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Explaining the Downfall of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi: A Closer Look at the Domestic, Regional and International Fronts

By

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Dedication

To the beautiful feeling of gratitude
that keeps me going

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ABSTRACT

This is a study on Egypt's brief interlude of civilian rule that lasted for just over a year between June 2012 and July 2013. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ascended to the presidency in what was hitherto Egypt's most democratic election. Morsi, the first civilian to hold the highest office in the state, was ousted from power in July 2013 in a military coup that was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This study seeks to explain the downfall of the Morsi regime, through emphasizing the dynamic interplay of three factors: 1) the regime's mismanagement of relations with powerful and autonomous state institutions (particularly the military) and with broad segments of Egyptian society; 2) its inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt's economic performance; and 3) its mishandling of Egypt's external relations with powerful regional and international players. The thesis contends that while none of the aforementioned factors singlehandedly explains why Egypt's democratic experiment under Morsi (imperfect as it was) fumbled, their complex interplay created a powerful platform that the military, and its allies within the state and society, exploited to bring down Morsi and the MB. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on the domestic and international conditions that can often lead to the faltering of democratic transitions.

Keywords: Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, Egyptian uprising, Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian military, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Democratic transitions, Domestic policies, Economic policies, Foreign relations, Deep state.

Table of Contents

Chapter **Page**

List of Figures

Chapter One

Introduction

This is a study on the brief period of civilian rule in Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi (also written Muhammad Mursi) after the deposing of Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, during the Egyptian uprising. Morsi, being the candidate representing "The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party" (*Hizb al-hurriyyah wa al-ʿadala*), assumed his duties as president on June 30, 2012, after he won Egypt's first popular democratic elections (Wickham, 2013). Morsi's rule only lasted one year before he was overthrown by a military coup d'état on July 3, 2013 (Abdelrahman, 2014).

This thesis aims to investigate the myriad of factors at the local, regional, and international levels that contributed to the eventual downfall of President Morsi. More specifically, it will explore how the mismanagement of the internal politics, the economy, and the foreign affairs of Egypt between June 30, 2012, and July 3, 2013, all contributed in this downfall.

1.1 Between the 2011 Egyptian Uprising and the Fall of Morsi in 2013

On January 25, 2011, millions of people of different socio-economic backgrounds and religions descended to Cairo's Tahrir Square to protest against the regime of Hosni Mubarak for eighteen consecutive days. Primarily, people were despondent with numerous domestic issues particularly in relation to the country's economic situation. In addition, the Egyptian people also opposed the government's corruption and the Mubarak regime's constant focus on its own survival rather than on improving the domestic

situation of the country. The citizens were aiming for a better future, which was the reason behind the relentless demonstrations that resulted in successfully bringing down President Mubarak who had been in office since 1981 (Kandil, 2012). The ousting of Mubarak materialized when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) deposed him on February 11, 2011, and charged him in military court with corruption and other criminal offences (Norton, 2013).

Later that same year, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) formed the "Democratic Alliance for Egypt" with several smaller parties in the country including the Salafi-affiliated Al Nour Party. The Brotherhood's alliance entered the parliamentary elections in November 2011 and won 216 parliamentary seats (43.4 % of the total number of seats). In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood along with other Islamist parties won the vast majority of the parliamentary seats. Consequently, the FJP along with other Islamist groups had the privilege of choosing the majority of the one hundred members of the Constituent Assembly. As a result, two-thirds of the Assembly members belonged to Islamist parties. It is important to note that the significance of the Assembly is due to its major role in drafting Egypt's new constitution (Wickham, 2013).

Following the huge representation of the Islamist groups in the parliament and the Constituent Assembly (CA), a group of lawyers and activists went to the Higher Administrative Court in order to try to disband the CA as they argued that the Assembly was not representative of the different groups of parliament and society. This lawsuit did not lead to dissolving the CA (Hope, 2012). However, a few months later, on April 1, 2012, the Higher Administrative Court disbanded the Constituent Assembly, basing its verdict on the parliament's error of assigning members of the parliament for more than 50

of the Assembly's 100 seats (Hope, 2012). Although the Court disbanded the Assembly for procedural reasons, the primary (concealed) intention behind the dissolution of the Assembly was political, more specifically related to the issue of the "Islamists' domination" (Revkin and Auf, 2012).

In the same period, the Security Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) banned the formation of a new government before the presidential elections. The SCAF feared that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would use its large base in the parliament to appoint an Islamist cabinet as a way to gain more power (Hope, 2012). In fact, based on the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that was made by the military after the overthrow of Mubarak, the SCAF became the only institution with the ability to assign the new cabinet before the presidential elections of 2012. As a result, the military leaders became the people to appoint the country's cabinet. However, this military-assigned cabinet had to resign once the presidential elections took place late in June 2012 (Wickham, 2013).

Prior to the 2012 presidential elections, the Presidential Election Commission that had been organized by the SCAF disqualified ten presidential candidates including three Islamists. One of the disqualified candidates was Mohamed al-Shatir, the Muslim Brotherhood's first choice for the presidential candidacy. The Commission assured that the disqualification was based on legal issues that these candidates had faced in the past (Fadel, 2012 April). However, al-Shatir and other members of the Brotherhood perceived the rejection of the candidacies of three strong Islamists to be a premeditated action made by SCAF and the members of the Presidential Election Commission who were mostly "sympathizers with the old regime" (Leyne, 2012). Mohamed Morsi, the Brotherhood's second choice after al-Shatir, was promoted as "the candidate of the revolution." Morsi

promised to work on unifying all Egyptians and properly representing them (Egypt Independent, 2012).

According to Al-Awadi (2013), the fall of Hosni Mubarak created a vacancy in the presidency which in turn helped the Muslim Brotherhood benefit from being a legitimate opposition to the previous regime. The Brotherhood also profited from the fact that the Muslim majority in Egypt shared similar religious beliefs. This can generally explain the success of the Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections of 2011 and the presidential elections of 2012 (Seeberg, 2012). However, it should also be noted that the MB was one of the most organized parties in the country with a grass roots operation spreading across Egypt. This, of course, was a factor that lent efficiency and experience despite it being its first time running for a national election (Seeberg, 2012).

On June 24, 2012, the Presidential Election Commission officially announced the results of the election showing that Morsi succeeded in becoming the first civilian president of Egypt with 51.7% of the votes against his opponent Ahmad Shafiq. Morsi's election was a historic event for Egypt because, as stated by Wickham (2013):

> *"Mursi's victory was a watershed event. For the first time in Egypt's history - as some Mursi supporters put it, "for the first time in seven thousand years" - the Egyptian people had selected their ruler in free and fair elections. In another precedent, an Islamist had become the democratically chosen president of a modern Arab state."*

On July 3, 2013, Morsi was overthrown by a military coup d'état in the wake of another round of popular demonstrations (Choppin, 2013). Despite its brevity, the

presidency of Morsi had to face multiple challenges that it largely failed to address. The 2013 coup d'état was carried out by the military under the leadership of Colonel General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces at the time. A few months later, al-Sisi was elected as the sixth President of the Republic. He has been recognized as the de jure and de facto leader of the country since his election in June 2014 (Trager, 2015).

1.2 Significance and Contribution to the Field

The Egyptian case between the years of 2011 and 2013 is of particular interest for a number of researchers. The 2011 peaceful uprising relied on popular demonstrations and sit-ins to bring about regime change. The fall of Mubarak was followed by a transitional period which witnessed an expansion of the public sphere and the entry of new players into the political arena (Seeberg, 2012). This phase culminated with the holding of Egypt's hitherto most democratic presidential elections that resulted in Morsi's coming to power (Shama, 2014). The significance of this study lies in seeking to explain why the civilian rule in Egypt failed to entrench itself and was brought to an abrupt ending by the military and its domestic and international allies. It thus hopes to contribute to the literature on why sometimes democratic transitions falter.

A number of studies have focused on how specific factors, such as Egypt's economic performance and the international pressure contributed to the collapse of Morsi's civilian rule in Egypt. The contribution of the current study lies in advancing a multi-causal explanation that ties together several factors in seeking to explain such an important development. Accordingly, this thesis aims to identify and elaborate on the interplay of multiple internal and external factors that collectively were responsible for the downfall

of Morsi. Again, this thesis underscores that no single factor by itself, be it internal or external, could explain this important development. It is necessary to look carefully at how various factors and forces coalesced to bring down this brief interlude of civilian Islamist rule.

1.3 Research Question

The circumstances in Egypt since the uprising of 2011 have attracted the attention of a number of researchers. Still, there is room for studies on various aspects of this important period. The uprising in response to Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian tendencies led many to believe that democratization was in the works (Brown, 2013, p. 45). However, this was not the case. In fact, a comparison between Egypt before the uprising of 2011 and post-Morsi Egypt, might reveal striking similarities between the current regime and the ones that dominated Egypt prior to 2011. After the fall of Morsi in 2013, the military is still the leading institution in the country and controls the Egyptian state structure where many ministers and workers in the public sector are themselves part of the military (Brooke, 2015). It is puzzling to see Egypt reverting to pre-2011 conditions despite the upheaval it underwent between 2011 and 2013.

Moreover, the sudden ousting of Morsi was shocking for many of the MB members and supporters. More than a year after the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, one of Morsi's presidency advisors said in a confidential interview with Hamid that "the president" – referring to Morsi – was informed, in the meetings that took place a couple of months before the 2013 coup, that al-Sisi was possibly working discreetly to overthrow him. However, Morsi trusted al-Sisi at the time and did not take any action to

try to counteract the claimed potential conspiracy because he wanted to avoid public distress that could be caused by "bad news" (Hamid, 2016).

Furthermore, even before the coup, Hamid (2016) argues, the Egyptians had "the sense that democracy had failed to bring real gains" which triggered "the breakdown of political order, the return of the generals, and the overthrow of Egypt's first democratically elected president" (Hamid, 2016). Although Morsi's rule deviated from many democratic standards, the Egyptian feeling that the civilian presidency did not bring about change during Morsi's rule and the question marks drawn by the Muslim Brotherhood supporters after the downfall of Morsi makes it essential to analyze the reasons behind the fall of the Brotherhood's rule. Thus, it is important to study the year of the civilian rule of Morsi in order to understand why Morsi, the MB president, failed to remain in power.

This is why this thesis will try to explain how the interplay of three key factors that laid the groundwork for the overthrow of Morsi. While there are a number of ways approach analyzing the failed interlude of civilian rule in Egypt, the coming chapters will examine how Morsi's management of the internal politics, the economy, and the foreign affairs played a role in the fall of the civilian regime in Egypt. The thesis will ask: To what extent did the policies pursued by the Morsi regime in the internal politics, the economy and foreign affairs contribute to bringing down the 2012 democratically elected President Morsi?

1.4 Methodology

This is a qualitative analysis of secondary and primary sources written in both English and Arabic, on the main access points that this thesis examines. It will also include a comparative analysis of the foreign relations under Morsi's rule and before his rule, as well as an online research of secondary sources. The analyzed factors that are studied to help explain the fall of Morsi are part of the internal and external levels.

In academic jargon, the independent variables are 1) Resistance of broad segments of Egyptian society and the powerful and autonomous state institutions that comprised more than the military; 2) Mismanagement of the economy represented by the inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt's economic performance; and 3) Foreign pressure after mishandling Egypt's external relations with powerful regional and international players. The dependent variable is the downfall of Morsi and the end of the civilian interlude.

1.5 Theoretical framework

This study is informed by a number of theories in efforts to build a significant analytical framework regarding this study's research question. To start with the level of the internal politics, it deals with the insights of deep state theory that claims that well-entrenched institutions (particularly the military and the judiciary) have the capacity of undermining the authority of new leaders who threaten to challenge their interest and placement within the political order. It also borrows from the insights of Political Economy theories that highlight the role of poor economic performance in eroding the regime's legitimacy. In an equally important manner, this thesis also highlights the role of the regional and international environment as factors constricting the freedom of action

of leaders. Egypt's status as a declining power in economic and military terms was partly responsible for the ability of outside players, mainly the rich Gulf States, to exploit its economic vulnerabilities in order to instigate regime change within the country.

In the next chapter, the literature review surveys the material on each of these theoretical frameworks.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 The Deep State in Egypt's Post-uprising Period

The notions of the deep state (*Derin Devlet* in Turkish) were first brought to light in Turkey starting in 1974 by Bülent Ecevit who was Turkey's Prime Minister at that time and was commenting the actions of Counter-Guerilla (Söyler, 2015). The Turkish Deep State was mostly expressed in the 1990s when the military and the judiciary were considered as two cooperative institutions that seemed to 'run' the system behind the scenes (Filiu, 2015).

Söyler (2015) generally argues that the deep state is associated with a cycle of renewed authoritarian institutions in the state. This internal renewal means that main figures might change inside these institutions, but the well-established principles continue regardless of the front figures. In addition, the deep state feeds on the fear of the opposition or new rulers who seek to make changes in the state's institutions. In fact, the deep state makes sure to stay powerful despite new leaders through "exerting a coup threat, instigating military interventions, and committing organized crime and extrajudicial killings within the boundaries of the formal security apparatus" (Söyler, 2015).

