LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF HEZBOLLAH

by

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A thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs

School of Arts and Sciences
December 2011
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
School of Arts and Sciences - Byblos Campus

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my father who continuously taught me that the best kind of knowledge is that which is learned from its own sake. Accordingly I dedicate it to my mother, who taught me that the hardest tasks may be accomplished by taking one step at a time. I am substantially grateful to their amazing love, inexorable encouragement and support throughout my life. There is no doubt that without them I would have not reached this noteworthy stage of my existence.
Acknowledgment

I would like to express my intense gratitude to all my professors who have monitored me throughout my studies at the Lebanese American University. My warmest gratitude goes to my advisor, Dr. Marwan Rowayheb who has been the ideal thesis supervisor. He was a mentor for me because of his sage advice, positive criticism, and unconditional support.

I would also like to thank the other members of the thesis committee: Dr. Diala Ammar and Dr. Walid Moubarak for their important suggestions and constructive comments.

I would also like to contribute my work to my siblings Ghinwa, Maysaa, and Elie for their confidence in my deeds, and for their support and enthusiasm that encouraged me to present the thesis in the most unique way possible. I would also like to thank my loyal friends who encouraged me and had faith in me and work respectively.
Psychological warfare is dissimilar to military warfare that has direct, immediate effects. It is resistance that employs nonviolent means, and which focuses on a domestic, neutral and enemy audience.

Military and Non-Military confrontations have existed between Hezbollah and Israel since 1982. Given that the military balance between Hezbollah and Israel favored Israel, this study attempted to show how the psychological warfare launched by Hezbollah against Israel has influenced Israel’s actions in Lebanon since 1982. This article argued that although Hezbollah had a number of resources like organizational discipline and sophisticated media, its ability to influence Israel’s actions in Lebanon through its psychological war was strengthened when it managed to defeat Israel in its war over Lebanon in 2006. The 2006 War had given Hezbollah’s psychological war a boost. This study argued that it is not only the result of the war that had created deterrence but the ability of Hezbollah to incorporate what happened during the war in its psychological war against Israel. Hence, this thesis proved how the psychological warfare of Hezbollah against Israel enhanced Hezbollah’s deterrence ability and had pushed Israel to take Hezbollah’s threats more seriously.

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies were investigated within the period of 1982 until 2011 by examining the groups’ different enemy (government and public) audiences. The thesis examined the factors that allowed Hezbollah to have a successful psychological war. These factors were the discipline that exists among the organization of Hezbollah, a sophisticated media that was able to transmit its military strength, and the power of Hezbollah’s social services in recovering from previous and any upcoming war. These factors proved how it was not important what
Hezbollah really had, but its value according to its enemy was big due to the ability of Hezbollah to send a precise message. This thesis explored the effect of the 2006 Psychological War launched by Hezbollah against Israel and emphasized on how this war had affected the Israeli audience and how Hezbollah had used the result of the war to strengthen its psychological war against Israel.

Keywords:
Hezbollah; Israel; 2006 July War; Psychological Warfare; Deterrence
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PSYOP Psychological Operations
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
SLA South Lebanese Army
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN United Nations
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
ACV Armored Combat Vehicles
SSNP Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
LCP Lebanese Communist Party
IHO Islamic Health Organization
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The most identifiable form of warfare is known as military, yet the definition of ‘war’ extends to include other types such as political, economic and psychological conflicts. Psychological warfare is dissimilar to military warfare that has direct and immediate effects. It is a resistance that employs nonviolent means and which focuses on three types of audiences which are: domestic, neutral and enemy audience. Hence, this combative strategy is a complicated one, yet very effective or useful to the weaker military player in an asymmetric conflict.

According to ancient military generals, psychological war is among the most rigorous and intricate, as perceived by the Chinese writer, Sun Tzu, in his classic work, Art of War: “To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.”

Military and Non-Military confrontations have existed between Hezbollah and Israel since 1982. Given that the military balance between Hezbollah and Israel favored Israel, this study attempted to show how the psychological warfare launched by Hezbollah against Israel has influenced Israel’s actions in Lebanon since 1982. This article argued that although Hezbollah had a number of resources like

organizational discipline and sophisticated media, its ability to influence Israel’s actions in Lebanon through its psychological war was strengthened when it managed to defeat Israel in its war over Lebanon in 2006. The 2006 War had given Hezbollah’s psychological war a boost. This study argued that it is not only the result of the war that had created deterrence but the ability of Hezbollah to incorporate what happened during the war in its psychological war against Israel. Accordingly it reflects throughout its chapters how it has benefitted from its different Historical Frameworks-while stressing on them- in maintaining and increasing its deterrence. Hence, this thesis proved how the psychological warfare of Hezbollah against Israel enhanced Hezbollah’s deterrence ability and had pushed Israel to take Hezbollah’s threats more seriously.

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies were investigated within the period of 1982 until 2011 by examining the groups’ different enemy (government and public) audiences. The thesis examined the factors that allowed Hezbollah to have a successful psychological war. These factors were the discipline that exists among the organization of Hezbollah, a sophisticated media that was able to transmit its military strength, and the power of Hezbollah’s social services in recovering from previous and any upcoming war. These factors proved how it was not important what Hezbollah really had, but its value according to its enemy was big due to the ability of Hezbollah to send a precise message. This thesis explored the effect of the 2006 Psychological War launched by Hezbollah against Israel and emphasized on how this war had affected the Israeli audience and how Hezbollah had used the result of the war to strength it psychological war against Israel.

The issue of who won or lost the war maybe loaded with biases and objective views. However, this thesis claims Hezbollah’s victory through Winograds report (which will be presented later on) that in turn spoke about Israel’s defeat. Accordingly, this was the first war that Israel ended through a UN cease-fire resolution.
All of the above was accomplished through a qualitative study where Hezbollah’s foundation and psychological warfare strategy was examined within the 1990-2006 time frame, and from 2006 until today and, by demonstrating the extent to which Hezbollah deters Israel through psychological warfare means. This study proceeds to examine, in a detailed manner, the factors employed by Hezbollah in its psychological warfare, and scrutinizes its impact on the Israeli government and public.

The data and information was acquired from books, reports, articles, online think tanks, and different media apparatuses to reveal the unending propaganda or misinformation relayed by both parties during, before and after the July 2006 war.

1.1 - Literature Review

There is a paucity of articles related to the psychological warfare between Hezbollah and Israel. Most of the published literature deals primarily with topics concerning Hezbollah’s military strength, religious beliefs, foreign relations and influence over the Shiites. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the general literature on Hezbollah since Hezbollah is one of the most researched groups in Lebanon and the Middle East. However, a few examples may prove useful. Amal Saad Ghroyeb’s book, *Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion*, concerns itself with the religious element of Hezbollah by reflecting on the groups’ understanding of the essentials of Islam--Jihad and Martyrdom--and examines how the organization compelled the Israeli occupation forces to withdraw in 2000. Judith Harik’s book, *Hezbollah: the Changing Face of Terrorism*, attempts to identify Hezbollah’s factual relationships between the group and other regional players, and its

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relationship with internal Lebanese players questioning how many non-Shiites support Hezbollah. Nicholas Blanford’s work, “Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah” reproduces Nasrallah’s speeches and interviews since the mid-1980’s; the book includes his well-known quotes, quips, ripostes and promises.

The enmity between Hezbollah and Israel initiated in 1982, and it was Israel’s willful decision to commence military operations as Dov Waxman stated in his article “Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hizballah,” as Israel had many targets in Lebanon. However, the sole objective achieved was expulsing the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) from Lebanon; it failed, as previously planned, to set up a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon. This, in turn, resulted in Israel’s unilateral troop withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah’s provocation led to the 2006 War when its fighters killed and captured IDF soldiers. Israel retaliated brutally, and hostilities ended with a ceasefire UNSCR 1701 resolution.

A few articles and books fall within the scope of this thesis. Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz’s article, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon of Asymmetrical Conflict,” describes how the media becomes a striking feature of modern warfare and how the relatively small, secretive Hezbollah shrewdly retained almost all the messages broadcasted by journalists in the 2006 War, and was thus enabled to extract propaganda from them. Accordingly, Gabriel Weimann describes

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in his report, “Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah’s Online Campaign” he how Hezbollah is a media-minded organization and orients its entire media to reflect its military might, and how it effectively targeted Israeli society and demoralized it.

Herbert Friedman reflects in his article, “Psychological Operations during the Israel-Lebanon War 2006,” on the different means of psychological warfare implemented in 2006 and the various reactions to this war. A number of scholars have reviewed and discussed the existing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and a few have focused on the impact of the mutually existent psychological war between the two. “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” by Ron Schleifer; and an important scholar, Dr. Pierre Cyril Pahlavi, engage this topic in “The 33 Day War: An example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age.” Consequently, this issue was elaborated on by Frederic M. Wehrey’s work, “A Clash of Wills: Hizballah’s Psychological Campaign against Israel in South Lebanon.”

Augustus Norton’s, “Hezbollah: A Short History,” examines Hezbollah’s roots, establishment and gradual development and the way it attained its status in Lebanese politics. Norton also considers the extent to which Hezbollah was a massive social service provider for the Shiites, and how after 2006 it augmented its military might. Given these various factors, Hezbollah successfully increased its

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support through its postwar reconstruction. This was also elaborated in the report by James B. Love “Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power”14 which describes how Hezbollah, through its social service network, attracted Shiites and other factions of the Lebanese society to its cause. Hezbollah, according to J.B. Love, was indisputably more significant and dependable than the Lebanese government in terms of funding and infrastructure building.

Shmuel Bar15 in “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah” reflects on the extent to which Israel was unable to clarify the precise nature of its red lines, which, in turn, provided Hezbollah with the opportunity to disregard it in 2006. Accordingly, Bar highlights the magnitude of the figure Nasrallah represents for Hezbollah and his psychological impact on the region. This topic is elaborated further in Amos Harel’s article in Haaretz, “Hezbollah chief’s speeches sway Israeli opinion more than any Arab leader”16.

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CHAPTER TWO
WHAT IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE?

Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) or psychological operations (PSYOP) as is it often referred to in accordance to contemporary notions, and more usually as the war of ‘Hearts and Minds’ and/or ‘Propaganda’, employs a number of tools to manipulate a targeted audience’s lifestyle, ideology, emotions, behavior, and other key elements. The intended audience could be governments, multinational corporations, individuals, terrorist organizations or other adversaries.

Hence, propaganda is one of the most powerful tools of PSYWAR whose main intention consists of manipulating the behavior of a particular audience. It selects facts and presents them in a manner that enhances instinct over mind in order to achieve a desired outcome or result. “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”

PSYWAR dates back to ancient times and the most notable example made its appearance with Alexander the Great of Macedonia. His empire absorbed the majority of what was known as the world in his era. Typically, having occupied various territories or nations, he would leave behind a number of troops to maintain power. However, he was aware that his army was gradually shrinking, and eventually could be defeated by his enemies. Alexander shrewdly devised a method of manipulating the enemy; he accomplished this by spreading fear within their armies and people. He proceeded to build objects that resembled gigantic shields and helmets, which made the enemy fearful of engaging combat with towering giants.

The reputation he had established also helped immensely to generate fear among those who contemplated fighting him or his warriors.¹⁸

Psychological warfare was a powerful tool used in ancient war, and in the modern sense it extends back to “Congregatio di Propaganda Fide” or “The Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples” who employed propaganda means against the Protestant Reformation to empower the Catholics in 1622¹⁹.

However, PSYWAR and propaganda, more accurately, was developed during the First World War by the Canadian aristocrat, Lord Beaverbrook, and a British one, Lord Northcliffe.²⁰ Although the propaganda tactics employed in the First World War and the Second World War were highly criticized, the methods were duly justified: “Why should there be such a stigma surrounding a process of persuasion designed to get people to stop fighting, and thus preserve their lives, rather than having their heads blown off?”²¹

PSYWAR prevailed mostly in the Second World War with Adolf Hitler who accredited himself for the failure of the traditional left and right parties. He took advantage of their collapse to renounce the conditions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.²² He was amongst the first that employed a microphone on the radio to proclaim that National Socialism would solve the country’s problems. He cunningly manipulated the German public that gradually accepted his dictatorship, and employed, as universally acknowledged, propaganda or misinformation to unite Germany and overcome internal resistance.

