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The Impact of Electoral Engineering on Political Moderation and Stability in Divided Societies: The Case of Lebanon's 2017 Electoral Law and 2018 Elections

By

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The Impact of Electoral Engineering on Political Moderation and Stability in Divided Societies: The Case of Lebanon's 2017 Electoral Law and 2018 Elections

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ABSTRACT

Politicization of ethnic identities is a major impediment to moderation in deeply divided societies. Two schools of thought dominate the literature on democracy in those types of societies, consociationalism and centripetalism. Consociationlaists support the philosophy of inclusion, power-sharing and mutual vetoes whereas, Centripetalists, promote the engineering of political institutions that encourage moderation through vote-pooling. Consequently, institutional engineering, more specifically electoral engineering is as a key tool to manage cleavages. This thesis aligns itself with centripetalism and evaluates Lebanon's electoral law passed in 2017 against centripetalist core concepts, both in theory and using empirical case studies from the results of Lenbanon's 2018 elections. Theoretical evaluation of Lebanon's electoral law showed that district formation, seats allocation and single preferential voting largely contradicts centripetalists concepts of bargaining, vote-pooling and moderate political discourses. Also, empirical results in Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections showed that cross-confessional and cross sectarian votes of minority groups are very high in districts with established majorities and vice versa. However, these votes are found to be very minimal in districts where sectarian groups have an equal number of voters and parliamentary seats. Empirical results showed that the electoral law in Lebanon will encourage, with a high likelihood, the Lebanese voter to cast a sectarian vote in districts where sectarian groups have approximately equal number of voters and. The thesis concludes that should political moderation be promoted in Lebanon; proportional representation is be rectified by redefining district formation and seats allocation. Also, single preferential vote should be substituted by multiple preferential voting with ranking system.

Keywords: Consociationalism, centripetalism, divided-societies, electoral law, electoral engineering, political accommodation, moderation, vote-pooling, Lebanon.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The politicization of ethnic identities remains one of the major challenges facing political moderation and stability in deeply-divided societies, especially in postwar consociational democracies. The literature on democracy in those types of societies is dominated by two major schools of thought, consociationalism and centripetalism, which use different institutional arrangements to manage ethnic conflict. Bogaards (2019) argues that advocates of consociationalism, following Lijphart (1977), support the philosophy of inclusion, power-sharing and mutual vetoes granted to ethnic elites along strict ethnic lines. In contrast, advocates of centripetalism, following Horowitz (1985), promote the engineering of political institutions that encourage moderation and the de-politicization of ethnic identities through vote-pooling. Both schools of thought consider institutional engineering, and more specifically, electoral engineering, a key tool in managing ethnic conflict and promoting political moderation and stability. Electoral engineering demarcates and constrains the extent to which would-be ethnic entrepreneurs can deploy and politicize their ethnic identities to gain votes. The process of electoral engineering is consequently a major driver that calibrates the politicization of ethnic identities of candidates and voters alike, which in turn, retains a major impact on political moderation and stability through the hardening/softening of ethnic

divisions. This thesis examines the impact of electoral engineering on prospects for political moderation in Lebanon using the case of the 2018 parliamentary elections.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

During *Pax-Syriana* (1990-2005), all electoral laws in post-war Lebanon used the majoritarian approach to vote counting, and vote casting used the Bloc Vote (BV) with preset sectarian lists. Electoral districts were occasionally modified from election to another to address Syrian interests by promoting pro-Syrian candidates and sidelining political opponents. After the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, a strong demand for structural changes in the electoral law emerged in the political arena. The advocates of this change consisted of mainly Christian political parties long marginalized under *Pax Syriana*, and civil society organizations and minority groups such as Kulluna Watani, Beirut Madinati, You Stink, etc.

Oppositional Christian political parties long argued that the previous electoral laws sidelined the true representatives of Christian citizens, and that Christian representatives need to be elected by mostly Christian votes and not Muslim votes. This demand for rectifying Christian political representation in post-Syria Lebanon was captured in the popular slogan '*sihat-al-tamthil al-masihi*'. On the other hand, civil society and minority groups advocated for more representative electoral laws along mainly Proportional Representation (PR) lines, and rallied behind the establishment of a de-sectarianized civil state (*dawla madaniya*) in Lebanon.

These twin pressures came to fruition after the election of General Michel Aoun to the presidency on 31 October 2016. After marathon negotiations, a new electoral law was promulgated in 2017 based on proportional representation at the district level and a

single preferential vote (PV) at the caza level. The PV is to be casted in each caza separately in each corresponding electoral district; it cannot be freely used across cazas in a given electoral district but strictly in the caza in which voters are registered. Moreover, the sectarian quota remained the same. As a result, the election in 2018 yielded a better Christian representation from the perspective of the Christians by an increase in parliamentary seats of the two major Christian political parties “FPM” and “LF”. Civil society and minority groups ended up with no parliamentary representation except for MP Paula Yacoubian, however.

The results of the 2018 parliamentary elections present a paradox for students of ethnic conflict. For albeit PR electoral systems are considered favorable in deeply divided societies and are supposed to provide minority groups better representation as advised by advocates of consociationalism such as Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2001), nevertheless, in some contexts, they may not promote moderation and representation for those groups. In fact, in the case of Lebanon, the structure of electoral districts, the use of the single PV at the level of the cazas rather than the bigger electoral district, and the predetermined sectarian quota, all combined to torpedo the effects of the PR electoral system. Instead, they reinforced sectarian discourse and undermined prospects for moderation, nor did it open the doors for the representation of anti-sectarian groups. Thus, in the context of Lebanon, one should be careful about the concept and details of any proposed electoral law because any mutation will create an illusion of proportional representation which aims at providing proper representation for all minority groups while in reality it is reinforcing the same old sectarian cleavages and discourses.

Following the same rationale, this thesis aligns itself with the centripetalist theory proposed by Horowitz (1985) and further developed by Reilly (2001) focusing on electoral engineering and electoral systems as ways of promoting moderation and accommodation in deeply-divided polities. The study proposes that an electoral law in deeply divided societies that deviates from the centripetalist approach will more likely yield political instability and promote extremism and parochialism in the political realm instead of political accommodation and moderation. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to answer the following questions: 1) What was the impact of institutional engineering on political moderation during the 2018 parliamentary elections in Lebanon? And 2) did the 2017 electoral law lead to political moderation or reinforce extremist and sectarian/confessional politics and discourse and why?

This thesis hypothesizes that since the 2017 Lebanese electoral law was based on concepts contradictory to the centripetalist approach to electoral engineering, the 2018 parliamentary elections exacerbated rather than ameliorated confessional and sectarian modes of political mobilization. Consequently, prospects for accommodation and collaboration between different sects/confessions declined, ushering in the present state of political instability. An empirical examination of the cross-ethnic vote in the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018 is undertaken to validate the previous hypothesis. Due to the institutionalization of sectarian politics in the Ta'if agreement and politicization of sectarian identities in post-war Lebanon, it has become imperative to examine sectarian behaviors rather than only confessional ones which were more relevant in the pre-war period. Thus, in this thesis, cross-ethnic vote will be considered

as a combination of both, cross-confessional and cross-sectarian votes and the empirical examination will cover both.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The choice of research strategy is mainly driven by the nature of the research and governed by the research question. Typically, qualitative strategies subscribe to interpretivist epistemology and constructivist ontology and follow an inductive pattern. Thus, qualitative strategies tend to correlate with the study of specific communities or criteria which have marginally a small population and are concerned with the in-depth study of the unit. Also, they are of a broad aspect, meaning that the researcher is exploring a certain community or topic to generate a certain theory or rationale. In contrast to qualitative strategies, quantitative strategies subscribe to positivist epistemology and objectivist ontology of research and follow a deductive pattern. Quantitative strategies are commonly associated with theory-testing and generalization and have the tendency to correlate with the study of the whole and look to understand trends and criteria describing the whole rather than the individual and thus correlate with large populations. The proposed research seeks to test the impact of the 2017 electoral law and 2018 parliamentary elections on political moderation and accommodation in post-Syria Lebanon. A theoretical evaluation of Lebanon's 2017 electoral law against the centripetalist requirements demonstrates just how far the terms of Lebanon's electoral law diverge from centripetalism.

Since theoretical evaluation is the core purpose of this research, a qualitative strategy seems to be the most adequate form of research. One would argue that the

interpretivist stand of qualitative strategies tends to distance the findings from empirical validation and support which in this case are vital and available through the elections' results, leaving the findings and outcomes weak and questionable. To address this weakness, the research aims to look at the cross-ethnic vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections as an indicator of moderation and accommodation. A cross-ethnic vote is defined in this research as the combination of cross-confessional and cross-sectarian votes. A cross-confessional vote is the vote cast by a Christian electorate (any type of Christian sect) to a Muslim candidate (any type of Muslim sect and Druze) and vice versa, and a cross-sectarian vote is the vote cast by any electorate (from any sect) to a candidate who is from a different sect within the same confessional group. The study hypothesizes that *the more cross-confessional and cross-sectarian votes cast, the more the political moderation and accommodation.* Consequently, the thesis will follow a mix of qualitative and quantitative strategies to provide empirical support to the argument and hypothesis.

Empirical validation of the argument requires a quantitative strategy. This entails a cross sectional design because it allows for collecting data on a specific sample of cases at a single point in time to collect a body of quantifiable data in connection with a pre-set of variables. The research question is not interested in the variation of cross-confessional or cross-sectarian voting through different elections, and hence a longitudinal design is dismissed. Also, the comparison of the cross-confessional or cross-sectarian votes in Lebanon and other countries is not the subject matter of the research question and thus, comparative designs are dismissed. The case-study design is dismissed because of its reductionist nature and the small size of the population, in the

presented case, the entire results of the 2018 election nationwide will be explored. Finally, the comparison of 2009 and 2018 elections, as tempting as it may seem to be, does not answer any of the research questions and does not feed into reinforcing any of the proposed arguments for a myriad of reasons. This is so for a number of reasons.

First, the process of comparison always requires fixing one set of variables and examining the variation of results with respect to the variation of the rest of the variables. In the case of the electoral laws and elections in 2009 and 2018, the major important variables, such as: 1) electoral law, 2) electoral districts, 3) voting process, 4) vote counting, etc. have all changed and thus any variation in the results between 2009 and 2018 cannot be strictly and individually linked to any of these variables distinctly but can be linked to them mutually or jointly. Additionally, cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian vote counting cannot be compared between 2009 and 2018 due to the different counting strategies used in each law. For instance, the 2009 majoritarian requires Block Vote allows each voter to cast multiple votes for more than one candidate in a single electoral district in such a way that these votes do not surpass the maximum number of seats in each district. By contrast, the 2017 law offers each voter 2 votes: one PR vote at the electoral district and another single PV at the level of the caza in which the voter is registered. This large difference in vote casting and counting makes the comparison of the number of votes vague and insignificant. Comparing the 2009 and 2018 elections may be significant on a theoretical and normative level; however, this is not the matter of interest of this thesis. The theoretical part of the thesis is based on the evaluation of the 2017 electoral law against the centripetalist approach to electoral engineering.

The thesis thus merges two methodological approaches. The first consists of a theoretical evaluation of the 2018 Lebanese electoral law against the centripetalist theory, while the second entails the empirical assessment of cross-confessional votes in the entire electoral districts and cross-sectarian votes in one particular district. The data on the results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary election will not be prepared by the researcher; however, secondary data examination will be considered and this data will be extracted from the results collected by Information International (2018).

The Christian cross-confessional vote is defined as the percentage of Christians who casted a vote for a Muslim candidate out of the total number of Christian voters in the electoral district, while the Muslim cross-confessional vote runs the other way. All cross-confessional votes will be calculated for each and every district of the 18 total electoral districts (Beirut I & II, Bekaa I, II & III, Mount Lebanon I, II, III & IV and South I, II & III). In order to understand the relevance of the cross-confessional vote, and to be able to compare results across districts, new variables are introduced to help in the computing process, namely the Christian/Muslim seats ratio in each district and the Christian/Muslim voter turnout ratio in each district. For better computational and visual requirements, normalized variables will be calculated as follows:

1- "A" is the normalized difference between Christian and Muslim votes in each district and is equal to:

$$A = \frac{(Christian\ votes - Muslim\ votes)}{(Christian\ votes + Muslim\ votes)}\ x\ 100$$

2- "B" is the normalized difference between Christian and Muslim seats in each district and is equal to:

$$B = \frac{(Christian\ seats - Muslim\ seats)}{(Christian\ seats + Muslim\ seats)}\ x\ 100$$

A & B are two normalized variables which have values varying from -100% to +100%.

A= -100% in a given electoral district means that this district has solely Muslim voters and vice versa which means that the more the value of A approaches -100% it means that the absolute majority of district voters are Muslim and the more the value of A approaches +100% it means that the absolute majority of district voters are Christian.

B= -100% in a given electoral district means that this district has solely Muslim seats and vice versa which means that the more the value of B reaches -100% it means that the absolute majority of district seats are allocated to Muslims and the more the value of B reaches +100% it means that the absolute majority of district seats are allocated to Christians. The rationale behind introducing these two normalized variables is, first and foremost, to have variables which have values between -100% and +100% which makes them easy to compute together in order to extract patterns and conclusions. Also, these variables will allow us the examination of the cross-confessional vote in relation to the district ethnic composition in terms of number of voters, the voting power of each confession and also in terms of allocated confessional seats. In other terms, this comparison will allow us to draw conclusions on the variation of cross-confessional votes across districts while tracking confessional number power and confessional seats numbers. The final results will be computed on graphs using Excel and conclusions will be elaborated in details. The same methodology will be used to investigate cross-sectarian votes. Cross-sectarian votes will be analyzed for all the

sects that have parliamentary seats allocated to them in a given district. The rationale behind this reasoning is that sects who do not have seats allocated to them in a district, are forced to cast a vote for a candidate that is not among their sectarian group and thus they will end up casting a cross-sectarian vote involuntarily. The study will be undertaken on all electoral districts.

Study population: The study population, as explained in the previous section, will be the entire results of the 2018 parliamentary elections in Lebanon across all districts. The data used is prepared by the Ministry of Interior in Lebanon, organized and published by Information International (2018). Thus, the study will be based on secondary data analysis which has already been disclosed to the public.

Study procedure: Since the data examined is a secondary data prepared by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOI) in Lebanon and organized and published by Information International (2018) and since the research does not require any contact with human beings, no informed consent is required to be submitted for IRB's approval. The data analysis and computations will be performed by the researcher himself. Information International (2018) will be used to extract data, Excel will be used to store data and compute results across different patterns and variables. The outcome of the research is to show that the 2017 electoral law and consequently the parliamentary elections of 2018 in Lebanon have been a driver for political instability rather than accommodation. Since the data is already disclosed by the ministry of interior, and since Information International (2018) has already organized it in their style and published it, no fear is raised concerning disclosure of information. Nor are there any

ethical challenges involved in the research given that all data has already been disclosed to the public.

1.4 MAP OF THE THESIS

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The next chapter examines the literature on institutional engineering and specifically electoral engineering from the perspectives of consociationalism and centripetalism. The chapter also examines Horowitz' (1985) centripetalist approach and describes the electoral systems favorable for centripetalism as advised by Reilly (2001). Chapter three provides a thorough explanation of the 2017 electoral reforms in Lebanon, and compares them against centripetalist approaches. The examination of cross-confessional and cross-sectarian votes in the entire districts in the results of the parliamentary elections in 2018 will be used as an empirical case studies to support the hypothesis in chapters four and five respectively. Chapter six presents a summary of the findings and spells out their implications for political accommodation in deeply divided societies.

CHAPTER TWO

INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Centripetalism, as described by Reilly (2001), understands democracy as a recurrent method of conflict management and an infinite sequence of dispute resolution in which cooperation and negotiation are the drivers for resolving conflicts rather than simple zero-sum games or majority rule. Thus, to reduce tensions among heterogeneous groups in a deeply divided polity along ethnic lines, inclusion, fair competition and political and civil liberties are pivotal. As concepts, “ethnicity” and more particularly “confession and sect” are tricky and the conflicts associated with these concepts are even more slippery and difficult to define. In any given polity, people are grouped under different denominators according to different identities, common memories or cultural resemblances, among which are: tribe, confession, sect, etc. However, as Reilly (2001) puts it, these identities constitute no challenge for the political realm unless they were politicized. Accordingly, this chapter borrows Reilly’s (2001) approach to define confessional and sectarian conflicts as a particular case of the broader ethnic conflict and thus, a “divided society” is understood to be a society which embeds multiple confessions and sects and where political salient cleavages, fueled by sectarian entrepreneurs, majorly pivot along these confessional and sectarian identities. The

management of these cleavages under democratic principles has become main stream in the study of political science, Reilly (2001) cited March and Olsen (1984, 738) and argued that 'democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions', thus the importance of institutional engineering. According to Reilly (2001), modifying political institutions will yield a change in both political practices and behaviors and thus, institutional engineering for conflict management in general, and in a more particular institutional choice, the electoral system, feeds into reinforcing democratic principles in divided societies. In turn, cooperation, moderation and accommodation can be enforced on rational political actors by designing specific electoral systems which increase the likelihood of success if candidates ditch uncooperative, hostile and extremist behaviors.

This chapter surveys the literature on institutional engineering, focusing more specifically on electoral engineering as a major part of institutional engineering. The chapter opens with a survey of the centripetalist-consociational debate. The following survey of the literature on institutional engineering and democracy is grouped into two major categories: 1) advocates of the consociational model (McCulloch 2018; Bogaards 2005; Bogaards 2013), and 2) Advocates of the centripetalist model (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2006; Reilly 2018; Stojanovic and Strijbis 2019; Bogaards 2010; Bogaards et al. 2010). It then moves on to consider this debate in the literature on Lebanon. The last part of this chapter explains Horowitz' (1985) and Reilly's (2001) centripetalist approach and discusses the electoral systems favorable for centripetalism.

2.2 INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING FROM A CONSOCIATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Advocates of Consociationalism argue that ethnic/confessional/tribal/etc. cleavages in a given society are strongly entrenched in individuals of the same polity through a history of reciprocated disunions and conflicts. Consequently, there is an imperative need to manage these cleavages rather than wasting energy on mitigating them because these vices can't be modified. Reilly (2011) suggests that the preponderance of intrastate violent conflicts in deeply divided societies underscores the need for conflict management mechanisms through institutional and constitutional design. This increased interest in institutional engineering to promote stability and democracy in postwar places has in turn created a considerable academic literature.

Advocates of the consociational model are divided among those who focus on the broad issue of institutional engineering (Bogaards and Elischer 2015; Bogaards 2005; Bogaards 2010; Bogaards et al. 2010) and those who address the specific issue of electoral engineering (McCulloch 2013; Bogaards 2013). Almost all of the researches in this category adopted a qualitative approach except for Bogaards (2013). Bogaards (2005) addressed the consociational model in the Italian first republic and argued that the post-war consociational democracy adopted in Italy is of a special kind. He labeled it "Consociationalism Italian style" (p. 503), and suggested that cleavages in the Italian polity are not of an ethnic, tribal or cultural type but are of a deep ideological type which makes 'polarized pluralism' a better definition for the Italian model than consociational democracy. While using a comparative approach to party systems and elite behavior, he argued that the nature of cleavages in a polity shapes the formation of

political institutions. Moreover, segmentation and polarization in a polity yield different types of political party systems which have their corresponding exclusive dynamics and, in turn, elite behavior.

In contrast to Bogaards (2005), Bogaards and Elischer (2015) argued that the nature and strength of political institutions have direct impact on the type of political system. Using Africa as an example, they suggest that competitive authoritarianism, which is a modified form of democracy, is directly related to three different factors: 1) linkage to the West, 2) Western leverage and 3) organizational power. According to Bogaards and Elischer (2015), the interplay of these factors and their intensity levels (low, medium, and high) is the key factor in demarcating whether or not competitive authoritarian regimes will transform into stable or unstable regimes, or into some kind of democracy. The nature of political institutions, as argued by Bogaards and Elischer (2015), is a direct result of institutional engineering and plays a major role in shaping political behavior in a given polity. Consequently, it contributes to either stability or instability in the political arena. Similarly, taking Africa as an example, Bogaards (2010) and Bogaards et al. (2010) criticized the centripetalist approach by emphasizing their limitations in yielding moderation through institutional engineering from the perspective of party politics and ethnic party bans. The purpose behind ethnic party bans in African states was to avoid politicizing ethnicities because such an action is believed to lead to ethnic clashes and political instability (Bogaards et al. 2010, pp. 599).

Bogaards et al. (2010) also emphasized the importance of political party engineering in shaping the stability of political systems. They surveyed the multiplicity

of African states that used ethnic party bans as an institutional engineering model to reduce ethnic and tribal conflict. Bans are found to be infrequently imposed, and decisions were governed by the interplay of the collective memory of ethnic violence in the past and the use of these memories by regimes to confine political party competition. They argued that ethnic party bans, as a centripetalist institutional measure for moderation, have very limited positive effects on democracy and political stability; moreover, conflict appears to be partial and depends on political context. Almost all countries possessed the legal infrastructure to ban such parties but only very few made use of it. Consequently, Bogaards et al. (2010) conclude that party bans are not very effective institutional mechanisms to support democracy and reduce inter-communal cleavages.

While investigating the same subject, Bogaards (2010) reached almost the same conclusion for the case of Nigeria. He investigated the array of measures taken by Nigerian leaders to fight the politicization of ethnicities in political party systems, distinguishing between two types of political party bans: positive and negative party bans. The former is the list of measures by which incentives are provided to parties to form across communal and ethnic boundaries, whereas the latter represents the measures by which ethnicity is forcefully removed from politics. Although Bogaards (2010) granted credits to the positive party ban, he insists that this form of institutional engineering has very limited and effective results.

In the discussion of a more specific type of institutional engineering, i.e. electoral engineering, both Bogaards (2013) and McCulloch (2013) took stands to defend consociationalism against centripetalism. Bogaards (2013) surveyed the countries that

are deeply divided along ethnic lines that went through peace-building and peace agreements to find the best electoral law to accommodate cleavages in these types of polities. He assessed the outcome of all electoral laws in every country and examined whether or not it achieved an inclusive government, inclusive parliament, peace and democracy. His findings show high correlation between PR and inclusivity in both government and parliament with peace. Correlation with democracy was found to be less than that of peace but remains very high. He thus concluded that PR electoral systems are in fact drivers for peace and democracy in conflict-prone and deeply fractionalized polities.

In contrast to Bogaards (2013), McCulloch (2013) emphasized the limitations of centripetalist electoral systems. She surveyed the countries that used electoral systems favored by centripetalists: namely, the majoritarian Alternative Vote (AV), the majoritarian Supplementary Vote (SV), and the proportional Single Transferable Vote (STV). She concluded that the absolute majority of elections in countries following centripetalist models led to less stable political systems because more than half of the victories were recorded by extremists rather than moderates. McCulloch (2013) also asserted that, in ethnic conflict management, centripetalist claims have a narrow and limited range of effectiveness, and that unless moderation from both leaders and followers is enhanced, centripetalist models will yield extremist results. In line with the conclusion conveyed by McCulloch (2013), one would argue that the core aim of centripetalism is to encourage moderate and accommodative discourses by competing factions through the creation of institutional incentives in electoral laws which is discussed in the following section.

2.3 INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING FROM A CENTRIPETALIST PERSPECTIVE

Similarly to their consociational counterparts, advocates of centripetalism are divided among those who focused on the broad issue of institutional engineering (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2006) and those who address a particular form of institutional engineering, i.e. electoral engineering (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2018; Stojanovic and Strijbis 2019). Reilly (2001; 2006) argues that democracy does not depend only on socio-economic conditions, but also on the design of political institutions. Different institutional practices directly impact democracy and its operations. He contends that centripetalist institutional and political strategies help in the creation of broad-based, cross communal and multi-ethnic political parties and party systems that encourage moderation and political accommodation. These centripetal incentives include: 1) electoral incentives for campaigners to moderate their political rhetoric to attract cross-ethnic votes by adopting vote-pooling and vote-trading strategies, 2) the provision of a bargaining area for actors from different ethnic backgrounds to gather and seek mutual support, and 3) the development of cross-ethnic and centrist political parties or coalitions of different ethnic parties (Reilly 2006, pp. 816). Moreover, there are multiple political institutional strategies to promote centripetalism, such as a top-down approach to party building like constraining the formation of ethnic/communal/tribal parties and party systems, and engineering proper electoral systems that have the capability to reshape party systems.