In Arabic, the deep state is known as *al-dawla al-'amîqa*. This concept became applicable in the Arab World especially after the "Arab Spring." However, before the recent Arab uprisings, the deep state could not be used in Arab politics because the ruling

systems were dictatorial and the main institutions such as the military and judiciary were run by the regime itself (Filiu, 2015). In these Arab countries, the deep state institutions worked hand in hand with the dictatorial regimes to ensure the authority of the ruling leaders.

Historically, the military has been considered the actual leader of Egypt since the Mamluk era in the 13th century (Choppin, 2013). Then, during the British rule, the Egyptian military and bureaucracy became independent of the religious leaders. This established the foundation of Egypt's deep state represented by a weak parliament with a strong military, judiciary, and bureaucracy (Zeghal, 1999). After the 1952 Egyptian revolution against the monarchy, the Egyptian deep state developed and the military forces were strengthened. Egypt was militarized, and military leaders came to power in the post-1952 state (Abul-Magd, 2018, p.35 - 37). Therefore, during Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule, the state institutions were restored and reinforced in a way that built up strong grounds for the deep state. Nasser, who was representative of the military at the time, controlled the media and repressed opposition. Under Nasser, the government became more and more dependent on its powerful military. Furthermore, Nasser controlled Al Azhar, the Sunni authority in Egypt (Zeghal, 1999).

The strength of the Egyptian military persisted even after Nasser and continued to develop under Anwar Sadat. The proof of the capabilities of the Egyptian Armed Forces is represented through military control over the situation in the country after the assassination of Sadat. The military was able to maintain stability within the country. The military even brought to power another high-ranking military figure, Hosni Mubarak who was Sadat's vice president at that time (Marcoux, 1990). It is argued that Sadat's

assassination served the deep state since it provided a reason for publicly legitimizing the role of the Egyptian military to protect the country from any kind of threat, especially coming from the Islamists (Marcoux, 1990).

Mubarak contributed to the strengthening of the deep state. He also extended his authority over civil society. For example, Mubarak imprisoned eighteen thousand members of the opposition, mostly Islamists, for political reasons. Under Mubarak, the military, judiciary, and other bureaucracies were interlinked with the government. This created a form of state's dependency on the military and the judiciary (Delvoie, 2013).

However, as previously mentioned, Mubarak's thirty-year reign ended in February 2011 following the Egyptian popular demonstrations. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control of the country until the election of the new president. Therefore, the SCAF controlled Egypt's power on the presidential, legislative, and executive levels (Lesch, 2011). After the uprising, the Armed Forces sought to reinforce their influence in the Reform of the Security Sector. The SCAF used "security threats" as a justification for their control which even extended to ministries (that were supposed to be civilian institutions) (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012). As put in the words of Norton (2013):

> *"Not only was the paramount role of the military unimpeded after the exit of Mubarak, but other key institutions were undiminished in their power. These include the ministry of the interior, which controls the much-despised and feared police, and the judiciary. In short, the bureaucratic behemoth was unaffected by the shuffling of chairs at the top."*

The 2011 "revolution" did not affect the internal security apparatus. Actually, what remained from the Mubarak regime's deep state surpassed the institutional framework to include five million Egyptian workers within state institutions, namely the military. The workers' role was to mainly keep an eye on the political space and repress dissent (Norton, 2013).

For the case of Egypt, after the 2011 uprising, one can talk about a strong, deep state with well-established networks between major state institutions. The military (the armed forces more specifically) was considered the leader of these networks that comprise the judiciary, the high-ranking bureaucrats in the state's administrations, as well as major businesses and industries (Saleh & Daragahi, 2012). It is even discussed by many analysts that the deep state is a major difficulty facing the transition to democracy in the post-uprising Arab States. This was believed especially because the deep state in Arab countries such as Egypt is considered very powerful (Filiu, 2015).

2.2 The Economy and Regime Change

The link between economic crisis and regime change has been widely studied in recent decades, producing research that overwhelmingly supports the idea that economic crises have the potential to cause changes in the regime or political structure. The exact nature of this change is debated within the literature – some scholars argue that economic crises lead to the disintegration of democratic processes; while other scholars argue they may actually catalyze democratic transition. Regardless of the direction, the consensus that the two events are related has become widely accepted in academia (Gasiorowski, 1995). One of the most prominent scholars who has worked on this relationship is Theda Skocpol (1979). Skocpol argues that one of the factors that can trigger demands for

change in the government is disorganized economic development which has in some way disappointed people's expectations. This results in the destruction of the present government (Skocpol, 1979).

In addition, there are specific institutional and structural aspects considered by some to contribute towards a regime's sway in the direction of either authoritarianism or democracy. These aspects were often socioeconomic in nature, such as urbanization and development, income levels, and education levels, and linked economic development to the concept of "modernization," a theory which would come to greatly influence the way in which Western scholarship would approach economic and development issues in the Middle East context (Gasiorowski, 1995).

Modernization theory designates a state's position within a linear path beginning with authoritarianism and ending with democracy. Low levels of certain socioeconomic indicators place a state closer to the authoritarian side of the spectrum, whereas higher levels place the state closer to democracy. The development of a country from an authoritarian state to a democratic state is simultaneously accompanied by economic development (Deutsch, 1961). In other words, a transition to democracy occurs in conjunction to a transition to a market economy. Some scholars take modernization theory to the next step by arguing that not only do these things occur simultaneously, but the transition to a market economy actually fosters the social conditions necessary to pressure a state to move towards democratization. Lipset (1959) is one scholar from the advocates of this point of view who argues that economic development is a precondition for democratization. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (1997) have argued that this theory can be applied further and used to analyze newly democratized regimes, specifically in

the context of analyzing policy decisions, law, and state institutions (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997).

Along the same lines, Peerenboom (2008) argues that economic prosperity is strongly related to change in the rule of law and democracy. For instance, among the Asian countries that went through political upheavals or popular demands for change, only those that had attained economic growth beforehand effectively democratized, such as Taiwan and South Korea. Nevertheless, countries that sought democratization with low economic development levels failed to achieve stability. Examples include countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and India (Peerenboom, 2008). Thus, based on this argument, economic growth can be an important factor to successfully transition to democracy or even to simply maintain stability in a country after popular upheavals. Similarly, Przeworski (2004) argued that countries that have a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have a better capacity at remaining democratic after transition than countries with a low GDP (Przeworski, 2004). Therefore, there is plenty of literature to suggest that economic development can play an important role in the change of the ruling regime.

This discussion provides unique insights into the case of Egypt in 2011. Egypt's dire economic state catalyzed not only the 2011 popular uprising but also directly contributed to Morsi's deposition as this was one of the most predominant concerns among Egyptians, particularly the younger generation, at that time.

2.3 Foreign Affairs and Regime Form

According to Gourevitch (1978), external factors are always acting upon and influencing a state's domestic affairs, affecting not only events and policies but also the nature of the state itself and sociopolitical hierarchies within the society (Gourevitch, 1978). Regional and international players can influence internal political developments and the security of a certain country (Gourevitch, 1978, p. 896). This will be particularly relevant while discussing the Egyptian regime under Morsi.

In the context of the international state system, it is also important to address the role of geopolitics, more specifically, any kind of interaction between countries based on geographical position, perspectives, and political practices (Cohen, 2003). This notion of geopolitics is especially relevant to the relations between the West (mostly the United States and the European Union) and North African countries such as Egypt. Cavatorta (2001) argues that the Western geopolitical interest in North African countries represent the major challenge for achieving democracy in these countries. These challenges originate from the West's geostrategic fears over their interests in North African countries which can discourage the promotion of democracy. For instance, one of the Western fears, in their countries of interest, is security. Consequently, these western powers could provide support for certain dictatorships in order to guarantee their interests. To be more precise, the U.S. and the EU could accept dictatorial regimes to protect their five geopolitical interests with Northern African countries. These interests are related to benefiting from energy resources, as well as economic liberalization, controlling migration to the West, defying the possible appearance of Islamic regimes, and keeping peace with Israel (Cavatorta, 2001, p. 181).

To take this theory one step further, Kristina Kausch (2015) argues that the West's interest in regional, political and economic dynamics in the Middle East, is largely defined by geopolitical zones of Western interest (Kausch, 2015, p.12). According to Kausch, the Western countries' concern for their own stakes further hinders possibilities for democratization. In fact, Western states such as the U.S. and members of the EU, trade prospects of democratization in order to secure their own concerns regarding their security and interest. In many cases of securitization in authoritarian states, Egypt providing just one example, this results in Western backing for authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa region (Kausch, 2015, pp. 13-16).

Securitization also plays a large role in defining the state's relationship to society and is commonly a result of global threats as discussed by Gourevitch (1978). Regardless of the legitimacy of a security threat, the perception of a threat allows the state to behave in a way that justifies authoritarian tactics in front of the society and the international community. The state can take many measures such as limiting free speech, regulating political parties, and cracking down on civil society, all in the name of "security." The state's efforts to secure itself follow a three-step process: Firstly, an actor who claims the emergence of an existential threat. Secondly, the actor takes many unusual countermeasures. Thirdly, the actor tries to convince the public that "those measures are justified to counter the threat" (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). In this instance, the state plays the role of the actor.

Typically, the authoritarian measures adopted by the state are not lost on the public or the external players; but rather tolerated for their apparent benefits. The democratic process becomes a necessary sacrifice in the eyes of the public. Still, it should also be

noted that the emergency measures taken by the state institutions against the threat come as a justification for less transparency of government processes and less involvement of the public in major decisions. Therefore, moves towards securitization often involve the end of the "dynamics of normal politics" (Williams, 2012). The effects of securitization are amplified with global threats such as terrorism. Therefore, global threats have the ability to reveal the "non-democratic characters" of states that are susceptible to them. The state's institutions to a global threat can "sustain authoritarian, totalitarian, or fascist regimes" (Gourevitch, 1978).

Furthermore, global threats also increase the odds of military control. The regime type, coalitions, and policies after the securitization process show the influence of the threat on the state. In many cases, it includes the army's domination and take over state power (Gourevitch, 1978). As previously mentioned, certain external players interfere in the domestic affairs of states in which they have geopolitical interests. This foreign meddling in these states' affairs poses obvious concerns for the wellbeing of the people. In fact, external players can give power to the army, for example, to protect their own interests (Cavatorta, 2009). Ultimately, securitization allows states to forego democracy and checks and balances in the name of "security." Naturally, these securitization processes usually provide extensive power to the military and armed forces, often making them inseparable from politics, and excuse authoritarian tactics executed by the state (Collins, 2013). This is especially applicable in the case of Egypt when many regional and international players accepted the claims that consider the Islamist rule of the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat not only for Egypt; but also on the international level. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

The coming chapters will argue that the failures of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in three overlapping areas were behind the growth of public discontent that culminated in the military coup d'état in 2013. It will specifically focus on assessing the role played by three leading themes that were separately mentioned in the few studies and papers written about this topic. The three discussed areas describe the Egyptian case during the Morsi rule, namely: the resistance of Egyptian domestic players that comprised more than the military, the mismanagement of the economy, and the foreign pressure.

Accordingly, this thesis will be divided into three main parts, respective to each of these three factors. Finally, it will conclude by showing the contribution of the three studied factors on Morsi's downfall in an attempt to analyze the successfulness of the Egyptian "revolution."

Chapter Three

Morsi's Mismanagement of Egypt's Internal Politics

This chapter surveys the main challenges that Morsi faced inside Egypt after he was elected by the public following the 2011 revolution. These challenges were mainly represented in three areas. First of all, the people refused the way Morsi tried to assert his authority in the country; people perceived his way as a new dictatorship, more precisely an Islamist one. Second, Morsi's troubled relationships with the civil society groups and the media caused huge discontent in Egyptian society. Finally, he failed to face the resistance of the deep state, particularly the military forces.

Before the uprising and throughout Mubarak's rule, Egypt was considered as a weak authoritarian state by many political scientists including Ninette Fahmy (2002). Fahmy argued in her book *The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relationship* that not only did the state have a weak authoritarian regime, but also the existing oppressive policies (implemented by the government) contributed in the weakening of the Egyptian society. The repressive actions implemented by the state were felt by individuals and different groups in society. Actually, the Mubarak regime had consistently oppressed political opposition parties, labor unions and syndicates, and other social organizations. This made it even more difficult for the people to bring on change within the regime (Fahmy, 2002). Indeed, the same society that was fragmented under Mubarak's rule continued to follow this pattern for several years, until it succeeded to unite in ousting President Mubarak in

February 2011. This happened when the weak authoritarian regime of Mubarak was doomed to fail as an effect of the people's uprising. More than a year later, in June 2012, Morsi, the representative of a religious group, the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected by the Egyptian people (Shama, 2014).