²¹ Taylor, Munitions of the Mind.
²² Rouse: Psychological Operations/Warfare.
Radio soon became the ultimate tool for the PSYWAR, which not only the Germans but also the Japanese employed it to broadcast patriotic music, propaganda, and speeches that dispirited the western alliance at times. However, the supreme example is that of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that provided English lessons for the Germans on the air to demonstrate that they understood what they were saying. Here is an example: "Now I will give you a verb that should be very useful. Again, please repeat after me. ICH BRENNE. I am burning. Du Brennst. You are burning. ER BRENNT. He is burning. WIR BRENEN. We burn. IHR BRENNT. You are burning. SIR BRENEN. They are burning."\footnote{Rouse: Psychological Operations/Warfare.}

Joseph Stalin was known as one of the most stubborn ideological leaders. Yet, during the Second World War he recognized that military means were not sufficient to defeat Germany, and this realization made him include propaganda and/or PSYWAR in the armed effort. He recognized that his Communist ideology had lost its initial appeal, and thus switched to the “Holy Russia” slogan with its past system, re-instating the ‘Church’ and ‘Class distinctions’ once more. “Even the official newspaper, "PRAVDA," dropped its Marxist motto, "WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE," and substituted the openly nationalistic slogan, "DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADER." The ensuing struggle became and is still officially known in Soviet history as "The Great Patriotic War".\footnote{Rouse: Psychological Operations/Warfare.}

This is why the PSYWAR or PSYOP has been referred to as: “planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.”\footnote{Ryan Clow. (2009). Psychological Operations: The Need to Understand the Psychological Plane of Warfare. Canadian Military Journal Issue 9 No. 1, 21-29.} For this result to be achieved there exists a number of conditions:
1. Psychological Activities: that range from ‘leaflets’ that are dropped from the sky, ‘posters’ hung up on walls, to ‘radio’ and/or ‘TV’ where a message is broadcasted on air. These conditions made this type of war more successful and more feasible.

2. Attitudes and Behaviors: the PSYWAR and propaganda tend to target the mentality and behavior of a well-defined audience. Thus, according to the Canadian National Defense (2004) this war has three interrelated goals:
   a. “Weaken the will of the adversary by lowering morale and reducing the efficiency of his force by creating doubt, dissonance, and disaffection.
   b. Reinforce feelings of friendly target audiences.
   c. Gain the support of uncommitted or undecided audiences.”

The PSYOP and propaganda are not part of a short-term war, their effectiveness and results are usually reflected in the long term. Accordingly, the results can never be forecasted. Nevertheless, the PSYOP or PSYWAR has different major factors, which complement it and make it efficient. These factors are:

1. An understanding of key principles of Psychological Operations
2. An understanding of target audiences.
3. An understanding of how to measure effectiveness.

When it comes to ‘Targeting the Audience’ a number of things must be taken into consideration, especially the environment of this specified audience. Studying the setting will lead to an understanding of how the audience shapes their point of view, and how their reaction is affected. Achieving the desired results over a targeted

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27 “Psychological Operations Doctrine articulates three categories of Psy Ops: Strategic Psy Ops (SPO), Crisis-Response Psy Ops (CRPO), and Combat Psy Ops (CPO). These categories generally conform to the levels of command, yet what is perceived to be the relevant aspects of each category have been used herein to illustrate the main effort at each level of command.” Clow, R. Psychological Operations.
audience is not a simple task; it requires a vast amount of analysis, expertise and time. All those factors are essential, but most important is to scrutinize the culture, society, norms, values, mode of life, language and history of the specified audience. To target the audience a well-defined strategy must be activated, thus the audience is described as ‘delineated’.

This strategy is currently extremely widespread where the audience is easily manipulated with the existence of the media ranging from internet to television, radio and the press. Hence, the PSYWAR and propaganda are a tactical procedure, which is capable of distinguishing among the same audience between those who wish to retaliate against the former forcibly, and those that could be handled by diplomatic means.

However, in order to do so, certain characteristics of the audience must be understood. First, the ‘conditions’ that surround them is important and how these conditions--poverty, location, political situation and others--orients their behavior and ideologies. Knowing these conditions, the PSYWAR is implemented in a way that inspires the audience to a novel, enhanced mode of living.

Second, the extent to which the audience is ‘receptive’ is vital. The PSYWAR must be molded in a way that the message accesses the psyche and instinct of its reader. This was mostly implemented with the USA PSYWAR in World War II when they changed their mode of discourse with the Japanese soldier. “Our experts in psychological warfare held a huddle and came up with a new one, replacing the ‘I surrender’ on the leaflet with ‘I cease resistance.’ It worked.”

Finally, yet significantly, the weak points of this audience must be studied. However, the level or amount of ‘vulnerability’ is crucial because it could result in

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limiting the effectiveness of messages by alleging to this audience that they should eliminate these weak points. Hence, identifying and studying the characteristics of the audience is critical because a miscalculation would project undesired effects for the long-term goals of the PSYWAR.

Having said all of the above it is worth studying the war between Hezbollah and Israel which has lasted since 1982, yet after the end of the July war in 2006, the PSYWAR became a controversial issue for many scholars and experts. It was considered phenomenal that a non-state actor was able to defend itself against Israel, a country acknowledged as having one of the most powerful well-equipped armies in the world. The Hezbollah/Israel rivalry has continued for a relatively long period, yet the last actual military confrontation was that of the July 2006 War.
CHAPTER THREE
HEZBOLLAH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

This section examines the psychological warfare implemented by Hezbollah during four periods:

- a. 1982 - 2000 Israeli Withdrawal
- c. July War 2006
- d. Post 2006 war- Today

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare will be examined in the context of the organization’s objectives and tactics. Accordingly the enemy audience will be studied throughout these periods.

3.1 - Audience

The enemy audience of Hezbollah could be divided into three parts: ‘the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF), the Israeli public, and the South Lebanese Army (SLA).³¹

3.1.1- 1982-2000 Israeli Withdrawal

The messages by means of which the Hezbollah attempted to influence or demoralize the enemy public were:

1. Claiming the conflict would be lengthy and result in a Hezbollah triumph.
2. Hezbollah questioned the willpower and fortitude of the Israeli public to achieve their goals.

²⁹ The IDF are the military wing of the Israeli State which consists of the navy, the ground forces and the air force.
³⁰ The SLA was a militia in southern Lebanon that was known in the Lebanese civil war in 1979. It was led by Saad Haddad who called for a Government of Free Lebanon. This militia was backed up by Israel since 1982-2000 to combat Hezbollah and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
3. It depicted the IDF as ultimately unsuccessful as compared to Hezbollah’s guerillas.

4. Hezbollah was persistent and adamant in its mission, which was to oblige an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

5. Whenever Hezbollah suffered casualties (whether civilians or guerillas), it endeavored to generate a sense of guilt in the Israeli public and IDF.32

Starting with the ‘IDF’, Hezbollah subjected them to various means of intimidation and terrorization in order to eradicate the self-confidence and arrogance the Israeli soldiers reportedly had.33 This was achieved by a combination of guerrilla attacks and psychological messages. Hezbollah guerillas assaulted IDF positions in southern Lebanon and, whenever possible, raised Hezbollah flags, killed or wounded the officers and soldiers, and placed mines along the Israeli northern border. These attacks or psychological tactics met the aim of sending demoralizing statements to its enemy.34 In addition, Hezbollah guerillas used a combat camera operator to film the attacks; these recordings were then handed to and edited by Al-Manar and specific incidents or scenes were broadcast with music and commentary. Videos broadcasting since 1991, reflect the view that the IDF, as compared to Hezbollah, was an inferior power. The recordings were also submitted to foreign news agencies such as Associated Press and Reuters, which in turn handed them to Israel for transmission to its public.35

The ‘SLA’ was targeted with a pre-arranged campaign that was replete with threats and intimidation. This was done to promote a sense of doubt within the SLA, sow discord between the SLA and IDF, thus disparaging and humiliating the former.

32 Schleifer, 11-12.
33 Schleifer, 5-7.
34 Schleifer, 8.
This operation was carried out by revealing the names of the SLA senior leadership (mainly Druze and Christians), and called for their assassination. The SLA fighters consisted mainly of Shiites that were threatened with retributions and death when caught.36

Hezbollah leaders frequently held press conferences during which they exhibited pictures of the SLA. Hezbollah advised the SLA soldiers to abandon their units, guaranteeing, in return, a secure life. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued with its radio broadcasts, stating that Israel always gave up on its allies, which made the SLA panic for its safety, especially when Israel was pressured into withdrawing from Southern Lebanon.37

Targeting the Israeli public was not a simple task since it consisted of three different categories:

1. The Labor Political Party (Left) that was for an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon
2. The Likud (Right) who were the decision makers
3. The Israeli families, especially those whose children were engaged militarily in Southern Lebanon.38

The true goal of this campaign was to discourage Israel from maintaining its positions in Southern Lebanon, and more significantly, to shatter its consensus vis-à-vis the public and government.39 Moreover, Hezbollah knew that the Israeli population, in general, was sensitive as to the number of its casualties, thus in 1996, Al-Manar added antennas to its broadcast system and was able to cover Northern Israel. By doing that Hezbollah openly addressed the Israeli public and notified them

36 Wehrey, 63.
37 Wehrey, 63-64.
38 Schleifer, 9.
about the cost of extending their occupation of Lebanon. Al-Manar broadcasted
images of Israeli corpses and displayed videos in several languages, including
Hebrew, for the Israeli public to understand their contents.\(^\text{40}\) In addition, as of 1996,
Hezbollah made use of the internet and targeted the Israeli public, especially the
parents of the IDF in Southern Lebanon. These close relatives continuously checked
Hezbollah’s website (updated frequently) for the latest news.\(^\text{41}\)

### 3.1.2- 2000 Israeli Withdrawal- July War 2006

After the Israeli unilateral withdrawal in 2000 until the July War of 2006,
Hezbollah’s enemies stayed the same which were the IDF and Israeli public, but by
then, the SLA was dismantled. The psychological warfare extended through Al-
Manar’s direct transmission throughout Israel, and programs were launched with
Hebrew subtitles requesting the Israeli inhabitants’ departure from Israel and return
to Europe and the United States.\(^\text{42}\) Accordingly, its radio station, Al-Nur, also
broadcasted in Hebrew to various large Israeli cities.\(^\text{43}\) Hezbollah’s transmissions to
Israel consisted of a blunt warning, informing it of the group’s military capacity to
target and destroy Israel’s homes, similar to the way the organization was capable of
directly influencing Israel’s television and radio station broadcasts.\(^\text{44}\) Hence,
Hezbollah’s main concern was to demoralize and alarm the Israeli public.\(^\text{45}\)

### 3.1.3- July 2006 War

During the July 2006 War Hezbollah’s main psychological war was aimed at
the Israeli public. The foremost message that Hezbollah projected was that they
targeted civilians in not only Northern Israel but also other populated areas, as long

\(^{40}\) Jorisch, 26-29.

\(^{41}\) Conway, “Cybercortical,” 13.

\(^{42}\) Schleifer, 14-15.

\(^{43}\) Wehrey, 67-68.

\(^{44}\) Schleifer, 14-15.

as Israel maintained its military actions. Hezbollah deliberately disclosed the number of IDF casualties and amount of destruction caused by their rocket attacks because they were conscious of the Israeli sensitivity on this issue.46

Nasrallah identified and sought advantage of Israel’s vulnerability whenever interviewed and threatened retaliatory rocket strikes aimed at Tel Aviv; in other words, civilian casualties, in case Beirut was bombed. Thus, Israel was steadily pressured and prepared to proclaim a cease-fire.47

3.1.4-July 2006 War-Today

Since the end of the July war in 2006 until today Hezbollah has maintained “a war of words”.48 Hezbollah is maintaining its propaganda through its different media apparatuses mainly al-Manar to express its readiness and willingness for any upcoming war. Nasrallah in turn continues to promise the Israeli public and government that Hezbollah now has the ability to strike any city beyond Tel Aviv. “We are now capable of attacking any city or village throughout Israel.”49 Accordingly, Hezbollah through Nasrallah and Al-Manar, continuously promises retaliating against the assassination of Imad Moughniyi, which keeps their enemy cautious. “Israeli politicians and generals, past and present, are very worried and very cautious and we would like them to stay that way…the blood of Imad Moughniyeh would haunt them everywhere.”50

3.2 - Overall Objectives and Strategy

49 Ibid.
3.2.1 - 1982 to 2000 Withdrawal

During this period Hezbollah had two main goals:

1. Oblige Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Gain the support of the Lebanese public regardless of its various religions and sects.

