

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

**Personalized Politics, Presidentialized Systems, and Migration:
Evidence for a New Nexus in Migration and Leadership Studies**

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts in Migration Studies

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
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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
Abstract	
I. Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Executive Leadership in Germany and Turkey	3
1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis	5
II. Chapter Two: Literature Review	8
2.1 The Personalization of Politics	8
2.2 The Concept of Presidentialization	12
2.3 Intersectionality of Migration	17
2.4 Theories of Migration Policymaking	19
2.5 Gaps in the Existing Literature	21
III. Chapter Three: Methodology	24
3.1 Sources and Methodology	24
3.2 Leadership Trait Analysis LTA	26
3.3 The Presidentialization Framework	30
IV. Chapter Four: Cases Background	34
4.1. Pre EU-Turkey Statement 2016	34
4.2 Post EU-Turkey Statement 2016	38
4.3 Narratives of EU-Turkey Dynamics	40
4.3.1 Within the EU	40
4.3.2 Within Turkey.....	42
V. Chapter Five: Findings and Discussion	45
5.1 Merkel and Erdogan Trait Implications	45
5.2 Executive Power Allocations in Germany and Turkey	49
5.3 Impact on Migration Policymaking	52
VI. Chapter Six: Conclusion	54
Bibliography	59
Appendices	65-71

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Table Title	Page
Table 1.	Response to Constraints.....	27
Table 2.	Openness to information.....	28
Table 3.	Motivation assessment.....	29
Table 4.	Motivation towards the world.....	30
Table 5.	Comparison of Merkel and Erdogan's LTA scores.....	46
Table 6.	t-test results of Merkel and Erdogan's LTA scores.....	47
Table 7.	Leadership Style according to Hermann (2005).....	49
Table 8.	Constitutional Allocation of Executive Power in Germany and Turkey.....	51
Table 9.	Constitutional Allocation of Executive Power in Germany and Turkey.....	52

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Figure Title	Page
Figure 1.	The dynamics of presidentialization.....	15
Figure 2.	Presidentialization and regime type.....	32

Personalized Politics, Presidentialized Systems, and Migration: Evidence for a New Nexus in Migration and Leadership

Jad Wissam Malass

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the relationship between migration policies followed by governments and the characteristics and nature of “personalized politics” at the executive level of government. It focuses mainly on decisions that involve migrations issues at international borders since 2016, and precisely on issues on the southeast of the European Union’s border. It lends credence to the argument that there is a direct correlation between the nature and the level of personalized politics at the executive level and the migration policies followed by states. As argued in the thesis, “personalized politics” is the outcome of the personality of the political executive (president or prime minister) and the political powers granted to him/her by his/her country’s constitution and political system. The thesis employs the comparative multi-case study research design, combining components of both cross-sectional and case study designs. It investigates the cases of the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the context of the EU-Turkey statement on migration governance. After employing a Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) with a comparison of executive power allocations between the two cases, the thesis concludes that leadership traits directly affected the nature of border policies between Turkey, Germany, and EU.

Keywords: Merkel; Erdogan; Personalized Politics; Presidentialized Systems; Leadership Traits; Executive Power; Border Policies; Migration.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Over the past century, the field of migration has grown in its intersection with other disciplines and phenomena such as development and securitization. These relationships are often discussed in the context of the nature and meanings of the existing connections. For instance, the migration-development nexus showcases the apparent linkages between migration as a phenomenon and the ideas of social, human, and economic development (IOM, 2002). On the other hand, the migration-security nexus highlights the relationship between international migration and complex security issues (Faist, 2006), which – contrary to popular belief – has been a point of great discussion even before the events of 9/11.

These ‘nexus’ have spurred much debate for many scholars in the fields of migration and interdisciplinary studies. In the past few years, however, a specific pattern of events on the EU’s eastern and southeastern borders has been well documented. Border openings on the part of EU neighbors such as Turkey (2020) and Belarus (2021) have become eye-opening, whereby thousands of migrants had rushed to seek asylum in Europe and struggled against aggressive push-back. Admittedly, these incidents were not the first of the kind to take place. In fact, a similar incident occurred between Cuba and the US during the mid-90s, when then-president Fidel Castro overturned his country’s coastal apprehension policy targeting illegal sea crossings in the wake of rising civil unrest

(Greenhill, 2002). Consequently, the policy reversal led 35,000 Cubans to leave Cuba towards the US state of Florida, creating a short-lived refugee crisis and a policy shift in US-Cuban immigration dynamics. What is essential to such observations is the role of these countries' leaders in the decision-making process, especially when it comes to border management. This new pattern, hence, begs the following questions: What about political leadership? Could there be a connection between policy choices on migration and the characteristics of the political behavior and personality traits of leaders on one hand, and system dynamics on the other? And if so, what are its key components?

This thesis attempts to address those inquiries. It investigates the existence – and then questions the nature – of a novel relationship between migration policy and the characteristics of personalized politics, warranted by the relative constitutional allocation of autonomous political power at the executive level. To that end, it makes the argument that personalized politics and presidentialized systems – indicated by the personalities of prominent leaders and their nations' system characteristics at the executive level respectively – possess a direct correlation with migration decisions taken regarding international borders. Particularly, the argument is advanced by looking at evidence southeast of the European Union's border dating back to 2016 at most, whereby the study is conducted in the context of the EU-Turkey statement on migration governance. The thesis employs the comparative multi-case study research design, combining cross-sectional and case study designs. It discusses the implications of quantified data along with qualitative documents using content and document analysis methods respectively. In terms of the cases used for the study, it is concerned with the personalities of executive leaders as heads of the state (particularly former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) and their nations' respective political systems (the German parliamentary democracy and the Turkish presidential system). The two leaders and their respective constitutions are, therefore, the main cases under study. Merkel and Erdogan's traits along with constitutionally allocated executive power in Germany and Turkey are then analyzed in the context of two main situations: (i) the case of Merkel's role in the inception of the EU-Turkey statement in (2015-2016); and (ii) Erdogan's opening of the Turkish border with Greece (2020).

1.2 Executive Leadership in Germany and Turkey

The histories of executive leadership in Germany and Turkey were important to understand as a background upon which the study could be developed. Merkel and Erdogan, and therefore their respective nations Germany and Turkey, were interesting cases to observe due to a variety of factors. Particularly, the German experience in executive leadership during the 20th century and its subsequent fallout provided an established base relative to the two cases at hand. Adolf Hitler's rise to power and methodology of government as German Chancellor and later Führer (leader) meant for a tyrannical rule over Germany before and during the second world war. In the post war era, the German political system experienced extreme changes when compared to the first half of the 20th century, making it a Kanzlerdemokratie (chancellor democracy) and a Parteienstaat (party state) with a semi sovereign face that has 'tamed power' in Germany (Katzenstein, 1987). The constitutional framework upon which the new German mode of government would be based describes the roles of the German chancellor vis-à-vis the Bundesrat, Germany's main federal legislative body. Accordingly, it is said that

chancellor democracy in Germany – as outlined in the German Basic Law – provides for a unique case of majoritarian federal government by means of a powerful combination of grand coalition and increased institutional privileges for national and land governments, thus creating limiting interpretations of the office of chief executive (Lijphart, 1999). The German experience, therefore, informs us of the struggles of autonomous executive power and the steps taken to constrain its drastic consequences.

On the other hand, the Turkish experience of the 20th century was one of “sweeping social, political, and religious reform within the nation”, particularly after the election of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the first President of the new Turkish Republic in 1925 following centuries of Ottoman rule (Sullivan, 2018). Accordingly, Atatürk’s vision of a secular and democratic Turkey defined his legacy as leader of the nation and the founding father of the Turkish republic. Certainly, his profound contributions to the institutional evolution of the Turkish mode of government – through the creation of the Grand National Assembly and the introduction of the Law of Fundamental Organization in the early 1920s – could be viewed as the foundation of the modern-day Turkish system. These institutions served as the backbone of the new Turkish constitution, which defined a checks and balances system based on the distribution of power among parliament, the presidency, and the office of the prime minister. The Turkish experience of the 21st century, however, is considered by some to be an era during which Atatürk’s legacy was undermined (p. 15). Sullivan backs this argument on the basis that the constitutional amendments which were introduced in 2016 and ratified via referendum in 2017 had redefined the country’s governance structure, with more power allocated to the president. When compared to the German case, the differences at the level of limitations on chief

executive power are significant, even though both nations were headed by similar personalities in Erdogan and Merkel during the 2010s. Thus, a comparison between the two cases in the context of a scenario where both leaders – and their respective nations – were prime stakeholders in the EU-Turkey statement was worth attending to.

1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis

Incidents of migration dimensions on the south-eastern borders of the European Union throughout the past decade have – at the very least – warranted a closer study of the possible underlying determinants of these incidents taking place. Particularly, the cases of Turkey and Germany are preferred in this thesis due to their historical relevance in relation to the main variables of the study. Comparing the personality traits of their leaders, their governments’ regime types, and the migration policies they sign off on under given instances could bear fruit in identifying the role of personalized politics and presidentialized systems in the policy stream of migration studies.

In 2015, more than one million ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ crossed into the borders of Europe (UNHCR, 2015). A year later in 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on a deal that would limit the number of incoming migrants into Europe and relocate irregular migrants that had crossed to Greece from Turkey back into safe Turkish hands (European Council, 2016). What was known as ‘The Merkel Plan’ at its early stages of inception dwindled into a major confrontation between the Greek border patrol and thousands of refugees and asylum seekers attempting to cross from Turkey starting February 2020. The flows came as a result of President Erdogan’s decision to ‘open the doors’ and let the migrants cross into the EU. The two instances were a representation of different migration and foreign

policy approaches: one was compromise driven; the other was competitively drawn. For that reason, the EU-Turkey statement was the main contextual setting of this thesis.

Therefore, this thesis aimed at investigating the following question: how did variations in leadership traits and executive power allocations in Germany and Turkey influence the nature of migration policymaking on their international borders?

Particularly, the thesis examined the relationship between three main variables: leadership traits, regime characteristics, and the nature of migration policies. It argues that 1) the political traits of leaders at the executive level at a certain moment and 2) the type of regime complementing that moment are correlated to the subsequent formation and outcomes of migration decision-making in the context of the concerned moment(s). As mentioned earlier, previous scholarly work has particularly focused on the relationship between migration and phenomena such as development and securitization. In terms of theory, the decision-making of political leadership and the type of regime have been disregarded.

This research shall shift the focus into the realm of comparative political systems, leadership studies, and political psychology. Pioneers in migration policy debates have advanced the discussion on who retains the major contributions to migration policy making based on varying theoretical perspectives. This thesis did refute any of these theories but rather sought to complement and add to them. It made this attempt by exploring a new relationship between migration and politics, thus facilitating intellectual inquiry into a novel dynamic between the two fields: a migration-leadership nexus. The viability of this novel nexus was tested based on the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis:

Although Merkel and Erdogan exhibit similar leadership traits (ex. ingroup bias, distrust of others) when it comes to foreign policy decision-making, they significantly vary in their respective allocated constitutional powers in 2020 compared to 2016. This variation is likely to have directly reflected Erdogan's traits in the opening of Turkey's borders with Greece in 2020.