3.1 The Brotherhood's Islamization Project

First and foremost, it is important to understand the history behind the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood first emerged in 1928 after being founded by Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna. At the time, the MB became the most important Islamist gathering that stood against the monarchy and would continue to oppose to the subsequent regimes (Abed-Kotob, 1995). Although it was created primarily as an educational and charitable group, the ideology of the MB is mostly religious and transnational, following the Sunni guidelines. For Al-Banna, the MB is a kind of a life-style that people should follow, one guided by the Qur'an and the Sunna which are considered "the rules of the Prophet" (Youtube, September 27, 2013). Due to its Pan-Islamic nature, the MB movement has crossed the Egyptian borders to reach out to groups in other Arab countries including Palestine, Tunisia, and Lebanon. All of these groups follow similar guidelines based on the same Islamic ideology (Abed-Kotob, 1995).

Interestingly, soon after being founded in 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood's group was linked to many negative stereotypes such as terrorism. These stereotypes were further aggravated during Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule that started in 1954 and persisted until before the 2011 uprising. The prejudgment circulating around the MB included concerns regarding the dangers that an "extremist" group can cause to society (Ismail, 2013).

The MB continued to proliferate and gain strength with time. In 2013, it was reported that the number of members in the MB surpassed one million individuals in Egypt alone. These members were mostly from the middle class, and their leaders were more frequently the highly educated elites. Moreover, the MB claimed to be financed completely by these members who pay a monthly fee to keep the organization sustainable (The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information, 2017). However, the advances of the MB were not only in its increasing number of followers but also in the power they amassed after the 2011 revolution. The group was able to win a fair share of seats in the parliamentary elections and then take hold of the presidential seat after Mohamed Morsi (being the MB party's candidate at the time) won in Egypt's democratic elections (Wickham, 2013).

The parliamentary elections in November 2011 and the formation of the Constituent Assembly that consisted of left Islamist groups as the majority, raised a growing concern that spread throughout Egyptian activist groups. They worried about the new power held by Islamist groups, most notably the MB. One secular activist group, the Revolutionary Youth Union, claimed that the MB was prioritizing its special interests over the interests of the majority of Egyptian citizens (Brown, 2013, p. 46). It is also essential to add that the Egyptian MB had always been in the opposition, a position which denied it the ability to accumulate experience in running the affairs of the state (Hamid, 2016). This lack of governmental experience combined with fears that the country was heading for a long period of an Islamist rule turned Egypt's elite against Morsi. It is argued that the political and economic elite did not appreciate the Islamist rule because they were terrified of the

losses that could touch their historic statuses and positions affecting their fortunes (Hamid, 2016).

In a similar view, the Brotherhood faced issues with respect to Morsi's presidency. After his election, Morsi was perceived as seeking to pursue an "Islamization" agenda (Selim, 2015). Additionally, the Egyptian civil society was also not interested in the Muslim Brotherhood's project conceived by Morsi. The MB's policies of exclusion led to a "consensus deficit" within the Egyptian political arena, a phenomenon that fostered greater discontent among political groups and the public alike (Szmolka, 2015, pp. 83-88). Furthermore, this Islamization attitude that was beginning to increasingly define the MB's rule furthered the authoritarian nature of the regime (Brown, 2013, p. 50). For that matter, the Revolutionary Youth Union linked and compared the MB to the National Democratic Party (the party that monopolized control during Mubarak's presidency) which lead to the painting of the MB as just another power-hungry political party with only a secondary concern for the issues of the people (Fadel, 2012).

Despite changing their slogan from "Islam is the solution" to "We bring good for Egypt" during the parliamentary elections of 2011 in an effort to mitigate concerns surrounding Islamization, the Islamization of the state was still a common fear among Egyptian citizens (Wickham, 2013, p.271). In 2012, after his election, Morsi attempted to enact a form of Shari'a law in the country. For instance, after his rise to power in 2012, Morsi reinstated the Islamist Constituent Assembly after it was broken up by the Supreme Constitutional Court. Then, he officially declared the unanimous respect of the Assembly's decisions to shield them from any legal objections (Isakhan and Slaughter, 2014). Morsi also commanded the instantaneous reassignment of the members of the

parliament who were elected in 2011 (Isakhan and Slaughter, 2014). Morsi also added article 219 to the Egyptian constitution which stated that the laws of Egypt will be "based on the Shari'a law as prescribed by Sunni Islam" (McTighe, 2014). All of these actions alarmed the opposition groups and most specifically the secular opposition.

Morsi had complex relationships with the Muslim secularists. While a big part of the population practices Islam, they are not of the same persuasion regarding the MB. Those people did not feel that the virtue of faith and following religion necessitated the Islamization of the state and the integration of religion in most of the state's affairs. They called for the separation between religion and politics which contradicted the MB's vision of a state (Selim, 2015).

Responding to secularist demands, As-Subhi Salih, an FJP lawyer, and parliamentarian, reasoned that due to the minority status of these liberal secular groups, it was not logical to heed to their demands as they do not represent the majority. As he stated, parliament "should not fall hostage to the dictatorship of the minority" (Trager, 2012). As-Subhi was addressing the one-quarter of the Constituent Assembly who boycotted its first meeting as a show of discontent (Revkin and Auf, 2012)

Despite assurances, the Morsi regime failed to expand its support base beyond its traditional followers among the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi could not convince the civil society in Egypt that he was leading a civilian regime that would include all the Egyptian political groups and intended to adopt democratic procedures to gradually democratize the state. Inevitably, he ran into conflict with many groups, especially those that disagreed with his regime (Szmolka, 2015).

Adopting the MB program without taking into consideration the public's opinion, Morsi seemed to be reestablishing a dictatorship, the same system that the Egyptians rejected by the uprising. Actually, Morsi mostly used the same dynamics of internal politics as his predecessor, Mubarak (Shama, 2014). One example of the proofs that testify to the dictatorship of Morsi's presidency was the shocking verdict of a court in Alexandria. In September 2012, the court penalized five labor union leaders who led a strike of almost 600 employees. The penalty consisted of imprisoning the leader for three years. This sanction was considered to be the most brutal for a protester ever since the time of Sadat (Beinin, 2013).

The political identity inherent to the MB government led the people and the opposition to accuse Morsi of "Ikhwanizing" the government (Ahmadian, 2014). Morsi did not demonstrate strong leadership and could not convince the people that he was the true independent decision maker. Morsi's dependency on the MB presented a major problem for his regime vis-à-vis the society. For example, Morsi was compelled by the MB to not only release prisoners of al-Gama'a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad but also to praise the assassins of Anwar Sadat during the 2012 October War celebrations. The problem in Morsi's stay in the shadow of the MB was represented by the Brotherhood's association with extreme Salafi and Jihadist organizations (Aly, 2014). As it turns out, when Morsi applied the Muslim Brotherhood's ideas in the country-wide by fostering legislations, it was considered to be a way to "Islamize" the state. As a result, the Egyptians felt that the injection and integration of Islamic laws into the state was inappropriate for the integration of all the people and for a flourishing future where Egypt has to withstand domestic and foreign pressures to survive (Shama, 2014).

Finally, it can be concluded that Morsi could not sell his vision of political Islam to the citizens especially after taking many extremist actions that were seen as steps to reinstate dictatorship. On the contrary, he scared the people and, as will be discussed later, the international players with his unclear plans of dealing with the country's internal issues. This is where the people perceived that the fall of the old regime did not yield the expected alternative (Strasser, 2015).

3.2 The Repression of Civil Society and the Media

The public sphere is a "shared universe" where citizens meet, discuss and voice their opinions (through diverse means such as existing forms of media or face to face encounters) concerning problems of common interest and to form, accordingly, a collective awareness about them (Taylor, 2004). Based on this definition, the public sphere nowadays can include, in addition to the media and personal encounters, all forms of social expressions through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), syndicates, political parties, and other groups that are mainly concerned with political and social issues.

In Egypt's case, the public sphere was repressed during two different time-intervals. The first period was before the 2011 uprising (under Mubarak's rule); the people were mostly prohibited from practicing their right to freedom of expression (El-Bendary, 2013). The fear of voicing one's opinions was due to the governmental procedures that criminalized any form of opposition. This contributed to the creation of what seems to be a passive society. Effectively, the suppression of the people was condemned to be visible, especially with the insignificant numbers of protesters in the few demonstrations organized by several NGOs at that time (El-Bendary, 2013).

Additionally, the media, which was owned by the state during Mubarak's rule, could not broadcast any material that opposed or criticized the regime (Blaydes, 2011). In this manner, the regime made sure to censor people's opinions to fit the pro-regime framework. However, this repression was shortly interrupted. Numerous groups within the Egyptian society organized a number of small-scaled demonstrations, which, even when oppressed, prepared the people for the upcoming upheavals (Brynen et Al., 2012). According to Tufekci and Wilson (2012), the people in Egypt had only social media as a means of public discussion when everything else was monitored by Mubarak's regime. Facebook, for instance, was one of these major virtual meeting spaces that helped in the uprising of 2011 (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).

Before digging deeper into the details of the second interval of repression to the public sphere and the media, it is essential to shed light on the importance of the media in shaping people's opinions. McCombs and Shaw (1972) state that the media do not only show a modified version of reality to help a certain political agenda; but can also affect readers and spectators' perception of the importance of some events over others. For example, radio or television stations can give more time for exposing and discussing some news in an attempt to shape people's opinions and to show the importance of these events. In general, the media have the ability to shape public opinions particularly in a country where all the media is dominated by one party (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

During the second period, which is after the election of Morsi on June 30, 2012, and until the end of his rule on July 3, 2013, the media and NGOs suffered again from governmental repression. Since opposing the regime or the president was considered a crime during the period of Morsi's rule, freedom of expression was considered as

dangerous at that time. Many Egyptian TV networks and Channels were either affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or controlled by the regime. Additionally, people could possibly get imprisoned for publicly taking sides against the MB regime (Elsayed, 2013). With respect to that reality, demonstrations organized by NGOs' were forbidden while there were only small but numerous protests organized by labor movements. In addition, the media witnessed repression that was illustrated when the Morsi regime shut down some channels. Similarly, journalists were afraid of being arrested. Morsi justified the media restraints by using national security and security threats as excuses. This authoritarian control allowed no space for the public to enjoy freedom of speech (El Issawi, 2014).

Although the Morsi regime repressed the media and prosecuted the opposing groups; protests during Morsi's rule increased. Actually, the number of small-scale protests organized by labor movements increased significantly in 2012 where more than 3,400 demonstrations took place over the entire country. These protests are divided into 1,000 protests before Morsi's election in June 2012, and 2,400 protests during Morsi's rule in the same year - that is between June 30, 2012, and December 31, 2012. The number of demonstrations during 2012, which was recorded by the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, exceeded the sum of all previous protests from 2000 until 2011. In the 2012 demonstrations, workers complained about different present social issues and demanded work towards economic development and reform (Beinin, 2013).

It is important to pinpoint that following the 2011 uprising; the Egyptians gained significant experience in voicing their discontent vis-à-vis regimes that do not fulfill their needs or comply with their demands and expectations. The 25 January 2011 popular

demonstrations represented a turning point in people's behavior (Abdelrahman, 2014). The new regime had to comply with popular demands as well. Nevertheless, Morsi who was legally the president started his rule by oppressing the opposition to establish his authority rather than working on opening up the state for more freedom conforming to people's expectations. Consequently, Morsi was unable to win the masses' support and trust (Al-Awadi, 2013). The MB president came into the scene in a time when the civil society was empowered and reawakening. In his turn, Morsi was very quick to try and restrain this civil society.

Egyptians, who revolted against Mubarak's regime, demanded change. Although Morsi was elected democratically, he failed to use the democratic means under his rule. This was clear when he quickly lost people's support, specifically in November 2012, after he proclaimed total executive power in a constitutional statement (Abdelrahman, 2014). Therefore, it goes without saying that Morsi was unable to expand his circle of supporters. Oppressing the civil society and other groups, the elected president failed to reach out to movements outside the Brotherhood. His tactics and politics have failed to provide a broad base of support for his regime beyond the MB members. The demonstrations then resurfaced for months preceding his fall in July 2013, this time with more violent tactics, in an effort made by the public to showcase their discontent (Trager, 2015).

3.3 The resistance of the Well-Entrenched Egyptian Institutions

Contrary to common perception, revolution does not inherently result in the fall of an entire regime including its state's institutions. Rather, as was the case in Egypt in 2011, well-entrenched state infrastructure and institutions (the deep state) can long outlive

governments. As Morsi quickly discovered, this deep state had the ability to fight back against new leadership and policies (Norton, 2013). In fact, according to Wickham (2013), one of the Brotherhood's major challenges was the Egyptian deep state institutions that are mainly represented by the Ministry of Interior and other bureaucracy including the military (SCAF) and the judiciary institutions. The Brotherhood had to play the hard role of "asserting its authority" in a country facing the deep state (Wickham, 2013). Azzam (2013) has attributed the persistence of the authoritarian nature of the regime and governance practices to the fact that the Egyptian state institutions (including the judiciary system as well as military bodies and their high-ranking employees) are resistant to change, being loyal to the sixty-year successive dictatorships (Azzam, 2013). Indeed, the military apparatus is considered as the backbone of the deep state in Egypt (Saleh & Daragahi, 2012).