One of Hezbollah’s crucial goals was to challenge Israel’s occupation of the South and compel its departure. By the year 2000, Hezbollah was able to accomplish this objective. During the 1990’s, Hezbollah was targeting both the Israeli and the Lebanese public. The strategy against Israel was carried out by means of both guerilla and psychological warfare\(^{51}\) in order to intimidate or deflate the IDF and SLA, outmaneuver the Israelis by taking advantage of their sensitivity to casualties, and thus force its political leaders to call for a retreat from Lebanese territory.

Hezbollah was cognizant of the fact that it required a larger number of accomplishments to acquire legitimacy and resemble a genuine resistance movement (not simply a radical terrorist group) from the viewpoint of Lebanese; where it would not terminate its military assaults against northern Israel, unless the latter carried out an offensive at against Lebanese civilians.\(^{52}\)

This was achieved by employing a variety of media outlets, but depending mainly on its TV station, Al-Manar. During this period, 60% of its broadcast was composed of news, religion, sport, and cultural programs, and the other 40% consisted of screening military engagements. The combat scenes were favorably modified before being broadcast.\(^{53}\)

3.2.2 - Post-2000 Withdrawal Until 2006, 34-Day July War 2006

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\(^{51}\) Schleifer, 6.
\(^{52}\) Wehrey, 61-62.
\(^{53}\) Wehrey, 65.
Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel continued after the 2000 unilateral withdrawal. The conflict persisted not only over the Shebaa Farms, but also extended to the aid Hezbollah provided for Palestinians, especially during their second rebellion in 2000. This period was critical for Hezbollah in relation to Israel. Hezbollah maintained its cross-border raids and mortar attacks against Israel, justifying them by claiming that Israel still occupied the Shebaa Farms and the conflict would persevere until Hezbollah’s remaining prisoners were released.54

Accordingly, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah broadened its satellite/transmission capacity, which allowed it to broadcast its message to the entire Middle East and the international community.55 By this time, Hezbollah had a number of concerns ranging from the occupied Shebaa Farms, to the remaining Lebanese prisoners; yet its main preoccupation, especially one that involved the usage of psychological warfare, was the Palestinian unrest that was instigated in 2000.56

3.2.3 - July 2006 34-Day War

During the July 2006 War, Hezbollah strongly depended on its guerilla warfare strategy to resist and confront the IDF. Through the guerilla attacks, Hezbollah relied on the sensitivity of Israelis towards civilian casualties, which would eventually make Israel accept a ceasefire agreement. Consequently, through the psychological warfare strategy, Hezbollah was attempting to demonstrate to the domestic and, specifically the neutral audience, the collateral damage that Israel caused throughout Lebanon in order to demonize it.

56 Jorisch, 28-29.
As for the war between Hezbollah and Israel, the organization’s primary concern was how to confront and overcome Israel’s military attacks. \(^5^7\) Hezbollah employed a strategy of ‘disguise’ or concealment that resulted in causing collateral damage from the Israeli strikes. Hezbollah’s guerillas, leaders and weapons were hidden in mosques and childcare centers. \(^5^8\) Guerillas would launch rockets from private schools and homes, and having accomplished this, immediately ‘took off’ and concealed themselves in another location. \(^5^9\)

Hezbollah realized that it could not defy or win the war against Israel through a military stratagem. Accordingly, Hezbollah sought of attaining victories that would influence its enemy audiences, and this, of course, could only be done through waging psychological warfare \(^6^0\) with the aid of Al-Manar, Al-Nur, and an assortment of websites \(^6^1\). According to Kreps, these media tools were of outstanding importance to Hezbollah because it was able to display the collateral damage caused by Israeli airstrikes and depict them as “egregious and inhumane.” \(^6^2\)

Hezbollah also decided to combat and pressure \(^6^3\) Israel and public opinion by exploiting its vulnerability, i.e. Israel’s acknowledged sensitivity to the casualties’ factor. Subsequently, Hezbollah fired an excessive number of rockets into Northern Israel, aimed intentionally at civilian targets. \(^6^4\)

Israel waged its own psychological warfare by generating fear in the ‘enemy audience’ with its employment of disproportionate military force. Hezbollah depended throughout the war on Al-Manar which, among its various other

\(^{57}\) Waxman, 32.
\(^{60}\) Schleifer 17.
\(^{61}\) Conway, “Cybercortical,” 18.
\(^{62}\) Kreps, 80.
\(^{63}\) Fayutkin, 214.
\(^{64}\) Waxman, 31.
transmissions, announced the kidnapping of the two soldiers at the start of the war, and broadcasted Nasrallah’s speech at the war’s conclusion.\textsuperscript{65} Israel was able to cyber attack some enemy websites, including Al-Manar. During the hostilities; Hezbollah retaliated by hijacking Israeli websites and posting videos on them.\textsuperscript{66}

3.2.4 - July 2006 War- Today

A ‘Cold War’ is a “state of political hostility and military tension between two countries or power blocs, involving propaganda, subversion, threats, economic sanctions, and other measures short of open warfare.”\textsuperscript{67}

The above definition defines appropriately the existent state of affairs between Hezbollah and Israel. An atmosphere of political hostility most definitely exists, military tension and threats of its use is always avoided by a well-defined propaganda that includes threats, but is short of explicit warfare. The current Cold War that is waged by the different media means of Hezbollah (mainly Al-Manar) that exists between Hezbollah and Israel today—psychological warfare between the two parties—prevents Israel from launching an attack on Hezbollah and vice-versa.

The situation between Hezbollah and Israel has been exceedingly calm and timorous since the July 2006 War. This situation is foreign, consisting of a Cold War that combines idle verbal threats with preparations for an impending war. Warfare is apparently unavoidable, and its cost much greater than any of the preceding ones. Political analysts and scholars maintain that both Israel and Hezbollah acknowledge the exorbitant devastation of a new war, “a miniature version of the so-called

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{66} Conway, “Cybercortical,” 18.
mutually assured destruction theory that some say helped prevent nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union…It's a little bit like the Cold War.”

Israel and Hezbollah are both comparatively convinced that a measure of deterrence exists between them. “There's an arms race and competition over operational plans, intelligence gathering and deterrence - and of course, there's media-assisted psychological warfare.” Israel considers both Hezbollah and Lebanon learned a lesson in 2006 when about 1,200 Lebanese were killed, and considerable damage was caused to the infrastructure not only in the south but also throughout the country. A recollection of this scenario, according to Israel, is sufficient to deter Hezbollah’s rockets.

On the other hand, Hezbollah considers that its stockpile of rockets, currently estimated to be 40,000, three times more than the figure that existed in 2006, is responsible for deterring Israel. Gabi Ashkenazi, chief of Israeli Staff, alleges that the Hezbollah missiles and rockets “have a range of 300 km and some of them have a range of up to 325 km…There is a paradox – one hand there is calm, but when you peek over the fence you can see armament and empowerment.”

Hamas stresses that its rockets have the indisputable capacity of reaching Tel Aviv. This has effectively alarmed the Israeli public and government where General Jacob Amidror claimed: “It's a totally different situation…Israel has never had such a threat to its homeland area. No question we will pay a higher price.”

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72 Sanders.
Nevertheless, since the (United Nations Security Council Resolution) UNSCR 1701 ceasefire, the current situation is relatively peaceful. A vicious war of words, threats and propaganda are prevalent for a number of reasons, but mainly for the purpose of deterrence. Through this psychological warfare, Israel and Hezbollah are exchanging various forms of ‘Direct Verbal Threats’ and ‘Non-Verbal Threats’ (which will be elaborated on in the next chapters).

3.3 - Conclusion

This section concentrated on indicating and describing Hezbollah’s primary goals and tactics against Israel from 1982 until today. The main emphasis was on the psychological warfare strategy that was aimed at its enemy audience. The following chapters will reveal to what extent the psychological warfare strategy was an essential factor that led to ending the 2006 War in a relatively short period; and how the existing psychological warfare is maintaining deterrence between the two entities.
CHAPTER FOUR
HEZBOLLAH/ISRAEL JULY 2006 WAR A TURNING POINT

The Israel/Hezbollah war of 2006 is referred to or is known as the July War (Harb Tammuz) in the Arab World, and is labeled as the Second Lebanon War in Israel (Milhemet Levanon Hashniya). The naming between Israel and the Arab world of the war may differ, yet this war is a symbolic one because it represents a turning point in Israel/Hezbollah and/or Israel/Lebanon and Israel/Arab world relations for a number of reasons.

Israel recognized the vulnerability and hazard vis-à-vis the neighboring Arab states that its establishment in 1948 caused; it was surrounded by defiant, antagonistic nations that rejected its presence. Thus, Israel’s main ideology and strategy based itself on the maintenance of a superior military might matching that of the entire Arab nations.\(^{73}\) This strategy and aim was emphasized during the 1967 Six-Day War, which resulted in the creation of a psychological myth among the Arabs of an indisputably, superiorly armed Israeli nation. Arab nations became wary of initiating military activities confronted with the specter of an aggressive Israeli power. The issue of who lost or won the July 2006 War is an uncertain, controversial matter that is mixed with emotions and biases, yet this war was an explicit setback for the myth created in the Arab and world psyche. “The 2006 war was a defining moment for Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. The decades of work, millions of dollars of funding, and political risk had paid off in a non victory for Israel.”\(^{74}\) The image of


\(^{74}\) B. Love.
frail and vulnerable Arab nations against Israel’s technology and weapons was indeed scattered not only among the Arabs and Lebanese, but also the Israeli public and government.

Accordingly, prior to the 2006 War Hezbollah was foreboding with its military power; however, Israel had never realized its true intensity until this war. Hezbollah was thus enabled to create of itself a deterrent, restraining icon for the Israeli public and government. Indeed, the 2006 Hezbollah/Israel War changed the nature of the game, considering particularly that Israel had taken for granted its establishment of the rules (and Arabs duly respecting them), and combating was an instigated force majeure at Israel’s choosing. However, the “July 2006 War and the Gaza War that followed it changed the rulebook, ushering in the new ‘Boss Has Gone Mad’ strategy, with all of its attendant carnage.”

Indeed 2006 was a turning point in the Hezbollah/Israel warfare in general. The psychological warfare that Hezbollah projected towards Israel was not a new tool. Hezbollah has been implementing this type of warfare since 1982.

4.1 - Israel Post 2006

Before examining the changes that occurred in Israel after the July 2006 War, it is worth noting that Israel’s military policy is an unswerving result of its history which has consisted of ongoing warfare with its neighbors since 1948. This policy was best summed up by Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, who stated flatly that the Arab refusal to recognize the state of Israel would persist, and result in Israel being in a perpetual state of war. Arabs, in turn, would preserve a state of military

vigilance, which would consequently make Israel expectant of an imminent attack. “Israel developed a security concept based on cumulative deterrence and the excessive use of force in both limited and general wars. This concept rested on the belief Israel would be unable to militarily impose peace on the Arabs; therefore, the goal was to persuade them to accept peace by making the price of war too high.”77

Israel recognized that it was surrounded by Arab nations that have significant geographic borders, social, cultural and economical ties that prevent it from expanding its nation. “Understanding the sacrifices it would have to make as a nation; Israel developed a military strategy emphasizing strategic defense of the homeland, taking the operational offensive, and forcing (and winning) short wars.”78

Hence, Israel’s strategy consisted of maintaining an edge over the Arab nations in terms of military might; this led to Israel’s enhancing and improving its military technology and training. “As a result of their investment in technology and training, Israel became the dominant; best trained and equipped military in the Middle East.”79

This was displayed in the 1967 Six-day War in which Israel’s victory emphasized the Israeli deterrence myth, which consequently made Arab countries fearful of initiating a war. Israel proceeded to develop its military capacity because of its conviction that the Jewish state inhabited an antagonistic region, where some Arab nations, parties or groups sought a way to challenge the myth of the 1967 Six-day War.

