

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Policing in Divided Societies:
A Comparative Study between Northern Irish and
Lebanese Police Experiences

By

Amr Khaled Yafawi

A thesis

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Name of Student: Amr Yafawi I.D.#: 199005090
Program / Department: International Affairs/Social Sciences
On (dd/mm/yy): 05/10/2012

has presented a Thesis proposal entitled:

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in the presence of the Committee Members and Thesis Advisor:

Advisor: Imad Salamey

(Name and Signature)

Committee Member: Sami Baroudi

(Name and Signature)

Committee Member: Jennifer Skulte Ouais

(Name and Signature)

Comments / Remarks / Conditions to Proposal Approval:

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Date: 25/9/2012 Acknowledged by

(Dean, School of SAS.)

cc: Department Chair
Thesis Advisor
Student
School Dean

Thesis Defense Result Form

Name of Student: Amr Yafawi ID.: 199005090
Program / Department: M.A. in Intl. Affairs / Social Sciences
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 Thesis is not approved. Grade NP is recorded

Committee Members:

Advisor:

Imad Salamey
(Name and Signature)

Committee Member:

Jennifer Skulte-Awad
(Name and Signature)

Committee Member:

Sami Baroudi
(Name and Signature)

Advisor's report on completion of corrections (if any):

Student completed requested changes satisfactory.

Changes Approved by Thesis Advisor: I. Salamey Signature

Date: 25/9/2013

Acknowledged by

(Dean, School of Arts and Sciences)

cc: Registrar, Dean, Chair, Thesis Advisor, Student



LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
School of Arts and Sciences

Thesis Approval Form

Student Name: Amr Yafawi

I.D. #: 199005090

Thesis Title : Policing in Divided Society: A comparative study between
N. Ireland and Lebanon

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School: Arts and Sciences

Approved by:




Thesis Advisor: Imad Salamay

Committee Member:



Committee Member:




Date: September 25, 2013

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Policing in Divided Societies: A Comparative Study between Northern Irish and Lebanese Police Experiences

Amr Yafawi

Abstract

This thesis compares models of policing in divided societies as applied in Lebanon and Northern Ireland and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each. This is particularly significant due to the fact that both Lebanon and Northern Ireland have been challenged in their law enforcement abilities while confronted by a fragmented sectarian politics. Communal perception of law enforcement practices are typically shaped by strong sectarian biases that often undermine the effective application of the law. The thesis explores the reasons why the police force in Lebanon has not been able to gain public confidence. Comparative public opinion data from both countries are collected and analyzed. Results suggest that enhancing public confidence in Lebanese police force and strengthening positive public perception in the country's law enforcement agencies require strong communal interventions. Lessons drawn from the Northern Irish experience and analysis of Lebanese public opinion data suggest that in a post-conflict situation Community Oriented Policing (COP) needs to be combined with Problem Oriented Policing (POP) as a transitional approach that can strengthen community-police relations. This conclusion has been further confirmed by a series of interviews completed with chief police officers in both countries.

Key words: Community Policing, Military Policing, Public Perception, Legitimacy, Sectarianism, Mass Politics and Media

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CHAPTER ONE

POLICING IN LEBANON: HOPES AND REALITIES

1.1 Introduction

Police work in divided societies such as Lebanon and Northern Ireland is vital --yet critical -- and needs to be handled with the highest accuracy and professionalism. Police officers in such divided societies have to confront challenges that are not found in established democratic societies. Sectarian divisions in both Northern Ireland and Lebanon were the reason for decades of military conflict. After precarious peace was achieved in both countries, Northern Ireland adopted a new policing model based upon community policing.

Community policing, as defined in a study by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (1994), is the collective effort between community residents and the police to identify and solve community related problems. "With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighborhoods. Community policing has far-reaching implications. The expanded outlook on crime control and prevention, the new emphasis on making community members active participants in the process of problem solving, and the patrol officers' pivotal role in community policing require profound changes within the police organization....Community members voice their concerns, contribute advice, and take action to address these concerns. Creating a constructive partnership will require the energy, creativity, understanding, and patience of all involved."

In 2001, after the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) --predominately Protestant and accused of being biased against Catholic communities --

was dissolved and replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The success of the community policing experience in Northern Ireland encouraged other countries such as Lebanon to explore the possibility of replicating the Northern Ireland police experience.

Looking at the Northern Ireland's community policing experience comparatively this thesis will test if a successful policing model in one country can be applied to another. The similarities between the two states are obvious: they are both post conflict countries, with a power sharing political system based on religious communities, they both have a history of violent crime and terrorism and they both integrated civil war era paramilitary groups into the political system. However, the similarities stop here. Northern Ireland, as a part of the British monarchy, is a strong state, with strong credible institutions, capable of issuing policy decisions and enforcing them.

Lebanon, on the other hand, is a weak state, with no credible institutions, political instability, obsolete laws, (including a very old and outdated criminal code).It is also surrounded by regional conflicts and political interests that render the entire state apparatus nonfunctional. In this context, the Lebanese police force (Internal Security Forces-ISF), not only has to operate in a very unstable, sectarian political system and society, but it also faces the lack of resources to enforce the law properly, corruption and the interference of political shareholders in the law enforcement process. The two contexts seem very similar to a certain extent, but the differences are also great and may tamper with the success of the police reforms and strategies of law enforcement.

1.2 Historic Background

1.2.1 Lebanon

In 1945, the Republic of Lebanon emerged as a consociational power-sharing political system, based on religious communities. Since the Taif Agreement (the Document of National Accord) that put an end to the Lebanese Civil War in 1989, there has been an important and obvious shift in the internal balance of power in Lebanon with the Shi'a community ascending in power and becoming more and more influential. Gradually, the balance of power shifted and the Christian/Muslim divide became a Sunni/Shi'a divide. The latter became apparent especially after the assassination of Lebanon's Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri on the 14th of February 2005 and the withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanese territory.

The post 2005 period witnessed the re-emergence of militia and district warlords in Lebanon. From 2006 onwards, violence became more widespread and took on sectarian implications. Confessional concerns were intensified by the many assassinations, which polarized the public and prompted them to seek refuge in their own sects. The post-war period in Lebanon, especially after 2005, could better be understood when described as a "cold civil war" (Knudsen & Yassin, 2011:125).

Politics and media influence public attitudes toward police in Lebanon. The political system in the country, as well as the media landscape, is bipolar. The political system split into anti-Syrian pro-Western Sunni led March 14 alliance and pro-Syrian Shi'a led March 8 alliance. The Lebanese media followed lead. Simultaneously, and as in all Lebanese state institutions, the police force's administrative appointments are made on sectarian lines. For example, the head of the ISF is a Sunni general, thus the ISF is portrayed in the media and perceived by the public as a

Sunni institution. In return, other state institutions, such as the Military Intelligence Office or the General Directorate of the General Security, are perceived as Shi'a institutions because they are run by March 8 affiliated Shi'a Generals (United Press International, Inc 2013).

After 2005, police -- especially the intelligence or information unit of the ISF --were not portrayed positively by the 8th of March political coalition news media. For example, it focused on negative criticism rather than positive or successful crime prevention efforts. In essence, the police information unit was successful in combating crime in all areas irrespective of any sectarian or political affiliation, but policemen were rarely portrayed as heroes due to political/religious considerations between the 8th of March and 14th of March coalitions (Saab Y, B 2012).

After 2005 Christian areas, whether in Beirut or elsewhere in Lebanon, enjoyed a relatively better security situation than other areas. The conflict line was placed between the Sunni and Shi'a areas of Lebanon, including the capital Beirut. Law enforcement became more necessary than ever, but due to the sectarian governmental policies, the Lebanese police force was not trusted by the public enough to be allowed to ensure public safety. The ISF were not only attacked morally in media reports, but also physically in bomb attacks. A police officer who investigated the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Major Wissam Eid, was assassinated in February 2007, on his way to work. The head of the ISF intelligence Unit, General Wissam El Hassan, was also assassinated in October 2012.

1.2.2 Northern Ireland

In 1920 the British passed the Government of Ireland Act, which divided Ireland into two separate political entities, each with some powers of self-government. The act was accepted by

Ulster Protestants and rejected by southern Catholics, who continued to demand total independence for a unified Ireland. Following a period of guerilla warfare between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and British forces, a treaty was signed in 1921 creating the Irish Free State which became later an independent republic.

Although armed hostilities between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland largely subsided after the 1921 agreement, violence erupted again in the late 1960s. British troops were brought to restore order, but the conflict intensified and continued until early 1990s. The political-sectarian conflict during that period became known as the “The Troubles.”

During that period the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) had the dual role of combating normal crime and armed insurgency from the IRA. It was assisted in the latter role by the army, but only when necessary and with police primacy. In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was signed by the main political parties on both sides. However, despite this peace agreement, Catholics and Protestants remained at odds especially over the establishment of a neutral police force and IRA disarmament (Imbornoni, Brunner & Rowen, 2007). In 2001 the RUC became the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the community policing model of the PSNI gradually replaced the military policing model of the RUC.

1.3 Police Practices (Democratic competent societies vs. Divided Societies)

Police practice is affected by a variety of factors: social homogeneity, occupational mobility, the role of religion in developing personal identity, deference to authority and political elites. Hence police behavior and the social context are inextricably linked. Some police practices cannot fit in any social context; they have to be adapted to the type of interaction within the community and between communities. The social context becomes vital, as the police reform cannot be directed

exclusively at policemen. Some reforms can be easily made by police agencies but others, resting on traditions and culture, are possible only through joint effort by police and public over long periods of time.

In democratic competent countries the sharpness of separation between the roles of policemen and citizen is at its minimal. Though police penetrate social life in democratic competent countries more extensively than policemen do in divided societies, their manner is much less formal. They do not need to display authority precisely because justification for intervention is not exclusively legal; it is founded on a sense of proficiency shared with citizens informally. Police in divided societies, on the other hand, though they intervene less often, always do so as agents of law. In many cases they are cast in a formal biased role.

The culture of police, the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules which inform their conduct is neither universal nor unchanging. The organizational styles and cultures of police forces vary with different places and periods. Informal rules are not clearly cut and articulated, but embedded in specific practices according to particular concrete situations and the interactional processes of each encounter. None the less, certain commonalities of the police outlook can be perceived in different social contexts. This is because they are rooted in constant problems which officers face. Cop culture has developed as a patterned set of understandings which helps one to cope with and adjust to the pressures and tensions which confront the police.

Police officers, especially in divided societies, are required to be proactive in engaging with local population to earn their trust. Rather than responding to crimes, police officers may prevent the crime from occurring in the first place. Police officers can do that by addressing the concerns of the local population and by monitoring dangerous groups and individuals. Such police approach

and behavior is not an easy task to handle. It is difficult to have officers change their personalities overnight from hard-rigid policing to warm and sociable community style policing. Hence the new cop culture, and consequently the new policing model, should seek lasting partnerships with community groups and agencies to encourage team work in combating crime.

1.4 Police Culture

In police departments, organizational norms constitute a powerful force in shaping police behavior. The police work is quite generally unstructured; organizational norms set standards of behavior for police officers to guide them regarding the treatment of witnesses and suspects, how to prioritize cases, and how charges should be dealt with. Change in legal rules or procedures must take into consideration the organizational norms that predate the changes. Changes in procedure, such as giving priority to sectarian based crime prevention, or changes in legal rules regarding police interrogation confronts police officers' preexisting behaviors and attitudes.

Control over the initial classification of incidents means that police wield the power, often unreviewed by others in the criminal justice system, to determine those situations in which the law will be applied (Bell, 2002). If police are to have law-abiding citizens on their side, they must make concerted and continuing efforts to reach out to the public. They must make clear that they cannot safeguard the public without the public's involvement and cooperation, that they are eager to know the primary concerns of the public, and that they want to be known, as individuals, to the members of the community. Such outreach does not guarantee judiciousness and mutual respect, but lack of it sustains a gap between the police force and the public that makes fulfillment of the police mission virtually impossible. At worst, such a gap results in an "us-against-them" feeling on both sides. Consequently a police officer without an understanding of

people will not deal competently with conflict, while one who has it can calm adversaries and ease tension, as well as gain credible information from his community (Delattre, 1996).

Cross-cultural communication in law enforcement must consider the police officers' own filters and perceptions which influences their assessment of each situation and their reactions toward it. Officers must keep in mind that rapport building is related to trust for many persons of different backgrounds. The more trust officers earn with members of sectarian communities, the more helpful these group members will be when officers need cooperation and information. To improve communication across cultures, it is essential that people in law enforcement understand the overall style of communication, verbal and non-verbal, of different groups and apply accordingly multicultural communication skills (Shusta et al, 2005).

Formally, the police are supposed to have almost no discretion, by law or in theory at least. However, discretion is inevitable, partly because the police can sometimes get information about serious crimes by overlooking minor crimes, and partly because the police believe that public opinion would not tolerate a policy of full enforcement of all laws all the time.

But problems arise if police discretion is built on sectarian basis. This type of discretion is harmful and difficult to detect because it is made supposedly for the purpose of security. Professional practices help police to build personal relationships with the communities they serve which would, in turn, bring valuable information much needed in the police work with divided societies.

When citizens perceive police as biased or disrespectful, they are less likely to trust them, less compliant with their requests, and less willing to cooperate with law enforcement to reduce crime (Krivo, Peterson, 2009).

The problem of horizontal or vertical cleavages in society is intertwined with the fact that police officers have a great deal of discretion in performing their job. Given that police must make determinations as to how to perform their job, it is not surprising that their judgments could be influenced by cultural, ethnic, or religious stereotypes. The road to police reform is partly an internal one, featuring training, supervision, internal inspections, performance measures, but it also requires policy making.

When law enforcement relies on a broad, superficial category such as culture or religion, this shortcut interferes with more effective techniques such as behavioral cues, evidence, as well as suspect or crime specific descriptions. Countering the threat requires good relationships with minorities, effective planning and close coordination between military, national intelligence and law enforcement personnel at all levels.

For proactive police work, the police officer must build a good relationship with the community of his jurisdiction -- one that is based on mutual respect and understanding of the different cultural and religious backgrounds of each individual. He must have a minimum knowledge of the society he serves and protects; he must not be biased and act according to his morals and conscience juxtaposed with good training in law enforcement.

1.5 Community Policing

The dominant model of policing today is community policing, which combines consultation with community members, responsiveness to their security needs, collective problem solving to identify the most appropriate means of meeting these needs, and mobilization of the public to make all this happen. However, explanations and execution methods of community policing take

a variety of forms and reflect differences in organizational structures, management strategies, resource availability, and geographical scope (Grabosky, 2009).

In all societies, police are charged with maintaining stability and order through crime prevention and law enforcement. Community policing that is based on a police-community partnership may be a flexible, problem solving approach. However, community policing should be a complete policing philosophy through which the community accepts policing measures, police-government relations improve, and police resources are used more efficiently. In many divided societies, like Lebanon, existing police forces are paramilitary organizations that have no standards for recruiting, training, or discipline. Therefore community policing in such cases should have a general strategy and be implemented in phases which include an administrative phase, a headquarters phase (environmental analysis, community consultation, and implementation), and a training phase.

In the wake of paramilitary disturbances after 2005 militia reappearances and security unrest, discussions regarding policing in Lebanon have become a heated debate. Nevertheless people agree that premium police services are necessary prerequisites for maintaining a minimum safety standard.

1.6 Policing in Northern Ireland vs. Policing in Lebanon

On the surface policing worldwide appears similar. Enforcement of the rule of law requires police to preserve order and be responsible for state affairs. This type of hypothesis is justified in select situations. Complexity arises when concealed differences outnumber apparent similarities in policing affairs which may lead to a change in policing activities. These differences between police organizations are perceived as bad policing while in fact they are a form of sociopolitical

coexistence based on different objectives which use different methods of police management including but not limited to abuse, brutality and corruption.

The core of any policing program is to enforce the law in order to improve state governance. In fragile states, such as Lebanon (where law is not well implemented), police functions tend to be brutal and aggressive, with strong emphasis on the protection of sectarian elites and public obedience. If the application of law coincides with political, economic and social reforms then the illegal use of force will be replaced by non-punitive measures. In robust states with a representative government, such as the case of Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement, police will be agents of expression toward liberal democratic behaviors.

Confusion between the situations mentioned above is the residue of disregard for policing differences among nations. Some of these differences are appropriate for their culture, place and time.

Police in Lebanon was never a source for sectarian divide. Rather, it has always been the recipient of such a divide. On the other hand, Northern Ireland after partition in 1922 could not have survived without the police's extensive apparatus of coercion and control. Policing was central to the very existence of the state and Protestant hegemony. The police in Northern Ireland was until the early 1990s predominantly Protestant and seen by Catholics as an agent of British policy and a proxy for continued Unionist (Protestant) domination. For Protestants, the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) was their police, protecting them from the IRA (Irish Republican Army).

Policing goes to the heart of the conflict in Ireland due to the sectarian nature of the Stormont state and the role of the RUC as direct agents of unionists power, particularly after 1974. In 1998

the Good Friday Agreement, which was intended to form the basis for a political settlement in Northern Ireland, did not directly address the problem of policing but recognized its centrality in general terms. Under the terms of the Agreement, a commission was set up, under the chairmanship of Chris Patten, to inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and to make recommendations for future policing structures and arrangements. The Patten Report recognized that increasing the numbers of Catholics in the police is an essential part of any reform process, but it cannot be seen in isolation. Without parallel changes to the ethos, culture and structure of the police, changing the religious, ethnic and gender composition of police members will achieve little. In an attempt to change the cultural milieu of the police, the report recommended that the human rights dimension should be incorporated into every module of police training (Ellison, Smith, 2002).

1.7 Conclusion

Globalization increased the frequency and scope of minorities demanding to be recognized as separate entities within one nation state. In failed or fragile states such minorities transform into hybrid sectarian, cultural or ethnic entities and partner in some cases with criminal syndicates in their search for power and finance. The outcome would be disastrous and poses major threats to public safety which, in turn, demands a highly flexible police response.

Issues like national sovereignty, political dispute and religious sensitivities form major setbacks for police work and public safety. Police in the future must have the ability to operate effectively under a keen administration that knows exactly what police can achieve and how. Finally, one must not forget that crime prevention and combating should not only be a police issue, it must also encompass cultural, religious and political schemes. Community policing is a good idea in

that respect, but only when the Lebanese state improves from being a fragile state to a democratic liberal state such as Northern Ireland.

What is the policing model mostly preferred by the Lebanese community? In the next chapters the thesis highlights the policing experience of Northern Ireland and examines if community policing in Lebanon would be feasible within the present turbulent security circumstances. Then it looks into how the Northern Ireland model of community policing can be compared and, if possible, adapted to the Lebanese system. The thesis addresses the potential obstacles, if any, and how they can be overcome. A questionnaire similar to the Community Attitudes Survey Questionnaire 2003 in Northern Ireland will be discussed in Chapter three along with the methodology used to conduct the quantitative and qualitative research of this thesis study.