Accordingly, after ousting Mubarak, the military has gained more credibility in the eyes of the people. Despite direct orders from Mubarak's government, the army nobly refused to shoot on the crowds of Tahrir Square. Hamid (2016) best describes this dynamic:

> *"The chant that reverberated in the days leading up to Mubarak's fall - "the army and the people are one hand" - was no accident. Even if it wasn't quite true, it was the message the military brass fell back on over and over again: They represented no party or faction, they were dutiful servants of the nation, and they would guard over the interests of Egypt and Egypt alone. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, which had repeatedly fallen victim to the military's manipulations, avoided direct criticism of the army."*

This strong relationship between the people and the military, specifically after the 2011 uprising, brings the discussion to the importance of the role played by the military during Morsi's rule. In fact, the Egyptian military has a long history in controlling the country's governments for decades. Indeed, since the Free Officers carried out their coup d'état in 1952, the military had persisted as the dominant state institution in the country. Also, each president until Mohamed Morsi had been a member of the armed forces, including Muhammad Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. This military dominance was the basis for Egypt's deep state. Thereby, the deep state in Egypt is mainly represented by the military control over the government where the military uses the power of the state institutions to make decisions. This is through the repression of opposition groups and keeping a strong grip on the politics of the country by using security threats justification for repressive action (Abul-Magd, 2018).

Within this context, one can notice that the deep state of Egypt mostly developed during Gamal Abdel Nasser's era. Nasser worked on strengthening the institutions that were under his rule with priority given to the military. This was done in the name of keeping all the pieces of the state together and under the military control. The deep state that was rooted in the Nasser regime persisted for decades after his death (Aboulenein, 2015). Nasser's institutions, which kept on following the same patterns with the succeeding presidents until Mubarak, used oppressive strategies to shut down any form of opposition. The military's violence against journalists and threats of imprisonment made the media become a tool in the hands of the regime and its well-entrenched institutions (Mousa, 2012). In addition, ever since Nasser's rule and till the downfall of Mubarak in 2011, the governments' institutions have promoted the idea that the MB is a dangerous

group that would bring chaos to the country (Brown & Dunne, 2014). The leaders following the death of Nasser (Sadat and Mubarak) did not declare the MB as illegal in the same way that he did; however, the military institutions kept in place the negative image of the MB that was promoted in the previous decades (Mousa, 2012).

The remnants of Nasser's policies can be deciphered by examining these same institutions during the year of Morsi's rule. Actually, a small selection of the figures who were in power before the 2011 uprising inside the state institutions changed after the fall of Hosni Mubarak and the election of Morsi (Saleh & Daragahi, 2012). For instance, following the election of Morsi, the MB regime asked very few high-ranking military officers to resign in order to replace them by officers who are trusted by the MB. The most prominent example is illustrated when Morsi dismissed Sami Hafez Anan from his position as the Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, only to assign Abdel Fattah al-Sisi instead. Apart from these insignificant changes, the military institutions were still mostly represented by the same figures (Winer & Tepper, 2012).

In the same line, the role of the SCAF shifted from a military advocacy role before the 2011 revolution, to a more political role. The direct engagement of the SCAF in internal politics started when Mubarak handed power to it a few days before resigning. After the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF declared, on the 13th of February of the same year, control over the state for a period of six months (Gamal, 2018). The actions taken by the SCAF during this time show how this institution was able to act solely following the pattern of the deep state. The SCAF made its own modifications on the constitution and called for the parliamentary elections after announcing the new electoral law. It also

forced any member of the military apparatus to obtain the SCAF's approval before taking part in any public affair including running for elections (Gamal, 2018).

Right after the uprising, the SCAF, which had officially taken over the state, continued using the same strategies that were implemented by Mubarak when he was in power. The SCAF decided to prolong the state of emergency. It controlled the media and prosecuted the opponents of the military (Stacher, 2011). Whereas the revolution demanded changes in the ruling system, the military persisted on using Mubarak's ruling model, which is rooted in the deep state institutions, to repress the people and keep the situation under control. The SCAF functioned alone and was able to allow or ban any action taken inside the country (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012).

By the time of the 2011 uprising, the Egyptian deep state was mainly cemented by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the SCAF, and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) (Aziz, 2016). As a matter of fact, during the rule of Mubarak, civilians who stood against the regime were convicted of crimes by the military courts. Mubarak had prosecuted more than 18,000 citizens mainly with charges of violence and opposition to the president and the military (Delvoie, 2013). With the election of Morsi, the SCAF persisted with the same way of dealing with opposition. As a matter of fact, the SCAF has put more than 1,200 individuals on trial during Morsi's one year rule (Aziz, 2016).

Furthermore, the National Defense Council (NDC) is only allowed to, by the Egyptian constitution, assemble in emergency situations; however, the SCAF managed to establish a new National Defense Council in June 2012 with no clear duty or purpose. This allowed the SCAF to smuggle authority from the executives on one hand. On the

other hand, it exemplified one way in which the deep state (the military) attempted and succeeded to weaken the control and power of Morsi during his presidency (Ahram, 2012). The pre-Morsi NDC went on to create a constitutional amendment committee which announced another constitutional declaration just days before handing over power to Morsi. This constitutional declaration granted the NDC its own legislative authority, its own autonomous sphere independent of the executive, and the veto power over any new constitution (Wenig, 2014).

If these events prove anything, they show the extent to which the military institutions are well-entrenched inside the state. Regardless of the ruling party, the deep state will stay functional when the leaders and the ideology of these institutions are independent of the changes that could happen in the regime.

Akin to the SCAF, the Ministry of Interior has always surveilled the Egyptian citizens to protect the regimes since 1952. The process by which the ministry functioned allows it to stay informed and in power in any case of conflict. Actually, the security directorate of each of the 27 Egyptian governorates had to report any suspicious event to the Minister of Interior himself (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012). This system of local governance and ministry reporting, that was imposed by the ministry itself, allowed the latter to conserve its powers even after the 2011 uprising. The Egyptian Ministry of Interior succeeded in keeping civilian affairs under control by forbidding new demonstrations (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012). Likewise, the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense surpassed that of protecting the country from threats and invaders. Based on the official website of this ministry, its responsibilities includes national projects related to education, health, and infrastructure (Egyptian Ministry of Defense Website, 2019). Consequently, alongside

the SCAF, both the Ministry of Defense and of Interior have a power that exceeds the military and reaches out to the civilians. When these ministries are involved in all of these projects, they procure a larger importance in the state.

The presence of a strong and well-entrenched military apparatus does not mean that Morsi did not have any influence on the deep state. On the contrary, the 2011 upheavals and then the Muslim Brotherhood rule assaulted the deep state by causing a certain form of chaos in the country where all the aspects of political and social life used to be controlled by the military (Aboulenein, 2015). The January 25th revolution temporarily altered the rules of the political arena as it says the deposition of a military president and the election of an Islamist one. Despite its triumph, the MB was very much aware of the challenges ahead with regards to the deep state. Thus, the "political maneuvering done by Mohamed Morsi while in power was to remove the means by which the deep state-controlled Egypt, something that officials within the Freedom and Justice party were open about" (Abdul Azim, 2013). Although the MB's attempts to weaken the deep state were unsuccessful, the deep state acknowledged the threat posed to its control by its "internal foe," the Muslim Brotherhood. Still, the MB remained focused on avenging generations of repression rather than institutional reforms (Latek, 2013). These assaults were not enough to destroy the deep state, especially because aids coming to these institutions were not affected by the fall of Mubarak, nor by the election of Morsi. Therefore, the military and other institutions kept working on their own plans with little regard for the regime (Aboulenein, 2014).

The MB made its hostility towards the deep state and its institutions known when the Brotherhood drafted a law lowering the age of retirement for the judiciary by ten years –

from 70 to 60 years old – and thereby forcing around 3,500 judiciary members of the SCC to retire (El Shobaki, 2013). In combination with other similar instances, the MB continued to use its short time in power to challenge judicial authority and purge those long-serving judges suspected of being Mubarak loyalists. Further efforts along the same vein included passing amendments designed to restrict judges' political speech and right to strike (International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, 2014). These amendments were the final straw for the judiciary in a long line of offenses, including the removal of prosecutor general Abdel-Maguid Mahmoud and the appointment of Talaat Abdullah, sparking them to then take to the streets in May 2013 (Ahram, 2013).

After the 2011 uprising and with the election of Morsi, many police and military retirees were appointed to positions within these states institutions, constituting what became known as "the officers' republic", in which "certain civilian ministries and departments have clearly emerged as military fiefdoms in which former officers always occupy senior positions." This is one of the root causes in the formation of a "self-reinforcing loop of military-bureaucratic appointments and networks" that continues to recycle the same leaders, politicians, and judges (Sayigh, 2012). Consequently, the deep state developed its own methods of revolt and retaliation against the MB, ultimately contributing to the rapid ousting of the MB after just one year of attempted rule. While successful in changing some of the leadership, Morsi was unable to control the military. He even appointed al-Sisi, who came to turn against him (Jamaleddine, 2014).

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

Morsi's attempts to assert his authority were seen as reversing the fruits of the revolution inside Egypt. The MB's perceived devotion to the Islamization project proved

to be excluding many factions of the Egyptian society who were not convinced by the Islamist political agenda of the MB. Furthermore, the regime's repression of civil society groups and the media was far too reminiscent of his predecessor and worked to foster even greater discontent among the public. At last, it was obvious that Morsi was unable to move the Egyptian bureaucracy in the direction he needed nor was he able to overcome, or even reform, the deep state that was mainly represented by the military. Consequently, the well-entrenched deep state fought back the new leader in order to weaken his power. These elements combined lead to the creation of an internal struggle that was too much for the new regime to counter.

However, the downfall of Morsi can not only be attributed to internal political issues. Many researchers have examined the economy during Morsi's rule. It is argued that the economic crisis in Egypt and the lack of economic support from many influential foreign players challenged the MB's legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Al-Awadi, 2013). The effects of Morsi's mismanagement of Egypt's economy will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

Morsi's Mismanagement of the Economy

This chapter sheds light on the role played by the deteriorating Egyptian economy in the fall of Morsi. It focuses on the effects of economic strategies and policies, prior to and following the Egyptian upheavals, on the Morsi regime. Finally, it will discuss the contributions of the Egyptian military alongside some regional countries to the decline of the economic performance during Morsi's rule. While this study treats the economic situation as a separate factor, it does interact with the other two principal factors that this thesis underscores: the relation to the rest of the state and to society and foreign relations.

4.1 The Egyptian Economy Before and During Morsi's Rule

It is widely accepted that there are different economic plans followed by different countries around the world. Therefore, each country has the choice to adopt the policies that are most suitable for its needs and goals (Cohn, 2016). Less developed countries can adopt a variety of economic strategies that are mostly different from those of the developed ones. For instance, East Asian countries were able to make a lot of economic progress as a result of following the economic liberal model after the 1980 foreign debt crisis. The strategies of this model consist of giving the autonomy to the market in order for it to be free from governmental interventions (Cohn, 2016).

Nevertheless, Arab countries had different priorities and followed different policies than those in other regions of the world. According to Springborg (2011), Arab political economy was unable to lead these countries to democracy. He claims that when a

government controls the private sector in a country, it becomes harder to reach democracy within. To be more precise, the governmental domination over the private sector is measured by several "indicators." The most important indicators of the state's domination in the private sector are measured by the government's role in employment inside private associations, the governmental meddling in regulating the production of goods, and the number of credits granted by the state to the companies of the private sector (Springborg, 2011).

This was the case in Egypt prior to the 2011 uprising where the government and the military always intervened in the economy, namely in the private sector. However, the policies and strategies that were going to be adopted by the Egyptian government after the 2011 uprising were imperative in deciding whether the country will follow the track towards democracy or not (Blaydes, 2011).

As a matter of fact, in the year 2000, Egypt made stronger connections to the global economy by adopting more open economic policies. These policies helped in increasing the GDP and developing the private sector. Egypt was moving to a more market-oriented economy and the new economic policies adopted by Mubarak amplified annual growth that reached around 8% every year between 2004 and 2009 (Kandil, 2012). However, despite this annual economic growth, Mubarak faced public discontent because his government failed to equitably allocate the economic returns to the whole society. The income distribution did not change after strong economic growth. In fact, Egyptians of the lower-class did not witness the positive effects of economic development (Ghanem, 2013). Discussing the equitable allocation of wealth among the people, Robinson (2004) explained that in most cases, poverty is not necessarily a result of lack of resources; but

"how resources are allocated and distributed, and how what social groups exercise control over what resources and how they are put in use" (Robinson, 2004, p.152). For that matter, between 2001 and the uprising against Mubarak, Egypt witnessed strong and continuous strikes to a degree it had not seen since 1952. The demonstrations were the consequence of the hard living conditions, the mounting problem of unemployment and underpaid labor. For most Egyptian workers, salaries were low with respect to the high cost of basic needs (Beinin, 2013).

