The Lebanese American University

Department of Social Sciences

Course: POL499: Senior Study

Why Intelligence Fails:

Intelligence before the Invasion of Iraq in 2003

By

Murielle Abi Akar

November 25, 2020

Plagiarism Policy Compliance Statement

I certify that I have read and understood LAU's Plagiarism Policy. I understand that failure to comply with this Policy can lead to academic and disciplinary actions against me.

This work is substantially my own, and to the extent that any part of this work is not my own I have indicated that by acknowledging its sources.

Name: Murielle Abi Akar

Signature:

Date: November 25, 2020

Abstract

This Senior Study questions the credibility and function of the national intelligence and examines how failures occur inside these communities. It stresses the work of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its relationship with the Executive branch and the interference and role of policymakers in and with different intelligence units. The analysis will examine the period before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S., under President Bush, decided to attack Iraq suspecting it to have Weapons of Mass Destruction which threaten world peace and security; however, in retrospect, these weapons were nowhere to be found. Therefore, this study will tackle the reasons of such suspicion and commonly known U.S. intelligence failure prior to the invasion in the U.S. government. It will delve into the actions and relationships between the Intelligence Community and the Bush administration. As an outcome, this study shows that the Bush administration pressured the U.S. intelligence community to come up with the results that primarily supported and justified the decision to invade. Policymaker pressure, as a form of politicization of intelligence, on intelligence officials led them to tone down and soften some conclusions from the information that they gathered and analyzed, especially when such intelligence assessments clashed with decision-maker views.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

WMD	**Weapons of Mass Destruction**
U.S.	**United States**
IC	**Intelligence Community**
SSCI	**Senate Select Committee on Intelligence**
UN	**United Nations**
UK	**United Kingdom**
DCA	**Director of Central Intelligence**
DOD	**Department of Defense**

Introduction

After World War II, the U.S. had influence in the international world more than ever before. With this power, it developed a strong intelligence community to prevent external attacks such as Pearl Harbor in 1941. However, many events embarked in the late 1900s between terrorist groups and the U.S. leading to the 9/11 attack in 2001. This action dismayed U.S. agencies and threatened its national security especially that reports at the time indicated that it was an intelligence failure and it could have been avoided. Two years later, intelligence agencies claimed to have information of the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. In response to these perceptions and assessments of WMDs in Iraq, the Bush administration decided to invade the country. Another reason for their invasion was focused on bringing an end to the Saddam Hussein regime and 'liberate Iraq.'

The U.S. Intelligence Community – known as the place where the undisclosed data of the government is gathered and analyzed – has always been prone to failing and vulnerable to information errors. Therefore, the inability of the IC to accurately assess the presence of WMDs in Iraq affected the community's reputation badly, especially after its failure in avoiding the 9/11 attack in 2001. After this failure, people have become skeptical about the country's intelligence and security capabilities and many studies were conducted to further examine the reasons behind it. Knowing that under the Intelligence Community lies numeric inquiries, imagery ones, and tons of information gathered through clandestine or via other means, the public's skepticism endured: how can a failure of this magnitude happen? A lot of perspectives and studies of different points of view addressed the invasion decision and the steps that followed in Iraq. On one hand, some discussed that the invasion had clear political objectives that overshadowed all truths about the

actual presence of WMDs. On the other hand, studies indicated errors in the U.S. intelligence and security systems since the 9/11 attack, which led to the intelligence failure in detecting whether or not there were WMDs.

In this context, it is important to study the role of intelligence, since it has been and continues to be one of the most important organs of a state. Around the globe, decisions of peace/war, or even minor, seemingly insignificant decisions that influence the lives of people are strongly dependent on the output of officials in the Intelligence Community. In his book "The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right", Kenneth Lieberthal states that intelligence is not a matter of science but rather of art, because one of the most important tasks in intelligence is communicating information as effectively and accurately as possible to policy-makers. However, and as this study argues, each President's administration has its own political agenda that it wishes to achieve by any means.[1]

This said, this study seeks to better understand the reasons why U.S. intelligence assessments of WMD in Iraq before the invasion is referred to as an intelligence failure. The time frame of my study is the period between 2001 until the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I chose this time frame because the IC improved its policies after the 9/11 attack and yet the Iraq invasion was classified as another intelligence failure.

The research question of this study is: Despite the fact that the intelligence community improved its intelligence capabilities after the 9/11 attack in 2001, why did it fail to properly analyze and make accurate sense of whether the Hussein regime in Iraq had weapons of mass destruction? The purpose of the research question is to contextualize the findings of the study and to define what exactly I am going to find out. Once answered, the research question will highlight

---

[1] Kenneth Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), 7

why the U.S. assessments of the presence of WMDs in Iraq were inaccurate prior to the invasion. The U.S. intelligence system is the essential organ that ensures national security; therefore, it is vital to study the failure of this system in decisions such as the invasion of Iraq that reflected poorly on the state's foreign policy. Among other factors, the study looks to unveil the dynamics of the relationship between the political administration and the intelligence system and how mutual influence may lead to unorthodox outcomes.

Scope of Study

While the term "intelligence" has many meanings, this Senior Study refers to the term as the information and data gathered and saved at the heart of the government. This study digs into the dynamics of operation and efficiency of the U.S. intelligence system in the face of political pressures. Supported by the case of the 2003 Iraqi invasion, the study answers to questions regarding the credibility and transparency of the IC and why it failed to properly analyze and make accurate sense of whether the Hussein regime in Iraq had WMDs.

In reference to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, I will be examining events that took place in the government prior to the invasion and discuss the elements that led to the failure of assessing the right information concerning the Iraqi WMDs. Moreover, I will shed the light on the relationship between the policy administration and the intelligence system when it comes to decision-making. I will study in depth the agencies of the IC as well as the administration of President Bush at that time, drawing on reliable sources from the library of the Lebanese American University, Google Scholar, governmental reports and speeches to examine the case. The study

will stress on analysis and data that are accessible between the time frame of the 9/11 attack and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Throughout the literature review, I will describe how intelligence works, why and how deficiencies occur internally, and the reasons that led to the 2003 invasion from the perspective of scholars. Furthermore, I will be analyzing these events with emphasis on the Bush administration while referring to unclassified reports and documents from the intelligence agencies and the government.