Electoral systems can be grouped under three main families: 1) plurality-majority, 2) semi-proportional, and 3) proportional representation or PR (Reilly 2001). Those

favored by centripetalists can either be of the plurality-majority family or the proportional family. Among the majoritarian systems, Reilly (2001) favors the Australian AV and the Sri-Lankan SV systems. However, if PR systems are to be used, Reilly (2001) contends that the STV is a far better choice than list-system PR for the accommodation of ethnic divisions. STV presents a better choice for its ability to allow voters to rank their preferred candidates by order of preference and winners are selected not only by their 1st choice vote numbers but also by their second choice vote numbers. If a candidate secures absolute majority in the first choice vote number he will be declared winner immediately. However, in divided societies, rarely can a candidate secure an absolute majority in the first choice vote number and thus, moderating political discourse will allow candidates to reach out to voters from outside their ethinc/confessional/tribal/etc. groups.

Reilly (2018) and Stojanovic and Strijbis (2019) used the cases of Australia and the USA to show the effectiveness of centripetalist electoral laws in promoting moderation and centrist political behavior. AV in Australia helped in the creation of a "relatively conservative electorate" (Reilly 2018), p.209) to punish any kind of emerging extremism. Reilly (2018) also examined the research on migrant voting in recent years in Australia and found that the "ethnic vote" is nearly extinct. In the American experience, he argued that in cities using the ranked choice voting (RCV), where …., candidates spent less time critiquing their rivals and had less vicious campaigns than in cities which did not use the RCV. Only 29 percent of runners in RCV cities described being negatively stereotyped by rivals compared to as high as 40 percent in non-RCV cities. On the other hand, Stojanovic and Strijbis (2019) used an

empirical statistical comparative analysis in a bilingual Swiss canton called Fribourg. They tested voter behavior in three different elections having the same polity but with three different electoral systems. By examining cross-ethnic voting behavior, they found that cross-ethnic voting is considerably more recurrent in multi member majoritarian elections than in two-member majoritarian or in list-PR elections.

2.4 INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN THE CONTEX OF LEBANON

The debate between consociational and centripetalist approaches still holds ground in the case of Lebanon. Salloukh (2006) and Haddad (2010) questioned the consociational model's institutional utility to promote postwar peace and moderation. Salloukh (2006) studied the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 and determined the institutional elements which explain cross-ethnic electoral alliances. Haddad (2010) studied the Lebanese parliamentary election of 2009 by examining electoral alliances and dynamics, elections outcome, and the social makeup of the new parliament; he also described the repercussions of these elections. Both Salloukh (2006) and Haddad (2010) agreed on the failure of all these electoral laws in promoting moderation and cross-sectarian cooperation. Salloukh (2006) argued that all the parliamentary elections in post-war Lebanon largely failed to achieve moderation. In *Pax Syriana* Lebanon, Salloukh (2006) argued, electoral laws were intentionally crafted to fit particular political purposes in alignment with the Syrian influence in Lebanon, discredited any type of opposition and denied them even a very small representation in parliament. Similarly, Haddad (2010), although examining the 2009 election that

transpired after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, shared the same critical view.

In contrast to all his previous works that pitted consociationalism against centripetalism, Bogaards (2019) revisited his original argument, which had defended consociationalism against centripetalism, and presented a more nuanced view underscoring the common ground between these two institutional perspectives. He argued that those concepts need not be mutually exclusive and there are some situations where they reinforce each other, and other situations where they work against each other. In consociational democracies (Lebanon, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Burundi and Fiji), vote pooling and bargaining were present in elections despite the unfavorable electoral systems such as bloc vote/PR with a confessional quota, FPTP, PR with mandatory multi-ethnic lists. In fact, Bogaards (2019) was among the first to examine the 2017 Lebanese electoral law and the 2018 elections. He argued that since the confessional quota is preserved in this new electoral law, the proposed PR system will have very little to no impact on confessional power (Bogaards 2019).

In a more recent work, Deets and Skulte-Ouaiss (2020) endorsed Bogaards' (2019) conclusions after a close examination of Lebanon's 2018 elections from the perspective of electoral law and civil society groups candidacy. Deets and Skulte-Ouaiss (2020) argue that the results of parliamentary elections were less than expected for civil society candidates especially "Kulluna Watani" despite the presence of multiple factors that could have helped them achieve a larger electoral representation. These are: 1) formation of a broad YouStink movement after the 2015 garbage crisis, 2) drafting a new electoral law, and 3) the promising results for civil society candidates in

the local municipality elections. Deets and Skulte-Ouaiss (2020) agreed with Bogaards (2019) that the electoral law had a major influence on the elections' results especially since the confessional quota was conserved while the electoral districts changed. This fact played against civil society candidates and their campaign had very little to no impact. However, they further added that such an outcome, which translates into the continuation of elites in the consociational system, is also related to multiple other important factors such as: 1) the elites' imperative control and domination over legislation and hence the electoral law, 2) the elites' complex networks of patronage and clientelism as well as their extended experience in deploying and using these networks and resources in their favor and 3) a political culture resilient to change. Moreover, Deets and Skulte-Ouaiss (2020) shared Bogaards' (2019) pessimism about the post-election period, which was clearly displayed in the events of Fall 2019 when a large part of the Lebanese people took the streets in protest against the government and parliament whom they elected two years ago.

2.5 CENTRIPETALISM AND ITS FAVORABLE ELECTORAL LAWS

In divided societies, the mixture of politically salient identities, such as confession and sect, and the non-confessional and non-sectarian contentious issues should normally be a driver for diverse cross-confessional and cross-sectarian coalitions. However, these types of coalitions are usually undermined by identity politics where confessionalism and sectarianism are deeply politicized and politically salient. In such circumstances, Reilly (2001) argues that these differences are not to be considered as dogmatic and

incompatible causes of conflict. Rather, they need to be managed through cooperation, bargaining and mutual trade-offs. Thus, the goal in dealing with contentious issues is collaboration and accommodation rather than consensus. This can be achieved through a process of negotiation and dynamic engagement. consequently, the adoption of a centripetalist approach to designing political institutions, namely electoral laws, becomes compulsory.

Reilly (2001) contends that the basic principle of a centripetalist approach to conflict management is the creation of institutional incentives for accommodation between conflicting parties in divided societies that provide more benefits in adopting moderate discourses rather than extremist ones. In a simpler way, the centripetalist approach encourages the formation of a political system where the competition between rivals is directed towards the center rather than the two extremes. Among the most practical ways to achieve this inter-communal or cross-sectarian collaboration, is to provide electoral incentives for conflicting parties to collaborate across sectarian lines in order to achieve larger successes in elections. When these institutional incentives, translated in a proper electoral law, are deployed in the political realm, the conflicting confessional and/or sectarian parties are assumed to act as rational actors in order to maximize their representation in parliament and thus will adopt more moderate electoral campaigns to attract more votes from other confessional or sectarian groups. In turn, as Reilly (2001) explains, such required cooperation encourages a reciprocal bargaining between different sectarian groups to address convergent benefits which creates confidence and helps mitigate the ‘security dilemma’ that underscores the majority of confessional and sectarian conflicts.

In the design of electoral laws, legislators often rely on the Downsian model of electoral competition to capture the real dynamics of electoral politics. According to Downs (1957), when voters are exposed to a left-right policy spectrum in a plurality-based election, they tend to converge to a middle ground policy and thus, political parties are forced to modify their electoral strategies to attract moderate voters. Regrettably, the dynamics in deeply-divided societies do not follow the logic of this model. According to Reilly (2001), political parties in such types of societies are usually mono-ethnic, or in the case of Lebanon mono-confessional or mono sectarian, and their voters are normally sectarian voters who always prefer to cast their vote for a fellow sectarian candidate rather than a non-sectarian one regardless of his qualifications. Accordingly, Reilly (2001) contends that should the Downsian model be applied in the case of deeply divided and ethnically polarized societies, it will yield ethnic, confessional and sectarian hostilities as well as terrible violent insurgencies. In order to address this dilemma, Horowitz (1985) proposed a seminal strategy in the design of electoral laws whereby the drafted electoral rules promise competing candidates more incentives and pay-offs in their political victory from adopting centrist behaviors rather than extremist ones. Horowitz (1985) contends that electoral rules should be designed to make competing candidates mutually reliant on the votes of other competing group members which are described as ‘vote-pooling’. Thus, to achieve the desired ‘vote-pooling’ among candidates in a positive-sum rather than zero-sum game, Horowitz (1985) argues that electoral laws should drive candidates to campaign for ‘second-choice’ ballots from voters. This strategy relies on the assumption that in deeply-divided societies, first voter choice will always be rewarded to a member of the

same confession, sect, clan, etc. Thus, addressing common broader interests of other group members and engineering an electoral laws that provide significance to second-choice voting, allow moderate candidates to sell themselves as second alternative bests and increase their chances in being elected. In turn, negotiations among competing candidates for cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian vote-pooling can increase the likelihood of vote transfers to non-sectarian candidates and thus the promotion and strengthening of a moderate sentiments among voters. Building on the narrow approach to centripetalism advocated by Horowitz (1985), and following the broader and wider approach adopted by Reilly (2001), this thesis borrows the narrative of Reilly (2001) by describing centripetalism as being a normative theory of institutional and electoral design which endorses the following three distinctive phenomena: 1) Electoral incentives for competing candidates to adopt moderate discourses so that to attract voters from outside their confessional or sectarian group, 2) Areas of bargaining whereby different competing groups can find a broader common ground for cooperation and 3) Centrist political parties and aggregative coalitions of parties that promote multi-confessional or multi-sectarian support and presentation and present a myriad of policy options capable of creating cross-sectarian appeal.

2.5.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS FAVORABLE TO CENTRIPETALISM

As explained in previous sections, institutional design and more particularly electoral laws design remains imperative for centripetalist values and to incentivize moderation and cooperation in the political realm. This section will use the analysis in Reilly (2001) to give a thorough, yet brief, explanation of the myriad electoral systems used in national elections across the world nowadays and focus on three electoral

systems favorable for centripetalism. Reilly (2001) contends that, regardless of the method used to classify electoral laws in the world, they can be grouped in three comprehensive families which are: 1) plurality-majority systems, 2) semi-proportional systems and 3) proportional representation systems.

The main difference between plurality and majority systems is that in plurality systems, winning candidates must secure more votes than any other contestant whereas in majority systems, the winning candidate must secure an absolute majority, i.e. more than 50% of votes. The types of plurality-majority electoral systems comprise two plurality systems which are: 1) first past the post (FPTP) and 2) block vote (BV), while the three majority systems are: 1) two-round run-off, 2) alternative vote (AV) and 3) supplementary vote (SV). In an FPTP system, elections are undertaken in single member districts and voters choose their candidate by a tick or a cross on a ballot. The winner is the candidate who gathers the most votes. Similarly, the BV system is the application of FPTP in multi-member districts where voters can choose as many candidates as there are seats assigned to a given districts. The process of voting, counting votes and winner selection is the same as FPTP. Under majority systems, the most used form of elections is the two-round run-off system. As its name suggests, elections in this system follow two rounds of voting. The first round proceeds a normal FPTP system and if any candidate secures an absolute majority, s/he is declared winner directly without the need for a second round. However, if no candidate achieves absolute majority, a second run-off round of elections will take place between the first two contestants and the winner of this second round is declared elected.

Another type of majority system is the AV system. Under AV systems elections are held in single member districts. Voters are required to rank their candidates by their order of preferences from 1 (as first choice) to 2 (as second choice) and so on. In the process of counting votes, if a candidate secures an absolute majority (more than 50%) s/he is declared elected immediately. However, if no one achieves an absolute majority, the candidate who has the least first priorities is eliminated and his first choice votes are redistributed to all other candidates according to their second choice of priority. This sequence of elimination is undertaken for second, third, fourth choice candidates and so on until a candidate achieves an absolute majority and thus s/he is declared elected. AV systems can be used in multi-member districts but the process differs a little bit. Each seat should be filled in a separate election but with the same electorate. The first seat is filled the same way as in a single-member AV. However, for the remaining seats the ballots displaying a first preference for a previously elected candidate are reassigned to the remaining candidates before the seat is occupied. Finally, the last type of majority systems is the SV which is considered as a middle alternative between the AV and two-round run-off. Under an SV system, voters rank their candidates as in a normal AV system. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority of votes, instead of sequentially eliminating candidates, all candidates are simultaneously eliminated and two candidates who have the highest scores remain in battle. All available preference votes are redistributed to these two only and the winner is thus elected. Therefore, SV can be considered as an instant run-off system in one round without the need of a second election.

Semi-proportional systems use features from both plurality-majority and proportionality systems. The main systems are the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and parallel systems. Under and SNTV system, which is used in multi-member districts, each voter has the possibility to cast only one vote. The seats are filled with the candidates who secure the most number of votes and thus, for instance, in a four-member district, a candidate who secures more than 20% of the votes can guarantee his/her election. On the other hand, parallel systems use both PR party list and single-member districts whereby part of the parliament is elected according to PR and the other according to a plurality-majority system.

Under proportional representation, three main systems emerge. Party list PR system, mixed member proportional (MMP), and single transferable vote (STV). In a party list PR system, competing parties are required to present a list of candidates to the voters. Voters are thus requested to vote for a party list rather than a candidate, and parties receive their share of parliament based on the percentage of the overall voter turnout. Candidates inside each list are chosen based on their respective position. In MMP systems, part of the parliament is elected based on majoritarian single-member districts and the other part based on proportional list PR so that to compensate any misrepresentation from the majoritarian part. STV systems usually use multi-member districts where voters are required to rank their choices just as in simple AV systems. After the first-choice votes are checked, a quota of votes is calculated to determine the minimum required first choice votes for a candidate to be elected. If no one achieved the required quota from his/her first-choice votes, the candidate with the lowest number of first choice votes is eliminated and his second, third, etc. preferences are redistributed

to the candidates remaining in the race. Moreover, for the candidates who secured first-choice votes more than the quota, their lower preferences are also distributed to the remaining candidates in the race. This sequential elimination continues until all seats are filled.

To identify the favorable electoral systems for centripetalists, Reilly (2001) highlights the different requirements of the two competing schools of thought: consociationalism and centripetalism. According to Reilly (2001), consociational recommendations for electoral systems usually favor list PR in large districts for the reason that it produces multi-party or multi-ethnic parliaments whereby grand coalition governments are formed to include all winning groups as well as segmented autonomy and veto power. In contrast to consociational orthodoxy, however, centripetalists claim that the best way to mitigate multi-ethnic tensions is to create an electoral system that encourages accommodation and collaboration rather than creating multi-ethnic parliaments which are a reduced projection of the large inter-ethnic conflicts (Reilly, 2001). In turn, Horowitz (1985) contends that the most adequate electoral systems for deeply-divided societies are those that try to surpass the salience of confession and sect by encouraging accommodation and bargaining across confessional/sectarian lines.

In order to identify these types of electoral systems, this thesis borrows Reilly's (2001) identification of 'preferential voting'. The most important feature shared by all preferential voting systems is their ability to provide voters with the power to rank their preferred candidates in an order of preference. In other terms, they allow voters to decide how they would vote for in case their favorite candidate lost in the race and they are forced to choose among the remaining candidates. By examining the previously

described electoral systems, only three systems have a preferential voting option and allow voters to rank candidates which are AV, SV and STV. Although the first two are majoritarian systems and the last one is based on proportional representation, all of them provide electors the power to rank their preferred candidates.

2.6 CONCLUSION

The presented survey of the literature on institutional engineering, and more specifically electoral engineering, informs us about both the importance and complexity of this subject and its impact on the quality of political stability and accommodation in deeply divided societies, either from consociational or centripetal perspectives. A large array of arguments were deployed in favor of broader institutional engineering, such as party politics, ethnic party bans, institutional politics, and in favor of electoral laws and systems to manage and mitigate such cleavages. This chapter also presented a thorough explanation of the theory of centripetalism in contrast to consociationalism. The centripetalist perspective endorses the idea to accommodate difference and find a broader common ground for competing groups to converge on, rather than creating an ethnically divided parliament that is a smaller copy of the larger community and having the same tensions. Centripetalism thus focuses on the importance of electoral engineering in promoting accommodation and collaboration. It endorses the systems that provide voters the power to rank the order of preference for their preferred candidates which is known as ‘preferential voting’. Among all the presented systems, only three electoral systems satisfy this condition and are favorable for centripetalism: 1) Alternative vote (AV), 2) Supplementary vote (SV), and 3) Single transferable vote

(STV). The former two are majoritarian based and the latter is proportional based. In the following chapter, the 2017 electoral reforms in Lebanon are explained, and a comparison with centripetalist's key elements is presented.

CHAPTER THREE

LEBANON'S 2017 ELECTORAL LAW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Lebanese Parliament voted to extend its tenure on two occasions since the 2009 elections before elections were finally held in May 2018. These extensions were largely the result of repetitive failures to agree on a new electoral law between the different political factions in Lebanon. However, after Aoun's election president in 2016, and due to rising pressures before the end of the renewed parliament's term, an agreement on a new electoral law was finally reached in 2017. Subsequently, Law No. 44 was passed on 17 June 2017. Passing this new electoral law, despite all the critics around the law itself, was considered an important achievement in the electoral legislation process in Lebanon especially because it tried to accommodate and balance the interests of the different confessional and sectarian groups, namely Christian sects, as well as civil society groups and it promised better parliamentary representation for all political constituencies in the country.

This chapter examines this latest cycle of electoral reforms, namely law No. 44. The electoral law is not explained thoroughly but selectively to align with the requirements of this thesis. The following section focuses on the articles and sections in the law that are required to assess it against centripetalist's core concepts as explained in the previous chapter. The emphasis will be on the proportional representation approach adopted in this law, voter registration, candidacy, the voting process, diaspora

and non-resident voting and finally the vote counting method. This is followed with an evaluation of the electoral law against centripetalists' concepts with a brief discussion of the areas of convergence and divergence between the two. The chapter relied on two sources to extract the required information to provide the explanations of the electoral law. The first source is the translation of the electoral law's original text in its entirety from Arabic to English published in *The Daily Star* newspaper on 7 July 2017. The second source is a thorough report about the election prepared by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in October 2017.

3.2 LEBANON'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL REFORM: LAW 44 OF JUNE 2017

Law 44, of 17 June 2017, is composed of eleven chapters that contain in total 114 articles as well as a set of appendices showing constituencies' quotas, seat allocations, etc. Chapter 1 contains only 2 articles and describes the voting system and the number of members and electoral districts. Voters and candidates' eligibility are addressed in 6 articles in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 defines the process of monitoring and supervising the elections through 15 articles. Thirty-three articles in Chapter 4 explain the preparatory work and electoral lists. Financing and electoral expenditures are discussed under 12 articles in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 uses 16 articles to identify the work of media and electoral advertising. Voting process is detailed in Chapter 7 under 13 articles. Election procedure is discussed in Chapter 8 (3 articles) and vote-counting and declaration of winners is addressed in Chapter 9 under 9 articles. Chapter 10 defines the eligibility of public servants to run for parliament (2 articles) and the last Chapter describes non-

residents and diaspora voting in 15 articles. In the following sections, different chapters and articles from the law are visited to draw emphasis and explain the proportional representation approach adopted in this law, voter registration, candidacy, voting process, diaspora and non-resident voting and finally the vote counting method and declaration of results procedure.

3.2.1 THE PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM

The first article of the electoral law states that the Lebanese Parliament is composed of 128 members who are elected for a period of four years on the basis of proportional representation. Also, elections are to take place in a single round, on a single day, in secret and on pre-printed ballots. The sectarian quota and its corresponding distribution of parliamentary seats is specified in Appendix 1 attached to the law as described in the first paragraph of article 2 of the law. The law recognizes 18 sects and allocates to each sect a number of parliamentary seats according to their corresponding number of registered voters and presence in specific districts. Parliamentary seats are divided equally between Muslim and Christian sects following the 1989 Taif agreement and the corresponding reforms in 1990. The second paragraph of the second article of law states: “All voters in the constituency shall vote for the candidates in their respective districts”. Article 112 of the law reserves six parliamentary seats for the Lebanese diaspora divided equally between Muslim and Christian confessions: one seat for each of the main Maronite, Orthodox, Catholic, Sunni, Shia and Druze sects. However, article 122 of the law explains that these seats are to be added to the 128 parliamentary seats making the total number of seats equals

134 in the first election (i.e. 2018) that expatriates vote in. After the first election takes place, the additional seats shall be removed and the diaspora quota shall be incorporated within the 128 seats. The transfer of six seats allocated to the diaspora shall be governed by a decree issued by Parliament on the recommendation of the minister of interior directly after the election. These seats shall be taken away from the quota of each sect in the district where it has the least representation. This matter shall be decided by consensus between sects.

The candidate nomination procedure is described in article 52 of the law. Candidates are to nominate themselves first and identify for which seat they are running and in which district. Subsequently, those who secure acceptance of nomination are requested to form electoral lists 40 days before Election Day. Article 52 also requires each list to include at least 40% of the number of seats in the electoral constituency. The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOI) will provide pre-printed ballots for each electoral district. Article 98 states that voters can then cast their vote for the list in the electoral district and give one preferential vote to a single candidate but in their smaller constituency within the larger electoral district.

Articles 98 and 99 in the law describe the counting process and define the number of seats won by each list and specify the selection of the winning candidates. First, an "electoral quotient" is measured by dividing the total number of votes cast by the number of seats in the district. Then, all lists who fail to collect more votes that the "electoral quotient" are excluded from the race and the new electoral quotient in re-measured after the removal of their scores. The remaining seats are then redistributed one at a time to the already qualified lists that received the largest balance after the first

division. The process is finally repeated until all seats have been allocated to winning lists. After the quota of seats of each list is identified, a percentage score for each candidate is calculated and all candidates are grouped in a single list by decreasing order of percentages. Candidates' percentage is calculated by dividing the preferential votes of each candidate based on the total preferential votes cast in the district in which they are running. In the case two candidates scored the same percentage, the older candidate has the priority and is placed on top of the other in the comprehensive list. Finally, the seat allocation process starts from top to bottom on the list until all seats are filled with winning candidates. The allocation process has to take into consideration sectarian quotas and representation in the electoral district which means that if the sectarian quota has been already filled, then all remaining candidates running for the same seat are deleted despite having more percentages than other potential candidates on the list.

3.2.2 VOTER REGISTRATION

Article 3 of the law concedes the right to vote for any Lebanese male or female, resident or non-resident who enjoy their civil and political rights, who has attained the required voting age according to the Lebanese constitution – or 21 years under article 21 of the Lebanese constitution. Naturalized Lebanese citizens may not acquire the right to vote unless they have been naturalized for at least ten years, according to article 5 of the law, however, this condition does not apply to women marrying Lebanese men. Lebanese individuals deprived of the right to vote are described in article 4 of the law as follows: People who are deprived of their civil rights; People permanently barred from public office and jobs; people under temporary disqualification from public jobs and

posts until qualification is re-established; people convicted of a felony; people convicted of one of the following offenses: theft, fraud, bribery, perjury, rape, intimidation, forgery, use of counterfeiting, false testimony, offenses against public morality as set forth in Chapter VII of the Penal Code, crimes related to the cultivation, manufacture and trafficking of narcotic substances; people who have been imprisoned for the duration of this period; people who have fraudulently declared bankruptcy or who have been sentenced to penalties as per articles 689 and 698 of the penal code; and, finally, people sentenced to penalties as per articles 329 and 334 of the penal code.

All the people listed in article 4 of the law (listed above) shall not be entitled to vote until their conditions are rehabilitated. The law in article 6 forbids all non-retired military personnel from participating in elections regardless of their department of service: army, general security, internal security or customs. Senior citizens above the age of 100 years old as well as those who do not have a registered year of birth are automatically removed from voting lists according to article 27 of the law, however, should they present the right documentation a month before the publication of voting lists, the ministry interior will re-enlist them on the voting list.