The 2006 July War proved to be an irrefutable turning point in the existing wars not only between Israel and Hezbollah but also between Israel and the Arab world. The image of the military supremacy Israel had over the Arab world since the six-day war in 1967 was now scattered. Israel’s claim to have won the war was

77 Zeev. Defending the Holy Land.
78 Ibid.
hollow and unconvincing. The fighting ended with a UN 1701 cease-fire resolution; massive destruction had occurred on both sides. A number of questions arose in the minds of the people, in the midst of which Hezbollah initiated a media campaign. It described the war’s outcome as a ‘divine victory’ for the organization, Lebanon and the Arab world because for the indubitably first time, Israel had been intimidated and was forced to withdraw.

What were the ensuing results of Israel’s actions? How did Israel perceive the war? Is Israel currently deterred by Hezbollah’s threat? Is the Israeli state preparing for another round of battle to re-establish its military supremacy? Before analyzing these questions one should note that it is faulty to assume that Israel is a weakened country that is ignoring the consequences of the 2006 War. On the contrary, Israel, similar to Hezbollah, has its own measures, tactics and strategies for monitoring the effects of the war, of launching its own psychological warfare, and of preparing for a possible upcoming war with Hezbollah or any other state or non-state actor. Indeed, Israel’s experience with Hezbollah, be it the unilateral withdrawal in 2000 or the 2006 war, was a baffling experience which made it re-examine its weak and strong points, and determine how to counter any future potential threat.

4.2 - The Winograd Report

The Winograd Report was issued by a commission of inquiry hired by the Israeli government. The head of the inquiry, Eliyahu Winograd, a retired judge, started his plenary session on September 18, 2006, and finalized the report on April 20, 2007. The report, which criticized some key decision making in the war was remarkably impressive to Nasrallah. "Even though they're our enemies, it is worthy of respect that the political forces and the Israeli public act quickly to save their state,
entity, army and their existence in the crisis…The first important outcome of this commission is that it has finally and officially decided the issue of victory and defeat... This commission spoke about a very big defeat.”^80

When the report was submitted, the committee admitted that the task they were appointed for was an uneasy one where they had to navigate not only the 34-day war but also events that had occurred since the 2000 Israel withdrawal from Lebanon. Accordingly, the committee stated that the report had been written for its disheartened public, for lessons to be learned and suggestions for the future. The overall impression of the 2006 War was that it consisted of a misguided, failed opportunity devoid of any apparent benefit:

“Overall, we regard the Second Lebanese War as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East which enjoyed full air superiority, size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-

reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.”

The report harshly criticized the Israeli decision–making process ranging from individuals in the political sphere to the military intelligence and their entourage. The report claimed persistently that the IDF was ill prepared for such a war, and that the defense structure displayed shortcomings dealing with shocking circumstances, and was unable to protect civilians that were attacked by rockets. “These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.” The report insisted that Israel had not weighed its decisions and did not have an exit plan for the war, thus resulting in its failure.

Israel’s political and military blunders made it lose on political grounds; unlike previous wars, Israel counted on international agreements favoring Israel which resulted in the UN cease-fire resolution 1701 “which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.” The report concluded that Israel must seek peace with its neighbors and, if necessary, compromise in order to survive a region that could be an impending threat. Yet, the report stressed that if policy adjustments are to be made, they ought to be made when its foes are well aware of Israel’s strength. “At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.”

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82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Winograd Committee submits final report.
4.2.1 - Israeli Analysis of Winograd’s Report

The report was highly critical of the existing government and repeatedly stated it had operated erroneously in the July 2006 War. “The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff.”\(^{85}\) Dan Halutz, the chief of staff, lacked professionalism and judgment; and although the prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, lacked experience in a war crisis, he had not requested any help; Amir Peretz, the minister of Defense, was frequently criticized by Winograd\(^{86}\). Accordingly, Peretz and Halutz resigned, but Olmert refused to do so even though the negative criticism increased concerning his performance.

Consensus was not met in the aftermath of the war and/or of the report. Some were calling on Olmert to resign (mainly the labor party) and others, the Likud in general, and Kadima in particular, supported him. The soldiers had their own grave reservations patent in the Ynet newspaper headlined, “Reserve soldiers say Olmert 'lacks moral authority’ must resign”; Sergeant Lior Dimenes stated blatantly that the trust of the soldiers cannot be regained.\(^{87}\) The report featured further interviews with soldiers and officers’ expressing their frustration with the government, asserting that nothing had been achieved ultimately, and this was apparent from the IDF’s performance in southern Israel, where citizens were threatened daily by missiles and rockets. They called for the government’s dismissal: “Livni should be the one hopping planes instead of the families, the chief of staff should be drawing up

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operational plans and not plans for the drawer – we should be thinking about how to get them out of there now, and the prime minister must be a lot more creative.”

Consequently, a Globes-Smith survey published on August 14, 2006 showed that Olmert’s Kadima party received less than a 20% mandate compared to the 29% it had received in March of the same year. Another striking survey said that only 3% of the Israelis believed that the government had accomplished most of its objectives compared to the 33% of the previous week. Sixty percent of the public said that they would no longer vote for Kadima or Labor; they would prefer instead to register as undecided voters. Elmerts’ supporters, on the other hand, such as Samson Blinded, criticized the leftist leaning of the Winograd report, saying: “Leftist members of the Winograd commission might not like that, but quite often war is the only option, and the army is the best expert on war, one well worth listening to.” He defended Olmert, stating that he had only been prime mister for two months, and blamed the Israelis who granted the Labor socialists 19 seats in the Knesset with Peretz as Defense Minister (who is Labor). Hence, the almost complete consensus among the Israeli government was shattered in the aftermath of the 2006 War.

Accordingly, the Winograd’s report focused on ground battles, confrontations and/or offensives. The final report stated that there should be an upgrading at all levels of the military especially the ground offensive... A paramilitary organization withstood the strongest army in the Middle East for weeks... These results have far-reaching consequences for our enemies and us as... The ground operation did not

90 Samson Blinded (2005): A Machiavellian Perspective on the Middle East Conflict. BookSurge Publishing
91 Ibid.
reduce the Katyusha fire nor did it achieve significant accomplishments, and its role in accelerating or improving the political settlement is unclear.”

The report asserted that when the ground forces conducted a large-scale offensive they had merely acquired military gains. It alleged that the ground forces were weak and not prepared for battle and the UN 1701 resolution was in their favor. “These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the Second Lebanon War… Israel depended on a political settlement which did indeed have some positive aspects for Israel—it was a settlement that allowed the fighting to stop despite not having been settled in the battle field.”

The IDF welcomed the Winograd Report and indicated that it had initiated corrective measures directly after the war in accordance to the recommendations formulated by the report. “More than 70 committees were appointed within the IDF to examine various aspects and make recommendations that are already being implemented.” The IDF had no alternative but to attempt enacting reforms, mindful of the profound disappointment and blatant dejection of the Israeli public: 52% of Jewish citizens were of the opinion that the IDF had achieved substandard results in Lebanon.

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92 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Winograd Committee submits final report.
95 Marciano.
4.3 - Deterrence

Deterrence is the result of mutual perceptions - self-image and the image of the enemy. These perceptions are laden with cultural and psychological overtones and passed through overlapping prisms of history, culture, language, and ideology.96

The Winograd report was most probably the foremost document after the 2006 War. However, Israel after the 2006 War continued pondering over its failures, puzzled that a militarily inferior non-state actor had successfully confronted the IDF. Israel queried the reasons for its incapacity to discourage Hezbollah, and wondered what its future options were. Indeed, the 2006 War was a perturbed experience for Israel, shattering the 1967 myth that had portrayed Israel as an invincible, unbeatable foe. It now had to recognize and accept the Winograd report that stated bluntly that Israel had lost the war.

The July 12, 2006, conflict began on the buffer zone when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military jeep on Israeli territory. The attack was an attempt to liberate Lebanese prisoners, and in the process, Hezbollah’s guerillas kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three others.

At 8.07 am (Lebanon time) on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fired rockets at the Israeli border by the villages of Zar’it and Shlomi. Simultaneously, a Hezbollah guerilla attacked two Israeli armed jeeps on Israeli territory guarding the latter’s side of the border, killing three, injuring two, and kidnapping two soldiers (master sergeant Ehud Goldwasser and first sergeant Eldad Regev). The Israeli attempt to rescue the kidnapped soldiers led to the death of an additional five soldiers.97

Hezbollah called it “Operation Truthful Promise”; its chief pledge consisted of exchanging the kidnapped soldiers for Samir Kuntar and his friends. Most significant of them were Nasim Nisr (an Israeli-Lebanese citizen that had spied on Israel); and Yahya Skaf (a Lebanese citizen arrested in Israel). Diplomacy became an undesired alternative to Nasrallah when he switched his choices to indirect negotiations and to a prisoner trade. Hezbollah was considered fully responsible, for it was an integral part of the political life, having two ministers in the cabinet of a sovereign country. Thus, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated, “Lebanon will bear the consequences of it actions”.

Although the war began suddenly and escalated to the extent that it did, in reality it was the residue of the six years since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Israel hoped to contain the Hezbollah threat, and the policy-makers maintained their policy of deterring Hezbollah when “they stuck to their policy of containment despite such Hezbollah provocations as soldier abductions, Katyusha barrages, and cross-border terrorist attacks.” Accordingly, economic growth was occurring in northern Israel, and the government wished to maintain the status quo fearful of war. Nonetheless, the Israelis did not underestimate Hezbollah, considering it a strategic threat, where General Moshe Yaalon had warned of the northern border in Israel, stating it was in constant peril from Hezbollah’s missiles.

98 BBC online: Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis – week.
102 Ibid, Ari Shavit, “Colleagues Undermine You”.
Hezbollah had not ignored the Israeli deterrent indications; however, Israel was faulted for not knowing how to transmit or clarify those indications. “Hizballah did not challenge Israeli deterrence—as it saw it—in its decision to abduct Israeli soldiers in July 2006. Israel had given it no reason to believe that such an act would no longer be considered within the rules of the game.”

This was sufficiently evident in Nasrallah’s speech in August 2006, when he stated that Hezbollah would not have engaged in such a war had he known that Israel would react so ruthlessly and bomb the entire nation. “We did not think, even one percent that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”

Hezbollah had always been aware of Israel’s military might and capability. The organization was profoundly knowledgeable that Israel could cause immense damage to Lebanon, and was somehow cautious of not crossing a border or ‘red line’. Yet, ‘Israel never spelled out this red line and therefore, Hezbollah construed it from Israel’s behavior in a long series of clashes with the organization.’

4.4 - The Aftermath

The errors or blunders that the Israeli government or IDF committed during the 2006 War were extensively studied. The Israeli government knew that for deterrence to work with Hezbollah it should now project obvious messages of what is truly a red line for Israel. Only this time, the level of dissuasion between the two entities

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104 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
became almost equal. "Hezbollah believed that Israel’s threat of “high-intensity deterrence” would be effectively constrained by the existence of Hezbollah’s “low-intensity counter deterrence” in conjunction with domestic and international pressures. Hezbollah always understood that this balance of deterrence was valid only as long as it did not cross a “red line.””

Indeed the effects and especially the psychological effects of the war were profoundly experienced by the government and public, when for the first time, Israel ended astonishingly a war through a cease-fire UN resolution. “UNSCR 1701 marked the first time in Israeli history that Jerusalem had sought a U.N. resolution to end a war.” This resolution spoiled U.N.-Israeli relations, resulting in Israeli Foreign Minister Livni’s outcry for the replacement of the “ineffective” United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a more “robust” international force. Accordingly, Olmert, requested an international force in southern Lebanon with the United Nations enforcing an efficient arms embargo.

