

# **LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

Migration, Demographic Changes, and Politics in  
Lebanon

By

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
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*To my parents, my brother, and my late aunt Khadijah.*

*To Dr. Hassan Harb.*

*To everyone who has been supporting me throughout my academic journey.*

*To the glorious October 2019 revolution.*

*To every righteous comrade who fought and fights for a better Lebanon.*

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# Migration, Demographic Changes, and Politics in Lebanon

Zeina Bilal Fakhreddine

## **Abstract**

Migration and its political and social impacts have always been subjects to numerous ongoing research. In migration studies, there are host countries and sending countries, and researchers found these countries as rich fields to investigate and study. A country like Lebanon is considered a country of both immigration and emigration. This makes it an even richer case to study. This research focuses on Lebanon, and its aim is to discuss how migration affected its demography. Demography in Lebanon primarily means the numerical size of each sect, and the political formation in Lebanon has sectarian basis. Hence, the aim of this research is study how migration affected the Lebanese demography, and how this in turn might affect the political formation of each sect. In this qualitative research, Pierre Bourdieu's social capital theory is used for the analysis.

**Keywords:** Migration, Lebanon, Demography, Political Formation, Sects, Politics, Lebanese House of Representatives, Pierre Bourdieu, Social Theory, Social Capital, Political Capital, Conversion of Capital.

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# Chapter One

## Introduction

Diaspora is an older term for transnational communities (Castles *et al.*, 2014). The concept is derived from ancient Greece where it meant scattering, and it was referred to the colonization practices of the city state (Castles *et al.*, 2014). The term is often used to address people who are displaced by force such as the Armenians or the Jews (Castles *et al.*, 2014).

Lebanon has always been a country of emigration (and later on a country of immigration) (Tabar, 2010), even before the Republic was established, and therefore, it was chosen to be the case study of this dissertation. Approximately half the Lebanese population was displaced or migrated during the civil war (1975-1990) which led to a major change in demography. The one and only official census was conducted in 1932, but the percentages of the three major sects, Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites, have changed ever since due to the migration that happened before and during the civil war. Yet, the Ta'if Accord still distributed the seats of the parliament in accordance to the outdated census, despite the slight amendment in the power share in favor of the Muslim communities (mainly Sunni and Shiite).

The Lebanese emigration during the civil war had various reasons besides the war itself. Some were seeking a better future for their children, others wanted to start a new chapter in their lives, and the majority fled unemployment which was a direct impact of the war (Tabbarah, 2016). The Lebanese political structure is based on sectarian representations, and it is not the best political division in Lebanon. However, many think that the Lebanese political system is a security measure for equality in the representation of the religious groupings in the country. Because the political system in Lebanon is based on sectarian representations, the demographic size of each sect becomes politically significant and in this sense, migration turns to be a crucial factor in determining the numerical size of each sect: as a result of migration, the smaller the numerical size of the sect is, the claim for its political share in the running of the Lebanese state becomes less legitimate. Migration, therefore, has significant political implications in the long run in a country like Lebanon.

Before the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1975 in Lebanon, one of the most used arguments to justify the unequal distribution of power in Lebanon was based on a putative larger number of Lebanese Christians over Lebanese Muslims (as mentioned earlier, the last official census conducted in Lebanon was in 1932). After the end of this war and the conclusion of the Ta'if Accord in 1989, the disproportionate representation of sectarian groups was partly redressed and one of the most utilized arguments mobilized to make this shift in the balance of power legitimate was the fact that the numerical size of Muslim communities in Lebanon is far larger than that of the Christians. In both instances, migration and its impact on the numerical size of the religious communities in Lebanon

remain a decisive issue that always lurks in the background to be used and mobilized whenever the question of power distribution and the distribution of the state benefits are raised.

Based on this reality, the thesis examines the relationship between migration and politics in Lebanon focusing on the post-war period up until the general elections of the House of Representatives in May 2018; henceforth, prior to October 2019 revolution. In so doing, we hope to show how the major political representatives of the religious communities in Lebanon deal with this matter, and how each group tries to either sideline the negative repercussions outmigration is having on its power share as defined by the Ta'if Accord, or utilize its positive outcome to seek a better share in the political set up in Lebanon.

## **1.2. Literature Review**

Various analyses have been done to understand how the sects in Ottoman Lebanon and their political role evolved in accordance with national and regional changes. Everything indicates that until the early 19<sup>th</sup> century a mutually tolerant and liberal atmosphere prevailed in the presence of mixed communities (Akarli, 1993). However, as of the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this prevailing peace was somewhat trembled. Many sectarian fights occurred due to the presence of newly-migrated sects which made Mount Lebanon a rich place for sectarian fights for several decades (Akarli, 1993). The numerical size of the sects who lived in the *Mutasarrifiyya*, and later on in Greater Lebanon, has

always been politicized, i.e., used to either justify the status quo, or to challenge it on the basis that the distribution of power is not fair and does not reflect the numerical size of the various sects. During the *Mutasarrifiyya*, the Maronites were the first to demand a sectarian division of the political seats given they formed the majority (Zamir, 1985). However, after the tables were turned in Greater Lebanon, and the numerical size of the Maronites was no longer as significant, and after the Maronites no longer formed the majority in numerical size, they could not let go of the *muhassasa*, also known as the sectarian quota.

The establishment of Greater Lebanon was a major turning point. Lebanon's modern state, Greater Lebanon, was founded on September 1, 1920 after the end of a war that lasted two years between the Allies and the Ottomans (Zamir, 1985). This war shaped the Middle East's present political character (Zamir 1985). These two years started on October 1918 when the Allied Forces occupied Beirut and Damascus, hence, ending 400 years of Ottoman rule (Zamir, 1985). The war ended in July 1920 with the loss of Faisal's government, and the Allies paved the way to the Middle East's partition between France and Britain and to its division into nation-states (Zamir, 1985).

The conflict between Syrian Muslims and Lebanese Christians was one of many in those crucial years (Zamir, 1985). According to Zamir (1985), in geographical Syria, local forces and foreign powers were incorporating to take advantage of the vacuum created after the Ottoman collapse. The majority of Arab Muslims had to resist the powerful

minority groups, such as the Jews in Palestine and the Maronites in Lebanon, who were trying to find their national aspirations (Zamir, 1985).

Between 1918 and 1920, the Christians requested an independent Christian state in Lebanon (Zamir, 1985). The Lebanese Christians generally, and the Christian Maronites specifically, were a well-established large community (Zamir, 1985). Moreover, France supported the Lebanese Christians, and France's serious colonial ambitions majorly threatened the Arabs' national aim of establishing a Muslim State (Zamir, 1985). Therefore, it is not surprising that since the establishment of an independent Christian state, Lebanese Muslims felt they were challenged (Zamir, 1985). Zamir (1985) also discussed that the aim of establishing a Lebanese Christian state is threefold; one, to create a loyal and permanent base in Levant; two, to establish a state against Muslims that had cultural and political aims; and three, to satisfy and fulfill the aspirations of the Christian Maronites.

After Greater Lebanon officially reigned under the French Mandate, the three major political seats were divided in accordance to the size of each sect. As the largest sect, the Maronites were offered the most powerful and highest position which is the President of the Republic (Faour, 2007). As the second largest sect, Sunnis were allocated the second most important political position of the Premiership (Faour, 2007). As the third in demographic size, the Shiites were offered the position of Speaker of the Parliament (Faour, 2007).

During the period post-independence and prior to the civil war (between 1943 and 1975), Christian leaders insisted on counting the Lebanese Christians abroad. The reason behind this was to counter balance the claim repeatedly made by Muslim leaders to the effect that sectarian demographic composition has changed in favor of the Muslim sects. Therefore, it was no longer acceptable to let the Christians leaders take the share of the lion in relation to the state power and state benefits. This partly explains the refrain by the state to conduct a national census. This debate using the demographic size of each sect erupted every now and then, especially when tensions and conflicts broke out between the leaders of the main sectarian groups i.e. the 1958 Civil Strife. According to Nadim Shehadi, Executive Director, LAU New York Academic Center, the 1958 civil strife was the aftermath of the Suez War in 1956 just like the 1969 crisis was the aftermath of 1967 war, and the 1973 war resulted in a civil war two years later (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008).

The Lebanese civil war started in April 1975 and ended in the 1990. The constant clashes in the country since the beginning of 1975 was clearly the primary reason for Lebanese people to leave the country (Labaki, 1989). The motive behind their migration was to guarantee a better future for their children (Labaki, 1992). The consequences of the spread of terror and political oppression in several parts of the country must be added to the clashes (Labaki, 1992).

Pearlman (2013) shows the political effects of migration on Lebanon. The war revealed the pre-existing structures of economic, social, and state powers; and it is important to note that migration was a part of the procedure in which groups controlled them anew (Pearlman, 2013b). Although there is not sufficient evidence to test these claims, Pearlman proposed that diverse migratory trajectories helped to produce different kinds of power amongst sectarian communities during the postwar period. For the Sunnis, migration was the reason behind the rise of tycoons who returned to exercise sweeping power over governmental decision-making and economic sectors (Pearlman, 2013b). Shiites also witnessed some emigrants become very wealthy, but their emigration had the greatest political impact through a wider-based social mobility which reinforced collective organization (Pearlman, 2013b). In contrast to the two cases mentioned, Maronites experienced emigration with minimum economic gain (Pearlman, 2013b).

### **1.3. Research Questions**

Considering the lack of crucial information about the correlation between emigration and the political formation in Lebanon, the central research questions are: *1) How have the major political representatives of the religious communities in Lebanon dealt with migration and the Lebanese diaspora focusing on the post-war period up until the general elections of the House of Representatives in May 2018? 2) How does each group try to either sideline the negative repercussions outmigration has had/is having on its power share as defined by the Ta'if Accord, or utilize its positive outcome to seek a better share in the political set up in Lebanon?* To provide a starting point in the research, we hypothesize that political sectarianism raises the question of the significance of the demographic size of

each sect owing to the fact the size of each community has often been mobilized throughout the modern history in Lebanon to justify the distribution of political power among members of the sectarian political elites. In the light of this hypothesis, our research focuses on emigration and its impact on changing the demographic size of each sect. Of particular focus is how the various political elites in Lebanon deal with this reality to either justify seeking more power-share or validate the current one.

#### **1.4. Methodology**

The method used in this paper is a literature review with an analysis of its secondary data. A discussion takes place to answer the mentioned research questions and to prove whether or not the hypotheses are correct. Additionally, the role of migration in changing the socio-economic balance of power between the major sects in Lebanon is thoroughly discussed. To do so, in-depth interviews with the major political representatives of the religious communities in Lebanon are conducted, and their answers are initially coded and analyzed according to Pierre Bourdieu's social capital theory. Since this dissertation's research instrument is in-depth interviews that took place at a single point in time, the research design is cross-sectional, and the research strategy is qualitative research (Bryman, 2016). This methodology has a number of benefits and limitations. The benefits of this methodology are taking the role of the other (people studied), understanding the meaning people attribute to their world, unexpected findings, detailed account of the social setting, thick description of what is going on, emphasis on social process, flexibility and limited structure, and concepts and theory are grounded in the data (Bryman, 2016). The

limitations are its subjectivity, its difficulty to replicate, its problem to generalize, and its lack of transparency (Bryman, 2016).

## **1.5. Study Population**

The population of this research is the 128 representatives in the Lebanese parliament. These representatives are either a part of the major political parties or independents. Purposive sampling is used in this dissertation because the sample was chosen according to the significant number of parliamentary seats the major political representatives of the religious communities have, which are the Free Patriotic Movement, the Future Movement, Amal Movement, the Lebanese Forces, Hezbollah, and the Progressive Socialist Party. One representative from each of the mentioned parties was interviewed, and the snowball process was followed to contact such high-profile personas. Each of the six informants represents the party they belong to rather than the entire population of 128 representatives. Purposive sampling has benefits and drawbacks too. On the one hand, purposive sampling permits the researcher to squeeze a large number of information out of the data collected (Bryman, 2016). On the other hand, it is prone to researcher bias because the researcher is making subjective or/and generalized assumptions while choosing participants (Bryman, 2016).

## **1.6. Study Procedure**

I conducted the interviews myself. After I received the university's Institutional Review Board's approval, I immediately started setting dates for qualitative in-depth interviews with the political representatives. The interviewees' consent was certainly taken prior to the beginning of the interview. I printed the informed consent sheets and distributed them to every participant, they signed them, and then we proceeded with the interviewing process after I informed them about my research and its objectives. After the outbreak of Covid-19, it was very difficult to conduct one-on-one in-depth interviews. In this case, some interviewees emailed me their answers, while others preferred to go with the interviewing process over phone and video calls.