Eligible voters' lists are prepared by the Directorate General of Personal Status (DGPS) in each electoral district, according to article 26, based on civil status records of all potential voters who were registered in the district a year before the annual voter update period which starts on the 20 October. Articles 29 and 30 require judicial courts and the Criminal Record Department to provide the DGPS with the list of individuals ineligible to vote under article 4 of the law. Multiple committees are formed in each electoral district: 1) one or more Primary Registration Committees (PRC) constituted of

three members and 2) one Higher Registration Committee (HRC). According to article 36 of the law, PRCs are headed by an administrative judge and the other two members are the president or a member of the municipal council in the district or caza and an officer from the DGPS. Article 37 further defines the role of PRCs which is the update of voter registration, receiving ballot boxes from polling stations and finally reporting results to the corresponding HRC. On the other hand, article 38 specifies that HRCs are headed by a judge who has to be a "president of a Chamber or Counselor at the Court of Cassation, or president of a Chamber at the Court of Appeal, or president of a Chamber or counselor at the State Council". The other two members are an administrative judge and an examiner from the Central Inspection Board. Article 39 define the role of HRCs which is determining petitions from the decisions of PRCs and summing districts' voting results from PRCs.

Under article 33 of the law, drafts of voters' lists are to be published by the ministry of interior on the 1 February. Potential voters can apply claims to their corresponding PRCs should there be a mistake in the published lists and the update can still be performed until the 1 March (Article 34). Concerning diaspora voting, according to section 3 of article 34, non-resident voters are requested to submit their applications to Lebanese embassies or consulates in their country of residences so that they can be forwarded to the corresponding DGPSs and PRCs. All decisions and corrections made by PRCs can be appealed to the HRC. The final version of the voter list is to become final on the 30 March of every year and will be used for any election that takes place before that date under article 35 of the law. In line with the requirements of the confessional system in Lebanon, although it is not very clear in the text of the law,

voters are registered and vote in their original villages rather than their area of residence; moreover, married female voters vote in their husbands' original villages.

3.2.3 CANDIDACY

Candidacy qualifications are outlined in article 7 of the law; they include the pre-requisite of being an eligible and registered voter, having a minimum age of 25 years and not being deprived of both civil and political rights. On the other hand, Article 8 specifies those who are not eligible for candidacy to become members of Parliament. These are: judges of all categories and grades and members of the constitutional council, staff holding public offices from the first and second degrees, non-retired military personnel of all departments, presidents and members of boards of any type of public institution who work on a full-time basis, presidents and vice-presidents of municipal councils and the president, vice-president and members of the electoral committee. Those people become eligible for candidacy if they submit their resignation at least six months prior to the end of the Parliament's term.

Under article 42 of the law, elected bodies shall be summoned by an official decree published in the Official Gazette at least 90 days before Election Day and candidates' nominations are no longer accepted 60 days before Election Day (Article 46). If the nomination period elapsed and no candidate has submitted his candidacy for any given seat, article 47 states that the period is to be extended for seven days and the MOI has to decide on the candidacy within 24 hours. Each rejected candidate has the opportunity to appeal within 48 hours of the receipt of his rejection. In case there was only one candidate nominated in a minor constituency (i.e. the caza in a given electoral district) after the expiry date of the nomination process extended by the seven days

period, that candidate is automatically declared winner unopposed, similarly, as dictated in article 48, any list that is nominated and accepted solely in a given district after the expiry of the nomination process is considered winner of the race.

Candidates who are eligible to enter the parliamentary race are free to register in any electoral district and any smaller constituency, however, they are not allowed to register in more than one (Article 44). Under article 50, candidates can withdraw their nominations 45 days before Election Day and receive a full refund. When the nomination process is finished, the MOI officially announces the names of accepted nominations and invites all candidates to arrange themselves in lists as per article 51. Candidates must fulfill this requirement at least 40 days before Election Day (Article 52). In order for a list to be accepted, Article 52 states that it must contain a number of candidates that is greater or equal to 40% of the allocated seats in the corresponding electoral district. The list must then be presented to the MOI by anyone of the candidates on that list provided that s/he secures an authorization from all others candidates on his list, including the bank certificate of fee payment for the entire list as per Article 54. Under the same article, the MOI has to register the list within 24 hours and any wrong information can be corrected within 24 hours. Any rejection of registration by the MOI may be appealed by candidates within 24 hours to the State Council, and a final decision has to be announced also within 24 hours (Article 54). At the end of the registration process, the Ministry publicizes the final electoral lists according to each electoral district with their smaller constituencies (Article 55), and the lists appear on the pre-printed ballot paper in order of registration (Article 52).

3.2.4 THE VOTING PROCESS

A major breakthrough in the election's voting process, introduced in Article 84 of the law, necessitates the issuance of a decree to implement an "electronic magnetic card" by the council of ministers based on the recommendation of the minister of interior and after securing a two-third majority in the cabinet for the next election. All necessary legislative amendments are to be proposed by the council accordingly. However, due to the very short period for implementation and the relative high cost of implementation, the electronic magnetic card was never used in the 2018 parliamentary election.

According to Article 85, polling centers and polling stations should be designated at least 20 days before Election Day by the minister of interior by notice in the official gazette. A maximum of 20 polling stations are allowed in a given polling center, each of which has between hundred and four hundred voters. This upper limit can be increased to no more than six hundred voters only if this is required for endorsing the integrity of the electoral process. Also, changing polling stations and centers in the week before Election Day is not allowed except on considerable situations and by virtue of a well-structured decision. The structure of polling stations is described in Article 86 of the Law. Every polling station is headed by a head officer and at least one clerk who are appointed by the governor or district commissioner and chosen from a list of civil servants provided by the MOI. The head officer is allowed to select an assistant from the present voters after the opening of the station and another assistant is chosen by the other voters. Law and order at the entrances and near polling stations and centers are maintained by internal security forces under Article 91 of the Law, however,

maintaining law and order inside the polling stations remains the responsibility of the head officer. Security forces can only be permitted inside polling stations if requested by the head officer for a short time to help him restore order and securing the integrity of the electoral process according to Article 86 of the law [para. 4]. The head officer is not allowed, under any circumstance, to prevent neither observers nor candidates and their representatives from exercising their right to monitor the process and cannot dismiss any candidate or agent and throw her/him out unless they were disrupting the electoral process or harassing voters despite having been warned [para. 5]. If such an incident takes place, Article 86, para.6, requires that the incident be recorded in writing and conveyed to the corresponding registration committee. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 86 of the Law penalize head officers and clerks who fail to undertake their assigned roles without legitimate excuses with up to one-month imprisonment or a one million Lebanese Pounds fine. All candidates, under Article 90 of the Law, are allowed to appoint one agent for every polling station deemed to be registered in the same political constituency and mobile agents who are allowed to enter polling stations in the constituencies. Agents are allowed to use computers and tablets inside polling stations as explicitly stated in Article 94, para.5. Only one mobile agent is allowed for every two polling stations in the villages and one for every three stations in the cities and their permits are issued by the governor or district administrator according to Article 90. Article 92 describes the obligations of the MOI towards polling stations. The ministry is required to provide, for every polling station, 1) a ballot box made of solid and transparent material, 2) an amount of official pre-printed ballot papers and stamped envelopes equal to the number of registered voter added by 20%, and 3) one or more

voting booths to be used by voters. The form and details of ballot papers that are used for voting are described in Article 93. The ballot paper should clearly show the following: 1) color and name of candidates, 2) confession, 3) passport photograph of the candidate, 4) the constituency or smaller constituency in which the candidate is running, 5) a box for voting for the list, and 6) a box for preferential voting. No security features, such as watermarks, are required on the ballot papers. Polling staff, on the other hand, will be allowed to vote the previous Thursday of Election Day, under Article 88, and their votes, are to be stored at branches of *Banque Du Liban* in sealed ballot boxes, then delivered to their corresponding registration committees after closing poll stations on Sunday. Each polling station is provided with a numbered and stamped "voters checklist" extracted from the voters lists which shows data for every voter at that polling station (Article 89), and only voters who are enlisted on that checklist are eligible for voting.

3.2.5 DIASPORA & NON-RESIDENTS' VOTING

The 2017 law states that six seats for non-resident candidates are reserved in the electoral law under Articles 112 and 122 and they are divided equally between Christians and Muslims. One seat should be allocated for each of the Maronites, Othodox, Catholics, Sunni, Shia and Druze sects. These seats are to be added to the total number of MPs and thus the parliament will have 134 members in total in the election following the first election according to this law. However, in the next election, the six seats are to be deducted from the 128 members each from its same confession and in the districts where the confession constitutes a majority. This measure should be put into force following a decree of the council of ministers based on the

recommendation of the MOI. Nevertheless, the minister of interior, in the 2018 election, did not take the required legislative measures to secure the establishment and application of this decree and in turn, no parliamentary seats were allocated to non-resident Lebanese and the diaspora. Consequently, their contribution was to take part in the national elections each in the constituency in which s/he was originally registered and vote for candidates in their respective large or smaller constituencies.

Non-resident Lebanese citizens, under Article 111, are allowed to vote if their names were registered in the "personal status record" and they are not ineligible under Article 4 and they undertake their voting in Lebanese embassies, consulates or any other places specified by the ministry. Eligible voters are requested, according to Article 113, to register their names in the embassy or consulate of their choice before the 20 November of the year preceding election year and are deemed to do it in person, by an authentic signed letter or electronically if possible. Once all information is collected, embassies are requested to send the list of voters to the Directorate General of Personal Status before the 20 December of the same year for verification and validation. DGPS then prepares separate voter lists for each embassy or consulate. A minimum of 200 names is required per voting center as dictated in Article 114 and voters' names are marked as out-of-country voters in the personal status register In order to prevent double voting inside and outside Lebanon. Voter lists are circulated to each embassy before 1 February of election year by the MOI (Article 115). The lists must be published and shared with all voters as quickly as possible so that potential voters can check and review them and identify the embassy of any mistake for rectification. Polling centers and stations at the embassies are designated by the Council of Ministers

no later than 20 days before Election Day according to Article 116. In the event of the number of registered voters in an embassy exceeds 400 voters, more than one polling station is to be made available. Polling officers of each station are appointed by the ambassador or consul, according to Article 117, from among the Lebanese staff of the embassy or consulate, which is also responsible to issue permits for candidates' agents. Article 118 stipulates that out-of-country voting is to take place at least 15 days before national election in the country and polling stations must open at 7am and close at 10pm following the same process as in-country elections as described in the previous section. When the voting process is finished, station officers open ballot boxes in the presence of the ambassador or consul or their representatives, candidates' representatives and authorized observers, they count the votes and place them in a red wax sealed envelope (Article 119). Article 120 requires that two copies of a report on the voting process to be prepared, one report remains at the embassy or consulate and the other one is submitted to BDL through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. When voting on election day in Lebanon is finished, the reports are sent from BDL to the Higher Registration Committee in Beirut for counting and the announcement of results.

3.2.6 VOTE COUNTING AND RESULTS

When the voting process is finished and the polling stations are closed, Article 100 states that the corresponding officers, candidates' agents, media representatives and authorized observers have the right to stay inside the polling stations. The head officer empties the ballot box on the table and counts the envelopes. If the number of envelopes is different from the number of actual voters on the checklist, the difference is to be written down and recorded in the polling station's final report. Under the supervision of

all the remaining people in the polling station, the head officer opens each ballot and declares the name of the list and its corresponding candidate that were marked by the voter. Polling stations are to be equipped with special cameras and television sets in order to facilitate the access of observers to the lists and the names marked on ballots as per Article 101. Ballot papers that are not the official ballot papers issued by the MOI, or any other ballot papers not in compliance with the law, are removed from the count and considered not valid (Article 102). On the other hand, Article 103 states that blank official ballot papers are considered valid and counted with the rest of the votes. Moreover, the law does not provide voters a replacement for a spoiled ballot, and thus, should a voter mistakenly damage his ballot paper it will be treated as invalid.

As per Article 16, the PRC uses computer software to count the votes automatically. In case there are discrepancies recorded between the counts, a manual re-count is conducted. After verifying and validating all counts, a report of the results is prepared, and two copies are signed by all PRC members and submitted to the HRC of the corresponding constituency. Another round of verification and validation is undertaken via computer software by the HRC according to Article 107, and any material or calculation errors are corrected and the final results for the constituency are recorded on a final report and schedule which is to be signed by all members. After the official results are released by the ministry of interior, all ballot papers are sent to BDL to be stored for three months, after which they must be destroyed. If the results were subject to review or appeal before the Constitutional Council, according to Article 108, the ballots should not be destroyed. Dissatisfied candidates from the election results, may file for appeal before the Constitutional Council because under Article 19, the

Constitutional Council is the sole entity authorized to arbitrate conflicts arising out of parliamentary or presidential elections.

In many aspects, then, the 2017 electoral law was an improvement on the 2009 law despite the former's many loopholes. The introduction of more responsibilities for the SCE, the introduction of official pre-printed ballots, and the introduction of a form of proportional representation are all palpable improvements. However, the kind of proportional representation used left so much to be desired. The next section examines the 2017 law against the main centripetalist claims.

3.3 ASSESSMENT OF LEBANON'S ELECTORAL LAW AGAINST CENTRIPETALIST CONCEPTS

As described in chapter 2 of this thesis, centripetalism emphasizes the importance of three distinctive principles in political mobilization and electoral campaigning. These are the provision of electoral incentives for competing candidates to adopt moderate discourses so that to attract voters from outside their confessional or sectarian group, creating areas of bargaining whereby different competing groups can find a broader common ground for cooperation, and encouraging the formation of centrist political parties and aggregative coalitions of parties that promote multi-confessional or multi-sectarian support and presentation and present a myriad of policy options capable of creating cross-sectarian appeal. Accordingly, the most adequate electoral systems for deeply divided societies capable of addressing these principles are those capable of surpassing the salience of confession and sect by encouraging accommodation and bargaining across confessional or sectarian lines. Thus, adopting a preferential voting

feature that provides voters with the power to rank their preferred multiple candidates in an order of preference encourage mitigating confessional and sectarian cleavages that is only found in three electoral systems: AV, SV, and STV.

Despite being identified as a proportional electoral system in its first article, and despite having preferential voting incorporated in its processes of voting and counting votes, Lebanon's 2017 electoral law presented a new form of proportionality and preferential voting which we label here "proportionality Lebanon Style" that could not be more alienated from centripetalists' understanding of these concepts and very distant from the only preferred proportional electoral system to centripetalism, the STV. This section uses the previous explanation of Lebanon's electoral law to describe how the 2017 law deviates from and contradicts the three tenants advocated by centripetalism, and shows how the illusion of proportionality and preferential voting has exacerbated divisions in political life instead of fostering political accommodation.

A survey of Lebanon's electoral law allows the identification of key elements and criteria fundamental to its evaluation against centripetalist concepts. The first criterion is the sectarian quota for parliamentary seats reserved for the 18 registered sects in Lebanon which was strictly preserved on the level of smaller districts. The second criterion is the proportional system and its impact on the formation of electoral districts especially through the introduction of electoral constituencies and their related minor constituencies. The final and most important criterion is the single preferential vote adopted at the level of the smaller constituencies. Although these criteria are mutually exclusive, intertwined between one another and conjunctionally impact political life, they will be addressed separately.

The second article of the first chapter of Lebanon's Law 44 declares that parliamentary seats shall be distributed equally between Muslim and Christian sects in line with Annex 1 of the law summarized in Table 1 below. With this article, the new electoral law further enforced the grip of sectarianism on the political dynamics in Lebanon by safeguarding sectarian quota. Tables 2 and 3 below show, respectively, the electoral districts and their smaller constituencies, and the abbreviations of sects.

Although the law did not specifically enforce a sectarian vote, which means that it granted every Lebanese citizen the freedom to vote for any candidate of his choice regardless of his sectarian affiliation, however, the relegation of the preferential vote to the level of the smaller constituency incentivized sectarian voting without legally enforcing it. After all, the smaller the district, the greater the possibility for sectarian entrepreneurs to deploy sectarian discourses and clientelist strategies to mobilize sectarian feelings and emotions to maximize their vote counts. In other terms, the smaller the vote district is, the more sectarian homogeneity is established and in turn, sectarian mobilization becomes greater. This outcome by the law largely contradicts the first tenet endorsed by centripetalism, namely the provision of electoral incentives for competing candidates to adopt moderate discourses to attract voters from outside their confessional or sectarian group.

GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018														
Ref: Information International		**SU**	**SH**	**DR**	**AL**	**MA**	**GO**	**GC**	**AO**	**AC**	**EV**	**MI**	**Chri.**	**Musl.**
Electoral district under 2017 Election Law	**# of Seats**													
Beirut I	8					1	1	1	3	1		1	8	0
Beirut II	11	6	2	1			1				1		2	9
Bekaa I	7	1	1			1	1	2	1				5	2
Bekaa II	6	2	1	1		1	1						2	4
Bekaa III	10	2	6			1		1					2	8
Mount Lebanon I	8		1			7							7	1
Mount Lebanon II	8					4	2	1	1				8	0
Mount Lebanon III	6		2	1		3							3	3
Mount Lebanon IV	13	2		4		5	1	1					7	6
North I	7	3			1	1	2						3	4
North II	11	8			1	1	1						2	9
North III	10					7	3						10	0
South I	5	2				2		1					3	2
South II	7		6					1					1	6
South III	11	1	8	1			1						1	10
Total	**128**	**27**	**27**	**8**	**2**	**34**	**14**	**8**	**5**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**64**	**64**

Table 1: Sectarian Distribution of Parliamentary Seats

(Lebanon Electoral law #44, 2017)

Electoral District	Minor Constituencies
Beirut I	East Beirut
Beirut II	West Beirut
Bekaa I	Zahle
Bekaa II	West Bekaa - Rachaya
Bekaa III	Baalbek - Hermel
Mount Lebanon I	Jbeil - Keserwan
Mount Lebanon II	Metn
Mount Lebanon III	Baabda
Mount Lebanon IV	Aley - Chouf
North I	Akkar
North II	Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh
North III	Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura
South I	Saida-Jezzine
South II	Zahrany-Tyre
South III	Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil

Table 2: Electoral Districts and Minor Constituencies

(Lebanon Electoral law #44, 2017)

ABBREVIATION	SECT
SU	Sunni
SH	Shiaa
DR	Druze
AL	Alewite
MA	Maronite
GO	Greek Orthodox
GC	Greek Catholic
AO	Armenian Orthodox
AC	Armenian Catholic
EV	Evangelical
MI	Minorities (Chritians

Table 3: Abbreviation of Sects

Moving on to the practice of proportionality in the 2017 law, which we label in this thesis “proportionality Lebanon Style”, it is widely accepted that the proportional representation adopted in the law is far from the centripetal understanding of PR. Usually, when proportionality in electoral laws is introduced, it aims at maximizing the size of electoral districts so that the concept of proportionality can display its positive outcome. However, in the case of Lebanon, proportionality was introduced in more or less smaller districts. The reason for adopting smaller districts can be attributed to family, clan, confessional and sectarian pressures which allow sectarian parties greater vote control. However, for proportionality to operate the way centripetalists want it to operate required larger electoral districts. Instead, the law promulgated medium sized electoral districts with preferential votes at the level of the smaller constituencies.

Another major factor in district formation was ensuring majority votes for a particular religious or sectarian group. Voters’ religious distribution is explained in Table 4 and shows that there is a clear dominance of the number of Christian voters over Muslim voters in Beirut I, Mount Lebanon I & II and North III. Dominance of Muslim voters over Christian voters is identified in Beirut II, Bekaa II & III, Mount Lebanon IV, North I & II and South I, II & III. Only in Bekaa I (Zahle) and Mount Lebanon III (Baabda) the variance in number of voters for both Christian and Muslim sects was not remarkable. Gerrymandering the size of the electoral district based on sectarian or religious majorities went a long way in predetermining the results. It also incentivizes sectarian voting: Smaller groups will try to mobilize as many supporters as possible using the sectarian card to attain the required quota for securing a seat whereas larger groups will mobilize sectarian feelings to try to gather as many votes as possible

to increase the value of the quota to deny smaller groups this privilege. Furthermore, the established hegemony of larger groups intimidates a portion of smaller groups and drags their support in fear of retaliation or fear of exclusion from the benefits and services of office. Electoral districts formation and proportionality “Lebanon Style” fall in direct contradiction to all three principles endorsed by centripetalism. Confessional and sectarian hegemony in electoral districts encourages candidates to play the sectarian card and distant themselves from moderate discourses by adopting more fundamentalist and extremist sectarian discourses. This political behavior reduces their chance to attract voters from other sectarian groups which contradicts with the first principle. By prioritizing sectarian discourses, candidates narrow down the area of bargaining between themselves for the reason that common broader ground for cooperation doesn’t work in their benefits and by that they contradict the second principle. Finally, multi-confessional and multi-sectarian coalitions, although they are established in these districts as a pre-requisite for accepting candidacy, they are more or less figurative because in a given district, the hegemonic sect will enforce the selection of candidates and thus cross-sectarian broader coalitions and understanding are far from reachable which contradicts the last principle.

GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018							
Ref: Information International				**Christians**		**Muslims + Druze**	
Electoral district under 2017 Election Law	**Registered voters**	**Voter turnout**	**Voter turnout (%)**	**Regi. Voters**	**% voters in district**	**Regi. Voters**	**% voters in district**
Beirut I	134,736	44,714	33.19%	117,701	**87.36%**	17,035	**12.64%**
Beirut II	353,414	147,801	41.82%	57,044	**16.14%**	296,370	**83.86%**
Bekaa I	175,868	94,082	53.50%	96,075	**54.63%**	79,793	**45.37%**
Bekaa II	143,812	68,227	47.44%	31,661	**22.02%**	112,151	**77.98%**
Bekaa III	315,644	190,268	60.28%	42,499	**13.46%**	273,145	**86.54%**
Mount Lebanon I	176,710	117,603	66.55%	154,578	**87.48%**	22,132	**12.52%**
Mount Lebanon II	179,919	92,446	51.38%	167,904	**93.32%**	12,015	**6.68%**
Mount Lebanon III	166,135	80,052	48.18%	85,026	**51.18%**	81,109	**48.82%**
Mount Lebanon IV	329,870	173,320	52.54%	125,665	**38.10%**	204,205	**61.90%**
North I	283,790	136,947	48.26%	74,351	**26.20%**	209,439	**73.80%**
North II	350,144	151,759	43.34%	39,090	**11.16%**	311,054	**88.84%**
North III	249,416	117,811	47.23%	223,288	**89.52%**	26,128	**10.48%**
South I	122,524	67,346	54.97%	48,916	**39.92%**	73,608	**60.08%**
South II	304,195	150,264	49.40%	37,732	**12.40%**	266,463	**87.60%**
South III	460,569	228,563	49.63%	45,132	**9.80%**	415,437	**90.20%**
Total	**3,746,746**	**1,861,203**	**49.68%**				

Table 4 Christian and Muslim Voters in Electoral Districts and Minor Constituencies

(Lebanon Electoral law #44, 2017)

The final and most important criterion to be addressed in this section is the preferential vote introduced in Law 44. According to the law, every voter has the right to cast only one preferential vote at the level of the smaller constituency within the electoral district where s/he is registered. Two important factors are at play, the first is the single preferential vote and the second is the casting on the level of the smaller constituency. In fact, the obligation for the voter to choose a list of candidates at the level of the electoral district but to cast the preferential vote at the level of the smaller

constituency in which s/he is registered is meant to incentivize sectarian and clientelist sentiments. This is one of the many ways the political elites torpedoed the concept of proportionality where the influence of local actors trumps the logic of PR. By shifting the preferential vote to the smaller constituency, political elites incentivized sectarian discourses and promoted the abuse of clientelist networks to attract votes and thus diminishing the possibilities of engaging in broader coalition using broader discourses that can address to larger shares of the communities. Preferential vote in the smaller constituency provided the necessary legal tools for local hegemons and tribal/clan leaders to maintain their grip on the political opinion of their communities. It then fortified the usage of the ethnic/sectarian card because the area of competition has been reduced to the narrow dimensions of minor constituencies. Thus, the proposed impact of proportionality has been brought down by the preferential vote on the level of minor constituencies.