4.4.1 - Assassinating Imad Moughiniyi

From the essence of the Hezbollah/Israeli conflict, the latter adopted a number of strategies to deter its enemy, where the crucial method was the “Direct Attacks on Hezbollah camps or Leaders.” First, was the assassination of Abbas al Moussawi, Hezbollah’s first Secretary General in 1992. Hezbollah retaliated by launching

108 Inbar.
109 Ibid.
110 Bar, Deterring Non-state Terrorist Groups.
rockets into northern Israel and attacking the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, dissuading Israel from conducting killings on a habitual basis.\textsuperscript{111}

Two years subsequent to the July 2006 War, Imad Fayez Moughniye (popularly known as Hazz Radwan), a prominent figure in Hezbollah, was assassinated. He was believed to be the head of Hezbollah’s security section, and, more importantly, a founder of the organization itself. He was considered responsible for a number of killings, ranging from a suicide vehicle-bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut in 1983 which killed 63 people; an attack on the Marine command center in Beirut in 1983 that killed 241 marines; the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 that killed 29; the assault on the Jewish Community Center (the AMIA) in Buenos Aires, and other violent activities.\textsuperscript{112} “Mughnieh, in his mid-40s, was accused of killing more Americans than any other militant before the 9/11 attacks, and the bombings and kidnappings he is alleged to have organized are credited with ending American involvement in Lebanon under the Reagan administration.”\textsuperscript{113}

Israel swiftly denied any responsibility for the killing, and the Israeli prime minister’s office condemned, “the attempt by terror groups to attribute to it any involvement in the killing.”\textsuperscript{114} Although Israel denied any responsibility, it and the United States did not hide their pleasure when Sean McCormack, a U.S. state

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.  
department person, stated, “The world is a better place without this man in it…One way or the other he was brought to justice.”

However, Blandford, in an editor’s note claimed: “While Israel has formally refuted allegations it was involved, former CIA (Center of Intelligence Agency) official Bruce Riedel says all signs seem to indicate the Mossad was behind the killing. Riedel, who spent over 30 years with the CIA before serving as a senior advisor on South Asian and Middle East affairs under three U.S. presidents, said Israel has already carried out similar operations in Syria. Currently a senior fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, he says Mugniyah's assassination proves Israel has successfully infiltrated Hezbollah and that even Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah knows he may also be in the crosshairs.

This is not the only evidence of Israel’s assassination of Imad Moughniyi, because the IDF has considered the killing successful in helping create a deterrence factor against Hezbollah: “The deterrence, created by the assassination in 2008 of Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh, is something that needs to be maintained on a regular basis.”

Consequently, whether the Israeli government has denied responsibility for the assassination or not, and given the above presented facts, it is not surprising that even though Israel might not have committed the assassination, it unquestionably played a great part in its accomplishment. Israel extensively studied the flaws in the direct messages of deterrence which Israel was not sending clearly. As a result, the Israelis

116 Blandford, Hezbollah’s Leaders Death.
employed a number of strategies for deterrence\textsuperscript{118} where the priority was directly attacking leaders or camps. The Winograd report had made it ample clear that Israel had lost the 2006 War. In retribution, a striking retaliation was inevitable, and the resultant killing of Imad Mughniyi was a tremendous coup praised by Israeli public opinion.

Israel’s denial of responsibility is also not surprising knowing that – and based on previous experiences such as the assassination of Abbas al Mousawi - Hezbollah will seek retaliation for this Israeli action. Sayed Hassan Nasrallah is not negligent of opportunities to remind the Jewish state that the blood of its martyrs, including that of Mughniyi, is never wasted.

The above assumption is justifiable because until today no real retaliation has been mentioned or planned for this assassination, and some would therefore view this as a successful deterrent strategy. “Particularly salient is the lack of response by Hezbollah to the February 2008 killing of Emad Moghniyya... The leadership was aware that cross-border attacks would allow Israel to retaliate more effectively than in the war of summer 2006, and therefore it tempered the natural urge for revenge.”\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{4.4.2 - The Issue of Consensus}

Israel had taken pride in its previous existent quasi-complete consensus either within the government or between the government and its public. However, Hezbollah’s psychological and military warfare implemented Israel during, before

\textsuperscript{118} “Other strategies of deterrence used by Israel were: Threatening the Shiite population of south Lebanon; Indirect deterrence by means of pressure on the Lebanese state; indirect deterrence through Syria.” Shmul Bar, Deterring Non-State Terrorist Groups.

\textsuperscript{119} Shmul Bar, Deterring Terrorists.
and after the July 2006 War, successfully shattering this harmony in one way or another.

As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah learned a great amount concerning Israel’s culture, and was conscious of its extreme sensitivity to the number of war casualties. Hence, as also related earlier, Hezbollah broadcasted a number of videos and messages to the Israeli public concerning battles and skirmishes that had occurred. This dates back to 1997 when 73 Israeli soldiers were killed while being transferred to Lebanon, and led to the founding of the ‘Four Mothers’ organization. This organization consisted of the parents of soldiers that had or were serving in Lebanon; they questioned the rightness of the war and its human cost. ¹²⁰

This was elaborated in the Winograd Report: “the IDF conducted itself during the war as if its concern about casualties among its soldiers was a central element in its planning process and operational considerations.” ¹²¹ The anxiety that was present among the families of the soldiers or among the public was a residue of the psychological warfare implemented by Hezbollah, where a confrontation with Lebanon was considered a ‘phobia’. “This cost-centered discourse created a new cultural barrier to sacrifice in the form of the ‘Lebanon Phobia.’” ¹²² The IDF was fearful of launching ground forces against Hezbollah, and reverted mostly to aerial attacks.

The public no longer supported the government and its wars referring to them as worthless, and now worriedly questioned its national security policies. After the 2006 War, and precisely when the IDF failed to achieve its goals, an unfamiliar

¹²¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winograd Committee submits final report.
¹²² Yagil, 6.
reaction among the religious parents\textsuperscript{123} existed. “At this point, it became clear that even bereaved parents holding hawkish positions, who had not questioned the rightness of the war in the past, would not tolerate sacrifice that, owing to military and political incompetence, did not have a real impact on national security.”\textsuperscript{124}

It is well known that the Jews of Israel and its Arab inhabitants have held divergent political positions, 90\% of the Jews backing confrontation with Hezbollah whereas 70\% of the Arab population supported Hezbollah’s actions.\textsuperscript{125} However, during the 2006 War, Jews and Arabs united against the government and called on it to end the war. Israel’s public opinion, especially that of northern Israel, expressed discontent with its governments’ actions. “The war has not been won quickly, as Israel's leaders promised; the war aims have been repeatedly changed, from the "obliteration" of Hizbullah to its ‘weakening’, and now the need for an international peacekeeping force in south Lebanon; northern residents are angry at being locked up in shelters for days on end, or forced to leave their homes; and there is resentment that the authorities are being evasive about whether they will reimburse the wages of those who have been unable to get to work.”\textsuperscript{126}

Two years after the 2006 War, Israel’s political situation and rupture of the earlier existent consensus among its inhabitants and leadership was becoming more evident and more intense. A number of experts and commentators demonstrated their anger and frustration in newspapers. Israel was conscious that Hezbollah had multiplied its missile arsenal after the war, creating fear among the Israeli public and scholars critical of the government claiming that there was no real leadership in

\textsuperscript{123} The religious parents usually back up the wars more than other parents where they believe that every citizen is a soldier of Israel and should act for the nation whenever it’s in need.

\textsuperscript{124} Yagil, 6.


\textsuperscript{126} Ibid .
Israel. Furthermore, they alleged that its national security with such government was at risk, and, accordingly, the public was no longer willing to pay the price anymore: “there is no leadership in Israel today capable of making security decisions …What is it worth when there is no leadership capable of insisting on decisions being implemented in full, even in the face of a public opinion with little patience and low endurance for suffering? The kind of public opinion that represses the central threats to the state's existence and is not prepared to pay the necessary price for Jewish sovereignty.”

Moshe Arens, a former Israeli diplomat and researcher, accused the government of living in ‘a state of denial’ since, according to him, the entire Israeli territories were under the threat of rocket attacks. “What used to be a basic tenet of Israel's defense doctrine - that in war, the safety of the civilian population must be assured - has gradually been abandoned…What to do? For a long period of time, our leaders seemed to be in a state of denial.”

The changes in public opinion, the support of the government, the break of consensus between the government itself, the change in Israel’s strategic posture - as Moshe Arens viewed it – displayed a substantial loss of vitality that existed prior to the Hezbollah/Israel confrontation in 2006. Hezbollah’s ongoing psychological campaign successfully reminded Israelis what the 2006 War has brought upon them. Additionally, Nasrallah’s proud and dignified discourses concerning the enhanced military strength of Hezbollah, made Israel’s public and government have a radically different estimation of another round of combat with Hezbollah.

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4.4.3 - Preparing for a New War

After the 2006 War, the Israeli Defense Forces was determined to scrutinize its mistakes and prepare for the next battle. This became especially essential and challenging to the Israeli government and IDF in the aftermath of the Winograd report, which contented that Israel had lost the war and considered the IDF inefficient: “the worst kind of mistakes and failures of the ground forces.”\textsuperscript{129} Israel perceives the impending war as a revenge for that of the 2006 one and seeks to regain its pride, intending to be excessively ‘hard’ on its enemy. Continuous talk about preparing the IDF for enhanced ground battles and efficient air strikes; the mutual deterrence carried out through direct and indirect threats on the part of both Israel and Hezbollah; and finally, the innovation of bomb shelters, would make an observer count down the days for the next, imminent conflict.

It was incredible that the Winograd commission accused the IDF Golani, Egoz and Magland ‘elite’ troops of committing the worst mistakes. A number of experiences were devastating, starting from the battle of Bent Jbeil that was a plan characterized as the ‘Web of Steel’, and expecting the IDF forces to defeat Hezbollah within less than 48 hours. After 6 days (July 24-July 30), the Golani forces were obliged to withdraw. Another example was in Aita al-Shaab where 26 IDF soldiers were killed and over a 100 injured without occupying any territory.\textsuperscript{130} “Increasingly, during the 34-day July 2006 War, Israeli soldiers disobeyed orders to advance against Hezbollah fighters, happily opting for 14-day jail sentences for disobeying orders.”\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winograd Committee submits final report.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
Thus, within one year, Ashkenazi presented the 5-year-plan that is known by the “Teffen 2012” to revamp the IDF’s fighting capability.\footnote{One of the major goals of "Teffen 2012" was to create "a decisive ground maneuver capability based on modern main battle tanks (MBTs) and other armored fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, low altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and transport aircraft." Matthews, M. M. (2008). Retrieved from http://carl.army.mil/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf.} These improvements were not for short term purposes but for long term ones where the IDF efficiency would be tested in the next large operation\footnote{Ibid.}. Barak claimed that penetrating Lebanon again is inevitable, and the training of the IDF for all possible circumstances is an absolute necessity. Hezbollah may have to be reminded of Israel’s power, and fighting could occur soon. “Even though it's quiet and deterrence exists, Hezbollah remembers the heavy beating they suffered from us in 2006. But it is not forever, and you may be called to enter again…We must be prepared for every test …The secret is reacting fast in the event that something happens, and within seconds, translating everything you learned in your training.”\footnote{Agence France-Presse. (2011, February 16). \textit{Israel troops 'may have to re-enter Lebanon': report.} Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetedailynews.com/n.php?n=israel-troops-may-have-to-re-enter-lebanon-report-2011-02-16.} 

Hence, the IDF has experienced a number of improvements and modifications, primarily for its ground troops, through a number of procedures. First, these soldiers have reverted to excessive training, anticipating the “probability of combat in urban areas, great emphasis is placed on training for such scenarios. To this end, a training city that replicates Arab villages has been set up at the National Center for Training in Tze’elim. Another facility for training in urban areas has been created at the Combat Engineering School near Eilat. The IDF today devotes 30 percent of its training to basic defense scenarios.”\footnote{Amir Rapaport. (2010, December). \textit{The IDF and the Lessons of the second Lebanon War.} Retrieved from http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS85En.pdf.}
Other procedures the IDF has undergone includes thorough familiarity with military machines such as Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs), where IDF soldiers, including the infantry, are taught how to employ the equipment efficiently. These methods taught the soldiers and their chiefs the dexterity needed to use different equipment, and how to advance in combat.136

Another noteworthy adjustment to mention was that of the ‘Intelligence’ because the IDF had scarce information concerning the clandestine reserves that Hezbollah had at its disposal. This led to undesired outcomes. The IDF now stresses ‘field intelligence’, which is to investigate Hezbollah’s locations, rather than ‘political intelligence’ which is the responsibility of its leaders.137

Consequently, the IDF is making it expectedly clear to Hezbollah that the next war will not be similar to the July 2006 War since it has an inordinate amount of information concerning Hezbollah’s locations, such as the village of el-Khiam, and the organization’s training. The IDF was refrained from submitting such information, but did so for a number of reasons ranging from strengthening their deterrence, to “sending a strong and clear message to Hezbollah that the IDF knows what it is doing in southern Lebanon and where its military installations are located.”138 Hence, they are signaling their powerful intelligence in an effort to deter Hezbollah from inciting the war because this time the IDF, ranging from its ground forces to air forces and other military contingents, are ready and well informed of Hezbollah’s objectives and targets.