Literature Review and Gaps

In a country such as the U.S., considered by many to be a hegemon in the world, the role of intelligence is quite essential for its national security since intelligence agencies are responsible for detecting security threats. The state rarely formulates a policy or takes a major decision without relying on intelligence assessments from various individuals tasked with collecting and analyzing different pieces of information. Therefore, U.S. governments have extensively invested time and resources to improve the intelligence system since World War II and until 2001.

In an increasingly interconnected and technologically savvy world, intelligence agencies in the U.S. have recognized some gaps, requiring more centers for data collection and analysis. This is why a lot more agencies were launched reaching about 17 agencies in 2001 under the supervision of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which is the organization responsible for coordinating intelligence and information across and between different agencies in the IC.[2] However, despite the presence of a strong IC, the assessment of the presence of WMDs in

---

[2] "ODNI Home," Home, accessed October 8, 2020, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic.

Iraq in the period before the invasion and later occupation was recognized as an intelligence failure. In this context, it is important to study the information cycle of the intelligence system. This study will synthesize three different perceptions of scholars about the work of the IC before the invasion; the technical failures, the biased information and unconscious psychological factors, as well as the politicization of the system.

The Information Cycle

In order to better understand the factors that led to failure, this section of the study looks into how the system works in the first place. The goals of various units within the intelligence community are mainly (1) to protect the nation from the adversary, (2) to detect any form of deception or attack, and (3) to brief and update the president on pressing developments.[3]

The IC consists of many agencies that were created in order to organize and analyze the flow of gathered information, and after the 9/11 attack, some agencies were added to ensure better organization and coordination in intelligence collection and analysis.[4] ICs strive to have the capabilities and means to uncover the intentions of other governments,[5] which is why the improvements made after 2001 focused on enhancing the relationship between the consumer, mainly policy-makers, and different intelligence analysts to better serve this purpose.[6]

In the book "The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy", the authors made it clear that analyst should provide policy-makers with material that are relevant to what they want,

---

[3] Dione Brunson, "2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE?," 2011, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553294/brunsonDione.pdf., 8

[4] Bruce Berkowitz, "Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence," *Orbis* 45, no. 4 (September 2001): 609–19, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0030-4387(01)00099-0.

[5] Ibid., 11.
[6] Brunson, "2003 IRAQ WAR", 2.

but these should not be based on biased and subjective interpretations.[7] Intelligence results are highly valuable and yet vulnerable to human error and subjectivity, which may very likely impact data analysis and transmission. This said, the process of selecting analysts should be based on strict criteria such as objectivity, transparency, and intensive knowledge of foreign policies.[8]

Moreover, the intelligence cycle involves information collection, analysis, and dissemination to policy-makers. John A. Gentry puts in in simple terms: planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.[9] Viewing the delicacy of the steps involved in this cycle, officials should make sure of the accuracy of the information, detect warnings, transmit them to policy-makers in a timely fashion, and make sure that these information are not stolen or hacked.[10]

Strategic Intelligence Failures

Within the different stages of the intelligence cycle, human errors and mistakes could lead to what is referred to as "intelligence failure". For instance, failure could be the result of poor information gathering. This is why it is very important to, first, make sure of the source of the data, to gather it properly, and to interpret it objectively.

Another failure that could occur is miscommunication. This type of failure could occur between officials while organizing and classifying data or while transmitting intelligence assessments to policy-makers, especially if the intelligence is not delivered in a timely fashion[11].

---

[7] Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy,* 17

[8] Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose Mcdermott, "Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reform," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4, no. 2 (2008): pp. 127-145, 128 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00061.x.

[9] "Intelligence Failure Reframed," *The Academy of Political Science*, n.d., https://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents), 7

[10] Ibid., 7.

[11] "Intelligence Failure Reframed,", 8.

A striking example is the 9/11 attack that could have been avoided had the agencies shared their data amongst them. The fact that there are ample agencies that are responsible to gather data means that they are prone to problems in coordination across different units.[12] This lack of communication between the agencies of the intelligence community was one of the major reasons that led to the 9/11 attack in 2001.[13]

Other studies focus on analysis and the need for analysts to be objective and, in many cases, drafting intelligence assessment that inform how policy-makers perceive policy goals and targets.[14] These are some of the challenges that can lead to an intelligence failure. According to Robert Jervis, many misleading information led to the outcome of the invasion in 2003,[15] and the SSCI had concluded that the data gathered was poorly transmitted.[16] Another mistake that blinded agency officials from detecting the right notes, which Jervis talked about considerably, is their certainty of the presence of WMDs.[17] This was clearly detected in the reports that the IC had published as well as their reliance on data that are not totally reliable. Lastly, Jervis explains in his article that the intelligence did not apply the comparison method, nor did it try to play the Devil's advocate role.[18] In other words, the intelligence service went ahead to look for any evidence to support their invasion case, not to look for the actual truth about the presence of WMDs per se.

---

[12] Loch K. Johnson, *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012))

[13] Stephen Marrin, "The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis," *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 2-3 (2011): pp. 182-202, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140)

[14] Kenneth Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), |PAGE|)

[15] Robert Jervis 1, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 13, doi:10.1080/01402390600566282)

[16] Ibid., 44

[17] Ibid., 14

[18] Robert Jervis 1, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures, 3

The WMDs commission has historically succeeded many times in detecting other countries' WMD – such as the case of Libya importing materials and engaging in WMDs programs in 2003.[19] However, the commission did not properly collect and analyze intelligence and available information in the case of Iraq.[20]

Bias Information and Unconsciousness Psychological Factors

In turn, psychology and biases played a crucial role in the decision of the invasion. Whatever decisions were made, there were people involved – people with prejudices, intentions, incentives, opinions, and even biases.