In chapter four the thesis polls the Lebanese public opinion and attitude toward the conduct of police and reveals the extent to which their perception is driven by sectarian convictions. Having probed for sectarian attitude, this has strong implication about the prospect of community policing when compared with the results of the Community Attitudes Survey conducted in Northern Ireland in 2003. The result may intrigue an exploration of policing models required to undermine polarized and communally divided opinion about the law enforcement practices. Chapter five further investigates this matter with four conducted interviews with law enforcement professionals and scholars. Accordingly, the thesis concludes with the possible alternatives for policing models in divided societies such as Lebanon.

CHAPTER TWO

POLICING MODELS IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES

2.1 Policing Experiences

Implementing best policing practices differ across societies. The United States, Japan, China, Britain, Northern Ireland, Central Africa, Australia, Afghanistan, Lebanon all have different social contexts and consequently different policing practices. Hence if one wants to improvise a general policing model that could be used in all of those societies irrespectively, and at the same time address the specific security needs of each and every one of them, one must think dynamically. Anderson (2000) stressed the fact that the industrial age with its militaristic law enforcement oriented policing is rapidly being replaced by the constantly changing, creative thinking information age world. Quick adaptation, flexibility, and networking/partnerships are the keys to individual and police agency survival in this new environment. Thus police should always be on a vision quest. Mistakes will be made and rectified as the mission and even the vision are constantly reevaluated and redirected in a rapidly and ever changing society.

A comparative analysis between police practices in the United States and Japan highlights the fact that enforcement difficulties may be as peculiar to different countries as views of morality are deeply rooted in popular culture. Bayley (1976) stresses the fact that in Japan the police have not been corrupted or demoralized by having to enforce laws against “victimless crime” as viewed by the public. Few people are brought into conflict with the law in their pursuit of pleasure because the law and public opinion would seem to be in harmony. According to Bayley, the key variable to assess regarding public opinion is whether the act involved is perceived as a private vice or a public menace. Japan criminalizes an act of vice only in the one instance where

there is an overwhelming consensus that the act is antisocial like drug addiction. On the other hand, the United States prohibits many kinds of vice regardless of whether the public considers them inherently antisocial. Bayley concluded that in the United States the linkage between public regard, police pride, and responsibility has operated to the detriment of police morals while in Japan the linkage has operated in favor of police responsibility and morals.

Though central African countries, Afghanistan, South Africa, Lebanon and Northern Ireland have different status as nation states and different causes for their societal divisions, similar law enforcement problems, but with different denotations, can be clearly noticed between them. Lefever (1970) examined the actual character and role of the armed forces and police in Ghana, the Congo, and Ethiopia from 1960 until early 1970. He stated that in many tropical African countries the police service was the junior partner in the task of maintaining internal security. In virtually all states the armed services performed police type, law and order functions, including border patrol, counter insurgency operations, and riot control. Though centrally administered, the police services were more provincially oriented, tribal, and less modernized than the armed forces. Their contribution to national identity and pride had thus been minimal.

Reid & Muhammedally (2011) highlighted the fact that within Afghanistan senior appointments to the police were generally made on political rather than professional grounds. The appointment system was well entrenched with political interference from the president, the parliament, and other powerful actors. In fact, political interventions in investigations of abuse or corruption were common. The poor reputation of the police and its ineffectiveness in establishing law and order contributed in some areas to support for the Taliban and, more broadly, was a significant cause of the disaffection of large parts of the population with the national government. The fact that only 8 percent of Afghans rated the Taliban as their most serious problem echoes this.

However, and due to high concerns regarding crime and access to justice, significant emphasis has been placed on using the police as an auxiliary force to fight the insurgency rather than to fight crime.

Marks, Shearing & Wood (2009) presented a community policing norm for post conflict and emergent states like South Africa. According to them the volatile character of South African state and society means that police configurations may be different than those in more reputable liberal democracies. Partnership arrangements between public police, private security officers and community members are convenient and crucial. They concluded that in developing countries like South Africa, police simply cannot be at the core of all community societal problem solving that is linked to broad notions of security.

Ellison & Smyth (2002) stressed that after the beginning of “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland in 1969, the British Army was deployed to protect nationalist areas (mainly Catholics) from loyalist attacks (mainly Protestants). After 1974, the decision to replace the British army with the predominantly Protestant RUC (Republic Ulster Constabulary) was a disastrous one -- especially after the transformation of the police into a fully-fledged counter insurgency force. This decision confirmed, in the eyes of nationalists (Catholics), that the police were simply the agents of British policy and a proxy for continued Unionist (Protestant) domination. For Protestants, the RUC was their police, protecting them from the IRA (Irish Republican Army).

Policing in developed countries, with mainly competent societies such as Britain, Australia and China, function according to different societal needs and security circumstances. Regarding the British Police experience, Reiner (1992) stressed the fact that in Britain there is an emerging consensus around a service based consumerist approach to policing. This kind of approach,

according to Reiner, is infinitely preferable to the tough “law and order” promises and practices of the early 1980s, which constituted much of the initial police reaction to combat crime and disorder. The consumerist approach in particular implies that the police can and should be whatever market surveys reveal consumer preferences to be. Policing business however, is the inevitably messy business of regulating social conflict. Police cannot control but rather are assaulted by the prevailing currents in society. The pressures of this underlie the demoralized condition of the British police as they enter the last decade of the millennium.

Fleming & O’Reilly (2009) commented that unlike Britain there are no formal policy parameters or legislation that compels Australian police organizations to undertake a committed holistic approach to working with communities. Australian police organizations have always struggled to meet the expectations of their stakeholders in terms of what their communities expect of them and what can realistically be delivered. While Australian communities are still linked to the arrest of offenders, and their own sense of safety and security as the determinants of whether police are doing their job, Australian police organizations will have no choice but to pursue small scale security initiatives, leaving them sufficient resources to pursue the more reactive calls for service approach the community expects.

Zhong (2009) divided the history of policing in China since 1949 into three periods: mass line policing (1949-1980), strike-hard policing (1981-2001), and community policing (as of 2002).

Zhong commented that to address the rising trend of crime and to improve police-public relations, the police imported the model of community policing from the West to China.

However, to a very large extent, mass line policing (as witnessed in the first period) demonstrated all of the features of community policing, even if the label was not used. The implementation of community policing was nothing more than “old wine in new bottles.” The

new package of community policing did not change the nature of policing much. The same language was used and similar approaches were adopted. The difference lies in the fact that the police operated in a totally different social environment, which was less conducive to community policing. Zhong concluded that the mass line, as a locally initiated policing guideline, should be upheld now as in the past, but the problem is how to adjust it to meet the needs of a changing social environment.

Everyone in a society has the right to debate what rules of engagement should govern the cops' attempt to enforce the law and keep the peace, but in the end, the authority of cops must be respected because being there really is radically different from watching it on TV. Making cops happier, more satisfied with their work, and more comfortable in their roles are all desirable goals for cops and consequently for the society they serve. There are limits to what can be done, many are moral and constitutional. Yet, asking cops what they want, observing them, and letting them speak openly may help create a better society.

2.2 Prevalent Policing Models

Using the standard model of policing, "one size fits all application" of reactive strategies to suppress crime, can lead police agencies to become more concerned with how police services are allocated than whether they have an impact on public safety. Whisenand (2009) argued that for community oriented policing (COP) and its tactical partner, problem oriented policing (POP), to happen, a police agency must first concentrate on values, ethics, vision, communication, then and all the rest. According to him, COP involves the abandonment of traditional management (top-down command) to team leadership, restructuring of police departments, and creating new community and police values. Police leaders who opt for a community oriented policing service

model must first build an organizational structure that counterbalances values (continuity) with vision (change). Leaders must be on the lookout for, and vigorously defend against, bureaucracy creep. Second, to implement empowerment, leaders must initiate a management by objectives program in which the objectives are clearly stated and the staff has sufficient interest to propose new solutions to old police problems, and jump in when they have something to contribute.

Problem Oriented Policing (POP) is a broad term that implies more than simply the elimination and prevention of crimes. Problem oriented policing is based on two assumptions. First, crime and disorder can be reduced by carefully studying the characteristics of problems in a geographic area and then applying the appropriate resources and tactics. Second, individuals make choices based on the opportunities presented by the immediate physical and social factors of an area and these factors can be affected in such a manner that the right choices will be made. Problem identification and problem definition are essential steps in POP. The superficial symptoms of crime are avoided while the root causes are looked for and desired. Both COP and POP strive for greater crime control, but the techniques are sufficiently different. COP depends more on community involvement, while POP relies more on corporate police-civilian problem solving. One strategy obviously contains tactics of the other.

Weisburd & Eck (2004) highlighted the fact that recent innovations in policing led to what is known as the problem oriented policing. This kind of policing approach expands beyond the standard model in terms of both focus and the tools that are used. Problem-oriented policing, as its name suggests, calls for the police to focus on specific problems and to fit their strategies to the problems identified. It thus calls for tailor-made and focused police practices. But in defining those practices, problem oriented policing also demands that the police look beyond their traditional law enforcement powers and draw upon a host of other possible methods for

addressing the problems they define. In problem oriented policing, the toolbox of policing might include community resources or the power of other government agencies.

Should police agencies continue to encourage community and problem-oriented policing?

Research evidence suggests that community policing, if not combined with problem oriented approaches, will make citizens feel safer, but will not necessarily affect crime and disorder. In contrast, what is known about the effects of problem oriented policing suggests its promise for reducing crime, disorder and fear.

Tyler (2004) commented that although the police represent the threat of force and carry guns with them, it is impractical for the police to be everywhere all of the time. Thus, the police must rely upon widespread, voluntary law abiding behavior to allow them to concentrate their resources on those people and situations in which compliance is difficult to obtain. When people widely ignore the law, the resources of the police quickly become inadequate to the maintenance of order.

To have an effective strategy for encouraging cooperation, people need to have additional reasons for cooperating that extend beyond instrumental assessments of police performance. One alternative is linked to the recognition that people have internalized values which the police may draw from to secure compliance and to gain cooperation. Legitimacy is suggested to be central to the exercise of police authority. When people feel that an authority is legitimate, they entrust that authority with the task of determining what their behavior will be within a given set of situations. A legitimacy-based strategy of policing increases cooperation with the law by drawing on people's sense of responsibility and obligation. The advantage of such a strategy lies in its ability to facilitate voluntary cooperation to the degree that cooperation is motivated by personal values.

Perlmutter (2000) observed that policemen are portrayed as heroes in reality-based media, films and television shows. But positive portrayals do not necessarily have positive social implications if social reality is in discordance with expectation. In being heroes who solve problems in mass media representations, real life police officers may fail to compete with this high standard. Cops live the opposition between what they must pretend to be and what the system actually lets them be. Police work is a study in the contradiction between expectations and reality.

2.3 Conclusion

While there are some similarities in terms of the way police deals with different political, religious or ethnic unrest in divided societies, a number of differences exist pertaining to how to approach these tensions, work on solving them and prevent if possible their reoccurrence in the future. That is why the comparative study of difficulties facing law enforcement in divided societies such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon is an important topic to discuss especially when it is presented from the viewpoint of a Lebanese police officer.

Law enforcement agencies today have an emerging and vital role in the war against religious/political extremism. Essential to their success is the critical step of building key relations and networks with multi-religious communities. For example, multi-sectarian knowledge and skills of local law enforcement can contribute to ease the tension among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland or Sunnis and Sh'ias in Lebanon in such a way that the communities will not feel targeted or persecuted. Winning over the different sects is of paramount importance; it will help to uncover key information, resources, and tools that are vital in the short term and prevent the rise of extremism and, consequently, closed religious communities who promote violence in the long term.

Policing in multicultural environments is a difficult task to handle especially in conflict ridden societies where the sect and culture coincide forming a complex situation. When religion and politic mix and interchange their roles, they feed into the multicultural/ multi-sectarian divide,. Bell (2002) stressed that change in legal rules or procedures must take into consideration the organizational norms that predate the changes. Changes in procedure, such as giving priority to terrorist crime prevention, or changes in legal rules regarding police interrogation confronts police officers' preexisting behaviors and attitudes. Control over the initial classification of incidents means that police wield the power, often un-reviewed by others in the criminal justice system, to determine those situations in which the law will be applied.

Community policing training is thus very important for police officers and helps them to be more equipped physically and mentally when dealing with conflict issues in divided societies. Robert Shusta, Levine, Wong & Harris (2005) argued that in order to improve communication across cultures, it is essential that people in law enforcement understand the overall style of communication, verbal and non-verbal, of different groups and utilize accordingly multicultural communication skills. Krivo & Peterson (2009) stated that when citizens perceive police as biased or disrespectful, they are less likely to trust them, less compliant with their requests, and less willing to cooperate with law enforcement measures to reduce crime. Delattre (1996) highlighted the fact that a police officer without an understanding of people will not deal competently with conflict, while one who has acquired it can calm adversaries, ease tension, and gain credible information from his community.

The thesis does not deny the advantages of community policing, but it questions the effectiveness of this style of policing in countries such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Brewer (1992) argued that attitudes toward the police in Northern Ireland cannot be properly understood

when they are presented only as a reflection of inter communal conflicts. Intra communal conflicts, that cause other lines of rupture, should also be accounted for. It was clear that there were cleavages within the minority community. These complicated the simplistic portrayal of Catholic attitudes toward the police and were reducing the prominence of religion as a determinant of those attitudes. Brewer concluded that political affiliation, rather than religion, was the best predictor of public attitudes toward the police. Other factors such as social status, gender and age were also important. Thus the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had the most work to do in improving its image among low status groups, the young, males, Catholics and nationalists.

The similarities between Northern Ireland and Lebanon in many aspects are striking; whether in the relation between politics and religion or in public perception toward police measures. Hickey (1984) remarked that in Northern Ireland religion inspires politics rather than politics making use of religion. Kerr (2005) stressed the fact that the power sharing experience in Northern Ireland and Lebanon depended on how the internal-external relationship was managed on both countries. The Ta'if accord in Lebanon and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in Northern Ireland were externally imposed agreements; however, the relationship between the external and domestic elites changed through the consociation. In Northern Ireland, given that the consociation suited the British and Irish governments, a higher level of interdependence developed among all the parties involved in the consociation. On the other hand, the relationship between Syria, Lebanon and the Arab world was a more complex one due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The mishandling and selfish interpretation of the agreed inter-confessional equilibrium at Ta'if by the Syrian regime doomed Ta'if to failure before it had even emerged. Thus the communities in Lebanon remained divided and lacked any serious unification.

Any future policing plan should recognize Lebanon's current security situation which is organized along sectarian divides. A transitional phase should be applied to transform the current sectarian policing environment to a non-sectarian one. In my opinion, the isolation of sectarianism in policing should be the foundation of any anticipated policing framework.

The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, which was set up as part of the agreement reached in Belfast, published a report entitled "A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland- Policing Plan 2012-2015" (March, 2012). In its report the independent commission stated that the full transformation of policing in Northern Ireland will be possible only with active community support and a continuing commitment to peace. The commission, through reviewing surveys of public opinion, highlighted the fact that the views people expressed about the police were often essentially political views about the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). They were evaluating the institution rather than the policing service which they themselves have received. The surveys have also found a large difference between Protestant and Catholic views of whether the police treat their two communities equally. However, most people in both communities stated that they would like to see a less "military" style of policing with less weaponry and smaller patrols. The report remarked that the problems faced by Northern Ireland police were in a sense unique to a divided society, but that many of them were also general policing issues confronting police elsewhere in the world.

According to the (Northern Ireland Policing Board Report, 2012), the situation in Northern Ireland has changed sufficiently to allow changes in the way in which policing services were delivered. Police are no longer relying on the army except when dealing with widespread public disorder and problem-solving policing in partnership with the community have become the

mainspring of police work. The report concluded that the objectives of the policing plan specified should be implemented as an integral whole and be clear to the community as well as to the police with time tables covering different responsibilities and periodic reporting to account for any failures to achieve the desired objectives. Also, police should be reflective of the population of Northern Ireland as a whole, particularly in terms of political/religious tradition and gender.

Building on what has been said about the political, religious and policing situation in both Northern Ireland and Lebanon, the next chapter will try to answer if community policing in Lebanon would be feasible within the present turbulent security circumstances. A questionnaire similar to the Community Attitudes Survey Questionnaire 2003 in Northern Ireland will be distributed and the results compared to assess the feasibility of such a policing model in Lebanon. The conclusion should highlight the policing model mostly preferred by the Lebanese community.

CHAPTER THREE

ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNITY POLICING – A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND AND LEBANON

3.1 Introduction, Aims and Objectives

As countries in the developing world struggle to move from authoritarian policing to democratic policing, they have searched for models to adopt. This research paper used the Northern Ireland case study of community policing to explore this concept was introduced in Lebanon.

Several attempts were made by NICO to introduce community policing in Lebanon. Community policing courses were offered to police officers at different ranks. Today, and for assessment purposes, a pioneering project of community policing is being introduced. A policing station in a multi sectarian middle class neighborhood in Beirut was identified as a perfect testing unit (Hbeish police station). Handpicked trained personnel will test the added value and community reactions toward the newly introduced concept of community policing.

In this research study community policing will be explored to understand how deeply divided societies operate under the community policing paradigm. Taking into consideration the special Lebanese cultural and indigenous attributes that set it apart from other models such as the Northern Ireland community policing model, this research compared several themes of community policing between Northern Ireland and Lebanon with regard to how community policing evolved in both countries.

The goal of this research is to explore policing dilemmas in divided societies. The tasks are to gather views on local policing quantitatively and qualitatively, analyze them, compare them and then offer the appropriate suggestions accordingly.

The study should offer in-depth analysis of the complexities of policing in divided societies by laying out some of the Lebanese lessons in detail. It should also identify opportunities for improvement in police operations and training through a relationship improvement perspective between community residents and security forces.

3.2 Methodology

In divided societies a large number of people are skeptical of the legality of actions taken by law enforcement personnel. The absence of a political/religious consensus, as is the case in Lebanon, and to a lesser extent in Northern Ireland, intensifies policing problems. The existence of paramilitary violence along with political divides leads to the creation of political/religious elites who enjoy wide powers. Security personnel encounter additional problems when training to act effectively while gaining community confidence at the same time.

Furthermore, it is believed that a select group of people may be discriminated against and treated unfairly by the security forces. Since 2005 there have been a number of reforms within the Lebanese police organization (ISF) in response to these concerns.

The methodology of this study reports about the procedures, the sample, the questionnaires and data analysis techniques.

3.2.1 Procedure:

In order to assess policing models and whether the Northern Ireland community policing model is suitable for Lebanon, the research carries out several personal interviews with key law officers in Lebanon and Northern Ireland in order to reveal comparative similarities and differences. It also triangulates the findings with a public opinion poll that probes for community attitudes toward policing practices, compares it with Northern Ireland Community Attitudes report, and reveals challenges for modeling the adaptation of such a policing model in Lebanon.

Four Personal interviews were conducted with key police leaders in Lebanon, a Northern Ireland researcher, and a former Northern Ireland police officer responsible for the implementation of NICO community policing program in Lebanon. The selection of these interviewees was made based on their police experience, publications and ongoing police reform programs. A quantitative attitude survey, with 240 Lebanese people, was also conducted in order to reveal public perception and communal differences toward the Lebanese police performance.

Secondary data were also used to confirm the various findings revealed from the interviews and surveys.