As mentioned previously, the research is about the effects of migration on the demographics and how this demographic change may or may not change the political set-up in Lebanon. The questionnaire particularly tackled this issue, in addition to questions about absentee voting, citizenship, and naturalization.

## **1.7. Ethical Considerations**

This research had no foreseen ethical concerns. There were not any known physical and mental risks to the participants throughout the interviewing process. Some of the interviews were audio-recorded, and the recordings were deleted right after transcription. No names or identities are revealed, and all the information provided are anonymously

written. The confidential information the participants gave out is not mentioned at all. The answers of the participants are only linked to the political party they belong to.

## **1.8. Data Management**

My main priority in this research is the confidentiality, the anonymity, and the security of the data provided by the participants. The documents, the data collected, and the interviews (both transcribed and recorded) were not kept anywhere in handy.

## **1.9. Data Analysis**

Given this is a qualitative research with qualitative in-depth interviews, the data we have is initially-coded manually. The data is analyzed according to Pierre Bourdieu's social capital theory. The patterns we found in the informants' responses are also studied. Additionally, discourse analysis is used to examine the words and terminologies each interviewee/participant uses.

## **1.10. Theoretical Framework**

Pierre Bourdieu used the field as one of his basic concepts (Albright *et al.*, 2018). In the Bourdieusian explanation, the field is formed of agents and social positions (Albright *et al.*, 2018). In the field, each agent's position is the outcome of the interaction between the field's rules, the habitus of the agent, and the capital of the agent whether they are

economic, cultural, or social capitals (Albright et al., 2018). Habitus is defined as dispositions, the skills, and socially inherited habits (Wacquant, 2014). Habitus is the portrayal of how individuals view and react to the society around them (Wacquant, 2014). People who have similar backgrounds usually share these dispositions (Wacquant, 2014). As aforementioned, there are three forms of capital. Economic capital comprises the resources that are instantly convertible into money (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). Cultural capital is objects such as books and paintings, qualifications such as diplomas, and acquired dispositions that prove the mastery of the linguistic, artistic and scientific codes of a given social space (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). The third form of capital, social capital, is the resource founded by acquaintances' usable networks based on mutual recognition such as a family name indicating social pedigree or a membership to private societies (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). All the mentioned capitals grant specific powers, predominantly symbolic power (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). Symbolic power is the power created when an individual is socially seen in what he or she says, does or possesses (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). The effectiveness of these capitals does not only prove itself in immediate usage, but also within the mere possession's socially-recognized meaning (Basaran et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003).

When Bourdieu (1986) presented the concept of capital, his work was not only limited to the conceptual approach of various forms of capital, it was also about the theoretical analysis within the interchangeability among cultural, economic, and social capitals (Yuksekk, 2018). Bourdieu clearly stated in 1986 that “the convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital

(and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of the conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself.” This means that throughout the process of the conversion of capital, people may be able to preserve their central positions in the society (Yukse, 2018). Although individuals are capable to directly acquire resources, whether cultural, economic, or social, they are also capable of indirectly intensifying their resources amid other forms of resources’ utilization (Yukse, 2018).

Bourdieu viewed economic capital as the most powerful form of capital, for it remains the absolute goal for individuals (Yukse, 2018). He discussed his concept about the conversion of capital within an individual, but he did not provide an analysis about conversion of capital among members of the society (Yukse, 2018). Although individuals accrue economic capital to guarantee the reproduction of their class positions, they are also able to convert it into other forms of capital, i.e., social and cultural, in order to maintain their social positions (Yukse, 2018). Nevertheless, this order is not necessary for the conversion of capital. The types of capital can be converted from and within one another (Yukse, 2018). For instance, one can convert their social capital into either cultural, economic, or political capitals; this is applicable to all forms of capital (Yukse, 2018).

In this dissertation, we adopt the Bourdieusian social capital theory to analyze our findings. Basaran *et al.* (2018) and Franklin (2003) define social capital as the resource

founded by acquaintances' usable networks based on mutual recognition. This shows that the demographic size of the religious communities in Lebanon is a type of social capital because it brings the individuals of the given sect together as a form of mutual recognition. The analysis from the Bourdieusian perspective shows how the major representatives of the religious communities in Lebanon use their demographic size as social capital to convert it into political capital.

# Chapter Two

## Historical Background

In order to prepare for the analysis of the topic post the Ta'if Accord, a historical background about the political formation of demography in what is today Lebanon since the Ottoman *Mutasarrifiyya*, which reigned over Mount Lebanon until 1975 (before the beginning of the civil war), should be addressed. This chapter focuses on how the issue of demography is played out by each sect in relation to sectarian political formation in Lebanon. This discussion is important to show that the change in number resulting from emigration as a prelude to my discussion in the following chapter about how these changes debated politically in the context of the struggle of power-sharing and political representation of various sects.

### 2.1. Sects and their Formation During Ottoman Lebanon

The Mount Lebanon's *Mutasarrifiyya* was one of the subdivisions of the Ottoman Empire which came after the Ottoman *Tanzimat* (Akarli, 1993). Mount Lebanon was considered the heterodox groups' haven (Akarli, 1993). In the past, many heterodox groups resided in different regions in Mount Lebanon where they managed to protect their sectarian identities and to preserve themselves from external pressures and influences

(Akarli, 1993). The case of the Christian Maronites is an important one with which to begin. Up until the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, Maronites were concentrated in Bcharri, Batroun, and Jbeil, formerly known as Mount Lebanon (Akarli, 1993). The Maronites lived in an introverted egalitarian peasant community in the Mountain where the main window to the larger world was Tripoli (Akarli, 1993). Nevertheless, the situation started to change as the Maronites started to move southward in increasing numbers as of the late 16<sup>th</sup> century onward (Akarli, 1993; Zamir 1985). They formed almost 60% of Mount Lebanon's entire population by the 1860s (Akarli, 1993).

During their expansion to the south, Maronites chose to settle in the lands evacuated by mutawâlî Shiites (Akarli, 1993). Shiism is an alternative interpretation for the Islamic Sharia held by the Sunni line (Akarli, 1993). It stresses on equity and social justice, and it tends to perceive the power of the state as a corruptive force (Akarli, 1993). From the 17<sup>th</sup> century onward, opposition movements against Islamic governments adopted a Shiite outlook (Akarli, 1993). There were Shiites' pockets among the Maronites in the North, but they were mainly concentrated in the southern and central parts of Mount Lebanon i.e. Matn, Keserwan, and the skirts of Saida (Akarli, 1993). Caught up in the discontinuous struggles that the rulers of Tripoli and Saida waged to gain sovereignty over one another amid the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Shiites dispersed (Akarli, 1993). Moreover, the Shiites at times suffered from the uncertainties of the Sunni establishments that were controlling the main power centers in the region (Akarli, 1993). The numbers of Shiites dwindled as some converted to Sunnism, and others left Mount Lebanon to reside

elsewhere (Akarli, 1993). Shiites constituted less than 6% of Mount Lebanon's entire population in the 1860s (Akarli, 1993).

A pact of primarily Druze chieftains led by Fakhr al-Din bin Kormaz Ma'n, the governor of Saida, eventually acquired firm control of the southern and central hills of Mount Lebanon in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century (Akarli, 1993). The Druze adopt a high esoteric and gnostic version of Shiism in which they combine Islamic teachings with Iranian, Hellenistic, and other pre-Islamic religious traditions (Akarli, 1993). The sect's full secrets were revealed to a few "sages" ('uqqâl) who were properly initiated (Akarli, 1993). These guardians of the Druze cultural and religious traditions commanded respect in the community, and they helped to keep the social order through acting as arbiters of disputes (Akarli, 1993). Even though particular families excelled in the sages' number they produced, the religious leadership of Druze did not create a caste (Akarli, 1993). The leaders were a part of the toils of the community, and they took part as ordinary members (Akarli, 1993). Military ventures and defense were what propelled certain families into aristocratic status (Akarli, 1993).

The Druze have had a reputation as brave warriors ever since the beginning of the history of their community (Akarli, 1993). Both the Ottoman and Mamluk governors, who ruled in the area of Damascus, tended to hire the Druze in their service instead of waging wars against them (Akarli, 1993). The Ottoman governors in the 16<sup>th</sup> century recognized Druze military capacity after costly and protracted efforts to subdue them (Akarli, 1993).

In 1593, the Ottomans appointed Fakhr al-Din Ma'n as the military governor of Saida recognizing him as the main Druze figure (Akarli, 1993). They let the Druze have their own rules in Mount Lebanon in exchange for their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire (Akarli, 1993). With Saida's revenue in his service and the weight of the government behind him, Amir Fakhr al-Din was a powerful leader of what was known as today's Lebanon and Northern Palestine (Akarli, 1993). All Damascus' ports were under his control, and therefore, the maritime trade with Anatolia, Egypt and Europe (Akarli, 1993). Complaints from Damascene notables and merchants eventually provoked the central government to turn against him (Akarli, 1993). Amir Fakhr al-Din was arrested in 1633 and executed in 1635 (Akarli, 1993).

After Fakhr al-Din's death, the power network he had established were instantly cut, except in the southern and central parts of Mount Lebanon and Wadi al-Taim (Akarli, 1993). Stability was partially restored to the hills of Matn, Keserwan, and Jezzine (Akarli, 1993). The Maronite and the Druze peasants settled in these areas with some remaining Shiites (Akarli, 1993). Everything indicates that until the early 19<sup>th</sup> century a mutually tolerant and liberal atmosphere prevailed in the presence of mixed communities (Akarli, 1993).

In fact, the Uniate Melchites, another dissident group of Christian Catholics, were attracted to Mount Lebanon and to its religiously tolerant atmosphere, as well as to its growing economic potential (Akarli, 1993). The Uniate Melchites, also known as the

Greek Catholics, were rebels from the churches of Jerusalem and Antioch (Akarli, 1993). They were related to the Roum or Greek Orthodox Patriarchate (Akarli, 1993). In the late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, activities of the Catholic missionaries, who were loyal to the Counter-Reformation, recruited countless devotees and sympathizers to support the cause of the Catholic union with the help of the Roman Church in Syrian cities (Akarli, 1993). The missionaries were primarily successful among Aleppo's and Saida's merchants who did business with the Europeans, and among local priests who despised the Church of Constantinople's authority over them (Akarli, 1993). By 1742, numerous Antiochene notables converted to Uniate (Akarli, 1993). Subsequently, the establishment of the Greek Orthodox began to increasingly take severe actions against the Uniates with the support of the central government (Akarli, 1993). These severe actions reached their utmost in the 1750s, and they continued until the end of the century (Akarli, 1993). Many Uniate Melchites were forced to migrate to Egypt where the Orthodox Church's authority was somewhat weak and the business prospects decent (Akarli, 1993). Other Uniate Melchites moved to Mount Lebanon where the Maronites, another Uniate Catholic group, were well established (Akarli, 1993). The split within the Christians ultimately led to the establishment of a further Greek Catholic group in Syria, which the Ottomans officially recognized in 1874 (Akarli, 1993). In the 1860s, the Greek Catholic Church's members constituted around 8% of Mount Lebanon's population and the majority of Zahle's (Akarli, 1993).

There was a Greek Orthodox population in Mount Lebanon too (Akarli, 1993). Koura was and remained mostly Greek Orthodox (Akarli, 1993). Yet, Arabs who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church were, like the Sunnis, mostly located in urban areas (Akarli, 1993). In Saida, the Kharroub hills, and Tripoli, the Muslim Sunnis were the majority, and the Orthodox Christians were the second major group (Akarli, 1993). Also, the majority of Beirut's population consisted of mainly Sunnis and Greek Orthodox Christians, and it remained this way until the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Akarli, 1993). The predominance of Muslim and Greek Orthodox Christians in cities is not surprising owing to the fact that the urban centers were the Ottoman ruling system's linchpins (Akarli, 1993). In the Ottoman system, the Orthodox Church became one of the most authoritative institutions (Akarli, 1993). It cooperated in maintaining Istanbul's hegemony over a huge network of cities (Akarli, 1993). Partially for this reasons and partially for economic reasons, a notable amount of Greek Orthodox Christians migrated from Syria to Beirut, while some moved to Mount Lebanon (Akarli, 1993). In the 1860s, Greek Orthodox Christians comprised 13% of Mount Lebanon's population (Akarli, 1993). During this time, the presence of Greek Orthodox Christians in Mount Lebanon made it a rich place for sectarian fights (Akarli, 1993).