Such human behavior entails the psychology behind intelligence decisions; an interpretation developed by Dione Brunson, which focuses on analyst's perception and analysis of the data.[21] In her opinion, officials tend to deviate and let their beliefs and political affiliations influence their outputs.[22] Analysts can downplay threats or even distort important information if it does not conform to their mindsets and images of the world.

More precisely, Richard Betts mentions the importance of cognitive psychology.[23] Betts explains that, while searching for a specific assessment, officials might unconsciously pick up only that which supports their case.[24] If they were meant to find data stating that there is WMDs in Iraq, they will search for every word that indicates this notion and might disregard the proof that points

---

[19] Paul Kerr, "Commission Slams WMD Intelligence | Arms Control Association," www.armscontrol.org, n.d., https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/commission-slams-wmd-intelligence.

[20] Robert Jervis 1, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures, 19

[21] Dione Brunson, "2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE?," 2011, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553294/brunsonDione.pdf, 12

[22] Ibid., 13

[23] RICHARD K. BETTS, "Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11and Iraq's Missing WMD," *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no. 4 (December 2007): 585–606, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2007.tb00610.x., 600

[24] Ibid., 600

in the opposite direction. By the same token, a well-known statement was afore mentioned by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."[25] The fact that there was no evidence to prove the absence of WMDs does not mean that one can totally overlook all possible assumptions; in other words, it is only rational to continue to suspect the presence of WMDs; however, to undeniably treat this claim as a fact would be imprudent.

Politicization of Intelligence

Referring again to the role of human beings and the politicization of intelligence, these are imperative factors describing why intelligence fails. Presidential administrations play a crucial role in the decision-making process and any actions that may follow. In fact, information is eventually gathered and transmitted to the administration where decisions are taken. This said, scholars underscore the importance of politicization in their analyses of the case of Iraq in 2003. Betts (2011) highlights that, during the negotiations that took place in Camp David on September 2002, a paper was issued prior to the invasion by the CIA under the title "The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq", which supports the idea that the Americans knew the consequences long before the attack.[26] Stressing more on this, according to the CIA report, the decision to invade was made without taking into account any intelligence information about Iraq.[27] Jervis clearly states in his article that policy-makers exercised pressure on the IC to come up with the answers that they wanted.[28] Some information were omitted and others were recognized to be bias, obviously highlighting the human pressure exercised inside the IC. Moreover, many sources claim that the U.S. and U.K. planned together for this politicization. These sources indicate that

---

[25] Robert Jervis 1, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures, 25
[26] BETTS, "Two Faces of Intelligence Failure", 597
[27] Ibid., 597
[28] Robert Jervis 1, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures, 6

Tony Blair excluded the part that explained that the weapons were no danger and that Saddam used them only to defend himself in order to stress on the urge to invade Iraq and to convince the public that this is for their own security.[29]

Gaps

Considering the fact that most information is classified by agencies, what was shared with the public was vague and some concepts were not properly explained. Most of the articles shed light on the strategic intelligence and described it as a factor for intelligence failure. However, the fact that there were clear signs of politicized intelligence and policymaker pressure deserves more attention. According to some scholars, this was the major reason that led the IC to fail in assessing WMDs in Iraq. Therefore, in this study, I will explain and focus on the politicization that occurred regarding the presence of WMDs and subsequently led to the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. I will draw on reports and varied sources to explain the dangers of politicizing intelligence, especially as it relates to the case of the U.S. and Iraq in 2003.

Argument

Reading several articles that project the point of view of different authors while describing and analyzing the system of intelligence in the US helped me direct the areas of my study. These articles pointed to a crucial deficiency in the intelligence that led to the failure of allocating WMDs in Iraq. The former being a good resort in the Arab region for the U.S., given the reservoirs of oil

---

[29] Ibid., 34

that it contains, which is why it is projected that President Bush needed to invade the country by any means.[30]

The U.S. intelligence system is one of the largest data collection systems in the world, always procuring new improvements within its system to avoid failure. Therefore, within all these improvements, this study examines what happened before the invasion between the in system and the government that led to this outcome. It will demonstrate the role of the intelligence system when it comes to the collection and analysis of data and how the interference of the policy administration could alter the outcome of any investigation.

If the political administration will always find a way to politicize and impact the intelligence system in how they collect and analyze information, then the IC will not be able to perform its function properly. This is likely to decrease the value and importance of the IC, which might lead to more failures such as the Iraqi incident. This study will discuss common practices of policy administrations when the results of the intelligence system oppose their plans; specifically, in the case of the Iraq invasion.

Furthermore, this study will look at politicization and policy-maker pressure on intelligence analysts as independent variables. These terms are characterized by the human pressures exercised on officials in the agencies to get the outcome that favor policymakers' demands, viewpoints, and interests. As for the dependent variable, it is the failure that occurred within the IC prior to the invasion when it was not able to properly identify the Iraqi WMDs program.

Methodology

---

[30] Jervis 1, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures, 7

After studying the structure of the intelligence system and what the U.S. did to improve after the 9/11 attacks, we will study the IC and its failures. For a better understanding of the topic and to eventually answer the research question, I chose the case study method to make a historic reference to an actual incident. During 2003, U.S. officials at that time took the decision to invade Iraq because they believed that the Iraqi government had WMDs which threaten world peace and security. Another reason for their invasion, they claimed, was to help the population eliminate the dictatorship regime by Saddam Hussein. After the invasion, it was clear that there were no WMDs, yet the U.S. military troops remain in Iraq to this day. This led many scholars to believe that there were other political objectives for this act. In this study, I will analyze the intelligence system and interpret the unclassified government data to study the reasons that led to the inefficiency of the information gathered and the debacle of the U.S. IC in analyzing and assessing the presence of WMDs in Iraq. The time frame will be between 2001 and 2003.

In addition, the data collection method used in this study is qualitative only. Primary data consists of all the reports of the government and agencies which were related to the case study, the SSCI reports, and others. As for secondary data, the study relies on academic articles and books. The collected data mainly discusses the case study itself, the relationship between the policy administration and the intelligence system, as well as the coalition of the U.S., UK, and Australia.