The interviewed persons were Mr. Jonathan McIvor, Project Director of Northern Ireland Co-operation Overseas (NI-CO) in Lebanon since 2008 (The Internal Security Forces Strategic Planning, Human Rights and Public Outreach Project), General Ibrahim Basbos, head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) training unit, General Dib Tbaily, head of Beirut Police, and Professor Michael Kerr Director - Centre for the Study of Divided Societies Middle East & Mediterranean Studies Program, School of Arts & Humanities King's College London, England.

The above individuals were selected because of their deep understanding of community policing issues in divided societies. Similarly Professor Michael Kerr is a world renowned authority on Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon.

The interviews addressed respondents' views on the role of security forces in divided societies. This involved structured and focused interviews with professionals in police conduct and structure in divided societies. The main objective of these interviews was to clarify issues based on the personal experiences of the respondents and complement the questionnaire results.

The Research hypothesis revolved around assessing community style policing in Northern Ireland and Lebanon with respect to other policing models in divided societies. Community style policing may not be the premium model for accomplishing the security and safety desperately needed by the public in such societies. The sensitivity of police culture for any process of change was taken into consideration especially that, in divided societies, religion, politics and culture play a major role in police appointment, structure, attitudes and security achievement strategies. Practically, the goal of the research was to explore different policing models as a preliminary step toward establishing the best policing model in divided societies in general and in Lebanon in specific.

3.2.2 Detailed Comparison between the Community Attitudes Survey (CAS) 2003 and the Lebanese survey:

The Sample

In this research the sample of respondents were 240 people, taken from citizens who visited certain Beirut Mokhtars (The criteria for their selection is presented in section 3.3.2-Quantitative Data Gathering). While the Irish study was drawn from a large representative sample of

1400citizens, the Lebanese sample was based on voluntary participation and not necessarily representation.

Sample selection in Lebanon was restricted due to the complexity of the sectarian divisions and the security situation, which have even prevented conducting a proper population census.

Though comparing results between a representative and non-representative sample may not be relevant, this thesis only seeks to become familiar with the attitudes and successes of community policing and makes no generalization regarding the population.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of seven sections and each contained several items. The used questionnaire has been previously developed by the Central Survey Unit - Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, (2003). The questionnaire was selected because of its fitness and relevance to this investigation.(Retrieved from <http://www.csu.nisra.gov.uk/survey.asp18.htm>)

The title of each of the seven sections of the questionnaire is listed below:

- 1- Satisfaction with local area
- 2- Frequency of certain crime types, crime trends and comparisons
- 3- Policing problems
- 4- Reporting crime, contact with and by the police
- 5- Fairness, effectiveness and balance of police
- 6- Complaints against the police, changes in the police, local involvement in policing issues
- 7- Accessibility, effectiveness and fairness of the courts and the criminal justice system

The Lebanese questionnaire has only used items available in the fifth subtitle “Policing Priorities,” sixth subtitle “Reporting a Crime and Contact with the Police” and seventh subtitle “Perceptions of the Police and Composition of the Police Force.”

The Fieldwork

In the Northern Ireland Community Attitudes Survey 2003 addresses were issued to a panel of around 50 interviewers on a monthly basis. The response rate (eligible addresses) between January 2003 and December 2003 were 73%. Productive interviews were obtained at 68% of eligible addresses. While in this research 80% of the Mokhtars -- selected on sectarian and regional bases -- were very cooperative and returned each the required 10 questionnaires within three weeks while the other 20% refused to cooperate.

Representativeness of the Sample

To evaluate how precisely the Community Attitudes Survey sample reflected the inhabitants of Northern Ireland, the sample has been matched with constituents of the Northern Ireland inhabitants from the 2001 census of Population. The CAS sample was also matched to the accomplished sample of the Continuous Household Survey (CHS). In Lebanon there was no available statistical data that could help the research and thus the Mokhtars were chosen to help cover people from different Beirut areas and sectarian back grounds, keeping in mind that this study is not about representative opinion, but only about preliminary assessment given to forms of policing by served constituencies.

Sampling Error

The sample for the Community Attitudes Survey in Northern Ireland was drawn as a simple random sample. While the sample in this research, was at first a stratified sample to select the Mokhtars on the basis of sect and region. At the second level, it was an accidental non-probability sample based on the citizens who visited the mokhtars.

Details of Selected Respondents

Classification of information relating to the selected respondents in the Community Attitudes Survey was always collected. Of those respondents who participated in the survey, 54% were Protestant, 39% were Catholic while 7% did not identify with either religion. In this research equal number of mokhtars was chosen from each sect to distribute the surveys to citizens who visited them irrespective of their sect -- though, in most cases, citizens visit a mokhtar from their own sect. The legal adult age to perform any legal document in Lebanon is 18.. Hence the respondents irrespective of their sex were all over 18.

Note on the Analysis of Results

All percentages were based on tables that reflected the full range of responses given by respondents, including "don't know" and "refusal." These responses can be seen in the tables accompanying the Northern Ireland bulletin results via the internet. Similar tables were compared together, while results based on new independent variables (such as attitudes toward policing in troubled neighborhoods in contrast to calm areas) were analyzed independently.

Structure of the Questionnaire

Due to logistic, financial and legal-structural restrains, only 16 questions were chosen out of 93 questions from the base Community Attitudes Survey Questionnaire 2003. From the initial survey under the 5th subtitle “Policing Priorities” questions (q27a, q27a1-oth, q28a and q31a) were chosen as the first, second, third and fourth questions consecutively of this research.

In question 27a, question one of this research, options 6, 7, 10, 13 and 14 were omitted and replaced by options 11(sectarian harassment/ attacks) and 12(teenagers hanging around the streets). Questions two and three were identical while in question 31a, question four of this research, options five and six were omitted and replaced by option 7 (more militarism of police).

Under the 6th subtitle “Reporting a Crime and Contact with the Police” questions (q 32a1, Whynot01-12, q33a, q33a11-14, q35a, q36) were chosen as questions number five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten consecutively of this research.

Under the 7th subtitle “Perceptions of the Police and Composition of the Police Force” questions q 42a, qf2a, q52a, q55a, q56a and q57 were chosen as questions number 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. In question 57, question 15 of this research, the respondents-- unlike the initial survey -- were given two options to answer: a “if the group of local people has sectarian or political affiliations” and b “if the group of local people is of no political or sectarian affiliation” and a follow up question “if there is a difference between option a and b and why.” Other questions were identical and every respondent was given the opportunity to add any other comments at the end of the survey.

Problems and Limitations

The Northern Ireland Community Attitudes Survey Questionnaire of 2003 was chosen to be compared with a 2013 community attitudes survey in Lebanon because the 2003 survey was most recent survey to be published on the internet site:

<http://www.csu.nisra.gov.uk/survey.asp18.htm>.

The researcher did not ask in this community attitudes survey about the sect of each respondent because that matter was sensitive and could cause bias in answering the survey. Thus mohktars from different sects were chosen instead because according to the viewpoint of the researcher perceptions toward police were primarily political-religious and local representatives such as the mohktars from different sects would provide better samples for generalization.

Undoubtedly, there was the risk that the selected sample was exceptional and did not represent the population (sampling error). However, the non-probability accidental sample of the Lebanese population was selected because it was not possible to obtain random observations of all the cases due to research limitations (time, financial). The observation unit in this research survey was the current Lebanese policing model while the variable was policing practices and public attitudes toward them.

In the opinion of the researcher the results were to a large extent consistent and accurate in representing the population under study and can be reproduced again under a similar methodology. The questions in the survey were intended to measure people's attitudes toward policing in general and community policing in specific and succeeded in achieving that goal.

3.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods

Quantitative and qualitative methods interact in the practice of social research, and that's why data collection in this research was gathered qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative methods produced information only on the particular cases studied while quantitative methods were used to verify the hypotheses.

The qualitative research method helped to better understand and interpret the social interactions of policemen within their local communities. It assisted in identifying the patterns, features and themes of police practices and behavior. The conducted interviews explore in-depth the community policing approach from the viewpoints of police and social experts with respect to other policing models. The intent of the interviews was to identify the strengths and weaknesses of existing police practices in Northern Ireland and Lebanon in order to recognize the best policing model for Lebanon.

The quantitative research method helps to look at the implications of the current policing model in Lebanon and make predictions for the best policing model in divided societies. It provides an efficient tool for, statistically and objectively, comparing the community policing model between Northern Ireland and Lebanon and to know if a successful policing model in one country can be projected and applied in another. This is essential to provide an insight into the setting of Lebanese police problems and help generate ideas for comparable quantitative research.

3.3.1 Qualitative Data Gathering:

Although the qualitative research interviews may not lead to objective information, they captured many of the subject's views on police and uncovered the meaning of their experiences. All interviewees were asked the same standardized open ended questions; this approach was used to

facilitate interviews by rendering them easier to analyze and compare. Ethical issues such as informed consent and confidentiality were accounted for. Research subjects were informed about the purpose of the interview investigation and the main features of the design. During the interview an interview guide was presented to indicate the topics and the sequence of the interview. The interviews were spontaneous and the interviewees talked freely with some follow-up questions (Kvale, 1996).

Three interviews were taped. Two of them were taped in Arabic and translated into English. A little bit of editing was also made for the same reason.

The interviews were structured to know the respondents' preferences regarding policing practices and objectives in conflict ridden and divided societies such as Lebanon. They also looked at the effect of political/religious divide on police work and stressed on the factors that were essential for its success. Finally, the interviews explored policemen/women prejudices on the job and how the absence of a political/religious solution can affect their work.

Also questions concerning the suitability of applying a certain policing model in many situations without any feedback or alterations were discussed. The importance of clear and effective policing strategy was highlighted. In conclusion, community policing with respect to other policing models and the level of its success in divided societies especially in Lebanon was clarified.

The first interview was conducted with Mr. Jonathan McIvor who is the Project Director of Northern Ireland Co-operation Overseas (NI-CO) in Lebanon since 2008 (The Internal Security Forces Strategic Planning, Human Rights and Public Outreach Project). The second and third

interviews were conducted in Arabic with general Ibrahim Basbos, head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) training unit and general Dib Tbaily, head of Beirut police. One interview was made via Skype because the interviewee, Professor Michael Kerr Director - Centre for the Study of Divided Societies Middle East & Mediterranean Studies Program, School of Arts & Humanities King's College London, was in England. The Interviewees were selected according to their experience (training, management) or extensive comparable knowledge regarding Northern Ireland and Lebanon. The questions were chosen carefully to uncover prevalent trends in the thoughts and opinions of the respondents. The answers helped me to develop an initial understanding and sound base for further exploration and investigation.

Interview answers formed a set of themes and patterns exclusive to the respondents. Any generalization based on these answers would be a hypothesis made by the researcher and should be tested further through quantitative research methods. The interview results of this research are reliable and verifiable. For validity purposes the three interviews made with the two Lebanese generals and Mr. Jonathan McIvor were taped. However, Professor Michael Kerr answered the interview questions via Skype.

3.3.2 Quantitative Data Gathering:

Quantitative data analysis techniques were used in order to determine the relationships between variables. This research was an observational quantitative research, not an interventional one. Dependent variables in this research were police performance, efficiency, and public preferences, while independent variables were sectarian affiliation and local districts. The relationship between variables was expressed through statistics, such as relative frequencies. The systematic empirical investigation of community policing via statistical techniques was a preliminary step applied before modeling and analyzing the data collected. Causal relationships

were studied by manipulating factors thought to influence community policing in Lebanon like sectarian affiliation or security dilemmas while controlling other variables.

In Beirut city there are 108 Mokhtars distributed within 12 Beirut districts. The Mokhtar is an elected local official that represents the local community and is also a member of the judicial police. For an accurate estimate of the relationship between variables, an observational research needs a sample of hundreds of people. Therefore, quantitative data was collected from 240 questionnaires distributed equally at the rate of 10 questionnaires to each of the 24 Mokhtars chosen on the basis of their sectarian affiliations (eight Sunni- eight Shi'a- eight Christian), district they represent and the security of their area.

The Mokhtars, were the most practical and efficient way to tap into a wide range of Beirut's various sectarian and political populations Beirut's diversity makes it a very good sample of the Lebanese population with regard to the religious/political opinions of its inhabitants and the success of policing it is pivotal for the success of policing in Lebanon in general.

The ultimate goal was to know the preference of the Lebanese public between community policing and other policing models. However, It was also important to see how the opinion toward policing differs between people who went to a Sunni Mokhtar and people who went to a Shi'a Mokhtar; between people who went to a Muslim Mokhtar and people who went to a Christian Mokhtar; between people who went to Mokhtars in troubled districts and people who went to mokhtars in calm and peaceful neighborhoods. It was vital to determine how different communities perceive policing according to their sect and the security situation in their region, and how much the two variables (the sect and the security situation) interfere with these perceptions.

Each mokhtar distributed the questionnaires to his acquaintances and to people who visited him on accomplish official business. Once the questionnaires were completed they were collected and compared on a question by question basis to a similar community attitudes survey questionnaire conducted in 2003 in Northern Ireland.

The community attitudes questionnaire of Northern Ireland in 2003 measured the attitudes toward police in general, and then measured them with respect to sect, age and sex. The results in the questionnaire were compared to the general results of the Northern Ireland questionnaire irrespective of age and sex. The sect of the Mokhtars was taken instead of the sect of the public because I wanted to know the opinion toward police from people who viewed the Shi'a mokhtar as their local representative in comparison with those who viewed the Sunni mokhtar or the Christian mokhtar as their local representative.

The new category of measurement unique to this research was the attitude toward police in troubled neighborhoods in contrast to calm area. Accordingly, community style policing in Lebanon was assessed with respect to Northern Ireland but from the view point of a Lebanese police officer.

3.4 Conclusion

In this research study qualitative data analysis was based upon the conducted interviews while quantitative data analysis was based primarily on the item by item comparison with the community attitudes policing survey of Northern Ireland. When the researcher moved toward implementation it was evident that there are minor changes in the attitudes of polarization along the Lebanese sectarian lines toward police. However, while it became the norm to discuss sectarian attitudes toward the police, this study had highlighted the wide divergences toward that matter within each sect at local levels and between different areas.

There was a unanimous understanding that any answer to Lebanese policing problems needs a widely agreed upon political reconciliation. An undisputed support for greater role of police was also witnessed. Though selected groups within the Lebanese community were unsatisfied with regard to particular aspects of current policing, the majority of the population remains in favor of police activities.

In the wake of security unrest, the police have been making moves toward "demilitarization" and it was important that this process be tested since this was unlikely, in itself, to lead to effective policing. Firstly, the Lebanese police is unable to switch easily or rapidly to community policing after decades of primarily paramilitary policing style. Secondly, there is no clear general strategy of implementation which bewilders Lebanese police chiefs and creates a major obstacle for the success of any newly introduced policing plan.

The next chapter will analyze the collected data to explore whether the Lebanese community is happy with the current role of police and the newly introduced model of community policing. The transparency and goal achievement of the new introduced model will be tested on two levels. The first level will be an independent analysis based upon the conducted interviews and survey results while the second level will be a comparative analysis based upon comparison with the results of the community attitudes survey 2003. The comparison will be restricted to similar questions and answers. Any addition specific to this research will be omitted from the comparison.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICE PERCEPTION AND EFFECTIVENES

4.1 Introduction

It is imperative that we understand how mass politics and media influence public attitudes toward police in Lebanon. After 2005 police, especially the intelligence or information units, were not portrayed positively by the 8th of March political coalition news media. For example, it focused on negative criticism rather than positive or successful crime prevention efforts. In essence, the police information unit was successful in combating crime in all areas irrespective of any sectarian or political affiliation, but policemen were rarely pictured as heroes due to political/religious considerations between the 8th of March and 14th of March political coalitions.

The conducted survey research highlighted the fact that Christians in general have better perception toward police than –Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. (Table number 10, 34, 37 in Results). The researcher suggests that the reason behind this difference is not due to sectarian or religious issues, but rather to security concerns. After 2005, Christian areas, whether in Beirut or in Lebanon, enjoyed a relatively better security situation than other areas. Respondents who believed that there is a high number of problems in their neighborhood were more likely to rate police effectiveness as being poor. Respondents may believe that the local police were not properly fulfilling their role in the community. These respondents may feel that the police were not adequately protecting their communities.

Finally, the Lebanese people in general and irrespective of their sectarian affiliation or area were more likely to hold low ratings of police effectiveness. These results are similar to prior research made by NI-CO which suggested that Lebanese people have an antagonistic view of police and

that there is a climate of distrust between Lebanese and law enforcement personnel. This research highlighted the same bad environment of cooperation between police and citizens. Nevertheless, Lebanese who resided in unsafe areas with high crime rate were more likely to have held negative attitudes toward police.

This study reveals that Lebanese in turbulent security areas are more likely to have negative attitudes toward police performance. Although statistically minimal, the strength of this finding is significant. In addition, there are differences with regard to police perception between the personnel level and the mass level. As I mentioned earlier the respondents' attitudes in the survey varied between safe areas and unsafe areas rather than between different sectarian affiliations. However, on the mass level all the Lebanese people can clearly notice the difference between the rhetoric of the 14th of March political coalition (spearheaded by the Sunni sect) and that of the 8th of March political coalition (spearheaded by the Shi'a sect) toward police, especially toward the information unit whose chief was assassinated in October 2012.

4.2 Northern Ireland and Lebanon- Survey Results and Analysis

The questionnaires in Lebanon were distributed randomly to 24 Mokhtars in Beirut city. The Mokhtars were chosen on the basis of their sectarian affiliations (eight Sunni- eight Shi'a- eight Christian), district they represent and the security situation in their area; 240 questionnaires were collected, at the rate of 10 questionnaires from each Mokhtar.

The names of the Sunni Mokhtars were Gharib Hassan (Marfaa area-stable security), Sami Al-Siblini (Dar-Al- Mraiseh area-stable security), Bassem Al-Hout (Minet Al-Hosn area-stable security), Abd AL-Basset Aitany and Ghassan Chehab (Ras-Beirut area-stable security),

Mohammed Ali Al-Anouty and Rifaat Al-Zuhairi (Mosaitbi area, turbulent security), Abd Al-Hadi Al-Obaidy (Mazraa area- turbulent security).

The names of the Shi'a Mokhtars were Rashid Baydoun, Ali Htait, Mohammed Yehia Al-Lababidi and Abbass Mallah (Zkak Al-Blat area-turbulent security), Mbarek Baydoun and Hassan Shouman (Al-Bachoura area-turbulent security), Mohammed Rakin and Sami Assaf (Khandak Al-Ghamik area, turbulent security).

The names of the Christian Mokhtars were Bedrous Koulagian and Michael Fayad (Al-Rmeil area, stable security), John Nihmey, Pyar Sadka, and Elie Sabagha (Achrafieh area, stable security), Francois Galakh (Mdawar area- stable security), Michael Nasr (Al-Seifi area-stable security), Ghassan Majdalani (Mosaitbi area-turbulent security).

