opportunity to prove itself as a defender of values such as democracy, freedom, humanity and dignity for every group and religion. The US needed to prove itself as a strong supporter to the Middle Eastern population without putting much risk on itself especially since much of the American population no longer favoured and supported military intervention. The fragility of the Libyan government provided that chance to the US and allowed it to intervene and “support” the people without significant military risk. Furthermore, the economic interest in Libyan oil played a factor in that decision. Therefore according to Hasler (2012), “authors like Roberts, Slaughter and Kuperman, doubted the importance of the idea of humanism for the US engagement in Libya, and demonstrated that US politics, motivated by the aim to create regime change ‘grossly exaggerated the humanitarian threat to justify military action in Libya’ ended up being right” (p. 110).
4.2.4 France’s interest in Libya

Libya and France share a long history together especially that both France and Great Britain took over the mandate of Libya and colonized it after the Italians in 1943. Since independence and until Qaddafi took over the rule of Libya, the main relationship between France and Libya was based on arms deals this caused a burdening of the relations between France and Libya particularly since France was one of the countries who occupied the Suez Canal in 1956 and also was involved in aiding Israel in giving it arms both before and after the Israeli Arab war.

On an economic level, France benefited a lot when Qaddafi came to power especially through the arms deals it made with Libya between 1970 and 1976 that enabled it to sign in 1974 an agreement guaranteeing that Libya will supply France with oil in exchange with technical and financial assistance. In 1977, Libya supported France in freeing some of its citizens in Chad however soon after the relationship weakened due to the policies that France held toward Middle Eastern countries and the role it played in the conflict in Chad which asked for Libya to withdraw from Chad in 1982. This led Libya to blame France for its defeat in Chad and became even worse when Libya was involved in the attack on the French passenger plane in 1989 killing 170 people, 54 of which were French civilians.

Upon the Libyan admittance of responsibility in the UTA plane bombing in 1999, the relationship between France and Libya improved. In 2003, the French president, Jacques Chirac flew to Libya to broker the compensation for the victims of the plane and thus removing obstacles that stood in the way of positive political and economic
relations. The relationship reached its peak when Qaddafi flew to Paris in 2007 and signed over 10 billion dollar euro worth contracts in France. In 2009, the exports from France to Libya were over 1 billion dollars’ worth and the imports were around 3.1 billion dollars’ worth making it the 3rd largest market for Libyan oil.

Therefore, when looking at the bilateral relationship between the US and France and Libya before the uprising, one can say they were quite different. According to Hasler 2012:

The U.S., as a cold war superpower, had a historically tense relationship with Libya. Coined by a full spectrum of conflicts in the last decades, the political relationship between both states was—despite Qaddafis latest attempts to improve them—still very tense. Events of the past still had influence on the relationship with the Qaddafi regime before the uprising started. Economically, the relationship was insignificant, although U.S. companies hoped to benefit from a political detente.

While France and Libya had tensions that originate from the colonial past, was highly interested in the economic prospects that improved after Libya liberalized its economy. The need to support their domestic economy, especially after the financial crisis started in 2008/2009, encouraged all three governments to renew or improve relations with the Qaddafi regime, even if this would mean accepting Qaddafi as a negotiating partner. (p. 61)

At the time of the intervention in Libya, France’s main interests were based on domestic and geo-strategic considerations. On a domestic level, French President Sarkozy
was in need to strengthen his political position especially when it came to the regard of the right wing. In early 2011, Sarkozy was under huge political pressure especially when it came to the failure in the way the France handled the “Arab Spring”, the debatable links with the Tunisian regime before the revolution, the charges of corruption that the French Foreign Minister was accused of and which led to her dismissal as well as dissatisfaction that the people as a whole felt towards the government and its politics. Therefore, intervening in a former colony to help the people against an unpopular dictator was the perfect opportunity to seize especially that Qaddafi was not seen positively in the EU who viewed him as a threat in the sense of allowing the uncontrolled flow of immigrants to Europe. This issue of illegal human trafficking to Europe through Libya was something that needed to be stopped and fast as it benefitted the right wing party and Sarkozy needed to have something in his favour.

Furthermore, the geo-strategic reason to regain power and credibility when it comes to North Africa and the Muslim world was also one of the main factors that contributed to the decision to intervene. From that perspective, based on the official papers and statements from French policy makers, it seems like the main reason or aim that the intervention was trying to achieve was to spread human rights and the idea of humanism in Libya.