Clearly, by proposing such a hypothesis, we must also acknowledge certain circumstances which can be considered as independent variables in their own rights but are too complex to compress into individual variables. These include the prevailing political discourse between the two countries, as well as internal and geopolitical dynamics, among others. The thesis briefly highlights those factors in the discussion to provide a contextual background to the relationship between Germany and Turkey and preserve the operational integrity of the chosen variables. The hypothesis hence operationalizes a set of two indicators only which will aid in understanding its key propositions. The chosen indicators are: 1) Leadership traits; and 2) the constitutional powers allocated to the executive branch.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The investigation of a new relationship between migration and leadership dynamics requires taking a close look at how the behavior of political leaders can be understood in the existing literature in political psychology on the personalization of politics; how this behavior can create leadership autonomy at the executive level and lead to system level changes towards presidentialization; the intersectionality of migration and what the concept of a nexus entails; and the major perspectives on migration policy-making and the role political leaders, states, and organized society retain in migration policy. Finally, the gaps section highlights the existing conceptual and methodological inconsistencies in the literature along with how the thesis addresses them within the proposed frameworks and methods.

2.1 The Personalization of Politics

The available literature on the personalization of politics makes it clear that there exists an overlap between the fields of political psychology, political communication, and leadership studies in the study of the political behavior of both leaders and electorates. Understandably so, the contemporary study of personalization in the context of this overlap has been limited to western democracies and systems, which is apparent through the works of McAllister (2007), Rahat and Sheafer (2007), and Rahat and Kenig (2018).

First and foremost, we can define political personalization as a “process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines over time (Rahat and Sheaffer, 2007, p. 65). On the other hand, the opposite is also true. Political depersonalization, therefore, refers to the process by which the importance of the political individual declines vis-à-vis that of the political group in the political process. In terms of gaining a typological understanding of the process of political personalization, Rahat and Kenig (2018) offer three main classifications: institutional personalization within both the private and public spheres, media personalization of both regulated and unregulated media, and behavioral personalization of elite and mass political behaviors. The distinction between elite and mass behavior has to do with the subjects of personalization: elite behavior refers to the choices, styles, and outcomes of certain leaders’ personalities, whereas mass behavior refers to those of mass followers and constituencies (Winter, 2003). Structurally speaking, behavioral personalization is characterized by a shift from coordinated action between individual leaders and their collective political group towards an uncoordinated action strategy. At the centralized level, this can be seen in several cases, such as Ronald Reagan in his tenure as US president and Margaret Thatcher as British prime minister.

When it comes to the analysis of contemporary personalization theory, McAllister provides a comprehensive account of the process in a number of democratic systems. Particularly, his work cites some of the institutional and non-institutional causes and consequences of personalization such as mass spread of electronic media (non-institutional), which alters the political behaviors of both the masses – and more

significantly, elite political leaders by virtue of innovations in communication technology such as television (McAllister, 2007). Accordingly, the primary evidence in favor of personalization theory – and particularly its claimed increase – is attributed to the enhanced visibility of political leaders due to the deviation on the part of the mass media from mentioning parties in electoral campaigns to focusing on the political candidates instead. This in return leads McAllister to argue that the personification of political parties’ own policy platforms in favor of the political leader rather than party itself increases the former’s electoral importance vis-à-vis the latter (McAllister, 2007, p. 547). In addition, the evidence across contrasting institutional structures (parliamentary and presidential) suggests that “the nature of the legislature, executive, and electoral institutions molds the style and substance of political leadership within a country” (p. 577). In terms of consequences, McAllister states three main effects of the increase in the personalization of politics in democratic societies. First, as Rahat and Sheaffer also proclaim, political weight would shift away from the political collective in favor of the political leader. Second, this would lead to an alteration of the democratic process, whereby leaders’ ‘personalized mandates’ would warrant increased levels of autonomy at the decision-making level. Finally, the increase in the personalization of politics in democracies could lead to rising appeals for systems restructuring especially in parliamentary systems, making them more prone for the presidentialization of the political system.

Nonetheless, personalization theory appears to be problematic to scholars in the field in that the study of the phenomenon itself is limiting. For example, Adam and Maier (2010) cite ‘normative and empirical shortcomings’ in the study of the process, causes,

and consequences of political personalization. Their main concern has to do with the following two core propositions of the personalization hypothesis: 1) the increased focus on the political individual vis-à-vis the political group; and 2) the increased relevance of the political individual's non-political traits vis-à-vis their professional competence and performance (Langer, 2009). Accordingly, the hypothesis is normatively tainted, 'shaky and one-sided' in that it is trivially studied against the classical orientations of democratic theory (Adam & Maier, 2010) which leads that the political decision-making of the electorate is dependent upon the extent of which their political behavior is rational and informed (Dalton, 2000). Would this mean that increased focus on non-political traits relative to information on issue-based decision-making on the part of the media leads to less issue-informed voting, and hence, increased levels of personalized political behavior? Not according to Adam & Maier, who argue that "the process of electoral decision making is not a zero-sum game in which stronger candidate orientation necessarily means a loss of the normatively more significant issue and party orientation". On the other hand, the empirical faults highlighted in their work draw on longitudinal comparisons of the main hypothetical propositions in the context of the three main areas of personalization: 1) election campaigns; 2) media reporting; and 3) voting behavior. The hypothetical propositions were only visible across the media reporting area, whereas empirical data could not fully support their viability across the remaining two (Adam & Maier, 2010, p. 220-232). This leads us to the suggestion that the description, explanation, and evaluation of the effects of personalization on democracy are 'inconsistent' and must be standardized to better operationalize the concept for future research agendas, especially regarding the second proposition of the hypothesis (p. 233-238). Here, it is also worth noting that most

studies conducted on personalization theory have focused on its effects vis-à-vis electoral campaigning and voter behavior (Kaase, 1994; Carpara et al, 2008; Garzia, 2011; Bennett, 2012; McAllister, 2015). This implies that the impact political personalization across the literature has only been studied in relation to the democratic process.

One study that could help fill these methodological inconsistencies is the work of Pedersen & Rahat (2019). They argue that the distinction between political personalization and personalized politics is important in that it informs our understanding of the concept by means of two separate perspectives: political personalization as a *process* and personalized politics as a *situation*. This would mean that while political personalization refers to “a process in which the prominence of individuals increases relative to the prominence of groups” over time, personalized politics therefore “describes a specific point in time, a situation where political individuals are more important relative to political groups”. (Pedersen & Rahat, 2019, p. 213) This should aid in solving some of the methodological problems inherent in the personalization theory:

“Personalization of politics thus intrinsically refers to a change that can only be studied using longitudinal data, preferably including data from the times of mass politics to be able to trace the process of personalization ... Personalized politics may exist at the very early stages of democracy as well as the most recent stages. It may exist in some political arenas or in some political parties at a given point in time but not in others” (Ibid).

2.2 The Concept of Presidentialization

This section begins with conceptualizing the notion of the presidentialization of politics. According to Poguntke and Webb (2005a), “presidentialization denominates a process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type.” (p. 1) This is

effectively due to the structural powers which presidential systems usually offer to leaders of executive branches, such as increases in leadership power resources in the form of minimal interference from other institutions, increases in leadership autonomy in the form of protection from pressure from within the executive's own party, and increased personalization of the electoral process in the form of naturally making the electoral process more about the highest elective office, and therefore, the personalities of the running candidates. On the other hand, contingent factors include the personalities of the political leaders involved and the political contexts used. Poguntke and Webb were able to operationalize their concept using a large number of cases (2005b).

Soon after, further iterations and operationalizations of the concept emerged, the most important of which is the work of Samuels and Shugart (2010) on the effects of the separation of powers on party characteristics. To that end, they define presidentialization as “the way the separation of powers fundamentally shapes parties’ organizational and behavioral characteristics, in ways that are distinct from the organization and behavior of parties in parliamentary systems” (2010, p. 6). This implies two types of presidentialization: constitutional presidentialization and party presidentialization (Elgie and Passarelli, 2018). As one of the insightful elements to this thesis, constitutional presidentialization refers to the variations in the origins and survival of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislature (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 37). The effects of constitutional presidentialization could hence be felt across several regime types. These include presidentialism, parliamentarianism, and semi-presidentialism (including president-presidentialism and premier-presidentialism). More importantly, however, the efforts of Samuels and Shugart produced an operationalization of the concept in a variational sense:

“they rely primarily on identifying the statistical relationship between variation in constitutional presidentialisation and the behavioural effects of party presidentialisation” (Elgie and Passarelli, 2018, p. 3).

While Samuels and Shugart conducted their operation in the context of constitutional variation, Poguntke and Webb on the other hand decided to study presidentialization in the context of procedural social and political change over time thus creating a ‘grand historical narrative’ (2018, p. 7) To that end, they also organize the three prominent regime types (presidentialism; parliamentarianism; and semi-presidentialism) as a function of their respective governments’ level of presidentialization or participation (see figure 2). In a similar light to Samuels and Shugart, they declare that the of presidentialism is the only system in which the true potential of presidentialization outcomes can be felt. Also, important to such argument is their distinction between majoritarian and consensual political systems in the context of the dynamics of presidentialization (see figure 1).




Figure 1. The Dynamics of Presidentialization, Poguntke and Webb (2005a), p. 12

In terms of the main propositions of the presidentialization theory, Poguntke and Webb argue that these are channeled through the three faces of presidentialization: 1) the executive face; 2) the party face; and 3) the electoral face. The executive face is primarily related to the ‘zone of autonomy’ of the chief executive – whether it be a prime minister or president – vis-à-vis the party they belong to and the other major institutions at play. The executive might attain increased power within his or her respective zone of autonomy by structural forces or electoral appeal, which could lead to an intra-executive power shift

in the head of government's favor. The reasons behind this, as argued in Poguntke and Webb (2005b) have to do with the internationalization of political decision-making, and the growth and complexity of the state (Poguntke and Webb, 2005b, p. 350). Accordingly, the internationalization of political decision-making tends to "shift power towards heads of governments and their coteries of key colleagues and advisers," due to the increasingly complex nature of this type of governance when international affairs and processes are factored in. This is especially seen in cases which exhibit supranational characteristics such as the European Union according to the evidence. In terms of the state, efforts to coordinate fragments of state responsibility with ministries and agencies can be seen in the context of state growth, and as an effect of centralized executive authority (2005a, p. 14).