➤ The result analysis of the Lebanese survey was based upon:

I- Sect of the Mokhtar

Sect of the Mokhtar	Frequency	Percent
Christians	80	33.3
Sunni	80	33.3
Shi'a	80	33.3
Total	240	100.0

Table N°1

II- Kind of Area

Kind of area	Frequency	Percent
Safe area	120	50.0
Unsafe area	120	50.0
Total	240	100.0

Table N°2

➤ Comparison between the Lebanese Survey and the Northern Ireland Community

Attitudes Survey 2003 was made on a question by question basis according to the chosen questions indicated earlier in chapter three.

The safe and unsafe category was omitted from comparison because this classification was unique to the Lebanese survey. The results from this classification highlighted the following facts:

- 1- The highest percentage of people in Beirut safe areas viewed police performance as neither good nor poor while the highest percent of people in security turbulent areas (Unsafe areas) viewed police performance as very poor (table Number 11 in Results).
- 2- In safe areas the highest percentage of people wanted more police who understand the needs of the local community, while in unsafe areas higher percentage of people wanted more army acting in support of the police and more militarism of police than in safe areas(table Number 14 in Results).
- 3- In safe areas people viewed police performance in handling their cases or complaints as neither good nor bad while the highest percentage of people in unsafe areas were very dissatisfied with how police handled their cases (table Number 29 in Results).
- 4- In safe areas the highest percentage of people thought that police should be prepared to explain their actions while the highest percentage of people in unsafe areas thought that it depends on the event (table Number 44 in Results).
- 5- In safe areas the highest percentage of people regarded that contacting the local police station or officer can cause a general change in the way police do their job while in unsafe areas the highest percentage for that change was through contacting the interior minister or the media and press(table Number 59 in Results).

Thus and according to the above mentioned facts one can conclude that people in unsafe Beirut areas have lower perception for police performance than in safe areas. In Beirut safe areas people trust local police stations more for initiating change, want closer links between police and local community groups and more police who understands the needs of the local community. On the other hand in unsafe areas people don't trust the police, resort to the interior minister or media for any police reform, and ask for more army intervention in support of the police and more militarism of police.

Accordingly, the researcher closes his argument by stating that security turbulence may have political or religious causes; however, police are always blamed because they represent the first line of defense for protecting citizens and maintaining law and order. That is not to say that police in Lebanon now is at its best, on the contrary, bad policing habits, corruption, sectarian appointments and intermediation are at their peak causing further damage to police performance and reputation(the detailed tables for all the results are found in appendix three of this research).

Since the current political/religious turbulence in Lebanon is basically sectarian in nature between Sunnis and Shi'a the results from Christian Mokhtars was not considered in the comparison tables with Northern Ireland. Also questions two, six and eight from the Lebanese survey were omitted from comparison due to logistical considerations. Minor changes were added to question fifteen to properly suit the Lebanese case; however only similar answers in the 13 remaining questions were compared between Northern Ireland Community Attitudes Survey 2003 and the Lebanese Survey. The percentages were adjusted accordingly.

4.3 Comparison between Northern Ireland & Lebanon

III- Comparison between Northern Ireland & Lebanon in questions:

1- What, in your view, should receive most attention from the police in this area?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Burglary	13.81%	19.67%
Theft of or from cars	15.48%	11.48%
Assaults	9.52%	4.92%
Damage to property/ vandalism	6.90%	18.03%
Drunk and disorderly people	7.38%	9.84%
Family disputes	1.67%	1.64%
Illegal drug abuse	21.19%	13.11%
Child abuse/ Women abuse	3.81%	3.28%
Unable to chose	1.67%	3.28%
All equally important	17.86%	4.92%
None of these	0.71%	9.84%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Burglary	23.73%	15.63%	11.15%	11.06%
Theft of or from cars	8.47%	14.06%	17.49%	9.24%
Assaults	5.08%	4.69%	9.13%	11.97%
Damage to property/ vandalism	20.34%	15.63%	11.15%	3.64%
Drunk and disorderly people	6.78%	14.06%	10.53%	4.55%
Family disputes	0.00%	1.56%	2.17%	2.73%
Illegal drug abuse	13.56%	12.50%	18.11%	33.03%
Child abuse/ Women abuse	3.39%	3.13%	4.18%	0.00%
Unable to chose	3.39%	3.13%	0.77%	1.82%
All equally important	5.08%	4.69%	15.33%	20.15%
None of these	10.17%	10.94%	0.00%	1.82%

- 2- Omitted from comparison
- 3- How good a job do you think the police are already doing in your area to deal with the problems identified in question one (27a in Community Attitudes Northern Ireland Survey)?
- a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Very good	1.3%	3.3%
Fairly good	12.1%	27.2%
Neither good nor poor	27.5%	20.7%
Fairly poor	31.7%	28.3%
Very poor	27.5%	20.7%

- b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Very good	3.19%	4.34%	0.00%	2.50%
Fairly good	28.72%	23.91%	13.80%	7.50%
Neither good nor poor	21.27%	18.47%	27.50%	21.30%
Fairly poor	28.72%	28.26%	23.80%	38.80%
Very poor	18.08%	25%	35.00%	30.00%

4- What kind of police measures would you like to see more in Northern Ireland/Lebanon according to the country of the survey?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
More police on the streets in cars	16.06%	12.63%
More police on the streets on foot	21.85%	40.00%
More army acting in support of the police	13.41%	1.05%
Closer links between police and local community groups	19.70%	17.89%
More women police officers	8.28%	2.11%
More police who understands the needs of the local community	20.03%	23.16%
Unable to choose	0.50%	1.05%
None of these	0.17%	2.11%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
More police on the streets in cars	13.40%	11.11%	17.03%	15.86%
More police on the streets on foot	50.52%	25.56%	21.83%	21.82%
More army acting in support of the police	2.06%	0.00%	13.26%	16.42%
Closer links between police and local community groups	12.37%	26.67%	20.91%	19.12%
More women police officers	2.06%	1.11%	7.54%	8.21%
More police who understands the needs of the local community	18.56%	30.00%	19.43%	17.44%
Unable to choose	0.00%	1.11%	0.00%	0.56%
None of these	1.03%	4.44%	0.00%	0.56%

5- If you had information about an ordinary crime, a nuisance, or disturbance, which one of the things listed below would you be most likely to do?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Would not report crime	10%	2%
Visit the police station	8.7%	13%
Talk to police else where	8%	1%
112 telephone call	52.5%	28%
Confidential telephone call	11%	9%
Ordinary telephone call	4.3%	46%
Written communication	1.7%	0%
No preference	3.7%	1%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Would not report crime	1%	2%	13.50%	9.70%
Visit the police station	15%	10%	11.50%	7.50%
Talk to police else where	1%	1%	8.70%	11.80%
112 telephone call	27%	27%	48.10%	54.80%
Confidential telephone call	8%	11%	11.50%	4.30%
Ordinary telephone call	46%	46%	1.90%	7.50%
Written communication	1%	0%	2.90%	1.10%
No preference	1%	1%	1.90%	3.20%

6- Omitted from comparison

7- Have you made contact with the police during the past 12 months?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Yes	34.7%	30%
No	65.3%	70%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Yes	31%	26%	41.30%	35.40%
No	69%	74%	58.80%	64.60%

- 8- Omitted from comparison
- 9- Overall, were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the police handled this matter?
- a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Very satisfied	7.6%	37%
Fairly satisfied	21.7%	32%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	28.3%	8%
Fairly dissatisfied	15.2%	9%
Very dissatisfied	27.2%	14%

- b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Very satisfied	39%	37%	7.90%	10.30%
Fairly satisfied	30%	35%	18.40%	13.80%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	7%	7%	26.30%	37.90%
Fairly dissatisfied	11%	4%	13.20%	17.20%
Very dissatisfied	13%	16%	34.20%	20.70%

10- In general, did this contact with the police make you feel more or less favorable toward the police, or did it make no difference to your view of them?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
More favorable	18.9%	17%
Less favorable	44.4%	11%
No difference	36.7%	71%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
More favorable	17%	22%	18.40%	14.30%
Less favorable	11%	12%	36.80%	53.60%
No difference	72%	66%	44.70%	32.10%

11- Excluding terrorism or sectarian crime, please tell me how polite the police in your area are when dealing with ordinary police problems?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Very polite	5%	34.07%
Quite polite	18.5%	46.15%
Neither polite nor impolite	63.9%	13.19%
Not very polite	7.1%	4.40%
Not at all polite	5.5%	2.20%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Very polite	38.71%	28.74%	1.20%	6.30%
Quite polite	46.24%	48.28%	14.60%	15.20%
Neither polite nor impolite	11.83%	14.94%	67.10%	67.10%
Not very polite	2.15%	5.75%	9.80%	5.10%
Not at all polite	1.08%	2.30%	7.30%	6.30%

12- Thinking now about terrorist or sectarian crime, do the police do a good job or a poor job?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Very good	2.5%	13.8%
Fairly good	15.3%	47.9%
Neither good nor poor	40.7%	14.9%
Fairly poor	26.3%	14.9%
Very poor	15.3%	8.5%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Very good	21.05%	4.39%	1.30%	3.80%
Fairly good	49.47%	46.15%	14.30%	11.30%
Neither good nor poor	11.57%	18.68%	39.00%	36.30%
Fairly poor	12.63%	16.48%	27.30%	32.50%
Very poor	5.26%	14.28%	18.20%	16.30%

13- Do you think it is important for local people to have a say in the way in which they are policed, or do you think decisions about policing are best made just by the police themselves?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Local police should have a say	66.7%	81.4%
Decisions best made just by the police	33.3%	18.6%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Local police should have a say	79.38%	86.73%	65.90%	67.50%
Decisions best made just by the police	20.62%	13.27%	34.10%	32.50%

14- Do you think it is important that the police be prepared to explain their actions or do you think that the police should be trusted to have acted in the best interests of the community?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Explain their actions	42.2%	65.3%
Trusted to have acted in the best interests	21.9%	22.4%
Depends on event	35.9%	12.2%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Explain their actions	57.58%	75.51%	43.80%	31.30%
Trusted to have acted in the best interests	30.31%	12.24%	21.30%	28.90%
Depends on event	12.12%	12.24%	34.80%	39.80%

15- In some areas, groups of local people meet regularly with the police to discuss matters to do with policing the community. How much notice do you think the police take of what such a group has to say?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
A lot of notice	47.3%	15.7%
Some notice	20.1%	66.3%
Not much notice	17.6%	14.6%
No notice at all	15.1%	3.4%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
A lot of notice	17.78%	13.64%	45.10%	52.60%
Some notice	70.00%	60.23%	19.50%	15.40%
Not much notice	10.00%	21.59%	24.40%	14.10%
No notice at all	2.22%	4.55%	11.00%	17.90%

16- If you wanted to see a general change in the way the police do their job in your area, who would you first think of contacting?

a. First:

	Lebanon	Northern Ireland
Local police station or officer	19.6%	30.0%
Police headquarters or the director general of Internal Security Forces	17.1%	5.7%
Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister	19.9%	0.0%
Member of Parliament	6.7%	30.0%
District governor or commissioner	3.4%	20.0%
Press or media	16.5%	0.0%
Other	0.9%	1.4%
Wouldn't contact anyone	15.9%	12.9%

b. Second:

	Northern Ireland		Lebanon (Mokhtar Sect)	
	Protestant	Catholic	Sunni	Shi'a
Local police station or officer	32.88%	26.09%	16.70%	17.50%
Police headquarters or the director general of ISF	8.22%	1.45%	23.70%	8.20%
Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister	0.00%	0.00%	17.50%	26.80%
Member of Parliament	34.25%	23.19%	9.60%	1.00%
District governor or commissioner	13.70%	30.43%	2.60%	4.10%
Press or media	0.00%	0.00%	11.40%	21.60%
Other	1.37%	2.90%	0.90%	1.00%
Wouldn't contact anyone	9.59%	15.94%	17.50%	19.60%

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

In 2001, after the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which is predominately Protestant and accused of being biased against Catholic communities, was dissolved and the subsequent agency was the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The researcher argues that police in Northern Ireland was part of the sectarian problem between Protestants and Catholics unlike the case in Lebanon where all the institutions (including the police) were affected negatively by the political/religious divide after the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Al Hariri in 2005.

According to the sectarian quota, the chief of police in Lebanon is a member of the Sunni sect and the ongoing perception after 2005 is that police are bias against the Shi'a community just as the RUC was bias against Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. The Comparison between the Lebanese Survey and the Northern Ireland Community Attitudes Survey 2003 in that respect highlighted the following:

- 1- Regarding police performance the highest percentage of Protestants viewed it as fairly good or fairly poor while the highest percentage of Catholics viewed it as fairly poor. In the Lebanese case the highest percentage of Shi'a viewed it as fairly poor while the highest percentage of Sunni viewed it as very poor.
- 2- With respect to police measures, the highest percentage of Protestants wanted more police on the streets on foot while the highest percentage of Catholics wanted more police who understand the needs of the local community. In the Lebanese case both the Sunni and the Shi'a wanted more police on the streets on foot.

- 3- In dealing with cases or complaints, the highest percentage of Protestants and Catholics were very satisfied with police. In the Lebanese case, the highest percentage of Shi'a was neither satisfied nor dissatisfied while the highest percentage of Sunni was very dissatisfied.
- 4- On the issue of whether police should explain their actions or not, the highest percentage of Catholics, Protestants and Sunni agreed that police should explain their actions while the highest percentage of Shi'a said that it depends on the event.
- 5- As for contacting the local police station for a general change in the way police do their job, Protestants had more trust in local police than Catholics and Shi'a more than Sunni.

The researcher concluded his comparison by negating the fact that Shi'a don't trust the police or that the local police is biased against them. In Lebanon, there is a clear lack of trust in police performance and measures, but this mistrust and bad perception of police is not restricted to a certain sect. Rather, it is related to the security situation as a whole. On the other hand, the percentages in the case of Northern Ireland clearly show that Protestants still have more trust in police measures and practices than Catholics. On a general level, police in Northern Ireland are much more trusted and loved than police in Lebanon.

The quantitative research highlighted how the police performance is perceived according to sectarian affiliations and according to securities in different areas of Beirut, but it also revealed that while in safer areas people encouraged the community policing approach, in unsafe areas the respondents were more in favor of a militarized approach-- regardless of the sect of the respondents. Therefore, the policing approach perceptions seem to be linked more to the security situation rather than the sect.

The large majority of both Sunni and Shi'a communities indicated that they would like to be consulted in terms of policing strategies, clearly preferring the community policing approach.

However, the part of the police they prefer to communicate with differs according to sect.

When asked who they would contact if they wanted to change the way the police work, most Shi'a respondents answered that they would contact the Minister of Interior, the police station or local officer, media or nobody. These answers show disappointment with how responsive the police is to citizens' requests. The Sunnis respondents' answers were slightly different: 23.7 percent of Sunni respondents indicated that they would address the police headquarters or the head of the Internal Security Forces, while only 9.3% of the Shi'a would do the same. The result shows slightly more trust in the police institution from the part of the Sunnis than from the part of the Shi'a. The finding seems quite logical, if interpreted along sectarian lines: the head of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces is a Sunni general.

The Shi'a opted either for the Minister of Interior, usually a Christian chosen by the Lebanese president, but who is hierarchically higher than the Sunni head of the ISF or for the local police officer, who is usually a member of the same community and is perceived as being sympathetic to the community's requests for change.

There were however, on both sides, a high percentage of dissatisfied people (around 18%) who would rather not communicate their requests or complaints to anyone.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SUGGESTED POLICE REFORM – INTERVIEW RESULTS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

Despite addressing Sunni and Shi'a dispositions toward police as if the two are consistent groups, this study reports about a deep horizontal and vertical spread in both of these communities regarding that matter. Additionally it tells about the complexities of achieving popular solutions to policing issues in divided societies such as Lebanon.

Although the study suggests a substantial increase of social unrest among segments of the Lebanese population (irrespective of their sects) concerning policing practices, the political assessment of the 14th of March coalition remains generally supportive of police. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate between the 8th and 14th of March coalitions concerning the legitimacy of the information unit in the Lebanese police. Seen from that perspective the restructuring of the Lebanese police force is mainly a political topic that should be preceded by a political settlement or agreement.

5.2 Qualitative Interview Results

Four interviews in this research thesis study were conducted. Two of them in Arabic with Lebanese police generals, general Ibrahim Basbos, head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) training unit and general Dib Tbaily, head of Beirut police respectively. The third and fourth interviews were in English with Mr. Jonathan McIvor who is the Project Director of Northern Ireland Co-operation Overseas (NI-CO) in Lebanon since 2008 (The Internal Security Forces

Strategic Planning, Human Rights and Public Outreach Project) and Professor Michael Kerr Director - Centre for the Study of Divided Societies Middle East & Mediterranean Studies Program, School of Arts & Humanities King's College London whose interview was conducted via Skype.

In essence, this research questions the suitability of applying the Northern Ireland community policing experience in Lebanon and accordingly attempts to identify the desired policing model that would best fit the Lebanese case. The interview results will be analyzed and compared on a question by question basis to clarify the main themes and issues of the above mentioned objectives. The first issue to be discussed is whether community or military policing is better in divided societies and why. The second issue relates to the limits of police work within a turbulent religious/political environment and without any accompanying political settlements. The third is about the relationship between police work and sectarian fanaticism. The fourth concentrates on the idea of community policing in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon. Finally, the fifth and last issue tests the level of community policing success in Lebanon.

5.3 Community or Military Policing: which is better in Divided Societies

All interviewees acknowledged that community policing is about cooperation and partnership between police and citizens. Professor Michael Kerr added that “community policing in divided societies would mean policing by consent.” While Mr. Jonathan McIvor defined community policing as “the style of policing that places the citizen at the center of policing,” he also mentioned a number of standard characteristics for community policing which concentrated on effective service delivery and problem solving approach responding to particular problems of the

community with tailor-made solutions for each. In addition, policing should be in partnership with the community to identify the needs of the citizens and empower them; within that respect, devolving the responsibility to the lowest level can enhance police empowerment.

Military policing on the other hand, as McIvor explained it, “is a contradiction to community policing. Military should not do policing because policing is a civil activity... In divided societies with conflict ridden situations the police should always lead. That is not to say that there is no need for the military, but the military should only intervene in support of the police within a limited amount of time.”

Which is better in divided societies? The respondents, unanimously, agreed that community policing is usually better in divided societies. However, Professor Kerr was more skeptical: “The question of what is better between community policing and military policing is difficult. I think it is a question of what is realistic and can be achieved through a political process or a peace process.”

5.4 Limits of Police Work in a Divided Society with no Political Settlement

The interviewed persons concurred that police are certainly affected by the political/religious divide; however police should treat all communities equally. Professor Kerr added that police work can be affected in a good way from that divide in the case when political/religious leaders mediate between police and communities to ease tensions.

Also effective police work cannot establish security by itself and help to decrease the political/religious divide if it is not accompanied by other initiatives. Moreover, there needs to be a balance between these initiatives since as Professor Kerr commented “if one security policy is

damaging the political policy (as it was often the case in Northern Ireland) then the political policy goes off the rails and makes the security situation worse.”