Another motive that France has in the intervention is to regain its political influence in the region. France was a colonial power of North Africa up until 1962 colonizing countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. France has kept close relations with some of its colonies after independence and plays a role in influencing their domestic and foreign policy; this is seen in Algeria and the Ivory Coast for example where
France supports Algeria in its military regime and has intervened several times in the Ivory Coast’s political affairs.

Finally the economy plays another vital role in the interest of France in North Africa as it would like to participate in the economic growth and development of France’s economic interests in the continent.

4.3 The strategic position of Libya and oil

The conflict in Libya while being one in which the Libyan people are leading the uprising, had the backing of the international community where the UN Security Council issued resolution 1973 allowing a no-fly zone and military interference in the conflict, less than a month after it started. Etzioni (2012) questioned the military interference which had its main argument according to the international community be as one that was strictly humanitarian and was done in order to prevent Qaddafi from his threat against the rebels. Yet this was not the only goal. According to Etzioni (2012) the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a change in regime which was seen as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal as well as to fulfill the imperial project in both North and West Africa. To understand this concept better we must therefore look at the strategic position that Libya plays in this project. Libya occupies a strategic position since it is located on the North African coast that is very important to defend European borders from African immigration.

Furthermore, Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer and the third largest in Africa. It also has the largest oil reserves in Africa (and significant natural gas reserves). It is important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is
also the center of oil production and refining. Libyan oil holds an important position in the world especially for the US. Prior to Qaddafi’s rule, the American oil industry thrived because of the Libyan industry. After the reforms in the early 2000s and the mutual political agreement between the US and Libya, the US was able to increase its share in the Libyan oil production. There have been further planned projects to solidify this even more leading Libya to become a promising economic partner for the US. Therefore the US has a huge interest in Libyan oil and wanted to both maintain the already established contracts as well as stabilize Libyan oil production. The Libyan conflict harmed this US interest especially if it were to continue longer without significant production of oil. Removing Libyan oil production from the market would prove to be damaging for the world economy in general and the US economy in particular.

Bush et al (2011) state that “opposition in Benghazi offered Washington the opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to install a Tripoli government that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the opening of Libya’s oil and gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically crucial part of Africa” (p.360).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of France and US’s interests in Libya</th>
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<td><strong>The United States interest in Libya</strong></td>
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<td>From an economic level:</td>
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<td>- The US is one of the primary importers of Libyan oil</td>
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<td>From a foreign policy level:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The May 2010 US National Security strategy for the US highlights the important role that the US foreign policy plays in terms of ensuring the safety and security of its American people, strengthening the US economy, and maintaining the US military authority</td>
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<td><strong>France’s interest in Libya:</strong></td>
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<td>From an economic level:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France is also one of the primary importers of Libyan oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France had benefitted economically when Libya liberalized its economy and was hoping to benefit again after the 2008/2009 financial crisis</td>
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<td>From a domestic level:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sarkozy was under scrutiny for how he handled the Arab Spring especially in Tunisia, he also had charges of corruption and therefore intervening in a former colony to help the people</td>
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o Militarily the US needed to prove itself as a defender of values such as democracy, freedom, humanity and dignity for every group and religion

| against an unpopular dictator was the perfect opportunity to seize |
| Libya has been accused of aiding in illegal human trafficking to Europe. Taking down Qaddafi would be a positive note to the right wing |

- **From a geo strategic level:**
  - Need for France to regain power and credibility when it comes to North Africa and the Muslim world

- **From a foreign policy level:**
  - France wanted to regain its political influence in the region after having been a colonial power in North Africa in the past.

### 4.4 The Role of Mediation

Pursuant to Resolution 1970, and as part of the International Community’s approach to putting an end to the conflict; the United Nations appointed former Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdul Elah al-Khatib on March 6, 2011 as special envoy to Libya for humanitarian and political talks due to the increased intensity of the fighting with Mr. Qaddafi launching air, land and sea attacks against his opponents. This mediation is greatly needed in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to millions of people in the county. According to Balogh et al (2011), for a mediation to be effective, six dimensions must be available: 1- approval of the mediator by all parties, 2- the ability of the mediator to positively influence the context of a conflict situation and transform the perception of it, 3- communication and being able to bring about interaction between the conflicting parties, 4- constructive interpretation of facts or showing flexibility in the understanding of the specific situation; 5- timing of the mediation, 6- the extent to which the mediator can influence the conflicting parties. Unfortunately, according to the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs, the UN prospects
for mediation have become more complicated after the security resolution 1970 authorizing the international criminal court to investigate criminal actions by the Libyan leadership who do not approve of the UN as a mediator. On May 3, 2011, the secretary-general’s special envoy for Libya, Abdel- Elah Al-Khatib, briefed the Security Council on his mediation efforts saying that although both the Libyan authorities and the rebels were “ready and willing” to implement a cease-fire, they disagreed on the terms. The Libyan government said that a cease-fire must be accompanied by a halt to the NATO bombings, while the TNC would not agree to a cease-fire would it were not directly linked to the departure of Qaddafi. Turkey, Russia and the African Union also took upon the role of mediator in the Libyan conflict yet again to no avail.