The party face, on the other hand, has to do with internal autonomous zones within the party itself. This means that for presidentialization to take place within the party face, an intra-party power shift in the leader's favor must occur. There can be several factors behind the shift, such as creating structural changes in a party's leadership elections or enhancing personalized mandates through networking and lobbying. In fact, both the executive face and the party face of presidentialization are characterized by the power dynamics between the leader and their respective party. Finally, the electoral face of presidentialization refers to the apparent shift from partified power in the electoral process in the favor of the leader. This could mainly take place under three conditions: the growing importance of leadership appeal in the campaigns, political media coverage is more focused on leaders, and the increasing importance of leader effect in voting behavior.

The above presentation of presidentialization theory is crucial in a conceptual sense. Nonetheless, the operationalization of presidential power variables has taken on multiple approaches in the literature on presidentialization theory (Doyle and Elgie, 2014). Some have attempted to study presidential power variables generally by proposing a large set of indicators (Shugart and Carey, 1992), while others have narrowed down their inquiries to target more specific indicators such as executive authority (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004) and systems of checks and balances. Therefore, this thesis was concerned with a combination of approaches primarily based on the work of Poguntke and Webb (2005a) and Samuels and Shugart (2010). It operationalized constitutional variation in order to make conclusions about executive leaders' zones of autonomy (see Chapter 1, section 6).

2.3 Intersectionality of Migration

The term 'intersectionality' can be traced back to the work of K.W. Crenshaw (1991) on feminist theory. It conceptualized a critical analysis approach targeted at interconnected and interdependent systems of oppression and discrimination against women (Crenshaw, 1991). The term was further proliferated and used in other disciplines such as migration, gender, and development studies (Bastia, 2014). What is of particular interest in Crenshaw's contribution is the emphasis on interconnectedness and interdependency. In the years following the introduction of these ideas, academics in the social sciences – particularly migration studies – have pointed to the intersection of migration with disciplines and phenomena such as development and security (Nyberg-Sørensen et al, 2002; Faist, 2006). The resulting investigations of these relationships created rigorous bodies of knowledge and scholarship that are worth attending to.

Initially, it is important to address what Carling (2017) terms as ‘nexification’. To do so, we must first gain an understanding of what a ‘nexus’ particularly entails. According to Stern and Öjendal (2010), a ‘nexus’ refers to “a network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects; alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relations” (Stern and Öjendal, 2010, p. 11). In the context of an examination of the links between security and development, Stern and Öjendal admittedly highlight stark inconsistencies in the relationship between the content of the concepts involved in a particular nexus and the policy formulation processes complementary to their understanding:

“Here we find a dual dilemma [...] first, there is a curious absence of attempts to probe evocations of ‘the nexus’ in order to discern the possible meanings attributed to it; second, the familiar uneasy relationship between intellectual inquiry and policy formulation becomes particularly fraught in such evocations” (p. 8)

This crucially implies that the bodies of scholarly inquiry into the stories or ‘narratives’ attributed to the main subjects of a particular nexus are lacking. Furthermore, such argumentation also points to the methodological disadvantages of looking at narratives due to their variety and diversity in terms of ideological and policy implications. However, it is quite clear that there is no universal consensus on what a nexus does or should imply. According to Carling (2017), a nexus “is only warranted when it refers to a set of complex interdependencies between two processes or phenomena, such as migration and development. We can then examine how discourses represent these processes and interdependencies in particular ways” (Carling, 2017). The difference between the latter’s conceptualization and that of Stern and Öjendal has to do with specifically identifying the ways in which two phenomena are interdependent, rather than

asserting infinite explanations. Carling goes even further to identify a set of questions scholars investigating a certain nexus must consider:

- 1) “How are migration and the other phenomenon related to each other? Is there a complex web of interdependencies—which would strengthen the case for calling it a nexus—or some other type of relationship? Perhaps ‘nexus’ muddles rather than clarifies.”
- 2) “How does it matter that ‘nexus’ tends to imply a holistic bundle? An account of ‘the nexus’ seems monumental and authoritative. Is that warranted, or even desirable?”
- 3) “How do particular understandings of ‘the nexus’—whether in your own writing, public policy, or elsewhere—privilege or exclude certain aspects of the relationship?”
- 4) “How might the possibility of a ‘nexus’ serve not only as fancy wrapping, but as inspiration for thinking about interconnections that you might not otherwise have considered?”

These questions are important to ask, Carling argues, in order to avoid presenting the potential relationship “quite casually without much reflection on how or why it constitutes a nexus”, a process he terms as ‘nexification’.

2.4 Theoretical Approaches to Migration Policymaking

Czaika and de Haas (2013) define migration policies as the set of “rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and measures) that national states define and implement with the (often only implicitly stated) objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal composition of immigration flows” (p. 489) In terms of theory, scholars in the field of migration policy tend to distinguish between two main inquiries: 1) why migration policies fail; and 2) how the inclusionary tendency of migration and integration policies can be explained (Boswell, 2007, p. 75). Across these two themes of inquiry, a number of migration policy theories can be traced by looking at the works of Gary P. Freeman (1995) of the neoclassical school of political economy, and the neo-institutionalist school evident in the works of James F. Hollifield (2004).

Freedman's approach to the political economy of migration policies is modelled on the nature and relative power of organized societal interests in three subsets of liberal democracies (Freeman, 2005). Accordingly, "The concentrated benefits and diffuse costs of immigration mean that the interest group system around immigration is dominated by those groups supportive of larger intakes and, by implication, the organized public is more favorable to immigration than the unorganized public" (p. 885). Such a perspective emphasizes political leaders' self-interests and incentives to respond to the preferences of the public on, say, immigration as a function of social and economic benefits and costs. This implies the following:

"The typical mode of immigration politics, therefore, is client politics, a form of bilateral influence in which small and well-organized groups intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it. Their interactions take place largely out of public view and with little outside interference" (p. 886).

Massey (2015) develops the above stated rationale even further, underlining the need for allocating more theoretical attention to the self-interests of 'politicians, pundits, and bureaucrats' in their pursuit of power resources through the "social construction and political manufacture of immigration crises when none really exist" (Massey, 2015, p. 1). In the context of the histories of Mexico-US migration flows, Massey outlines how the Latino Threat Narrative in public policymaking was at some point used by self-interested officials to increase their popularity, visibility, and relevance to the general public. This, he states, incited 'fear' amongst the native American communities and played a role in operationalizing public resources towards more aggressive border enforcement measures at the Mexico-US line (p. 9).

The state, on the other hand, would only complete this proposed model in that it is the actor responsible for drafting and implementing the favored policies. However, the neo-institutionalist approaches lay considerable emphasis on the state's role in the study of migration theory and the practice of migration policymaking (Boswell, 2007). This school is concerned with the state as a major player in migration policymaking in its own right, and not merely a reactive institution towards the interests of organized society. However, the state is the player who has mostly suffered the consequences of what Hollifield describes as the 'liberal paradox': "the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure" (Hollifield, 2004, p. 887). This is the case due to the histories of state sovereignty, and the rise of globalization and transnationalism. The state should, therefore, manage its way out of this paradox.

2.5 Gaps in the Existing Literature

In the preceding sections, the thesis presented Germany and Turkey's experiences in executive leadership. It also took a brief look at the existing literature on the definition, classification, and analysis of the process of political personalization in democratic societies as well as the concept of the presidentialization of politics. The examined scholarly work also provided an essential introduction and conceptualization of the process of presidentialization primarily based on the works of Poguntke and Webb, and Samuels and Shugart. It then addressed the concept of nexification and ventured into the precepts of some of the major 'nexuses' connecting migration with other phenomena such as the migration-development nexus and the migration-security nexus. Finally, it briefly

touched on theoretical approaches to migration policymaking, whereby some have focused on organizational societal interests under the neoclassical political economy school of thought while others have adhered to the histories of state sovereignty and globalization under the neo-institutionalist school.

However, the major gap which is encompassing of all aspects of the reviewed literature is strikingly the absence of focus on the role of personalized politics – and particularly the executive leadership’s personalized behavioral tendencies as well as their allocated powers – on the migration story. With the apparent rise in the number of incidents involving border openings, refugee movements and asylum seekers attempting to cross international borders and into the safe havens such as the European Union; subsequently fomenting migration crises of severe humanitarian repercussions, the scholarship on the causes and implications of the migration policies inherent to these incidents is lacking when it comes to executive leadership. The consequences of the personalization of politics in the decision-making autonomy of officers high up the leadership ladder are therefore overlooked (Doyle and Elgie, 2014, p. 6).

At this juncture, it is worth noting that looking at presidentialization as a consequence of personalization is for it informs our contextual understanding of the latter, whereas solely focusing on personalization would limit the scope of the study to the extent were making conclusions about executive leadership in decision-making is less accurate. On the other hand, the study of personalization in the context of presidentialization helps us grasp the true connections of the independent variables. We cannot fully understand personalization without paying close attention to its effects – one of which is systems presidentialization; similarly, it is impractical to do research on presidentialization as a

process or a situation without operationalizing its key fundamental aspect, the personal characteristics of leaders within allocated zones of autonomy. The two concepts are intertwined by virtue of their correlation and therefore must be studied together against the dependent variable. Therefore, the thesis made two main contributions: First, it operationalized personalization and presidentialization in a snapshot context in order to make conclusions about personal power within varying executive power allocations. Second, it linked the findings of the operationalization to the direct zone of autonomy of executives, particularly in a migration context, represented in policy decisions made at the executive level. This helped bridge the gap between the existing methodological reasonings of personalization and presidentialization theories on one hand, and the prospect of operationalizing the variables to produce empirical conclusions on the other.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Sources and Methodology

The thesis employed the comparative multi-case study strategy, which combines cross-sectional and case study forms of research design (Bryman, 2016, p. 64-67). In an exception to the general form, however, the cross section was conducted at two instances without much concern for mapped change across time, but rather comparison across situational variation. Essentially, change over time was isolated as a measure in order to ground the concern of the study with measuring the outcomes of both similar and contrasting conditions in specified situations rather than measuring change over time. This helped factor in Rahat and Pedersen's (2019) suggestion of applying personalization theory through a situational rather than longitudinal lens which generally requires a large sample of cases (large N). Bryman lays out the reasoning for using the multiple case studies design quite coherently:

“In the discussion of independent and dependent variables, the underlying perception of cause and effect is indicative of what is often referred to as a ‘successionist’ understanding of causation. As the term ‘successionist’ implies, this notion of causality entails an effect following on from an independent variable that precedes it. Critical realism [...] operates with a different understanding of causation, which is to seek out generative mechanisms that are responsible for observed regularities in the social world and how they operate in particular contexts. Case studies are perceived by critical realist writers as having an important role for research within this tradition, because the intensive nature of most case studies enhances the researcher’s sensitivity to the factors that lie behind the operation of observed patterns with a specific context (Ackroyd, 2009). The multiple-case study offers an even greater opportunity, because the researcher will be in a position to examine the operation of generative causal mechanisms in contrasting and similar contexts” (p.68).