Analysis and Findings

Historical Background: U.S.-Iraq Relations

Prior to the Iraq invasion in Kuwait and the aim of annexing it to their land, Iraq had good relations with the western world. However, the clashes of 1990 and the presence of Saddam Hussein, the brutal President of Iraq, were the genesis for some threats to peace and security in the Middle East. Ever since tensions started to grow between Iraq and the U.S. In 1991, the U.S. interfered in Kuwait and eventually defeated Iraq. Indeed, Iraq was known to have WMDs since Saddam used poison gas against Iran in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s.[31] Therefore, the UN drafted many resolutions against Iraq for it to forgo its weapons, but none of these resolutions were adopted, which made the U.S. assume that Iraq still has its non-conventional weapons.[32] This being said, Iraq became the biggest enemy for the U.S. and the place where it would actually set fight and conflicts.

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence shifted its own priorities towards what was dangerously spreading around the world; terrorism.[33] This subject was always a concern to the U.S. government especially after the 9/11 incident. The country was suffering; therefore, the government set every investigation agency to work and figure out what was the reason of this attack. Soon after, Al Qaeda, the terrorist group in Afghanistan that exercised many terrorist attacks, was found to be behind the 9/11 catastrophe.[34] Moreover, in a paper drafted by the Defense

---

[31] John Hope, "The Iraq War: Causes and Ramifications," YouTube Video, *YouTube*, March 3, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhzjhUgT850&ab_channel=JohnHopeFranklinCenteratDukeUniversity.

[32] "Report to the President of the United States The Commission on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Official Government Edition," 2005, 133 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf.

[33] Richard M. (Richard Moody) Swain, "Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (Review)," *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 2 (2005): 611–12, https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2005.0129, 116

[34] "The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT" (National Commission on terrorist attacks, July 22, 2004),335

Department in Camp David, Al Qaeda and Iraq were recognized as a threat to the U.S. since Iraq had interests in terrorism and WMDs.[35]

Between 2001 and 2003, the IC strived to gather all the accurate data possible about Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and terrorist groups. Some of this intelligence indicated that Iraq could be developing WMDs since it is importing chemical substances that are used to build weapons.[36] In order to prevent other attacks such as 9/11 in the U.S. or any other country, President Bush decided to invade Iraq in 2003 to diminish that threat. His statement was scripted and published to the media to reach the public and his claim was backed up by the UK and Australia.[37] After the invasion, and to the surprise of the U.S. administration, there was no evidence of WMDs in Iraq. In other words, the intelligence failed to adequately assess the absence of WMDs. Therefore, this section of the study discusses and analyzes the events that took place before the invasion in order to know why the U.S. failed in assessing the reason behind its attack in Iraq.

Not A Strategic Failure

When President Bush declared war on Iraq, many protests were held all around the world to halt this decision. Consequently, the U.S. government needed a valid reason to vindicate their invasion in Iraq. The main reason behind the failure of the presence of WMDs was the lack of accuracy of information provided by the intelligence system. For instance, the evidence that were on the table prior to the invasion showed how inefficient it was to go into a pre-emptive war while

---

[35] Ibid., 335

[36] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Post war findings about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments", 2006, 14, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf

[37] Alan Doig et al., "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case for War in Iraq, 2002–2003," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (March 2007): 23–40, 25 https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601142484.

some did prove the absence of WMDs in Iraq. Greg Thielmann, who worked in the INR on an important review about Iraq programs and actions,[38] clearly states that there was no proof of any nuclear program that is being refurbished.[39] This review was handed to the Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001. This was one of the pieces of evidence that were available prior to the invasion and indicated the inefficiency of a war in Iraq.

Furthermore, in a letter sent by George Tenet – Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) – on October 2002 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, he stated that Iraq does not impose threat to the U.S. and it would only use its WMDs if it were attacked.[40] In other words, even if there was WMDs, evidence showed how risky it was to invade because Iraq would then use the WMDs and its close ties with al Qaeda as a form of defense. Yet, the Bush administration invaded the country and took advantage of its population. As a result, we might deduce that the policy administration clearly disregarded the evidence in hand for it invaded Iraq despite being alerted about the consequences ahead of time.

In *The New Yorker*, Seymour M. Hersh wrote an article titled "The Stovepipe" stating that it was obvious that evidence were not strong enough for the government to invade.[41] Furthermore, what the U.S. knew about Iraq programs and exchanges following the NIE report in September 2002 was nothing that they did not know before.[42] The only evidence they had dated back to the 1991 Gulf War, and intelligence officials were not sure if the WMDs program was reinitiated or not. Even the CIA never had a clear conclusion about the presence of WMDs in Iraq.

---

[38] Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe," The New Yorker, October 20, 2003.
[39] Ibid.,
[40] Director of Central Intelligence, Letter to Senator Graham from CIA Director George J. Tenet, (George J. Tenet 2002), 2 https://s3.amazonaws.com/caa-production/attachments/360/Tenet_Letter_-_Annex.pdf?1366918926
[41] Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe,"
[42] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 2004, 16 https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf.

The CIA knew about the weakness of the sources that they were provided with, and that this data by itself could not conclude a robust assessment as such of waging war on Iraq.[43] The intelligence was clear about the nature of the found evidence in its communication with the political administration. They clearly explained to the Bush administration that the evidence was blurry and insufficient, and that they needed more time to process the gathered information to come to a conclusion.

All of this goes to show that the policy administration knew about the inconvenient information and still invaded Iraq. The fact that the data sets were insufficient and weak entails that what happened was, indeed, not an intelligence failure. The administration was made aware of the facts and circumstances, but it willingly decided to invade knowing that it can later use the weakness of the intelligence system as an excuse after the invasion to justify the decision to the public.