After the election of Morsi, the MB and their allies tried in vain to overcome the economic problems that were already in place during Mubarak's rule including "unemployment, inflation, the structural fiscal deficit, and infrastructure weaknesses." Egypt was identified to pass through an economic crisis (Butter, 2013). The first choice for Morsi's government was to follow the previous trend of seeking international support to face the resulting fiscal imbalance between revenues and expenditures. Policy-makers followed the belief that influxes of international capital from foreign investors to a country would help put an end to an economic crisis. This will allow a country to increase its living standards and progress economically (Butter, 2013) However, the partial preservation of the same Mubarak economic strategies during Morsi's rule accentuated the similarities between both presidents on the economic front. Morsi was unable to correct the economic problems that were facing the country, and he did not adopt clear policies that were satisfactory for the people. Actually, the lack of economic planning of Morsi complicated the governmental task of having clear and consistent economic policies, in order to recover from the economic crisis that persisted after the 2011 uprising (Sakamoto, 2013).

The Egyptian people, youth specifically, continued to suffer from the deteriorating economic situation and the rising unemployment under Morsi's rule. As a response to the deteriorating economic situation that was sweeping the country, the people demanded improvements at the economic level. Their demands included better salaries and equal employment opportunities (Sakamoto, 2013). Consequently, Morsi's regime had plans for economic reform that did not appeal to the people. Morsi's government planned for an increase in taxation on many necessities. This strategy did not appeal to the public, especially since, wages did not increase (Al-Awadi, 2013). Therefore, Egyptians refused to spend more money on commodities when they noticed that their salaries remained the same. They saw that increasing taxes is not a proper solution to the economic crisis. It will rather increase the burden of life on the poor (Abdelrahman, 2014).

It was clear at that time that the country was in the middle of tough economic times that were visible due to the budgetary fiscal deficit, the increased inflation at a faster pace than employees' remunerations, and the high rates of unemployment (Al-Awadi, 2013). It is important to note that the inflation level rose to reach 10 percent in June 2013, at the time of the beginning of the popular demonstrations against Morsi (Norton, 2013). This can be seen in figure 4.1 below, where the annual official inflation rate was less than 7 percent in January 2013. However, the inflation rate climaxed to reach the highest number during Morsi's rule (10 percent) in June 2013, simultaneously with the time when the people started the popular demonstrations of 2013 calling out Morsi to stand down. Also, shockingly enough, by the end of Morsi's rule, the minimum wage decreased to 700 Egyptian Pounds, which was equal to 105$ at that time (Beinin, 2013).



Figure 4. 1: *Egypt's Inflation Rates Between January and June 2013 (Hanke, 2013)*

The economic decline has existed from before the 2011 uprising and has aggravated afterward even after the election of Morsi in 2012 (Tobbala, 2012). Undoubtedly, the people who aimed for better living conditions saw that the economy was still following a continuous deteriorating pattern. To be more precise, towards the end of Morsi's rule in June 2013, the people were alarmed when the International Monetary Fund sought to decrease the value of the Egyptian pound; the Egyptian public completely refused this economic action (Norton, 2013).

At this level, the masses were waiting for changes in Egypt's economic policy to be made by Morsi (Kharas & Abdou, 2012). Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood's regime also adopted policies, neoliberal in part, that were very similar to Mubarak's policies. To make things worse, the new regime had a more extensive plan that was based

on the privatization of public assets. The people actually feared the effects of maintaining such policies. Moreover, the long-endured economic crisis that was felt on the individual level within the population in the last decade of Mubarak's rule dictated a fear of the perpetuation of such a financial problem (Beinin, 2013).

Egyptian people expected that overthrowing Mubarak would be followed by fast economic growth. However, Morsi did not bring the economic development that the people awaited (Beinin, 2013). Egyptians who protested against the MB rule mistrusted the economic agenda of Morsi who was surrounded by what they saw as an "aura of incompetence." Morsi seemed to be failing to salvage the country from the economic crisis. He did not provide his citizens with a guiding vision of the economy nor explain his economic plans to international players (Norton, 2013).

4.2 The Economic Relations with External Players and the Military

Before the uprising that led to the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian rentier economy was highly dependent on inflows of capitals from outside of the country, especially from the Gulf States and the U.S. (Springborg, 2011). This foreign dependence during Mubarak's rule made it difficult for the country to survive unless it was on good terms with the providers of this capital. After his arrival to power, Morsi was presiding over a rentier economy that was highly dependent on global trends. This made his economic plans weaker and more penetrable. In fact, the post-2011 uprising economic crisis was especially expressed when the total of foreign exchange capitals was cut down from $36 billion to $16.3 billion in 2012 following Morsi's election (Tobbala, 2012).



Figure 4. 2: *Three Phases of Egypt's Economic Crisis (Abdou & Zaazou, 2018)*

As can be seen in the graph above (figure 4.2), between 2009 and December 2010, Mubarak financed the country's account deficit with the stored account surplus. Mubarak's strategy changed at the beginning of 2011; he relied on using the country's net international reserves (Paciello, 2013). Following the 2011 uprising, Egypt's transitional government used Mubarak's same economic policies of using the international reserves of Egypt. As a result, the international reserves were depleted (Abul-Magd, 2013). This was accompanied by a decrease in the net investment within the country. In the third period, after the presidential elections of 2012, Morsi followed an economic policy that covered the account deficit by cashing credit loans through the Central bank of Egypt.

Although the period of Morsi's rule showed some improvements in the net direct investments and the central bank liabilities, the country could not escape the economic crisis. Equally important, these improvements were not accompanied by an increase in the net international reserves. The unchangeable amount of international reserves even when the country stopped using them, shows that Egypt under Morsi lacked the same historical international financial support (See Figure 4.2).

Morsi's strategy to lean on international support and the MB's attempts to lure foreign investments failed due to many factors, including not having the country's economy on top of the Muslim Brotherhood's list of priorities; the MB assigned more importance to their political agenda instead. In an equally important manner, the interventions of the well-entrenched military forces in many aspects of the new regime had an influence on the regional and international arena (Butter, 2013).

Hence, it is essential to explain that Egypt's economy has been in the hands of the military since the 1952 Egyptian revolution. This military control was both hard to change, because of the deeply-entrenched military institution, and scary for the people, since the transition to an economy away from the military is a huge change that needs time to reform. Zeinab Abul-Magd (2018) writes: "The Egyptian military … owns business enterprises that invest in almost everything and produce almost anything … By tapping into domestic consumer markets and managing every urban vicinity, the military keeps constant surveillance over and penetrates into the everyday life of docile or discontented individuals in the nation. Meanwhile, it perpetuates a nationalistic discourse about saving the nation from and securing it against internal and external threats alike. This situation is far from being a new phenomenon that emerged with the recent ascent of

a new military president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; its deep roots are entrenched in the past sixty years of the country's history." (Abul-Magd, 2018, pp.228-229)

Woertz identifies the Egyptian military as a state within the state – relatively independent with its own economy and the special privilege of taking decisions inside the state. The importance of this economy becomes even more apparent when considering that around 30 percent of the country's GDP is a product of the military's underground economic deals such as foreign contracts (Woertz, 2014). Going back to the days of the Mubarak regime, the president, being a senior military officer, had specific knowledge regarding how to work with and appease the military through the granting of government and foreign contracts. This, however, was not applicable in Morsi's rule (Linn, 2016). In reality, the class of business and military elites who were fostered by Mubarak continued to retain power and dominate most of the Egyptian businesses and the state's economic institutions during Morsi's regime (Momani, 2013).

Following the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) wanted to continue playing the role of the holder of Egypt's economy. This was proven when the military protected the grounds of important regional investors even when situations were not as promising. Additionally, The EAF had their hands on biddings for governmental procurements. Therefore, for the masses, the Egyptian military forces were the "primary gatekeeper for the Egyptian economy" (Marshall, 2015). Therefore, the military had an international economic power which exceeded that of Morsi. This made it harder for the MB regime to win the trust of the people who demanded better economic conditions. Accompanying the decreasing trust of the people towards the Morsi regime was the constantly increasing strength of the military forces on which citizens continued to rely.

The military was trusted by the people, a trust which was further buttressed by their status as one of the few economically stable governmental entities (Abul-Magd, 2013).

It is true that Morsi's government complied with numerous demands made by the military; however, this was perceived as an indefinite agreement when Morsi was working on excluding the military from important developmental projects (including the Suez Canal development plan and Toshka's land reclamation project). Simultaneously, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, who was appointed as the head of the armed forces by Morsi, had more trust and support from international governments, particularly the Gulf States. This is due to the fact that he was part of the military and not the Muslim Brotherhood's regime. This claim was further evidenced when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates presented al-Sisi with significant funding after the fall of Morsi, given that this support was not provided to the Morsi regime (Marshall, 2015).

4.3 Chapter Conclusion

Morsi inherited a country in economic turmoil. Poor economic performance during his brief reign was due to numerous reasons. The most obvious one is the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood regime to have a well-articulated economic vision in managing the economy - that was partly due to his team's lack of experience in economic management. For their part, the people were unable to withstand the burden of a deteriorating economic situation guided by a president with a vague economic vision. In fact, Morsi's economic management faced a lot of difficulties on the local and international fronts. As a start, Morsi deployed similar economic policies to those of Mubarak, including policies that perpetuated an inequitable allocation of wealth among Egyptians. Also, the state institutions did not help the regime since many of these institutions, such as the military

forces, were well-entrenched and did not rely on the newly-elected civilian president or members of his team. Furthermore, Morsi was untrusted by international players; unlike the military that could otherwise serve the country as an economic asset. As a result, Morsi's regime further lost its ability to mitigate both domestic and external pressures. This left the economically ineffective government with a weak and penetrable economy on the eve of the downfall of Morsi in July 2013.

The vulnerabilities of the Egyptian economy were exploited by some of the regional and international players, including the Gulf States and the U.S. who worked side by side with the Egyptian military in order to prepare the grounds for bringing Morsi down (Butter, 2013). Inevitably, it is crucial at this point to have a closer look at Morsi's policies regarding foreign affairs.

Chapter Five

Morsi's Mismanagement of Foreign Relations

The focus of this chapter is to analyze how Egypt's foreign relations became the third pivotal factor that contributed to Morsi's downfall. To begin with, the chapter will have a look at Egypt's foreign affairs between 1954 and up until the 2011 uprising. Then, it will compare between Morsi and Mubarak's foreign policies in order to explain how Morsi's relations with multiple regional and International players had a role in his demise. Overall, this chapter will address two main questions:

1) What were the post-revolutionary changes in Egypt's foreign policy during Morsi's rule?

2) How did these changes in foreign relations play a role in the fall of the first civilian president Mohamed Morsi?

5.1 The Evolution of Egypt's Foreign Policy between 1954 and 2011

After the 1952 Egyptian Revolution that overthrew the monarchy, Egypt's international policy shifted throughout different phases corresponding to the rule of the following presidents. In this regard, Egypt's posture in the international arena was heavily dependent on its president who played an important role in shaping the country's foreign policy.

Primarily, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt adopted the Pan-Arabism approach which intended to build a unified social, cultural, and political Arab identity through good relations with the surrounding Arab countries. Gamal Abdel Nasser even tackled Egypt's relations with the U.S. and Britain in one of his speeches refusing to build any alliance with non-Arab countries during his rule (The Eastern Media Company, n.d.). In fact, Nasser's Pan-Arabism ideology created tension with Israel and caused him to remain distant from the two superpowers that were leading the Cold War, being the Soviet Union or the United States. Therefore, the country abstained from allying itself with either of these countries. Nasser only focused on his country's relations with the Arab countries especially Yemen and Syria since they were strong allies with Egypt (AlRodhan et al, 2011).

Following the death of Nasser in 1970, his vice president Anwar Sadat came to power. Sadat had a patriotic ideology, and his foreign policy concentrated on national needs according to his own vision. All international relations under Sadat's rule aimed to achieve the country's best direct interests. Hence, Egypt's foreign policy during his rule was different than Nasser's foreign policy, and the change was especially flagrant in regards to the weaker relations with the Arab countries (Shebli, 2002). Unlike Nasser, Sadat did not see the significance of maintaining strong relations with Arab countries and was interested in building a better relationship with the United States. For instance, Sadat did not respect the Egypt-Syria agreement and signed a peace treaty with Israel. Neither did he consult any of the Arab countries before visiting Israel or signing the "Camp David Accords" in the U.S. (Shebli, 2002).

After the assassination of Sadat in October 1981, his vice president, Hosni Mubarak became Egypt's president. Mubarak attempted to combine Nasser's Pan-Arabism and Sadat's patriotism. He tried to reestablish good relations with the Arab states while keeping the cooperation that Sadat built with the West. Mubarak ordered radios to stop diffusing the anti-Arab publicity that Sadat wanted to diffuse in the country (Mahmood, 2007). Mubarak's goal was to foster a good position in the Arab World while simultaneously preserving peace with Israel and good relations with the U.S (Abootaleb, 1989). However, this task was not easy, especially since Egypt's alliances with the U.S. and the West weakened after Mubarak re-established relations with the Arab states (Ajami, 2011).