The thesis draws on the findings of original research carried out by Kutlu et al (2021) in their work on ‘Understanding the Role of Leadership Styles of Erdogan and Merkel in Sustainability of Turkey-European Union Relations: A Leadership Trait Analysis’. In the mentioned research, an LTA was conducted in order to compare the scores of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel against the scores of 214 other leaders in an attempt to understand their leadership styles’ role in EU-Turkey relations. The content of 100 interviews (50 interviews each) made by President Erdogan and Chancellor Merkel was collected using LexisNexis Academy Universe and ProQuest Databases. The data was coded using the Profiler Plus automatic coding software. This thesis, however, utilized these findings in a manner complemented by a measurement of power distributions using official legal-constitutional documents which outline the regime type and could hence assist in analyzing the degrees of presidentialization at the executive level during a particular moment.

In order to conduct the proposed method of examining distributions of power, the thesis proceeded with the collection and analysis of legal-constitutional excerpts compiled from government agencies. This is possible through online access to official government sites and their respective organizational databases. The main sources used were the German Basic Law of 1949, the Turkish Constitution of 1982, and its amended revision of 2017.

In this thesis, both personalization and presidentialization are studied in in their situational - not procedural - contexts. In other words, the incidents inherent in the selected

cases are treated as a situation each under the applied frameworks. Not only did I use the situational context to measure the moment of personalized politics, but I also apply the same choice of contextual analysis towards the inquiry into presidentialized systems, for it is considered one of the direct consequences of political personalization and its study could therefore benefit our understanding of personalized politics as mentioned in Chapter One.

3.2 Leadership Trait Analysis LTA

Due to the presence of methodological inconsistencies across the literature on personalization theory, the thesis measured the main tenet of its theoretical propositions: leaders' personality traits. To do so, Hermann's assessment of leadership traits (2005) was employed.

LTA is an at-a-distance trait analysis framework aimed at examining the leadership styles of leaders. It is used to analyze the content of leaders' speeches and interviews in order to make conclusions about their leadership styles. According to Hermann (2005): "By analyzing the content of what political leaders say, we can begin to learn something about the images they display in public even when such individuals are unavailable for the more usual assessment techniques." The model began its initial development in 1980, when Margaret Hermann published her work on explaining the foreign policy behavior of political leaders by analyzing their personality traits (Hermann, 1980). The main traits studied in the context of foreign policy decision-making were nationalism, belief in one's ability to control events, need for power, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others.

More than 30 years after Hermann originally published her research, the LTA framework now consists of seven main traits: 1) Belief in One’s Ability to Control Events (BACE); 2) Need for Power and Influence (PWR); 3) Self Confidence (SC); 4) Conceptual Complexity (CC); 5) Motivation for Seeking Office (Task Focus) (TASK); 6) Ingroup bias (IGB); and 7) Distrust of others (DIS). It is against these indicators that the leadership traits of the selected subjects are measured. The following presents the definitions of the main indicators used to run an LTA on the selected cases, based on Hermann’s LTA codebook (2005):

The Belief in One’s Own Ability to Control Events (BACE) and the Need for Power (PWR) indicate how leaders approach certain constraints according to their perceptions of their settings and surroundings: “Political leaders who are high in their belief that they can control what happens and in the need for power have been found to challenge the constraints in their environments, to push the limits of what is possible [...] Those leaders, however, who are low in these two traits appear to respect, or at the least accede, to the constraints they perceive in their environments and to work within such parameters toward their goals” (p. 187-191). Leaders who are moderate in these traits (low in one and high in another or vice versa) will either challenge or respect constraints depending on the context in which they are bound.

Table 1. Response to Constraints, Herman (2005), p. 188

Trait Interrelations for a Response to Constraints		
Belief to Control Events		
Need for Power	Low	High
Low	Respects constraints; works within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus-building are important	Challenges constraints but less successful because too direct and open in use of power; less able to

		read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to acquire desired influence
High	Challenges constraints and more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion—behind the scenes; good at being “power behind the throne” where can pull strings but are less accountable for the result.	Challenges constraints—skillful in both direct and indirect challenges

Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Self Confidence (SC) aid in our assessment of leaders’ openness to information: “Those whose scores on conceptual complexity are higher than their self-confidence scores are open, they are generally more pragmatic and responsive to the interests, needs, ideas, and demands of others [...] Leaders whose self-confidence scores are higher than their scores on conceptual complexity tend to be closed, they are ideologues, principled and driven by causes” (p. 193-195).

Table 2. Openness to information, (2005) p. 194

Trait Interrelations for Openness to Information	
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	Open
Self-Confidence > Conceptual Complexity	Closed
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both High	Open
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both Low	Closed

Ingroup Bias (IGB), Distrust of Others (DIS), and Task Focus (TASK) allow us to understand what determines each leaders’ motivation:

In assessing Task Focus (TASK), “Leaders with a task focus are often ‘task masters,’ always pushing a group to work on solving the particular problem of the moment. They tend to see the world in terms of problems and the role of the group as providing solutions to these problems [...] Leaders with a group-maintenance or relationship focus want to

keep the morale and spirit of their groups high. These leaders are generally sensitive to what the people want and need and try to provide it” (p. 195-197).

Table 3. Motivation assessment, p. 198

Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office	
Task Focus	Motivation
High	Problem
Moderate	Both problem and relationship depending on context
Low	Relationship

As for Ingroup Bias (IGB), “Political leaders high in ingroup bias are interested in maintaining the separate identity of their groups at all costs. They become quite concerned when other groups, organizations, governments, or countries try to meddle in what they perceive are the internal affairs of their group. The higher the score, the more isomorphic the leader and group become--the leader is the group; if anything happens to the group it happens to the leader and vice versa [...] Leaders with high scores for ingroup bias tend to see the world in “we” and “them” (friends and enemies) terms and to be quick to view others as challenging the status of their group” (p. 197-200).

Finally, in assessing Distrust of Others (DIS), “Leaders who are high in distrust of others are given to being suspicious about the motives and actions of others, particularly those others who are viewed as competitors for their positions or against their cause/ideology [...] Leaders who distrust others tend to be hypersensitive to criticism--often seeing criticism where others would not--and they are vigilant, always on the lookout for a challenge to their authority or self” (p. 200-201).

Table 4. Motivation towards the world, p. 200

		Distrust of Others	
Ingroup Bias		Low	High
Low		The world is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and reacted on a case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, must deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for the flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible (Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships)	The world is perceived as conflict-prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests (Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant)
High		While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders view that it is bounded by a specified set of international norms; even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as leaders work to limit the threat and enhance their countries' capabilities and relative status (Focus is on dealing with threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities)	International politics is centred around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior (Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems)

3.3 The Presidentialization Framework

As mentioned in Chapter 1, in 2005 Poguntke and Webb conducted a comparative study across modern democracies in order to describe, explain, and measure presidentialization. The study involved 14 countries, all of which were western democracies. In the first chapter of their book, they provided a framework of analysis for the presidentialization of politics. Later in 2010, Samuels and Shugart conceptualized and operationalized presidentialization in the context of constitutional variation. It is based on these ideas that the thesis will test the degree of presidentialization in the selected countries.

As part of Poguntke and Webb's (2005a) presidentialization theory, executive presidentialization refers to "a shift in intra-executive power to the benefit of the head of government (whether a prime minister or a president), accompanied by signs of growing executive autonomy from his or her party. In order to measure the existence – or absence – of such a shift, their work suggests three choices of indicators: 1) Leadership power within the executive; 2) Leadership power within the party; and 3) Candidate-centered electoral processes. However, it is also crucial to acknowledge the type of regime of the selected cases: 1) presidential; 2) Semi-presidential; or 3) Parliamentary. Particularly, the study of presidentialization as a function of constitutional variation at the executive level theoretically complements the preferred theoretical approach which Poguntke and Webb state is the 'ideal-typical approach' to the study of presidentialization:

"Theoretically, that is, through an analysis of the inherent mechanics of presidential systems. Here the focus is on the incentives and constraints that result directly from the configuration of the essential constitutional elements (legislature, executive, chains of accountability, methods of election, and so on)" (p. 2).

Studying characteristics of regime types – particularly during two main instances – allows for better insight extraction from the correlation between the variables in the context of the two contrasting cases. This smaller number of instances helps protect the hypothesis from interference from outside the main context. This assists in applying presidentialization theory over a small N in a comparative research context.




Figure 2. Presidentialization and regime type, Poguntke and Webb (2005a), p. 6

For the purpose of this thesis, the measurement of presidentialization involved investigating constitutional variations in regime characteristics of the selected countries concerned with the allocation of executive authority in a particular situation using the document analysis method developed by Bowen (2009) and later O’Leary (2014). Those characteristics included executive power, checks on executive power, and elections. The study surveyed the Document analysis refers to the “systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009, p.27). However, rather than purely quantifying data (content analysis), combining content and thematic analysis elements in a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative manner – which would entail “a first-pass document review, in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identified” – and then thematically analyze the data in the context of the research question(s) and hypothesis(es) (p. 32) is a useful method in empirically studying legal-constitutional documents. After

comparing the results of the executive power allocations investigation with the format proposed in Poguntke and Webb (2005a) and laid out in Figure 1, we got a sense of the degree of presidentialization in each country.

CHAPTER IV

CASES BACKGROUND

Before delving into the findings on and implications of Merkel and Erdogan's leadership traits and the relative constitutional allocations of executive power in their countries, we must first discuss the realities of contemporary political discourse surrounding the two cases in the wider European context. This is crucial in that Kutlu et al (2021) discuss their LTA findings in the context of EU-Turkey relations. Also, the two situations under study are situated at the heart of the EU-Turkey transactional cooperation doctrine, which has been one of the forwards-driving forces at times for EU-Turkey dynamics.

4.1 Pre EU-Turkey Statement 2016

Turkey's application for associate membership to the European Economic Community EEC (EC or the Community from this point forth) in 1959 could be viewed as a point of historical significance – and departure – in the context of EU-Turkey relations. Accordingly, the least that can be observed on EU-Turkey relations since 1959 is the non-linearity of a 'cyclical' relationship involving changing internal, global, and bilateral dynamics as well as a pattern of ebbs and flows of vicious and, at times, virtuous interactions:

“EU–Turkey relations can be broken down into three main periods: the Cold War years, and in particular from Turkey's first application for associate membership to the Community in 1959 to its application for full membership in 1987; the 1990s, an era in which both sides redefined their identities and interests in the aftermath of the Cold War; and the 2000s, which comprise both the rising

optimism between the two sides (2001–05) and the ensuing period of stagnation that defines relations to this day” (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015, p. 9).