Human Pressures and Politicization of Intelligence

The Bush Administration

The 43rd President of the U.S., George Bush, reigned from 2001 till 2009, his presidential period having marked a major switch in the U.S. politics and economy. Following his father's steps, President Bush's policy focused majorly on terrorists as he launched the "war on terror" act in 2001 with a keen focus on Iraq, as his father did in back in 1991. His father's influence on him was detected in his speech announcing the invasion. He was even sitting in the same place and

---

[43] Ibid., 14

talking in the same manner as his father did when he announced the decision to attack Iraq, prohibiting it from annexing Kuwait to it. [44]

After gaining public support due to his actions in response to the 9/11 attacks, Bush's main concern was the prevention of other terrorists' attacks, and he methodically used this fear to invade and wage war in Iraq.[45] In his decision, Bush clearly demonstrated his agenda that could not be altered. He used the threats of the presence of WMDs in Iraq to portray a reasonable image to invade; however, there are other political reasons for the U.S. to interfere in Iraq. In fact, there are many pieces of evidence that prove the integration of the Bush administration in the intelligence process.

First of all, oil resources are the utmost priority for the majority of countries. Risking the lives of his soldiers, Bush needed any possible reason to invade Iraq and firmly plant his foot in its ground in order to benefit from the oil gas resources. In 1970, Iraq turned out all the foreign oil firms and nationalized their oil sources.[46] Unsurprisingly, one of the cities that were invaded was Baiji, which is known for the largest oil reservoirs in the country.[47]

Second, after the 9/11 attack, the U.S.'s dominant power diminished and national security was questioned. Thus, in order to insure national and international security, and to conserve the U.S. image as powerful state, the Bush administration decided to launch a war against Iraq and

---

[44] CBS News, "2003: President Bush Announces Invasion of Iraq," YouTube Video, *YouTube*, March 19, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zT-ZHBbOzM&t=118s&ab_channel=CBSNews.

[45] "George W. Bush: Impact and Legacy | Miller Center," Miller Center, July 10, 2017, https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/impact-and-legacy.

[46] John Duffield, ""Oil and the Iraq War: How the United States Could Have Expected to Benefit, and Might Still," 2005, https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=political_science_facpub.

[47] Hamasaeed Sarhang and Nada Garrett, "Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War," United States Institute of Peace, May 29, 2020, https://www.usip.org/iraq-timeline-2003-war.

also portrayed it as an easy one, demonstrating U.S. power and dominance.[48] Officials who

supported the invasion had a challenge to find compelling data to invade Iraq, because the UN did

not give the consent to this invasion since it violated the international law and the UN charters.[49]

This being said, Bush took advantage of every chance to justify his decision to attack Iraq[50] despite

the many protests against it.

In an interview with *The New Yorker*, Seymour M. Hersh revealed that intelligence officials

were aware that some of the senior officials in the Bush administration did not assess intelligence

properly when they came to power.[51] Indeed, it was stated previously that Treishman handed a

document stating that there was no evidence of WMDs to the Secretary of State Colin Powell –

the U.S. Secretary of State being one of the highest positions in administration.[52] Nominated by

the president himself, Powell was a Republican and on the President Bush's side.

Furthermore, the White House did not allow the Senate Select Committee to access the

Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) about Iraq's non-conventional weapons.[53] Preventing access to

CIA articles can lead the Committee to more mysterious assessments about the administration. Not

---

[48] Michael E O'Hanlon, "Iraq Without a Plan," Brookings (Brookings, 2005),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/.
[49] Security Council, "SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS FIRST DEBATE ON IRAQ SINCE START OF MILITARY ACTION; SPEAKERS CALL FOR HALT TO AGGRESSION, IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," Un.org, 2019,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7705.doc.htm.
[50] Ian Cobain and Clara Usiskin, "EXCLUSIVE: UK Spy Agencies Knew Source of False Iraq War Intelligence Was Tortured," Middle East Eye, November 7, 2018,
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-spy-agencies-knew-source-false-iraq-war-intelligence-was-tortured.
[51] Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe,"
[52] Ibid.,
[53] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Post war findings about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments", 2006, 7,
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf

only was the Committee unable to review and examine the accuracy of the findings, but the administration assessments did not even rely on intelligence data.[54]

The political pressures that were exerted at the time deeply affected the intelligence, jeopardizing the work of analysts who strived to gather reliable and trusted sources. More specifically, some information was even altered, such as those indicating that Iraq imported Uranium from Africa.[55] President Bush avoided making any specific claims about this, which indicates how badly the administration wanted every reason to convince the public that there was evidence of non-conventional weapons and the necessity to stop these actions. They were playing on every word in order to convince the UN that Iraq was importing uranium while evidences were not fully trusted and credible.[56]

The Central Intelligence Agency Prior to the Invasion

While every agency in the IC has its specific role and duties, the CIA is dedicated to the White House and takes actions following the president's orders. In 2002, the report of the SSCI clearly mentions that the policy-makers exercised pressure on the CIA[57], which led the CIA to bypass the vetting process.

A former National Security Council expert on Iraq stated that "Bush people" did stovepipe the information and communicated only what was necessary to them back then.[58] This clearly shows that the CIA was the first tool that the Bush administration manipulated. Moreover, it was

---

[54] Ibid., 7
[55] Ibid., 14
[56] Ibid,15
[57] Philip H.J. Davies 1, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (October 2004): 495–520, 511 https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000298188.
[58] Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe," The New Yorker, October 20, 2003

mentioned that John Bolton, Secretary of the State of Arms Control, along with an intelligence team from the INR, were prohibited from entering a meeting concerning the raw product of Iraq.[59] It later turned out that some information about the products were re-addressed in such a way as to favor the administration's position towards the Iraqi WMDs.

Secretary of the Defense Donald Rumsfeld gathered his own team, took information from the Pentagon intelligence, and transformed it in a way that supports the administration's policy agenda.[60] These movements prove the illegal transactions that were going under the table of the IC. The favored analysts that were related to policy-makers were "cherry-picking", as described by Seymour M. Hersh, the information that benefited their affiliations and administration strategies. Subsequently, they used this modified information to convince the public of their actions against Iraq. Moreover, the SSCI indicated that the CIA did not share information about Iraq's programs, but only exposed information proving the threat of Iraq on the U.S. and hid all information necessary for analyst to proceed with their work.[61] Hiding information from analysts means prohibiting them from formulating an official objective statement about the situation. Consequently, it was obvious how the policy-makers took advantage of every possibility to mitigate the information and to exaggerate the threat that Saddam imposed on the U.S.