The other major important issue relates to the singularity of preferential voting. As discussed in previous sections, the main target of centripetalism is to create electoral incentives for candidates to adopt moderate discourses in order to attract voters from outside their confessional or sectarian group. Also, it is required that areas of bargaining be created between candidates so that different competing groups can find a broader common ground for cooperation. Finally, cenripetalism encourages the formation of centrist political parties or aggregative coalitions of parties to promote multi-confessional or multi-sectarian support capable of creating cross-sectarian appeal. In a proportional electoral system, the most adequate law is the STV which fundamentally relies on the concept of their ability to provide voters with the power to rank their

preferred candidates in an order of preference. In other terms, they allow voters to decide how they would vote for in case their favorite candidate lost in the race and they are forced to choose among the remaining candidates. This tool gives the power to voters to share multiple opinions about multiple candidates and thus, broadens their area of influence. Such an action might deter candidates from adopting extremist discourses because if they are not able to secure an absolute majority in the elections, they are going to need the second and third rank votes from voters in order to secure seats in the parliament. By adopting a single preferential vote without the possibility of voters' ranking of candidates in Lebanon's 2017 electoral law, the core concept of moderation and accommodation in the centripetalist theory is violated. Consequently, the law was reduced to a majoritarian one at the level of the smaller constituency. In practice, then, the practice of PR was devoid of its true intents, creating what we have labeled in this "proportionality Lebanon Style".

3.4 CONCLUSION

Lebanon's new electoral law promulgated in June 2017 constituted a significant improvement with respect to previous electoral laws. The main improvement was the introduction of proportional representation, which was never adopted in previous elections from the establishment of the state. Major issues remain unresolved especially with what regards the proposed proportional system itself which is a distorted form of proportionality; whereby the political elite manipulated the law in such a way to incentivize sectarian and local clientelist sentiments. Maintaining a sectarian quota at the level of minor constituencies and maintaining religious/sectarian hegemony in

medium sized electoral districts helped neutralize the effects of moderation and accommodation by fortifying and increasing the benefits of adopting extremist discourses. The adoption of a single preferential vote at the level of smaller constituencies rather than multiple preferential votes with a ranking system at the level of larger districts emptied the proportional system and preferential voting of its true meaning and reduced the competition to a majoritarian at the level of the caza. The next chapter will show how this law exacerbated sectarian and confessional polarization by examining the religious and sectarian vote during the 2018 parliamentary elections.

CHAPTER FOUR

CROSS-CONFESSIONAL VOTE IN LEBANON'S 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Centripetalism advocates the creation of institutional incentives for competing parties or individuals in the political realm to adopt moderate approaches and discourses. Such an approach allows them to attract as many votes as possible from sectarian or ethnic groups other than their own. Vote-pooling is one way of achieving this objective. It encourages all competing parties to transcend their mutual disagreements and establish a broad area of agreement, based on which they come together in broad coalitions and try to exchange as many votes as possible and support each other in order to win the most number of parliamentary seats. Thus, the qualitative theoretical evaluation and outcomes of Lebanon's electoral law that was presented in the preceding chapter will be further endorsed with a quantitative empirical evaluation of the results of Lebanon's 2018 elections in this chapter. The independent variable (IV) used to evaluate whether or not centripetalism was achieved by the latest 2017 electoral reforms should be construed from the centrist approaches adopted by candidates and by their vote pooling ability and implementation. This is largely assumed to be a proxy on the overall general orientation of Lebanon's electoral law and its convergence or divergence from centripetalism.

This thesis defines the number of votes that each competing group was able to recruit from groups other than their confessional/sectarian group to be the Independent Variable (IV). These votes are referred to as cross-confessional votes in this chapter and they are the number of Christian votes cast for Muslim candidates and vice versa. Chapter five will examine the results of elections in the Baabda district but focuses on cross-sectarian votes in a more particular and narrower examination. Cross-sectarian votes refer to the number of votes a candidate of a given sect scores from voters from outside his sectarian group. In this chapter, cross-confessional votes will be examined nationwide across all electoral districts. The following section 4.2 explains the methodology used to identify and assess cross-confessional votes. Section 4.3 examines actual turn out of cross-confessional votes in an empirical case study across all electoral districts. Findings are then discussed in section 4.4 and the chapter ends with concluding remarks in section 4.5.

4.2 METHODOLOGY

The Christian cross-confessional vote is defined as the percentage of Christians who cast a vote for a Muslim candidate out of the total number of Christian voters in a given electoral district, while the Muslim cross-confessional vote runs the other way around. All cross-confessional votes will be calculated for each and every district of the 15 total electoral districts (Beirut I & II, Bekaa I, II & III, Mount Lebanon I, II, III & IV, North I, II & III and South I, II & III). In order to better understand the relevance of the cross-confessional vote, and to be able to compare results across districts, new variables are introduced to help in the computing process, namely the Christian/Muslim

seats ratio in each district and the Christian/Muslim voter turnout ratio in each district. For better computational and visual requirements, normalized variables will be calculated as follows:

- "A" is the normalized difference between Christian and Muslim votes in each district and it is equal to:

$$A = \frac{(Christian\ votes - Muslim\ votes)}{(Christian\ votes + Muslim\ votes)}\ x\ 100$$

- "B" is the normalized difference between Christian and Muslim seats in each district and is equal to:

$$B = \frac{(Christian\ seats - Muslim\ seats)}{(Christian\ seats + Muslim\ seats)}\ x\ 100$$

- "C" is the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic votes out of the total Christian votes in each district:

$$C = \frac{(Christian\ cross\ ethnic\ votes)}{(Total\ Christian\ votes)}\ x\ 100$$

- "D" is the percentage of Muslim cross-ethnic votes out of the total Muslim votes in each district:

$$D = \frac{(Muslim\ cross\ ethnic\ votes)}{(Total\ Muslim\ votes)}\ x\ 100$$

A & B are two normalized variables that have values varying from -100% to +100% whereas C & D have values between 0% and 100%:

- A value for variable A equal to -100% in a given electoral district means that this district has solely Muslim voters and a value of +100% means that this district has solely Christian voters.
- The more the value of variable A approaches -100% suggests that the majority of the district voters are Muslims, while the more the value of variable "A" approaches +100% means that the majority of district voters are Christians.

- A value for variable B equal to -100% in a given electoral district means that this district has solely Muslim seats, while the value of +100% means that this district has solely Christian seats.
- The more the value of variable B reaches -100% means that the majority of district seats are allocated to Muslims, and the more the value of variable B reaches +100% means that the absolute majority of district seats are allocated to Christians.
- A value for variable C equal to 0% in a given electoral district means that no Muslim voters cast votes to Christian candidates, and a value of 100% means that all Muslim voters in this district voted for Christian candidates.
- The more the value of variable C reaches 0% means that the majority of Christian voters voted for Christian candidates and not Muslim candidates, and the more the value approaches +100% means that the majority of Christian voters voted for Muslim candidates rather than Christian candidates.
- Finally, the more the value of variable "D" reaches 0% means that the majority of Muslim voters voted for Muslim candidates and not Christian candidates, and the more the value approaches +100% means that the majority of Muslim voters voted for Christian candidates rather than Muslim candidates.

The rationale behind introducing these normalized variables is, first and foremost, to have variable that have values between -100% and +100% and variables with values between 0% and 100% which makes them easy to compute together on graphical representation to identify patterns and extract conclusions. Moreover, these variables will allow us to examine the cross-confessional vote in relation to the district confessional or sectarian composition in terms of number of voters, the voting power of each confession and also in terms of allocated confessional seats. In other terms, this comparison will allow us to draw conclusions about the variation of cross-confessional votes across districts while tracking confessional number power and confessional seats numbers.

The next section presents the final results on tables and computed on graphs using Excel. The number of votes used is extracted from the published volume of Information International (2018) which provides an approximation of the votes in each

district by counting the votes of all winners and the majority of losers without taking into account the vote count of diaspora and employees. Since diaspora and employees votes do not constitute a major percentage of the entire votes, they are assumed to be not very relevant and thus, are disregarded. This approximation presents a small level of uncertainty and inaccuracy, however, considering its relatively slight value, it is considered negligible.

4.3 EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY

The number of cross-confessional votes in the results of Lebanon's 2019 electoral law, i.e. the independent variable, will be used to assess the alignment or divergence of Lebanon's 2017 electoral reforms from centripetalist assumptions. In fact, this number will indicate the extent to which voters cast their votes to candidates who do not belong to their confessional group. Thus, following centripetalism's assumptions pertaining to institutional incentives, the more the percentage of cross ethnic votes is recorded in a given district, the more an adoption of broad cross-confessional alliances and agreements, bargaining and vote pooling is assumed among differentgroups. This should encourage more moderation and accommodation in the political realm.

Table 1 summarizes the total number of cross confessional votes for both Christian (Variable C) and Muslim (Variable D) voters across all electoral districts in Lebanon's 2018 elections. Chart 1 visualizes these results in comparative bar charts showing both variables side by side in each electoral district. A close examination of Table 1 shows a large difference in both Christian and Muslim cross-confessional votes during Lebanon's 2018 elections, however.

Christian cross-confessional votes varied from as low as 1.3% in the Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-Keserwan) district to as high as 83.8% in South III (Marjaayoun – Nabatieh – Hasbaya – Bint Jbeil) district. Districts where the total number of Christian cross-ethnic votes is 0% (Beirut I – Mount Lebanon II –North III) are districts where there are no parliamentary seats allocated for Muslim candidates by law and thus this result is de facto imposed and not indicative. Similarly, Muslim cross-ethnic votes varied largely from as low as 1% in Beirut II (West Beirut) to as high as 37.7% in Bekaa I (Zahle) district. Districts that recorded 100% Muslim cross-ethnic votes are the same districts with 0% Christian cross-ethnic votes. This result is logically predictable due to the fact that Muslim voters were forced to vote exclusively for Christian candidates because there are no Muslim candidates in these districts and thus, the results in these districts are also not indicative.

GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018									
Ref: Information International (p.194-217)				**Chri.**	**Musl.**	**Christians**		**Muslims + Druze**	
Electoral district under 2017 Election Law (Muslim = Muslim+Druze)	**Total Approx. Christian votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes**	**Total Approx. Muslim votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes**	**Seats**	**# of seats**	**# of seats**	**Cross Etynic Votes**	**Variable "C" % of Cross Etynic Votes from Approx. total christian votes**	**Cross Ethnic votes**	**Variable "D" % of Cross Ethnic votes from Approx. total muslim votes**
Beirut I (East Beirut)	32,153	5,232	8	8	0	0	0.0%	5,232	100.0%
Beirut II (West Beirut)	4,886	112,510	11	2	9	1,858	38.0%	1,102	1.0%
Bekaa I (Zahle)	35,497	39,470	7	5	2	1,746	4.9%	14,867	37.7%
Bekaa II (West Bekaa-Rachaya)	8,213	50,392	6	2	4	3,372	41.1%	1,237	2.5%
Bekaa III (Baalbek-Hermel)	15,503	141,504	10	2	8	1,466	9.5%	5,921	4.2%
Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-Kesrwan)	84,549	10,687	8	7	1	1,138	1.3%	2,369	22.2%
Mount Lebanon II (Metn)	71,517	4,597	8	8	0	0	0.0%	4,597	100.0%
Mount Lebanon III (Baabda)	26,933	31,053	6	3	3	1,757	6.5%	1,659	5.3%
Mount Lebanon IV (Aley-Chouf)	37,163	79,407	13	7	6	4,377	11.8%	18,244	23.0%
North I (Akkar)	22,872	80,931	7	3	4	3,065	13.4%	17,918	22.1%
North II (Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh)	5,777	101,347	11	2	9	3,847	66.6%	1,471	1.5%
North III (Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura)	78,610	9,943	10	10	0	0	0.0%	9,943	100.0%
South I (Saida-Jezzine)	12,813	29,409	5	3	2	716	5.6%	6,861	23.3%
South II (Zahrany-Tyre)	8,559	123,981	7	1	6	2,182	25.5%	2,013	1.6%
South III (Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil)	4,845	187,843	11	1	10	4,061	83.8%	2,471	1.3%

Table 5: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts



Chart 1: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts

The large difference in the percentage of cross-ethnic votes in electoral districts renders the comparative task confusing and complicates the task of finding reliable patterns to draw conclusions. Thus, electoral districts are aggregated under five groups (A, B, C, D & E) as shown in Table 2 and visually computed in Chart 2. Beirut I, Mount Lebanon II and North III electoral districts are clustered under group A. All of these

districts have an absolute majority of Christian voters with a small Muslim minority; nor are there any parliamentary seats allocated to Muslim candidates in these districts. Thus, both Christian and Muslim voters are institutionally compelled to vote only for Christian candidates, which explains the 0% of Christian cross ethnic votes and 100% of Muslim cross ethnic votes.

	GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018									
	Ref: Information International (p.194-217)				Chri.	Musl.	Christians		Muslims + Druze	
	Electoral district under 2017 Election Law (Muslim = Muslim+Druze)	Total Approx. Christian votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes	Total Approx. Muslim votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes	Seats	# of seats	# of seats	Cross Etynic Votes	Variable "C" % of Cross Etynic Votes from Approx. total christian votes	Cross Ethnic votes	Variable "D" % of Cross Ethnic votes from Approx. total muslim votes
A	Beirut I (East Beirut)	32,153	5,232	8	8	0	0	0.0%	5,232	100.0%
	Mount Lebanon II (Metn)	71,517	4,597	8	8	0	0	0.0%	4,597	100.0%
	North III (Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura)	78,610	9,943	10	10	0	0	0.0%	9,943	100.0%
B	Beirut II (West Beirut)	4,886	112,510	11	2	9	1,858	38.0%	1,102	1.0%
	Bekaa III (Baalbek-Hermel)	15,503	141,504	10	2	8	1,466	9.5%	5,921	4.2%
	North II (Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh)	5,777	101,347	11	2	9	3,847	66.6%	1,471	1.5%
	South II (Zahrany-Tyre)	8,559	123,981	7	1	6	2,182	25.5%	2,013	1.6%
	South III (Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil)	4,845	187,843	11	1	10	4,061	83.8%	2,471	1.3%
	Bekaa II (West Bekaa-Rachaya)	8,213	50,392	6	2	4	3,372	41.1%	1,237	2.5%
C	Bekaa I (Zahle)	35,497	39,470	7	5	2	1,746	4.9%	14,867	37.7%
	Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-Kesrwan)	84,549	10,687	8	7	1	1,138	1.3%	2,369	22.2%
D	Mount Lebanon IV (Aley-Chouf)	37,163	79,407	13	7	6	4,377	11.8%	18,244	23.0%
	North I (Akkar)	22,872	80,931	7	3	4	3,065	13.4%	17,918	22.1%
	South I (Saida-Jezzine)	12,813	29,409	5	3	2	716	5.6%	6,861	23.3%
E	Mount Lebanon III (Baabda)	26,933	31,053	6	3	3	1,757	6.5%	1,659	5.3%

Table 6: Electoral districts Groups A, B, C, D & E

Beirut II, Bekaa II, Bekaa III, North II, South II and South III, electoral districts are clustered under group B. All of these districts have an absolute majority of Muslim voters with a small Christian minority. In contrast to group A, these districts have 1 or 2 parliamentary seats allocated for Christian candidates. Following the assumption of a

high likelihood of an ethnic voter in these districts, one would expect that in such types of districts, Christian voters would rally behind Christian candidates and vice versa. In these districts, this assumption proved viable only for Muslim voters who rallied behind their ethnic candidates which is clearly shown in the extremely low percentages of Muslim cross-ethnic votes (between 1% and 4.2%). However, this was not the case for Christian cross-ethnic votes which recorded values as high as 83.8% in South III and as low as 9.5% in Bekaa III.

The first impression from these results would mistakenly be that the Christian cross-ethnic vote reflects moderation and accommodation in the political arena. However, a close examination of these results suggests otherwise. Electoral districts under group B can be differentiated between two sub-groups B1 and B2. Beirut II, Bekaa II, North II and South III are gathered under sub-group B1 and Bekaa III, and South II is gathered under sub-group B2. In the districts of sub-group B1, the main Christian parties (LF, FPM and the Kataeb) competing in the election do not have a large number of supporters and thus, they are not openly eager to mobilize them because such a movement has a low likelihood of having an impact on election results. Christian voters in these districts find themselves stuck in an electoral battle in which they are very weak and thus, they choose not to identify themselves with their confessional identity in order to preserve their safety. This behavior gives an indication that Christians in districts dominated my Muslims tend to adopt bandwagoning strategies by casting their votes to the de facto candidates of Muslim majority. Bandwagoning helps us understand that large percentages of Christian cross ethnic votes in these districts are not likely to be the result of moderation and accommodation

but rather they originate from a security dilemma. On the other hand, Muslim voters feel safe in their ethnic environment and thus they do not have any incentive to cast votes for Christian candidates. Thus the lower percentages of cross-ethnic votes among Muslim voters.

By contrast, in electoral districts of sub-group B2, Christian parties have stronger presence (LF in Bekaa III and FPM in South II) and thus, they choose to mobilize the majority of Christian voters and rally them behind their Christian candidates, thus yielding very low Christian cross-ethnic votes. Muslim cross-ethnic votes remained very low in these districts as well. In contrast to the results in districts under group B, electoral districts under group C, Muslim voters chose to bandwagon with Christian majority in Mount Lebanon I which explains a Muslim cross-ethnic vote percentage of 22.2%. The number is not very high compared to Christian cross-ethnic votes in Muslim majority districts because of the fact that Hizbullah had a very powerful candidate in that district behind whom he tried to rally as many Muslim voters as possible. In Bekaa I on the other hand, despite the almost equal numbers of Christian and Muslim voters, more parliamentary seats are allocated to Christian candidates than Muslim candidates (5 to 2). Under the single preferential voting system, and with a relatively small quota for securing a seat, the excess of Muslim votes can be deployed by Muslim candidates to Christian candidates in their blocs in order to grab the seats from the majority of Christian voters and in contrast, Christian voters will rally behind their selected candidates in order to prevent their loss in front of Christian candidates of Muslim blocs. This explains the larger Muslim cross-ethnic votes and the lower Christian cross-ethnic ones.



Chart 2: Cross ethnic Votes in Groups A, B, C, D & E

In electoral districts under group D, the number of Muslim voters is almost double that of Christian voters. However, parliamentary seats allocated to Christians and Muslims are slightly different (Mount Lebanon IV 7Christian:6Muslim; North I: 3Christian:4Muslim; and South I: 3Christian:2Muslism). Following the same logic as in districts under group C, the excess of Muslim voters are deployed to vote for Christian candidates in the same bloc, which yields larger numbers of Muslim cross-ethnic votes than Christian cross ethnic votes. Nevertheless, both cross ethnic votes were in the lower quarter percentile.

In the last group there is only one electoral district Mount Lebanon III, namely the Baabda district. The specificity of this district is that it has an almost equal number of

Muslim and Christian voters, and an equal number of parliamentary seats allocated to both Muslims and Christians. Moreover, all competing large sectarian parties on both sides have a strong presence in this district. In other words, there is no advantage for any ethnic party over the others in terms of excess of votes or excess of seats and thus, the electoral battle in this district nearly has no buffer votes for any candidate or bloc. In turn, due to the electoral system specificities such as the sectarian quota and the single preferential vote on the level of caza, ethnic entrepreneurs will largely play the ethnic card to attract as many votes as possible which will yield, one would argue, a lower percentage of cross-ethnic votes on both sides.

As illustrated in Table 2 and Chart 2, the election results show that the Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes are very low, 6.5% and 5.3% respectively. Not only do they register lower values compared to other districts, they also have very negligible difference. It can be concluded, then, that when the electoral powers of the different ethnic groups are of equal magnitude, when the distribution of seats is also equal among confessions, and when the incentive for cross-ethnic vote is not enforced by an electoral law, voters and candidates alike in a given district will always choose to associate themselves with their ethnic group and refrain from casting a cross-ethnic vote. This largely explains the lower levels of cross-ethnic votes in this district.

GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018										
Ref: Information International (p.194-217)				Chri.	Musl.		Christians		Muslims + Druze	
Electoral district under 2017 Election Law (Muslim = Muslim+Druze)	Total Approx. Christian votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes	Total Approx. Muslim votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes	Seats	# of seats	# of seats	Variable "A" Normalized difference in christian/muslim votes equals = (chris votes - musl votes)/(christ votes + musl votes)	Cross Etynic Votes	Variable "C" % of Cross Etynic Votes from Approx. total christian votes	Cross Ethnic votes	Variable "D" % of Cross Ethnic votes from Approx. total muslim votes
Beirut I (East Beirut)	32,153	5,232	8	8	0	72.0%	0	0.0%	5,232	100.0%
Beirut II (West Beirut)	4,886	112,510	11	2	9	-91.7%	1,858	38.0%	1,102	1.0%
Bekaa I (Zahle)	35,497	39,470	7	5	2	-5.3%	1,746	4.9%	14,867	37.7%
Bekaa II (West Bekaa-Rachaya)	8,213	50,392	6	2	4	-72.0%	3,372	41.1%	1,237	2.5%
Bekaa III (Baalbek-Hermel)	15,503	141,504	10	2	8	-80.3%	1,466	9.5%	5,921	4.2%
Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-	84,549	10,687	8	7	1	77.6%	1,138	1.3%	2,369	22.2%
Mount Lebanon II (Metn)	71,517	4,597	8	8	0	87.9%	0	0.0%	4,597	100.0%
Mount Lebanon III (Baabda)	26,933	31,053	6	3	3	-7.1%	1,757	6.5%	1,659	5.3%
Mount Lebanon IV (Aley-Chouf)	37,163	79,407	13	7	6	-36.2%	4,377	11.8%	18,244	23.0%
North I (Akkar)	22,872	80,931	7	3	4	-55.9%	3,065	13.4%	17,918	22.1%
North II (Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh)	5,777	101,347	11	2	9	-89.2%	3,847	66.6%	1,471	1.5%
North III (Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura)	78,610	9,943	10	10	0	77.5%	0	0.0%	9,943	100.0%
South I (Saida-Jezzine)	12,813	29,409	5	3	2	-39.3%	716	5.6%	6,861	23.3%
South II (Zahrany-Tyre)	8,559	123,981	7	1	6	-87.1%	2,182	25.5%	2,013	1.6%
South III (Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil)	4,845	187,843	11	1	10	-95.0%	4,061	83.8%	2,471	1.3%

Table 7: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts versus Variable “A”

To better understand the variation of percentages in cross-ethnic voting between Christian and Muslims, Table 3 and Chart 3 compute these percentages (variables C and D) against the normalized difference in Christian/Muslim votes (variable A). As explained in the methodology section, A is a normalized variable with values between -100% and +100%. The more the value of A reaches -100% means that the majority of voters, in a given district, are Muslim, and the more it reaches +100% means that the majority of voters are Christian. Districts congregated in group A (Beirut I, Mount Lebanon II and North III) are disregarded from this analysis for their irrelevance due to the absence of seats allocated to Muslims. As shown in Table 3 and computed in Chart 3, the more the value of variable A reaches high positive values (i.e. Mount Lebanon I,

77.6%) the lower the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic vote (1.3%) and the higher the percentage of Muslim cross-ethnic vote (22.2%). In contrast, the more the value of variable A reaches high negative values (i.e. Beirut II, -91.7% - South III, -95%) the lower the percentage of Muslim cross-ethnic vote (1%, 1.3% respectively) and the higher the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic vote (38%, 83.8% respectively). Also, the more the value of variable A approaches 0, such as in Mount Lebanon III (Baabda, -7.1%), the percentages of both Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes are almost identical and are reduced remarkably in value (6.5% - 5.3% respectively).

In contrast, Bekaa I district (Zahle) is an exception to this interpretation having a value for variable A equal to -5.3% which is near 0% while recording low Christian cross-ethnic votes (4.9%) but high Muslim cross-ethnic votes (37.7%). This exception was interpreted earlier by highlighting the impact of the confessional seats allocation which plays a major role in the determination of cross-ethnic votes. In this instance, the greater number of Muslim voters, the small number of Muslim seats (2 for Muslims against 5 for Christians), and the lower quota number creates an excess of votes for Muslim voters that can deployed to influence the election of Christian candidates, hence the difference in percentages.