According to Balogh et al (2011), in the case of Turkey,

there was a significant problem with approval. Libyan opposition did not want Ankara to mediate in the conflict and by the time Turkey engaged in mediatory efforts, opposition forces had already decided to topple the regime. Thus, there was a lack of common ground between the parties, suggesting also a problem with timing. Turkish mediation initiatives in Libya were hindered by the fact that at least one of the parties was not ready to negotiate. Timing and the opposing parties’ perceptions were not ripe for mediation (p.3)

On April 10, 2011, the African Union sent its mediators to negotiate a ceasefire between the conflicting parties. The mediators included officials from South Africa, Mauritania, Mali and Congo. They were to meet with both representatives from Qaddafi and from the opposition. Despite the fact that Qaddafi agreed to the road map
set out by the African Union, the rebels flatly rejected that treaty. Therefore, the African Union’s attempt to mediate the conflict was also one that failed. Although the African Union met with the rebel group, the group felt that the 53 nation union was in the pocket of Qaddafi and was supporting him especially since it was well known that the Qaddafi had given an enormous amount of donations to the AU. Furthermore, the African Union’s Democracy Charter is clear stating that those who take power by force are not welcomed and the opposition movement was doing just that. The lack of trust and acceptance that the rebels felt towards the AU resulted in its failure to broker an agreement.

On May 26, 2011, at a G8 summit, Russia announced its willingness to negotiate an agreement in Libya and to facilitate Qaddafi’s departure. However, similar to all the other mediation efforts at the time, Russia’s effort to mediate the conflict in Libya was also condemned to failure. This is mainly due to the fact that Russia had a shaky relationship with the Transitional National Council, the rebel movement opposing Qaddafi at the time. Russia refused to recognize the Transitional National Council as a legitimate representative of the Libyan people and thus approval of Russia as a mediator from the perspective of the TNC was limited and so was communication. Furthermore, Russia’s interests lay within the keeping of Qaddafi in power which did not give it an advantage to transform or constructively influence the conflict.

**4.5 Restoring Libya’s Authority post-Qaddafi**

The international community according to R2P, does not only have a responsibility to prevent and react but it also has a huge responsibility to rebuild since protection and human security does not only come from an absence of war but also
from the ability of the country to provide its people with a decent living. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the report on Preventing Deadly Conflict states that to adequately resolve a conflict it is not enough to just stop the violence, rather one needs to address the root causes of the conflict and rebuild societies that have been shattered by war. According to a report published by New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (2012), post Qaddafi, the Security Council mandated the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to work with the NTC to rebuilding Libya. UNSMIL has played a central role in post-conflict work in Libya and in coordinating other international actors to work on facing the following challenges:

- **Addressing human rights concerns:** There have been many reports on human rights abuses by the Qaddafi troops and thus a UN inter-agency humanitarian assessment team was sent to Tripoli in September 2011; the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) put a team of senior officials in the field where the Commission released a widely-read report on 2 March 2012 summarizing its findings.

- **Taking up transitional justice issues** through the International Criminal Court particularly when it comes to Saif Al Isalm Qaddafi and Abdullah Senussi, Muammar Qaddafi’s former intelligence chief

- **Creating conditions for economic recovery.** There have been multiple tracks to assist Libya to economic recovery. The UN Security Council lifted its sanctions on Libya freeing up needed assets for the NTC. Libya also looked to strengthen bilateral ties with neighbors, and Gulf countries like Qatar and the UAE. The NTC, European Union, United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and other international partners jointly agreed on a framework for a post-conflict needs assessment in September 2011, creating a basis for important political-financial linkages for post-conflict assistance.