General Tbaily said that “police work should be accompanied by other political, social and economic initiatives. The problem with Arab society in general is that it is still tribal in nature and the loyalty is to the tribe or the tribal chief rather than to the country. In divided Arab societies this problem is exaggerated due to political/religious considerations, thus the above mentioned initiatives are necessary to increase national fanaticism and help in the fusion of society.” Looking at the same issue from another perspective, General Tbaily highlighted the fact that the criminal has no religion, thus security should be indivisible on all the Lebanese territory and nobody should refuse to arrest a criminal who has killed or stolen. As for the relationship between establishing security and politics, he commented that this is an accidental subject and when police intervene in a political/religious incident, it should work in conjunction with politicians or religious figures due to the sensitivity of the issue in a divided society like Lebanon.

In countries like Lebanon and Northern Ireland the political/religious divide is still at its peak. Professor Kerr commented that “it was only after 2007 in Northern Ireland that all the main political parties accepted the idea of power sharing, and the idea of a shared future and the idea of co-existence. The Lebanese accepted that a century ago. They accepted it in 1920, in 1943 and in 1956. All the Lebanese parties accept the idea of power sharing you don’t have to convince them about it. It is the security and political uncertainty that is problematic in Lebanon not the idea of co-existence itself.” Community policing according to Mr. McIvor is applicable to homogeneous societies and to divided societies as well because basically “it is all about providing a fair and equitable service toward communities.”

5.5 Police Work and Sectarian Fanaticism

It would be incorrect to say that policing was a cause of sectarian fanaticism in Lebanon or Northern Ireland; However, Professor Kerr commented that “Bad policing and errors...added considerable ideological fervor, fueled sectarian action and encouraged people to join paramilitary organizations that they would have not normally joined.” In Lebanon people’s perception toward police is negative due to certain sectarian and political affiliations. Though, as General Basbos said: “Police in Lebanon are working in a professional manner and are respected by neutral people for what they do.”

General Tbaily argued that very few people in Lebanon perceive security organizations from a sectarian or confessional view point. Though “the media played a negative role in this matter; however, this is not the nature of Lebanese people.” He stressed the fact that all the personnel of security organizations swear a solemn oath to treat all people neutrally and equally and any deviation from that oath would be unforgivable and punished severely.

Police men/women’s political/religious affiliations certainly affect their prejudices while working because “they are just like any other person guided by their basic assumptions, values, behaviors and are role products of their upbringing and environment,” says Mr. McIvor who added that “there is a lot of work to be done so that police men and women learn what is meant to be fair and equitable and treat people without prejudice.”

Police men/women’s private lives are also affected by their police work. Professor Kerr highlighted that matter by saying: “You are only as safe as the militia leaders in your area allow you to be. So by killing a Catholic police officer the militia leaders sent out a message to Catholics ‘don’t join the police.’ He added: “How can you tell if the police was impartial in

Northern Ireland? It is impartial since both the Protestant and the Catholic paramilitary hate the police. ”

5.6 Community Policing in Post Conflict States

Clear and flexible policing strategies are needed to establish security in post conflict states like Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Whether community policing or other policing models are adopted, policing in Lebanon is precarious and odd in its form and implementation. Professor Kerr commented that “it is essential for Lebanon to have external support for the different forms of security. It is not normal to have a resistance movement in a state that is engaged in regional challenges that do not benefit the state or arguably any of its citizens. Nor it is normal for the army to be the most effective policing force.”

From another perspective, General Basbos said:“Different policing strategies should be used in various areas within the post conflict states: A military policing strategy in turbulent areas that refuse to cooperate with police and a community policing strategy with law abiding citizens that want their country to overcome the state of war that it was once in.”

General Tbaily concentrated on the fact that community policing (policing with consent) rather than military policing was found and used successfully in Lebanon even before it was formally introduced as a new policing model in the democracies of the West.“We must not forget, we were applying something similar to community policing by our intuition,” he said. This intuition was due, according to General Tbaily, to our Arabic culture, heritage and tradition.

Though Mr. McIvor insisted that “in Lebanon community policing until now is a pilot project to show how community policing works. You haven’t even scratched the surface of community

policing. It seems that there is not a clear idea of what is community policing. In order to develop a good strategy, people should first understand what community policing is. Currently the police in Lebanon are entirely centralized. No devolved responsibility is given to commanders and there is no clear idea about partnership. There is a lack of understanding of community policing especially with senior officers despite the training that has been done and that is why we are addressing the senior leaders' program.”

5.7 Community Policing in Lebanon- A Story of Success or Failure

There is a consensus among all respondents that community policing, as a newly introduced policing model, is not yet applied in Lebanon as it should be. However, something similar to community policing has been implemented. General Basbos said: “In my opinion, we didn't apply community policing in Lebanon yet. Though we are applying something similar to it based upon our social relations with the community that we serve...Community policing remained theoretical since there was no clear strategy for applying it.” General Tbaily also observed that community policing, which is based on mutual respect and understanding between police and citizens, was applied in Lebanon even before it was introduced formally from the West.

On the other hand Mr. McIvor insisted on the fact that community policing in Lebanon is still a pilot project and that there is no clear strategy for applying it. He also criticized Lebanese society and the overall development plan for improvement; as he said: “The Lebanese society is very individualistic, there is very little sense of community and very huge democratic deficit; people feel powerless to actually change anything...Community policing is only one part of a series of activities that complement the needs to build a democracy. Other factors include proper representation of people's concerns and the environment, and understanding what community

policing is before putting the strategy needed to implement it. That is why we are going through a pilot study to know what the community policing looks like.”

Professor Kerr also agreed that community policing at its current stage in Lebanon was a failure since according to him “community policing should be preceded by an agreement between the different communities and a political peace accord. After that, it should be built up and institutionalized throughout a long period of time and in parallel with other reform processes within an overall strategy of peace and reconciliation.”

5.8 Summary

Though the Lebanese case is unique, good lessons can still be taken and learned from successful examples of policing such as Northern Ireland. Also, learning the lessons of failures would be beneficial. General Basbos said: “Community policing in divided societies such as Lebanon can benefit broadly from foreign police experiences but alterations should be introduced periodically to fit our diversified society.”

We can benefit generally from foreign police experience, but details should be treated specifically to fit the explicit problems of our society. Policing experts such as Mr. McIvor unanimously acknowledge that “there is nothing for police called ‘off the shelf solution.’ It is about lesson drawing not model imposition and the solution has to be tailored according to the local situation.”

Police men/women, especially in divided societies, should be trained to be fair and neutral. Their first loyalty should be to their -- country not to their sect, religion or anything else. Oppressive means of policing can ensure security and combat crime; however, as Mr. McIvor commented

“enforcement is not the same as policing... Policing needs legitimacy and consent....The police in Lebanon lack legitimacy unlike the army which represents the Lebanese national pride and identity.”

So it is all about legitimacy. One major factor that would affect police work is building up political trust and legitimacy which happens slowly and is a long process. Establishing legitimacy and trust, whether through religious or political means, would help the police to achieve security in areas that used to be forbidden. It is of most importance for the police force to be viewed as community helpers and saviors rather than just another type of gangsters.

This is why the Lebanese army enjoys more trust than the police. It is publically viewed as the savior and protector unlike the corrupt, religiously and politically affiliated police force. Professor Kerr said: “Whenever a society is fragile and recovering from civil war people seek an impartial and fair authority of the state to establish security. Anomaly that authority in Lebanon has been the Lebanese army because it represented the least threat to the Lebanese people,” while “the Lebanese police, unfortunately, are not viewed as neutral.”

5.9 Lessons to be learned from Northern Ireland

In 2012 the Guardian newspaper stated that 1200 Ulster police officers have been injured over the past seven years in riots. The casualty figures, according to the Police Federation of Northern Ireland, showed that police officers on frontline duty in the province stood a one in four chance of getting injured in riots. A spokesperson for the police said: "Where is the political will to solve these disputes? The price in terms of police officers injured is far too high. Police officers have human rights too and it is time the politicians took that on board while they seek to resolve this problem (MacDonald, 2012)."

On the other hand, in October 2012, and primarily for political/religious incentives a vehicle bomb exploded in the Achrafieh district of Beirut, killing the chief of intelligence in the Lebanese Internal Security forces, General Wissam Al Hassan and 7 others. Of course, every situation is different, and we should not overstate the similarities between Northern Ireland and Lebanon. However, we should benefit from the Northern Ireland experience.

The British Ambassador to Lebanon, Tom Fletcher, was asked to share the lessons learned from Northern Ireland. He suggested five ideas which I found to be very beneficial, even within the domain of policing, whether directly or indirectly. Those suggestions concentrated on the ability to challenge preconceptions and learn the real background information to promote a fuller understanding of the sectarian beliefs and culture of the other. Also, a common vision needs to be identified and promoted by courageous leaders. Thus all parties involved should be prepared to sit down with their enemies and political objectives should be secured through legitimate processes rather than violence or threats of violence. In this respect, Fletcher welcomed that Hezbollah are becoming more involved in state politics in Lebanon. Finally, external support and intervention, according to Fletcher, are needed to break the current negative statico of the Lebanese crisis (Fletcher, 2012).

The police's reaction toward conflict management in divided societies such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon varies depending on the security situation. The choice between community style policing and other policing models should be connected to the preservation and maintenance of public tranquility.

5.10 CONCLUSION

Community policing model for emergent and post conflict states such as Lebanon means that police conformations may be somewhat different from those in more reputable liberal democracies such as Northern Ireland. Partnership arrangements between police, militias and community members are improvised and convenient, which means that all policing role players remain somewhat unclear about their duties, and even the police remain suspicious actors seeking to find smarter ways of coordinating with other formations devoted to make their country a secure and safer place for all. Thus, community policing in Lebanon today should be centered on the creation of horizontal and vertical networks between the police and other groupings involved in governing security.

This would provide a basis for certainty about who precisely does what, how and at what cost. An advantage of this mindset is that it matches well with what the police want to be. They want to be real police who can interfere efficiently to restore public disorder and combat crime. They don't want to be stretched beyond their ability in terms of their training, resources, skills and authority. In developing countries like Lebanon, they simply cannot be the core of all community societal problem solving that is associated with broad notions of security. This is important because the local sectarian militias enjoy a high degree of local ownership and legitimacy, and their solutions to every day security problems are often more efficient than top-down police interventions.

Indeed, there is not even an agreement on how police should proceed. As such, policing procedures and systems of accountability should be reexamined. On the other hand, leading community consultation initiatives are being introduced to allow local communities to have a

greater say in the type of police services that they desire. In a few words, the expected policing plan should not only address future policing priorities and needs, but also core policing matters and community partnership issues.

It is obvious that the Lebanese public perception toward police is affected by sectarianism. Some Shi'a argue that the police force has prejudices against them though this was not evident in the conducted survey results. On the other hand, the Sunni believe that fundamental police reform is unnecessary.

It is widely believed that a political settlement is required prior to any agreement on policing matters. This would resolve many practical problems-- especially if a clear margin for a structural and strategic plan of action is set. Otherwise, many conflicts could not be settled.

Currently, the Lebanese police are in the process of being transformed from an aggressive community hostile force into a friendly community style policing force. It is important for this process to be tested periodically because its success is uncertain for the following reasons:

- 1- The Lebanese police transformation could not take place overnight especially after decades of conventional military style policing and within an extreme environment of corruption, sectarianism and security turbulence.
- 2- The lack of a clear, transparent planning and implementation strategies.
- 3- The Sunni-Shi'a polarization is at its peak with the latter picturing the Lebanese police as a biased Sunni institution.

In the wake of sectarian unrest between the Sunni and Shi'a in Lebanon the legitimacy of police should be prioritized. Though and as mentioned earlier, on the grassroots level, all sects in

Lebanon view the police equally which is not the case in Northern Ireland where we have a clear difference between Catholics and Protestants regarding police performance.

Thus, police in Lebanon should be more transparent, less corrupted and less politically affiliated. Clear strategical and structural plans should be taken into consideration. Community policing would surely help build bridges of trust between police and citizens, but first police legitimacy should be prioritized. Legitimacy build up is a slow and long process which should be accompanied by proper media coverage from first level politicians such as Saad Hariri, Hassan Nasrallah, Michel Aoun, Samir Geagea. By publically praising the police force for their attempts of reform, and highlighting their good deeds and sacrifices toward all sects irrespectively, these politicians can help turn around the negative image so often associated with the police. Whether this can happen within the current political/religious and security turbulence in Lebanon is a matter that the researcher links to a political/religious compromise whose perquisites are not yet on the horizon.

The qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed at the same time. The goal of combined use of qualitative and quantitative data was to enhance and elaborate on results from one method with results from the other and intended to test the same hypothesis but from different aspects. Both data gathering methods were given equal emphasis and both converged on the fact that the Lebanese experience was different. Consequently, any policing model adopted in Lebanon in the future (whether community policing or other policing models) should take that finding into consideration.

In this thesis quantitative data were used primarily to compare community policing attitudes between Northern Ireland and Lebanon. It is true that different criteria were used for data

gathering, but the goal was to have only a glimpse at the results of comparison rather than a detailed analysis which would have needed much more financial and human capabilities not available in this thesis study. Also, the quantitative data provided new insight on how people from different sects and areas viewed the Lebanese police and it negated the rumor that the Shi'a population, at least on the personal level, hated police more than other sects do. Whereas the strength of qualitative methods lied in answering questions from police experts and professionals regarding community policing, military policing and what differentiated the Lebanese police experience from other policing experiences such as the Northern Ireland police experience.

5.11 Recommendations

When a divided society attempts to make the transition from violent conflict to peace, it must tackle the daunting challenge of rehabilitating those state institutions most responsible for the violation of human rights. However, the reform of organizations cannot be seen as an end in itself. Such reform only adds value to the extent that it provides an entry point and paves the way for wider systemic engagement to fulfill people's aspirations of self-respect, safety and security. In societies split violently along evident political/religious fault lines, the challenge of guaranteeing security does not require solely the reform of police and/or military organizations. Rather, it requires a holistic general approach with respect for human dignity and diversity as cornerstones of any change process.

In post conflict societies, histories of exclusion, sectarianism and violence often create divisions so deep that finding a way to present an acceptable model of policing to all is a challenge in itself. Being oblivious to policing needs and failing to recognize policing demands in developing countries such as Lebanon can result in a failure to improve policing norms. The unsuccessful

interpretation of this problem causes the transfer of irrelevant theoretical or conceptual models onto genuine situations, resulting in misguided efforts to solve the wrong problems, or deal with an effect rather than with the real cause.

Due care must be granted not only to police organizations but also to social groups and the general public who is ultimately the final recipient of policing services. It is argued that policing is state and situational specific. To assume similarities in policing affairs may be a false hypothesis causing damage to police building initiatives (Murney, McFarlane, 2009).

This thesis seeks first to investigate how police can work in post conflict states with no political settlement and in a turbulent environment in which paramilitary groups are becoming more and more the norm rather than the exception. Second, it clarifies how police perception on a personal level is sometimes different from that perception on the mass level due to political or religious beliefs such as the case of Shi'a sect in Lebanon, as presented in the questionnaire results. Thus police face difficult political/religious challenges when enhancing their public perception in divided societies like Lebanon because all the top police ranks are appointed by politicians and according to sectarian affiliation.

Will the Lebanese police in the future deliver fair and impartial policing, will it provide accountability and transparency, will it be more community oriented and will it protect human rights? All these questions are yet to be answered within a multi variable political/ religious environment and a turbulent regional situation. Police reforms such as improving the technical capacity, organizational structure, accountability, oversight and training will help, but most importantly a political/religious unanimity should accompany those reforms and be in parallel with them. Social media should highlight this unanimity to improve public perception toward police which in Lebanon is a very crucial point for police success.

Different political/religious groups may have different views on what constitutes security. In Lebanon, some communities took steps to create their own security systems, resulting in a lack of police legitimacy. There are many challenges awaiting the Lebanese police. The first challenge is generating cooperation between police and all the Lebanese sectarian communities. Political/religious representatives and elements of the civil society should help in that respect to paint an overall picture that the security forces as a whole and police in specific are there to help and serve. The second challenge is in increasing police legitimacy. An overall and agreed upon criteria for impartiality, fairness and professionalism with proper media coverage can help to shed the light on police-community relationships. A third challenge concerns dealing with past mistakes and convincing the public that there exists a clear and serious will for a substantial and pivotal reform.

The best policing model for divided societies is an objective that this research study tried to attain using specific situational contexts. However, the researcher stresses the fact that there is no off the shelf fit all policing model. Future policing should be both dynamic and visionary. Dynamic in such a way to acknowledge mistakes and visionary because improvement cannot be achieved without a clear and transparent strategy of implementation and proper on the ground follow up.

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Appendix One:

Interview questions:

1-What is your definition of community policing and of military policing; in your opinion which is better in divided societies with conflict ridden situations/fragile security and why?

2- Do you think that police work in divided societies like Northern Ireland or Lebanon (According to the nationality of the interviewee) is affected by the political/religious divide and how?

3- In your opinion what are the factors that affect police work in divided societies and are basic for it to be successful in insuring security and combating crime?

4-If the societal division is political/religious in nature such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon would that affect the police work and if yes how? Do you think that the absence of a political/religious compromise affects police work?

5-Do you think police men/women political/religious affiliations affects their prejudices while working and how?

6-Do you think that the police experience in one country can be applied in another with similar political/religious divide with minor changes or that the police strategy in each country should be tailor made?

7- Do you think that effective police work solely can establish security and help to decrease the political/religious divide in your society or that it should be accompanied by other initiatives?

8- Do you think police work played a role in arousing sectarian fanaticism in your country and how?

9-Do you think that Lebanese people/ Northern Ireland people (According to the nationality of the interviewee) transcended their religious/ political divide? Accordingly does this transformation affect the policing strategy in each country or not?

10-In your opinion what is the difference between community policing in democracies and community policing in divided societies?

11-Do you think that community policing would succeed in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon?

12-Do you think that community policing until the present date succeeded in Lebanon and if not why?

Professor Michael Kerr Full Interview

1-What is your definition of community policing and of military policing? In your opinion which is better in divided societies with conflict ridden situations/fragile security and why?

I think community policing in divided societies would mean policing by consent. In the past during the troubles in Northern Ireland we certainly didn't have policing by consent and there were areas where police didn't enter (no go areas). A deformed type of community policing in those areas took place by paramilitary organizations themselves, who had a grip on local communities that the police and the state were unable to challenge. Thus, in Northern Ireland the UDA (Ulster Defense Association), the UDF (Ulster Defense Force) or the IRA (Irish Republican Army) controlled their own areas and they practiced a form of community policing.

In the early seventies, the police were ill-equipped to deal with the IRA insurgency and military policing by the UK military failed also because they were not trained or equipped for policing. They were trained to deal with colonial situations such as Malaysia and Cyprus. Very quickly military policing alienated the Catholic population in Republican areas and the IRA was successful in creating a disjuncture or a split between the entire community of that areas and the British Army, which was in fact sent to Northern Ireland to protect Catholics in certain areas from Protestant militias like in West Belfast.

The question of what is better between community policing and military policing is difficult. I think it is a question of what is realistic and can be achieved through a political process or a peace process. For example, after the Good Friday Agreement there was a big debate over the police and police reform which came about through the Patten report. Thus police force today in Northern Ireland appears and acts symbolically in public as a force that represents the whole population of Northern Ireland. Therefore it is easier for the police force in such a case to police with consent.