Israel is preparing for the next round to the extent, according to a European intelligence report issued in London, of evacuating hundreds of families living in

136 Rapaport.
137 Ibid.
Galilee or regions close to Lebanon to safer places within Israel. Another report, originating in Germany, claims that Israel intends to reoccupy a 5-6 kilometer security zone situated inside Lebanon, where according to Israeli Defense Minister sources, “their military engineers have finished putting designs for building two military airports inside the Lebanese "new security zone", which will stretch temporally up to the Litani River in the early stages of the war."

The IDF is considering all measures, and Israel is now divided into a color-coded map with each region coded according to its distance from Hezbollah’s military range. “The map divides Israel into 27 regions that are grouped into five ‘belts,’ based on the distance from Hezbollah’s missile array. The ‘belts’ are differentiated by the amount of time residents will have to scurry for shelter after a warning siren sounds.”

Indeed, after the 2006 War, Israel experienced an increase of war phobia, anxious about where, when and to what extent they would experience missile hits. This led the government of Israel to undertake a number of steps intended to protect its citizens and restore a sense of security and safety. As a result, bomb shelters were now a necessity in northern Israel, resulting in a ‘scare’ concerning what the habitation in that region looks like. “Every building in the country must now have a bomb shelter to protect residents in the event of war.”

The most recent innovation consists of what is known as the ‘Iron Dome Missile Defense system’, a $200 million Israeli government investment related to the threat of Hezbollah’s missile capability. The system is exceedingly innovative and

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140 Bejjani.


has yet to be implemented. It is a scheme that relies on cameras and radars employed to track incoming missiles, shooting them down within a few seconds.\textsuperscript{143} This system was criticized widely in Israel with an editor in Ha’aretz commenting, “The Israel Defense Forces must formulate a different plan and stop investing huge sums in systems that conjure the illusion of a protected home front.”\textsuperscript{144}

4.5 - Verbal Threats

Although direct negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel are seemingly non-existent, psychological warfare between the two, where threats and counter-threats are broadcast live on TV and the Internet, makes one conclude that a direct form of negotiations does prevail between them.

Nasrallah addresses the Israeli public and government directly; he pressures and threatens them with imminent warfare and/or of retaliation for Mughniyi’s death. His effect is palpably successful; he has been designated as the most persuasive and influential Arab leader of Israel’s public since 30 years ago.

Nasrallah has communicated to the Israeli public and government on a number of occasions. It is highly significant that his speeches continuously stress and warn against the psychological warfare implemented by Israel; “I tell Israelis that you tried every form of psychological warfare against us, but in return you received nothing


but greater bravery, stability and faith from our side. In the future, we will do the same thing.”

Accordingly, on the commemoration of Imad Moughniyi’s assassination, Nasrallah threatened the Israeli leaders and generals by saying: “Wherever you go in the world ... at any time, watch your heads because the blood of Imad Mughniyeh will not be wasted.”

Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, directly replied to Nasrallah’s threat by saying; “Whoever hides in a bunker should stay in the bunker…no one should doubt Israel’s strength or its ability to defend itself.”

Coincidentally, Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defense Minister, while visiting Israel’s northern border just before Nasrallah’s above speech, warned the IDF of a forthcoming war: “This is not forever and it could under certain conditions deteriorate, and then you will have to be called on again, with everything you learned in training… Today the units are better trained and more prepared but there is always more to be done and you need to be ready for every test.”

Nasrallah, in return, replied to Barak by threatening, “I tell the fighters of Hezbollah, be ready in case war is forced on Lebanon, the leadership of the resistance may ask you to take over Galilee.”

The above are merely a few instances of the direct negotiations occurring between Israel and Hezbollah. The threats between the two entities are conveyed

149 Evans.
openly, and are directed at their mutual governments and publics. It is plain that these ‘psychological threats’ serve the purpose of deterring both from launching another war.

4.6 - Non-Verbal Threats

Psychological warfare plays a crucial part in preparations for upcoming wars while essentially enhancing deterrence between two entities. The ‘non-verbal threat’ of both Hezbollah (which will be discussed in coming chapters) and Israel are witnessed preparing for an upcoming war, and claiming—with their enhanced military power—that any future war would differ from previous ones.

Another form of a non-verbal threat that had and still has an immense psychological effect on the Israeli government and public, exists in the form of intelligence (knowledge concerning the Israeli government and its public) that Hezbollah possesses concerning Israel. This factor became manifest when Yedioth Ahranoth produced a document that revealed the extent to which Hezbollah was knowledgeable of Israeli activities and military deployments, particularly those of the 91st brigade in northern Israel.

“There is no doubt that Hezbollah knows the weapons used in every Jeep of every patrol. They even know the diameter of every mortar in the Jeep and the time of every patrol, including the documents that are usually sent from the division chief to the brigade chief. In fact they have information that cannot be seen through binoculars, so how did they get it?” An Israeli Channel 10 commentator asked.150

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare proved to be immensely successful (for deterrence purposes) when on the memorial of Imad Mughniyi’s assassination, Israel proclaimed the temporary shutdown of four diplomatic missions, and security alerts were issued in eight countries: Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania and Venezuela. The Israeli government warned its citizens concerning these hazardous ‘hotspots’ which are inhabited by a large number of Israelis; it feared action against them from Hezbollah.  

4.7 - Conclusion

The Winograd commission concluded that Israel had lost the July 2006 War. This realization was exceptionally disheartening to Israel’s government and public, considering it was not since 1948 that Israel had suffered such significant casualties. The IDF was characterized as inefficient, particularly the ground forces that according to the report were the worst Israel had ever encountered historically.

This chapter revealed the extent to which Israel is still recovering and examining its erroneous assumptions and errors committed before and during the 2006 War, which led to the current results. It concluded that the level of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah was low. Israel had not sent a sufficiently clear, emphatic message concerning what its ‘red lines’ were, thus allowing Hezbollah to violate these lines, escalating the situation to a full-blown war.

The Israeli government has witnessed a breakdown in consensus either within the government or between the government and its public. Parents of the soldiers, including religious parents (usually supportive of its government), are resentful,

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mistrustful and wary of sending their children to future, overtly meaningless wars, primarily since Israel was unable to achieve any of its intended goals in the 2006 War.

Hence, the psychological warfare of Hezbollah against Israel proved to be efficient since one of the factors that have created deterrence was this psychological warfare. Consequently, Israel is currently seeking a novel, more guaranteed method of deterrence or engagement against Hezbollah which includes forceful measures or ‘messages’ such as assassinations, similar to the one, for instance, committed against Imad Moughniyi. This was an indication to Hezbollah that Israel was mindful of the locations of its leaders, and could chastise them or the organization whenever it wished. Accordingly, the IDF has exhibited to Hezbollah documents displaying the extent to which they are knowledgeable of the exact locations of the organizations’ training camps and weapon supplies. Israel’s principal intention is to signal that the next war with its rival, Hezbollah, would be an utterly different experience from the 2006 conflict. The Jewish state is preparing itself in a variety of ways ranging from alterations within the IDF, changes in government policies, and substantial modifications in cities and towns that include protective shelters for their citizens.
CHAPTER FIVE
THEMES USED BY HEZBOLLAH

Hezbollah’s greatest advantage against Israel in the next major military engagement against Israel, according to Pentagon sources, “is not seen in Washington as being based on just Hezbollah’s demonstrated ability to prevail on the battlefield against Israeli ground forces, withstanding potential days or weeks or months of carpet bombing and during hugely asymmetric conflicts. Rather, increasingly Hezbollah’s success against Israeli is being explained by its moral, political, popular, religious, psychological, culture that were enhanced by Hezbollah’s ‘Lebanonization’ and growing acceptance by other sects while being dubbed by some at the Pentagon as now the ‘8th greatest missile power in the World.’”

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare launched against its various adversaries is a complex, well-defined conflict. However, its most crucial game plan is aimed at its chief rival, Israel. Hezbollah’s organization employs a number of methods and strategies to implement its psychological tactics. One of the most significant catalysts of the various methods, the one that clearly prevails among them and is stressed in Israel, is the figure of the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah.

As mentioned earlier, psychological warfare has existed for a long time and with the introduction of modern technology, implementing psychological maneuvers has become easier and more effectual. Hezbollah launches its campaigns from Al-Manar and major websites where they transmit their news, their military strength and capacity, the importance of religion in supporting martyrdom and combat against the

\[152\] Lamb.
enemy, and accordingly in reflecting how Hezbollah has great knowledge of the Israeli government and public

This chapter focuses on the different means Hezbollah utilizes in its psychological campaign ranging from the speeches Nasrallah delivers highlighting the manner in which Hezbollah researches its enemy and is expert at targeting it; the way Nasrallah manipulates his listeners thanks to covert information the organization possesses; and last, but not least, how Hezbollah in general and Nasrallah in particular remind the enemy that Hezbollah’s warriors, religious to the core, are fearless of death. Finally, the psychological warfare of Hezbollah reflects that it is not important what they really have but what makes it important is the message that they send that triggers the enemy.

5.1 - Objectives and Ideology

Hezbollah gained recognition in 1982 as an armed force created in reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, or “Operation Peace for Galilee” as Israel calls it. However, it was not until 1985 that Hezbollah officially revealed its policies stating that it consists of four principal goals. February 16, 1985 was the date when Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Amin announced Hezbollah’s manifesto:

“We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community) ...We are an ummah linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Prophet Muhammad. ... As for our culture, it is based on the Holy

Quran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation...”

These four goals as confirmed by the Hezbollah spokesman are as follows: Israel’s withdrawal was considered a first step leading ultimately to its destruction; the termination of the remaining imperialist authority over Lebanon; deference of the Phalange organization of “just rule” and conveying them to assessment for their felonies; and granting the population the freedom to choose the form of government they desired. These aims would of course be accomplished without revoking their pledge to the rule of Islam. However, the most crucial notion was the abolishment of Israel and/or the Zionist entity not only from southern Lebanon but also from Palestine. However, after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s main aim became to maintain the status-quo in the south, by strengthening its army, and shielding the region from any Israeli manipulations. Accordingly, Hezbollah has justified its existence after the year 2000 on the grounds of Israel’s continuing occupation of the Shebaa Farms, and the presence of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. They were later released in a prisoner exchange in the year 2009.

The group obeys and follows ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ that has Iran at the focal point for “religious and pan-Islamic worldview.” The followers of Hezbollah believe

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155 Ibid.
that Ayatollah Khumayni is a divine leader that inspires them; after the death of Ali Khumaynis’s death, he was replaced by Ali Khamene’i.\textsuperscript{161}

When Hezbollah wrote its manifesto they mentioned the destruction of Israel. Hezbollah did not ultimately mean its destruction because they knew that they could not achieve that goal. Anyhow, that goal was named as the ultimate or first goal as a psychological attributes towards the Israelis (enemy audience) themselves to enhance fear among them. Accordingly it was sentenced towards their domestic audience especially the Shiites in order to enhance their will to resistance. Consequently, the organization believes in its cause of ‘resistance’ against Israel because its residents are perceived as illegitimately residing in ‘Occupied Palestine’.

Resistance against Israel has taken various forms ranging from the Secular parties SSNP (Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party) and LCP (Lebanese Communist Party) to the Lebanese Palestinian coalition (Sunni’s) to last but not least Hezbollah. In the beginning, the resistance gained some achievements, but with Hezbollah it achieved victory. Why? This is because the doctrine of Hezbollah requires ‘Al-Jihad’ and because the ‘Jihad’ is a historical psychological situation that instills fear in Israel. Hezbollah, accordingly during its festivals, appears in a highly disciplined organized manner which creates fear in the organized army of Israel, the IDF.