To capture this particularity more accurately, variable B, the normalized variation between Christian and Muslim seats in a given district, is further explained in Table 4 and computed in Chart 4. Following the same methodology as for variable A, the more the value of B reaches 100% the more the seats in the district are allocated for Christians and vice versa. And the more the value reaches 0, the more the seats are distributed equally between Christians and Muslims. As shown in Table 4 and

computed in Chart 4, the more the value of variable B reaches high positive values (i.e. Mount Lebanon I, 75%) the lower the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic vote (1.3%) and the higher the percentage of Muslim cross-ethnic vote (22.2%). In contrast, the more the value of variable B reaches high negative values (i.e. North II, -63.6% - South III, -81.8%) the lower the percentage of Muslim cross-ethnic vote (1.5%, 1.3% respectively) and the higher the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic vote (66.6%, 83.8% respectively).



Chart 3: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts versus Variable “A”

Also, the more the value of variable B approaches 0 such as in Mount Lebanon III (Baabda, 0%), the percentages of both Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes are almost identical and are reduced remarkably in value (6.5% - 5.3% respectively).

Following this interpretation, the Bekaa I district (Zahle) does not constitute an exception and scores 42.9% for variable B which is largely greater than 0% and thus, low Christian cross-ethnic votes (4.9%) and high Muslim cross-ethnic votes (37.7%) are anticipated.

GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018										
Ref: Information International (p.194-217)				**Chri.**	**Musl.**		**Christians**		**Muslims + Druze**	
Electoral district under 2017 Election Law (Muslim = Muslim+Druze)	**Total Approx. Christian votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes**	**Total Approx. Muslim votes for winners and major losers without employees & diaspora votes**	**Seats**	**# of seats**	**# of seats**	**Variable "B" Normalized difference in christian/muslim seats equals = (chris seat - musl seats)/(chris seats + musl seats)**	**Cross Etynic Votes**	**Variable "C" % of Cross Etynic Votes from Approx. total christian votes**	**Cross Ethnic votes**	**Variable "D" % of Cross Ethnic votes from Approx. total muslim votes**
Beirut I (East Beirut)	32,153	5,232	8	8	0	100.0%	0	0.0%	5,232	100.0%
Beirut II (West Beirut)	4,886	112,510	11	2	9	-63.6%	1,858	38.0%	1,102	1.0%
Bekaa I (Zahle)	35,497	39,470	7	5	2	42.9%	1,746	4.9%	14,867	37.7%
Bekaa II (West Bekaa-Rachaya)	8,213	50,392	6	2	4	-33.3%	3,372	41.1%	1,237	2.5%
Bekaa III (Baalbek-Hermel)	15,503	141,504	10	2	8	-60.0%	1,466	9.5%	5,921	4.2%
Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-	84,549	10,687	8	7	1	75.0%	1,138	1.3%	2,369	22.2%
Mount Lebanon II (Metn)	71,517	4,597	8	8	0	100.0%	0	0.0%	4,597	100.0%
Mount Lebanon III (Baabda)	26,933	31,053	6	3	3	0.0%	1,757	6.5%	1,659	5.3%
Mount Lebanon IV (Aley-Chouf)	37,163	79,407	13	7	6	7.7%	4,377	11.8%	18,244	23.0%
North I (Akkar)	22,872	80,931	7	3	4	-14.3%	3,065	13.4%	17,918	22.1%
North II (Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh)	5,777	101,347	11	2	9	-63.6%	3,847	66.6%	1,471	1.5%
North III (Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura)	78,610	9,943	10	10	0	100.0%	0	0.0%	9,943	100.0%
South I (Saida-Jezzine)	12,813	29,409	5	3	2	20.0%	716	5.6%	6,861	23.3%
South II (Zahrany-Tyre)	8,559	123,981	7	1	6	-71.4%	2,182	25.5%	2,013	1.6%
South III (Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil)	4,845	187,843	11	1	10	-81.8%	4,061	83.8%	2,471	1.3%

Table 8: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts versus Variable "B"



Chart 4: Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes in all districts versus Variable “B”

4.4 DISCUSSION

The number of cross-confessional votes, the independent variable, is considered a proxy pointer that indicates the extent to which Lebanon’s electoral law conforms to,

or diverges from, centripetalist expectations. The percentage of these votes out of the total votes for each confession in each electoral district, shows the number of votes leveraged by candidates from groups other than their confessional group. Given the condition of a single preferential vote on the level of the caza (qada') stipulated in the 2017 electoral law, voters are only able to cast one and only one vote for their preferred candidate without the possibility of selecting second or third choice candidates. The number of cross-confessional votes is a specific measurement of voters' single and only choice and thus, represent the actual decision of voters to choose or not a candidate out of their confessional group. The evaluation of these votes gives an indication of the efficacy of the electoral law in fulfilling two important features of centripetalism: 1) Electoral incentives for candidates to reach out for votes out of their confessional groups, and 2) the areas of bargaining between candidates. The higher the percentage of cross-ethnic votes in a given electoral district, in theory, suggests that voters in this district were more willing to cast a vote for a candidate out of their own confessional group. As a result, one would assume that there were enough electoral incentives in the electoral law that encouraged candidates to attract votes from different confessional groups other than their own. This assumption leads to the conclusion that candidates moderated their political discourse and broadened their campaigning horizon and thus satisfied the first condition of centripetalism. Also, one would assume that the electoral law encouraged political actors to come together and negotiate vote-pooling to attract as many votes as possible and thus, satisfying the second condition of centripetalism. In contrast, should the percentage of cross-ethnic voting be very low, the conclusion runs

the other way around, and it would be assumed that the electoral law acted in contradiction to the two identified conditions of centripetalism.

A broad and thorough examination of the percentages of cross-ethnic votes in Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections across all electoral districts sheds empirical light on three major patterns in the results that are very indicative and integral to the analysis. The first pattern involves the consistency of a large variance between the percentage of Christian cross-ethnic votes (variable C) and Muslim cross-ethnic votes (variable D) in a given district except in Mount Lebanon III (Baabda), Bekaa III (Baalbek - Hermel) and North I (Akkar) districts.

	GENERAL ELECTIONS 2018					
	Ref: Information International (p.194-217)		**Christians**	**Muslims + Druze**		
	Electoral district under 2017 Election Law (Muslim = Muslim+Druze)	**Cross Etynic Votes**	**Variable "C" % of Cross Etynic Votes from Approx. total christian votes**	**Cross Ethnic votes**	**Variable "D" % of Cross Ethnic votes from Approx. total muslim votes**	**Ratio between percentages of Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes**
A	Beirut I (East Beirut)	0	0.0%	5,232	100.0%	N/A
	Mount Lebanon II (Metn)	0	0.0%	4,597	100.0%	N/A
	North III (Bcharre-Zghorta-Batroun-Koura)	0	0.0%	9,943	100.0%	N/A
B	Beirut II (West Beirut)	1,858	38.0%	1,102	1.0%	C38
	Bekaa III (Baalbek-Hermel)	1,466	9.5%	5,921	4.2%	C2.3
	North II (Tripoli-Minnieh-Dennieh)	3,847	66.6%	1,471	1.5%	C44.4
	South II (Zahrany-Tyre)	2,182	25.5%	2,013	1.6%	C15.9
	South III (Marjaayoun-Nabatieh-Hasbaya-Bint Jbeil)	4,061	83.8%	2,471	1.3%	C64.5
	Bekaa II (West Bekaa-Rachaya)	3,372	41.1%	1,237	2.5%	C16.44
C	Bekaa I (Zahle)	1,746	4.9%	14,867	37.7%	M7.7
	Mount Lebanon I (Jbeil-Kesrwan)	1,138	1.3%	2,369	22.2%	M17.1
D	Mount Lebanon IV (Aley-Chouf)	4,377	11.8%	18,244	23.0%	M1.9
	North I (Akkar)	3,065	13.4%	17,918	22.1%	M1.6
	South I (Saida-Jezzine)	716	5.6%	6,861	23.3%	M4.2
E	Mount Lebanon III (Baabda)	1,757	6.5%	1,659	5.3%	C1.2

Table 9: Ratio between percentages of Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes.

Table 5 shows the ratio between Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes. This variable is calculated by dividing the larger percentage of cross-ethnic vote by the lower one irrespective of them being Christian or Muslim. To indicate which is larger than which, a letter is added before the number. The letter C refers to Christian and M to Muslims and the number succeeding this letter indicates the multiplier by which Christian or Muslims cross-ethnic votes increase above one another. For instance, M17.1 (Mount Lebanon I district) means that Muslim cross-ethnic votes are 17.1 times greater than Christian cross-ethnic votes and C44.4 (North II district) means that Christian cross-ethnic votes are 44.4 times greater than Muslim cross-ethnic votes. The more the value for this variable approaches 1, the more Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes are almost equal which is clear in the case of Mount Lebanon III district. As shown in Table 5, the majority of the values have large number. This indicates that in any given electoral district, Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes are inversely proportional. This means that either Christian cross-ethnic votes are largely greater than Muslim cross-ethnic votes and vice versa. Moreover, the Christian multiplier is relatively higher than the Muslim multiplier which suggests that the Christian cross-ethnic vote tends to be much greater in percentage in comparison to Muslim cross-ethnic votes than that of Muslims compared to Christian cross-ethnic votes in a given district. Districts with no seats allocated to Muslim candidates are not considered because Muslims are forced to vote for a Christian candidate and Christian are forced not to vote for a Muslim candidate making the percentages (0% Christian and 100% Muslim cross-ethnic votes) irrelevant.

The second pattern is the inconsistency of results across districts where percentages of cross-ethnic votes, for both Christians and Muslims, varied differently between districts. Table 5 also shows that the percentages of cross-ethnic votes were as high as 83.3% for Christians and 37.3% for Muslims, and as low as 1.3% for Christians and 1% for Muslims.

Finally, the third pattern is the consistency of mutual exclusiveness of high versus low cross-ethnic votes for Christian and Muslims. This means that whenever the Christian cross-ethnic vote is high, the Muslim cross-ethnic vote is low, and vice versa except for Zahle and Baabda districts.

The three highlighted patterns help us understand and analyze more accurately the high percentages of cross-ethnic voting recorded in the previous tables. As discussed earlier, the proposed approach to evaluate Lebanon's 2017 electoral law against centripetalism suggests that should cross-ethnic votes, in a given election, yield large numbers, this indicates that the electoral law secured enough electoral incentives for candidates to reach out and score votes from different ethnic groups other than their own and helped create an area of bargaining. Looking into the results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary election, provides a clear figure of high percentages of cross-ethnic votes and thus, one would mistakenly conclude that the electoral law satisfied centripetalist concepts, and it consequently further promoted political accommodation and cooperation. The recorded large percentages of cross-ethnic votes in the results of Lebanon's 2018 election, if analyzed separately, are seen to have provided enough evidence to prove that the electoral law satisfied centripetalist concepts. However, this section argues that the evaluation of the numbers should not be made separately, and

results are not to be analyzed out of their institutional and organizational context. Accordingly, in the current case of Lebanon, taking the three identified patterns into consideration, the inconsistency of high percentages in the results across districts as well as the steep variation between Muslim and Christian cross-ethnic votes and the mutual exclusiveness of high/low percentages in districts suggest a completely different outcome, one that is directly in contradiction with the first assumption.

Under the same electoral law, the difference in the percentages of both Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes, and the difference of percentages between different districts, suggest that there are one or more new variables governing this variation other than the electoral law since it is constant across all districts. Two major variables emerge as potential reasons for such a variation and are: 1) district formation and 2) seats allocation. The examination of electoral districts in terms of confessional affiliation of registered voters (Tables 2, 3 & 4) shows that the absolute majority of electoral districts are formed in such a way as to secure domination by one confessional or sectarian group at the expense of the other – except for the Bekaa I (Zahle) and Mount Lebanon III (Baabda) districts. The hegemony of one confessional group at the expense of another one forces the minority into bandwagoning strategies with the majority. This strategy results in high cross-confessional percentage for Christians and low cross-confessional percentages for Muslims in Muslim majority districts and vice versa.

Only one electoral district deviates from this general rule: Bekaa III (Baalbek – Hermel). This electoral district has an absolute majority of Muslims (mainly Shi‘a), however, which explains why both Christian and Muslim cross-confessional

percentages are very low. In this instance, the Christian minority did not choose to bandwagon with the Muslim majority for the reason that one of the major Christian parties (LF) is highly represented and active in that district and it used its presence to influence voters and rally them behind their candidate. This argument is also valid when comparing the seat allocation of Muslims and Christians.

Districts with a majority of seats allocated to Christian candidates yielded very low Christian and very high Muslim cross-ethnic votes and vice versa. The only exception to this general rule is the South II (Zahrani–Tyre) electoral district where an absolute majority of Muslim seats did not yield a high percentage of cross-ethnic votes for Christians. Christian cross-ethnic vote percentage was only 25.5% which is low relative to other similar districts. As in the Bekaa III electoral district, this outcome is attributed to the fact that one of the major Christian parties (FPM) is highly represented and active in that district and used its national presence to influence voters and rally them behind its candidate.

District formation and seats allocation have also a direct impact on the disproportionality and the reverse relationship between Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes. As the results demonstrate, in a given district, if Christian cross-ethnic vote is very high Muslim cross-ethnic vote is reciprocally very low and vice versa. An exception to all these rules is the district of Mount Lebanon III (Baabda district) where both Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes were almost equal (6.5% and 5.3% respectively) and were both relatively low. This outcome, as we later discuss in more details in the following chapter, captures the true relevance of Lebanon's electoral law which completely stands in contradiction to centripetalist principles. In the Mount

Lebanon III (Baabda) district, both Christians and Muslims have almost the same number of registered voters and exactly the same number of confessional seats. Consequently, no single confession claims hegemony over the other. This implies that the negative effects of the number of votes and the seat allocation are neutralized in this district and thus the institutional effect of Lebanon's electoral law can be evaluated precisely in this district.

Since both cross-confessional results are very low in this district, this suggests that when Lebanese voters are not pressured by security or confessional constraints to cast a confessional vote, they nevertheless still decided to cast confessional votes. This is mainly attributed to electoral districts formation and the single preferential vote at the caza (Qada') level. The law established confessional hegemony in the districts and denied voters the element of choice, encouraging instead to either cast a confessional vote or refrain from casting a cross-confessional vote with a percentage that is greater than 93% and lower than 7% respectively as shown in Baabda district.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections examined in this chapter show that there are very high percentages of both Muslim and Christian cross-ethnic votes in every electoral district. However, these high percentages need not be analyzed out of their institutional context because these high values do not indicate convergence of the law with centripetalist principles. When the results are put in their institutional context, by introducing the elements of single preferential vote, and district formation and seats allocation according to the law, these numbers reflect a large divergence from

centripetalist principles. The inconsistency of the percentages across districts and between Christians and Muslims, as well as the reverse relationship between Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes underscores the assumption that these numbers should they be analyzed independently, mistakenly suggest that Lebanon's electoral law satisfied centripetalist principles.. However, when put in context, then, high numbers of cross-ethnic votes are attributed to the safe strategy of minorities to neutralize the threat of majorities by following bandwagoning strategies. The only exception that stands out is the case of Mount Lebanon III (Baabda) district where confessional majorities are institutionally neutralized. No single majority confessional group can exercise hegemony over other minority groups, a confessional vote power balance and equal seat allocation. are established in this district. This district placed in perspective the true nature of the electoral law, namely because all derivative variables are not at play in this district, only the value of the electoral law is evaluated. When the effect of confessional rivalry is neutralized in a given district, Lebanon's electoral law demonstrated through the single preferential vote that it will likely encourage the Lebanese voter to cast a confessional vote with a proportion that is higher than 93%. Consequently, Lebanon's electoral law contradicts in practice the values and principles of centripetalism due to three major factors: 1) district formation based on disproportional confessional voting power, 2) disproportional confessional seat allocation, and 3) a single preferential vote. The next chapter will look more closely into the sectarian behavior of voters and analyzes cross-sectarian votes of all sects across all districts.

CHAPTER FIVE

CROSS-SECTARIAN VOTING IN LEBANON'S 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The examination of cross-ethnic votes in Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections showed high and low peaks for both Muslim and Christian voters in all districts. Chapter Four argued that, should these numbers be explained in line with the institutional elements of single preferential vote, district formation and seats allocation, they project divergences from centripetalism. When analyzed in their context, however, they demonstrate how hegemony clarifies that inconsistency and reverse relationships between Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic votes, drive minorities to seek the neutralization of majorities' threat by following bandwagoning strategies. Also, when confessional rivalry is balanced in a given district (i.e., Baabda District) and the confessional groups' related voting power and seat allocations are almost similar, Lebanon's electoral law encourages the voter to cast a confessional vote with a high likelihood.

Although the examination of cross-confessional voting provided enough evidence for the divergence of the 2017 law from centripetalism, political dynamics in Lebanon in the aftermath of Taif accords requires a more detailed study of the cross-sectarian vote. Following the same rationale as in Chapter Four, this chapter defines the number

of votes that each competing candidate was able to recruit from groups other than his/her sectarian group to be the Independent Variable (IV). These votes are referred to as cross-sectarian votes in this chapter and they are the number of votes of a given sect cast for a candidate from a different sectarian group regardless of them being within the same confessional group or not. For example, the number of Armenian Orthodox votes cast for a Maronite candidate will be counted as Armenian Orthodox cross-sectarian votes. In this chapter, cross-sectarian votes will be examined nationwide across all electoral districts.

The next section (5.2) explains the methodology used to identify and assess cross-sectarian votes for different sects and across all electoral districts. Control variables and their numerical evaluation and calculation are introduced also in section 5.2. Section 5.3 examines actual turn out of cross-sectarian votes in an empirical case study for all sects who have parliamentary seats allocated to them in the electoral law and across all electoral districts. Findings are then discussed in section 5.4 and the chapter ends with concluding remarks in section 5.5.

5.2 METHODOLOGY

This chapter defines cross-sectarian vote as the percentage of voters from a given sect who cast a vote for a candidate who belongs to a group other than their own sectarian group out of the total number of voters of this sect in a given electoral district. For instance, Greek Orthodox cross- sectarian votes in the Bekaa 1 (Zahleh) electoral district is the number of Greek Orthodox voters who cast their votes for all candidates

in the district who belong to the Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, Melkite Catholic, Sunni and Shi'a sects. All cross-sectarian votes will be calculated for each and every district of the 15 total electoral districts (Beirut I & II, Bekaa I, II & III, Mount Lebanon I, II, III & IV, North I, II & III and South I, II & III). In order to better understand the relevance of the cross-sectarian vote, and to be able to compare results across districts and across sects, new variables are introduced to help in the computing process, namely the percentage of cross-sectarian vote for each sect and in each district, and the percentage of voters for each sect in each district.

The proposed analysis makes three major assumptions: 1) Sectarian votes will be counted only for sects who have seats allocated to them in each district and all other sects are disregarded from the analysis. Sects who have no seats allocated to their sect in a given district are forced to cast a cross-sectarian vote, thus their percentage will necessarily be 100% and consequently not relevant. For instance, in the Beirut 1 district, parliamentary seats are allocated to Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, Melkites Catholic and Armenian Catholic sects. Accordingly, only votes affiliated with these sects are analyzed whereas votes of all other sects are disregarded from the analysis – namely, the votes of Syriac Catholics, Shi'a, Latin, Evangelical, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic, Assyrian Orthodox, Druze, etc. 2) The voting power of sects is evaluated based on the actual voter turnout of each sect in each district to capture the actual voting power of sects and not the theoretical power that is calculated by addressing the number of registered voters. 3) The study uses secondary data published by Information International after the elections. The data presented in this reference has a number of limitations: a) only the results of all winning candidates and

major losing candidates are available and thus part of the data is not available – namely, the results of all losing candidates, b) the number of votes cast by public sector employees who were supervising the election and non-residents are not identified by their sectarian affiliation, thus their value is not relevant for this study and consequently, they are disregarded.

For better computational and visual requirements, normalized variables will be calculated as follows:

- "E" is the normalized percentage of cross sectarian vote:

$$E = \frac{(Total\ votes\ of\ voters\ of\ a\ given\ sect\ casted\ to\ all\ candidates\ from\ other\ sects)}{(Total\ votes\ of\ voters\ of\ a\ given\ sect\ casted\ to\ all\ candidates\ )}\ x\ 100$$

For instance, in Mount Lebanon 2 (Metn) electoral district, Armenian Orthodox cross sectarian votes are calculated by counting the votes cast by Armenian Orthodox voters to candidates affiliated with the Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Melkites Catholic sects. Thus, variable E is calculated by dividing this number by the total number of Armenian Orthodox votes in this district and then multiplied by 100.

- "F" is the normalized percentage of sectarian voters in the district and is equal to:

$$F = \frac{(Total\ number\ of\ votes\ of\ a\ given\ sect\ in\ a\ given\ district)}{(Total\ number\ of\ votes\ of\ all\ analyzed\ sects\ in\ this\ district)}\ x\ 100$$

The term "all analyzed sects" in the above formula refers to all the sects that have electoral seats allocated to them in the electoral law for a given district and not all sects participating in the elections in the district. For instance, in Bekaa 2 (West Bekaa–Rachaya) electoral district, the percentage of Sunni voters in the district is obtained by

dividing all the Sunni votes in this district by the sum of all the Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Maronite and Greek Orthodox votes in this district.

E is a normalized variable with a value between 0% and 100%. The more the value of variable E approached 0% indicates that the voters of a given sect in a given electoral district are refraining from casting cross-sectarian votes and are inclined to cast sectarian votes. The more the value of variable E approaches 100% indicates that the voters are more oriented to cast a cross-sectarian vote rather than a sectarian one. Moreover, the relationship between cross-sectarian voting and sectarian voting for a specific sect in a given district is a complementary one where their addition yields 100%. In other terms, if the percentage of cross-sectarian votes of a specific sect in a given district is equal to 25%, this automatically means that the percentage of sectarian votes is 75%.

F is also a normalized variable with a value between 0% and 100%. The more the value of variable F approaches 0%, this indicates that the voter turnout (or the number of actual votes) of a specific sect in a given district is very low and minimal. The number of voters in the district is directly related to the third assumption and limitation of this study explained earlier. Consequently, it has to be understood that it has a level of uncertainty associated with it. The more the value of variable F approaches 100% indicates that the voter turnout (or the number of actual votes) of a specific sect in a given district is very high. For instance, in the North 2 (Tripoli–Minieh–Dinnieh) electoral district, the sects to be analyzed are the Sunni, Alawite, Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects who have electoral seats allocated to them by law. Their corresponding percentage of voters in the district is 90.59%, 4.69%, 3.21% and 1.51% respectively.

This indicates that the Sunni sect has the absolute majority of voting power (90.59%) and the rest of the sects represent minorities in this district.

These variables will allow us to examine the cross-sectarian vote in relation to the district's sectarian composition in terms of actual number of voters (sectarian voter turnout) and the voting power of each sect. In other words, this comparison will allow us to draw conclusions on the variation of cross-sectarian votes across districts while tracking the number of sectarian votes for each sect. The final results are shown on tables and computed on graphs using Excel as will be shown in the following section. The number of sectarian votes used is extracted from the published volume of Information International (2018) which provides an approximation of the sectarian votes in each district by counting the votes of all winners and the majority of losers. Sectarian vote count of diaspora and public sector employees who were supervising the election are not taken into account as explained in the third assumption in the previous section. Since diaspora and employees votes do not constitute a major percentage of the total vote, they are assumed to be not very relevant and thus, are disregarded. This approximation presents into the data a moderate level of uncertainty and inaccuracy. However, considering its relatively small value, it is considered negligible.

5.3 THE CASE STUDY

The number of cross-sectarian votes in the 2018 elections, i.e. the independent variable, will be used to cross-check the results found in Chapter Four. It is also used to analyze the cross-confessional vote and provide more evidence about the divergence of Lebanon's electoral reform in 2017 from centripetalism. In fact, the cross-sectarian vote

percentage will indicate the extent to which voters cast their votes to candidates who are not within their sectarian group. Following the assumption about institutional incentives in centripetalism, the more the percentage of cross sectarian votes is high in a given district, the more an adoption of broad cross-sectarian alliances and agreements, bargaining and vote pooling is assumed among different sects. This theoretically encourages more moderation and accommodation in the political realm. The study will be undertaken individually on each and every electoral district and a final comprehensive table will show the percentages of all cross-sectarian votes across all districts and all relevant sects.