- **Building an inclusive political framework.** The interim government is committed to political reform, including national elections that took place in early July, 2012. However the continued activity of Libya’s militias remain a concern for Libya at this point.

Upon looking at the Libyan revolution and how it unfolded, we can say that it seems to be mainly following a Western Model – something that is in the interest of the West since they have often been threatened by the Qaddafi regime. By the time the revolution began, the political system had not collapsed yet it was terrible weaker than what it used to be. Qaddafi’s socialist ideology, held in high regard in the past, is no longer something that the young people of Libya believe in especially since most of the riches of Libya were being exploited by Qaddafi’s family who spent the revenues from Libya’s oil resources in the West. Furthermore, the Libyan Army is not as strong as it used to be since Qaddafi undermined it over the years in fear that it may overthrow him at one point in time. Most of the committees that had been established like the popular committee, the revolutionary committee and the General People’s congress were also undermined and had lost their credibility since they have been widely corrupted.

Therefore, it is quite obvious that at the start of the Arab Spring, the young and educated people of Libya have become major political players. These people have a different worldview and values than the regime as they are more accustomed to the
modern life and the use of the internet, mobile phones, social media and networks. They are accustomed to the life presented by the West and hold that ideology. Therefore just like anywhere in the world, especially the Arab World, a generational conflict arose where the young people have overcome their fear of the older generation and aspires for change in their nation: a change in which they can portray their positive, global and open perspective to the world. Therefore three other new groups have entered Libyan internal politics and have to be greatly taken into consideration in the restoration of the country:

- The first group that is to be taken into consideration is the Islamists, who have always been marginalized by Qaddafi as he continuously feared that they may overthrow his regime as they had already tried multiple of times. Some Islamist groups are more moderate and are linked to Tunisia’s Islamists and Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood, while others are more radical and have roots in al-Qaeda and/or the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia.

- The second group is made of the Arab tribes who were often attacked and undermined by Qaddafi’s administration and thus are part of the political arena with revenge in mind.

- The third group that have played an active role in the revolution itself are the Berbers. The Berbers fought actively against Qaddafi and constitute between 5 to 10% of the population.

All these groups will clearly play a role in the shaping of the future of Libya and will all want to portray their own image in the “new” Libya that has arisen after the revolution. In the years to come their main challenge will be in the holding of free
elections and writing a constitution that is representative of Libyan society as well as introduce reforms in all sectors mainly the economy. They need to find a way to create viable political parties and programs where everyone’s vote is heard whether it is the tribal leader, the educated youth, the Islamist or the moderate and those living in the urban cities or those in the more rural parts of the country.

This process of rebuilding Libya will take time and will need to be approached in a way that would ensure the best for the country and its people.

It is still early to be able to determine the consequences of the uprising in Libya. The intervention did lead to the death of Qaddafi and the change in regime however there is much to be done in terms of building a Libyan society that is able to stand on its feet. Anderson (2011) states that “Libya will need to begin by constructing the rudiments of a civil society... It will need to redefine the relationship between their privileged capital cities and their sullen hinterlands. Therefore … Libya confronts the complexity not of democratization but of state formation. It will need to construct a coherent national identity and public administration out of Qaddafi’s shambles” (p.7).
Chapter Five

The Role of Regional Powers, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

This chapter will project based on the school of realism a conclusion on what happened in Libya. The hypothesis that the intervention is pure humanitarian is to be tested. Furthermore, what are the new waves or syndrome of the Uprising and what is the role of other regional powers in the region, which Turkey may be one of these emerging major powers.

“Everything that is not new in a time of innovation is pernicious.”- Louis Antoine de Saint-Just.

“The impact of revolutionary developments is hard to predict.” Thus, is the case of the Arab Uprising or what is called the “Arab Malaise” which can be described with what Mahmoud Darwish’s : “Singing in a cage is possible and so is Happiness.” The simple slogan that emerges in the uprising is mainly: “Down with the president. Long Live the Future. May it be so!”

The paper has taken into consideration the international intervention in Libya. The main causes and effects and their ramifications. For instance, as Samuel Huntington puts it in his classic book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government
activities and policies.” (Huntington, S.) In addition, Huntington continues, “A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order.”

Despite the different strategies adopted by the UN and international community to stop the conflict in Libya and to ensure a quick and easy transition to a post Qaddafi era, it was after all the use of force that led to the ending of the conflict or rather to the displacing of Qaddafi. In the process, however, over thousands of civilians died (estimates are between 2,500 and 25,000) with 72 killed during NATO air strikes as reported by Human Rights Watch. However was the use of force the only solution to the conflict in Libya or could the international community have intervened in other ways that could have resulted in less civilian casualties and divide in the country?