5.2 - Religion

The Shiite community is strongly influenced by Imam Hussein’s 680 AD account of Ben Ali and its legendary Karbala War. This story became a canon for the Shiite warriors who follow the path of Al Hussein; the latter was faced with the choice of either accepting Caliph Yazid’s military demands in Karbala or to resist

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
and fight. Al-Hussein chose to resist until the end, despite the demise of his companions and family.\textsuperscript{162} This account has become indoctrinated in the Shiites minds; they sought inspiration from the struggle for righteousness that Hussein martyred for at Karbala.

Hezbollah in general, and Sayed Hassan in particular, incessantly utter (or broadcast) slogans related to Karbala such as, “every day is Ashoura and every land is Karbala” and “humiliation is far from us,” implying that the political ideal of resistance is an expression of faith that transcends time and space.\textsuperscript{163}

Al-Manar utilizes this incident incessantly and broadcasts videos of Imad Moughniyi’s assassination, juxtaposing his icon-like figure with imagery from Karbala. Moughniyi is pictured as a “Knight of Hussien” arriving on his horse from Karbala to join previous high-profile Hezbollah martyrs in paradise. Accordingly, Nasrallah in the 2006 War continuously used the slogan “Heyhat mina azzila”, comparing the struggle of Hezbollah’s guerillas to that of Al-Hussein and his warriors. It is the mission of the southern Lebanon Shiite combatants to resist and fight their enemies, mainly Israel and the United States.\textsuperscript{164}

Accordingly, Nasrallah always expresses pride with Hezbollah’s martyrs in the media, taking for granted their religious obligation to fight and resist. “Certainly, I would like to tell you and the viewers that when a martyr falls, we inform his family,


and we then announce this. We do not hide our martyrs until the end of the battle. We have never done this. On the contrary, we always take pride in our martyrs.”165

Commenting on the impending war, Nasrallah anticipates the determined martyrs that will confront Israel: “The future victory of Hezbollah, keeping in mind the heightened martyrdom seeking spirit of the resistance combatants, would be more glorious than the previous victories, including the ones in the years 2000 and 2006.”166

5.3 - Nasrallah, the Celebrity

“Israel’s deterrent image in the eyes of Hezbollah is first and foremost that which is formed in the eyes of its leader, Hasan Nassrallah. Nassrallah’s predominance in projecting the strategy of Hezbollah is such that almost all references to Israel’s deterrence (or lack of deterrence) can be traced back to his statements.”167

Sayed Hassan Nasrallah (1960 - ) has been Hezbollah’s Secretary General since 1992, whereby, since then, Hezbollah has conducted a number of guerilla war attaches against Israel in southern Lebanon and abroad. Hezbollah, under Nasrallah’s authority, bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in retaliation for the Abbas Musawi assassination.168 The struggle between Hezbollah and the IDF and Christian SLA since 1985 was enhanced with Nasrallah’s coming when “Hezbollah’s military

167 Bar: Deterring Nonstate 18.
capabilities increased, as a result of Nasrallah’s leadership and close ties with Iran.”

Nasrallah is Hezbollah’s leader and key spokesperson for the organization that designated him as the foremost instigator of the psychological warfare campaign. Nowadays, Nasrallah represents one of the most loved and worshipped celebrities among the Shiites of southern Lebanon and the Arab world. He was referred to as a ‘Celebrity and Mastermind’ by Gabriel Weimann in his article, Hezbollah Dot Com, which depicts Hezbollah’s online campaign to reflect the impact Nasrallah has on the public.

When the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in the year 2000, Nasrallah’s status was aggrandized in the Arab world where he is now “perceived as a hero”.

Nasrallah was quoted as saying after the withdrawal, “It (Israel) has a nuclear weapon and the strongest air force in the region, but in truth, it is weaker than a spider web.” Although Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, this action did not conclude Nasrallah’s contentious discourse against the Jewish state.

Nasrallah was an effective and major figure in the 2006 War; a local and international audience anticipated his appearances and speeches. Nasrallah made sure to stress the loss of innocent lives, especially those of civilians and children, and insisted that Hezbollah would continue its retaliation on Jewish settlements as long as Israel bombed Lebanon. “When we bombard settlements, it is a reaction and any

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169 Ynet News: *Hezbollah Chief*
170 Ibid.
171 “According to this “spider web” theory, Israel’s reverence for human life and the hedonistic nature of Israeli society make it weak and unable to sustain continued war and bloodshed.” Ibid. Nasrallah reuses this phrase or quote of the spider web throughout the 2006 war to refer to a weak community or state, that of Israel.
time you decide to stop bombarding our villages, we will not hit your settlements. We will fight you face to face on the battlefield; ‘we are men of this war.’”

By 2006, Nasrallah recognized the fact that besides clear-cut military engagements, a psychological factor would be required to confront the Israeli enemy, and he therefore accentuated the concept of ‘honor’. The kidnapping of the two Jewish soldiers was thus viewed as an operation of a Fulfilled Promise (al-wa‘ad al–Sadeq), and the Shiites of southern Lebanon were viewed as returning to their homes with honor (karama).

As the July war ended that year, Nasrallah further advanced his anti-Israel position and statements especially after the assassination of Hezbollah’s Operations Chief, Imad Moughniyi, when Nasrallah stated that that assassination would lead to the "disappearance of the Jewish state" and declared an "open war" on Israel.

Nasrallah also warned of Israel’s counter-psychological tactics vis-à-vis Lebanon, Arab countries, and, specifically, the Shiite community. He requested the public to adopt a resolute, indomitable attitude in the face of such warfare: “Against psychological warfare, the first goal is to strengthen the will and determination of our people … and on the other hand we need to strike the enemy and its security and military institutions with psychological warfare as well…I tell Israelis that you tried every form of psychological warfare against us, but in return you received nothing but greater bravery, stability and faith from our side. In the future, we will do the same thing.”

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172 Weimann.
173 “This is a pre-Islamic (Jahili) term, which is a part of the Arab set of values transferred to Islam, and refers to male honor endowed upon one’s family, tribe, and people” Bar, 20.
174 ADL online: Hassan Nasrallah.
175 Ya Libnan, Nasrallah warns Israel.
Hence, it is not startling to witness the Ha’aretz headlines: “Hezbollah chief’s speeches sway Israeli opinion more than any other Arab leader.”\textsuperscript{176} The ensuing article reported that an important Israeli intelligence officer claimed that Nasrallah was the first Arab leader in 30 years that had had such an effect on the Israeli public. Apparently, the chief of the intelligence Colonel Ronen examined 10 of Nasrallah’s speeches delivered during the July 2006 war and stated: “Apart from the rockets it lobbed into Israel, the speeches were the only offensive weapon that Hezbollah used in the war.”\textsuperscript{177}

Nasrallah succeeded in influencing Israel’s government and public by indicating their weaknesses, which consisted primarily of intolerance to economic losses, and an aversion to casualties; “The Israelis are interested in blood and money”.\textsuperscript{178}

As a result, Nasrallah succeeded in becoming a celebrity not only to the Shiites of southern Lebanon, or the Lebanese, or the Arabs, but also to the Israeli public and government that was seemingly swayed by his statements, quotes and threats, and accordingly, reacted to these claims. “A recurrent motif in Nassrallah’s speeches was the description of the Israeli leadership as “confused,” while Hezbollah’s acts were aimed at increasing this confusion no less than they were meant to achieve any military goal.”\textsuperscript{179}

\section*{5.4 - Social Services}

Hezbollah and through their different speeches on their stocks i.e. social services confirms the importance of sowing fear constantly, since their continuity

\textsuperscript{176} Amos Harel, \textit{Hezbollah chief’s speeches}.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Bar, 19.
(especially after the July, 2006 War) itself is a psychological war. Accordingly, their secrecy of information was succeeded in persuading their ally and opponent of their ability and strength. This claim gained popularity and credibility when Israel confessed that Hezbollah gained victory in the July, 2006 War. Hence, the claim in military, security and disciplinary capabilities, as well as financial and human ones as well as the cleansing of popular incubation especially during the July War and the solidarity with the Lebanese army achieved the wanted goals domestically and in within Israel as mentioned in the previous chapters.

Before starting to elaborate on the importance of the Social Services network that Hezbollah operates, it is important to note that the act of Charity or what is known as the Zakat, a pillar of Islam, is a duty mandated by God to address the comprehensive needs of the less fortunate.\textsuperscript{180}

The Social Service Network indeed was one of the major factors that backed up and empowered Hezbollah. “Hezbollah’s overwhelming success can be attributed to its use of Social Services.”\textsuperscript{181} The Social Service Network has a vital role in the organization of Hezbollah because it has contributed to human resources in the army, the back-up of external people who are benefitting from the services, and a base for the political outreach that is needed for the Hezbollah officials to get into the Parliament. “The Social Service Section serves as an equal arm within the organization and is used as much as the military and political wing in terms of leverage.”\textsuperscript{182}

The Social Service Network obtains its power and strength from its diverse wide-ranging nature. Hezbollah made sure that this network fills the gap of every


\textsuperscript{181} B. Love.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
insufficiency that is found within the Shiites community and later extended to other communities especially those present in the south. This network is mainly made up of 6 groups or foundations which are:

2. Islamic Health Organization.
3. The Martyrs Foundation.
4. The Women’s Association.
5. The Imam al-Mahdi Scouts.
6. The Education Division.\textsuperscript{183}

Jihad Al-Binaa is a reconstruction group that has been a part of Hezbollah since 1985 which replaced the Lebanese country in assisting and rebuilding the Shiites areas in the south and Bekaa, and also serves populations from other sects and religions.\textsuperscript{184} This act in itself promoted Hezbollah’s figure and reputation among the Lebanese public and was able to gain their sponser and support, which made the Jihad Al Binaa a nongovernmental organization.\textsuperscript{185} The main principle of this NGO is to back up Hezbollah’s ideology and goals through its own measures ranging from the infrastructure development to compensation funds. It is believed that Jihad al-Binaa is composed of over a thousand civil engineers, architects, demographic experts, electricians, plumbers, and other specialists\textsuperscript{186}, which made it a competitive reconstruction group in the region and in turn swayed away the attention of the military activity. “The organization caught the world’s attention immediately

\textsuperscript{183} B. Love
\textsuperscript{184} Hala Jaber (1997) \textit{Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance}. New York: Columbia University Press.
\textsuperscript{186} Omayma Abdel-Latif, (2006). Rising from the Ashes. \textit{Al Haram Weekly}.
following the 2006 War when Hezbollah initiated a reconstruction plan that was
developed and executed without the assistance of the Lebanese government."187

This group or organization was pledged by the citizens who were compensated
not only financial but also were granted new furnished homes where a number of
articles commented on this immediate aid after the 2006 war.188 This was also
evident in the witness of the residents of which is Rana Moussawi who received
$10,500 for rent and claimed: “…if it was not for Jihad al-Binaa, my family and I
would be sleeping in the street.”189

Islamic Health Organization (IHO) is another organization within the Social
Service Network that was established in Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1984
and was commonly initiated in Lebanon to aid the Shiites of Lebanon. Its main tasks
lie in supplying health and medical services, including clinics, medications,
evacuation of casualties, and food distribution.190 It is well known that the health care
expenses are very high which makes the IHO’s mission difficult to accomplish
without the Iranian funding and a staff that is highly professional. Hence, as Judith
Harik puts it: “The staff owes its livelihood to Hezbollah…which translates to
political loyalty.”191

Other organizations tend to spot the light and take care of the welfare for the
families and people that were killed, martyred, or wounded through the
confrontations with Israel. These organizations were found for a number of reasons.
One is the Islamic requirements stress on charity, and the other reason lies for the

187 B. Love.
188 Norton 111,187.
189 Allers.
190 B. Love.
191 Harik, 84,241.
guerillas and soldiers of Hezbollah where they will go to the battle knowing that in case anything happens to them they and their families will be taken care of.\textsuperscript{192}

These organizations are the Martyrs Foundation; Foundation for the Wounded; and Women’s Association. The ‘Martyrs Foundation’ helps in supplying and supporting the families of martyrs, detainees, and resistance fighters.\textsuperscript{193} The ‘Foundation for the Wounded’ aid Hezbollah’s wounded soldiers and civilians of the Israeli attacks.\textsuperscript{194} The ‘Women Association’ is made up of the female members of Hezbollah whose main task is to empower women rights and give support in social welfare projects.\textsuperscript{195} The wives of the martyrs were often put under the autocracy of their father in law and were mis-treated at times. Through the Women Association and Martyr’s Foundation the women were able to practice their rights and were able to gain a special status in the community.\textsuperscript{196}

Accordingly, the youth have their special programs that Hezbollah stressed on to achieve generations that are indoctrinated with Hezbollah’s ideology, objectives and goals. This was obvious through the scout of Imam Al-Mahdi in 1985 where the scouts’ ages range from 8 to 16 and then are relocated in the military wing at the age of 17.\textsuperscript{197}

Hezbollah pays so much attention to the educational branch of the society. They paid $14 million worth of scholarships and financial aids within 6 years range (1996-2001).\textsuperscript{198} Iran aided Hezbollah to develop their own curriculum that ranges from kindergarten to the college level which in turn indoctrination Hezbollah’s

\textsuperscript{192}B. Love.
\textsuperscript{194}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195}Jaber 161.
\textsuperscript{196}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197}B. Love.
\textsuperscript{198}Hamzeh, 55.
ideology and goals. In turn, the tuition costs for schooling are either free of charge or reduced by Hezbollah’s educational branch.