## **2.2. The Establishment of Greater Lebanon Under the French Mandate**

Lebanon's modern state was established on September 1, 1920 after the end of a war that lasted two years (Zamir, 1985). This war shaped the Middle East's present political character (Zamir 1985). These two years started on October 1918 when the Allied Forces occupied Beirut and Damascus, hence, ending a 400-year Ottoman rule (Zamir, 1985). The war ended on July 1920 with the loss of Faisal's government, and they paved the way to the Middle East's partition between France and England and to its division into nation-states (Zamir, 1985).

Greater Lebanon was established by the high commissioner for Lebanon and Syria, General Gouraud (Zamir, 1985). The creation of Greater Lebanon was France's first step in order to accomplish its pledges to protect the Lebanese Christians (Zamir, 1985). For the Lebanese Christians, specifically Maronites, the creation of an independent Christian state under the French protection was a life-long dream (Zamir, 1985). On the other hand, for the Syrian and Lebanese Muslims, it was the final knockout in a series of frustrating events (Zamir, 1985). Modern Lebanon was the only Christian state in the Arab world (Zamir, 1985).

## **2.3. The Sectarian Political Formation of the Lebanese Parliament**

The conflict between Syrian Muslims and Lebanese Christians was one of many in those crucial years (Zamir, 1985). In geographical Syria, local forces and foreign powers were incorporating to take advantage of the vacuum created after the Ottoman collapse

(Zamir, 1985). The majority of Arab Muslims had to resist the powerful minority groups, such as the Jews in Palestine and the Arab Maronites in Lebanon, who were trying to find their national aspirations (Zamir, 1985). Additionally, compressed groups such as the Alawites and Druze, and other dispersed groups such as the Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox, were not trying to find self-determination, but instead, they were concerned to secure their interests and positions in any upcoming Sunni-dominated Arab state (Zamir, 1985).

Between 1918 and 1920, the Christians requested an independent Christian state in Lebanon (Zamir, 1985). The Lebanese Christians generally, and the Christian Maronites specifically, were a well-established large community (Zamir, 1985). Moreover, France supported the Lebanese Christians, and France's serious colonial ambitions majorly threatened the Arabs' national aim of establishing a Muslim State (Zamir, 1985). Therefore, it is not surprising that since the establishment of an independent Christian state, Lebanese Muslims felt they were challenged (Zamir, 1985).

Throughout World War I, the Lebanese Christians were still convinced that their national aspirations will be recognized during the French occupation (Zamir, 1985). However, even when World War I was over, it took the Lebanese Christians another two years to achieve their dream in having an independent Christian state (Zamir, 1985). Eventually, France fulfilled the Lebanese Christians' dream; however, the interests of France in the area were also reflected in the development of a strong relationship with the

government of Faisal in Damascus (Zamir, 1985). The aim of establishing a Lebanese Christian state is threefold; one, to create a loyal and permanent base in Levant; two, to establish a state against Muslims that had cultural and political aims; and three, to satisfy and fulfill the aspirations of the Christian Maronites (Zamir, 1985).

**Table 1. Population during the Mutasarrifiyya (1911) Per Sect**

<b>Sect</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Maronites</b>	<b>242, 308</b>	<b>58.40</b>
<b>Greek Orthodox</b>	<b>52, 356</b>	<b>12.62</b>
<b>Greek Catholic</b>	<b>31, 939</b>	<b>7.70</b>
<b>Other Christians</b>	<b>3, 026</b>	<b>0.73</b>
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>329, 626</b>	<b>79.45</b>
<b>Sunnis</b>	<b>14, 529</b>	<b>3.50</b>
<b>Shiites</b>	<b>23, 413</b>	<b>5.64</b>
<b>Druze</b>	<b>47, 290</b>	<b>11.40</b>
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>85, 232</b>	<b>20.54</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>414, 858</b>	<b>99.99</b>

*Note:* Reprinted from *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, Zamir, M., (1985), Sydney: British Library Cataloguing, p. 98.

**Table 2. Population during Greater Lebanon (1921) Per Sect**

<b>Sect</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Maronites</b>	<b>199, 181</b>	<b>32.70</b>
<b>Greek Orthodox</b>	<b>81, 409</b>	<b>13.37</b>
<b>Greek Catholic</b>	<b>42, 462</b>	<b>6.97</b>
<b>Other Christians</b>	<b>12, 651</b>	<b>2.08</b>
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>335, 703</b>	<b>55.12</b>
<b>Sunnis</b>	<b>124, 786</b>	<b>20.48</b>
<b>Shiites</b>	<b>104, 947</b>	<b>17.23</b>
<b>Druze</b>	<b>43, 633</b>	<b>7.16</b>
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>273, 366</b>	<b>44.87</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>414, 858</b>	<b>99.99</b>

*Note:* Reprinted from *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, Zamir, M., (1985), Sydney: British Library Cataloguing, p. 98.

**Table 3. Population during Greater Lebanon (1932) Per Sect**

<b>Sect</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Maronites</b>	<b>227, 800</b>	<b>29.11</b>
<b>Greek Orthodox</b>	<b>77, 312</b>	<b>9.88</b>
<b>Greek Catholic</b>	<b>46, 709</b>	<b>5.97</b>
<b>Other Christians</b>	<b>45, 125</b>	<b>5.77</b>
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>396, 946</b>	<b>50.73</b>
<b>Sunnis</b>	<b>177, 100</b>	<b>22.63</b>
<b>Shiites</b>	<b>155, 035</b>	<b>19.18</b>
<b>Druze</b>	<b>53, 334</b>	<b>6.82</b>
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>385, 469</b>	<b>49.26</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>782, 415</b>	<b>99.99</b>

Note: Reprinted from *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, Zamir, M., (1985), Sydney: British Library Cataloguing, p. 98.

Based on the Lebanese census, the French allocated power shares in Lebanon. The expansion of the *Mutasarrifiyya* into Greater Lebanon (1911 census in comparison with the 1932 census) brought a drastic demographic change (Zamir, 1985). The Christians who made up to 80% of the *Mutasarrifiyya*'s population, became 51% in Greater Lebanon as stated by the census of 1932 (Zamir, 1985). Even the smallest statistical majority was only attained through including legal emigrants, predominantly Christians and Armenians, who resided in Lebanon after World War I (Zamir, 1985). Without the two mentioned groups, the Muslims would have been the majority (Zamir, 1985). The balance was later shifted due to the high Muslim birth-rate and the emigration of Christians (Zamir, 1985). However, the Maronites still formed the majority in Greater Lebanon (Zamir, 1985). The Greek Catholics and the Greek Orthodox communities maintained their percentages, but the percentage of Druze dropped from 11% to 7%, which made them the fifth largest sect (Zamir, 1985). On the other hand, the Sunnis, who made only 3.5% of the *Mutasarrifiyya*'s population, became the second largest sect in Greater Lebanon with a

percentage of 22%; and the Shiites', also known as Mutawallis, percentage increased from 5.5% to 20%, thus, becoming the third largest sect (Zamir, 1985).

As the largest sect, the Maronites were offered the most powerful and highest position which is the President of the Republic (Faour, 2007). As the second largest sect, Sunnis were allocated the second most important political position of the Premiership (Faour, 2007). As the third in demographic size, the Shiites were offered the position of Speaker of the Parliament (Faour, 2007). Accordingly, out of 128 representatives, there were six Christians for every five Muslims (Faour, 2007). This provided the basis for the change in the Ta'if Accord where there are six Christians for every six Muslims.

#### **2.4. The Political and Sectarian Clashes between 1943 and 1975**

During the period post-independence and prior to the civil war (between 1943 and 1975), Christian leaders insisted on counting Lebanese Christians abroad. The reason behind this was to counter balance the claim repeatedly made by Muslim leaders to the effect that sectarian demographic composition has changed in favor of the Muslim sects. Therefore, it was no longer acceptable to let the Christians leaders take the lion's share of state power and benefits. This partly explains the refrain by the state to conduct a national census. This debate using the demographic size of each sect erupted every now and then, especially when tensions and conflicts broke out between the leaders of the main sectarian groups, i.e., the 1958 civil strife. Given the fact it was the commercial and intellectual capital of the Middle East, Lebanon was considered the magnet for democracy, money,

and political refugees (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). However, the rise of Jamal Abdul Nasser in the late 1950s in Egypt, and the abrupt strong increase in Arab nationalism placed the democratic system of Lebanon under severe strain (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). The conflict for power between the Lebanese president and Lebanon's pro-Arabist opposition was also intensified by the unification of Egypt and Syria which was then known as the United Arab Republic in February 1958 (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). By raising the question of the Arab unity, Abdul Nasser truly threatened the critical balance of power which had been achieved by the Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze since the independence in 1943 (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Many Lebanese Christians felt that this development would threaten the independent existence of the Lebanese State, and would also threaten their important role in the society and the government (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Adel Osseiran, then the Lebanese Speaker of the Parliament, announced in 1958 that "Lebanon will march with the Arab caravan" and that "anyone who thinks of working for interests other than those of the Arabs will have no room in Lebanon" (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008).

But this triggered Camille Chamoun, then the Lebanese President, who became progressively intolerant to the Muslim opposition (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Chamoun became the president of the country during the time Abdul Nasser came to power in 1952 (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). In the midst of Chamoun's six-year term, Abdul Nasser's burgeoning Arab nationalism and Chamoun's pro-Westernism were locked in battle (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). What triggered the dismay of both the Lebanese nationalists and the Muslims was the refusal of the Lebanese President to cut diplomatic ties with France

and Britain after they attacked Egypt in 1956 (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). After this incident, Abdul Nasser declared that the Lebanese rulers had stabbed him in the back (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). Without taking into account Muslims Lebanese sensitivities, Chamoun took a step forward and put Lebanon beneath the Eisenhower Doctrine to defend the friendly governments who were fighting against the outside communist threats (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Chamoun and his government overestimated the strategic importance of Lebanon to the West, however (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). They guaranteed winning the Battle of the Wills against the oppositions (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008).

The murder of Nassib Matni, anti-Chamoun Maronite and the editor of *The Telegraph* at that time, intensified the unrest (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). The rebellion almost became a religious clash between Muslims and Christians (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). During the morning of July 14, 1958, a rebellion brought down the Iraqi monarchy, and all the members of the royal family were killed (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Neighboring and more powerful nations had long impacted the politics and the national agendas in Lebanon, and there was a fear that this impact might increase in the future (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Jubilation prevailed in some Lebanese areas where anti-Chamoun sentiment took over, and where the radio stations started announcing that Chamoun's regime would be next (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). Chamoun summoned the ambassadors of Britain, France and the United States after he realized the gravity of his situation on July 14 (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). Chamoun also argued that Syria, who was receiving arms from the Soviet Union, was helping Muslim Lebanese (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006).

On July 15, 1958, the first American marine arrived to Beirut (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). The operation was successful, swift, and clean (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). Civil strife ended on July 31, 1958, with both parties agreeing on General Fouad Chehab as the new president of Lebanon (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008; Baroudi, 2006). Even though 2,000 to 4,000 people had been killed by the end of the war, many viewed it as a comic opera owing to the fact 5,000 American marines arrived to the shores of Beirut and waded among swimmers and sunbathers (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008). According to Nadim Shehadi, associate fellow at Chatham House, the 1958 civil strife was the aftermath of the Suez War in 1956 just like the 1969 crisis was the aftermath of 1967 war, and the 1973 war resulted in a civil war two years later (*Al-Jazeera*, 2008).

The numerical size of the sects who lived in the *Mutasarrifiyya*, and later on in Greater Lebanon, has always been politicized, i.e., used to either justify the status quo, or to challenge it on the basis that the distribution of power is not fair and does not reflect the numerical size of the various sects. During the *Mutasarrifiyya*, the Maronites were the first to demand for a sectarian division of the political seats given they formed the majority (Zamir, 1985). However, after the tables were turned in Greater Lebanon, and the numerical size of the Maronites was no longer as significant, and after the Maronites no longer formed the majority in numerical size, they could not let go of the *muhassasa*, also known as the sectarian quota. The emigration that happened as a result of the Lebanese civil war has led to the change of the parliamentary seats that were allocated during the French rule.