As this thesis attempts to show, if one is to look closely at how the international community had dealt with the conflict in Libya as opposed to the conflicts in other Arab countries such as Syria for example it is interesting to note that no use of force was called for in those conflicts. However in the Libyan case, less than a month on the start of the conflict, the use of force had been authorized. Bush et al (2011) question the resolution, by stating that “R2P was used in the Libyan case as a pre-emptive rationale for intervention to prevent greater loss of civilian life after some had died in state violence, while in Syria thousands of civilians have actually been slain by security forces and repression in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has reinforced state power against demonstrators calling for political reform” (p. 358). This may be explained by the interest that the Western countries had in Libya especially the inability to control
Qaddafi. From the onset of Qaddafi’s rule, Libya had been seen as the “rogue state” defined by Chomsky as a state that poses a threat to its neighbors and the entire world. According to Kinsman (2011) the authorization of force by the United Nations Security Council in such proportion has been unprecedented in 66 years of its existence and thus the Libyan experience went beyond the protection of civilians.

Etzioni (2012) also questioned the military interference which originated according to the international community as a strictly humanitarian intervention to prevent Qaddafi from his threat against the rebels. However, the goal quickly changed. According to Etzioni (2012) the goal of the Libyan mission expanded to include a change in regime which is seen as essential to achieve the humanitarian goal. It is therefore important to look at the imperial project in both North and West Africa and understand the strategic position that Libya plays in this project. The first thing to look at is Libya’s strategic position since it occupies an important geo-strategic location on the North Africa coast, seen increasingly by the EU as crucial in its strategy to maintain ‘fortress Europe’ in the defense of borders from African immigration. Another factor to look at is understandably an economic factor based on oil and energy demands which is an important dimension to address. Libya is the seventeenth largest world oil producer and the third largest in Africa. It is likely to also have the largest oil reserves on the continent (and significant natural gas reserves) and its crude oil is of high quality low sulphur content with 85% of production exported to Europe, and 5% to the US. It is important to note that the rebellion originated in eastern Libya which is also the center of oil production and refining. Bush et al (2011) believe that “opposition in Benghazi offered Washington the opportunity for regime change. It offered an opportunity to
install a Tripoli government that will be predictable, will accept neoliberal reform, the opening of Libya’s oil and gas sector and a military platform in a geo-strategically crucial part of Africa” (p.360). On the same note, looking at the Libya December 2012 Country report issued by the Economics Intelligent Unit, Libya’s Fiscal Policy allocated 54.8 billion dollars to be invested in the development of the oil sector in Libya. The oil was mainly exported to Italy importing 21.5%; Germany importing 13.5%, and France importing 13.4%, thus totaling around 48% of the total Libyan oil exports.

Therefore if one is to analyze all the different factors that come into play, the use of force therefore becomes a matter of international interests rather than a matter to aid the Libyan people or that of humanitarian intervention. In solving the Libyan conflict, the use of force and military intervention could have come at a later stage while the use of negotiation and mediation could have been emphasized and encouraged further. According to Etzioni 2012, as early as May 2011, Qaddafi offered a ceasefire to the rebels that would have ended the conflict yet with no regime changed however the rebels refused it. In his article ‘NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A New Model’, Westervelt (2011) argues that although NATO stated that throughout the conflict, its actions were limited to supporting the U.N. resolution that calls for protecting civilians and enforcing an arms embargo, it certainly pushed the boundaries, providing close air support for anti-Qaddafi rebels. To most observers, NATO was clearly taking the rebel side in a civil war and backing efforts to oust Qaddafi. Had NATO not been supporting the rebels at the time, and demanding a change of regime, both Qaddafi and the rebels would have been forced to give negotiation and mediation a serious chance. However, being backed up by the international community, the rebels did not see a need to
negotiate. As Dunne and Giftikins (2011) point out, “the no-fly zone and other punitive sanctions were in place for five months before the Qaddafi regime fell. It is too soon for a final reckoning of the intervention; however, it is clear that the UN mandated measures curbed Libyan state terror and tipped the balance of forces in favor of the Transitional National Council. Yet the specter of Kosovo remains in terms of a mismatch between the protection of civilians mandate and the declared aim ‘of the intervening states’ to remove Qaddafi from power” (p. 525).