When going back to the "Nasserite" understanding of Egyptian foreign affairs, it is essential to understand the three components of Egypt's relations with the outside players which were represented by the Arab, African, and Islamic countries. Nonetheless, by Sadat and Mubarak's definitions, international relations were mostly established with the United States, Europe, and the Gulf States. As discussed previously, their priorities in this regard were leaning towards the West in the objective of profiting from their countries' support as strong international players. Interestingly enough, for the three presidents Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, who came to power successively from 1954 to 2011, important foreign policy decisions were made exclusively by the office of the president (Aly, 2014).

Mubarak was the last president who made decisions regarding Egypt's international affairs before the 2011 uprising.

5.2 Egypt's Foreign Relations Between February 2011 and June 2012

During the 2011 demonstrations, the protesters avoided taking a stand against any country because they wanted to focus on internal issues, particularly the need to oust Mubarak. Nevertheless, after they succeeded in this regard, a debate over Egypt's new role in the world emerged around the time of Morsi's election (Abdo, 2011). Accordingly, along with the previously-discussed domestic demands, the Egyptian national interest after the 2011 uprising leaned towards a better standing in the region and the world. The citizens who considered their country to be a great power, since it is localized in a strategic milieu with the largest population of the area, hoped that their state could serve again as a liaison between the Middle East and the West (Shama, 2014). Based on the observations of foreign affairs expert, Mohammad Salem, all the articles that mentioned Egypt's expected foreign policy after the upheavals discussed the importance of re-establishing strong relations with the Arab states and the African neighbors in order for the country to regain a strong standing in the region (Salem, 2011).

Nevertheless, during the year of Morsi's rule (30 June 2012 – 3 July 2013), Egypt reached its lowest level of effectiveness on the international level. It is true that the Egyptians complained about the decline in Egypt's regional role in the last years of Mubarak's rule. However, the country's regional role under Morsi's foreign policy was seen as even worse than during the time of his predecessor (Aly, 2014).

Despite Morsi's attempts to build new regional and international alliances; he mostly maintained the instrumental practices of foreign policy as his predecessor Mubarak in order to serve domestic interests. For example, Morsi tried to maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States (Theodoulou, 2012). Morsi's attempts

which aimed at keeping good relations with regional and international players did not materialize due to the fact that many of Egypt's historic allies (such as the Gulf States and the United States), mistrusted the MB rule (Shama, 2014). For the Muslim Brotherhood government, keeping the same policy in with numerous regional and international players was necessary in order to protect the country's national security. Although Morsi tried to find new regional and international allies; making new coalitions with foreign countries was considered a secondary interest (Abdolhadi, 2013).

Two main reasons help explain the partial preservation of Mubarak's stance regarding the international arena. Primarily, the previously mentioned "deep state" is one of the factors holding back certain aspects of foreign policy. In fact, the body that was responsible for shaping foreign coalitions, next to the president and his advisors, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is considered as another well-entrenched institution of the state. Hence, the bureaucracy of this ministry was able to operate independently on determining and shaping many relations between Egypt and other countries. It is to be noted that this Ministry stayed resistant to change by not accepting the integration of the new rulers in its decision-making processes (Aly, 2014). Moreover, the new regime could not easily change the country's relations for the reason that it was restrained by the necessity of keeping up with the economic needs of the state (Kienle, 2012). As a matter of fact, Morsi was attacked by many critics such as Nabil Fahmi. For him, Morsi was unable to face regional powers because he was afraid from accumulating more difficulties during his rule. Morsi worried about the possible impact of any regional conflict on the domestic level which could threaten the MB rule. In this regard, People saw Morsi as a weak president vis-à-vis the regional and international spheres. He was also considered to

be prioritizing the "discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood" without giving the required attention to Egypt's foreign policy (Fahmi, 2013).

After realizing the commonalities between Mubarak and Morsi on the international level, Egyptians did not only perceive the MB president as an extension to Mubarak's authoritarian rule but also began to feel that the Brotherhood was weakening the country's stand in the international arena. This is why Monier and Ranko (2013) argue that Egypt's foreign affairs played a major role in the fall of Morsi's regime in July 2013. Similarly, the perceived threat of the MB to the region was promoted by some regional media outlets such as the Kuwaiti Al-Resalah Channel during the June 2013 demonstrations (Hearst, 2013). This anti-MB propaganda showed that Egypt's relations with the Gulf States were troubled under Morsi who could not win the trust and support of these regional players (Monier & Ranko, 2013). In fact, Morsi's relations with the rentier Gulf countries – especially Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait – were the most detrimental to the MB rule. The Gulf States cut their typical financial aid to Egypt during Morsi's rule, only to resume after al-Sisi's rise to power by jointly providing more than of $12 billion in aid on al-Sisi's public proclamation of the Muslim Brotherhood being "finished" (Meringolo, 2015).

5.3 Morsi's Relations with Regional Players

As previously noted, Morsi won the presidency as the candidate of the Islamist opposition group, the Freedom and Justice Party. Upon his election, the party became influential in the foreign relations domain, and those who became the president's advisors were mostly members of the MB. For instance, his foreign policy advisor Essam Hadad belonged to the same Islamist group and participated in shaping a lot of the country's

foreign decisions. Hadad was regarded by Morsi as the MB's voice concerning the foreign policy (Hendawi, 2013). According to Aly (2014), the inexperienced MB's arrival to power as well as Morsi's blind compliance to the decisions made by the Islamist group's Guidance Bureau were limitations for change in Egypt's foreign policy. The country's relations with regional countries declined starting 2011 when many states like Libya, Sudan, and the Arab Mashriq (the North-Eastern countries of the Arab World) were experiencing internal turmoil with the spread of the Arab uprisings. The Geo-strategic bonds between Egypt and these countries were affected by the internal problems that they were facing. For instance, Sudan reduced its cooperation with Egypt regarding their joint management of the Nile. At the same time, Sudan took advantage of Egypt's weakness after the 2011 "revolution" by asking to revisit the status of the disputed area between the two countries, Shalateen and Halayeb. Conversely, in an attempt to hide its domestic weakness, Libya forced Egypt to send back Libyan political refugees. Similarly, in order to deflate public anger, Libya expelled a number of Egyptian workers (Aly, 2014).

5.3.1 Morsi's Relations with the Gulf States

Historically, Egypt's relations with the rich and conservative Gulf States went through various ups and downs. At the outset of the republic's formation, Nasser sought close relations with Saudi Arabia in order to counter the power of the Jordanian and Iraqi monarchies. His relations with Saudi Arabia, however, weakened from the late 50s up until the June 1967 war as Nasser veered towards a tacit alliance with the Soviet Union. After Egypt crushed the fields in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, it sought to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in order to receive financial assistance. At

the height of the of the second Arab-Israeli 1973 war, the Gulf States supported Egypt and Syria. Egyptian relations with the Gulf countries, however, soured after Egypt decided to pursue a unilateral peace with Israel which was culminated with their 1979 peace treaty. The Gulf States and other Arab countries voted to expel Egypt from the Arab league and to reduce diplomatic relations with it (Buzan, 1991).

With time, Egypt's relations with the Gulf developed. The Gulf States had large numbers of Egyptian workers (they reached three million in the 1990s) who provided economic returns to their home country. Moreover, the oil produced by the Arab Gulf made its way towards many destinations in the world through Egypt's Suez Canal and the Summed pipeline. Similarly, the Gulf States made important investments in Egypt's economy (Kienle, 2012). Following Mubarak's ascension to the presidency, Egypt's relations with the Gulf States started to improve again. Egypt joined the Gulf States to support Iraq in its war against Iran. Egypt shared the Gulf States' apprehensions about the Iranian revolution. Actually, the Iranian revolution was arguably the principle reason behind the rapprochement between Egypt and the conservative Arab States that lasted until the eve of the 2011 uprising (Lesch, 1991). On another note, the Mubarak opposition parties pointed out Egypt's dependency on the Gulf funds and considered that the "cliental" relations with Riyadh made the regime submissive by allowing Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi ideology to enter Egypt (Ahram, 2011). As a response, Mubarak always talked in his speeches - especially ones tackling the foreign policy - about Egypt's role in the preservation of the Arab Gulf security. By stating these claims, Mubarak aimed to prove to his opposers that his relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC), namely with Riyadh, do not prescribe under "Clientelism"; but rather built on mutual benefits (Ahram, 2011).

Hence, relations between Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were essential for both parties' ruling elite. For this reason, a couple of months after Mubarak's regime downfall, the Egyptian Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) assured in an official declaration its commitment to maintain a strong relation between their country and the GCC. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the alliance was not moving towards a crisis, embodied by the questionable role of Egypt that could potentially affect the Arab Gulf security after the fall of Mubarak (Farouk, 2014). On this issue, between 2011 and 2013, relations with the Arab Gulf persisted; but the Gulf countries were showing signs of concern over Egypt's growing instability. The most serious strain in this relationship emerged after the election of Mohamed Morsi. It is actually considered that even when the Gulf States - Saudi, UAE, and Kuwait - continued to have interactions with Egypt concerning strategic interventions in the country's domestic issues, there was a damage in the relations between these two players. The damage was mostly expressed by the disruption of the usual form of financial support, especially after the election of Morsi who represented the MB (Butter, 2013). To this effect, in her article "More than Money: Post-Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf," Farouk (2014) states:

> *"… all channels of interaction except financial remained stable through the crisis. Therefore, it argues that the conventional finance-focused analysis of Egypt-GCC relations is inadequate. While the flow of money from the Gulf States was interrupted, all other reciprocal flows persisted. Strategic, transnational, and*

trans-governmental relations challenged the states' control over bilateral relations and hampered the spillover of the crisis to other channels."

On the whole, the Gulf States – with the notable exception of Qatar – had major problems both ideologically and politically with the MB (Roberts, 2014). Painting with broad strokes, the paramount reason for which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates limited their financial support to Egypt (during the MB rule) was the fear of the propagation of the Arab Spring to the Gulf. These financial maneuvers were enacted in order to weaken the MB and consequently prevent any form of revolution that could be ignited by MB-supported Islamist groups in the Gulf States (Aly, 2014).

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Muslim Brotherhood's use of Islam for political purposes was deemed as dangerous, especially after the Islamic groups gained power in Egypt during the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, and in Tunisia when the Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda party won the elections in October 2011. This growing power of the Islamist group in these two big Arab countries frightened the states of the Arab peninsula from a possible spillover of the discontent onto their own streets which would bring instability to these countries and threaten the existence of the ruling families (Sailer, 2016).

The negative sentiments of the Gulf States towards the Muslim Brotherhood were not without their fair share of history. Throughout the mid-1900s, the Gulf States, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, hosted many MB members after fleeing persecution in Egypt under the Nasser regime. Fleeing did not affect their activism, as they began to engage in civil society within their new communities in the Gulf States and spread the MB

ideology. The spread of these new ideologies was viewed as a threat by the Gulf States who, in turn, chose to outlaw all MB activity in the 1990s. This, however, did not entirely curb the Brotherhood's activity in the Gulf States, as the Muslim Brotherhood remained an active threat within Saudi Arabia and the UAE even around the time of the 2011 Arab uprisings despite being illegal (Hegghammer & Lacroix, 2007).

Therefore, during the period of Morsi's rule, the Gulf States did not take a public stance against the MB government in Egypt; however, they also did not provide the financial support typically given which the destabilized country depended on in order to keep up with the expectations of the people.

5.3.2 Morsi's Relations with Qatar and Turkey

Conversely, there was another Gulf State that had an important role during the post-Egyptian uprising period - Qatar. Contrary to the other Gulf States, Qatar sided with the Muslim Brotherhood. For Qatar, the Brotherhood's power in Egypt was considered an extension to the small Gulf State's power and influence (Roberts, 2014). In fact, this Gulf State had been building strong bonds with the MB and other Islamist groups throughout previous decades. Qatar has hosted one of the most prominent Egyptian Islamists: Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, an avowed critic of all pre-2011 Egyptian regimes. Qaradawi briefly returned to Egypt after the uprising, supported the rule of the MB, and was once more "persona non grata" in his native Egypt after the downfall of Morsi. For both ideological and pragmatic reasons, Qatar stood to benefit (or so its rulers believed) from the rise to power of Islamist movements in places such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Qatar also backed the Islamist jihadist groups in Syria.

However, Qatar's support for Morsi, without the blessing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, was not enough to provide him with the necessary means to remain in power (Sailer, 2016). Indeed, the Egyptian bureaucracy and the people in Egypt preserved their view of Saudi Arabia as the GCC's front-runner in regards to political and economic interventions. Hence, the Qatari plan to take Saudi Arabia's place as Egypt's main Gulf ally under Morsi's regime failed (Farouk, 2014).

In another attempt to gather more support from international and regional players after the distrust that arose from many of Egypt's strong historical allies, Morsi worked on creating a coalition with Turkey alongside his bond with Qatar. However, unfortunately for the MB regime who saw a potentially strong ally in Turkey, the latter government had to face many domestic and regional challenges. The popular demonstrations that ignited in Istanbul in June 2013 and the country's involvement in the Syrian war, served as primary reasons for which Ankara was not able to prioritize its relations with Cairo. Thus, Turkey was not able to salvage Egypt from its fragile regional and international standing. In effect, the three-sided coalition would not be as solid as expected by the MB knowing that Qatar is a small state and Turkey had some interests in the West and the Middle East that were incompatible with the MB's views and ambitions (Aly, 2014).