2- Do you think that police work in divided societies like Northern Ireland or Lebanon (According to the nationality of the interviewee) is affected by the political/religious divide and how?

Yes, certainly police work would be affected by the political/religious divide but in a good way and in a bad way. For example, if there was great deal of tension between one community and the state like the case of the IRA and the British army during the troubles, Catholic religious leaders mediated between the two sides. I know also Protestant religious leaders and even some Protestant ministers who sat down and engaged in political discussions with paramilitary leaders like the UDA and security services to communicate the concerns of their community and try to reduce the tension and violence in the early 1990s before paramilitary groups declared cease fire in 1994. This relates to the current situation in Lebanon in the sense that some Salafist or Hezbollah leaders are using their religious positions to advance political strategies and agendas whether internally or externally from the Gulf region, Iran and Iraq and consequently affecting negatively police work and missions.

3- In your opinion what are the factors that affect police work in divided societies and are basic for it to be successful in insuring security and combating crime?

Speaking generally, the state can insure security and combat crime by being extremely oppressive. Take the Syrian military for example, their secret service (Mokhabarat) intimidated people in Lebanon and Syria to achieve security. Whereas in Northern Ireland the British government was not trying to win the

military conflict there rather it was trying to stop the insurgency and resolve the civil war. Thus police work in Lebanon was affected negatively by the exploitive relation of Syria unlike the case in Northern Ireland where the British government helped to reach a peace agreement and reconstructed the Policing Service of Northern Ireland accordingly.

4-If the societal division is political/religious in nature such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon would that affect the police work and if yes how? Do you think that the absence of a political/religious compromise affects police work?

Yes absolutely, in the civil war the Lebanese militias controlled local economies and the state didn't function properly. Similarly, during the troubles in Northern Ireland the Protestant and Republican militias collected money by racketeering and imposing protection money on businesses. They also controlled drugs and criminal activities in their areas. However the peace process in Northern Ireland empowered the central state unlike the peace process in Lebanon.

The militias in Northern Ireland through the peace process were included in the power structure of the state and government and prisoners from those militias were released in return the militias gave up their criminal activities and racketeering to a large extent. That all happened through the political process which would not have been possible if the proximate regional issues were not solved then. Similarly, if Hezbollah were to decommission his weapons to the state and consequently strengthen it militarily, Lebanon has always been weak and neutral, and if Israel, Syria and the United States were to accept that, then Hezbollah would get something back from that. It will get legitimacy and a degree of international acceptance. That is what happened with Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland when they joined the government and helped the police; they are not regarded as terrorists any more.

Hence, one major factor that would affect police work is building up political trust which happens slowly and in stages. Establishing trust through political leaders in the areas that used to be "no go" places for police would help it to achieve security in those areas and be able to show that they are there to help the community and that they are not gangsters. Symbolism and Symbolic issues are very important in that respect. For example, now in Northern Ireland whenever something bad happens like the assassination of a police man, killing of a soldier or a bomb, the protestants, the unionists, the nationalists, the republicans, all go hand on hand on TV standing shoulder to shoulder beside the head of the police service and condemning the terrorist action. This sends a strong and clear message to all communities that there is a unity of purpose amongst the political leaders in society. That is the key and that is very critical for police work.

Whenever a society is fragile and recovering from civil war people seek an impartial and fair authority of the state to establish security. Anomaly that authority in Lebanon was the Lebanese army because it represented the least threat to the Lebanese people and it was one of the last institutions that failed before the Lebanese civil war. Also the Lebanese army doesn't have any of the baggage of the civil war that communities or militias have in the sense that they are not blamed for the atrocities of civil war. The Lebanese police, unfortunately, are not viewed as neutral, though they are not viewed also as an institution to be blamed for civil war.

5-Do you think police men/women political/religious affiliations affects their prejudices while working and how?

It is impossible not to be aware of such things. A couple of years ago there was a police officer called Ronan Kerr who was blown up and killed only because he was a Catholic. The Catholic and Protestant police officers usually live within their own areas. So if you are a Protestant police officer or a Catholic police officer and you work against your community or if the police force is in conflict with your community or area then you could be in danger. You are only as safe as the militia leaders in your area allow you to be. So by killing a Catholic police officer the militia leaders sent out a message to Catholics “don’t join the police”.

In the Lebanese civil war the political pressure impacted the neutrality of the Lebanese army and caused it to collapse. People before the civil war didn’t think of Lebanese army units in terms of Sunni, Shi’i, Duzi but later they began to do so. In times of extreme conflict everybody goes back to his own tribe. However, that is not how the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) behaved during the troubles in Northern Ireland. Certainly there were some elements in the force that would have had sympathies with paramilitaries from their own religion and not everybody behaved in a neutral way of policing. In the post conflict Northern Ireland I think that the policing is impartial and it is a very good model and example of establishing a new police force that is as impartial as possible.

How can you tell if the police was impartial in Northern Ireland? It is impartial since both the Protestant and the Catholic paramilitary hate the police. So in that case the Northern Ireland Policing Service is either doing a terrible job or a very good job. In the past during the troubles the Protestants viewed the RUC as their police force and that they are there to protect the state. Today the police service is for all and the vast majority of people see it in that respect protecting all communities not one above the other and that is the success of the peace process.

6-Do you think that the police experience in one country can be applied in another with similar political/religious divide with minor changes or that the police strategy in each country should be tailor made?

I think it should be tailor made. In Northern Ireland there exists two divided communities with a set of different paramilitary groups where as in Lebanon you have one paramilitary group that has a greater arsenal and military potential than the state, the police force and the army put together in the sense of Hezbollah. You have also other militias, the Israeli, Syrian, and Iranian interests and the whole question if the Lebanese security forces should stay weak. So it is a completely different matter than in Northern Ireland.

Though the Lebanese case is unique good lessons could be taken and learned from successful examples of regulations and resolutions from Northern Ireland and perhaps Bosnia as well. Also learning the lessons of failures like Iraq would be beneficial in the sense that you should take a broad look at other examples to see what is helpful and fits; accordingly tailor an approach that is really suitable for Lebanon.

7- Do you think that effective police work solely can establish security and help to decrease the political/religious divide in your society or that it should be accompanied by other initiatives?

I think that there needs to be a balance and this is really a very crucial point. Where military or community policing does not work properly and where we have a real imbalance is where we don’t have a security policy that is twined, linked, compatible and complementary with the political policy. The two

things must go hand in hand. They need to be structured together and that is very difficult in some places like Lebanon where there are so many different political -security facets and variables to play. Thus, if one security policy is damaging the political policy as it was often the case in Northern Ireland then the political policy goes off the rails and makes the security situation worse.

8- Do you think police work played a role in arousing sectarian fanaticism in your country and how?

The sectarian fanaticism that we have experienced in Northern Ireland has probably been ideological or religious. So to say that policing whether bad policing, terrible policing or policing the state in general was a cause of sectarian fanaticism, I think that would be incorrect. Bad policing and errors like the bloody Sunday which was very badly handled and internments in the early seventies where police arrested a lot of the wrong people added considerable ideological fervor , fueled sectarian action and encouraged people to join paramilitary organizations that they would have not normally joined. But I wouldn't say that the police structures were to blame for that. The sectarian tensions pre-existed the troubles and were latent in the Northern Ireland society.

9-Do you think that Lebanese people/ Northern Ireland people (According to the nationality of the interviewee) transcended their religious/ political divide? Accordingly does this transformation affect the policing strategy in each country or not?

I think the answer to that would be no. In Northern Ireland and Lebanon for the society to have confidence towards police changes and for the sectarian divisions to be transcended that is ultimately going to be a tough line process. For example, if you see Samir jahjah, Hassan Nasrallah, the president and the head of the army all condemning a sectarian attack together that would have a considerable impact on people's views towards sectarianism and towards each other. That is the case in Northern Ireland and how things are working now at least at certain levels of society. I am not saying that things are perfect now since that process is slow and long. I don't think that this is likely to be the situation in Lebanon without an agreement between the Lebanese elites on how to take things forward which is unlikely within the current turmoil.

The peace process and the confidence built over the years by the British and Irish governments and the agreement of all parties on the power sharing accord contributed in transcending the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland. Though the sectarian divide is still present, there are still divisions and hatred, it hasn't gotten away but it is being managed and contained. However, Northern Ireland is not like Lebanon. Lebanon is far more advanced in that sense. It was only after 2007 in Northern Ireland that all the main political parties accepted the idea of power sharing, accepted the idea of a shared future and accepted the idea of co-existence. The Lebanese accepted that a century ago. They accepted it in 1920, in 1943 and in 1956. All the Lebanese parties accept the idea of power sharing you don't have to convince them about it. It is the security and political uncertainty that is problematic in Lebanon not the idea of co-existence itself.

10-In your opinion what is the difference between community policing in democracies and community policing in divided societies?

Sometimes divided societies are democracies. Lebanon and Northern Ireland could one day be both healthy democracies. Yes it makes great deal of difference because in a democracy you have to police

with consent and there has to be an engagement. On the other hand there are other forms of policing and conflict regulation where you can impose authority like military policing or the use of secret service “mukhabarat”. Instead of policing by consent you have the threat of police and the fear from police. For example between 1990 and 2005 in Lebanon there was no sectarian violence and the rates of crime and murder were minimal because everybody was frightened from the Syrian regime. So that is effective policing in the sense that it completely killed off any threat.

11-Do you think that community policing would succeed in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon?

It is essential for Lebanon to have external support for the different forms of security. It is not normal to have a resistance movement in a state that is engaged in regional challenges that do not benefit the state or arguably all of its citizens. Nor it is normal for the army to be the most effective policing force. So I think what is essential economically and politically is to have a fixed agreement between external states that have an interest in Lebanon as to how Lebanon’s security will be provided in the future.

12-Do you think that community policing until the present date succeeded in Lebanon and if not why?

I don’t think community policing succeeded in Lebanon because of the Lack of trust between the different rival factions. So it is impossible for this model of policing to succeed at the moment and may be also in the near future. Community policing should be preceded by an agreement between the different communities and a political peace accord. After that it should be built up and institutionalized through a long period of time and in parallel with other reform processes within an overall strategy of peace and reconciliation.

General Ibrahim Basbos Full Interview

Interview questions:

1-What is your definition of community policing and of military policing? In your opinion which is better in divided societies with conflict ridden situations/fragile security and why?

Community policing is based upon real partnership between police men/women and citizens. Effective communication should be accomplished between police and representatives of the civil society as well as ordinary people to create an environment of mutual trust and understanding in which people feel that they are an important pillar in enforcing the law and establishing security. As for military policing, it is a type of policing that generally uses force to enforce the law. Military policing is usually found in dictatorial regimes to defend the regime and suppress freedoms.

In divided societies there should be a mix between military policing and community policing. Community policing should be used as long as the security situation is stable while military policing should be only used to re-establish law and order within a specific time period and in a limited place. Currently the situation in Lebanon is generally stable accordingly community policing model should be prioritized over military policing model.

2- Do you think that police work in divided societies like Northern Ireland or Lebanon (According to the nationality of the interviewee) is affected by the political/religious divide and how?

Currently, police work in Lebanon is affected by the political/religious divide due to political interventions and sectarian quota in the appointment of approximately all senior security officials heading the police organization. However, after being appointed those generals serve all people equally without any prior political or religious prejudices. Police in Lebanon, by doing their job neutrally and with equality, tries to curtail as much as possible the political/religious divide which affects people's perceptions and consequently police work in a negative manner.

3- In your opinion what are the factors that affects police work in divided societies and are basic for it to be successful in insuring security and combating crime?

Police men/women whether in divided societies or homogeneous societies should be qualified, professional and treat all parties with respect and neutrality. Even if a certain society is divided, police should do their job neutrally irrespective of people's political and sectarian affiliations. For police to be successful in divided societies very high standard of professionalism and qualification is needed.

4-If the societal division is political/religious in nature such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon would that affect the police work and if yes how? Do you think that the absence of a political/religious compromise affects police work?

Certainly the political/religious divide in a society affects negatively police work. In homogeneous societies police work is much easier. In Lebanon senior posts in the police organization are appointed based upon sectarian quota and political interventions hence police generals take into consideration political/religious matters especially within their own sects. The political/religious limits of police intervention create troublesome environment that the Lebanese police try to overcome by acting in a professional, qualified and neutral manner. The absence of a political/religious compromise effects

negatively police work. Since in such cases, police men/women would be more affected by their political/religious affiliations.

5-Do you think police men/women political/religious affiliations affects their prejudices while working and how?

Police men/women political/religious affiliations affect negatively their work because in that case they execute the desire of politicians and religious figures from their own sects irrespective for the wellbeing of their country. Executing security in a biased manner in favor for people or places with similar political/religious affiliations as the police men/women would cause chaos and mistrust towards police officers. Here comes the role for training and military upbringing in the police academy where we train police cadets to love their country and sing the Lebanese National anthem which stresses on the fact that loyalty should be to one's own country not to the sect or any political leader.

6-Do you think that the police experience in one country can be applied in another with similar political/religious divide with minor changes or that the police strategy in each country should be tailor made?

Every country has its own peculiarity, thus we cannot apply the community policing model of Dubai or London, for example, in Lebanon. Lebanon has a diverse society with varied religious and political constituents. Community policing in divided societies such as Lebanon can benefit broadly from foreign police experiences but alterations should be introduced periodically to fit our diversified society.

7- Do you think that effective police work solely can establish security and help to decrease the political/religious divide in your society or that it should be accompanied by other initiatives?

Effective police work solely in divided societies without accompanying political, social and economic initiatives establishes relative security. As we witnessed lately in Lebanon, the lack of a political compromise affected negatively the security situation. Hence police work establishes security only when it is backed up by political, religious, social and economic initiatives that secure the welfare of people and consequently curtail crime rates.

8- Do you think police work played a role in arousing sectarian fanaticism in your country and how?

If police work is professional, competent and neutral then this will certainly help to curtail sectarian fanaticism. If we take the Lebanese case, in some areas people's perception towards police is negative due to certain sectarian and political affiliations. However, police in Lebanon is working in a professional manner and it is respected by neutral people for what it does and for the martyrs it offers in doing that.

9-Do you think that Lebanese people/ Northern Ireland people (According to the nationality of the interviewee) transcended their religious/ political divide? Accordingly does this transformation affect the policing strategy in each country or not?

Unfortunately, the Lebanese people didn't transcend yet their religious/political divide. People's religious/political affiliations and consequently conceptions towards police affect the way they deal with police. Accordingly, the policing strategy differs from area to another depending on the security situation.

For example, in certain areas witnessing a turbulent religious/political situation police cannot enforce construction laws equally as it does in other areas.

10-In your opinion what is the difference between community policing in democracies and community policing in divided societies?

The citizen in democracies is much more relaxed and secure than in divided societies. He knows his rights, his obligations and trusts his state. There is an environment of cooperation between the citizen and the police which is essential for the success of community policing. While in divided societies, the police are looked at with suspicion especially from people whose religious/political affiliations are different than that of the ruling authority. Thus community policing in divided societies has limited scope in contrast to democracies.

11-Do you think that community policing would succeed in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon?

The essence of community policing is an effective relationship between police and citizens. Police should have close relations with citizens so that they feel important in their society. In post conflict states with turbulent security situation there exists some people that prefer chaos instead of order. These people know only how to use weapons, kill and steal. Definitely community policing strategy with such kind of people would be lenient and inappropriate. Different policing strategies should be used in post conflict states. A military policing strategy in turbulent areas that refuses to cooperate with police and a community policing strategy with law abiding citizens that want their country to overcome the state of war that it was once in.

12-Do you think that community policing until the present date succeeded in Lebanon and if not why?

In my opinion, we didn't apply community policing in Lebanon yet. Though we are applying something similar to it based upon our social relations with the community that we serve. In every police station we have a log that contains information about the area we are policing, also every police officer visits periodically the head of municipalities, schools and merchants within his territorial jurisdiction. Recently the bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the American Embassy of Beirut helped in community policing training of approximately five thousand police officers. However, community policing remained theoretical since there was no clear strategy for applying it. Currently, the strategic planning team in the Lebanese police in cooperation with the USA Embassy and Northern Ireland Cooperation Overseas (NICO) organization is launching a pilot community policing project in Hbeish police station in the Hamra area in Beirut. Hamra was chosen because the inhabitants of that area are from different sectarian, political and economical backgrounds. Also it contains schools, universities, hospitals, shops and ordinary living places. In that project the police station will be equipped properly and police personnel trained adequately to work conformity with community policing principles and accordingly if this pilot project succeeded then it will be generalized to other police stations in Lebanon.

General Dib Tdaily Full Interview

Interview questions:

1-What is your definition of community policing and of military policing? In your opinion which is better in divided societies with conflict ridden situations/fragile security and why?

Community policing, in my opinion, is about the relationship between police men/women and the society they serve. It should be based on mutual respect and cooperation in order to create a better civilized and secure society that eventually will benefit both. Military policing is necessary to counter criminal acts that exist in every society. Crime exists since history began; however, community policing should be the base while military policing, in the current age, should only be the exception.

Community policing is better in divided societies because oppressive means for establishing security in such societies lead to uprisings. In Lebanon community policing was applied innately before it was introduced formally as a new policing strategy from USA and Europe. The standards, principles and characteristics of Community policing that were itemized and documented experimentally were being applied in our society by intuition. My evidence upon that matter is that through fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon very few policing stations were attacked and even in these rare cases people wanted them back as quickly as possible. While in neighboring Arab countries as witnessed lately as soon as there was a security turbulence police stations were attacked and police men could not wear their uniform or patrol the streets. In my opinion community policing is better than military policing in all societies including divided societies.

2- Do you think that police work in divided societies like Northern Ireland or Lebanon (According to the nationality of the interviewee) is affected by the political/religious divide and how?

In my opinion, police work should not be affected by the political/religious divide. Though the Lebanese society is made out of many confessions and sects, our police and military training are adequate to curtail any political/religious divide. Lebanon is for all while religion should be an individual personal matter. I think that very few people perceive security organizations from a sectarian or confessional view point. The media played a negative role in that matter; however, this is not the nature of Lebanese people. Security organizations personnel swear a solemn oath to treat all people neutrally and equally. Any deviation from that oath is unforgivable and the personnel responsible for any biased act are punished severely.

3- In your opinion what are the factors that affects police work in divided societies and are basic for it to be successful in insuring security and combating crime?

There are two factors that affect police work. The first is the struggle against criminal acts which benefit all people irrespective of their religion or political view point. Criminals don't differentiate and their criminal acts effects all; this matter should work in favor of police and make them stronger in executing their jobs. The second factor is training and fanaticism towards police unity as a first step towards national unity. Fanaticism is generally bad; however, military fanaticism creates positive competition in favor of the country.

4-If the societal division is political/religious in nature such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon would that affect the police work and if yes how? Do you think that the absence of a political/religious compromise affects police work?

The lack of a political/religious compromise does not affect police work. The criminal has no religion, thus he should be apprehended and punished. Security is indivisible on all the Lebanese territory and nobody refuses to arrest a criminal who have killed or stolen. We fight criminal acts irrespectively. As for the relationship between establishing security and politics, this is an accidental subject. Police training is primarily against criminal acts; however, police intervene sometimes in incidents that are political /religious in nature. In such cases police should work in conjunction with politicians or religious figures due to the sensitivity of the issue in a divided society like Lebanon.