Table 1 shows the percentage of cross-sectarian votes of the sects that have parliamentary seats allocated to them in the Beirut 1 electoral district, which is mainly in eastern Beirut or more specifically its Christian dominant part. The percentage of voters in the district for each of these sects is also shown in Table 1, and is calculated only for the five sects with parliamentary seats in the Beirut 1 district: Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, Melkites Catholics and Armenian Catholics. As discussed in the previous chapter, the study will be restricted to the sects who have parliamentary seats reserved for them as per the law since the all other sects are forced to cast a cross-sectarian vote anyway and, consequently, their results are not relevant to this study. The values of Variable E, i.e., the percentage of cross-sectarian votes, varies between 28.31% for the Armenian Orthodox and 82.49% for the Armenian Catholics. Almost the absolute majority of sects have a cross-sectarian voting percentage above 70% except for the Armenian Orthodox (28.31%) and Maronites (57.95%).

BEIRUT 1 ELECTORAL DISTRICT																						
Candidate / Sect	Nicholas Sehnaoui	Jean Talouzian	Nadim Gemayel	Imad wakim	Massoud Achkar	Hagop Tarazian	Michel Faraoun	Paulette Yagobian	Alexandre Matoussian	Sebouh Kalbakian	Ziad Ebs	Gilbert Doumit	Nicholas Chammas	Serge Jokhadarian	Sebouh Makhjian	Antoine Pano	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Melkite Catholic	Armenian Catholic	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Armenian Orthodox	Melkite Catholic	Armenian Orthodox	Armenian Orthodox	Armenian Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Armenian Catholic	Armenian Orthodox	minorities						
Greek Orthodox	1424	1031	1218	1382	1317	34	729	489	27	17	627	339	369	15	62	134	9214	2378	6836	**74.19%**	**31.95%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Armenian Orthodox	295	455	193	222	128	2482	335	653	1782	536	55	49	46	463	302	32	8028	5755	2273	**28.31%**	**27.84%**	Armenian Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	969	494	1207	984	1134	21	386	261	16	2	238	271	74	15	39	100	6211	2612	3599	**57.95%**	**21.54%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Melkite Catholic	632	439	539	500	489	20	389	199	5	7	161	155	67	8	19	61	3690	1021	2669	**72.33%**	**12.80%**	Melkites Catholic Cross-sectarian vote
Armenian Catholic	132	157	116	81	92	327	76	160	208	66	25	31	38	140	42	5	1696	297	1399	**82.49%**	**5.88%**	Armenian Catholic Cross-sectarian vote

Table 10: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Beirut 1

Chart 1 shows both variables E and F on the same diagram to help us identify a pattern between the percentage of cross sectarian votes and the percentage of voters in the district. As shown on Chart 1, the two variables are inversely proportional. This means that whenever a sect has a low percentage in its voter in district value, its related cross-sectarian percentage is high except for the Greek Orthodox sect. The lower the voter in district percentage is, the higher the cross-sectarian voting percentage. The principle of hegemony helps us explain these types of scenarios whereby minority groups seek to bandwagon with majority groups for security purposes. However, in this electoral district, there is no clear majority for a given sect. The percentages are distinctive of each other but with no single sectarian group claiming majority on others. Only Armenian Catholics and Melkites Catholics happen to have only 5.88% and 12.80% voters in district and can be labeled as minority groups in this district. The hegemony principle explains the behavior of these two sects, but it cannot explain the

high cross-sectarian voting percentage for the remaining sectarian groups because they are not majority groups.



Chart 5: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Beirut 1

Table 2 shows the percentage of cross-sectarian votes for sects that have parliamentary seats allocated to them in the Beirut 2 electoral district, in mainly western Beirut or more specifically its Muslim majority part. The percentage of voters in district for each of these sects is also shown in Table 2 and is calculated only for the five sects with parliamentary seats in the Beirut 2 district: Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Greek Orthodox, and Evangelical. The values of Variable E, i.e. the percentage of cross-sectarian votes,

vary dramatically between 10.00% and 10.68% for Sunni and Shi'a sects respectively, and 71.1% for the Evangelical Christians.

BEIRUT 2 ELECTORAL DISTRICT																					
Candidate / Sect	Amin Cherri Shi'a	Saad Hariri Sunni	Adnan Traboulsi Sunni	Fouad Makhzoumi Sunni	Tamam Salam Sunni	Mohamad Khawaja Shi'a	Roula Tabch Sunni	Nouhad Machnouk Sunni	Rabih Hassouna Sunni	Imad El Hout Sunni	Zaher Ido Sunni	Ali Shaer Shi'a	Nazih Najm Greek Orthodox	Edgard Traboulsi Evangelical	Faysal Sayegh Druze	Ghazi Youssef Shi'a	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
Sunni	2617	19524	11425	8949	9220	749	6447	5835	5728	3808	2372	1876	905	83	444	1472	81454	73308	8146	**10.00%**	**70.89%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Shi'a	19183	333	518	1758	97	6639	26	149	37	36	36	405	28	53	79	116	29493	26343	3150	**10.68%**	**25.67%**	Shi'aCross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	59	107	34	147	43	9	8	51	3	1	2	2	985	609	33	41	2134	985	1149	**53.84%**	**1.86%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Druze	67	39	21	44	16	16	2	38	7	2	4	5	7	21	1255	11	1555	1255	300	**19.29%**	**1.35%**	Druze Cross-sectarian vote
Evangelical	42	21	5	23	8	13	1	30	3	2	4	2	27	76	2	4	263	76	187	**71.10%**	**0.23%**	Evangelical Cross-sectarian vote

Table 11: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Beirut 2

Chart 2 shows both variables E and F on the same diagram and shows that the Sunni sect has a very high percentage of voters in district (70.89%) followed by the Shi'a sect (25.67%), whereas the Druze, Greek Orthodox and Evangelical sects have very low percentages of voters in district, namely 1.35%, 1.86% and 0.23% respectively. In turn, following the aforementioned explanation of the reverse relationship between variables E and F, the high percentages of cross-sectarian votes for the Greek Orthodox and Evangelical sects, and the low percentage for the Sunni sect, are justified. The Druze and Shi'a sects diverge from this rule for two reasons. Although Druze voters are considered a minority in this district, they chose to rally behind their sectarian candidate in the election. As for the Shi'a sect, they have a 25.67% voter in district value which does not classify them as minority. Given the nature of the preferential vote and the votes' quota for every list to secure a seat in Parliament, Shi'a voters were mobilized by their parties behind their sectarian candidates to secure their

election, and to break into the Sunni Bloc and deny them the selection of the Shi'a winning candidate in Beirut.



Chart 6: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Beirut 1

Table 3 and Chart 3 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in district in the Mount Lebanon 1 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Maronite and Shi'a sects. As shown both on Chart 3 and in Table 3, the Maronite sect has the majority of voters in the district and has an 89.22% of voters in district which explains the very low percentage in cross sectarian vote of only 1.27%. On the other hand, the Shi'a sect has a 10.78% voters in district value which should be associated with a high cross-sectarian vote percentage at 17.49%. Following the reverse relationship rule between variables E and F, the cross-sectarian vote percentage of the

Shi'a sect is expected to be a lot higher. However, it is widely acknowledged that Shi'a voters were rallied behind Hezbollah's candidate and list to secure the Shi'a parliamentary seat.

MOUNT LEBANON 1 (KESERWAN - JBEIL) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																		
Candidate / Sect	Ziad Hawat	Neemat Frem	Chawki Daccache	Simon Abi Ramia	Hussein Zeaiter	Farid El Khazen	Walid Khoury	Chamel Roukoz	Roger Azar	Mansour el Bon	Fares Souaid	Moustapha el Housayni	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E**	**Percentage of Voters in District (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Shi'a	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Shi'a						
Maronite	12434	9756	9203	8629	958	8437	6860	6709	6349	5962	5051	64	80412	79390	1022	**1.27%**	**89.22%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Shi'a	485	56	43	303	7845	38	296	17	24	161	277	175	9720	8020	1700	**17.49%**	**10.78%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote

Table 12: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 1



Chart 7: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 1

Table 4 and Chart 4 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in district in the Mount Lebanon 2 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Melkites Catholics and Armenian Orthodox sects. As sown both on Chart 4 and in Table 4, the Maronite sect has the majority of voters in the district and has a 59.32% of voters in district and a 38.98% of cross-sectarian percentage. The other sects, the Greek Orthodox, Melkites Catholics and Armenian Orthodox, have a low percentage of voters in district at 17.93%, 11.92 and 10.82% respectively, and their percentage of cross-sectarian votes are high at 54.48%, 85.20% and 54.05% respectively. Following the reverse relationship rule between variables E and F, the cross-sectarian vote percentage of the Greek Orthodox, Melkites

Catholics and Armenian Orthodox sects is justified. On the other hand, the relatively high cross-sectarian vote percentage for the Maronite sect is the result of a preponderance of voting power in this district, which allows votes to be mobilized for candidates of other sectarian affiliation but on the same list as that of the Maronite candidates.

MOUNT LEBANON 2 (METN) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																			
Candidate / Sect	Sami Gemayel	Michel El Murr	Majed Abillamaa	Elias Abou Saab	Agop Bagradounian	Ibrahim Kanaan	Edgard Maalouf	Sarkis Sarkis	Ghassan Achkar	Charbel Nahhas	Ghassan Mkhayber	Elias Hankache	Michel Mkattaf	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variab**	**Percentage of Voters in District (Variable I**	**Notes**
	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Armenian Orthodox	Maronite	Melkites Catholic	Maronite	Maronite	Melkites Catholic	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Melkites Catholic						
Maronite	9229	4736	4518	3034	889	4466	3276	2534	1453	1219	1416	1700	699	39169	23900	15269	**38.98%**	**59.32%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	1454	2946	1250	1819	217	825	933	489	385	442	625	261	194	11840	5390	6450	**54.48%**	**17.93%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Melkites Catholic	1317	1452	1057	1004	231	557	745	351	299	278	184	254	142	7871	1165	6706	**85.20%**	**11.92%**	Melkites Catholic Cross-sectarian vote
Armenian Orthodox	529	838	481	398	3283	257	364	366	154	220	75	113	67	7145	3283	3862	**54.05%**	**10.82%**	Armenian Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote

Table 13: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 2



Chart 8: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 2

Table 5 and Chart 5 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in district in the Mount Lebanon 3 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Maronite, Shi'a and Druze sects. As sown both on Chart 5 and in Table 5, no particular sect has an absolute majority of voters. This translates into moderately similar percentages of voters in districts especially for thr Maronite and Shi'a sects: 41.74% and 37.00% respectively. The Druze sect has a percentage of 21.27% which is around half of the percentages of the other sects but not low enough to be considered a minority. As for the percentages of cross-sectarian votes, they are found

to be very low for the Maronite, Shia and Druze sects, and have values of 5.08%, 3.44% and 8.13% respectively. The low value of cross-sectarian voting in this district is attributed to the balance of sectarian voting power and the political mobilization capacities of the competing factions.

MOUNT LEBANON 3 (BAABDA) ELECTORAL DISTRICT													
Candidate / Sect	Ali Ammar	Pierre Abou Assi	Hadi Al hasan	Alain Aoun	Fadi Alameh	Hikmat Dib	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of Voters in District (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Shi'a	Maronite	Druze	Maronite	Shi'a	Maronite						
Maronite	145	9361	740	7002	156	3095	20499	19458	1041	**5.08%**	**41.74%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Shi'a	12013	160	110	199	5533	157	18172	17546	626	**3.44%**	**37.00%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Druze	63	454	9596	220	53	59	10445	9596	849	**8.13%**	**21.27%**	Druze Cross-sectarian vote

Table 14: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 3



Chart 9: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 3

Table 6 and Chart 6 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the Mount Lebanon 4 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Druze, Maronite, Sunni, Greek Orthodox, and Melkites Catholic sects. As shown both on Chart 6 and in Table 6, the Greek Orthodox and Melkites Catholic sects have very low percentages of voters in the district, 3.69% and 4.17% respectively. Following the reverse relationship between variables E and F, both sects have high values of cross-sectarian vote percentages that are 52.32% and 89.21% respectively. The Druze sect has a percentage of voters in district of 48.98% which is relatively high, however, their cross-sectarian vote percentage is not very low but around 25%. This can be attributed to the fact that the excess of Druze voting power was rallied behind the candidates of other sects running on the same list as the major Druze candidates. The

Maronite and Sunni sects have a percentage of voters in district equal to 24.56% and 18.60% respectively. They are not very low to be considered minorities like other minority sects in this district, but are low enough to make them engage in relatively higher percentages of cross-sectarian votes: 24.04% and 22.23% respectively.

MOUNT LEBANON 4 (CHOUF - ALEY) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																					
Candidate / Sect	Akram Chehayeb	Taymour Joumblat	Mohammad Hajjar	Georges Adouan	Bilal Abdallah	Cesar Abi Khalil	Henry Helo	Talal Erslen	Anis Nassar	Wiam Wahhab	Marouan Hamade	Nehme Tohme	Naji Boustany	Mario Aoun	Farid Boustany	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in District (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Druze	Druze	Sunni	Maronite	Sunni	Maronite	Maronite	Druze	Greek Orthodox	Druze	Druze	Melkites Catholic	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite						
Druze	12824	9771	54	351	241	542	6877	6833	635	4788	6710	4833	540	123	101	55223	40926	14297	**25.89%**	**48.98%**	Druze Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	393	637	286	7286	209	4801	319	126	3843	486	196	481	2500	4197	1935	27695	21038	6657	**24.04%**	**24.56%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Sunni	188	142	9152	479	7154	45	19	195	153	964	220	280	1590	95	292	20968	16306	4662	**22.23%**	**18.60%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	261	122	5	31	1	1342	188	158	1984	19	6	10	10	16	8	4161	1984	2177	**52.32%**	**3.69%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Melkites Catholic	156	644	77	1019	95	346	51	57	556	236	71	508	367	336	188	4707	508	4199	**89.21%**	**4.17%**	Melkites Catholic Cross-sectarian vote

Table 15: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 4



Chart 10: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Mount Lebanon 4

Table 7 and Chart 7 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in district in the North 1 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Maronite and Alawite sects. As shown both on Chart 7 and in Table 7, the Alawites have very low percentages of voters in district, 2.54%, and a very high value of cross-sectarian vote percentage of 70.24%. The Sunni sect has a percentage of voters in district of 75.82%, which is high. However, their cross-sectarian vote percentage is not very low but is 23.24%. This can be attributed to the fact that the excess of Sunni voting power in this district was rallied behind the candidates of other sects running on the same list as the main Sunni candidates. The Maronite and Greek Orthodox sects have a low percentage of voters in district equal to 10.66% and 10.97% respectively. Their cross-sectarian percentages are 34.98% and 31.67%, and are not very high. This indicates that sectarian voters were rallied behind sectarian candidates to secure their election.

NORTH 1 (AKKAR) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																	
Candidate / Sect	Walid Baarini	Mohammad Sleiman	Mohammad el Merhebi	Hady Hobeich	Jimmy Jabbour	Mohammad Yehya	Wehbe Qaticha	Assaad Dargham	Mohammad Chedid	Emile Abboud	Moustapha Hussein	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Maronite	Maronite	Sunni	Greek Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Sunni	Greek Orthodox	Alewite						
Sunni	19709	14318	13422	8479	2062	7211	3156	1802	5004	2158	409	77730	59664	18066	**23.24%**	**75.82%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	92	111	184	1282	1654	125	1932	4018	73	1737	41	11249	7687	3562	**31.67%**	**10.97%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	171	70	122	2737	4370	38	2126	863	73	334	27	10931	7107	3824	**34.98%**	**10.66%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Alewite	116	254	125	216	53	617	36	239	41	132	775	2604	775	1829	**70.24%**	**2.54%**	Alewite Cross-sectarian vote

Table 16: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 1



Chart 11: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 1

Table 8 and Chart 8 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in district in the North 2 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Sunni, Alawite, Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects. As shown both on Chart 8 and in Table 8, the Alawite, Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects have very low percentages of voters in district, 4.69%, 3.21% and 1.51% respectively. Very high values of cross-sectarian vote percentages are shown for the Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects: 63.81% and 97.26% respectively. The percentage of cross-sectarian vote for the Alawite sect is relatively low at 18.82% despite having a very low percentage of voters in district. This can be attributed to the rallying of sectarian votes

behind sectarian candidates. The Sunni sect has a percentage of voters in district of 90.59% which is very high and the Sunni sect can be considered as the absolute majority in this district. The percentage of cross-sectarian vote is consequently very low at 2.07%.

NORTH 2 (TRIPOLI - MINIEH - DINNIEH) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																									
Candidate / Sect	Najib Mikati	Mohamad Kabbara	Samir el Jisr	Faisal Karami	Ashraf Rifi	Taha Hussein	Ahmad Omran	Ali Darwich	Dima el Jamali	Wassim Alwan	Mohamad anas nadim el jisr	Rafle Diab	Jean Obeid	Chadi Nachabeh	Nicolas Nahhas	Othman Alameddin	Kathem Kheir	Jihad el Samad	Sami fatfat	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of Voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Alewite	Alewite	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Sunni	Greek Orthodox	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni						
Sunni	20389	9218	9045	6564	5604	3633	331	345	1991	1911	1412	266	859	1072	187	9639	6225	10114	7349	96154	94166	1988	**2.07%**	**90.59%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Alewite	303	54	57	244	38	81	2303	1742	4	2	13	55	51	14	22	0	0	0	0	4983	4045	938	**18.82%**	**4.69%**	Alewite Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	176	93	78	78	56	18	38	35	15	4	6	683	84	6	549	293	351	663	178	3404	1232	2172	**63.81%**	**3.21%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	83	38	32	53	27	19	38	31	5	6	5	83	44	4	79	24	21	799	215	1606	44	1562	**97.26%**	**1.51%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote

Table 17: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 2



Chart 12: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 2

Table 9 and Chart 9 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the North 3 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Maronite and Greek Orthodox sects. As shown both on Chart 9 and in Table 9, the Greek Orthodox sect has a low percentage of voters in district that is equal to 22.66%, and a relatively low value of cross-sectarian vote percentage equal to 25.00%. On the other hand, the Maronite sect has a very high percentage of voter in district equal to 77.34%, and consequently a very low percentage of cross-sectarian vote equal to 7.23%.

NORTH 3 (BCHARREH - ZGHARTA - KOURA - BATROUN) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																				
Candidate / Sect	Gebran Bassil	Fadi Saad	Boutros Harb	Fadi Karam	Salim Saadeh	Fayez Ghosn	George Atallah	Nicolas Ghosn	Toni Franjieh	Michel Moawad	Estephan douaihy	Setrida Taouk	Joseph Isaac	Melhem Taouk	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E**	**Percentage of voters in dostrict (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite	Maronite						
Maronite	8470	7426	4304	2253	377	897	474	347	9369	5941	3974	6262	5476	4536	60106	55758	4348	**7.23%**	**77.34%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	1690	1101	634	3956	3767	1942	2356	1188	314	288	313	1	52	11	17613	13209	4404	**25.00%**	**22.66%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote

Table 18: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 3



Chart 13: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – North 3

Table 10 and Chart 10 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the Bekaa 1 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Sunni, Shi'a, Melkite Catholic, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox sects. As shown both on Chart 10 and in Table 10, the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox sects have very low percentages of voters in district: 9.04% and 1.29% respectively. Very high values of cross-sectarian vote percentage are shown for these two sects: 80.41% and 95.09% respectively. The percentage of cross-sectarian vote for the Maronite sect is high at 84.57% despite having a low percentage of voters in district equal to 16.32%. The Sunni and Shi'a sects have a percentage of voters in district of 31.42% and 23.34% which are not high; however, their related percentages of cross-sectarian votes diverge dramatically at 69.98% and 14.24% respectively. Both the Shi'a and Sunni sects have only one parliamentary seat each in this district. Sunni voters used their excess of voting power to support candidates of other sects on the most powerful list, whereas Shi'a voters were rallied behind their sectarian candidates only. The Melkites Catholic sect has a percentage of voters in district equal to 18.60% and its corresponding percentage of cross sectarian vote is 31.27%.

BEKAA 1 (ZAHLEH) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																		
Candidate / Sect	Anwar Jomaa	Georges Okayss	Michel Daher	Asem Araji	Myriam Taouk	Nicholas Fatouch	Salim Aoun	Asaad Nakad	Nizar Daloul	Mary Bilazkdjian	Cesar Maalouf	Eddy Demerdjian	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Shi'a	Melkite Catholic	Melkite Catholic	Sunni	Melkite Catholic	Melkite Catholic	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Shi'a	Armenian orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Armenian orthodox						
Sunni	848	472	3873	6719	950	1634	290	1000	2692	3453	444	8	22383	6719	15664	**69.98%**	**31.42%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Shi'a	13312	274	388	57	411	591	122	345	945	26	145	9	16625	14257	2368	**14.24%**	**23.34%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Melkite Catholic	421	3506	2270	96	2062	1269	1640	885	81	98	912	11	13251	9107	4144	**31.27%**	**18.60%**	Melkites Catholic Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	319	3845	1497	98	1210	946	1794	785	58	89	969	13	11623	1794	9829	**84.57%**	**16.32%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	187	1281	1051	48	940	623	921	638	64	56	623	5	6437	1261	5176	**80.41%**	**9.04%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote
Armenian orthodox	203	125	93	14	121	143	61	57	15	20	39	25	916	45	871	**95.09%**	**1.29%**	Armenian Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote

Table 19: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 1



Chart 14: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 1

Table 11 and Chart 11 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the Bekaa 2 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Maronite and Greek Orthodox sects. As shown both on Chart 11 and in Table 11, the Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects have very low percentages of voters in district: 4.25% and 5.44% respectively. Very high values of cross-sectarian vote percentage are shown for these two sects and are 48.03% and 78.56% respectively. The percentage of voters in district of the Shi'a and Druze sects are low and almost equal at 19.86% and 19.02% respectively. Their percentages for cross-sectarian vote is low, however: that of the Shi'a sect (25.82%) is almost double that of Druze sect (11.39%). The Sunni sect has a 51.41% of voters in district and a 7.8% of cross-sectarian vote percentage. This very low percentage of cross sectarian vote can be attributed to the fact that the Sunni sect has 2 seats allocated for them in this district, whereas the rest of the sects have only one each. This encourages the sectarian mobilization of Sunni voters behind their sectarian candidates.

BEKAA 2 (WEST BEKAA - RACHAYA) ELECTORAL DISTRICT														
Candidate / Sect	Abdel Rahim Mrad Sunni	Wael bou Faour Druze	Mohamad Nasrallah Shi'a	Mohamad Karaaoui Sunni	Ziad el Kadiri Sunni	Elie Ferzli Greek Orthodox	Faysal Daoud Druze	Henri Chdid Maronite	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
Sunni	10640	1383	204	8159	7655	375	99	177	28692	26454	2238	**7.80%**	**51.41%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Shi'a	2215	220	8224	92	37	246	29	23	11086	8224	2862	**25.82%**	**19.86%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Druze	607	7622	41	26	119	360	1783	56	10614	9405	1209	**11.39%**	**19.02%**	Druze Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	474	344	63	102	158	1219	26	651	3037	651	2386	**78.56%**	**5.44%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	313	475	79	72	58	1239	72	76	2384	1239	1145	**48.03%**	**4.27%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote

Table 20: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 2



Chart 15: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 2

Table 12 and Chart 12 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the Bekaa 3 electoral district. The allocated seats in this district are for the Shi'a, Sunni, Melkites Catholics and Maronite sects. As shown both on Chart 12 and in Table 12, the Sunni, Maronite and Melkites Catholics sects have very low percentages of voters in district: 7.91%, 6.78% and 2.76% respectively. the Sunni and Melkites Catholics sects register very high values of cross-sectarian vote percentages: 44.44% and 72.79% respectively. The Maronite sect in this district, despite having a very low percentage of voters in district, had a similarly very low percentage in cross-

sectarian vote equal to 8.58%. This exception is due to the fact that one of the major Christian parties in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces, rallied all Maronite voters around their candidate to be able to secure the win of the Maronite seat in that district against the massive voting power of Shi'a voters affiliated with Hezbollah. The percentage of voters in district of the Shi'a sect is equal to 82.54%. This explains the very low percentage of cross sectarian vote of only 8.16%.