The following is a brief overview of some of the major decisions, shifts, and milestones in EU-Turkey relations during the aforementioned time scope. Between the first and second periods, the observed relationship between Turkey and the EC is quite unique. Turkey’s application for association with the EC in 1959 resulted in what is known as the EC-Turkey Association Agreement, which was eventually signed in 1963, 4 years after association negotiations officially began. Considered as an interim step towards accession, the agreement stipulated the fundamental conditions towards creating a ‘balanced and continuous’ association between the Community and Turkey in terms of trade and economic cooperation, one of which was the creation of a Customs Union following the Additional Protocol which entered into force in 1973 (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1977). In tandem with Turkey’s application were similar moves on the Greek front, with Greece formally applying for association in 1959 as well. In comparison, negotiations between Greece and the Community took much less than with Turkey; two years to be exact. Although the Community welcomed Turkey’s application primarily for its strategic position in the context of the Cold War, the relative delay in negotiations, according to Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, was due to the weak economic performance on the part of Turkey in light of declining US foreign economic assistance (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015, p. 10). In the Turkish eye, this created a sense of imbalance in the EC’s stance on the Greek and Turkish positions, contributing to a turbulent stint between itself, Turkey, and Greece in the years to come (Güvenç, 1998).

In 1974, Turkey launched a military intervention in neighboring Cyprus following a Greek coup which ousted then-President Makarios and his government. The crisis

positioned the EC at a critical juncture, one that accelerated Greece's efforts for achieving full membership in the Community (Greece formally tabled its membership application in 1975 and was admitted as a Member to the Community in 1981) and hence necessitated that the EC alter its position towards the disputing parties. Some would argue that the prospect and then approval of Greek membership seriously affected EC-Turkey relations in that the Community was backed against the wall of world politics, while Turkey's aspirations towards European membership were – to an extent – psychologically weakened (1998, p. 106). This goes to say that until the late 1980s, many in Turkey viewed that it had earned the right for membership in the Community by virtue of its strategic decisions on Greece's return to NATO and the strong economic ties between both the EC and Turkey on one hand, and Greece with the latter on the other. This did not, however, present enough grounds for the Community to formally admit Turkey into the bloc (Turkey's tabled membership application in 1987 was rejected by the EC in 1989), with renewed tensions between Turkey and Greece in 1987 over oil exploration in the Aegean Sea obstructing EC-Turkey relations once more (Aydın-Düzgüt and Tocci, 2015, p. 15).

Following the end of the Cold War and the signature of the Maastricht Treaty which laid the foundation for European unification, talks between Turkey and the EU regarding accession continued to stall. Although Turkey had attempted to reinvigorate its strategic importance for transatlantic interests by participating in the Gulf War in the early 1990s, its case for accession still fell short despite US lobbying efforts. The reasoning for such a situation could be traced to the unaligned strategic interests between Europe and Turkey on the consequences of European interventionism in the Middle East (2015, p. 17). It was not until 1999 that Turkey's accession aspirations were finally realized at the

Helsinki European Council, where some would argue that the strategic importance of the Turkish military for NATO and the consolidation of European defense and security – showcased during the Balkan War – formed the basis of the Council’s recognition of Turkey’s candidacy. Certainly, internal dynamics within the EU had a major role to play, whereby:

“[...] the Social Democrat–Green coalition [in Germany] supportive of Turkish accession replaced the Christian Democrats who were largely against Turkish membership. The most notable shift however happened in Greece, which in the late 1990s reversed its position on Turkey’s EU membership from being a firm veto player to a strategic actor that relied on EU conditionality for the solution of its bilateral disputes with Turkey but in principle accepted Turkey’s full membership precisely as a means of guaranteeing its interests” (p. 19).

Come the early 2000s, Turkey had already agreed a Customs Union with the EU in 1995 and was finally declared eligible for beginning accession negotiations with the Commission in 2004, with negotiations to begin in October of 2005 (European Commission, 2004). It is also worth noting that between 1995 and 2004, the Turkish Constitution was amended eight times in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria – the EU membership’s eligibility code – as part of Turkey’s political reform efforts (Grigoriadis, 2006). Since then, accession negotiations have continued to stall, with only 14 chapters opened out of 35, and only 3 negotiated since 2011 (Turhan and Reiners, 2021). Aside from factors related to fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria and the already bumpy relationship, global and regional developments during the 21st century have had an important role to play in EU-Turkey relations. On one hand, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the United States fuelled anti-muslim sentiments across the West, and particularly in Europe (Allen, 2004). The Syrian civil war and the subsequent refugee crisis that followed, on the other hand, placed mounting migration pressures on third countries such

as Turkey and countries of destination such as the EU. The large influx of refugees, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 1, created a major emergency situation for the European Union culminated in the European refugee crisis of 2015.

4.2 Post EU-Turkey Statement 2016

The EU-Turkey Statement was a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the EU aimed at improving EU-Turkey relations and creating a mechanism for migration governance following the massive refugee influxes in 2015, which according to UNHCR (2015), were the biggest the continent had seen in a single year since the second world war. The deal was announced on the 19th of November 2015 and agreed on the 18th of March 2016. According to the European Council's official press release for the Statement, the deal stipulated seven main clauses:

“1) All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey [...]; 2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU [...]; 3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU [...]; 4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated [...]; 5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements [...]; 6) The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 billion by the end of 2018 [...]; 7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union; 8) The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace [...]; 9) The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria [...]” (European Council, 2016).

Effectively, the deal's integrity in real time would last until late February of 2020, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey had opened its borders with Greece in a televised address: "What did we do yesterday? We opened the doors" In a direct follow-up of the move, the International Organization for Migration IOM announced that the number of migrants at the Greek-Turkish border had surpassed 13,000, the majority of whom were Syrians but also included Afghani and Iraqi migrants (IOM, 2020). It also outlined the severe conditions which the migrants had to endure along the crossing points. On the other side, the migrants were met with a heavily fortified Greek border, whereby the Greek Prime Minister had declared that "Our national security council has taken the decision to increase the level of deterrence at our borders to the maximum [...] The borders of Greece are the external borders of Europe" (Mitsotákis, 2020). Looking in retrospect, President Erdogan's sentiment towards opening the border with the EU was nothing new. He had on multiple occasions between 2016 and 2020, threatened to open Turkey's borders and allow refugees to pass into Europe if the EU did not keep its promises laid out in the original plan. The move also signified that the relationship was once again falling into a vicious state. Between March of 2016 and of 2020, escalating geopolitical tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and major system-level shifts in the Turkish constitution (see Chapters 1 and 2) led the European Council to declare that "Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union" (Council of the EU, 2019). Accession negotiations along with efforts to update the Customs Union would later come to a halt following a vote by the European Parliament in 2019. Overall, EU-Turkey relations have come a long way since Turkey's association application in 1959. However, the relationship has been tainted by a continuous cycle of vicious-

virtuous episodes due to a variety of factors, symbolizing a complex state of distrust between the two neighbors (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015, p. 24).

4.3 Narratives of EU-Turkey Dynamics

4.3.1 Within the EU

During the 1990s, Europe made the leap from the critical cross-roads between economic communitarization and federal governance with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 establishing the Union and the introduction of the Copenhagen Accession Criteria in 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria, also known as the *acquis communautaire* is a set of political, economic, and administrative criteria constituting a total of 35 chapters which every prospective candidate for EU membership had to fulfill. Turkey and the EU would have to “‘open’ and ‘provisionally close’ [chapters] by reviewing Turkey’s adoption and implementation of the relevant minutiae of the *acquis*” (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015, p. 25). Consequently, two broad opinions about European federalism would emerge throughout that decade. These were on one hand what Grigoriadis (2006) termed the ‘Euro-Federalists’, and those which opposed the idea of supranational federalism on the other (Grigoriadis, 2006, p. 149). In essence, the Euro-Federalists contended that the identity of Europe be vested in the ideas of political and cultural uniformity, and that these ideas would be the prerequisite to establishing a European supranational entity.

On the other hand, those who opposed European federalism contended that the Union only retain its economic character vested in the European Economic Community and be the ‘final stage of convergence’ for member states. These perspectives implied a contested view on Turkish membership, as the Euro-Federalists argued that Turkey was

non-conforming to what constituted European values and beliefs. Religious conformity had a critical role to play in that regard, as some proponents of European Federalism acknowledged the stark differences between Europe's Greco-Roman and Judo-Christian religious heritage and Turkey's largely Islamic orientation. This meant that fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria would not be enough for Turkey to earn membership into the Union, as religious sentiment was viewed by some as a divide between the European and Turkish identities. In contrast, others within the Euro-Federalist camp strongly believed that the prospect of Turkish membership symbolized the EU's tolerance towards inclusion and diversity, and that the European identity should not be based on the ideas of religious conformity but rather the ideas of liberal democratic values (2006, p. 149). Other factors which came into play within the EU involved concerns on the strategic interests of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, its lower levels of economic development and the prospect of economic redistribution, and its shaky track record in critical areas such as democracy and human rights (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015, p. 26). However, G. Icoz and N. Martin (2021) argue that strategic security interests have kept the idea of Turkish accession alive for the EU:

“Turkey was admitted into the European sphere, as an aspirant member, and subsequently a formal candidate, because of its security value in different ways at different times. This security value became a driver of the enduring path dependence and is still evident in Turkey's accession process. Since the beginning of the Cold War it has been too valuable strategically to cast adrift from ‘Europe’ but not quite valuable enough for this to override the liberal democratic criteria of the EU” (G. Icoz and N Martin, 2021, p. 91).

Of particular interest within intra-EU perspectives on Turkey, however, is the German factor. Within the wider European context, the dynamics of the relationship between Germany and Turkey have largely mimicked the ebbs and flows pattern of EU-

Turkey relations. Major milestones in German-Turkish relations such as the Helsinki Council of 1999, along with severe setbacks such as the German Bundestag's recognition of the Armenian Genocide in 2016 have reflected the 'mutual distrust' tainting German-Turkish relations (Turhan, 2019). However, Turhan argues that the EU-Turkey Statement on migration represents the most recent 'rapprochement' in the German-Turkish relationship: "The most recent period of proper rapprochement and intensified intergovernmental collaboration was predominantly interest-driven and took place between September 2015 and May 2016 throughout the efforts to finalize as well as implement the 'EU-Turkey Statement' on dealing with the refugee crisis, which had transformed from a crisis of the Middle East to a European/German one mid-2015" (Turhan, 2019, p. 13). This is to say that Chancellor Merkel was particularly keen on 'managing' the migration crisis that had hit Europe in 2015 as a united European front, but not without serious collaborative efforts with the EU's neighbors, Turkey in particular.

4.3.2 Within Turkey

In the context of domestic politics within Turkey, it is important to first note that Turkish politics witnessed continuous changes during the latter half of the 20th century and the early 21st century. Stints of political instability, economic crises, and the electoral behavior of the Turkish mass have defined Turkey's contested relationship with the EU from the former's standpoint. Equally as important, however, is the raging internal debate on Turkish identity vis-à-vis Europe.