5-Do you think police men/women political/religious affiliations affects their prejudices while working and how?

Police men/women political/religious affiliations should not affect their work. Currently police in Lebanon is neutral and far away from the political/religious environment. Any police behavior proved to be politically/religiously prejudiced is severely punished whether professionally or judiciary.

6-Do you think that the police experience in one country can be applied in another with similar political/religious divide with minor changes or that the police strategy in each country should be tailor made?

Approximately all Lebanese police officers go through foreign and domestic study and training sessions. Policing is one block; though societies differ, fighting criminal activity doesn't. Every society has his problems but in the end the essence of police work is the same. We can benefit generally from foreign police experience but details should be treated specifically to fit the explicit problems of each society.

7- Do you think that effective police work solely can establish security and help to decrease the political/religious divide in your society or that it should be accompanied by other initiatives?

Police work should be accompanied by other political, social and economic initiatives. The problem with the Arab society in general is that it is still tribal in nature and the loyalty is to the tribe or the tribal chief rather than to the country. In divided Arab societies this problem is exaggerated due to political/religious considerations, thus the above mentioned initiatives are necessary to increase national fanaticism and help in the fusion of society.

8- Do you think police work played a role in arousing sectarian fanaticism in your country and how?

No, on the contrary, though the appointment of police officers in Lebanon is according to certain sectarian quota, this type of enrollment preserved the Lebanese sectarian mosaic and prevented any sect from feeling aggrieved. The police academy changes the belonging and loyalty of newly recruited police cadets from their religious or sectarian groups to the police organization. Once they wear police clothes they are police officers serving all people neutrally and professionally in conformity with the police code of conduct. That is what I experienced and closely witnessed during my thirty five years of police service.

9-Do you think that Lebanese people/ Northern Ireland people (According to the nationality of the interviewee) transcended their religious/ political divide? Accordingly does this transformation affect the policing strategy in each country or not?

I have no doubt that the political/religious divide still exists in Lebanon; however, all parties agree that the security institutions, police and army, can diminish this divide. The political/religious divide does not affect police strategy because as I said before, police primary mission is to fight criminal activity which affects all citizens irrespective of their political/religious affiliations. On the other hand, any incident which has a political/religious nature should only be managed in cooperation with politicians or religious figures because such matters of contention are outside the specialty of police and beyond their scope.

10-In your opinion what is the difference between community policing in democracies and community policing in divided societies?

I think they are similar. The documented and experimental principles of community policing that is applied in democracies such as Europe and USA succeeded in a divided society like Lebanon. Before that, we must not forget, we were applying something similar to community policing by our intuition as I mentioned earlier.

11-Do you think that community policing would succeed in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon?

Definitely yes, people in post conflict states are eager for security and stability. For example, racism and ethnic discrimination had been a major issue in the United States since the civil war between the North and South, despite that matter community policing helped to achieve security in the USA more than military policing did in the 1960s.

12-Do you think that community policing until the present date succeeded in Lebanon and if not why?

Community policing is applied successfully in Lebanon and it is based upon mutual respect and understanding between police and citizens. Police in Lebanon is engaged in several community outreaching approaches such as entertainment parties, sport events, visits to schools and meetings with civil society representatives. Any problem is facilitated and solved later by mutual cooperation between police and civil society members.

Mr. Jonathan McIvor Full Interview

Interview questions:

1-What is your definition of community policing and of military policing? In your opinion which is better in divided societies with conflict ridden situations/fragile security and why?

Community policing is the style of policing that places the citizen at the center of policing. It responds to his needs which are predominately in post conflict societies safety and security. There are a number of standard characteristics for community policing which are:

- 1-** Effective service delivery and problem solving approach.
- 2-** Policing is not looked at as a standard service delivered across the country but rather as responding to particular problems of the community with tailor made solutions to each.
- 3-** Policing is done in partnership with the community to identify the needs of the citizens.
- 4-** Empower citizens and police by devolving responsibility to the lowest level possible for example: give the section commander power to make decisions and to adjust the policing service.

Military policing is a contradiction to community policing. Military should not do policing because policing is a civil activity. The military may create presence on the street to maintain security but that is not called policing and that is not what policing is about. Policing has got to be a civil process; it has got to be linked to civil courts and due processes. When the military are involved in maintaining safety and security they are linked to military courts, there are no due processes and no transparency. In divided societies with conflict ridden situations the police should always lead. That is not to say that there is no need for the military, but the military should only intervene in support for the police within a limited amount of time.

2- Do you think that police work in divided societies like Northern Ireland or Lebanon (According to the nationality of the interviewee) is affected by the political/religious divide and how?

Yes, it is affected by the religious divide. Policing on the broadest level is not being delivered to homogenous societies that are integrated and mixed but rather to a serious of communities. That is not to say that one community should be favored over another community but all communities should be treated equally and the principles of community policing as mentioned earlier in the answer for question one are applicable in divided societies equally as they are in societies that are integrated.

3- In your opinion what are the factors that affects police work in divided societies and are basic for it to be successful in insuring security and combating crime?

In all policing you should have the desire, the will and the commitment of the people you are policing. Policing is made by consent (people accept the role of the police to enforce the law and combat crime, the police are seen as legitimate) whether in small communities or nationally. All policing should be regarded as being legitimate. Policing needs legitimacy and consent. The military can impose curfews, restrictions but that is not policing that is enforcement and enforcement is not the same as policing. Enforcement is part of a range of things that policing does but policing work includes much more than enforcement. Police prevents and investigates crime when it happens with transparency and accountability unlike the military. Military courts in Lebanon, as many people say, are also inappropriate in dealing with many of the crimes that take place. The police in Lebanon lack legitimacy unlike the army which represents the Lebanese national pride and identity. Police needs to gain people's trust. However, police in Lebanon is trusted more than the judiciary and politicians. According to the last surveys police is approximately trusted as much as the general security forces.

4-If the societal division is political/religious in nature such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon would that affect the police work and if yes how? Do you think that the absence of a political/religious compromise affects police work?

It is much more difficult to do community policing in divided society but it is not impossible. In Northern Ireland community policing in its major guidelines came out way before the political settlement. The political accord is helpful in community policing but it is not a prerequisite and you could still deliver the principles of community policing without it. The model in Northern Ireland cannot be transferred to Lebanon. However, there are some comparable things between the police in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. The police in Northern Ireland was seen, according to people's perceptions, as a Protestant organization and now in Lebanon the police are seen as a Sunni organization which is anti Shi'a and anti Hezbollah. I think that people in Lebanon don't see the police as legitimate or as delivering the proper service, people don't have enough confidence in police and we are trying to change that.

5-Do you think police men/women political/religious affiliations affects their prejudices while working and how?

Yes, I think that police men/women are just like any other person guided by their basic assumptions, values, behaviors and are role products of their upbringing and environment. There is a lot of work to be made so that police men and women learn what is meant to be fair and equitable and treat people without prejudice.

6-Do you think that the police experience in one country can be applied in another with similar political/religious divide with minor changes or that the police strategy in each country should be tailor made?

You can only draw lessons from other countries you cannot transport policing solutions. There is nothing for police called “off the shelf solution”. It is about lesson drawing not model imposition and the solution has to be tailored according to the local situation.

7- Do you think that effective police work solely can establish security and help to decrease the political/religious divide in your society or that it should be accompanied by other initiatives?

No, it needs to be accompanied by other initiatives. Community policing is only one part of the civil mechanism that is there to address the political and religious divide.

8- Do you think police work played a role in arousing sectarian fanaticism in your country and how?

In Northern Ireland there were people on both sides of the community, on the Protestant side and on the Catholic side, the loyalist side and the nationalist side who attempted terrorist acts and the police had to deal with that. Equal representation of all communities in the police does not necessarily guarantee an equitable and fair service. Good service has to do with training and the kind people who are in the police. During the RUC the working class Protestants and working class Catholics equally got bad service from the police. Middle class Protestants and middle class Catholics got pretty good service from the police. The level of service was according to the socio economic status rather than religion. Hence, I think that critiques of the RUC as being sectarian is by writers who looked at the issue from a superficial point of view and they didn't deal with the whole issue of legitimacy and the need for nation building. Legitimacy of the police with respect to equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants came only after the Good Friday Agreement. But we should not mix the two issues of community policing and legitimacy together.

9-Do you think that Lebanese people/ Northern Ireland people (According to the nationality of the interviewee) transcended their religious/ political divide? Accordingly does this transformation affect the policing strategy in each country or not?

No, I think Northern Ireland now is more polarized than it have ever been, Catholics live in Catholic areas and Protestants live in Protestant areas and we still have a divided society but apparently community policing works. I think community policing is applicable to homogeneous societies and to divided societies as well so it is all about providing a fair and equitable service towards communities. We don't send Catholic police to Catholic neighborhoods and Protestant police to Protestant neighborhoods rather

we have a mixed police force in Northern Ireland that takes care of Catholic and Protestant communities in the same way. The training should be as such to keep the political affiliations aside and treat all people with equity upholding the law.

10-In your opinion what is the difference between community policing in democracies and community policing in divided societies?

I think the principles of community policing apply in both and we must keep in mind that a divided society can still be a democracy.

11-Do you think that community policing would succeed in post conflict states with fragile social, economic and security situations like Lebanon?

In Lebanon community policing until now is a pilot project to show how community policing works. You haven't even scratched the surface of community policing. It seems that there is not a clear idea of what is community policing. In order to develop a good strategy people should first understand what community policing is. Currently the police in Lebanon are entirely centralized, no devolved responsibility to commanders and there is no clear idea about partnership. There is a lack of understanding of community policing especially with senior officers despite the training that has been done and that is why we are addressing the senior leaders program.

12-Do you think that community policing until the present date succeeded in Lebanon and if not why?

There is no strategy in Lebanon and that is the problem. Also, the Lebanese society is very individualistic, there is very little sense of community and very huge democratic deficit; people feel powerless to actually change anything. Now the Lebanese people are ready to move into more societal activities. For example, on the web sites citizens are criticizing policemen disobeying rules and the civil civic responsibility is beginning to be realized by the Lebanese community. Community policing is only one part of a series of activities that complement the needs to build a democracy. Like proper representation of people concerns and the environment. There is no care for the environment in Lebanon and the Lebanese are destroying old buildings which represent their heritage, so community policing is just one bit of a range of civic activities that need to take place. Community policing is an important element to cut back the democracy deficit in Lebanon. First the police in Lebanon should ask what are the problems and what are we supposed to do and how do we do it and then follow a certain strategy to achieve the desired goal. Understand what community policing is before putting the strategy needed to implement it and that is why we are going through a pilot study to know what the community policing looks like.

Appendix Two:

Policing Attitudes Survey Questionnaire 2013

Prepared by: AmrKhaledYafawi- Student in the Master Program of International Affairs in the Lebanese American University (LAU)

Supervised by: Dr. ImadSalamey

Title of the Study: Policing in Divided Societies: A Comparative Study between the Northern Ireland and the Lebanese Police Experiences

Purpose of the Survey: Assessing attitudes and opinions towards police in Lebanon and comparing the results to a similar survey conducted in Northern Ireland in 2003

Please take a few moments to answer the following questions. The results of this questionnaire will be used to enhance police performance in the future. Your signature at the end of the questionnaire is your written consent of its content but your identity will remain confidential. You have the ability to refuse to answer any of the questions or to stop the survey at any time you choose.

Question number one: What, in your view, should receive most attention from the police in your area?

- 1- Paramilitary activity/ Militia activity
- 2- Burglary
- 3- Theft of or from cars
- 4- Assaults
- 5- Damage to property/ vandalism
- 6- Drunk and disorderly people
- 7- Family disputes
- 8- Illegal drug abuse
- 9- Child abuse/ Women abuse
- 10- Organized crime
- 11- Sectarian harassment/ attacks
- 12- Teenagers hanging around the streets
- 13- Unable to chose
- 14- All equally important
- 15- None of these

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Question number Two: What other things do you think should receive most attention from the police in this area?

Open ended answer

The results of this question will be published

Question number Three: How good a job do you think the police are already doing in your area to deal with the problems identified in question one?

- 1- Very good
- 2- Fairly good
- 3- Neither good nor poor
- 4- Fairly poor
- 5- Very poor

The results of this question will be published

Question number four: What kind of police measures would you like to see more in Lebanon?

- 1- More police on the streets in cars
- 2- More police on the streets on foot
- 3- More army acting in support of the police
- 4- Closer links between police and local community groups
- 5- More women police officers
- 6- More police who understands the needs of the local community
- 7- More militarism of police
- 8- Unable to choose
- 9- None of these

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Question number five: If you had information about an ordinary crime, a nuisance, or disturbance, which one of the things listed below would you be most likely to do?

- 1- Would not report crime
- 2- Visit the police station
- 3- Talk to police else where
- 4- 112 telephone call
- 5- Confidential telephone call
- 6- Ordinary telephone call
- 7- Written communication
- 8- No preference

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Question number six: Why would you not report the crime?

- 1- Not my business
- 2- Deal with the matter myself/ourselves
- 3- Dislike of the police
- 4- Fear of the police
- 5- Do not trust the police
- 6- Fear of reprisal by offenders
- 7- Make matters worse
- 8- Police could do nothing
- 9- Police would not be bothered/interested
- 10- Inconvenient/too much trouble
- 11- Too trivial/not worth reporting
- 12- Other

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Question number seven: Have you made contact with the police during the last 12 months?

- 1- Yes
- 2- No

The results of this question will be published

Question number eight: Why did you make contact with the police during the last 12 months?

- 1- To report a crime or some other incident
- 2- To produce documents or to make a statement
- 3- To ask for help or advice
- 4- Through work/professional contact
- 5- Other

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Question number nine: Overall, were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the police handled this matter?

- 1- Very satisfied
- 2- Fairly satisfied
- 3- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 4- Fairly dissatisfied
- 5- Very dissatisfied

The results of this question will be published

Question number Ten: In general, did this contact with the police make you feel more or less favorable toward the police, or did it make no difference to your view of them?

- 1- More favorable
- 2- Less favorable
- 3- No difference

The results of this question will be published

Question number Eleven: Excluding terrorism or sectarian crime, please tell me how polite the police in your area are when dealing with ordinary police problems?

- 1- Very polite
- 2- Quite polite
- 3- Neither polite nor impolite
- 4- Not very polite
- 5- Not at all polite

The results of this question will be published

Question number twelve: Thinking now about terrorist or sectarian crime, do the police do a good job or a poor job?

- 1- Very good
- 2- Fairly good
- 3- Neither good nor poor
- 4- Fairly poor
- 5- Very poor

The results of this question will be published

Question number thirteen: Do you think it is important for local people to have a say in the way in which they are policed, or do you think decisions about policing are best made just by the police themselves?

- 1- Local police should have a say
- 2- Decisions best made just by the police

The results of this question will be published

Question number fourteen: do you think it is important that the police be prepared to explain their actions or do you think that the police should be trusted to have acted in the best interests of the community?

- 1- Explain their actions
- 2- Trusted to have acted in the best interests
- 3- Depends on event

The results of this question will be published

Question number fifteen: In some areas, groups of local people meet regularly with the police to discuss matters to do with policing the community. How much notice do you think the police take of what such a group has to say?

- a-** If the group has sectarian or political affiliations
 - 1- A lot of notice
 - 2- Some notice
 - 3- Not much notice
 - 4- No notice at all
 - b-** If the group is of local people with no sectarian or political affiliations
 - 1- A lot of notice
 - 2- Some notice
 - 3- Not much notice
 - 4- No notice at all
- The results of this question will be published

Is there a difference between “a” and “b”, if the answer is yes explain why?

Open ended answer

The results of this question will be published

Question number sixteen: If you wanted to see a general change in the way the police do their job in your area who would you first think of contacting?

- 1- Local police station or officer
- 2- Police headquarters or the director general of Internal Security Forces
- 3- Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister
- 4- Member of Parliament
- 5- District governor or commissioner
- 6- Press or media
- 7- Other
- 8- Wouldn't contact anyone

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

Please explain and specify anyone else you would contact

Open ended answer

The results of this question will be published

Any other comments:

Signature and Date

Lebanese Survey Results

IV- Sect of the Mokhtar

Sect of the Mokhtar	Frequency	Percent
Christian	80	33.3
Sunni	80	33.3
Shi'a	80	33.3
Total	240	100.0

Table N°1

V- Kind of Area

Kind of area	Frequency	Percent
Safe area	120	50.0
Unsafe area	120	50.0
Total	240	100.0

Table N°2

VI- Questions: 1-17

1- **Question 1:** What, in your view, should receive most attention from the police in your area?

More than one response can be given and the results of this question will be published

	Results
Paramilitary activity/ Militia activity	7.8%
Burglary	9.8%
Theft of or from cars	11.0%
Assaults	6.7%
Damage to property/ vandalism	4.9%
Drunk and disorderly people	5.2%
Family disputes	1.2%
Illegal drug abuse	15.0%
Child abuse/ Women abuse	2.7%
Organized crime	4.9%
Sectarian harassment/ attacks	8.4%
Teenagers hanging around the streets	8.1%
Unable to chose	1.2%
All equally important	12.6%
None of these	0.5%
Base=100%	593

Table N°3

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Paramilitary activity/ Militia activity	1.9%	12.2%	9.1%	7.8%
Burglary	14.6%	7.2%	7.3%	9.8%
Theft of or from cars	14.6%	11.3%	6.1%	11.0%
Assaults	6.8%	5.9%	7.9%	6.7%
Damage to property/ vandalism	4.4%	7.2%	2.4%	4.9%
Drunk and disorderly people	5.3%	6.8%	3.0%	5.2%
Family disputes	0.5%	1.4%	1.8%	1.2%
Illegal drug abuse	13.1%	11.7%	21.8%	15.0%
Child abuse/ Women abuse	4.9%	2.7%	0.0%	2.7%
Organized crime	5.3%	4.1%	5.5%	4.9%
Sectarian harassment/ attacks	4.4%	11.7%	9.1%	8.4%
Teenagers hanging around the streets	6.8%	7.7%	10.3%	8.1%
Unable to chose	1.9%	0.5%	1.2%	1.2%
All equally important	15.0%	9.9%	13.3%	12.6%
None of these	0.5%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%
Base=100%	206	222	165	593

Table N°4

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Paramilitary activity/ Militia activity	6.3%	9.2%	7.8%
Burglary	12.0%	7.5%	9.8%
Theft of or from cars	12.0%	9.9%	11.0%
Assaults	7.3%	6.1%	6.7%
Damage to property/ vandalism	5.0%	4.8%	4.9%
Drunk and disorderly people	5.0%	5.5%	5.2%
Family disputes	1.0%	1.4%	1.2%
Illegal drug abuse	12.0%	18.1%	15.0%
Child abuse/ Women abuse	4.0%	1.4%	2.7%
Organized crime	5.0%	4.8%	4.9%
Sectarian harassment/ attacks	7.0%	9.9%	8.4%
Teenagers hanging around the streets	6.3%	9.9%	8.1%
Unable to chose	1.3%	1.0%	1.2%
All equally important	15.3%	9.9%	12.6%
None of these	0.3%	0.7%	0.5%
Base=100%	300	293	593

Table N°5

2- **Question 2:** What other things do you think should receive most attention from the police in this area?