The Bush administration relied on the single results of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) in October and added to the report only the data and assessments from the CIA, ignoring the data gathered by the INR and the DIA.[62] Once more, it was evident that policy-makers were "cherry picking" only the data that could please the Bush administration agenda and plans.

---

[59] Hersh, "The Stovepipe,"
[60] Davies 1, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States", 511
[61] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq", 28
[62] Davies 1, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,", 510

A competing agency in the IC, the CIA should have strived to prove its credibility to the public especially after the 9/11 attack; however, it manipulated all available data to favor the Bush administration. Furthermore, analysts were not open to other officials from the different intelligence agencies.[63] According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "the Agency lost objectivity" while it took tubes of aluminum to test them without experts from the Department of Energy, again proving the CIA's affiliations.[64] Some, if not all of the illicit actions made by the CIA at the time were obligatory under the orders of the Bush administration.

It is noteworthy to mention that the CIA knew that intelligence agencies delved into the data gathered and some of them demonstrated the absence of the atomic weapons in Iraq. The fact that there were many types of data that did not allow the agencies to draw a firm assentation about the WMDs program further proves that the CIA did not have strong evidence of the presence of WMDs.[65]

"Intelligence to Please"

First used in the Vietnam War, the expression "intelligence to please" refers to the manipulation of information from the intelligence in a way to please the political administration. During the war, President Johnson blatantly "ordered" a report from the CIA, "I need a paper on Vietnam, and I'll tell you what I want included in it."[66] It is evident that the administration's pressure on the CIA has always been the way to achieve their political agendas. Therefore, similar

---

[63] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,", 28
[64] Ibid., 28
[65] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 2004, 28
[66] Ralph Edward Weber, *Spymasters : Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words* (Wilmington: Sr Books, 1999), 251

actions were taken while working on the Iraq WMD case. The intelligence gathered by the NIE on October 2002 were exaggerated and mischaracterized, and they were not assisted by a proper intelligence.[67] This indicated that the data sent to the committee by the intelligence agencies were ignored or altered.

Contrary to intelligence evidence, the policy administration believed that it was easy to invade Iraq and to change the system and the constitution. What is more ironic is that analysts feared losing their jobs if they did not submit information that pleased their superiors, while they should be worried about not giving consistent information.[68] This is how badly the intelligence system is impacted by the leaders' beliefs and demands. Moreover, officials from the Vice President team pressured the IC to give them the exact data that they needed in order to have proof and picture it to the public as legitimate evidence. They demanded from the Community "to look again" and find data that can prove that Iraq and Al Qaeda share a close relationship.[69] In addition, an expert from the DOD said that the CIA in an indirect way was encouraging them to come up with results about the tubes of aluminum tested that they were not going to be used for a rocket program.[70] The CIA was trying to get other departments to engage with it and bring intelligence to please.

---

[67] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 2004, 14.

[68] John Gentry, Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 35–37;(why intelligence)

[69] ROBERT JERVIS, "Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash," *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 2 (June 2010): 185–204, 201 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2010.tb00672.x.

[70] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 2004, 28 https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf

The American, British and Australian Coalition

It is noteworthy to mention that the war against Iraq was always an American target. However, the coalition with other two countries and their military backup was definitely in place to counter the concept of the unique U.S. against Iraq.[71] This alliance affected internal and external opinions; nevertheless, their alliance did add legitimacy to the invasion. The UK and Australia both accepted that there is an urge to take down Saddam Hussein.[72]

John Haword, Prime Minister of Australia, made sure to stand by the Americans aiming to strengthen the U.S.-Australian Intelligence relationship and to get the U.S. more involved in their country, while even projecting to the world their close liaison.[73] From that note, it is self-evident that realism always plays a substantial role in international politics. Haword, similar to what Bush did, politicized the intelligence information to seek his country's own interests from this action which was to engage even more in their relationship with the U.S. According to a governmental report authorized by the senate, the Prime Minister tried to mitigate the intelligence data and declared his decision into war while intelligence doubted the evidence that they had.[74]

On the other hand, Tony Blair, Prime minister of the UK, presented similar evidence as the U.S. to prove the righteousness of the U.S. administration and the necessity to engage in a warfare. The U.S. and UK both relied on human sources for their decision, which impose high risks on the results of the final assessments.[75] To trust only human sources proves a lack of credibility –

---

[71] Alan Doig et al., "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case for War in Iraq, 2002–2003," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (March 2007): 23–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601142484.

[72] Ibid.,

[73] Ibid.,

[74] "THE SENATE IRAQ PROCEDURAL TEXT" (authorized by the senate, December 1, 2003), https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansards/2003-12-01/0080/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf.

[75] Davies 1, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," 509

evidence should be backed by scientific and trustworthy intelligence. The absence of intelligence questions the whole case and the policy-makers' affiliations and preferences. Both the UK and the U.S. took in accordance the confessions of Ibn Al Libi who was captured in the U.S.-run prison of Afghanistan and then was flown to Egypt.[76]

Ibn Al Libi was their major source that they used to prove the presence of a relation between Al Qaeda and Iraq and that there was a plan in Iraq for WMD program. [77] As previously mentioned, the intelligence had a lot of information about Iraq; however, none of them could conclude a firm result about the presence of WMD. Indeed, relying on a human assessment that was the result of massive torture in Egypt would not lead to a solid declaration. Moreover, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) did not give much attention to the September dossier released.[78]

When stating the JIC, we mean the most important intelligence agency in the British government constituting the honorable heads' officials of the government department. The September Dossier was altered prior to its publication overstressing the threat of Iraq in a way to attract the audience, and to be fully addressed against Saddam Hussein.[79] This is a form of human pressure and manipulation. Sources from the intelligence were very clear that they could not assume from it a firm conclusion, and that they were very solid. Indeed, a report from the CSIS states that Bush and Blair did "spin the intelligence" illegitimately in order to please their political

---

[76] Ian Cobain and Clara Usiskin, "EXCLUSIVE: UK Spy Agencies Knew Source of False Iraq War Intelligence Was Tortured," Middle East Eye, November 7, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-spy-agencies-knew-source-false-iraq-war-intelligence-was-tortured.