5.1 The Political Rationale of the US and France

Looking at what is currently happening in Syria in terms of mass atrocities, violation of human rights and the Syrian regime fighting with its own people one can but question the influence of norms when it comes to humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. The cases of both Syria and Libya are very similar and the rhetoric of Western countries against what was happening in Libya and what is happening in Syria is almost identical. When it comes to statements made about Libya, US President Obama said that “… the violence must stop: Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy and he must leave…” Similarly the comments in the case of Syria were “I strongly condemn this brutality, including the disgraceful attacks on Syrian civilians in cities like Hama and Deir al Zour… for the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.” (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 147). France has also made the same remarks on both conflicts however the applications are not enforced the same way. Therefore one can conclude that Syria and Libya have been treated as two different cases although extremely similar and both fit in the criteria to have a humanitarian intervention and thus implement the Responsibility to Protect. So what is
different? The difference according to Hasler (2012) mainly lies in 2 things: the time of occurrence and the country’s position in world politics, economics, society, and military.

When looking at the time of the uprising, we can see that the Syrian uprising started on March 15, 2011 and the reaction of the security forces came on the 18th of March, 2011. This means that the uprising in Syria happened 4 months after the start of the uprising in Tunisia which spilled over to Egypt and Libya. The military intervention in Libya happened one day before the Syrian crisis which led the whole focus to mainly be on Libya especially since the media, politicians and the global community were all focused on what is happening with the military intervention. Another point worth mentioning when looking at the timeline basically has to do with Russia and China who both were not supporters of the military intervention. The Russian government, and upon assessing the intervention, believed that the NATO campaign “in many cases go beyond the framework set by the Security Council” and that the use of “excessive military force would lead to further additional casualties among civilians” reaching the conclusion that Russia will “never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in Libya” (as cited in Hasler, 2012, p. 150). Without Russia’s acceptance of a military intervention in Syria, the US will not be able to intervene in the conflict. Moreover, learning from the Libyan crises, countries have become less excited about having a military intervention as they are unsure that the intervention has led to a state of peace in Libya or a democracy for that matter especially since ongoing domestic conflicts are taking place.
In comparison to Libya, Syria is stronger in terms of social structure, geography, strength, size, and leadership and military and is politically supported by countries like Iran and allies like Hezbollah and Hamas and therefore, holding a military intervention will lead to high stakes and a huge resistance. Although both countries are comparable in terms of human rights violations and violence against the people, the politics involved in intervening in Syria provides much higher stakes to countries which shows that any intervention cannot be based on humanitarian considerations alone.

Both the US and France condemned the leadership and the violence in Libya and Syria, especially that the actions have been taken against the population itself. The countries officially support and advocate for human rights, democracy and justice as the main foundations for a modern democracy. These concepts and ideas definitely played a role in the intervention that happened in Libya but as has been analyzed in this thesis, it hasn’t played the major role in the Libyan case and definitely not at all in the Syrian case. Both the US and France follow their own national interests and use the concepts as a means to establish norms or an umbrella to justify their interests. Although partly believing in the idea of the defending of human rights and democracy, the idea of realism, or domestic politics dictate the decisions that these countries take.

When it came to Libya, the US initially did not want to take part of the Libyan conflict and instead allowed NATO to take charge of and responsibility for the intervention. However, upon further evaluation of the crisis and finding that an intervention may serve the US’s interest in gainer trust and sympathy from the new movements in the Middle East, the US used the idea of humanity as a main driver for military engagement of course realizing that the Libyan regime had become weak and
thus could not be of much danger. The same could be said of France who did a similar assessment to the situation based on internal domestic politics. President Sarkozy at the time wanted to try and gain political support for his election campaign through the ousting of Qaddafi and regaining influence in North Africa. Although not bringing about the result it hoped for, the case of Libya was a calculated risk for the French government.