5.3.3 Morsi's Relations with Israel and Hamas

In the same context, another important regional player was Israel. The country that signed a peace treaty with Sadat in 1979 feared that the MB government in Egypt could threaten this peace. Israel was aware of possible negative repercussions of the good

relationship between the MB and Islamist groups that stand-against and actively fight Israel such as Hamas (Nusse, 1998).

After the MB's rise to power, Morsi made sure to hold onto the peace agreement with Israel. However, Morsi's efforts were not enough to build the trust needed to procure a strong relationship with Egypt's northeastern neighbor. The Israeli mistrust of the MB government in Egypt originated from the similar ideology that is shared among the MB and Hamas, viewed as one that could empower Hamas to rise up against Israel (Shama, 2014). In fact, this fear was indeed backed up by on-the-ground observations. The Gaza-Sinai tunnels were opened during Morsi's rule and allowed the passage of Islamist activists as well as individuals who were considered terrorists by the Israeli government. Evidence of the role of the Sinai tunnels as a gate to transfer goods and people in and out of Gaza was illustrated on August 5, 2012, more than a month after the election of Morsi, when Islamist militants used these tunnels to escape from Gaza to Egypt. These militants subsequently killed sixteen Egyptian soldiers and attacked Israeli forces (Pelham, 2012). Actually, Hamas had hoped that with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt, the illegal tunnels could become a free-trade zone between Gaza and bordering Egypt. Hamas was ultimately disappointed since Egypt did not have any plans of fostering a free-trade zone with the Palestinian territory. In reality, Egypt blocked the tunnels with Gaza, an action which was harmful for Hamas both politically and economically (Friedman, 2012). Although Morsi disappointed Hamas, Egypt's relations with Israel did not flourish. Instead, and to demonstrate the tension between the two parties, the Israeli military attacked upon many stances the Egyptian security personnel in the Sinai borders. This was a sign of the growing rift between the two countries (Aly,

2014). In this context, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the existence of the Egyptian-Palestinian tunnels that facilitated the smuggling of weapons and individuals in and out of Palestine had a direct effect on weakening the relationship of the MB's Egypt with Israel.

One case in point, Morsi tried to show good intentions towards peace between Palestine and Israel by playing a major role in orchestrating a ceasefire during the war of November 2012. This war between Israel and Palestine that lasted eight days, killing more than 160 Palestinians and 6 Israelis in the process, ended with the signing of a truce in Cairo supervised by Morsi on the 21st of November 2012 (The Guardian, 2012). When the conflict started, Morsi had to react in a way that would not threaten his relations with Israel, yet, at the same time, would keep good relations with Hamas (Friedman, 2012). To stay on good terms with both sides of the conflict, Morsi did not have much of a choice. Firstly, Morsi put the Egyptian military intervention off the table as it would completely destroy Egypt's relations with Israel. Additionally, he could not stay silent because it would upset Hamas. Hence, Morsi found that his only resort was encouraging a ceasefire and stopping the atrocities. The only action that he could take was to use the media to initiate propaganda wars against Israel rather than making direct and dangerous official announcements (Momani, 2012). By doing so, Morsi aimed to preserve his official relations with Israel without being obliged to give up the Muslim Brotherhood's principles.

Although Morsi tried to keep a certain distance between Egypt and the two conflicting enemies, in an effort to avoid a possible direct conflict with Israel: this was not enough for him to procure a good standing for Egypt in front of either Israel or

Hamas. Hence, it can be concluded that Morsi failed to build trust with Israel as an important player of the region. Simultaneously, he disappointed Hamas, the MB's ideological twin, by not officially supporting the Palestinian party.

5.3.4 Morsi's relations with Iran and Syria

In the same context, Morsi failed to revive the long-destroyed alliance with Iran - that existed when Sadat was in rule until before he signed the peace treaty with Israel (Shama, 2014). He actually faced two main challenges when he tried to improve his government's relations with Iran.

The first challenge was related to the opposing stands of Egypt under Morsi and Iran regarding the Syrian issue. Whereas Iran was supporting the Assad regime politically, economically and militarily; Egypt, on the other hand, was openly against the regime (Ahmadian, 2014). Egypt's MB president expelled Syria's ambassador to Egypt, consequently cutting diplomatic links with Syria (Aladvi, 2013). Morsi also declared his opposition to the "criminal Assad regime." Taking it a step further, Morsi supported the Syrian opposition forces that fought against the Syrian army. He even attended Salafi events that called for jihad in Syria (Shama, 2014). This has put at stake Morsi's new possible relations with Iran, one of Assad's major allies.

The second challenge that Morsi faced while he sought to improve his relations with Iran was related to Egypt's economic dependence on the Gulf States. These States have stood against the Iranian regime since the cold war. The new government was pressured to preserve Mubarak's cautious foreign policy towards Iran out of the fear of losing GCC's economic support. The Brotherhood rule was expected to strengthen its relations

with Iran which had a closer ideology to the Islamist movement than the Gulf States. Nevertheless, the Islamist identity brought forward in Egypt by the MB president was not enough to attain this goal (Ahmadian, 2014). Despite the efforts of Morsi who held numerous meetings with the Iranian President Ahmadinejad; the mutual relations between the two countries did not witness any positive change. Ironically, the MB rule played a reversed role by intensifying the political conflict between Iran and Egypt regarding mainly the Syrian crisis alongside disapprovals related to Yemen and Iraq (Ahmadian, 2014). Morsi was again put in a critical position where he would either lose the GCC's support to build new relations with Iran or vice versa.

5.4 Morsi's Relations with International Players

The three main areas of Egypt's international relations have historically been the Arab, African, and Western entities. In this respect, even though Egypt struggled since 1954 to find equilibrium between these three entities, the country always had a good position in the international arena which was advantageous to the government politically and economically (Aly, 2014). However, with Morsi's rise to power, many regional and international players questioned his ability to make a balance between the three aforementioned entities in his government's foreign policy (Özkan, 2013). In fact, the West, which is most importantly represented by the United States and the European Union in the case of Egypt, feared the potential drastic shift in the MB's regional and international relations and foreign policy. This is because the Muslim Brotherhood is perceived as a radical Islamist group by the West (Özkan, 2013).

5.4.1 Morsi's Relations with the United States and the European Union

Egypt had allowed external interventions of some allies and Western powers in domestic affairs for decades, especially during Mubarak's rule. After the 2011 uprising, Egyptians demanded less external involvement in the domestic issues. However, the same foreign players, especially those who had an economic weight, continued to play a role inside the country. On the international level, the United States maintained a lot of its influence regarding the Egyptian policy on both the domestic and interstate levels despite the strains in the Egyptian-US alliance (Shama, 2014).

Egypt's coalition with the United States has its roots in the days of Sadat in the 1970s. Whereas Nasser built strong alliances with the socialist Soviet Union, Sadat had a different viewpoint when it came to the international community. Sadat created strong relations with the U.S. and its allies in the west precisely the members of the European Union (Aly, 2014). The Egyptian-US relations were also strong during the years of Mubarak's rule. As a matter of fact, the United States offered approximately $1.3 billion annually to the Egyptian army under Mubarak as a way to help ensure state security (Ali, 2016).

The European countries that were part of the European Economic Community (EEC) have had historical relations with Egypt since 1966. Ten years later, the coalition between the two parties had become stronger when the EEC started cooperation with Egypt with the purpose of making social and economic improvements in the Arab Mashreq by offering grants and giving loans (the Commission of the European communities, 1976). It is also essential to mention that the European countries, that were for decades some of the

most significant aid donors for Egypt, were second following the Gulf States with respect to the density of Egyptian migrants in the world (Pinfari, 2013).

Egypt's historical relations with the European countries developed further with the formation of the European Union (EU) which stayed on good terms with the government of Mubarak. The EU never took part in sensitive political discussions with the authoritarian regime. The EU believed that supporting Mubarak was a better security decision for the country and the region rather than the possible instability that could emerge if the regime were to fall (Seeberg, 2012).

Nonetheless, after Mubarak's downfall, the EU changed its previous policy of silence with Egypt when it came to sensitive topics. Then, following the election of Morsi, the EU had to become more open to political discussions with the new regime and "get accustomed to more binding forms of political cooperation with the Islamist parties and movements which now dominate the political scene in some of the Middle Eastern countries and Egypt in particular" (Witney & Dworkin, 2012). Officially, the EU stated in its new response of 25 May 2011 that it was supportive of the democratic trends which started in Tunisia and Egypt. It perceived the overthrow of the oppressive regimes as a departure towards a more democratic future in the region (EU commission, 2011). This is why the EU commission supported the Egyptian expected transition to democracy. It encouraged, as stated by the EU commission in 2011: "free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces." Additionally, the European alliance

with Egypt wanted to empower the non-governmental organizations as an essential democratic step to be taken without harming the security (EU commission, 2011). Thus, it is obvious that the EU aimed to preserve its geopolitical role in the region by keeping its relations with Egypt.

Similarly, after the uprising, the EU became an essential economic partner for Egypt. The products exchange between the two parties increased to a total of $23.8 billion in 2012 after it was $11.5 billion when the cooperation between the two partners took place in 2004 (Seeberg, 2012). However, right after the June 2012 election, members of the EU found it both difficult and controversial to deal with the new government out of fear of the Islamist tendencies of the new leadership. The EU was concerned that the Brotherhood was moving too quickly to Islamize the country and society instead of democratizing the system and focusing on the rights of minorities. Furthermore, the MB pushed for a constitution that was considered by the EU to be non-democratic. The EU members felt that the MB should focus on building a civil state in Egypt rather than trying to Islamize society (Pinfari, 2013).

The EU was not alone, as the United States also became skeptical of the country's ability to embody a positive example for its Arab neighbors and retain stability after the uprising. The West actually distrusted Egypt even further under Morsi out of fear of the Islamist group (Aly, 2014). The United States, who had a historical bond with the Egyptian military for decades, found that the SCAF was the most trustworthy institution in Egypt based on their past experience. Morsi was aware of this issue and therefore decided to make some changes among the US-trusted military leaders. For instance, he asked Sami Hafez Anan, a senior military figure, to retire because he was alarmed by the

very strong relationship that the military leader had built with the US. For this reason, Morsi assigned al-Sisi to take Anan's place; however, the new military leader also gained the US's trust very fast (Winer & Tepper, 2012). This stance proves the extent to which the US foreign policy in the region was based on the fear of the unknown after they doubted the intentions of the Brotherhood as opposed to the military.

The distrust and subsequent shift in the Washington-Cairo alliance became evident when President Obama made a statement after the election of Morsi in which he said that Egypt is no longer a "strategic ally" and it turned into "neither an ally nor an enemy" (Jocktson, 2012). Likewise, Morsi's plans to meet the U.S. president in person at the White House were never realized during his year of rule. This demonstrates, if anything, the deteriorated relations between the two countries and Egypt's change in priorities regarding its foreign policy (Aly, 2014).

5.4.2 Morsi's Relations with the East and the BRICS Coalition

The Muslim Brotherhood regime was aware of the difficult situation that it was facing in the international arena. Consequently, the Islamist movement that came to power found it necessary to build new coalitions after many historical allies distrusted the new rule. Morsi decided to extend his government's foreign policy in a way that encompassed new potential partners in the world (Grimm and Roll, 2012). Consequently, Morsi sought new allies within the Eastern countries. One of his Eastern destinations was China, where he went with the goal of advancing on the technological level, and, more importantly, opening his country's opportunity for new foreign investment. This policy of

finding new allies from the East hinted at the possible tension that could arise with the West in the coming years (Ahmadian, 2014).

In addition, the BRICS coalition, that included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, became Morsi's target as the potential new ally in order to recover what was lost in Egypt's standing worldwide. In a video of his speech at the end of the two-day visit to New Delhi in March 2012, Morsi expressed his hope to increase the trade between his country and India to reach $10 billion in the coming years instead of the $5.2 billion at that time. He stated that he desired to witness BRICS becoming E-BRICS after Egypt is integrated into the coalition (Youtube, July 31, 2015). Morsi also revealed that he was planning to attend the 2013 BRICS summit held in South Africa with the purpose of proposing Egypt's addition to the coalition and discussing his plan for creating a "south-south investment bank" that would offer loans and aids for urbanization projects in many countries (The National, 2013).

Unfortunately, his proposal to enter the coalition never cemented. This was due to the deteriorating economic situation of the country as well as BRICS' fear of the Islamist character of the MB rule. In reality, the leaders of the BRICS coalition were very vigilant with respect to accepting new members. They considered that deciding to expand by making the quick and not well thought out judgment of adding a new member could potentially threaten the organization and negatively affect its ability to achieve its goals (Mahapatra, 2015). When Morsi visited Russia, his discussions with the President regarding the possible alliance were not fruitful. Russia saw the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a security threat since Russia feared Islamism in the context of the Russian Muslim population that can be a threat to the state if they mobilize as in

Egypt (Aly, 2014). Hence, it can be concluded that Morsi failed to convince the five countries of the coalition to accept Egypt as the new member.