# Chapter Three

## History of Migration

This chapter discusses the history of migration in Lebanon, particularly the emigration that happened during the civil war, and its impact on the size and the demographics of each sect. It also discusses how this emigration affects the size of Christians to Muslims in quantifiable terms, and how this this impact is made a political issue in the context of the struggle over the legitimate political share that each sect should have in the state of Lebanon.

### **3.1. Immigration and Emigration in Lebanon**

#### **3.1.1. Lebanese Emigration During Civil War (1975-1990) in Numbers**

The post-1975 phase in Lebanon was predominantly characterized by mass refugee migration from the civil war (Humphrey, 1998). Researcher Dalia Abdelhady assessed that the total number of the Lebanese people who migrated throughout the civil war is 990,000 (Bayeh, 2015; Labaki, 1992), which makes 40% of the total population (Pearlman, 2013b). At the beginning of the war, the Lebanese people were granted a special consideration to migrate or prolong their temporary stay in Australia (Humphrey,

1998), as well as other countries such as Canada, the United States, the Gulf, Brazil, New Zealand, Senegal, South Africa and so forth (Hourani, 2014; Pearlman, 2013b; Zgheib, 2011; Abboud, Leichtman, Farry and Tarraf, 2005; Labaki, 1992). The migration patterns in this period were irregular because the Lebanese people on tourist-visas were often permitted to prolong their stays due to the fighting outbreaks in Lebanon, and most of the requests to convert their temporary stays into permanent residence were accepted as well (Humphrey, 1998). In Australia for instance, the Lebanese emigrants' number increased annually reaching an average of 2,139 per year (Humphrey, 1998). The majority of these emigrants were Christians, but Muslims also started to arrive and their number increased from 1,000 to 7,960 (Humphrey, 1998). Although emigration from Lebanon was controlled after refugees' initial surge between 1976 and 1978 (Humphrey, 1998), the number of Muslim emigrants increased from 7,000 to 15,600 between 1976 and 1981 (Tabar, 2014). Amid this period, emigrants' sectarian origins markedly changed and included as many Muslims as Christians (Humphrey, 1998). A further source stated that approximately 75% of emigrants who departed between 1975 and 1990 left to North America, Australia and Western Europe (Kasparian, 2003). More than 70% of these emigrants obtained a second citizenship, while 64% of them did not plan to return back to Lebanon (Kasparian, 2003). It was estimated that Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and Maronite Christians emigrated in nearly equivalent number (Kasparian, 2003). Another study stated that the Lebanese emigration continued after the civil war between 1992 and 2007 (Kasparian, 2009).

Research conducted by the Lebanese Information Center in January 14, 2013, stated in numbers the Lebanese emigration in years and sects. This study divided Lebanese migration during the civil war into two waves. The first was between 1975 and 1984 when over 500,000 Lebanese migrated; 78% of which were Christians and 22% of which were Muslims (Lebanese Information Center Lebanon, 2013). Many incidents occurred in these years; Trabousli (2012) and Harris (1997) listed possible reasons that urged the Christians to outweigh the Muslims in migration. Some of which are the following: the ‘Ayn al-Rummaneh incident which was the beginning of the civil war, Karami’s formation of six-man cabinet excluding Jumblat and the Phalange, the launch of ‘Transnational Programme for the Democratic Reform of the Lebanese System’ by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the rounds of fighting in Zgharta and Zahleh, the Black Saturday and the Battle of Hotels, the fall of Damour, the loss of the Phalange in the last stronghold in West Beirut also known as the fall of the Holiday Inn hotel, the assassination of Kamal Jumblat, the assassination of Tony Franjiyeh and his family, the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, War of the Mountain between Druze and Christians which led to the displacement and massacre of the majority of Christians from Mount Lebanon’s southern parts, and the longest *Coup D’Etat* led by Samir Geagea against the Tripartite Agreement between Jumblat’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Nabih Berri’s Amal Movement and the Lebanese Forces commanded then by Elie Hobeika. In other words, these were the main reasons contributing to the first wave of migration that mainly consisted of Christians between 1975 and 1984.

However, the second wave of the Lebanese migration during the civil war was between 1985 and 1990 when the percentages of sects were flipped. Amid these years, 385,000 Lebanese migrated; 17% of which were Christians and 83% of which were Muslims (Lebanese Information Center Lebanon, 2013). Traboulsi (2012) and Harris (1997) also discussed the possible factors for the major Muslim migration during this period, and they are the following: clashes between Shiite and Sunni parties when Amal Movement took over West Beirut, the War of the Camps led by Amal Movement against Palestinian camps, the rise of the Lebanese Christian resistance, and West Beirut bombardments during 1989's "war of liberation" between the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea and the Lebanese Army led by General Michel Aoun. Although the number of Muslim emigrants surpassed the number of Christian emigrants during the second wave, this study highlights that the total number of Muslim emigrants throughout the two waves is less than the number of Christian emigrants.

### **3.1.2. The Motives Behind the Lebanese Emigration During the Civil War (1975-1990)**

The constant clashes in the country since the beginning of 1975 was clearly the primary reason for Lebanese people to leave the country (Labaki, 1989). The motive behind their migration was to guarantee a better future for their children (Labaki, 1992). The consequences of the spread of terror and political oppression in several parts of the country must be added to the clashes (Labaki, 1992). This has driven a number of Lebanese people, mainly intellectuals, into exile to work in white-collar jobs (Labaki, 1992). Aside from

statistics, the wholesale destruction of the Lebanese economy should be mentioned (Labaki, 1987). Large sectors were left inoperative without being destroyed (Labaki, 1985). One of the most important phenomena which motivated the mass influx of the Lebanese population from their towns and villages was the destruction and occupation of their lands, houses, schools, shops, factories and offices (Labaki, 1985). Civilians have become homeless, lost their resources, and were left without social, health and educational services (Labaki, 1985). Around 800,000 Lebanese people were directly affected by this phenomena, which wrecked the social structure of urban areas and villages and which drove a part of the population into leaving the country altogether, and the other part into a permanent state of marginalization (Labaki, 1992). The rate of unemployment rose from 5.4% in 1970 to 21% in 1985 (Labaki, 1985). Amid the same period, the economic activity rate dropped from 27% in 1970 to 14% in 1985 (Labaki, 1985). Population displacements, the destruction of businesses and the difficulties in communications and transport across several parts of the country resulted in a sharp fall in economic activity which ended up being reflected in the fall of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Labaki, 1992). For instance, when the Lebanese pound's exchange rate was 1 pound to 40 US cents in 1974, the GDP dropped from LL8.1 billion to LL5 billion between 1974 and 1983 (Labaki, 1992). GDP from the same phase per capita dropped from LL3,115 to LL2,000, approximately from \$1400 to \$900 (Labaki, 1992). Because the situation was deteriorating exponentially, the minimum monthly wages dropped from an estimated of \$280 in 1983 to \$27 in 1987 (Labaki, 1992).

### **3.1.3. Economic Loss and Brain Drain**

The existing information regarding the economically active emigrants' total number should be examined, keeping in mind the professional and sectorial categories of emigrants (Labaki, 1989). The economically active emigrants' total number was below 100,000 in 1975, it increased to over 200,000 in 1979, and it reached around 500,000 in 1982 (Labaki, 1989). Statistics showed that Arab countries appealed the majority of Lebanese emigrant workers, the percentages are as follows: 52.1% in 1975, it increased to 58.8% in 1979, and then to 59.7% in 1982 (Labaki, 1989). The rise of Lebanese emigrant workers between 1975 and 1978 overlapped with the oil boom, whereas the following slow-down was possibly the effect of the Gulf war and the drop in the oil revenue in the Arab countries (Hourani, 2014; Zgheib, 2011; Labaki, 1989). Although there is not any definite statistical evidence, it is extremely possible that emigration increased in non-Arab countries after 1982 (Labaki, 1989).

Regarding the Lebanese emigrant workers' qualifications, the data collected from the Lebanese Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs showed that the ministry released up to 78,057 qualification certificates for technicians requesting visas for oil-producing Arab countries to facilitate the visa process (Labaki, 1987). The comparison between the statistics and the total Lebanese emigrant workers' number who arrived to these countries between 1975 and 1982 reinforces the conclusion that 80% of these Lebanese emigrant workers had technical qualifications (Labaki, 1987).

The Center for Economic Studies and Documentation of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry published at the end of 1977 the first assessments toward a decomposition by sectors of the Lebanese emigration since 1975 (Labaki, 1987). Statistics showed that amid the two-year war (1975-1977), Lebanon lost more than one-fifth of its economically active population (Labaki, 1987).

In a semi-qualitative study about emigration amid the first three years of war published in April 1978, the geographical and sectorial or professional distribution of emigrants were correlated (Labaki, 1987). This study points an obvious correlation between the qualification level of emigrants and the development level of the recipient country (Labaki, 1987). An estimated number of 200,000 skilled workers fled the country during the war (Koinova, 2010). The United States of America appealed the utmost number of skilled workers; the Arab Gulf appealed businessmen and technicians; Europe appealed business and students; and Africa appealed the families of the existing emigrants who belong to the lesser skilled category (Hourani, 2014; Zgheib, 2011; Labaki, 1992).

An additional type of emigration is the Lebanese businesses' transfer abroad which started before the war but then it got enhanced by it (Labaki, 1989). Some information about the Lebanese insurance businesses in 1979 was available (Labaki, 1989). As mentioned earlier, primarily in the oil-producing Arab countries, they had begun increasing their activities outside Lebanon (Labaki, 1992; Pearlman 2013a). Subsequent of the civil war's outbreak in 1975, the expansion extended and accelerated to non-Arab

countries such as Greece and Cyprus (Labaki, 1992). This Lebanese insurance activities' expansion outside Lebanon was the result of the departure of employees and managers responsible for this extension (Labaki, 1992).

Further detailed information for certain regions and professions is available (Labaki, 1992). Researchers concerned about the brain-drain gathered data about engineers' movement which hands in a better understanding of this emigration aspect (Labaki, 1992; Pearlman 2013a). This collected information compared the distribution of Lebanese engineering graduates by countries from the American University of Beirut (AUB) (Labaki, 1992). Between 1972 and 1982, AUB graduates created the largest engineers' group in Lebanon, including around 25% of the Engineering's Association membership (Labaki, 1992).

The outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon caused a major influx, therefore, a brain drain. In 1983 and 1984, a field survey was conducted about Lebanese engineers working for five big firms; this survey showed the breakdown according to countries of destination (Labaki, 1992). Over 85% of these Lebanese engineers were distributed as follows; Two-thirds were based in countries in the Arab world with 34% in Saudi Arabia alone; and 15% in western countries (Labaki, 1992). A field survey showed a further trend of the Lebanese AUB engineering graduates' geographical distribution (Labaki, 1992). In this case as well, more than half of AUB graduates were outside Lebanon, 40% of which were working in the Arab world and 8% of which were working in the United States (Labaki,

1992). This study provided precise statistics about how AUB engineering graduates working in Lebanon fell from 53% in 1971 to 41.6% in 1982 (Labaki, 1992). Concurrently, the rate of Lebanese engineers working in the United States increased from 4% to 8.8%, and in Saudi Arabia from 6.5% to 10.3% (Labaki, 1992). For Lebanese engineers who were outside the United States and the Arab World, primarily in Canada and Western Europe, it increased from 7% to 9.1% (Labaki, 1992). Hence, statistics about the brain drain that happened in Lebanon during the civil war is evident of the influx that happened particularly from Lebanon to the United States and Saudi Arabia.

## **3.2. Sects, Demography, Migration, and Politics in Lebanon**

### **3.2.1 The Political, Economic and Demographic Effects Post-Civil War**

The Lebanese emigration during the civil war had countless effects some of which are social, economic, and political. This section examines the social influence by focusing on the impact of the civil war on the sectarian composition of the Lebanese population, and how this demographic change, by consequence, is impacting the dynamics of Lebanese politics. It is worth noting that the term demography in Lebanon normally means the numerical size of the sectarian communities of the country (Pearlman, 2014).

The effects of the Lebanese emigration in correlation with the different sects in Lebanon, and their political representation in the parliament should be addressed across different eras. According to Pearlman (2013b), this trend varied across time. To begin with, Lebanon underwent its only population census during the French Mandate in 1932.