On the other hand, the case of Syria is very different. After seeing the outcome of the intervention in Libya and finding out that it doesn’t have much impact on domestic politics, both the US and France are not as likely to want to venture off into an intervention that has little if any pay-off for them on a domestic level. Furthermore, the assessed impact of the Libyan intervention did not bring about the positive image that the US had hoped for in the MENA region nor did it bring about a boom in the economic sector, and the likelihood of that happening if an intervention takes place in Syria, is quite small. Finally, the risk of holding an intervention in Syria is much higher and more difficult than in Libya as it can lead to a civil war and a regional conflict something that is likely to affect negatively the US- Israeli and US-Iranian relations. The high military risk is not in the interest of France as well as it will not gain any strategic advantage in the region.
5.2 Concluding Remarks

This thesis has served to show not only that there is selectivity in intervention, but also that this selectivity arises based on the interests of the countries that comprise the permanent members of the Security Council. According to Fermor (2013), looking at “rhetorical inconsistency, we may draw the conclusion that where economic, geographic, military and diplomatic difficulties outweigh likely economic and strategic advantages Britain, France and the US (the three NATO members with permanent seats on the UN Security Council) are unlikely to press for or undertake military intervention. (p. 349)”. In his same article, NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist principles or humanitarian norms?, Fermor goes on to quote Roberts and Zaum (2008) by saying that “The Council”s selectivity is rooted in the Charter as well as in the political realities within which the Council operates” adding that “The Council is not intended to maintain the rule of law: it was intended to maintain international peace and security [...] Selectivity is an inherent, and prudent, aspect of this role”(p.349). International humanitarian law, and the Responsibility to Protect, allows nations to pick and choose when and how to intervene based on their own understanding of international normativity. Thus, when a country (namely members of the Security Council) sees that it is in its own best interest to actually intervene, it would push for an intervention to take place and when a country does not see it in its best interest to intervene, it would stay away bringing about double standards to the concept of humanitarian intervention and R2P. It is therefore fitting to look at things from an international political reality as Morgenthau put it:
"The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman”’s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil" (as cited in Fermor, 2013 p. 350)

This however does not rule out the importance of humanitarian concern, nor does it mean that realists do not do things out of a humanitarian purpose yet it means that it is important to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible. It is desirable, for example, that the conflict in Syria ends, however at this point it is not possible to do so without harming other interests and other nations and causing conflict within them as well.

The status of dignity project failed in Libya based on the interference in sovereignty. In 1970, Henry Kissinger said “Control Oil and you will control nations. Control food and you will control people.” Thus, the main drive behind the intervention in Libya is to control oil and the nation. The strength of Qaddafi’s regime is its geographical location – located in the center of the African nations yet reflecting a sign of independence between them. The main interest for the countries of the West lies in destroying Qaddafi’s vision on the Unity of the Arabs and the African world. Qaddafi represented a revolutionary leader who pressures all the major political powers to defeat him and turn him down from power. Qaddafi’s political regime presented a challenge to the west on the economic level.
All investments that were taking place in Libya were controlled by the Libyan government. This is mainly due to the fact that the central bank was state owned and all the investments were carried out through the “Libyan Investment Authority” (LIA), which managed a huge portfolio of investments which the West did not have a share in. These investments were mainly generated by the oil revenues. Qaddafi’s vision of a pan Arab or African Union was based primarily on the vision to invest those huge monetary resources and get rid of the western aid. According to him, it is this aid that deprived the Arab and African countries of their independence and turned them to slaves toward the major donors. One major threat that was present in Qaddafi’s vision is that of “The Gold Standard”. Qaddafi dreamt of eliminating the US dollar currency and instead exchanging it with a new currency that would be used in multiple Arab and African countries. His vision was to introduce the gold dinars into the African and Muslims countries and build the exchange currency on that balance. Qaddafi believed that “by establishing and supporting this currency a real monetary wealth will be generated, free from predatory lending agencies and depreciating fiat currencies.”

By examining all the facts that were stated we can bring to the table several variables that are involved into the equation. We have a visionary leader dreaming of unity between the Arab and African countries, a wealthy nation, huge resources, geographically challenging location and most importantly a “mad” leader that believes in defeating nations of the West. In his main discord and vision the Qaddafi regime challenged the main hypothesis of the school of realism which is the “Security Dilemma” defined by Waltz as “the situation that emerges when a state or coalition of states grows in power, thus, making another state or coalition feel threaten, leading it
to seek ways to check the other” (p.32). This new balance of power that Qaddafi tried to create in his vision by challenging the existing system played a major role in the intervention in Libya. Qaddafi’s regime dared to change the rule of Global security by all means. Although the ways for interventions were legalized within the UN resolution and implemented by the NATO forces, the waves of democracy didn’t reach Libyan territory. In fact the major oil and investments companies reached the Libyan coast and landed safely in a blessed sea to shrink the Libyan sovereignty.