5.5 Chapter Conclusion

Morsi's inability to successfully navigate foreign affairs was the third factor that eventually coalesced into his downfall. The Morsi regime lacked an overarching strategy to tackle Egypt's foreign relations and to consequently use these relations to boost his rule. Morsi did not know how to use international relations to get support and unintentionally alienated nearly every regional ally. In fact, to no avail, Qatar was the only country among the Gulf States that supported Morsi's rule. Morsi did not reassure the Arab Gulf that the Muslim Brotherhood had no intention to spread its ideology beyond Egypt. In the case of Israel and Hamas, Morsi's efforts to stay neutral resulted in the alienation of both sides. Furthermore, Morsi's unclear stance on Iran's dealings with Syria raised speculation and distrust among both countries. Finally, Morsi sacrificed his alliances with the West in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to secure other alliances with other countries including Iran, China, and Russia.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

This chapter concludes with the main findings of the thesis. It summarizes the role played by each of the three studied overlapping factors that contributed to the fall of Morsi. Equally important, and in an attempt to get a closer look at the changes in Egypt's internal, economic and foreign policies, the chapter sheds light on these factors after Morsi's downfall in July 2013; and more particularly, after the election of al-Sisi who occupied the position of the presidency since June 2014.

6.1 Summary of the Argument

As argued in the previous chapters, the interplay of three key factors (the internal politics, the economy, and foreign relations) was largely behind the abrupt termination of Morsi's presidency. Morsi's mismanagement of Egypt's internal politics (his half-baked Islamization plan that further troubled his relations with the entrenched institutions of the Egyptian state and with a broad section of the public), his mismanagement of the economy (i.e. his inability to tackle the deep seated economic policies in order to enhance the economic situation) and his mismanagement of relations with important regional and international players (which eroded Egypt's ability to confront international pressures) all contributed to his regime's downfall.

To reiterate, no single factor was solely responsible for Morsi's demise. To explain Morsi's ousting, previous literature had focused on different elements such as resistance from the deep state, mismanagement of the economy, and international pressure; while

only underscoring one element as the predominant reason. The significance of this thesis lies in countering this trend in mono-causal analysis and bringing together multiple factors whose complex and dynamic interplay majorly contributed to the abrupt ending of Morsi's presidency.

In his attempts to maintain control over the Egyptian society, Morsi tried to assert his authority in a manner that caused the public to perceive his rule as dictatorial. More specifically, Morsi's domestic decisions that were based on the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood formed an image of an Islamist dictatorship which was failing to represent all segments of the Egyptian society. The people's fear of the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamization project and Morsi's repression of the civil society and the media instigated an outcry from vocal members of the Egyptian society, particularly activists of the opposition and secular parties. Ultimately, Morsi's Islamist agenda and his repression of dissent convinced the public that Morsi was not keen on preserving the revolutionary ideals. Also on the internal level, the Egyptian deep state institutions, the military, in particular, used their power and experience to run the state and fight back the new leader in order to weaken the new regime. Morsi was unable to move the Egyptian bureaucracy in the direction he needed nor was he able to overcome, or even reform, the deep state.

On the economic front, Morsi neither had the resources nor the vision that can tackle Egypt's lingering economic problems: national debt, fiscal deficit, inflation, unemployment, and other rising economic discrepancies. Ultimately, Morsi was unable to withstand the economic crisis leftover from Mubarak's time in office. Morsi inherited a weak economy that was reliant on foreign aid and remittances. Then, when he came to power, Morsi failed to meet the people's expectations for economic prosperity mostly

because he lacked a well-constructed economic plan and could not attract foreign aid or investments into Egypt. The people thought that by overthrowing Morsi, the Gulf States and other international players such as the U.S. would go back to providing the aid necessary for economic growth (Guenaien, 2014). Therefore, the Morsi government weak economic policies on one hand and the economic autonomy of the SCAF on the other represented one aspect that facilitated Morsi's downfall.

Concerning Egypt's foreign relations, Morsi had no clear plan for dealing with strong regional and international players. In fact, the Morsi regime was mistrusted by several regional and international players due to the lack of a clear direction in foreign policy. Even though Morsi sought good relations with the Gulf States, he was unable to gain their support because they feared the Brotherhood's rise to power in the region. The Arab Gulf sought to avoid the uprisings' spillover to their lands by keeping a distance from the MB regime. While Morsi did not plan to alienate the West, he lost the trust of the Western powers, particularly the United States and the European Union. He also tried, to no avail, to join the BRICS coalition and to improve Egypt's relations with Russia and China. Furthermore, perhaps most alarmingly for the Gulf States and the U.S., Morsi sought to improve relations with Iran while simultaneously criticizing the Iranian intervention in Syria. He was also unable to take a side in the conflict between Israel and Hamas since he feared breaking Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. On the whole, his approach was very vague and cautious, his foreign relation strategy was plagued by inexperience, and his interactions reflected his inability to appropriately deal with difficult regional and international situations. An incoherent foreign policy was the

predicament Morsi found himself in, time and time again, with numerous regional and international players.

All in all, Morsi was unable to provide the Egyptians with a forward-looking leadership in order to bring the country together and progress forward its economic, political and social fronts. Morsi's rule consisted of a new unexperienced regime in power, facing major economic and social challenges. Correspondingly, the Morsi regime lacked the economic resources to deal with these challenges. It was also unable to face the military and the justice system as well as civil society groups that were not represented by the MB rule. Furthermore, Morsi's foreign relation strategy was weighed down by the international fear of the Brotherhood's ideology. Between these lines, Morsi's interactions with several countries in numerous situations reflected his inability to appropriately deal with important regional and international players. On an important notice, countries such as the conservative Arab states did not criticize the regime on the surface; but still worked in secret to undermine its economic position. After all, it can be said that Morsi failed to articulate a proper vision for the country that was "inclusive" enough to comprise all Egyptian fragments, and novel enough to comply with people's demands on the local, regional and international fronts. Hence, Morsi's downfall was indeed scripted by the confluence of all the factors mentioned in this thesis.

6.2 The Post-Morsi Egypt

After the Egyptian military staged their coup and deposed Morsi in July 2013, Adly Mansour was appointed interim president until the time al-Sisi was elected to office in June 2014 (Wenig, 2014). Al-Sisi's election was surely not unrelated to his status as a member of this military institution. He actually worked hard to market himself as a

decidedly military leader sent to save Egypt in its time of need, defending it from the threat of insurgency in the Sinai. Al-Sisi used the fear of the Egyptians from the possibility of a troubled future similar to that of Iraq and Syria (Bahareez TV, 2014).

Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) theory of intergenerational value change can provide insight regarding the Egyptian people's eagerness to elect al-Sisi following Morsi's deposition. According to this theory, people will give priority to those socioeconomic needs viewed by them to be the direst at any given point in time. Physical security, they argue, is one of the most basic and elemental of these needs. When conditions become less than favorable, people will prioritize physical safety over socioeconomic values, such as freedom and democracy (Welzel & Inglehart, 2005; 2009, p97.p131). Al-Sisi campaigned on a platform of security, something the people were quick to prioritize after the pitfalls and turmoil they experienced during Morsi's short time in office (Jamaleddine, 2014). Primarily using TV broadcasts to promote for the security threats facing Egypt, al-Sisi was successful at framing himself as a solution and counterweight to the Muslim Brotherhood's policies. Al-Sisi was seen by the public as a solution for which democracy was surely a reasonable price for the people to pay.

6.2.1 Post-Morsi Internal Politics and the Deep State:

Ever since his first election in 2014, al-Sisi has worked on strictly repressing dissent in the country. He silenced his political opponents, controlled the media, and crushed the civil society (John, 2018). Najia Bounaim, Amnesty's North Africa Campaigns director, recently stated that "Today, it is more dangerous to openly criticize the government in Egypt than at any other time in the country's recent history" (Press TV, January 2019).

All of these changes targeted at granting the army - which was working hand-in-hand with al-Sisi - more power in the country.

Moreover, after Morsi's overthrow, the SCAF and al-Sisi worked on strengthening the military's hold on power. The SCAF selected Adly Mansour to be interim president. Mansour made legal changes to the constitution, and issued new laws such as Law number 20/2014, in order to formalize the SCAF's missions and interventions in the state's affairs (Wenig, 2014). After the election of al-Sisi as the new president, he restructured the SCAF by dismissing some military officers and promoting or reassigning trusted members of the army to leading positions in the Council (Wenig, 2014). He also reassigned more than 50% of the SCAF members in order to make the Council more loyal to the Sisi regime (Abul-Magd, 2014). In fact, throughout two popular uprisings and two election cycles, the institutions of the deep state managed to retain their control and regulate the executive branch when it ventured too far from its agenda, manipulating the public through propaganda, religion, and security discourse throughout the processes (Elbenni, 2017).

6.2.2 The Post-Morsi Economy

Immediately after al-Sisi's election in 2014, Egypt witnessed a rise in the stock market's revenues. This rise in revenues and al-Sisi's promise of stability attracted more investors. The country's USD index increased by 30% as compared to the previous year (The Economist, May 2015).

Nevertheless, the economic prosperity after the military coup of 2013 did not last long: Egypt witnessed an "economic slowdown" since 2014 (Ottaway, 2015). The

economy faced a major crisis especially after the 2014 drop in oil prices. Egypt's oil is no longer as lucrative for the state as before (Ottaway, 2015). The losses from the oil sector had a direct effect on Egypt's currency value that dropped by 50 percent (Runsewe, 2018). Similarly, in 2017, Egypt witnessed an abrupt inflation of 33 percent compared to 12 percent in 2014. This crisis burdened many individuals as the 2013 minimum wage of 174 USD decreased to 68 USD in 2018 (Runsewe, 2018).

Although the state was suffering from an economic crisis, the SCAF prospered economically after the election of al-Sisi. The military sought more financial support from the new government. Interestingly, the SCAF preserved its control over the economy and refused any civilian inquiry on its budget (Filiu, 2015). One member of the military expressed the SCAF's economic role in Egypt by saying: "We will fight for our projects and this is a battle we will not abandon. We will not let anyone destroy the effort in which we have invested for thirty years, or let anyone, whoever it is, touch the projects of the armed forces" (Filiu, 2015).

Unsurprisingly, after the election of al-Sisi in 2014 was the restoration of the pre-Morsi foreign aid that provided by the Gulf States. Consequently, foreign investment was on the rise, fortunate for al-Sisi as at the time it was clear "Egypt's government needs foreign money" to further develop the economy (The economist, 2015).

6.2.3 The Post-Morsi Regional and International Relations

Despite the difficulties regarding foreign affairs faced by Egypt under Morsi's rule, many international players changed their foreign policy with Egypt after he left office. For instance, in June 2014, the U.S. sent to Egypt 575 thousand USD in the form of

military aid that had been frozen during Morsi's rule, followed by another 1.3 billion USD, also earmarked for the military (Marshall, 2015). Similarly, Arab Gulf States (namely the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) did not hesitate long after the 2013 coup to offer around 20 billion USD to Egypt to supplement the period between the end of 2013 and 2014 (Ahram, 2014). It is also important to mention in this context that more than 60 percent of the Gulf aid to Egypt was provided immediately after the election of al-Sisi specifically because of the Gulf States' attitude towards his political agenda (The economist, 2015). As a result, the Arab Gulf has regained its status Egypt's top ally after resuming their policies of economic aid to Egypt (Kausch, 2015).

The restored financial aid coming from the Gulf States and the military aid from the U.S. actually draws more attention to the role played by the regional and international players not only in the downfall of Morsi but also the consolidation of power during al-Sisi's rule. The aid that was provided exclusively to the SCAF shows how the external powers, especially the neighboring Gulf States, privileged Egypt's security at the expense of freedom. Many international players saw that empowering the deep state was a better choice. Hence, al-Sisi continued to receive more economic support from the international community (Meringolo, 2015).

Clearly, the most evident change that took place after the election of al-Sisi is represented by Egypt's relations with regional and international players. Under al-Sisi's military rule, the country gained greater international support (except for Qatar and Turkey). This can be explained by these countries' geopolitical interests which requires stability in Egypt. The improvement in Egypt's foreign relations enhanced al-Sisi's

ability to handle domestic issues, particularly, the deteriorating economic performance as well as the opposition from Islamists and other elements of the Egyptian society.

6.3 The 2011 Egyptian Uprising: A Failed Revolution

In hindsight, the Egyptian uprising of 2011 do not seem to have produced a successful revolution. Morsi's rule was of special importance in drawing the shape of Egypt's future regime. As this thesis argues, the fall of the post-2011 uprising's first democratically-elected civilian regime is the result of the interplay of many factors on the internal, economic and international levels. The institutions that were at the core of the Mubarak regime, particularly the military, were able to reassert themselves and take control of the situation while benefiting from the weaknesses and failures of the civilian government of 2012 on various fronts. The state institutions of today, during al-Sisi's rule, are the same institutions of the past, the economy remains in sharp decline, and international policies have reverted back to those of Mubarak's regime. So long as these settings persist, one can question the likelihood of visualizing any concrete long-lasting political change, democratization, or transition away from the authoritarianism that has persisted for decades.

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