[77] Ibid.,

[78] Davies 1, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,", 513

[79] Biljana Scott, "A CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES: THE DAVID KELLY AFFAIR," accessed November 25, 2020, https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/IC%20and%20Diplomacy%20%28FINAL%29_Part18.pdf.

concern.[80] Blair, just like Bush, wanted any reason to convince the government that attacking Iraq was a necessity, so he took the risk to change the intelligence results, politicizing the intelligence in the process.

Conclusion

Leaders want to know and analyze the world they are living in, but also need to withstand themselves politically. The utmost goal for President Bush was to enter Iraq; the country that was suspected to have close relations with al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attack in 2001 and many others in the world, even when such intelligence and evidence was scattered and weak. Therefore, Iraq through the perception of the US was seen as threat to world peace and security especially that it was suspected to have non-conventional weapons. In addition, Iraq still has, to this day, large oil reservoirs and continues to be governed by an elite that is not representative of the wider public and masses. These consist some of many justifications used by President George Bush to attack Iraq.

Nevertheless, the intelligence systems strive to give the most credible and accurate information possible. Officials gather data and analyze it in order for policy-makers to process it. However, this community has less power than its own consumers. These formers always find a way to highjack the agencies and select only the data that they need, which was the main reason for the 2003 invasion debacle. This deficiency is the outcome of the divided intelligence system in the U.S., and the way each agency is related to a separate governmental department, which

---

[80] Anthony Cordesman and Arleigh Chair, "The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War(s)," August 6, 2004, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/iraq_intelligenceiraqiwar.pdf.

eventually will tend to please it. Moreover, this system also creates more competition between the agencies over reliability and the consideration from the policy administration.

The Iraqi incident tolerated some conclusions that might never change. First, it emphasized the anarchic world that people are living in. The countries that would disregard humanity matters just to satisfy their own political interests. The Iraq invasion led to the killing of 4,483 American soldiers and about thousands of Iraqi civilians, and yet there was no proof of WMD on the territory when it was invaded.[81] Second, and more importantly, the Intelligence Community's deficiencies were underlined. When officials spent all their efforts to get the finest outcome, and policy administrators made it very simple to interfere and alter what analysts had been working on. The CIA was directly pressured by the Bush administration, since it is the agency responsible for the PDBs. Bush relied on untrusted sources, prohibited other agencies to enter the meetings, and took part of the assessments that only proved that there is WMD in Iraq. What was more appealing is the coalition of the UK and Australia, which also in their turn, played on their intelligence systems and politicized the results to take side with the U.S. They did not need from the U.S. to convince them that Iraq should be confronted, rather they took the principal of the Bush administration and joined the attack. From that note, it is apparent that exercising pressures on humans to get what the administration needs is an action considered everywhere.

In a nutshell, this political interference in the intelligence system does not only threaten the reliability of the intelligence, but the whole democracy in the country. The more there are proof of human pressures in the system, the more a dominant image will reign in the government, which will lose the public support soon after. Additionally, a lot of failures are about to take place if informational agencies are prone to more politicization. Consequently, intelligence communities

---

[81] Youssef Bassil, "The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences," *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 4, no. 5 (2012): 29–47, https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-0452947.

around the world are more likely to lose their reputation if politicians will always find a way to interfere and achieve their agendas implicitly.

Bibliography

"2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis." Accessed October 11,

   2020.

   https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553294/brunsonDione.pdf;seq

   uence=1

Bar-Joseph, Uri, and Rose Mcdermott. "Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach

   to Intelligence Reform." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2008, pp. 127–145.,

   doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00061.x

Bassil, Youssef. "The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences." *IOSR Journal of*

   Humanities and Social Science 4, no. 5 (2012): 29–47. https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-0452947.

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence." *Orbis* 45, no. 4 (September 2001): 609–19.

   https://doi.org/10.1016/s0030-4387(01)00099-0.

BETTS, RICHARD K. "Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq's Missing

   WMD." *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no. 4 (December 2007): 585–606.

   https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2007.tb00610.x.

CBS News. "2003: President Bush Announces Invasion of Iraq." YouTube Video. *YouTube*, March 19,

   2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zT-ZHBbOzM&t=118s&ab_channel=CBSNews.

Cobain, Ian, and Clara Usiskin. "EXCLUSIVE: UK Spy Agencies Knew Source of False Iraq War Intelligence Was Tortured." Middle East Eye, November 7, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-spy-agencies-knew-source-false-iraq-war-intelligence-was-tortured.

Cordesman, Anthony, and Arleigh Chair. "The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War(s)," August 6, 2004. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/iraq_intelligenceiraqiwar.pdf.

Davies 1, Philip H.J. "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (October 2004): 495–520. https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000298188.

Director of Central Intelligence, Letter to Senator Graham from CIA Director George J. Tenet: George J. Tenet 2002, 2 https://s3.amazonaws.com/caa-production/attachments/360/Tenet_Letter_-_Annex.pdf?1366918926

Doig, Alan, James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian, and Rodney Tiffen. "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case for War in Iraq, 2002–2003." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (March 2007): 23–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710601142484.

Duffield, John. ""Oil and the Iraq War: How the United States Could Have Expected to Benefit, and Might

    Still," 2005.

    https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=political_science_facpu

    b.

"George W. Bush: Impact and Legacy | Miller Center." Miller Center, July 10, 2017.

    https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/impact-and-legacy.

Hersh, Seymour M. "The Stovepipe." The New Yorker, October 20, 2003.