BEKAA 3 (BAALBEK - HERMEL) ELECTORAL DISTRICT																	
Candidate / Sect	Jamil el Sayyid	Ihab Hamadeh	Ghazi Zeaytir	Ali Mokdad	Ibrahim El mousawi	Hussein el Hajj Hasan	Antoine Habchi	Al Walid Sukkariyyi	Yehya Chamas	Bakr el Hujeiri	Albert Mansour	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Maronite	Sunni	Shi'a	Sunni	Melkite Catholic						
Shi'a	31515	17871	16782	16824	16305	15028	735	5733	4228	50	4021	129092	118553	10539	**8.16%**	**82.54%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Sunni	762	212	384	288	195	376	754	1053	2120	5823	409	12376	6876	5500	**44.44%**	**7.91%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	153	145	146	78	78	79	9696	34	67	15	115	10606	9696	910	**8.58%**	**6.78%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Melkite Catholic	138	14	41	66	6	19	2632	45	138	45	1175	4319	1175	3144	**72.79%**	**2.76%**	Melkite Catholic Cross-sectarian vote

Table 21: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 3



Chart 16: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – Bekaa 3

Table 13 and Chart 13 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the South 1 electoral district. The seats in this district are for the Sunni, Maronite and Melkites Catholic sects. As shown both on Chart 13 and in Table 13, the Sunni sect has a very high percentage of voters in district equal to 61.83%, with a very low percentage of cross-sectarian votes equal to 1.32%. Melkites Catholics are a minority in this district with a very low percentage of voters in district equal to 6.99% and a very high percentage of cross sectarian votes equal to 84.07%. The Maronite sect in this district has a percentage of voter in district equal to 31.18%, however their percentage of cross-sectarian vote is very low at 5.97%. This is so

because the major Christian party in this district, the Free Patriotic Movement, rallied the majority of Maronite voters behind their Maronite candidate.

SOUTH 1 (SAIDA - JEZZINE) ELECTORAL DISTRICT											
Candidate / Sect	Bahiyya Hariri	Ibrahim Azar	Ousama Saad	Ziad Aswad	Salim Khoury	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
	Sunni	Maronite	Sunni	Maronite	Melkite Catholic						
Sunni	12762	215	7472	55	1	20505	20234	271	**1.32%**	**61.83%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Maronite	172	4086	150	5639	295	10342	9725	617	**5.97%**	**31.18%**	Maronite Cross-sectarian vote
Melkite Catholic	113	647	164	1024	369	2317	369	1948	**84.07%**	**6.99%**	Melkite Catholic Cross-sectarian vote

Table 22: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 1



Chart 17: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 1

Table 14 and Chart 14 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the South 2 electoral district. The seats in this district are for the Shi'a and Melkites Catholic sects. As shown on Chart 14 and in Table 14, the Shi'a sect has a very high percentage of voters in district equal to 96.09%, with a very low percentage of cross-sectarian votes equal to 1.54%. Conversely, the Melkites Catholics are a minority in this district with a very low percentage of voters in district equal to 3.91%, and a relatively low percentage of cross sectarian votes equal to 25.37%. This is explained by the fact that the major Christian party in this district, the Free Patriotic Movement, mobilized the majority of Melkites Catholics votes behind its own Melkite Catholic candidate.

SOUTH 2 (SOUR - ZAHRANI) ELECTORAL DISTRICT															
Candidate	Nabih Berri	Nawaf Mousawi	Hussein Jachi	Inaya Ezz Eddine	Ali Khreiss	Wissam hajj	Michel Moussa	Ali Ousayran	Riad el Asaad	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
Sect	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Shi'a	Melikte Catholic	Melikte Catholic	Shi'a	Shi'a						
Shi'a	39280	21851	22918	16383	13601	365	1461	1561	1207	118627	116801	1826	**1.54%**	**96.09%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Melkite Catholic	153	58	123	356	162	2175	1429	221	152	4829	3604	1225	**25.37%**	**3.91%**	Melkite Catholic Cross-sectarian vote

Table 23: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 2



Chart 18: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 2

Table 15 and Chart 15 show the percentage of cross-sectarian votes and percentages of voters in the South 3 electoral district. The seats in this district are for the Shi'a, Sunni, Druze and Greek Orthodox sects. As shown both on Chart 15 and in Table 15, the Shi'a sect has a very high percentage of voters in the district equal to 90.17% with a very low percentage of cross-sectarian votes equal to 3.28%. The Sunni, Druze and Greek Orthodox sects are a minority in this district with very low percentages of voters in district equal to 6.18%, 3.02% and 0.62% respectively. While Melkites Catholics had a very high percentage of cross-sectarian votes equal to 65.70%, the Druze and Sunni sects had a relatively higher percentage of cross-sectarian votes equal to 16.60% and 16.34% respectively. This is so because the major Sunni and Druze parties in this district, the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party,

rallied the majority of Sunni and Druze voters behind their own sectarian candidates. Melkites Catholics do not have a sectarian party to mobilize voters and thus were forced to bandwagon with the other majority or relatively larger groups.

SOUTH 3 (HASBAYA - MARJEYOUN - NABATIYEH - BINT JBEIL) ELCTORAL DISTRICT																	
Candidate / Sect	Mohamad Raad Shi'a	Hasan Fadlallah Shi'a	Ali Fayad Shi'a	Hani Qobeyssi Shi'a	Ali Khalil Shi'a	Ali Bazzi Shi'a	Imad Khatib Sunni	Yasine jaber Shi'a	Ayoub Hmayyid Shi'a	Anwar Khalil Druze	Qasem Hachem Sunni	Assaad Hardan Greek Orthodox	Total Votes of the sect	Total sectarian votes of the sect	Total Cross-Sectarian votes of the sect	**Percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E)**	**Percentage of voters in district (Variable F)**	**Notes**
Shi'a	42351	37947	26474	19626	15246	8598	148	7575	7038	308	3504	1622	170437	164855	5582	**3.28%**	**90.17%**	Shi'a Cross-sectarian vote
Sunni	228	28	289	77	357	10	7597	44	5	579	2182	293	11689	9779	1910	**16.34%**	**6.18%**	Sunni Cross-sectarian vote
Druze	3	0	61	1	61	0	227	1	0	4768	39	556	5717	4768	949	**16.60%**	**3.02%**	Druze Cross-sectarian vote
Greek Orthodox	5	0	70	3	128	0	230	1	0	260	71	401	1169	401	768	**65.70%**	**0.62%**	Greek Orthodox Cross-sectarian vote

Table 24: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 3



Chart 19: Percentage of cross-sectarian votes and voters in district (Variables E & F) – South 3

Table 16 aggregates all the percentages of cross sectarian votes for all sects and across all electoral districts, and the averages of cross sectarian votes for all sects in all districts and for all districts. Table 16 also shows the average of cross sectarian votes for Christian and Muslim sects for all district. Chart 16 shows the average percentages of cross sectarian votes of all sects in one chart as well as the average of Christian and Muslim sects. Chart 17 shows a comparison of the average cross-sectarian votes of Christian and Muslim sects across all districts. A general look at Table 16, Chart 16 and Chart 17 shows a wide variation in cross sectarian votes for all sects. However the Christian sects show, on average, a tendency to cast a cross-sectarian vote than the Muslim sects. The average percentage of cross-sectarian vote for Christian sects is equal to 61.75% whereas that of Muslim sects is equal to 23.33%. However, if the Alawite sect is to be taken out of consideration, the revised average of cross-sectarian vote for Muslim sects will be reduced to 16.26%, which is almost 4 times less than that of Christian sects. Chart 17 also demonstrates that the percentage of the cross-sectarian vote for Christian sects is always dramatically higher than that of Muslim sects except for the Mount Lebanon 1 and North 1 districts. The cross-sectarian vote percentage for the Christian and Muslim sects in the Mount Lebanon 3 district is almost identical and very low at around 5%.

CROSS SECTARIAN VOTE FOR SECTS REPRESENTED IN THE PARLIAMENT																			
	Beirut 1	Beirut 2	Mount Leb 1	Mount Leb 2	Mount Leb 3	Mount Leb 4	North 1	North 2	North 3	Bekaa 1	Bekaa 2	Bekaa 3	South 1	South 2	South 3	Average		
			Keserwan - Jbeil	Metn	Baabda	Aley - Chouf	Akkar	Tripoli - Minieh - Dinnieh	Bcharreh - Zgharta - Koura - Batroun	Zahleh	West Bekaa - Rachaya	Baalbak - Hermel	Saida - Jezzine	Sour - Zahrany	Hasbaya - Marjeyoun - Nabatiyeh - Bint Jbeil			
Greek Orthodox	74.19%	53.84%		54.48%		52.32%	31.67%	63.81%	25.00%	80.41%	48.03%				65.70%	**54.94%**		
Armenian Orthodox	28.31%			54.05%						95.09%						**59.15%**		
Maronite	57.95%		1.27%	38.98%	5.08%	24.04%	34.98%	97.26%	7.23%	84.57%	78.56%	8.58%	5.97%			**37.04%**	**61.75%**	**Average Christian Sects**
Melkite Catholic	72.33%			85.20%		89.21%				31.27%		72.79%	84.07%	25.37%		**65.75%**		
Armenian Catholic	82.49%															**82.49%**		
Evangelical		71.10%														**71.10%**		
Average Christian sects Cross Sectarian Vote	**63.05%**	**62.47%**	**1.27%**	**58.18%**	**5.08%**	**55.19%**	**33.32%**	**80.53%**	**16.12%**	**72.83%**	**63.30%**	**40.69%**	**45.02%**	**25.37%**	**65.70%**	**61.75%**		
Sunni		10.00%				22.23%	23.24%	2.07%		69.98%	7.80%	44.44%	1.32%		16.34%	**21.94%**		
Shi'a		10.68%	17.49%		3.44%					14.24%	25.82%	8.16%		1.54%	3.28%	**10.58%**	**23.33%**	**Average Muslim Sects**
Druze		19.29%			8.13%	25.89%					11.39%				16.60%	**16.26%**		
Alewite							70.24%	18.82%								**44.53%**		
Average Muslim Sects Cross Sectarian Vote		**13.32%**	**17.49%**		**5.79%**	**24.06%**	**46.74%**	**10.45%**		**42.11%**	**15.00%**	**26.30%**	**1.32%**	**1.54%**	**12.07%**	**31.01%**		
Average in districts	**63.05%**	**29.71%**	**12.08%**	**58.18%**	**5.61%**	**39.62%**	**41.37%**	**38.48%**	**16.12%**	**59.67%**	**31.10%**	**32.06%**	**23.17%**	**9.48%**	**22.80%**			

Table 25: Cross sectarian vote for all sects represented in parliament across all districts



Chart 20: Average cross-sectarian vote of sects represented in parliament across all districts



Chart 21: Average cross-sectarian vote for Christian sects and Muslim sects across all districts

5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

The argument in this chapter follows the same rationale as the one explained in chapter 4 while evaluating cross-confessional voting in all district. However, the level of analysis in this chapter is narrower and tackles the more specific level of sectarian voting behavior. In other terms, Chapter Four examined the confessional behavior of Christian and Muslim voter in what regards their cross-confessional voting behavior. In this chapter, the analysis goes deeper into the different Christian and Muslim sects and analyses their cross-sectarian behavior. The number of cross-sectarian votes, the

independent variable in this chapter, is considered a proxy pointer that indicates the extent to which Lebanon's electoral law converges or diverges from centripetalism. The percentage of these votes out of the total votes for each sect in each electoral district shows the votes leveraged by candidates from groups other than their sectarian group and consequently provides an idea of how the electoral law influenced the voting behavior of sectarian and non-sectarian voters in the district.

The single preferential vote at the level of caza (qada') in the 2017 electoral law meant that voters were only able to cast one vote for their preferred candidate. The number of cross-sectarian votes is consequently a specific measurement of voters' single and only choice and thus, they represent the actual decision of voters to choose or not a candidate out of their sectarian group. The evaluation of these votes gives an indication of the efficacy of the electoral law in fulfilling the conditions of two important features of centripetalism, namely 1) Electoral incentives for candidates to reach out for votes out of their sectarian groups, and 2) the areas of bargaining between candidates. In theory, then, the higher the percentage of cross-sectarian votes in a given electoral district, the more voters in this district were willing to cast a vote for a candidate out of their sectarian group. As a result, one would assume that there were enough electoral incentives in the electoral law that encouraged candidates to attract votes from different sectarian groups other than their own. This assumption leads to the conclusion that candidates moderated their political discourse and broadened their campaigning horizon and thus satisfied the first condition for centripetalism. Also, one would assume that the electoral law encouraged political actors to come together and negotiate vote-pooling deals to attract as many votes as possible and thus, satisfying the

second condition for centripetalism. By contrast, should the percentage of cross-sectarian voting be very low, then the causality runs the other way: the electoral law acted in contradiction to the two identified conditions for centripetalism.

A broad and thorough examination of the percentages of cross-sectarian votes in Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections across all electoral districts sheds light on three major patterns in the results which are very indicative and integral to the analysis. The first pattern is the consistency of a large variance between the percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E) and the percentage of voters in district (Variable F) in a given district and for a given sect. This pattern highlights the reverse relationship between the percentage of voters in district and the percentage of cross-sectarian vote for a given sect. In other terms, this indicates that the more the percentage of voters of a given sect approaches 100%, the less they are likely to cast a cross-sectarian vote which translates into very low percentage of cross-sectarian votes and vice versa. This voting behavior is best described by the hegemony principle whereby sects who have a majority of voters seek to rally behind their sectarian candidates while minority groups seek to bandwagon with majority groups for security purposes. This pattern also specifies that the more the percentage of voters in a district is moderate (not very high nor very low, mainly near the 25-35% threshold), the related cross-sectarian vote is also moderate and coincides or nearly coincides with the percentage of voters in district. In other term, voters tend to cast a cross-sectarian vote moderately when they are in a group that is not categorized as minority group but not large enough to be categorized as a majority group.

The examination of Tables and Charts 1 to 15 helps us identify the presence of this pattern almost in all districts and across all sects. Some exceptions to this rule are recognized in the charts whereby the percentages of variables E and F are identical or have small variance such as sects having low percentage of voters in a district and also low percentages of cross-sectarian votes and vice versa. These exceptions are recorded for the Armenian Orthodox in Beirut 1 district, the Shi'as in Mount Lebanon 1, Bekaa 1 and 2 districts, the Maronites in Mount Lebanon 2 and 4 and Bekaa 3 districts, the Sunnis in Mount Lebanon 4 and South 3 districts, the Greek Orthodox in North 3 district, the Melkites Catholics in Bekaa 1 district, and the Druze in Bekaa 2 and South 3 districts.

The second pattern is the inconsistency of the percentage of cross-sectarian votes for each sect apart across all districts. Table 16 shows that the percentage of cross-sectarian votes for a given sect varies dramatically from one district to another. This indicates that there is a large inconsistency in voting behavior for each sect depending on which district they are voting in. For example, the Maronite cross-sectarian vote percentage varies from as low as 1.27% in the Mount Lebanon 1 district to 97.26% in the North 2 district with an average of 37.04% in all districts. The Greek Orthodox percentage varies from as low as 25% in the North 3 district to 80.41% in the Bekaa 1 district with an average of 54.94% in all districts. The Armenian Orthodox varies from 28.31% in Beirut 1 district to 95.09% in the Bekaa 1 district with an average of 59.15% in all districts. For the Melkites Catholics, the range is from 25.37% in the South 2 district to 89.21% in the Mount Lebanon 4 district, with an average of 65.75% in all districts. For the Sunnis it is from 1.32% in the South 1 district to 69.98% in the Bekaa

1 district, with an average of 21.94% in all districts. For the Shi'as it is from 1.54% in the South 2 district to 25.82% in the Bekaa 2 district, with an average of 10.58% in all districts. For the Druze it varies from 8.13% in the Mount Lebanon 3 district to 25.89% in the Mount Lebanon 4 district, with an average of 16.26% in all districts. For the Alawites it is from 18.82% in the North 2 district to 70.24% in the North 1 district, with an average of 44.53% in all districts. The inconsistency of percentages as well as the large difference between cross-sectarian voting for a given sect between districts sheds light on the interplay of other variables in influencing the dynamics of sectarian and non-sectarian voting. The most important such variables are: a) district formation and b) seats allocation.

The third pattern is the relatively higher percentage of cross-sectarian votes for Christian sects especially in Christian dominated districts compared to the relatively low percentage of cross-sectarian votes for Muslim sects in Muslim dominated districts. In fact, as shown in Table 16 and Charts 16 and 17, the average of percentage of cross-sectarian votes for Christian sects in the entire election is equal to 61.75%, whereas the average for Muslim sects is equal to 23.33%, or nearly one third of that of Christian sects. If the percentage of cross-sectarian vote of the Alawite sect is taken out, which is a recognized minority in Lebanon, the average percentage of cross sectarian votes for Muslim sects drops down from 23.33% to 16.26% which is almost one fourth of that of Christian sects.

The three highlighted patterns help us understand and analyze more accurately the high percentages of cross-sectarian voting recorded in the previous tables and charts. As aforementioned, the proposed method to evaluate Lebanon's 2017 electoral law against

centripetalist objectives assumes that should cross-sectarian votes, in a given election, yield large numbers, then this indicates that the electoral law succeeded in vote-pooling. In turn, the electoral law is then considered to have endorsed centripetalist principles and hence serves the purpose of political accommodation and cooperation.

The large percentages of cross-sectarian votes registered in the results of Lebanon's 2018 election, if analyzed separately, mistakenly provide evidence to prove that the electoral law satisfied centripetalist concepts. However, the following section argues that the evaluation of the numbers should not be undertaken separately and the results are not to be analyzed out of their institutional and organizational contexts. Accordingly, in the current case of Lebanon, taking the three identified patterns into consideration, we notice the following patterns: 1) the consistency of a large variance between the percentage of cross-sectarian vote (Variable E) and the percentage of voters in district (Variable F) in a given district and for a given sect, 2) the inconsistency of the percentage of cross-sectarian vote for each sect apart across all districts, and 3) the relatively higher percentage of cross-sectarian vote for Christian sects especially in Christian dominated districts and the relatively low percentage of cross sectarian vote for Muslim sects in Muslim dominated districts suggests a completely different outcome, one that contradicts the previous assumption.

The large difference in the percentages of cross-sectarian votes, and the difference of percentages between different sects and districts, suggests that there are one or more variables governing this variation other than the electoral law since it is constant across all districts. The two variables identified in Chapter Four to explain the difference of cross-confessional behavior – district formation and seats allocation – remain of integral

importance in the explanation of cross-sectarian vote variation. However, one more variable is added: political parties' presence and capacity to mobilize voters in a given district as well as their political alliances. The examination of electoral districts in terms of sectarian affiliation of voters (Tables 1 to 15) shows that the absolute majority of electoral districts are formed in such a way to secure the domination of one or two sectarian groups at the expense of all others. In most of the cases, the dominant sectarian groups are from the same confessional group (Christian or Muslim). An exception to this assumption are Beirut 1, Mount Lebanon 3 and Bekaa 1 districts. Consequently, and to evaluate the extent to which district formation, seats allocation, and party politics influence voters' sectarian and cross-sectarian behavior, a thorough yet brief examination will be undertaken for each district and its related sectarian composition.

In Beirut 1 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, Melkites Catholics and Armenian Catholics. Melkites Catholics and Armenian Catholics are minorities in this district and that explains the high percentage of cross-sectarian votes registered (Table 1 and Chart 1). The remaining sects have moderate percentages of voters in district and these percentages are more or less similar, which does not qualify any of them to be a majority. In turn their percentages of cross-sectarian behavior are relatively high at 57.95% (Maronite) and 74.19% (Greek Orthodox). Despite having a moderate percentage of voter in district (21.54%), the Armenian Orthodox percentage of cross-sectarian vote was the lowest in the district at 28.31%. Yet if district formation and the percentage of voter in

district do not capture these results for the Armenian Orthodox sect, seats allocation can.

An investigation of the seats allocated for each sect show that the Armenian Orthodox sect has 3 seats allocated for them while all other sects have only 1 seat for each sect and one for Christian minorities and thus, the Armenian Orthodox are strict in rallying their sectarian voters behind their sectarian candidates; this, in turn, explains their relatively low cross-sectarian vote. Party politics and party mobilizing strategies in the election do not have a major impact in this district because the major competing parties have strong candidates from all sects in all their lists.

In the Beirut 2 district, the sectarian composition is divided between the Sunni, Shi'a, Greek Orthodox, Druze and Evangelical sects. The Greek Orthodox, Druze and Evangelical sects are minority groups with percentages of voters in district less than 3% (Table 2 and chart 2), which explains the high cross-sectarian vote. The Druze are an exception and have a low cross-sectarian vote percentage at 19.29% due to the fact that sectarian leaders rallied their voters behind their candidate. The Sunni are a majority group in this district and their low cross-sectarian vote is anticipated especially due to the fact that there are 6 seats allocated to them in this district which required the major Sunni party (Future Movement) to rally its supporters behind its sectarian candidates. As for the Shi'a sect, they have a moderate percentage of voters in district (25.67%), however they have a very low cross-sectarian vote (10.68%). This is best explained by party politics and party strategies in the election. Shi'a leaders (Hezbollah and Amal Movement) were not represented in this district in previous elections because the old electoral law used the majoritarian bloc vote that made it possible only for the Sunni

majority to choose all winning candidates. With the new law based on proportional representation, they have a chance to use their voting power to win parliamentary seats and thus, they decided to mobilize their voters behind sectarian candidates rather than other candidates. This resulted in the very low cross-sectarian vote percentage.

In Mount Lebanon 1, the sectarian distribution is divided between Maronite and Shi'a sects. The Maronite sect has the majority of voters in this district and thus a very low cross-sectarian vote is anticipated. However, the Shi'a sect, despite having small voter in district percentage yielded a very low cross-sectarian vote percentage at 17.49% (Table 3 and chart 3). Shi'a voting behavior is also explained by party politics since Hezbollah (without the Amal Movement) was not represented in this district and was eager to win the Shi'a parliamentary seat and rallied all of Shi'a voters behind his candidate.

In Mount Lebanon 2, the sectarian distribution is divided between Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Melkites Catholics and Armenian Orthodox votes. The majority of voters are Maronite while other sects have percentages of voters in district less than 18% (Table 4 and chart 4). This explains the high values of cross sectarian votes which are above 50% for Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox) and above 80% for Melkites Catholics. On the other hand, the Maronite sect, which has a percentage of voters in district around 60%, did not have a low cross sectarian vote but a relatively lower one at 38.98%, which is explained by the same argument as in the Beirut 1 district.

The situation in Mount Lebanon 3 is the most interesting one. The votes are divided between Maronite, Shi'a and the Druze sects. All sects are more or less equally

represented in this district, except for Maronites who have a marginally higher representation with respect to the Druze (Table 5 and chart 5). Surprisingly, the percentage of cross sectarian votes for all three sects was around 8% and less which is a very low. This outcome is best explained by all three variables of district formation, seats allocation and party politics. The allocated seats for each sect are 3 seats for Maronite sect, 2 seats for Shi'a and 1 for the Druze, which perfectly correlates with their percentages of voters in district at 41.47%, 37% and 21.27% respectively. Party politics and party electoral coalitions played a major role in this district because Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement formed a coalition against the Lebanese Forces and the PSP. This, in turn, played against cross-sectarian voting. Hezbollah rallied Shia voters, the PSP rallied Druze voters and the FPM and LF rallied Maronite voters each for their own sectarian candidates. Consequently, all hegemonic pressures were neutralized because all sects were represented in proportion to their allocated seats. Party politics and electoral coalitions shaped cross-sectarian behavior in this district.