It is clear that the idea of European integration has remained Turkey's prime interest in its relationship with the EU, despite its cyclical nature (Önis, 2010). To trace

back its origins, Önis argues, one must look at the early notion of westernization (2010, p. 361), which had been vested in the modern Turkish project since the days of the Ottoman empire and consequently led to the modern-day Europeanization of Turkey primarily characterized by EU conditionality and shifting democratic, economic, and cultural standards in Turkey towards EU-led orientations (Yilmaz, 2016). However, the process of fulfilling the prospects of westernization through European integration itself has been contested within Turkey. Indeed, the Kemalist vision of westernization was heavily influenced by the prospects EU membership (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015). Particularly, Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci state that “For Turkey, ‘Europe’ – and by extension the EU – was a prime tenet of Kemal Atatürk’s project of identity formation, which saw Westernization and Europeanization as synonymous with progress” (2015, p. 21). During the latter half of the 20th century, this rhetoric was advanced by the secularists who maintained that the idea of membership would mean for a continuation of the Kemalist vision of a secular, progressive, and modernized Turkey (Önis, 2010, p. 362).

On the other hand, the rise of Islamism in Turkey during the 1990s – while keeping similar interest in European membership – created a divergent vision of what the integration into the European project would bring. Accordingly, achieving EU membership meant that religious freedom would be protected and the interests of the conservative elites in Turkey maintained (Ibid). The subsequent ascension of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and then-Prime Minister Erdogan onto the Turkish political scene in the post-Helsinki era represented this vision. Even though both perspectives treated the idea of membership with optimism and enthusiasm, the tide began to shift on both ends towards a Euro-skeptic view after the Cyprus referendum of 2004 on

the Annan Plan, the halting of accession negotiations in 2006, and simultaneously, vetoes by France and Cyprus on opening new chapters in the negotiation process. These incidents, according to Yaka (2015) led to a shift in Turkish public and elite opinion whereby “popular enthusiasm was rapidly fading away and the EU membership issue was gradually vanishing from the political agenda, as the negotiations were effectively blocked” (Yaka, 2010, p. 154).

In a similar light, while some would argue that the ‘golden age’ of EU-Turkey relations was initiated by the AKP’s reform efforts leading up to the opening accession negotiations in 2005 (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015; Önis, 2010), others contend that the AKP’s hegemony over Turkish domestic politics from 2007 onwards did play into a new foreign policy strategy with the EU, one which aims to establish Turkey as an independent and powerful Muslim actor both in the region and across the globe (Yaka, 2015). The new strategy effectively represented the dissolution of the idea of EU membership as an anchor for Turkey towards modernization, and the initiation of an era of selective-Europeanization – and possibly de-Europeanization – led by the AKP and Erdogan (Yilmaz, 2016).

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Merkel and Erdogan Trait Implications

As mentioned early on in Chapter One, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between migration policy and the characteristics of personalized politics, warranted by Merkel and Erdogan's leadership traits and the relative constitutional allocations of executive power in their respective countries. The following is a presentation and discussion of the findings produced by Kutlu et al (2021) in their analysis of Merkel and Erdogan's leadership traits and their impact of EU-Turkey relations. According to Hermann (2005), a score on a certain leadership trait is designated as low or high depending on the standard deviation from the mean group. A low or high score is reflected through one standard deviation from the mean group. The results of the LTA are laid out in Table 5 below. In the case of Merkel, the former German Chancellor's scores were high in Self Confidence (SC) and Distrust of Others (DIS); low in Task Focus (TASK) and Ingroup Bias (IGB); and average in the Belief in One's Ability to Control Events (BACE), the Need for Power (PWR) and Conceptual Complexity (CC). On the other hand, President Erdogan's data indicated high scores in the Distrust of Others (DIS); low scores in Task Focus (TASK) and Ingroup Bias (IGB); and average scores in the Belief in One's Ability to Control Events (BACE), the Need for Power (PWR), Self Confidence (SC), and Conceptual Complexity (CC). The only trait which exhibited

different scores between Merkel and Erdogan vis-à-vis the mean group is Self Confidence (SC), whereby Merkel exhibits a high score and Erdogan an average score.

Table 5. Comparison of Merkel and Erdogan's LTA scores, Kutlu et al (2021), p. 7

LTA Characteristics	Political Leaders N=214	Erdogan	Merkel
BACE (Belief in Ability to Control Events)	0.34 Low < 0.30 High > 0.38	0.35 (average)	0.35 (average)
PWR (Need for Power)	0.26 Low < 0.22 High > 0.30	0.26 (average)	0.26 (average)
SC (Self-Confidence)	0.36 Low < 0.27 High > 0.45	0.43 (average)	0.49 (high)
CC (Conceptual Complexity)	0.65 Low < 0.61 High > 0.69	0.61 (average)	0.61 (average)
TASK (Task Focus)	0.73 Low < 0.67 High > 0.79	0.60 (low)	0.65 (low)
IGB (Ingroup Bias)	0.51 Low < 0.44 High > 0.58	0.12 (low)	0.14 (low)
DIS (Distrust of Others)	0.01 Low < 0.01 High > 0.01	0.16 (high)	0.07 (high)

Merkel and Erdogan’s similarly average scores in BACE and PWR indicated that they can be challenging and/or respectful towards constraints depending on the given situation. This, of course, is contingent upon the contextual settings and surroundings which they find themselves in. Their low scores in TASK indicated that they are relationship oriented in their motivations for seeking office and more sensitive to the needs of others. In terms of their low IGB and high DIS scores, both Merkel and Erdogan generally perceive of the world as a conflict-prone environment. They remain flexible in

their responses due to the constraints brought forth by other countries, while also retaining a vigilant approach. Merkel’s high score in her SC compared to her score in CC means that she is more closed to information and is generally satisfied with her own capacity of interpreting situations.

The most significant variation between Merkel and Erdogan’s LTA scores appears in the DIS trait, whereby Erdogan (0.16) is approximately one standard deviation higher than Merkel (0.07). The variation between the leaders’ scores on this trait was crucial in the context of the present thesis due to the near impossibility that it appeared in the findings by chance. This was reflected in Table 6, whereby the t-test on DIS indicates a $p = 0.000$ meaning that the possibility that the DIS scores are inaccurate is null.

Table 6. t-test results of Merkel and Erdogan’s LTA scores, (2021), p. 7

Variables	Group	N	\bar{x}	ss	t	P
BACE	Erdogan	50	0.353344	0.1441142	-0.068	0.946
	Merkel	50	0.354952	0.0839362		
PWR	Erdogan	50	0.618322	0.1271989	0.146	0.884
	Merkel	50	0.615004	0.0984966		
SC	Erdogan	50	0.439150	0.2316146	-1.190	0.237
	Merkel	50	0.491758	0.2098595		
CC	Erdogan	50	0.264294	0.1292299	0.049	0.961
	Merkel	50	0.263186	0.0952615		
TASK	Erdogan	50	0.607246	0.1660354	-1.536	0.128
	Merkel	50	0.653186	0.1310489		

IGB	Erdogan	50	0.125562	0.1528068	-0.860	0.393
	Merkel	50	0.146342	0.0766511		
DIS	Erdogan	50	0.169960	0.1395661	4.405	0.000*
	Merkel	50	0.070734	0.0767510		

Note: () There is a significant difference in Erdogan and Merkel's DIS scores. (p is significant at 0.01)*

Particularly, of significance to this thesis was the explanation of EU-Turkey relations as indirectly reflected in Erdogan and Merkel's low scores in IGB and high scores in DIS. The two neighbors' lasting relationship – characterized by continuous stints of ebbs and flows – reflects both leaders' low likeliness to see the world in black and white terms. On the contrary, they tend to perceive others as *we* and *them* rather than *us* and *them*, depending on the context they are in while still retaining a patriotic interest in their respective nations (Hermann, 2005, p. 202). However, the stark difference in Erdogan's DIS score compared to Merkel's reflects his heightened distrust towards the EU. As mentioned earlier, it is no secret that there is a significant amount of distrust on the part of Erdogan vis-à-vis the EU, whereby his numerous public accusations of the bloc as well as his continuous threats to open the borders allowing migrants through is a clear indication of this reality.

Overall, both leaders' TASK, IGB, and DIS scores reflect – when evaluated together – their common tendency to appeal to the needs of their mass voter bases in order to preserve continuous public support and ameliorate voter discontent. In terms of their final analysis of the findings, Kutlu et al (2021) content that although they possess similar scores in most of the leadership traits used in LTA, Merkel and Erdogan still differ in their respective leadership styles (Table 7):

“To clarify, although their personal traits are similar, the comparison of the two leaders’ scores indicates that Merkel is more problem-oriented than Erdogan, and thus, her leadership style falls between Expansionist and Directive leader. Erdogan is found as a more relationship- oriented leader, and hence, his profile falls between the Evangelist and Consultative leadership style” (Kutlu et al, 2021, p. 18)

Table 7. Leadership Style according to Hermann (2003)

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges Constraints	Closed	Expansionistic (Focus is on expanding one’s power and influence)	Evangelistic (Focus is on persuading others to accept one’s message and join one’s cause)
Respects Constraints	Closed	Directive (Focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one’s views while still working within the norms and rules of one’s position)	Consultative (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)

5.2 Executive Power Allocations in Germany and Turkey

The findings regarding the constitutional allocations of executive power between Germany and Turkey in 2016 and 2020 respectively are reflected in Tables 8 and 9 below. Accordingly, the investigation was carried out as a function of executive power, checks on executive power, and elections. In March of 2016, the allocation of executive authority in Turkey was presented through the 1982 Turkish constitution (2011 rev). Based on this version of the constitution, executive power in Turkey is vested in the President of the Republic (also the head of state), the Council of Ministers, and therefore, the Prime Minister (Articles 8 and 104). These entities are legally bound by the constitution to

exercise the powers of executive authority and carry out its functions. However, the constitution grants the Grand National Assembly the right to check the power of the executive branch through the prospect of Parliamentary investigation (Article 100), which is motioned upon by the Assembly against the Prime Minister, and hence, any member of his/her respective cabinet. Finally, the constitution highlights that election of the President in Turkey is carried out both directly and indirectly, partly through the popular vote and partly from among the members of the Grand National Assembly.

On the other hand, the German Basic Law of 1949 (2012 rev) allocates executive power to the Federal Government, consisting of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor is responsible for laying out general policy guidelines which form the scope of operation for each Federal minister and their respective department (Articles 62 and 65). The Basic Law also places constraints on the powers of the executive primarily through the vote of no confidence which the Bundestag has the right to pursue (by electing a successor) (Article 67), the concurrent Legislative powers of the Länder which allow land governments in Germany to exercise legislative power (Article 72), and the matters under the abovementioned concurrent legislative powers of which refugee related issues is noteworthy (Article 74). In terms of elections, the Bundestag elects the Federal Chancellor on proposal from the Federal President (Article 63), who is elected via the Federal Convention (Article 54).