The results of this census showed that there are three major sects or religious groupings in Lebanon, the Christian Maronites being the majority (28.8%), followed by the Muslim Sunnis (22.4%), then the Muslim Shiites (19.6%) (Jaulin, 2010; Faour, 2007). After Lebanon earned its independence in 1943, religious groups' size official estimate indicated an increase in the percentage of Maronites from 28.8% to 30.4%, and a decrease in the percentages of Sunnis and Shiites from 22.4% to 21.3% and from 19.6% to 19.3% respectively (Jaulin, 2010; Faour, 2007). The majority of Maronites were located in the Northern part of Mount Lebanon, the majority of Muslim Sunnis were located in the North Western Region and Beirut, and the majority of Muslim Shiites were located in the Northeastern and Southern Regions (Amery, 1992). In accordance to the numerical sizes of each of these three major religious groups, the seats in the parliament were distributed (Faour, 2007). As the largest sect, Maronites were offered the most powerful and highest position which is the President of the Republic (Faour, 2007). As the second largest sect, Sunnis were allocated the second most important political position of the premiership (Faour, 2007). As the third in demographic size, the Shiites were offered the position of Speaker of the Parliament (Faour, 2007). Accordingly, out of 128 representatives, there were six Christians for every five Muslims (Faour, 2007).

The demographics of Lebanon changed between 1956 and 1986. As mentioned previously, the emigration of Christians outweighed the emigration of Muslims between 1975 and 1984. This explains why the percentage of Maronites dropped to almost the half between 1956 and 1986 from 30% to 16%, while the percentage of Muslim Sunnis and Muslim Shiites increased from 20.3% in 1956 to 27% in 1986 and from 17.7% in 1956 to

41% in 1986 respectively (Jaulin, 2010; Faour, 2007). This made the Muslim Shiite sect the highest among Lebanese people; nevertheless, the political positions assigned after the French Mandate did not change.

It has been stated before that there has not been a national census since 1932. Nonetheless, detailed statistics were conducted by Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, showed the following Lebanese demographic information for a population of roughly four million: 27% Sunnis, 27% Shiites, 21% Maronites, 8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 5% Druze, 7% other smaller Christian denominations as well as other small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Mormons, Buddhists, and Hindus (Samii, 2012). A further study conducted by Information International sal in 2019 showed in detail the Lebanese demography and its increase between 1932 and 2018.

*Table 4. Comparison of the Lebanese Population by Sect between 1932 and 2018*

Sect	1932 (Residents and non-Residents)	2018 (Residents and non-Residents)	1932 Percentage	2018 Percentage
<b>Maronites</b>	<b>351, 197</b>	<b>934, 704</b>	<b>33.6</b>	<b>16.9</b>
<b>Roum Orthodox</b>	<b>133, 343</b>	<b>329, 865</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>5.9</b>
<b>Roum Catholic</b>	<b>76, 336</b>	<b>231, 193</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>4.2</b>
<b>Armenian Orthodox</b>	<b>28, 072</b>	<b>94, 780</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>1.7</b>
<b>Armenian Catholic</b>	<b>6, 434</b>	<b>22, 344</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Syriac Orthodox</b>	<b>2, 820</b>	<b>21, 447</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>
<b>Syriac Catholic</b>	<b>3, 115</b>	<b>13, 105</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.2</b>
<b>Protestant</b>	<b>4, 600</b>	<b>20, 668</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Chaldean<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>744</b>	<b>3, 594</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.07</b>
<b>Christian Minorities</b>	<b>6, 463</b>	<b>33, 275</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.6</b>
<b>Total Christians</b>	<b>614, 397</b>	<b>1, 686, 975</b>	<b>58.47</b>	<b>30.67</b>
<b>Sunnis</b>	<b>194, 305</b>	<b>1, 721, 853</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>31.3</b>
<b>Shiites</b>	<b>166, 545</b>	<b>1, 743, 718</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>31.6</b>
<b>Druze</b>	<b>62, 084</b>	<b>295, 664</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5.31</b>
<b>Alawites</b>	<b>4, 830</b>	<b>55, 677</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total Muslims</b>	<b>431, 767</b>	<b>3, 821, 717</b>	<b>41.1</b>	<b>69.21</b>
<b>Jews</b>	<b>4, 003</b>	<b>4, 805</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.09</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1, 046, 164</b>	<b>5, 508, 692</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Note:* Reprinted from *اللبنانيون: 5.5 مليون نسمة*, Information International sal., (2019), Monthly Magazine, p. 2.

According to the statistics shown in the table above, between 1932 and 2018, the total percentage of Christians dropped from 58.47% to 30.67%, whereas the total percentage of Muslims increased from 41.1% to 69.21%. It was noted that the decline in the proportion of Christians to Muslim was mainly due to emigration and the high Muslim birthrates over the past 60 years (Samii, 2012). Yet, a study conducted on January 7, 2019 showed that between 1971 and 2004 the birthrates were decreasing among Muslim

<sup>1</sup> Numbers include both Chaldean Orthodox and Chaldean Catholic

citizens (Khalil, 2019). These statistics showed that in the upcoming 19 years, the estimated number of Lebanese Christians will form 38% to 40% of the entire population (Khalil, 2019).

The political stagnation, and the repetitive names in the Lebanese parliament, created some sort of frustration among citizens. This frustration with the Lebanese status-quo was tangible because questionnaires showed that the Lebanese people are “fed up” with the lack of accountability and corruption in public life (Pearlman, 2013a). A study about the public opinion conducted in 2007 showed that citizens wanted leaders to stand up for “fighting corruption and integrity” (Pearlman, 2013a). Another one showed that more than 66% of the respondents negatively perceived political parties, and a number claimed that parties do not represent them (Pearlman, 2013a). In 2011, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people revolted against sectarianism and the sectarian politics (Pearlman, 2013a). However, nothing was taken into consideration, and gradually, the protest movement ran out of steam (Pearlman, 2013a). In spite the complaints of the citizens about their leadership, the same politicians return every elections (Pearlman, 2013a).

There are two explanations for the resistance to change the basic practice and structure of Lebanese politics. One blames this resistance on the lack of trust among sects and on the deep-seated sectarian identities (Saab, 2012). Another blames leaders’ self-interest in which leaders become elites due to their agreement on at least one value (Koury, 1976). These explanations tell a lot, but they are still insufficient (Pearlman, 2013a). According

to an analysis about the corruption in Lebanon, to avoid polarization and keep the engine of this fixed confessional system running, power brokers need fuel (Pearlman, 2013a). Foreign aid, a major source of revenue, is a product of interstate policy (Pearlman, 2013a). Migrant workers' remittances are another key source for an informal mechanism which operates at the level of the society (Pearlman, 2013a). Not transferred for political reasons or dictated by political representatives, the implications of migrant workers' remittances for politics are easily overlooked (Pearlman, 2013a). Nevertheless, a closer study proposes that remittances can play a serious role in sustaining the political status-quo of Lebanon (Pearlman, 2013a).

Another study for Pearlman also conducted in 2013 shows the political effects of migration on Lebanon. The war revealed preceding structures of economic, social, and state powers; and it is important to note that migration was a part of the procedure in which groups controlled them anew (Pearlman, 2013b). Although there is not sufficient evidence to test these claims, Pearlman proposed that diverse migratory trajectories helped producing different kinds of power amongst sectarian communities during the postwar period. To begin with Sunnis, migration was the reason behind the rise of tycoons who returned to exercise sweeping power over governmental decision-making and economic sectors (Pearlman, 2013b). Shiites also witnessed some emigrants become very wealthy, but their emigration had the greatest political impact through a wider-based social mobility which reinforced collective organization (Pearlman, 2013b). In contrast to the two cases mentioned above, Maronites experienced emigration with minimum economic gain

(Pearlman, 2013b). She gave examples about people from different sects who paved their way to take a part of the Lebanese parliament; and they are discussed later in the paper.

### **3.2.2. The Rise of New Names in the Parliament During the Post-War Period**

Pearlman gave examples about individuals from two major sects in Lebanon, and how migration affected their political statuses in Lebanon. While businessmen who turned out to be politicians came from all sects, a number of them were Sunnis whose prominence marked the breakthrough of their sects to power in the higher strata of the Lebanese economy (Pearlman, 2013b). Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004, mounted at their summit (Pearlman, 2013b). Born to a humble family, Hariri migrated to Saudi Arabia in 1964 where he worked as a teacher before he started working in construction and becoming a multi-billionaire (Pearlman, 2013b). He rose to become an eminent figure through philanthropy in Lebanon, had a major role in the Ta'if Accord, and had a close relationship with the Saudi royal family (Pearlman, 2013b). Lebanon had a tradition of emigrants sanctifying their achievements through a political career, and war circumstances permitted Hariri to follow this path to extraordinary heights (Pearlman, 2013b). As Paul Salem said, "Never has one individual wielded such a combination of public and private power in modern Lebanon as has Rafiq Hariri." Hariri lavishly spent his wealth which was equal to around one quarter of the GDP of Lebanon to attain a far-reaching influence over people, policy-making and institutions (Pearlman, 2013b).

Some Shiites who emigrated became political or business elites in Lebanon (Pearlman, 2013b). Nabih Berri, for instance, was born in Sierra Leone, West Africa, and lived in Dearborn, Michigan before becoming the leader of Amal Movement and the speaker of the Parliament from 1992 until the current date (Pearlman, 2013b). Nevertheless, migration did not lift off Shiites to top strata of the economy to a similar degree as the members of other sects did (Pearlman, 2013b). Emigration's impact lay in the continued transformation of the community from peasantry to the urban middle class's ranks (Pearlman, 2013b). The mobility's character was predictable, assumed lower rates of education among Shiites on the war's eve (Pearlman, 2013b). Ali Faour conducted a survey in 1989 on Shiite village in the south of Lebanon; this survey's findings showed that "emigrants with high school education or lower outnumbered university graduates at a rate of four to one," 81% of them were laborers (Pearlman, 2013b). When these emigrants landed in the same countries as their higher-educated nationals, they enrolled in different labor sectors (Pearlman, 2013b). According to Faour's study, 40.6% of the emigrants went to the Arab countries, 20.42% to Africa, 20.3% to Europe and 16.7% to the Americas (Pearlman, 2013b). Given their low educational background, these labor emigrants who left to the Gulf worked as mechanics, chauffeurs, plumbers, or construction workers (Pearlman, 2013b). They were less proper to become Hariri-style kind of tycoons (Pearlman, 2013b).

Migration outside Lebanon did not show an impact on the political ideologies of the Lebanese people who returned (Amery, 1992). The same names that appeared before and during the civil war still appear every election (Amery, 1992). However, migration did

help in the rise of new names post-civil war such as Rafiq Hariri (Amery, 1992). Instead of openness to new political systems and ideologies, the Lebanese people clung even more on their former political leaders.

# Chapter Four

## Findings and Discussion

This chapter tackles the answers of all six informants. As mentioned previously, the population of this research is the 128 representatives in the Lebanese parliament. Each of the representatives is either a part of the major political parties or an independent. The sample is chosen according to the significance of the major political representatives of the religious communities in Lebanon, which are the Free Patriotic Movement, the Future Movement, Amal Movement, the Lebanese Forces, Hezbollah, and the Progressive Socialist Party. None of the political parties' representatives refrained from sitting for the in-depth interview.

### 4.1. The Lebanese Emigration

To the first question, there are several similar answers. However, certain parties' stances regarding the reason they are against the Lebanese emigration varied. Amal Movement, Future Movement, and Hezbollah (3 out of 6 participants) are against emigration because it is the outcome of terrible political, social, and economic crises.

On the other hand, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party (2 out of 6 participants) present viewpoints on the pros and cons of the Lebanese emigration. They both believe that the Lebanese work-force abroad is an important factor for the local economic boost, for the Lebanese expatriates remit around \$7B annually. Nevertheless, their answers regarding the reason they are against emigration are different. On the one hand, the Free Patriotic Movement believes emigration causes severe demographic changes, and while the number of the Lebanese residents is decreasing, the number of foreigners is increasing. On the other hand, the Progressive Socialist Party points out that the negative repercussion of emigration is the brain drain Lebanon is witnessing.

The Lebanese Forces (1 out of 6 participants) is against emigration but for reasons different than the ones mentioned above. They believe that since the Christian emigration outweighs the Muslim emigration, this jeopardizes the presence, the entity, and the history of the Christian force. They also believe that since the Christian birthrate is already lower than the Muslim birthrate, emigration would create a huge demographic gap between the Christians and the Muslims. The second part of the Lebanese Forces' answer partially overlaps with the Free Patriotic Movement's opinion regarding the demographic changes.

The political representatives of the major Muslim religious communities only pinpoint the negative reasons behind emigration. While, the political representatives of the major Christian representatives emphasize that emigration can result in severe changes in

demographics and a huge gap between the Christian and the Muslim sects. In contrast to both answers, the Druze (non-Muslim and non-Christian) do not see any kind of negative repercussions besides the brain drain and the frequent loss of the labor force.