In the Mount Lebanon 4 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Druze, Maronite, Sunni, Greek Orthodox, and Melkites Catholics voters. The Greek Orthodox and Melkite Catholics are minority groups with percentages of voters in district less than 5% (Table 6 and Chart 6). In this case, high percentage of cross-sectarian votes is to be anticipated. The Maronite and Sunni sects have a moderate percentage of voters in district around 25% and 20% respectively. Given the allocated seats for each of these sects (5 and 2) their voting power allowed them to mobilize some of their votes towards candidates other than their co-sectarians. The Druze are the major

sect in this district with a percentage of voters in district around 50%, however with a moderate cross-sectarian percentage at 25.89%. This is best explained by the political ominance of the PSP in this district. It aimed to secure as many Druze seats in this district without losing seats earmarked for other sects. Consequently, only a limited number of Druze votes was directed to other candidates but remained limited.

In the North 1 district, the sectarian composition is between Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Maronite and Alwite voters. The Alwites are the minority group and their cross-sectarian vote percentage is very high at 70.24% (Table 7 and chart 7). On the other hand, Sunni voters are the major sectarian composition with a percentage of voters in district equal to 75.82%. This explains the low cross-sectarian percentage. However, given the fact that only 3 seats out of the 7 reserved seats are allocated for Sunnis, the Sunni sect has an excess of voting power. This explains their percentage of cross sectarian votes. As for the Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects, and despite being minority groups in this district, they were mobilized by the FPM and the LF behind their own sectarian candidates. This explains their relatively low cross-sectarian vote.

In the North 2 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Sunni, Alwite, Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters. The Sunni sect is the absolute majority, which explains the very low cross-sectarian percentage at 2.07% (Table 8 and chart 8). The Alawites, Greek Orthodox and Maronite are all minority groups with percentages of voters in district less than 5%. This whexplains the very high percentage of cross-sectarian vote of the Maronite and Greek Orthodox voters (97.26% and 63.21% respectively). The Alwites have a relatively low cross sectarian vote of 18.82% because they were rallied *en masse* behind their own sectarian candidate.

In the North 3 district, the sectarian composition is divided between the Maronite and Greek Orthodox sects. Maronites are the majority with a percentage of voters in district of 77.34%, which explains the low cross-sectarian vote at 7.23% (table 9 and Chart 9). On the other hand, Greek Orthodox sect has a moderate percentage of voters in district of 22.66% and a cross-sectarian vote of 25%. Usually, in Christian-majority electoral districts, the cross-sectarian vote is more likely to be high as in the Beirut 1 and Mount Lebanon 2 districts. However, in the North 3 district, the Maronite cross-sectarian vote is very low. This outcome is best explained by party politics: namely, the hard battle over all Maronite seats between the FPM and SSNP on one side, and the LF and other Christian politicians.

In the Bekaa 1 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Sunni, Shi'a, Melkites Catholic, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox sects. The Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox sects are minority groups with percentages of voters in district equal to 9.04% and 1.29% respectively. This explains the high percentage of cross-sectarian votes (table 10 and chart 10). The Shi'a, Melkite Catholics and Maronite sects have moderate percentages of voters in district of around 20%. The Shi'a voters were rallied behind their sectarian candidates as a strategy followed by both Hezbollah and Amal to secure their monopoly over Shi'a representation in Parliament. This is why in all districts, including the Bekaa 1, the Shi'a cross sectarian vote was very low. On the other hand, Melkite Catholics have two parliamentary seats allocated for them in this district and thus, given their relatively small number in the district, their sectarian voters were mobilized behind their same-sect candidates to secure their win.

In the Bekaa 2 district, the sectarian distribution is divided between Sunni, Shi'a, Druze, Maronite and Greek Orthodox voters. The Maronite and Greek Orthodox sects are the minority groups. This explains the high percentages of cross sectarian votes of 78.56% and 48.03% respectively (Table 11 and Chart 11). The Sunnis are a majority group, which explains the low percentage of cross sectarian vote percentage of 7.8%. The Shi'a and Druze have moderate percentage of voters in district of around 19%, however they do not have very high cross-sectarian vote percentages (25.82% and 11.39%). This is so because they do not have excess voting power to mobilize beyond their sectarian candidates.

In the Bekaa 3 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Shi'a, Sunni, Maronite and Melkite voters. The Shi'a are the majority group in this district while the remaining sects are minority groups. This explains the very low percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 8.16% for Shia', and the high percentage of cross sectarian vote for the others (table 12 and chart 12). The Maronite sect is an exception in this district, because despite having a very low percentage of voters in district (6.78%) it had only 8.58% of cross sectarian votes. Party politics best explains this outcome since the LF, the major Maronite political party in this district, rallied Maronite voters behind their candidate to secure his election.

In the South 1 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Sunni, Maronite and Melkites Catholic voters. Melkite Catholics are a minority group. This explains the very high percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 84.07% (Table 13 and chart 13). By contrast, the Sunni sect has a very low cross-sectarian vote given that it represents the majority sect. The Maronite sect, despite having a relatively high

percentage of voters in district (31.18%), had a very low percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 5.97%. This can be explained, as seen in the Bekaa 3 district, by party politics. The FPM, the major Maronite political party in this district, rallied sectarian voter behind its own candidates.

In the South 2 district, the sectarian composition is divided between Shi'a and Melkite Catholic voters. Being the majority sect, the Shi'a had a very low percentage of cross sectarian vote of 1.54% (table 14 and chart 14). However, the Melkite Catholics, while having a very low percentage of voters in district of 3.91%, had a relatively low cross-sectarian vote of only 25.37%. This was the case because the FPM mobilized their voters behind their candidate.

Finally, in the South 3 district, the sectarian composition is divided between the Shi'a, Sunni, Druze and Greek Orthodox. The Shi'a are the majority group, which explains the very low percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 3.28%. On the other hand, while all the other sects are minority groups, only the Greek Orthodox scored a high percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 65.7%, while Sunni and Druze scored 16.34 and 16.6% respectively. The Future Movement and the PSP mobilized their voters behind their candidates.

In line with the aforementioned discussion of each district and its related results, the hegemony principle seems to be the major driving force for cross-sectarian voting for all sects and across all districts. The hegemony of one sectarian group at the expense of others forces minority groups to bandwagon with the majority. This strategy results in high cross-sectarian percentages for dominant sects and low cross-sectarian percentages for others. On the other hand, in multiple , the hegemony principle was not

able to explain the entire set of outcomes as shown in the previous discussion because in some districts majority sects yielded relatively high percentages of cross sectarian votes, and minority sects yielded relatively low percentages of cross sectarian votes. To address this divergence from the general rule of hegemony, new variables need be added to the previously defined ones. The discussion will be divided into two major parts; the first one seeks to explain why majority groups sometimes tend to have high percentages of cross-sectarian votes and the second one seeks to explain why minority groups sometimes have relatively low percentages of cross-sectarian votes.

First, to understand the reason behind which majority groups tend to have high cross-sectarian vote percentages, the relationship between the percentage of voters in district and the number of allocated seats is examined. This relationship is defined to be a correlation relationship and refers to the percentage of seats allocated to the sects versus the percentage of voters in district of the same sect. If the percentage of seats allocated to a sect in a given district perfectly correlates with the percentage of voters in district of this sect, this means that the voting power of the sect is just enough to let the sect elect its corresponding sectarian candidates. In this scenario, the cross-sectarian vote for this sect is expected to be low. On the other hand if the percentage of voters in district is larger than the percentage of seats allocated to this sect out of the total seats, then this means that the sect has an excess of voting power that can be mobilized to support candidates of other sectarian groups. For instance, this scenario is clear in the behavior of Sunni voters in the North 1 district. The Sunni sect has 3 seats allocated to them out of the total 7 seats in the district, i.e. 42.85% of total seats. Sunni percentage of voters in district is equal to 75.82% (Table 7 and chart 7) which is almost double

their percentage of their share of parliamentary seats in the district. Sunni parties will likely mobilize their excess of voting power to support candidates out of their sectarian group which explains the relatively high percentage of cross-sectarian vote of 23.24%. Another example of this occurrence is the example of the Druze sect in the Mount Lebanon 4 district. The Druze sect has 4 seats allocated for them out of the total 13 seats in the district, i.e. 30.7% of total seats. Conversely, their percentage of voters in district is 48.98%, which is around 65% higher than their percentage share of allocated seats in the district. Following the same logic, the Druze parties will use the excess of voting power to cast cross-sectarian votes and consequently their related percentage is anticipated to be relatively high at 25.89% (Table 6 and chart 6).

Second, a number of variables help explain why minority groups sometimes have relatively low percentages of cross-sectarian votes. These variables are 1) party politics and party coalitions, 2) party capacity to mobilize voters, and 3) sectarian parties. Party politics and party coalitions will influence the behavior of sectarian voters to cast a sectarian vote or cross-sectarian vote in a given electoral district. An example of this scenario is the case of the Mount Lebanon 3 district where all sectarian voters are mobilized to cast a sectarian vote, while other scenarios were discussed when the coalitions are modified and how cross-sectarian votes will be changed dramatically. Party capacity to mobilize voters indicates the influential presence of a specific party in a given district and its capability to mobilize sectarian voters. For instance, the influential presence and ability of the LF to mobilize Maronite voters in the Bekaa 3 district, or the influential presence of FPM and their ability to mobilize Maronite and Melkite Catholics in the South 2 district, will drive the cross-sectarian percentage to

lower values despites having a low percentage of voters in district for this sect. Conversely, in districts where the sect has low percentage of voters in district, and where there is no influential presence of a sectarian party, this sect will almost always choose to bandwagon with the majority groups. Finally, sectarian parties are of very importance to this discussion because it is noticed that all sects who do not have an influential and large sectarian party to support them will always choose to bandwagon with majority groups in districts where they represent a minority.

Another interesting observation is the large difference between the average of cross-sectarian votes for Christian sects and Muslim sects. Christian sects have an average percentage of cross-sectarian votes of 61.75%, whereas that of Muslim sects is equal to 23.33% (table 16). The behavior of Christian sects in districts where Christian are an absolute majority and Muslims do not have any seats allocated for them needs to be explored. The same thing has to be done for Muslims sect. However, there are no electoral districts where Christian sects has no seats allocated to them. Accordingly, the selection of the relevant districts is based on those with an absolute majority of Muslim sects with a minor presence of Christian sects. In the first scenario, the Beirut 1, Mount Lebanon 2 and North 3 electoral districts are selected as districts with solely Christian candidates and seats. Table 16 shows all the percentages of cross-sectarian votes of Christian sects and the average of these percentages is calculated and is equal to 52.75% which is relatively high. On the other hand, the Beirut 2, Mount Lebanon 4, North 1 and 2, Bekaa 2 and 3, South 2 and 3 districts are selected as districts with absolute majority of Muslim sects and absolute majority of seats allocated to Muslim sects. Based on Table 16, the average of percentages of cross-sectarian votes is equal to 18.77%.

Consequently, after the neutralization of the cross-confessional threat, Christian voters are found to be almost three times more willing to cast a cross-sectarian vote in districts with Christian majority than Muslims to cast a cross-sectarian vote in district with Muslim majority.

In the Mount Lebanon 3 district, all three sects, the Maronites, Shi'a and Druze have almost the same correlation between their voting power in district and their related allocated seats in district. All political parties involved in the elections have the same influence and presence, and thus all the negative influences of institutional and non-institutional factors are neutralized in this district. Nevertheless, the results of percentages of cross-sectarian votes are lower than 8%. This suggests, at least empirically, that voters tended to vote along sectarian lines even when voters were not pressured by security or sectarian constraints. This is mainly the result of the incentives produced by the structure of the 2017 law, especially its electoral district formation and the single preferential vote at the caza (Qada') level.

The examination of voting behavior undertaken in this chapter supports the findings in Chapter Four pertaining to the institutional incentives favoring voting behavior in Lebanon's 2018 elections. The driving factors influencing sectarian voting can be divided into two categories: 1) institutional factors, and 2) political system factors. Electoral districts formation and seat allocation are among the institutional factors that negatively impact cross-sectarian voting. These factors also define the correlation between the voting power of each sect and their related allocated seats identified as a major driver for sectarian voting behavior. Another major institutional factor is the single preferential vote on the level of the Caza forcing voters to cast only

one vote without the possibility of multiple choices and ranking. On the other hand, factors related to the political systems and party politics are identified to be drivers defining sectarian behaviors. The influential presence of political parties in electoral districts and their capacity to mobilize voters of minority groups are found to be drivers for the sectarian behavior of voters. Also, the presence of sectarian parties influences sectarian voting behavior because sects who do not have sectarian parties in their support will almost always adopt bandwagoning strategies.

5.5 CONCLUSION

In tandem with the findings of Chapter Four, the results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections showed that there are very high percentages of cross-sectarian votes for both Muslim and Christian sects in every electoral district. However, the percentages of cross sectarian votes for Christian sects in Christian majority district is almost three times more than that of Muslim sects in Muslim majority districts. These high percentages need not be analyzed out of their institutional contexts because they do not indicate a convergence of the law with centripetalist principles. When the results are put in their institutional contexts, namely by introducing the elements of single preferential vote, district formation, seats allocation and the correlation of voting power with the sectarian seats quota according to the law, then these numbers reflect a large divergence from centripetalist principles. Also, party politics, party mobilization power and sectarian parties play an integral role in driving sectarian voting behavior. The inconsistency of the percentages across districts and between Christians and Muslims sects, as well as the reverse relationship between the percentage of voting in district and

the percentage of cross-sectarian votes, observed almost across all districts and sects, supports the assumption that these numbers, should they be analyzed independently, yield inaccurate results. When put in context, and with the help of the concept of hegemony, the high numbers of cross-sectarian votes are explained by the strategy of minorities to neutralize the threat of majorities by following bandwagoning strategies, by the influence of parties within minority groups, or the presence of sectarian parties. A remarkable exception is the case of Mount Lebanon 3 district where hegemonic privileges are institutionally neutralized by a sectarian voting power balance, a perfect correlation between voting power and seats allocation in the district, and a convenient balance of power in the presence of major political parties and their electoral alliances. This district amplifies the true relevance of the electoral law: because all derivative variables are not at play, only the value of the electoral law is evaluated. When the effect of sectarian rivalry is neutralized in a given district by institutional measures and convenient political alliances, the single preferential vote encourages voters to cast a sectarian vote with a proportion that is higher than 93%. Consequently, aside from the dynamics of party politics and political alliances, Lebanon's electoral law contradicts in practice the values and principles of centripetalism due to three major factors: 1) district formation based on disproportional sectarian voting power, 2) disproportional sectarian seat allocation, and 3) the single preferential vote. The next chapter will provide a general overview of the argument of the thesis and restates the variables and findings. The theoretical implication of the argument pertaining the current law and the different ways of its improvement to better align itself with centripetalism will alos be dscuused.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 RESTATING THE ARGUMENT

This thesis explored the latest electoral reforms in Lebanon embodied in the 2017 electoral law and tested the latter's deviation from centripetalist assumptions against the results of the 2018 elections. Centripetalism rests on deploying institutional engineering to 1) create electoral incentives for competing candidates to adopt moderate discourses to attract voters from outside their confessional or sectarian group and hence vote-pooling, 2) provide areas of bargaining whereby different competing groups can find a broader common ground for cooperation, and 3) empower centrist political parties and aggregative coalitions of parties that promote multi-confessional or multi-sectarian support to create cross-sectarian appeal.

More specifically, the thesis quantified both cross-confessional votes and cross-sectarian votes across all electoral districts and across all confessions/sects to evaluate to what extent were voters willing to cast cross-confessional or cross-sectarian votes. Cross-sectarian and cross-confessional votes are the control variables used to evaluate whether or not the 2017 electoral law based on proportional principles, the independent variable (IV), provided enough incentives, created bargaining areas, and promoted centrist discourses that led to more accommodative and cooperative political discourses, the dependent variable (DV).

Lebanon's 2017 electoral law marked a significant institutional improvement with respect to previous electoral laws. The main improvement was the introduction of PR list voting at the level of 15 new electoral districts with a single preferential vote at the level of 27 Cazas. However, close examination of the new electoral law showed that it deviates substantially from centripetalist prescriptions. First of all, upholding the sectarian quota at the level of the Caza while maintaining confessional/sectarian hegemony in medium sized electoral districts served extremist discourse. Second, adopting a single preferential vote at the level of the Caza, rather than allowing for multiple preferential votes with a ranking system, emptied the proportional system and preferential voting of any value. This also reduced competition to a majoritarian form at the level of the Caza. This institutional feature of the 2017 law contradicts centripetalist principles and stands in contrast with all laws favorable to centripetalism that have preferential ranking at their core requirement.

These theoretical arguments were tested on two case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. Cross-confessional votes were investigated in Chapter 4 across all electoral districts for Christians and Muslims. Chapter 5 investigated more deeply the cross-sectarian votes across all electoral districts and across all sects represented in Parliament. The results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections displayed very high percentages of both Muslim and Christian cross-ethnic votes in every electoral district. However, these high percentages need not be analyzed out of their institutional context because they do not indicate convergence of the law with centripetalist principles. When the results are put in their institutional context, by introducing the elements of single preferential vote, district formation and parliamentary seats allocation, these numbers reflect a large divergence from centripetalist principles. The inconsistency of the percentages across

districts and between Christians and Muslims, as well as the reverse relationship between the Christian and Muslim cross-ethnic vote, supports the assumption that when these numbers are analyzed independently, they end up yielding inaccurate results. When put in context, and with the help of the concept of hegemony, high numbers of cross-ethnic votes are attributed to the safe strategy of minorities to neutralize the threat of majorities by following bandwagoning strategies. The only exception that stood out was the case of the Mount Lebanon III (Baabda) district, where hegemonic privileges were institutionally neutralized by the confessional vote balance of power through district formation and equal seat allocation. This district amplified the true role of the electoral law: the role of the electoral law could be measured precisely because all derivative variables were not at play in this district. Consequently, when the effects of confessional rivalry is neutralized in a given district, Lebanon's electoral law demonstrated through its single preferential vote that it will likely encourage voters to cast a confessional vote with a proportion that is higher than 93%. Consequently, Lebanon's electoral law contradicts in practice the values and principles of centripetalism due to three major reasons: 1) district formation based on disproportional confessional voting power, 2) disproportional confessional seat allocation, and 3) the availability of a single preferential vote.

Consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 examined the results of Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections and showed that there are very high percentages of cross-sectarian votes for both Muslim and Christian sects in every electoral district. However, the percentages of cross sectarian votes for Christian sects in Christian majority districts is found to be almost three times more than that of

Muslim sects in Muslim majority districts. As discussed for cross-confessional votes, high percentages of cross-sectarian votes need not be analyzed out of their institutional contexts because these high values do not indicate convergence of the law with centripetalist principles. When the results are put in their institutional contexts, and by introducing the elements of single preferential vote, district formation, seats allocation and the correlation of voting power to sectarian seats quota according to the law to the law, then these numbers reflect a large divergence from centripetalist principles. Moreover, party politics, party mobilization power and sectarian parties play an integral role in driving sectarian voting behavior. The inconsistency of the percentages across districts and between Christian and Muslim sects, as well as the reverse relationship between the percentage of voting in district and the percentage of cross-sectarian votes, observed across almost all districts and sects, supports the assumption that when these numbers are analyzed independently, they end up yielding inaccurate results.

When put in their institutional contexts, then, and with the help of the concept of hegemony, high numbers of cross-sectarian votes are attributed to the safe strategy of minorities to neutralize the threat of majorities by following bandwagoning strategies, or by the influence of parties within minority groups, or the role of sectarian parties. A remarkable exception is the case of the Mount Lebanon III district, where hegemonic privileges are institutionally neutralized by a sectarian voting balance of power, a perfect correlation between voting power and seats allocation in the district, and a convenient balance of power in the presence of major political parties and their electoral alliances. This district also embodies the full impact of the electoral law, because all derivative variables are not at play in this district; subsequently, only the value of the

electoral law is evaluated. When the effects of sectarian rivalry are neutralized in a given district through institutional measures and through convenient political alliances, Lebanon's electoral law operating through its single preferential vote will likely encourage voters to cast a sectarian vote with a proportion that is higher than 93%. Consequently, and aside from the dynamics of party politics and political alliances, Lebanon's electoral law contradicts in practice the values and principles of centripetalism due to three major factors: 1) district formation based on disproportional sectarian voting power, 2) disproportional sectarian seat allocation, and 3) the single preferential vote.

Consequently, this thesis demonstrated empirically that despite marketed as a remarkable improvement compared to older electoral laws, the 2017 law did not emancipate voters from sectarian political dynamics. Although the reforms were drafted along proportional and preferential voting bases, in fact, the details of the election processes and the counting process neutralized the impact of proportionality and enhanced sectarian dynamics and discourses.

First, district formation, the allocation of parliamentary seats according to sectarian quotas across all districts, and the single preferential vote on the level of the Caza constituency suggests that the law was drafted with the exact opposite intentions of centripetalist principles. Indeed, the electoral law promoted neither accommodation nor cooperation in the political arena, and therefore exacerbated sectarian cleavages and polarization. Second, the examination of both cross-confessional and cross-sectarian voting behavior provided enough evidence to endorse the theoretical findings. Both

cross-confessional and cross-sectarian votes were found to be very low when the negative influences of sectarian majority hegemony are neutralized.

6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS

In sum, then, and against centripetalist objectives, the 2017 electoral law proved to be a divisive law, promoting sectarian voting rather than accommodation and collaboration between the different political factions. The empirical survey undertaken in this study showed that whenever sectarian hegemony is not established in any given electoral district, the law encouraged, with a very high likelihood, voters to cast a sectarian vote rather than a cross-sectarian one. Consequently, two main factors in the current law must be revisited to observe better results in cross-confessional and cross-sectarian voting, ones driven by moderation and not hegemonic practices: 1) preferential voting and 2) district formation and seat allocation.

The current law adopts a single preferential vote on the level of the minor constituency (Caza). This denies voters the right of preferential choice and ranking of candidates. Voters are then forced to choose only one candidate without the possibility of ranking other optional candidates. By contrast, centripetalism suggests exactly the opposite. It requests the ranking of candidates by voters based on their order of preference. Electoral laws favored by centripetalism, whether they are majoritarian (Alternative Vote and Supplementary Vote) or proportional (Single Transferable Vote), share between them the multiple choice and ranking system that allows voters to rank their candidates in their order of preference. Consequently, candidates must secure good scores not only in first choice votes but also in second or third choice votes. The

ranking system and order of preferential voting provides an incentive for candidates and competing political parties to modify their political discourses to reach out to groups other than their sectarian/confessional groups. In turn, more lenient and accommodative policies are adopted and common areas of interest between different groups are thus explored, identified and built upon. Consequently, it is advisable that single preferential voting on the level of Caza in the latest electoral law in Lebanon be substituted by a multiple preferential voting system (at least two preferential votes) with a ranking possibility on the level of the larger electoral district. The adoption of multiple preferential vote should be coupled with proper electoral districts formation and parliamentary seats allocation to secure a high likelihood of cross-sectarian and cross-confessional voting behavior. This is the second factor that should be be addressed in the law.

Lebanon's electoral law divided Lebanon into 15 electoral districts as major constituencies and some of these districts were divided also into minor constituencies (27 minor constituencies in total). A close examination of the sectarian composition of electoral districts shows that, in almost all districts, at least one or two sectarian groups have an absolute majority of voting power. Also, and with only some exceptions, sectarian parliamentary seats allocated to these groups within the district overlap with their voting power. In turn, whenever voting power and seats allocated to a given sect are coherent and with the same magnitude, cross sectarian voting was relatively low. However, when voting power in the district was higher in percentage than the percentage of seats allocation of a given sect, sectarian groups mobilized their excess votes to support other candidates from different sectarian groups. As for the case of

minority groups, they engaged in bandwagoning strategies everytime except when their related sectarian political parties were well established and had good mobilizing power within the district. This anomaly in district formation and seats allocation in the electoral law in Lebanon should be revisited in order to reduce, as much as possible, the impact of sectarian mobilization. When coupled with multiple preferential voting, district formation and seat allocation help reducing sectarian polarization and promotes more accommodative and cooperative politics. Toward this end, electoral districts should be redesigned to reduce, as much as possible, sectarian hegemony of one or more groups on others in a given district. This can be achieved by adopting electoral districts that are larger than the Caza but smaller than the provided districts in Lebanon's 2017 electoral law.

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