In March of 2020, exactly four years after the EU-Turkey statement had been agreed, the situation was different for the constitutional allocation of executive power in Turkey. The 2017 amendment of the Turkish constitution significantly altered executive power allocations, whereby the President retained all executive authority as the head of

government and of the state (Article 8*) thus abolishing Council of Ministers and the office of Prime Minister, and the right to rule by Presidential decree was introduced (Article 104*).

Table 8. Constitutional Allocation of Executive Power in Germany and Turkey.

March, 2016	Executive Power	Checks on Executive Power	Elections
Turkey (1982 Turkish Constitution)	<p>Article 8. Executive power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and laws.</p> <p>Article 104. The President of the Republic is the head of the State. In this capacity, he/she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation; he/she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of the State [...]</p>	<p>Article 100. Parliamentary investigation may be requested against the Prime Minister or ministers through a motion tabled by at least one-tenth of the total number of members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Assembly shall debate and decide on this request through secret ballot within one month at the latest [...]</p>	<p>Article 101. The President of the Republic shall be elected by the public from among the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey who are over forty years of age and have completed higher education, or from among Turkish citizens who fulfil these requirements and are eligible to be deputies [...]</p>
Germany (Basic Law of 1949, 2012 rev)	<p>Article 62. The Federal Government shall consist of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers.</p> <p>Article 65. The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy. Within these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently and on his own responsibility. The Federal Government shall resolve differences of opinion between Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor shall conduct the proceedings of the Federal Government in accordance with rules of procedure adopted by the Government and approved by the Federal President.</p>	<p>Article 67. The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.</p> <p>Article 72. On matters within the concurrent legislative power, the <i>Länder</i> shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by enacting a law [...]</p> <p>Article 74. Matters under concurrent legislative powers</p>	<p>Article 54. The Federal President shall be elected by the Federal Convention without debate. Any German who is entitled to vote in Bundestag elections and has attained the age of forty may be elected [...]</p> <p>Article 63. The Federal Chancellor shall be elected by the Bundestag without debate on the proposal of the Federal President [...]</p>

Note: Check Appendix II for sources.

This, in turn, led to the articles identifying checks on executive power in Turkey to be removed as well. Article 100 on Parliamentary investigation was therefore repealed under the 2017 constitutional amendments due to the abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister. Elections wise, the Grand National Assembly would be excluded from the voting process, whereby the President would be directly elected by eligible members of the public (Article 101*). In comparison, the same allocations of executive power in Germany under the German Basic Law of 1949 (2011 rev) were maintained in March of 2020 with no significant amendments to mention.

Table 9. Constitutional Allocation of Executive Power in Germany and Turkey.

March, 2020	Executive Power	Checks on Executive Power	Elections
Turkey (1982 Turkish Constitution, 2017 rev)	<p>Article 8*. Executive power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the Republic in conformity with the Constitution and laws.</p> <p>Article 104*. The President of the Republic is the head of the State. In this capacity, he/she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation; he/she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of the State [...] The President of the Republic may issue presidential decrees on matters relating to the executive power [...]</p>	Article 100**	Article 101* . The President of the Republic shall be elected directly by the public from among Turkish citizens who are eligible to be deputies, who are over forty years of age and who have completed higher education [...]
Germany (Basic Law of 1949, 2012 rev)	<p>Article 62. The Federal Government shall consist of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers.</p> <p>Article 65. The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy. Within these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his</p>	<p>Article 67. The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must</p>	<p>Article 54. The Federal President shall be elected by the Federal Convention without debate. Any German who is entitled to vote in Bundestag elections and has attained the age of forty may be elected [...]</p> <p>Article 63. The Federal Chancellor shall be elected by the Bundestag</p>

department independently and on his own responsibility. The Federal Government shall resolve differences of opinion between Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor shall conduct the proceedings of the Federal Government in accordance with the rules of procedure adopted by the Government and approved by the Federal President.

and on comply with the request and appoint the person elected. The Federal President [...] without debate on the proposal of the Federal President [...]

Article 72. On matters within the concurrent legislative power, the *Länder* shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by enacting a law [...]

Article 74. Matters under concurrent legislative powers

Note: Check Appendix II for sources.

Articles with () subjected to amendment in 2017.*

*Articles with (**) repealed on January 21, 2017; Act No. 6771.*

The findings presented above allowed the thesis to extrapolate the degree of constitutional presidentialization (Samuels and Shugart, 2010) on the presidentialization-regime type continuum provided by Poguntke and Webb (2005a) in Figure 2. Accordingly, the constitutional allocation of executive power in the case of Turkey in 2016 positions the Turkish system at the semi-presidential point, indicating that it is an averagely presidentialized system when it comes to executive leadership in that situational context. In comparison, the situational context in the case of Turkey in 2020 means that the constitutional allocation of executive power positions the Turkish system at the presidential point when it comes to executive leadership. As such, the system adheres to the full potential of a presidentialized system. On the other hand, executive power as allocated in the German Basic Law are the same in both situational contexts studied. Therefore, the German system is placed at the parliamentary position on the continuum, pointing to less presidentialized and more partified system in terms of executive leadership.

5.3 Impact on Migration Policies

The presentation of the findings on Merkel and Erdogan's LTA conducted by Kutlu et al (2021) and the document analysis of the constitutional allocation of executive power in Germany and Turkey in 2016 and 2020 is important in the context of our understanding of the role that leadership traits play in migration policymaking. The following is a discussion of the findings presented above in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and the decision by Erdogan to open the Turkish border with Greece in March of 2020.

Preceding the agreement between the EU and Turkey on the 2016 migration deal, Merkel had been largely involved in the negotiation process as one of the core leaders in Europe. At a refugee crisis summit for EU leaders in 2015, Merkel announced her endorsement of the aid plan that would supply Turkey with €3 billion in an effort to garner political support for the deal to move forward, which of course it did. In fact, the deal was termed by many commentators as the 'Merkel Plan' as already mentioned in Chapter one. At the same time, Turkey's harboring of approximately 2 million asylum seekers including 1.7 million Syrian refugees in 2015 laid a significant refugee burden on the Turkish government headed by Erdogan. Therefore, it was in the best interest of the two sides to strike a deal of the kind at the time. Indeed, in a continuation of the transactional cooperation between the two neighbors the deal went through. But can the deal in itself directly reflect the two leaders' traits laid out in the LTA findings? This is unlikely in that first, the deal saw Merkel negotiating on behalf of a much more complex institutional structure compared to Germany. Second, it could be said that the norms-based nature of the European project – which Merkel played a role in preserving while ensuring an open-

door policy (Pries, 2019) and later a safe return to transit Turkey – played a significant role in the push for the deal. Third and more importantly, a unilateral decision by Merkel at both the national and EU levels to return migrants to Turkey in avoidance of the norms-based order of Europe was impossible to pursue. This is mainly due to the presence of a rigorous system of checks on executive power allocations in Germany which involves both Federal and Länder authority especially in regard to refugee matters. Nonetheless, it could be argued that the two leaders' leadership styles played a role, albeit indirect, during this particular milestone in EU-Turkey relations. Particularly, Merkel and Erdogan's average BACE scores in the context of the statement could reflect their respect to constraints put forth by the EU on Erdogan in that irregular crossings needed to be halted. The same applies to the constraints put forth by member states on Merkel in that irregular migrants in Europe needed to be returned. However, the deal represented a convergence of interests for the two actors which resulted in an indirect effect on migration policies and the overall narrative of EU-Turkey relations.

President Erdogan's decision to open Turkey's borders with Greece in 2020 represents the flip side to the coin. While some would argue that the Turkish military's severe losses in northern Syria during February of 2020 – which meant for a possibly new influx of refugee into Turkey – accelerated Erdogan's decision after years of clearcut distrust towards the EU, the thesis argues that the situational combination of autonomous executive power available to Erdogan (or the full potential of the presidentialized Turkish system at the executive level) with the significantly high levels of the DIS trait reflected in the LTA presented the president with the necessary motive to pursue a largely unilateral decision with little regard to constraint. This means that Erdogan's high distrust vis-à-vis

the EU was put on direct display in March of 2020 by virtue of the relatively large zone of constitutional executive autonomy at his disposal.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated the existence of a novel relationship between migration policy and the characteristics of personalized politics, warranted by the relative constitutional allocation of power at the executive level. To that end, it made the argument that personalized politics – indicated by the personalities of prominent leaders and their nations’ constitutional characteristics at the executive level – possesses a direct correlation with migration decisions taken regarding international borders. Particularly, the argument was advanced by looking at evidence southeast of the European Union’s border dating back to 2016 at most, whereby the study was conducted in the context of the EU-Turkey statement on migration governance.

The thesis employed the comparative multi-case study research design, combining components of both cross-sectional and case study designs. It discussed the implications of quantified data along with qualitative documents using content and document analysis methods respectively. In terms of the cases used for the study, it was concerned with chief executive leaders particularly former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On the other hand, it was also concerned with their nations’ respective political systems. After complementing a Leadership Trait Analysis LTA with a comparison of executive power allocations between the two cases, the thesis concludes that leadership traits directly affected the nature of border policies between Turkey and the EU when autonomous executive power was present in Turkey. The thesis

concludes that Erdogan's leadership traits directly affected the opening of the Turkish border with Greece in 2020, whereby the president's large zone of executive autonomy by virtue of the constitution allowed him to exact a unilateral act of distrust. On the other hand, the leadership traits of Chancellor Merkel can be indirectly felt in the inception of the EU-Turkey Statement, whereby the multilateral nature of the negotiation process between the EU and Turkey – influenced by Merkel's personality and agenda – can be viewed as a mediator variable. Therefore, it can be extrapolated the stark variation in the distrust trait between Erdogan and Merkel, along with the clearly visible difference in constitutional executive power allocation between Germany in 2016 and Turkey in 2020 led to migration policymaking processes of varying natures and outcomes.

Considering that the main aim of this thesis was to investigate a new relationship in migration and leadership studies, it can be argued that the findings of this thesis represent the steppingstone for a new venture into intellectual inquiry on migration. While Carling (2017) indicates the necessity of a complex web of interdependencies between two phenomena for a relationship to be conceptualized as a 'nexus', this thesis offered a preliminary attempt at investigating the existence of the relationship in the first place, thus laying the foundations for assessing the relationship between migration and leadership dynamics at a more complex level. That said, the following recommendations for future academic inquiry into the relationship are worth attending to.