All political representatives of the major religious communities are against emigration. Nevertheless, answers show that the Christian sects are concerned about further decrease in its number, for the history of the Lebanese Christian emigration cannot be compensated. In contrast, the major political representatives of the Muslim sects are more focused on the motives behind emigration rather than emigration itself. In other words, the decrease in the number of Muslims does not threaten the major political representatives of the Christian sects. As opposed to other parties, the major political representative of the Druze sect is more concerned about the economic impact rather than the motives and the demographic changes.

#### **4.2. Lebanese Emigration's Impact on Sectarian Political System**

All participants answered positively to the question on whether or not the Lebanese emigration might affect the sectarian political system. However, the explanations on how emigration might affect the political system varied.

The Future Movement and Amal Movement (2 out of 6 participants) think that emigration can lead certain parties to demand more political seats given the increase in

the number of Muslims and the decrease in the number of Christians. This might have been the case prior to the Ta'if Accord. However, post-Ta'if and after former MP Rafik Hariri emphasized on the principle of “stop the count”, this question shall not be raised anymore. Additionally, both the Future Movement and Amal Movement do not guarantee that certain parties will stick with what the Ta'if Accord states.

Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party (2 out of 6 participants) believe that the ongoing emigration and the constant change in the demographics will definitely lead the majority to demand further political representation. They think that when certain sects outnumber others, they will no longer accept being underrepresented in the Lebanese parliament.

The answers of the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants and majority Christians) are quite the same. Although both parties assume that the change in demography, as a result of emigration, and the decrease in the number of Christians will lead Muslims to ask for more representation in the Lebanese parliament, they differ in their political stance about federalism and its presence in the system. The Lebanese Forces raises federalism as a solution, while the Free Patriotic Movement mentions that they are firm about the equity between the Christians and the Muslims.

The major political representative of the Sunni sect and one out of two major political representatives of the Shiite sect do believe that emigration can lead to the change of the

political system in regards to the demography. Yet, both of them are abiding and will abide by the articles of the Ta'if Accord. As Muslim political representatives, Amal Movement and the Future Movement numerically outnumber the Christian sects. However, they are against any change in the political system, for they are firm about the equity between Muslims and Christians. They believe that the Muslim-Christian coexistence is what Lebanon is constituted from.

The major political representative of the Druze sect and one out of two major political representatives of the Shiite sect finds that the demographic changes can and might have an impact on the sectarian political system. Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party think that it is fair for the sects that outnumber others to demand further political representation. Given there is currently a huge gap in the demographic size of the sects, certain sects are being underrepresented in the Lebanese parliament. The only difference in the results is that Hezbollah emphasizes the importance of the “fair” representation regarding the demographic size of the sects, while the Progressive Socialist Party only believes that the political representation is subject to change.

All the major political representatives of the Christian sects think that the Muslim sects will demand more political representation, for their numerical size is bigger. Nonetheless, both the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement are strictly against it because it will jeopardize the Muslim-Christian coexistence. To achieve this equality, they believe

there should be equal shares in the Lebanese parliament. The Lebanese Forces proposes federalism if the Muslim sects demand a bigger political share.

### **4.3. The Demographic Size of the Sects' Impact on the Political Formation**

The interesting pattern we found in the answers of this question is that each sect has its unique response when it comes to the impact of the demographic size of the sects. This question complements the previous question owing to the fact all political parties find that the impact of emigration on the Lebanese political system primarily targets its formation.

Hezbollah and Amal Movement (2 out of 6 participants and Shiite majority) think that the demographic size of the sects might and can affect the Lebanese political formation if the majority of the sect's individuals insist on further political representation. If each sect is represented according to its demographic size, then yes, it will certainly have an impact.

The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants and Christian majority) believe that since the number of Christians is decreasing and the number of Muslims is increasing, this will lead the Muslim sects to demand more parliamentary representation. Nonetheless, both parties are against any changes. The Lebanese Forces, on the one hand, will go back to federalism if any changes occurred,

while the Free Patriotic Movement will demand counting the Lebanese people abroad to show the significant number of the Lebanese Christians.

The Future Movement (1 out of 6 participants and Sunni majority) believes that the demographic size of the sects should not and will not have an impact on the Lebanese political formation. They are very solid about what the Ta'if Accord and former MP Rafik Hariri states regarding the equity between Muslims and Christians. The Future Movement does not see a correlation between the change of the demographic size of the sects and politics because Lebanon constitutes of equal rights between Muslims and Christians regardless of the change in number.

The Progressive Socialist Party (1 out of 6 participants and Druze majority) thinks that the demographic size of the sects can have an impact on the Lebanese political formation. Yet, they are against it owing to the constant change in the Lebanese demography, and this could cause a problem on the long run. They do not believe it is practical to keep on changing the political seats in accordance to the continuous change in the demographic size of the sects.

All the major political representatives of the Shiite sect see that demography might have an effect on the political formation because Muslims outnumber Christians, and this can lead to the change of the parliamentary seats in favor of the Muslims. However, both

of them emphasize that this proposal will be formally raised if the majority of Shiites demand more representation.

All the major political representatives of the Christian sects reemphasize that the Muslim communities, given their bigger numerical size, have the validity to demand further political representation. Contrarily, both the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement clearly state that they are against anything related to shrinking the Christian share in the Lebanese parliament. They are firm about the equity between the Muslims and the Christians as well as their coexistence. In addition to this, the Lebanese Forces once again raises federalism as a solution if the Muslim parties demand a bigger share at the expense of the Christian parliamentary seats.

#### **4.4. The Maronite Church and Lebanese Citizenship**

The Maronite church is known to encourage the Maronites abroad to retrieve their Lebanese citizenship. The question here is about whether the parties are with or against this move and why. The answers and the reasons varied a lot in this question.

The Future Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (3 out of 6 participants) believe that any Lebanese person who lives abroad has the right to retrieve their Lebanese citizenship, for the Lebanese expatriates have a huge impact in promoting and boosting the Lebanese economy. However, these three parties are against it if and

only if it is going to take a sectarian path, i.e., counting the Lebanese people abroad to raise the number of Christians and so forth.

The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants) are completely with what the Maronite church is doing because the majority of those who emigrated during the war are Christians. Thus, the Lebanese Christian force currently lives abroad. They also believe that the Maronite church is trying to keep the balance between Muslims and Christians in terms of the number. The Lebanese Forces adds that Hezbollah has an agenda in converting Lebanon into a Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist given that the number of Shiites is exponentially increasing. Hence, counting the Christians abroad will strengthen the diverse entity of Lebanon and the Lebanese community which is composed of Christians and Muslims.

Hezbollah (1 out of 6 participants) refrained from answering this question for reasons related to the central party.

The major political representatives of the Sunni and Druze sects and one out of two representatives of the Shiite sect encourages the Lebanese people abroad to retrieve their citizenship regardless of their sect. The Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party, and Amal Movement do not prioritize the Lebanese Maronites over the rest of the Lebanese expatriates.

All the major political representatives of the Christian sects are absolutely with the Maronite Church encouraging the Maronites abroad to retrieve their Lebanese citizenship. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement have a strong belief that the Christian force abroad will somewhat compensate for the loss of Christians as a result of emigration. They believe the demographic balance after these Christians retrieve their citizenship will weaken the stance of the Muslims in demanding further parliamentary share.

One out of two political representatives of the Shiite sect refrained from answering this question. In the previous questions, Hezbollah states that they are with changing the political seats according to the numerical size of the sects, i.e., in favor of the Muslims. However, they refrain from answering a question that might lead to the increase in the number of the Lebanese Christians. Re-naturalizing the Lebanese Christians might weaken Hezbollah's stance in demanding further political share, for the number of Lebanese Christians will become equal or close to the number of Lebanese Muslims.

#### **4.5. Absentee Voting's Legalization**

The results on the legalization of absentee voting are pretty interesting, for 5 out of 6 participants have similar responses. The Future Movement, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Forces, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party are fully with the legalization of absentee voting because it is one of the grounds behind keeping a strong tie between the Lebanese people abroad and their homeland. In addition to their stance on absentee

voting, Amal Movement also adds the importance of having a quota for absentee voting. The quota is to have one Lebanese representative elected in the name of the Lebanese people of each continent. The Lebanese residents of the given continent will elect one representative to speak on their behalf. Amal Movement believes this is a better way to keep the ties between the Lebanese expatriates and Lebanon.

The Free Patriotic Movement (1 out of 6 participants) is also with the legalization of absentee voting. Nonetheless, the reason for which they are with it is quite different. They believe that the Lebanese expatriates are boosting the Lebanese economy, thus, they should have a say in choosing who represents them. The Free Patriotic Movement also demands a correct Christian representation without disrupting the numerical balance of the Christians and the Muslims.

All parties except the Free Patriotic Movement support the legalization of absentee voting for non-sectarian reasons. They believe that the Lebanese expatriates have the right to still be involved in their country's politics, and this is one of the most basic rights Lebanon can offer its expatriates in terms of keeping a sentimental bond. Whereas, the Free Patriotic Movement sees the economic benefit of absentee voting. Their viewpoint is that when the Lebanese diaspora feel they are involved in their country's politics; they will be more concerned about its economy as well. Additionally, the Free Patriotic Movement mentions that it demands a correct Christian representation to show the significant number of the Lebanese Christians who live abroad.

#### **4.6. The Impact of Absentee Voting**

This question tackles the impact of absentee voting on the sects' political fate and on the Lebanese political system. It is worth to note that for the second time, the Future Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (3 out of 6 participants) have the same response. They believe that certain sects may think that absentee voting will enhance their share in politics or it will partially retrieve the demographic balance between the Christians and the Muslims. The aim behind absentee voting might have been the numbers, but this mindset has always led Lebanon to wars. Nevertheless, the reason behind absentee voting is to involve the Lebanese people abroad in their homeland's politics, and to strengthen the ties among them. Aside from this answer that all three parties agree on, the Future Movement adds that they are firm about former MP Rafik Hariri's "stop the count".

The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants) find that the fundamental impact of absentee voting solidifies equal rights between the Christian and the Muslims given most of the Lebanese expatriates are Christians. Moreover, they think that absentee voting preserves the National Pact and the equity between the Christians and the Muslims. The Free Patriotic Movement adds that having a true Christian representative like General Michel Aoun as the President of the Republic will restore the Christians' rights.

Hezbollah (1 out of 6 participants) refrained from answering this question for reasons related to the central party.

The major political representatives of the Sunni and Druze sects and one out of two major representatives of the Shiite sect do not want absentee voting to have a sectarian impact. The Future Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party refer to those who are still concerned about demographically counting the people according to their sects as “delusional” because the sectarian clashes have always led Lebanon to wars. Additionally, the demographic numbers of the sects will never have an impact on the political formation for two reasons. One, they believe in equity between the Christians and the Muslims. Two, they will never give those who are asking for further political share their demands.

All the major political representatives of the Christian sects view that the demographic impact of absentee voting stabilizes the numerical balance of the Christians and the Muslims. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement pinpoint that absentee voting show the presence of the Lebanese Christian force abroad. They believe that this somewhat compensates for the loss of their people during the war. Absentee voting, in their perspective, solidifies Christian rights. This shows that the major political representatives of the Christian sects feel threatened that the Muslim parties will demand more share at the expense of the Christian seats. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement are very firm about the equity between the Christian and the Muslims.

One out of two major representatives of the Shiite sect refrained from answering this question. For the second time, Hezbollah refrained from answering a question that is either related to the change of the political share or can lead other parties to justify their current share. A conclusion about this can be made that Hezbollah has an agenda to explicitly demand a better share in the Lebanese parliament. The Lebanese Forces does accuse Hezbollah of having a sectarian agenda that could lead to the formation of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

#### **4.7. The Sects' Stances on Absentee Voting**

Once again, the distribution in the percentages with regards to the major political representatives of the sects' stances are noteworthy. All parties respond with the opinion that Christians are more eager than Muslims about absentee, but the reasons behind their opinions are partially different. On the one hand, the Future Movement, Hezbollah, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (4 out of 6 participants) think that Christians are more keen on absentee voting because the Christian emigration during the civil war outnumbered the Muslim emigration. The drastic decrease in the number of the Lebanese Christians has led them to be more enthusiastic about absentee voting. These parties believe that absentee voting, in a way, would make up for this loss.