	Results
Traffic problems	18.8%
Sectarian problems	6.7%
Security problems	56.4%
Other	18.1%
Base=100%	149

Table N°6

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Traffic problems	21.3%	19.2%	16.0%	18.8%
Sectarian problems	2.1%	7.7%	10.0%	6.7%
Security problems	61.7%	57.7%	50.0%	56.4%
Other	14.9%	15.4%	24.0%	18.1%
Base=100%	47	52	50	149

Table N°7

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Traffic problems	20.3%	17.5%	18.8%
Sectarian problems	2.9%	10.0%	6.7%
Security problems	60.9%	52.5%	56.4%
Other	15.9%	20.0%	18.1%
Base=100%	69	80	149

Table N°8

- 3- **Question 3:** How good a job do you think the police are already doing in your area to deal with the problems identified in question one?

	Results
Very good	1.3%
Fairly good	12.1%
Neither good nor poor	27.5%
Fairly poor	31.7%
Very poor	27.5%
Base=100%	240

Table N°9

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Very good	1.3%	0.0%	2.5%	1.3%
Fairly good	15.0%	13.8%	7.5%	12.1%
Neither good nor poor	33.8%	27.5%	21.3%	27.5%
Fairly poor	32.5%	23.8%	38.8%	31.7%
Very poor	17.5%	35.0%	30.0%	27.5%
Base=100%	80	80	80	240

Table N°10

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Very good	0.8%	1.7%	1.3%
Fairly good	11.7%	12.5%	12.1%
Neither good nor poor	35.8%	19.2%	27.5%
Fairly poor	30.8%	32.5%	31.7%
Very poor	20.8%	34.2%	27.5%
Base=100%	120	120	240

Table N°11

4- **Question 4:** What kind of police measures would you like to see more in Lebanon?

	Results
More police on the streets in cars	14.2%
More police on the streets on foot	19.3%
More army acting in support of the police	11.9%
Closer links between police and local community groups	17.4%
More women police officers	7.3%
More police who understands the needs of the local community	17.7%
More militarism of police	11.6%
Unable to choose	0.4%
None of these	0.1%
Base=100%	683

Table N°12

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
More police on the streets in cars	13.6%	14.9%	14.1%	14.2%
More police on the streets on foot	19.5%	19.1%	19.4%	19.3%
More army acting in support of the police	9.7%	11.6%	14.6%	11.9%
Closer links between police and local community groups	16.9%	18.3%	17.0%	17.4%
More women police officers	8.1%	6.6%	7.3%	7.3%
More police who understands the needs of the local community	20.3%	17.0%	15.5%	17.7%
More militarism of police	11.0%	12.4%	11.2%	11.6%
Unable to choose	0.8%	0.0%	0.5%	0.4%
None of these	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Base=100%	236	241	206	683

Table N°13

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
More police on the streets in cars	14.1%	14.3%	14.2%
More police on the streets on foot	19.4%	19.3%	19.3%
More army acting in support of the police	10.0%	14.0%	11.9%
Closer links between police and local community groups	18.3%	16.5%	17.4%
More women police officers	6.4%	8.4%	7.3%
More police who understands the needs of the local community	20.2%	14.9%	17.7%
More militarism of police	11.4%	11.8%	11.6%
Unable to choose	0.3%	0.6%	0.4%
None of these	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
Base=100%	361	322	683

Table N°14

5- **Question 5:** If you had information about an ordinary crime, a nuisance, or disturbance, which one of the things listed below would you be most likely to do?

	Results
Would not report crime	10.0%
Visit the police station	8.7%
Talk to police else where	8.0%
112 telephone call	52.5%
Confidential telephone call	11.0%
Ordinary telephone call	4.3%
Written communication	1.7%
No preference	3.7%
Base=100%	299

Table N°15

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Would not report crime	6.9%	13.5%	9.7%	10.0%
Visit the police station	6.9%	11.5%	7.5%	8.7%
Talk to police else where	3.9%	8.7%	11.8%	8.0%
112 telephone call	54.9%	48.1%	54.8%	52.5%
Confidential telephone call	16.7%	11.5%	4.3%	11.0%
Ordinary telephone call	3.9%	1.9%	7.5%	4.3%
Written communication	1.0%	2.9%	1.1%	1.7%
No preference	5.9%	1.9%	3.2%	3.7%
Base=100%	102	104	93	299

Table N°16

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Would not report crime	8.2%	12.1%	10.0%
Visit the police station	9.5%	7.8%	8.7%
Talk to police else where	6.3%	9.9%	8.0%
112 telephone call	50.6%	54.6%	52.5%
Confidential telephone call	14.6%	7.1%	11.0%
Ordinary telephone call	3.8%	5.0%	4.3%
Written communication	2.5%	0.7%	1.7%
No preference	4.4%	2.8%	3.7%
Base=100%	158	141	299

Table N°17

6- Question 6: Why would you not report the crime?

	Results
Not my business	5.9%
Deal with the matter myself/ourselves	5.9%
Dislike of the police	0.3%
Fear of the police	3.5%
Do not trust the police	13.2%
Fear of reprisal by offenders	15.9%
Make matters worse	3.2%
Police could do nothing	18.4%
Police would not be bothered/interested	10.0%
Inconvenient/too much trouble	20.3%
Too trivial/not worth reporting	2.2%
Other	1.1%
Base=100%	370

Table N°18

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Not my business	6.2%	9.6%	1.7%	5.9%
Deal with the matter myself/ourselves	4.7%	6.4%	6.9%	5.9%
Dislike of the police	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	.3%
Fear of the police	6.2%	0.8%	3.4%	3.5%
Do not trust the police	7.8%	12.8%	19.8%	13.2%
Fear of reprisal by offenders	17.1%	13.6%	17.2%	15.9%
Make matters worse	3.9%	3.2%	2.6%	3.2%
Police could do nothing	15.5%	20.0%	19.8%	18.4%
Police would not be bothered/interested	7.0%	11.2%	12.1%	10.0%
Inconvenient/too much trouble	28.7%	19.2%	12.1%	20.3%
Too trivial/not worth reporting	2.3%	1.6%	2.6%	2.2%
Other	0.8%	1.6%	0.9%	1.1%
Base=100%	129	125	116	370

Table N°19

	Kind of area		Results
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Not my business	7.7%	4.0%	5.9%
Deal with the matter myself/ourselves	5.6%	6.3%	5.9%
Dislike of the police	0.0%	0.6%	0.3%
Fear of the police	4.6%	2.3%	3.5%
Do not trust the police	10.7%	16.1%	13.2%
Fear of reprisal by offenders	14.3%	17.8%	15.9%
Make matters worse	4.6%	1.7%	3.2%
Police could do nothing	16.8%	20.1%	18.4%
Police would not be bothered/interested	8.2%	12.1%	10.0%
Inconvenient/too much trouble	24.0%	16.1%	20.3%
Too trivial/not worth reporting	2.6%	1.7%	2.2%
Other	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%
Base=100%	196	174	370

Table N°20

7- **Question 7:** Have you made contact with the police during the last 12 months?

	Results
Yes	34.7%
No	65.3%
Base=100%	239

Table N°21

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Yes	27.5%	41.3%	35.4%	34.7%
No	72.5%	58.8%	64.6%	65.3%
Base=100%	80	80	79	239

Table N°22

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Yes	31.7%	37.8%	34.7%
No	68.3%	62.2%	65.3%
Base=100%	120	119	239

Table N°23

8- **Question 8:** Why did you make contact with the police during the last 12 months?

	Results
To report a crime or some other incident	23.4%
To produce documents or to make a statement	11.7%
To ask for help or advice	27.7%
Through work/professional contact	16.0%
Other	21.3%
Base=100%	94

Table N°24

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
To report a crime or some other incident	27.3%	20.0%	25.0%	23.4%
To produce documents or to make a statement	4.5%	15.0%	12.5%	11.7%
To ask for help or advice	31.8%	32.5%	18.8%	27.7%
Through work/professional contact	9.1%	15.0%	21.9%	16.0%
Other	27.3%	17.5%	21.9%	21.3%
Base=100%	22	40	32	94

Table N°25

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
To report a crime or some other incident	21.4%	25.0%	23.4%
To produce documents or to make a statement	14.3%	9.6%	11.7%
To ask for help or advice	28.6%	26.9%	27.7%
Through work/professional contact	14.3%	17.3%	16.0%
Other	21.4%	21.2%	21.3%
Base=100%	42	52	94

Table N°26

9- **Question 9:** Overall, were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the police handled this matter?

	Results
Very satisfied	7.6%
Fairly satisfied	21.7%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	28.3%
Fairly dissatisfied	15.2%
Very dissatisfied	27.2%
Base=100%	92

Table N°27

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Very satisfied	4.0%	7.9%	10.3%	7.6%
Fairly satisfied	36.0%	18.4%	13.8%	21.7%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	20.0%	26.3%	37.9%	28.3%
Fairly dissatisfied	16.0%	13.2%	17.2%	15.2%
Very dissatisfied	24.0%	34.2%	20.7%	27.2%
Base=100%	25	38	29	92

Table N°28

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Very satisfied	2.2%	13.0%	7.6%
Fairly satisfied	26.1%	17.4%	21.7%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	30.4%	26.1%	28.3%
Fairly dissatisfied	15.2%	15.2%	15.2%
Very dissatisfied	26.1%	28.3%	27.2%
Base=100%	46	46	92

Table N°29

10- Question 10: In general, did this contact with the police make you feel more or less favorable toward the police, or did it make no difference to your view of them?

	Results
More favorable	18.9%
Less favorable	44.4%
No difference	36.7%
Base=100%	90

Table N°30

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
More favorable	25.0%	18.4%	14.3%	18.9%
Less favorable	45.8%	36.8%	53.6%	44.4%
No difference	29.2%	44.7%	32.1%	36.7%
Base=100%	24	38	28	90

Table N°31

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
More favorable	20.0%	17.8%	18.9%
Less favorable	40.0%	48.9%	44.4%
No difference	40.0%	33.3%	36.7%
Base=100%	45	45	90

Table N°32

11- Question 11: Excluding terrorism or sectarian crime, please tell me how polite the police in your area are when dealing with ordinary police problems?

	Results
Very polite	5.0%
Quite polite	18.5%
Neither polite nor impolite	63.9%
Not very polite	7.1%
Not at all polite	5.5%
Base=100%	238

Table N°33

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Very polite	7.8%	1.2%	6.3%	5.0%
Quite polite	26.0%	14.6%	15.2%	18.5%
Neither polite nor impolite	57.1%	67.1%	67.1%	63.9%
Not very polite	6.5%	9.8%	5.1%	7.1%
Not at all polite	2.6%	7.3%	6.3%	5.5%
Base=100%	77	82	79	238

Table N°34

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Very polite	5.9%	4.2%	5.0%
Quite polite	16.1%	20.8%	18.5%
Neither polite nor impolite	62.7%	65.0%	63.9%
Not very polite	10.2%	4.2%	7.1%
Not at all polite	5.1%	5.8%	5.5%
Base=100%	118	120	238

Table N°35

12- Question 12: Thinking now about terrorist or sectarian crime, do the police do a good job or a poor job?

	Results
Very good	2.5%
Fairly good	15.3%
Neither good nor poor	40.7%
Fairly poor	26.3%
Very poor	15.3%
Base=100%	236

Table N°36

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Very good	2.5%	1.3%	3.8%	2.5%
Fairly good	20.3%	14.3%	11.3%	15.3%
Neither good nor poor	46.8%	39.0%	36.3%	40.7%
Fairly poor	19.0%	27.3%	32.5%	26.3%
Very poor	11.4%	18.2%	16.3%	15.3%
Base=100%	79	77	80	236

Table N°37

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Very good	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%
Fairly good	19.7%	10.9%	15.3%
Neither good nor poor	45.3%	36.1%	40.7%
Fairly poor	21.4%	31.1%	26.3%
Very poor	11.1%	19.3%	15.3%
Base=100%	117	119	236

Table N°38

13- Question 13: Do you think it is important for local people to have a say in the way in which they are policed, or do you think decisions about policing are best made just by the police themselves?

	Results
Local police should have a say	66.7%
Decisions best made just by the police	33.3%
Base=100%	240

Table N°39

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Local police should have a say	66.7%	65.9%	67.5%	66.7%
Decisions best made just by the police	33.3%	34.1%	32.5%	33.3%
Base=100%	81	82	77	240

Table N°40

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Local police should have a say	67.5%	65.8%	66.7%
Decisions best made just by the police	32.5%	34.2%	33.3%
Base=100%	123	117	240

Table N°41

14- Question 14: do you think it is important that the police be prepared to explain their actions or do you think that the police should be trusted to have acted in the best interests of the community?

	Results
Explain their actions	42.2%
Trusted to have acted in the best interests	21.9%
Depends on event	35.9%
Base=100%	251

Table N°42

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Explain their actions	51.9%	43.8%	31.3%	42.2%
Trusted to have acted in the best interests	15.2%	21.3%	28.9%	21.9%
Depends on event	32.9%	34.8%	39.8%	35.9%
Base=100%	79	89	83	251

Table N°43

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Explain their actions	50.0%	34.4%	42.2%
Trusted to have acted in the best interests	17.5%	26.4%	21.9%
Depends on event	32.5%	39.2%	35.9%
Base=100%	126	125	251

Table N°44

15- a- Question 15: In some areas, groups of local people meet regularly with the police to discuss matters to do with policing the community. How much notice do you think the police take of what such a group has to say?

If the group has sectarian or political affiliations

	Results
A lot of notice	47.3%
Some notice	20.1%
Not much notice	17.6%
No notice at all	15.1%
Base=100%	239

Table N°45

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
A lot of notice	44.3%	45.1%	52.6%	47.3%
Some notice	25.3%	19.5%	15.4%	20.1%
Not much notice	13.9%	24.4%	14.1%	17.6%
No notice at all	16.5%	11.0%	17.9%	15.1%
Base=100%	79	82	78	239

Table N°46

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
A lot of notice	38.8%	55.9%	47.3%
Some notice	25.6%	14.4%	20.1%
Not much notice	22.3%	12.7%	17.6%
No notice at all	13.2%	16.9%	15.1%
Base=100%	121	118	239

Table N°47

15- b- Question 15: In some areas, groups of local people meet regularly with the police to discuss matters to do with policing the community. How much notice do you think the police take of what such a group has to say?

If the group is of local people with no sectarian or political affiliations

	Results
A lot of notice	11.2%
Some notice	13.7%
Not much notice	32.6%
No notice at all	42.5%
The results of this question will be published	
Base=100%	233

Table N°48

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
A lot of notice	9.0%	11.3%	13.3%	11.2%
Some notice	15.4%	11.3%	14.7%	13.7%
Not much notice	44.9%	35.0%	17.3%	32.6%
No notice at all	30.8%	42.5%	54.7%	42.5%
The results of this question will be published				
Base=100%	78	80	75	233

Table N°49

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
A lot of notice	8.5%	13.9%	11.2%
Some notice	13.6%	13.9%	13.7%
Not much notice	44.9%	20.0%	32.6%
No notice at all	33.1%	52.2%	42.5%
The results of this question will be published			
Base=100%	118	115	233

Table N°50

15- c- Question 15: Is there a difference between “a” and “b”?

	Results
Yes	71.2%
No	28.8%
Base=100%	118

Table N°51

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Yes	69.7%	64.0%	82.9%	71.2%
No	30.3%	36.0%	17.1%	28.8%
Base=100%	33	50	35	118

Table N°52

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Yes	70.2%	72.1%	71.2%
No	29.8%	27.9%	28.8%
Base=100%	57	61	118

Table N°53

15- d- Question 15: If there is a difference, explain why?

	Results
Sectarian affiliation	27.6%
Political affiliation	56.9%
Sectarian & Political affiliation	15.4%
Base=100%	123

Table N°54

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Sectarian affiliation	31.4%	39.0%	0.0%	27.6%
Political affiliation	54.3%	37.3%	100.0%	56.9%
Sectarian & Political affiliation	14.3%	23.7%	0.0%	15.4%
Base=100%	35	59	29	123

Table N°55

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Sectarian affiliation	32.2%	23.4%	27.6%
Political affiliation	47.5%	65.6%	56.9%
Sectarian & Political affiliation	20.3%	10.9%	15.4%
Base=100%	59	64	123

Table N°56

16- Question 16: If you wanted to see a general change in the way the police do their job in your area who would you first think of contacting?

	Results
Local police station or officer	19.6%
Police headquarters or the director general of Internal Security Forces	17.1%
Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister	19.9%
Member of Parliament	6.7%
District governor or commissioner	3.4%
Press or media	16.5%
Other	0.9%
Wouldn't contact anyone	15.9%
Base=100%	327

Table N°57

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Local police station or officer	24.1%	16.7%	17.5%	19.6%
Police headquarters or the director general of Internal Security Forces	18.1%	23.7%	8.2%	17.1%
Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister	16.4%	17.5%	26.8%	19.9%
Member of Parliament	8.6%	9.6%	1.0%	6.7%
District governor or commissioner	3.4%	2.6%	4.1%	3.4%
Press or media	17.2%	11.4%	21.6%	16.5%
Other	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	0.9%
Wouldn't contact anyone	11.2%	17.5%	19.6%	15.9%
Base=100%	116	114	97	327

Table N°58

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Local police station or officer	22.9%	15.8%	19.6%
Police headquarters or the director general of Internal Security Forces	20.6%	13.2%	17.1%
Ministry of Interior or the Interior Minister	16.0%	24.3%	19.9%
Member of Parliament	9.1%	3.9%	6.7%
District governor or commissioner	2.3%	4.6%	3.4%
Press or media	13.1%	20.4%	16.5%
Other	1.1%	0.7%	0.9%
Wouldn't contact anyone	14.9%	17.1%	15.9%
Base=100%	175	152	327

Table N°59

17- Any other comments:

	Results
Attention to traffic problems	5.3%
Attention to sectarian and political problems	21.1%
Attention to security problems	5.3%
Attention to the development of the police work	21.1%
Other	47.4%
Base=100%	19

Table N°60

	Sect of the Mokhtar			Total
	Christian	Sunni	Shi'a	
Attention to traffic problems	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	5.3%
Attention to sectarian and political problems	75.0%	9.1%	0.0%	21.1%
Attention to security problems	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	5.3%
Attention to the development of the police work	0.0%	18.2%	50.0%	21.1%
Other	25.0%	63.6%	25.0%	47.4%
Base=100%	4	11	4	19

Table N°61

	Kind of area		Total
	Safe area	Unsafe area	
Attention to traffic problems	0.0%	11.1%	5.3%
Attention to sectarian and political problems	40.0%	0.0%	21.1%
Attention to security problems	0.0%	11.1%	5.3%
Attention to the development of the police work	0.0%	44.4%	21.1%
Other	60.0%	33.3%	47.4%
Base=100%	10	9	19

Table N°62