Hope, John. "The Iraq War: Causes and Ramifications." YouTube Video. *YouTube*, March 3, 2017.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhzjhUgT850&ab_channel=JohnHopeFranklinCenteratDuk

    eUniversity.

"Intelligence Failure Reframed." *The Academy of Political Science*, n.d.

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

JERVIS, ROBERT. "Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash." *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 2

    (June 2010): 185–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2010.tb00672.x.

Johnson, Loch K. *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. New York: Oxford University

    Press, 2012

Kerr, Paul. "Commission Slams WMD Intelligence | Arms Control Association." www.armscontrol.org,
    n.d. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/commission-slams-wmd-intelligence.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right*.
    Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009

Marrin, Stephen. "The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence
    Analysis." *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 2-3 (2011): 182–202.
    https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140.

"ODNI Home." Home. Accessed October 8, 2020. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-
    of-the-ic.

O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Iraq Without a Plan." Brookings. Brookings, 2005.
    https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/.

Ralph Edward Weber. *Spymasters : Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words*. Wilmington: Sr Books, 1999.

"Report to the President of the United States The Commission on the Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Official Government Edition," 2005.
    https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf.

Robert Jervis. "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq." *Journal of Strategic
    Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 3-52. doi:10.1080/01402390600566282.

Sarhang, Hamasaeed, and Nada Garrett. "Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War." United States Institute of

    Peace, May 29, 2020. https://www.usip.org/iraq-timeline-2003-war.

Scott, Biljana. "A CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES: THE DAVID KELLY AFFAIR."

    Accessed November 25, 2020.

    https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/IC%20and%20Diplomacy%20%28FINAL%29_Pa

    rt18.pdf.

Security Council. "SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS FIRST DEBATE ON IRAQ SINCE START OF

    MILITARY ACTION; SPEAKERS CALL FOR HALT TO AGGRESSION, IMMEDIATE

    WITHDRAWAL | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." Un.org, 2019.

    https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7705.doc.htm.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar

    Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 2004. https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/ssci_iraq.pdf.

Swain, Richard M. (Richard Moody). "Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire

    (Review)." *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 2 (2005): 611–12.

    https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2005.0129.

"THE SENATE IRAQ PROCEDURAL TEXT" (authorized by the senate, December 1, 2003),

https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansards/2003-12-

01/0080/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf.

Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq's ... (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2020, from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202928

 "The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT" National Commission on terrorist attacks, July 22, 2004.

COLLABORATIVE INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING INITIATIVE (CITI PROGRAM)
COMPLETION REPORT - PART 1 OF 2
COURSEWORK REQUIREMENTS*

* NOTE: Scores on this <u>Requirements Report</u> reflect quiz completions at the time all requirements for the course were met. See list below for details. See separate Transcript Report for more recent quiz scores, including those on optional (supplemental) course elements.

- **Name:** Murielle Abi AKar (ID: 9014804)
- **Institution Affiliation:** Lebanese American University (LAU) (ID: 3787)
- **Institution Email:** murielle.abiakar@lau.edu
- **Institution Unit:** LAU School of Arts & Sciences
- **Phone:** 0096176175410

- **Curriculum Group:** IRB Exempt Research
- **Course Learner Group:** Same as Curriculum Group
- **Stage:** Stage 1 - Basic Course
- **Description:** No direct contact with human subjects.

- **Record ID:** 35982367
- **Completion Date:** 18-Mar-2020
- **Expiration Date:** 18-Mar-2023
- **Minimum Passing:** 70
- **Reported Score*:** 92

REQUIRED AND ELECTIVE MODULES ONLY	DATE COMPLETED	SCORE
History and Ethical Principles - SBE (ID: 490)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBE (ID: 491)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Informed Consent - SBE (ID: 504)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBE (ID: 505)	18-Mar-2020	3/5 (60%)
Assessing Risk - SBE (ID: 503)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)

For this Report to be valid, the learner identified above must have had a valid affiliation with the CITI Program subscribing institution identified above or have been a paid Independent Learner.

Verify at: www.citiprogram.org/verify/?kd0e56eba-651c-4a04-847b-f8cf8bb8f5f0-35982367

Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI Program)
Email: support@citiprogram.org
Phone: 888-529-5929
Web: https://www.citiprogram.org

COLLABORATIVE INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING INITIATIVE (CITI PROGRAM)
COMPLETION REPORT - PART 2 OF 2
COURSEWORK TRANSCRIPT**

** NOTE: Scores on this <u>Transcript Report</u> reflect the most current quiz completions, including quizzes on optional (supplemental) elements of the course. See list below for details. See separate Requirements Report for the reported scores at the time all requirements for the course were met.

- **Name:** Murielle Abi AKar (ID: 9014804)
- **Institution Affiliation:** Lebanese American University (LAU) (ID: 3787)
- **Institution Email:** murielle.abiakar@lau.edu
- **Institution Unit:** LAU School of Arts & Sciences
- **Phone:** 0096176175410

- **Curriculum Group:** IRB Exempt Research
- **Course Learner Group:** Same as Curriculum Group
- **Stage:** Stage 1 - Basic Course
- **Description:** No direct contact with human subjects.

- **Record ID:** 35982367
- **Report Date:** 18-Mar-2020
- **Current Score**:** 92

REQUIRED, ELECTIVE, AND SUPPLEMENTAL MODULES	MOST RECENT	SCORE
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBE (ID: 491)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Assessing Risk - SBE (ID: 503)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Informed Consent - SBE (ID: 504)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBE (ID: 505)	18-Mar-2020	3/5 (60%)
History and Ethical Principles - SBE (ID: 490)	18-Mar-2020	5/5 (100%)

For this Report to be valid, the learner identified above must have had a valid affiliation with the CITI Program subscribing institution identified above or have been a paid Independent Learner.

Verify at: www.citiprogram.org/verify/?kd0e56eba-651c-4a04-847b-f8cf8bb8f5f0-35982367

Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI Program)
Email: support@citiprogram.org
Phone: 888-529-5929
Web: https://www.citiprogram.org