On the other hand, the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants) believe that the Christians are more excited about absentee voting for two reasons. One, there are more Lebanese Christians abroad than there are Lebanese

Muslims. Two, when the Lebanese Muslim sects find that their local demographic impact has decreased due to the numerical increase of Christians, they will no longer ask for a bigger share in the Lebanese parliament.

It is relatively expected that all responses would be positive to this question. It is a fact that the Christian emigration during the civil outnumbered the Muslim emigration. However, the major political representatives of the Christian sects elaborate more on this particular point. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement believe that the Christians are more enthusiastic about absentee than the Muslims are because, unlike the Muslims, the Christians do feel the urge to compensate for the loss that happened owing to emigration. This shows that the major representatives of the Christian sects are explicit about their motives behind legalizing absentee voting.

#### **4.8. The Impact of Absentee Voting on May 2018 General Elections**

A question on how absentee voting impacts the General Elections of the House of Representatives in May 2018 is discussed. Five out of six participants (83.33%) find an impact, but each party views the impact differently.

The Future Movement, Hezbollah, and the Progressive Socialist Party (3 out of 6 participants) find that the absentee voting's impact is crucial, but it is mainly political and sentimental. However, on the sectarian level, none of these parties finds a tangible impact.

The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants) believe that absentee voting reflects the importance of Lebanon and the Lebanese people in front of foreign policies. Additionally, they think that political and economic decisions go hand in hand. On the one hand, it supports the equity between the Christians and the Muslims. On the other hand, it enhances the Lebanese economy because when the Lebanese people abroad feel they are involved in their homeland's politics, they will be more encouraged to remit money.

Amal Movement (1 out of 6 participants) does not find a huge impact because each of the expatriates voted according to his or her sectarian background. They believe it is the first time absentee voting is legal in Lebanon, so Amal Movement does not expect a sharp participation. Nonetheless, they think it is acceptable for a first trial.

None of the parties has any sectarian discourse with regards to this question. They objectively discuss their answers which are primarily about how absentee voting enhances the economy, reflects the importance of Lebanon in front of the foreign policies, and has a crucial sentimental impact on keeping the ties between the expatriates and their homeland. Only Amal Movement does not see an impact, for voters chose their representatives in regards with their sect.

#### **4.9. The Political Formation according to the Demographic Size of the Sects**

The sectarian political formation in Lebanon is subject to change in accordance to the demographic size of the sects. Five out of six informants (83.33%) are strictly against the change of the political seats according to the demographic size of the sects. However, the reasons they are against it are diverse.

The Future Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (3 out of 6 participants) are against this proposal because they believe in the equity between the Muslims and the Christians, and they perceive the Lebanese as citizens rather than numbers, and no matter how the much the numbers change, the Lebanese people should stick to this equity. Furthermore, Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party highly demand a non-sectarian representation and a civil state.

The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (2 out of 6 participants) are against changing the political representation in accordance to the demographic size of the sects owing to their belief that the Lebanese identity is constituted of Muslims and Christians. Even if the numbers have changed, they cling to equity. They rigorously refuse changing the seats at the expense of the Christians. Moreover, the Lebanese Forces adds that any proposal similar to this one will lead them to request a federal state.

Hezbollah (1 out of 6 participants) refrained from answering this question for reasons related to the central party.

The major political representative of the Sunni sect is against any change in the Lebanese political formation in regards to the demographic size of each sect. The Future Movement is firm about the articles of the Ta'if Accord because its founder, former MP Rafik Hariri, is the one who signed this agreement partially as a middle-ground to end the clashes between the Muslims and the Christians. Hence, the response is not surprising. Nevertheless, the major political representative of the Druze sect and one out two major political representatives of the Shiite sect are with the Ta'if Accord's equity, but they prefer abolishing political sectarianism and establishing a civil state. Given that Nabih Berri, the head of Amal Movement, and Walid Joumblat, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, were involved in sectarian clashes during the Lebanese Civil War (see Chapter 3), it is quite questionable that their parties demand the formation of a civil state and the abolition of political sectarianism.

The major political representatives of the Christian sects are against the change of the Lebanese political formation in accordance to the demographic size of each sect. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement already mention that they will not agree or let the Muslims demand more parliamentary representation at the expense of the Christian seats. They reemphasize here that Lebanon's identity is constituted of the Muslim and the Christian coexistence, and they will not permit anyone to disrupt this

equity no matter how much the demographic numbers fluctuate. This shows that the major political representatives of the Christian sects are using “coexistence” to justify their current share in the Lebanese parliament.

One out of two major political representatives of the Shiite sect refrained from answering this question. This is the third time Hezbollah refrained from answering a question related to the change of the political share. Once again, the question about Hezbollah having an agenda to change the political seats to its benefit is raised.

#### **4.10. Stances on Periodically Conducting an Official Census**

There has not been an official census in Lebanon since 1932 during the French Mandate. Some parties claim that the Lebanese Christians are numerically equal to the Lebanese Muslims, but they happen to live abroad. A question about periodically conducting an official census that includes the Lebanese people abroad is crucial. One out of the six informants is solidly with periodically conducting an official census, while the rest list a number of reasons for their conditional approval.

The Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Free Patriotic Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party (5 out of 6 participants) are with periodically conducting an official census that includes the Lebanese people abroad if the objective behind it is to have accurate data about birthrates, death-rates, and

unemployment etc. without mentioning the sect in people's civil documents. Conversely, if the objective behind it is sectarian in serving the case of certain parties to demand more parliamentary representation, then they are decisively against it.

Hezbollah (1 out of 6 participants) is firmly with periodically conducting an official census because it is important for the state's resources and institutions. They have not commented on counting the Lebanese people abroad, but they are not against it owing to their belief that every person who has Lebanese roots has the right to retrieve their citizenship.

None of the parties except one have a problem in periodically conducting an official census with the inclusion of the Lebanese people abroad as long as it does not have a sectarian intention. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is ultimately with periodically conducting an official census, but they are indifferent about counting the Lebanese diaspora. Counting the Lebanese people abroad partly justifies the current share of the Christians in the Lebanese parliament given that most of the Lebanese expatriates are Christians. This has the ability to weaken Hezbollah's stance in demanding more political seats in the Lebanese parliament. The Shiite sect is currently the largest in demographic size with an estimated number of 1,743,718 (31.6% of the Lebanese people) in 2018 (see Chapter 3).

#### **4.11. Naturalization and Citizenship**

In a dissertation primarily about the Lebanese demography and the political formation, the naturalization of the citizens of the neighboring countries is a crucial topic to discuss. Five out of six informants are strictly against the naturalization of the Syrian and Palestinian citizens. The reasons behind their refusal are wide-ranging.

The Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party (2 out of 6 participants) are against the naturalization of the Syrians and the Palestinians, for the Lebanese Constitutional Law is clear about the refusal of naturalization.

Amal Movement and Hezbollah (2 out of 6 participants) are also against the naturalization of the Syrians and the Palestinians for two reasons. One, Syria is 18.5 times bigger than Lebanon, the Syrian civil war has ended, and each person should live in his or her homeland. Two, naturalizing Palestinians will serve in favor of the colonial Zionist State, and it will lead Palestinians to forget the “right to return”.

The Lebanese Forces (1 out of 6 participants) is against naturalization because they believe that the Civil War happened as a result of this proposal.

The Free Patriotic Movement (1 out of 6 participants) believes that naturalizing the Syrian and the Palestinian citizens depends on the person. They assume that many people

who were naturalized in the past like Sahnawis and Chaghouris boosted the Lebanese economy, and they offered numerous job opportunities etc. The Free Patriotic Movement does not mind naturalizing people who are able to boost the Lebanese economy rather than being a burden on it. Those who are willing to be naturalized must not have any foreign ties and must speak and think “Lebanese”.

The major political representative of the Sunni sect and the major political representative of the Druze sect are against naturalization because it goes against the Lebanese Nationality Article in the Constitutional Law. The Lebanese nationality cannot be obtained by naturalization or birth (Lakkis, 2015). It can only be passed through paternity (Lakkis, 2015). The Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party sanctify the Lebanese Constitutional Law, and they will not accept any changes to happen, for it might lead to conflicts among the Lebanese people. Given that the majority of the Syrian and Palestinian emigrants in Lebanon belong to the Sunni sect, the disagreement of the Future Movement shows that they truly do not care about their demographic number. It would not matter to them the increase or the decrease in the number of Sunnis owing to their strong belief that the demographic size of the sect will not change the parliamentary representation. Moreover, most Lebanese Druze have ties and families in Jabal al-Druze in Syria. Their naturalization leads to the increase in the demographic size of the Druze in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Progressive Socialist Party is against naturalization. This shows that the Druze sect, like the Future Movement, is indifferent about their demographic size, and they are strict about the articles in the Constitutional Law.

All the major political representatives of the Shiite sect are against naturalization. As Shiite representatives, Hezbollah and Amal Movement cannot in any way benefit from the naturalization of the Syrian and the Palestinian refugees. Little to no Syrians and Palestinians belong to the Shiite sect. Hence, it will not demographically affect their number. However, naturalizing Syrians and Palestinians might lead to the increase of other sects i.e. the Muslim Sunnis, the Christians, and the Druze. Hezbollah and Amal Movement justify their stance against naturalization through politics and geographical size.

One out of two major political representatives of the Christian sects is clear about the reason they are against naturalization. The Lebanese Forces blames that this particular proposal is one of the reasons behind the Lebanese Civil War. To preserve Lebanon and the Lebanese community, one shall not demand naturalization. All the Lebanese Forces takes into account is the civil peace.

One out of two major political representatives of the Christian sects believes that naturalizing the Syrians and the Palestinians depends on the sect and the mindset of the individual. The Free Patriotic Movement explicitly mentions that only the Christian Syrians and Palestinians are the ones who are not a burden on the Lebanese government, and the ones who actually enhance the Lebanese economy. They give examples about Chaghouri, a multimillionaire Aounist, and Sahnawi, one of the Free Patriotic Movement's representatives. One can't not notice the sectarian and racist discourse in the

response of this question. The Free Patriotic Movement's answer does not only stop at being sectarian and racist, it can also be viewed from the sense that they want to increase the number of the Lebanese Christians to justify their current share in the Lebanese parliament.

# Chapter Five

## Bourdieu and the Conversion of Capital

In chapter 1, we discussed the Bourdieusian capital theory, and we showed how capital can be converted. The Bourdieusian theory can be used for the analysis of this dissertation in the sense of converting demography as a social capital into a political capital.

### 5.1. The Future Movement

To begin with the Future Movement, they converted the demographic size of the Muslim sects into a political capital when they added one Muslim seat during the announcement of the Ta'if Accord. There were six Christian seats for every five Muslim seats, it has become six Christian seats for every six Muslim seats after the Ta'if Accord (see Chapter 3). It is worth to note that the Future Movement were the first to convert their demographic size into a political capital.

### 5.2. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement

The major political representatives of the Christian sects, the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement, want the inclusion of the Lebanese people abroad, for their

number is decreasing, and the Muslim sects have the ability to demand further political representation at the expense of the Christian seats. They see that the Muslims, currently the majority, are able to convert their demographic size into a political capital. However, their awareness urges them to count the Lebanese people abroad, majority Christians, to show that the current parliamentary representation is fair.

### **5.3. Hezbollah**

Hezbollah, one out of two major political representatives of the Shiite sect, implicitly wants the change in the parliamentary representation to occur. They refrain from answering any questions that justify the Christians' current share, while they utterly support the change of seats based on the demographic size of each sect. Given the Lebanese Shiites are the majority in demographic size at an estimated number of 1,743,718 individuals (31.6% of the Lebanese people) in 2018, their conversion of social capital into political is somewhat valid. Hassan Nasrallah, current Secretary General of Hezbollah, explicitly demanded the establishment of an Islamic State under the name of Islam (Nasrallah, 00:00:42 – 00:00:48). He also added that Lebanon should not be an Islamic Republic on its own, but rather, a part of the Greater Islamic Republic, governed by the Master of Time, the Mahdi, and his rightful deputy, the Jurisprudent Ruler, Imam Khomeini (Nasrallah, 00:00:50 – 00:01:15). This shows that Hezbollah aims to explicitly demand more parliamentary seats based on their demographic size in the right time. This partly solidifies the accusations of the Lebanese Forces that Hezbollah has an agenda to convert Lebanon into a Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.