First, this thesis makes it clear that a wider study of border openings as a function of leadership dynamics in a situational rather than longitudinal context is warranted. Examples of cases in Cuba (1994), Turkey (2020), and Belarus (2021) are just a small sample of a possibly larger N that could be effective in carrying the conclusions of this

study even further on one hand and confirming its hypothesis using a more general lens on the other. Second, while the present thesis made conclusions regarding migration policies as a function of leadership dynamics, the relationship remains to be explored in the opposite direction. Could migration policies possess an influence leadership dynamics? And if so, what conclusions can we make regarding the nature of such a relationship? This should aid in the academic inquiry into the questions laid out by Carling in his discussion of the conceptualization of a nexus and the notion of nexification mentioned in Chapter one.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: List of Interviews used by Kutlu et Al (2021)

Note: Authors cited in Bibliography.

Appendix I-a: Recep Tayyip Erdogan

1. 2ND ROUNDUP: EU membership would make Turkey model for Islamic world, say Erdogan. 3 September 2003, **Deutsche Presse-Agentur**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
2. A Conversation with Turkey's Prime Minister in Washington. 8 December 2009, **The Charlie Rose Show**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
3. An Interview with the Turkish Prime Minister. 13 April 2010, **CNN International CNN's AMANPOUR**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
4. Bush Meets with Turkey's Erdogan at White House; President pledges U.S. support for Turkish EU membership. 10 December 2002, **State Department**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
5. Bush/Blair Meeting; U.S. Milk Supply; GM Layoffs; Erdogan Interview. 7 June 2005, **CNN CNN WOLF BLITZER REPORTS**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
6. Conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 28 April 2014, **The Charlie Rose Show**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
7. Discussion With Prime Minister of Turkey. 14 September 2005, **The Charlie Rose Show**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
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9. Erdogan Lobbies for EU Membership. 16 April 2007, **Spiegel Online**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
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11. Erdogan says he will not accept any delay of European Union entry Turkey's Member- ship. 6 October 2004, **Associated Press International**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
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13. Exclusive Interview with Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 7 September 2012, **CNN INTERNA- TIONAL CNN'S AMANPOUR**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
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16. Interview with the Turkish President; Carnage in Beirut After Multiple Suicide Bombings; Peshmerga Forces Look to Retake Sinjar; EU to Give Billions to Africa

- to Address Migrant Crisis; Combating Human Trafficking. Aired 3–4p ET. 12 November 2015, **CNN INTERNATIONAL WORLD RIGHT NOW WITH HALA GORANI**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
17. Interview with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. No Evidence Russia Plans Attacks Inside Syria; Britain Announces It Will Accept 20,000 Refugees Over Next Five Years; Recent Deaths No Deterrent For Migrants Desperate To Get To Europe; Stopping Price Tag Attack In Israel No East Task. Aired 11a–12p ET. 7 September 2015, **CNN INTERNATIONAL CONNECT THE WORLD**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
 18. Interview with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; Imagine a World. Aired 2–2:30p ET. 31 March 2016, **CNN INTERNATIONAL CNN’S AMANPOUR**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020.
 19. Interview With Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan; Interview With Sergey Lavrov; Interview With Jose Manuel Barroso. 25 September 2011, **CNN FAREED ZAKARIA GPS**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
 20. Interviews with Goodluck Jonathan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Kofi Annan. 18 April 2010, **CNN International CNN’S AMANPOUR**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020.
 21. MONDAY INTERVIEW: RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY: TAKING PART IN THE EU WILL BRING HARMONY OF CIVILISATIONS—IT IS THE PROJECT OF THE CENTURY”. 13 December 2004, **The Independent (London)**, Lexis- Nexis, 12 May 2020.
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 23. Newsweek: Exclusive Interview: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey. 22 March 2003, **PR Newswire**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020.
 24. PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TONY BLAIR HOLDS A NEWS CONFERENCE WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER RECEP ERDOGAN. 16 December 2006, **Congressional Quarterly**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
 25. Recep Tayyip Erdogan discusses terrorism, relations with the US and membership in the European Union. 8 June 2005, **NPR All Things Considered**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020. RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN, PRESIDENT OF TURKEY, IS INTERVIEWED ON CNN’S
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37. Turkey’s new leader promises sweeping human rights reforms CONSTITUTION REVIEW NEEDED TO COMPLY WITH EUROPEAN STANDARDS AHEAD OF ANY EU MEMBERSHIP TALKS. 14 November 2002, **Financial Times (London, England)**, Lexis- Nexis 12 May 2020.
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39. TURKEY-EU: WE ASK FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP, SAYS ERDOGAN. 7 July 2009, **ANSAméd—English**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
40. Turkish PM tells Russian paper about economic successes, EU membership roadblocks. 23 November 2013, **BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020.
41. Turkish premier escalates criticism of Germany during visit to Berlin. 2 November 2011, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
42. Turkish premier on fight against PKK, ties with USA, EU membership. 5 November 2007, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 11 May 2020.
43. Turkish president interviewed ahead of Italy visit. 5 February 2018, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 12 May 2020.
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Appendix I-b: Angela Merkel

1. ABC NEWS NOW/SPECIAL REPORT #2. 30 April 2007, LexisNexis 13 May 2020. ABC NEWS NOW/SPECIAL REPORT #6. 4 January 2007, LexisNexis 13 May 2020. Cameron To Meet EU Leaders In Brussels; EU Parliament To Hold Special Session;
2. European Stocks Rise In Early Trade; Italian Prime Minister Says Brexit Could Be Great Opportunity; Italian PM Says Italy Will Ensure Its Banks Are Secure; Labour’s Corbyn Faces No-Confidence Vote, Is Defiant Amid Cabinet Exodus; Merkel Says No Brexit Talks Until Article 50 Invoked, Says Close Ties To UK

- Will Continue; Merkel Says EU Must Learn Lessons From UK's Exit. Aired 4–5a ET. 28 June 2016, **CNN NEWSROOM**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
3. German CDU leader Merkel says wants to prevent grand coalition with SPD. 16 August 2005, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 4. GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL DELIVERS REMARKS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS. 3 November 2009, **CQ Transcriptions**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 5. German chancellor answers readers' questions on Syria, EU issues. 10 September 2013, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
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 7. German chancellor defends "tough" measures. 7 July 2006, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 8. German chancellor defends EU achievements, purpose. 23 March 2007, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 9. German chancellor discusses USA trip, torture issue, Russian relations. 9 January 2006, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 10. German Chancellor Gives Update On Coronavirus; World Economies Launch Giant Stimulus Package; E.U. Leaders Give Update On Coronavirus; E.U. To Close European Borders To Outside Travelers; S&P Global: Virus Has Led To Global Recession; IATA Asks Governments For Broad Tax Relief; U.S. Stocks Rally On Coronavirus Stimulus Plans. Aired 3–4p ET. 17 March 2020, **CNN INTERNATIONAL QUEST MEANS BUSINESS**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 11. German chancellor interviewed on Russia, Europe, trade agreement with USA. 9 December 2014, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
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 13. German chancellor on ties with Russia, China, Turkey's EU membership. 3 December 2007, **BBC Monitoring Europe**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
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 24. Jobs Report Indicates Growth; President Obama and Angela Merkel Press Conference. 2 May 2014, **CNN Legal View with Ashleigh Banfield**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 25. Live News Conference with President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel; Fox to Host America's Town Hall Tonight; ABC and Kelly Ripa. 24 April 2016, **Fox News Network MEDIA BUZZ**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 26. Merkel Calls on Europe to Do More for Refugees; European Countries Address Refugee Crisis; EU to Propose Country-By-Country Quota System; German Government Welcoming Refugees; Migrants Could Become Part of German Workforce; Farmers Protest Plunging Food Prices; European Stocks Closer Higher; Chinese Central Bank Says Volatility Nearly Over. Aired 4–5p ET. 7 September 2015, **CNN INTERNATIONAL QUEST MEANS BUSINESS**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
 27. Merkel Give First In-Depth U.S. Network Interview; Merkel Assesses Green Surge in European Elections; 11th Person Dies on Crowded Mount Everest; Theresa May, Best Option for UK is Leaving EU with a Deal; U.S. President Wraps Up State Visit to Japan; 55 Inmates Killed in String of Prison Riots in Brazil; The Mission to Collect Evidence of Syrian's Alleged War Crimes; Interview, Stephen Rapp, Former Chief Prosecutions, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Evidence of Syrian War Crimes; Netanyahu Threatens Fresh Elections As Government Deadline Looms; Facebook Execs to Defy Canadian Subpoena. Aired 11a–12p ET. 28 May 2019, **CNN INTERNATIONAL CONNECT THE WORLD**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
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 31. Obama, Angela Merkel Hold News Conference in Germany. Aired 11:30–12p ET. 17 November 2016, **CNN AT THIS HOUR WITH BERMAN AND MICHAELA**, Lexis- Nexis 13 May 2020.

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37. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP HOLDS A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL. 27 April 2018, **CQ Transcriptions**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
38. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL. 17 March 2017, **CQ Transcriptions**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
39. President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel Conclude Press Conference; Discussion of the Press Conference. 9 February 2015, **CNN Legal View with Ashleigh Banfield**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
40. President Obama Holds Joint News Conference With German Chancellor Merkel. 7 June 2011, **CNN LIVE EVENT/SPECIAL**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
41. President Obama, Angela Merkel Hold Joint Press Conference on Ukraine. 9 February 2015, **CNN Legal View with Ashleigh Banfield**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
42. President Trump and German Chancellor Merkel Hold Joint Press Conference; Media Overhypes Budget Cuts; Trump’s Travel Ban on Hold. 17 March 2017, **INTELLIGENCE REPORT INTELLIGENCE REPORT**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
43. Press Conference With President Donald Trump And German Chancellor Angela Merkel; President Trump Says China Called And “Wants A Trade Deal”; Trump: Next G7 Will Probably Be In Miami At His Golf Resort. Aired 5:30–6a ET. 26 August 2019, **CNN EARLY START**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
44. Putin, Merkel statements for media after 11 Jan talks. 14 January 2020, **BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
45. Report: Trump and Merkel Hold Press Conference; Trump Says Kim Jong Un Meeting to Be Quite Something; Trump Says DC Can Be A Nasty Place. Aired 2–2:30p ET. 27 April 2018, **CNN NEWSROOM**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.
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47. U.S. President Barack Obama Holds a Joint News Conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel—Final. 7 June 2011, **FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.

48. U.S. President, German Chancellor Hold Joint Press Conference. Aired 11a–12p ET. 24 April 2016, **CNN INTERNATIONAL CONNECT THE WORLD**, LexisNexis 13 May 2020.

Appendix II: List of Constitutional Documents used

Appendix II-a: The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey

1. Turkish Const. art. 8.
2. Turkish Const. art 100.
3. Turkish Const. art 101.
4. Turkish Const. art. 104.

Appendix II-b: Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany

1. German Basic Law. art. 54.
2. German Basic Law. art. 62.
3. German Basic Law. art. 63
4. German Basic Law. art. 65
5. German Basic Law. art. 72
6. German Basic Law. art. 74