## **5.4. Amal Movement**

The other major political representative of the Shiite sect does not seem to have an intention to change the political formation for their own benefit. Amal Movement mentions during the interview that they would rather have a secular/civil state. However, at the time being, they are willing to stick to the articles of the Ta'if Accord. Amal Movement's case is similar to that of Hezbollah. Both of them are the major political representatives of the Shiite sect which is currently the highest in demographic size. But unlike Hezbollah, Amal Movement is clear about its stance regarding the change of the parliamentary seats, and they are against it. Their demand of having a civil state is quite questionable given Amal Movement's history in the involvement in sectarian clashes (see Chapter 3). This shows that they are satisfied with the current parliamentary representation, for as Shiite Muslims, they also benefited from the Ta'if Accord when it converted the demographic capital into political capital by adding one Muslim seat.

## **5.5. The Progressive Socialist Party**

The Progressive Socialist Party's case is similar to that of Amal Movement, they also support having a non-sectarian political system and a civil state. The major political representatives of the Druze sect were also involved in sectarian clashes during the civil war (see Chapter 3). The only difference is that the Druze's demographic size is not as significant as the Shiites. They are profoundly not affected by any change owing to the fact their demographic number will not grant them more parliamentary seats, nor will it take any away. This can only be explained as the following; their demand of having a civil

state helps competent Druze to make it into politics, thus, their share would become bigger. One cannot believe that a party with a sectarian history suddenly finds having a civil state as the country's salvation.

## **5.6. Results**

Taking everything into account, the political representatives that belong to the bigger sects in demographic size utilize migration's positive outcomes to seek a better share in the Lebanese parliament. They do not view migration as a positive phenomenon, but they would rather pinpoint its tragic motives instead of the outcomes. Whereas, the political representatives that belong to the sects that lost its demographic size because of emigration, sideline the negative repercussions outmigration can have on its power share. Hence, they are inviting the Lebanese diaspora, primarily those from their sect, to retrieve their citizenship, and to participate in absentee voting to justify their current share.

# Chapter Six

## Conclusion

The history of migration in Lebanon has always had an empirical impact on the numerical size each sect. This in turn has an impact on the Lebanese politics. The numerical size of each sect made the political formation an issue in the context of the struggle over the legitimate political share that each sect should have in the state of Lebanon. The major political parties of the bigger sects in terms of demography demand more political share, while the major political representatives of the sects that are losing their significant demographic size are using the Lebanese people abroad to justify their current share.

As the highest sect in numerical size, the major political representatives of the Shiites implicitly demand further political representation. They believe they are underrepresented, and the six Christian seats for every six Muslim seats is no longer fair given their demographic size.

As the second highest sect in numerical size, the major political representatives of the Sunnis are not requesting more political representation. Given former MP Rafik Hariri has

a huge role in officiating the Ta'if Accord, the Future Movement cannot go against his will. Hariri had always wanted to stop clashes between the Muslims and the Christians, politically and militarily. Although the major representatives of the Sunni sect have a strong stance to ask for additional political representation, they refrain from doing so to fulfill Rafik Hariri's will in having a Lebanon where the Muslims and the Christians coexist peacefully. The reason they are not willing to demand further political representation is primarily emotional and sentimental.

Unlike the two cases mentioned above, the major political representatives of the Christian sects feel highly threatened because the number of the Lebanese Christians is exponentially decreasing. They are aware of the decrease in the number of their sect, and the increase in the number of others. That is why the major political representatives of the Christian sects always mention the Lebanese abroad in their discourse. They strongly believe that counting the Lebanese Christian expatriates will somewhat compensate their loss, and will strengthen their case in justifying their current parliamentary share.

The Druze are basically indifferent about any change in the demography. They are a small closed community who has never been a major sect, and they are aware they will never be one. The major political representatives of the Druze sect demand the abolition of political sectarianism and a civil state. It was mentioned previously, that their demand to establish a civil state may have a sectarian intention. When the political representation no longer has sectarian basis, competent Druze will have more chance to make it into

politics. After the Druze have more than only 9 seats in the Lebanese parliament, the Progressive Socialist Party will then tacitly work in favor of the Druze sect.

The revolution of October 2019 broke out as this dissertation was being finalized. Alongside the economic demands of the revolution, one major unified call is to abolish the sectarian political representation in the governance, and to pave the way to establish a modern secular state. The solution protestors demand to achieve an equitable political representation would rather be working to build a civil state instead of redistributing the sectarian quota. The fate of October 2019 revolution is still ambiguous. Results show that up until now the major political representatives of the religious communities are using the sectarian discourse to try to either sideline the negative repercussions outmigration has had/is having on its power share as defined by the Ta'if Accord, or utilize its positive outcome to seek a better share in the political set up in Lebanon.

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# Appendix A Institutional Review Board Approval



Institutional Review Board (IRB)

لجنة الأبحاث

## NOTICE OF IRB APPROVAL

To: Ms. Zeina Fakhreddine  
Dr. Paul Tabar  
Professor  
School of Arts & Sciences

APPROVAL ISSUED: 5 March 2020  
EXPIRATION DATE: 5 March 2021  
REVIEW TYPE: EXPEDITED – INITIAL

Date: March 5, 2020

RE: IRB #: LAU.SAS.PT3.5/Mar/2020

Protocol Title: Migration, Demographic Changes, and Politics in Lebanon

Your application for the above referenced research project has been reviewed by the Lebanese American University, Institutional Review Board (LAU IRB). This research project qualifies as exempt under the category noted in the Review Type

This notice is limited to the activities described in the Protocol Exempt Application and all submitted documents listed on page 2 of this letter. Enclosed with this letter are the stamped approved documents that must be used.

### CONDITIONS FOR ALL LAU NOTICE OF IRB EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

**LAU RESEARCH POLICIES:** All individuals engaged in the research project must adhere to the approved protocol and all applicable LAU IRB Research Policies. PARTICIPANTS must NOT be involved in any research related activity prior to IRB notice date or after the expiration date.

**EXEMPT CATEGORIES:** Activities that are exempt from IRB review are not exempt from IRB ethical review and the necessity for ethical conduct.

**PROTOCOL EXPIRATION:** PROTOCOL EXPIRATION: The LAU IRB notice expiry date for studies that fall under Exemption is 2 years after this notice, as noted above. If the study will continue beyond this date, a request for an extension must be submitted at least 2 weeks prior to the Expiry date.

**MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS:** Certain changes may change the review criteria and disqualify the research from exemption status; therefore, any proposed changes to the previously IRB reviewed exempt study must be reviewed and cleared by the IRB before implementation.

**RETENTION:** Study files must be retained for a period of 3 years from the date of project completion.

**IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ABOVE CONDITIONS, THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR SHOULD MEET WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE IRB OFFICE IN ORDER TO RESOLVE SUCH CONDITIONS. IRB CLEARANCE CANNOT BE GRANTED UNTIL NON-COMPLIANT ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.**

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact the IRB office by email at [irb@lau.edu.lb](mailto:irb@lau.edu.lb)

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The IRB operates in compliance with the national regulations pertaining to research under the Lebanese Minister of Public Health's Decision No.141 dated 27/1/2016 under LAU IRB Authorization reference 2016/3708, the international guidelines for Good Clinical Practice, the US Office of Human Research Protection (45CFR46) and the Food and Drug Administration (21CFR56). LAU IRB U.S. Identifier as an international institution: FWA00014723 and IRB Registration # IRB00006954 LAUIRB#1

**Dr. Joseph Stephan**  
Chair, Institutional Review Board



**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED:**

LAU IRB Initial Protocol Application	Received 22 February 2020
Proposal	Received 24 February 2020
Consent Form	Received 22 February 2020, amended 4 March 2020
Questionnaire	Received 22 February 2020
NIH Training – Paul Tabar	Cert.# 186703 Dated (17 February 2009)
NIH Training – Zeina Fakhreddine	Cert.# 2928538 Dated (16 September 2018)

# Appendix B Consent Form and Questionnaire

## *Consent to participate in a Survey/Questionnaire Migration, Demographic Changes, and Politics in Lebanon*

*I would like to invite you to participate in a research project by completing the following questionnaire. (I am a student at the Lebanese American University and I am completing this research project as part of my M.A. in Migration Studies). The purpose of this questionnaire aims to examine the impact of migration on both the demographic changes and the political formation in Lebanon.*

*There are no known risks, harms or discomforts associated with this study beyond those encountered in normal daily life. The information you provide will be used to enhance and improve the research gap found in the literature. You will not directly benefit from participation in this study. The study will involve six to eight participants. The interviews will be audio-recorded, and the recordings will be destroyed after transcription. Completing the survey will take 45 minutes of your time.*

*By continuing with the questionnaire, you agree with the following statements:*

- 1. I have been given sufficient information about this research project.*
- 2. I understand that my answers will not be released to anyone and my identity will remain anonymous. My name will not be written on the questionnaire nor be kept in any other records.*
- 3. When the results of the study are reported, I will not be identified by name or any other information that could be used to infer my identity. Only researchers will have access to view any data collected during this research however data cannot be linked to me.*
- 4. I understand that I may withdraw from this research any time I wish and that I have the right to skip any question I don't want to answer.*
- 5. I understand that my refusal to participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which I otherwise am entitled to.*
- 6. I have been informed that the research abides by all commonly acknowledged ethical codes and that the research project has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at the Lebanese American University*
- 7. I understand that if I have any additional questions, I can ask the research team listed below.*
- 8. I have read and understood all statements on this form.*
- 9. I voluntarily agree to take part in this research project by completing the following questionnaire.*

*If you have any questions, you may contact:*

<i>Name (PI)</i>	<i>Phone number</i>	<i>Email address</i>
<i>Zeina Fakhreddine</i>	<i>+96170768001</i>	<i>Zeina.Fakhreddine@lau.edu</i>

*If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or you want to talk to someone outside the research, please contact the:*

*Institutional Review Board Office,  
Lebanese American University, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor, Dorm A, Byblos Campus  
Tel: 00 961 1 786456 ext. (2546), [irb@lau.edu.lb](mailto:irb@lau.edu.lb)*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of participants and Date



الأسم:

مستقل أم عضو في كتلة نيابية؟

أسم الكتلة؟

لأي تيار أو حزب سياسي تنتمي؟

هجرة اللبنانيين من لبنان ظاهرة تاريخية وهي تتفاقم مع مرور الزمن.

هل أنت مشجع لهذه الظاهرة أم لا؟

لماذا؟

هل تعتقد أن استمرار الهجرة من لبنان له أي تأثير على النظام السياسي الطائفي في لبنان؟

ما هو هذا التأثير؟ ولماذا هذا التأثير؟

هل تعتقد أن الحجم العددي للطوائف في لبنان له تأثير على:

المصير السياسي للطائفة المعنية؟

لماذا؟

على النظام السياسي العام في لبنان؟

لماذا؟

من المعروف أن الكنيسة المارونية تحث وتشجع الموارنة في الخارج على المطالبة بجنسيتهم اللبنانية؟ ما

رأيك بهذه الخطوة؟ وهل تؤيدها أم لا؟

هل أنت مع أو ضد تشريع حق المغترب في التصويت من الخارج في الانتخابات النيابية؟

لماذا؟

كيف ترى تأثير هذا الحق سياسياً على كل طائفة في لبنان؟

وعلى مجمل النظام السياسي اللبناني؟

هل تعتقد أن القوى السياسية المسيحية في لبنان أكثر حماساً وتأييداً من القوى السياسية الإسلامية لقانون

التصويت من الخارج ؟

لماذا؟

برأيك ما هو تأثير مشاركة اللبنانيين في الخارج في الانتخابات اللبنانية؟

هل أنت مع أو ضد تغيير حصة الطوائف في البرلمان اللبناني حسب العدد الفعلي للبنانيين المقيمين وغير

المقيمين؟

لماذا؟

هل توافق أم تعارض على المبدأ القائل أن انخفاض عدد طائفة نسبة إلى طوائف أخرى يجب أن ينعكس

بتخفيض عدد المقاعد المخصصة للطائفة الأقل عدداً في البرلمان؟

لماذا؟

انت مع أو ضد فكرة إجراء رسمي لإحصاء اللبنانيين دورياً؟

وفي حال تم القيام بإحصاء رسمي لعدد اللبنانيين، هل توافق على شمل اللبنانيين في الخارج في هذا الإحصاء

أم لا؟

انت مع أو ضد اعطاء الجنسية اللبنانية إذا طالب بها الفلسطينيون والسوريون في لبنان؟

لماذا؟

Institutional Review Board  
Lebanese American University  
05 MAR 2020  
APPROVED