Although Hezbollah was awarded with popular back-up, yet it was committed to make a change through the Social Service Network where numbers speak louder than words, and Hezbollah was able to enhance the Shiites area more than the Lebanese government where:

a. Jihad al-Binaa was able to build 35 schools, 9,000 homes, 800 shops, 5 hospitals, 8 clinics, 100 mosques, 8 cultural centers, and 7 agricultural center cooperatives between 1988 and 2000.

b. $14 million were given as scholarships and financial aids between 1996 and 2001 from the educational unit.

c. It is estimated that around half a million people receive free or reduced rates health care by the health care unit.

These measures and rates are not very new, yet they represent a remarkable essence and reflect the level of dedication Hezbollah gives to the social service network thus, to the people. Hence, the social service network aided in increasing the popularity of Hezbollah among the Shiites, who in turn, became loyal to the organization which enhances discipline, which is a main support of the psychological warfare.

The social services network not only helped in enhancing the discipline and loyalty, but also directly served in reflecting how powerful Hezbollah is in the eyes of its enemy. Hezbollah, through these services, was able to recover in a relatively short period of time, and accordingly was able to launch threats and will for an

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199 B.Love.
200 Ibid
201 Hamzeh 50-51.
202 Ibid 55.
203 Ibid 54.
upcoming war with Israel through the media and the existing services. It is also important to mention that the institutions of Hezbollah are not substitute of the Lebanese government. However, the weakness of the institutions of the Lebanese government pushed Hezbollah to lock any loophole that the Israelis might benefit from.

5.4.1 - Recovery and Threats of Upcoming War

The war erupted in July, 2006, hence approximately 5 years have passed since then, and the level of deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel seems to be relatively high. The first alarming message Hezbollah sent to Israel and the international community is its competence to rebuild, repopulate, and consequently rearm the south. As one member of the Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah spokesperson Ali Fayyad stated, “We are not sleeping…We are working.”

Hezbollah may not be wishing for a clash with Israel, but it surely is prepared for it. Nasrallah claims, in his speeches, a boost in the organization’s missile stock, and eagerly asserts that Hezbollah has rejoined the Lebanese coalition government as a full partner with a veto power. “The Israelis have reason to be concerned…The Zionists will discover that the war they had in July was a walk in the park if we compare it to what we’ve prepared for every new aggression.”

Hezbollah has proved that it has the capacity to recover rapidly from any degree of destruction, and its construction projects rebuilt the south by “completing a lavish reconstruction project with hundreds of millions of dollars ...New asphalt

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205 Blanford: Hezbollah plots.
roads, designed and paid for by Iran, connect the interior and border villages of southern Lebanon — all Hezbollah areas — to the main coastal highway.”

In addition, the Israelis have good reason to maintain an awareness of Hezbollah’s activities, especially after the assassination of Imad Moughniyi. A number of analysts expect Hezbollah to retaliate at a specific time and location, according to its own convenient plan and fitting occasion. Amal Ghroyaeb claimed, “This was never going to be a tit-for-tat immediate response but a strategic retaliation, one that will take time!” Accordingly, Nasrallah justified these expert opinions on the commemorative ‘Martyr’s Day’ by saying on February 15, 2010,

“In Lebanon there is infrastructure, and in “occupied” Palestine as well. We have an airport and they have airports. We have power plants, and they have very large ones. They have oil refineries, and we do too. The infrastructure in Israel is much more advanced than ours. Today, I hereby tell them the following, and they can be assured of it, “If you strike Rafiq al-Hariri International Airport in Beirut, we will strike Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. If you strike our ports, we will strike your ports. And if you strike our refineries or our factories we will strike your factories and your refineries. Today, in the memory of Sayyed Abbas and Shaykh Raghib and al-Hajj Imad, I announce and accept this challenge. We, in Lebanon, as a people and a resistance and a national army are capable “of this” because we protect our country and we don’t need anyone in the world to protect Lebanon.”

In 2011, Nasrallah reaffirmed the above by calling upon Israeli leaders to be cautious because the blood of Imad Moughniyi would not be wasted. The threats of Nasrallah have carried far beyond missile strikes or assassinations Israeli leaders:

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206 The renaissance in southern Lebanon is on full display in Aita al Shaab. Almost destroyed in 2006, it has been ostentatiously rebuilt, and its population has increased by about 30 percent from its prewar level, to 12,000 inhabitants. “Cambanis.
207 Blanford: Hezbollah plots.
208 Qifa Nabki, Game Changer: Nasrallah announces a New Hezbollah Deterrence.
“The decision is still ours and, God willing, it will be carried out. I tell Zionist leaders and generals to watch out for your heads wherever you go in the world and whenever you go... Imad Mughniyeh's blood will not be wasted.”

In retaliation to the Israeli minister Barak’s claim that the IDF is set to enter Lebanon, Nasrallah has made it clear that in the event of another outbreak of hostilities, Hezbollah’s combatants are prepared to occupy ‘Galilee’.

“Barak told the (Israeli) troops you have to be prepared, because if there is a war you may be asked by your leadership to go into Lebanon again…I tell the fighters of Hezbollah, be ready in case war is forced on Lebanon, the leadership of the resistance may ask you to take over Galilee”

Hence, Hezbollah, the organization and its leader, have not missed any opportunities to demonstrate that it was able to recover rapidly from any possible war, and is willing and primed for any imminent war. The threats Nasrallah projects are continuously questioned for two reasons: to what extent is Hezbollah truly prepared and effectual? Are these statements uttered solely for deterrence purposes?

5.5 - Secrecy of Information and Knowledge of the Enemy

Hezbollah has informed Israel and the world of its familiarity with the enemy; the organization readily acknowledges having scrutinized its culture, language, norms, weak and strong points. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Nasrallah and/or Hezbollah always refer to ‘surprises’; this results in political analyzers and scholars attempting to figure out the precise nature of what Hezbollah is alluding to. These two strategies are proclaimed in the media through speeches delivered by Nasrallah or ads displayed in Al-Manar.

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209 Mroue.
210 Evans.
Nasrallah’s speeches, especially those directed at the Israeli public and government, conceitedly display his knowledge of Israeli society. He declares that he always reads and analyzes a number of Israeli newspapers such as ‘Haaretz, Ma’ariv, Yedioth Aharonoth, and other publications.

“Nasrallah reads all our journals, reads all the details and memorizes them. We can say that he is the sole Arab leader who is aware of what is taking place in Israel. His approach was very precise when he spoke about the poisonous fish and, in fact, he took advantage of it in the media to say that Hezbollah bites and wins and therefore, this image fits Hezbollah,” Tseva Yehezkeli, an Israeli expert in Arab affairs, told Israeli television.”

Nasrallah claims to possess reliable intelligence concerning Israel, and hence characterizes the Israeli society by the cobweb theory that perceives “Israel as a makeshift society that will fall apart the moment there is a real threat on the civilian population, reflects the traditional picture that has had currency in the Arab world and Iran for decades.”

It was not only in Nasrallah’s threats and words that Hezbollah had intelligence over Israel, but a number of battles, especially those of the 2006 War which displayed his assumptions and predictions. According to Shmuel Bar, these guidelines consist of:

1. The Israeli Air Force has precision weaponry that is employed in the opening stage of any attack to decapitate the leadership. However, this capability can be neutralized by building reinforced bunkers and hiding places for the senior figures in advance.

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211 Shmaysani.
212 Bar, 18.
2. Israel is an open society, and it is therefore impossible for Israel to achieve strategic surprise in a blow against Hezbollah.

3. The Israeli army is a regular army reinforced by reserves. Mobilization and movement of forces to the Lebanese theater take time, allowing Hezbollah to strike at Israel’s population centers\(^\text{213}\)

Hence, Hezbollah prepared for the confrontation with Israel in 2006; it studied the topography of southern Lebanon and set up expert transportation and communication systems. Accordingly, an intense study of Israel was conducted ranging from its IDF capabilities and their schedules. “They were able to concentrate their forces at critical points, prepare optimum defenses, and streamline their logistical needs. From the border, where it predicted where Israel would cross, to the approaches into villages, where it laid mines and explosives, to the villages themselves, where they established firing positions and set booby traps, Hezbollah mounted an effective and economical defense.”\(^\text{214}\)

The astounding news was when *Yediot Ahronoth* published a top-secret 150 page document entitled: “Nasrallah Knows Everything about Us” which claimed that Hezbollah intelligence had successfully penetrated the Israeli army and Israel while spying on regular communication and coded communication networks.

Hezbollah is well informed of the Israeli Brigade 91 activities on the border while monitoring simultaneously the IDF land, naval and aerial activities with surveillance equipment and binoculars.

“Israeli experts and retired servicemen who served in the north have said that the data gathered by Hezbollah by means of the document was highly sensitive and that part of it had been cloned by Hezbollah from secret documents belonging to the

\(^{213}\) Ibid, 18.

91st brigade. They detail the nature of the Israeli army’s deployment in the north. Those who see the documents know that they have been copied page by page from the original top-secret documents. Hezbollah might have gathered the data by means of spies or by infiltrating into the Israeli side to take pictures,” Ronen Bergman, an Israeli expert in intelligence affairs told Israeli television Thursday.”

“There is no doubt that Hezbollah knows the weapons used in every Jeep of every patrol. They even know the diameter of every mortar in the Jeep and the time of every patrol, including the documents that are usually sent from the division chief to the brigade chief. In fact they have information that cannot be seen through binoculars, so how did they get it?” an Israeli Channel 10 commentator asked.”

Nasrallah continually depicts the Israeli leadership as being in a state of bewilderment because of the covert information Hezbollah enjoys, and the disorientation Hezbollah provokes is for psychological purposes, rather than military ones. Furthermore, Nasrallah employs a perpetual strategy of threats and ‘surprises’ in order to deter the Israeli government and public.

Mhmoud Komati, one of Hezbollah’s founders, claimed that Hezbollah is not wasting its time, and mentions the “strategic ambiguity” of having the enemy constantly speculate about the extent of Hezbollah’s strength. “In addition to fortifying its ranks and replenishing its missile capacity… Hezbollah has adopted a self-described policy of “strategic ambiguity” concerning whether it has acquired anti-aircraft capacity, advanced Scud missiles or other military equipment that could alter the balance of forces with Israel.”

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215 Shmaysani.
216 Shmaysani.
217 Bar, 20.
218 Cambanis.
This was revealed in the article published by “Information Dissemination” that revealed the opinion of Hezbollah in the Israeli naval advanced capabilities. Nasrallah seemed decidedly confident in his verbal retaliation concerning those Israeli capabilities by claiming that Hezbollah could ‘wipe out’ any Israeli navy.

“If you launch a new war on Lebanon, if you blockade our coastline, all military, civilian or commercial ships heading through the Mediterranean to occupied Palestine will be targeted by the Islamic resistance…Whether along the northern or southern Israeli shore, we can target ships, bomb them and hit them God willing…when the world sees how these ships are destroyed, no one will dare go there (Israel)...And I am only speaking about the Mediterranean, I haven't reached the Red Sea yet.”219

The surprises Nasrallah and/or Hezbollah speak about are not only limited to military and intelligence capabilities, where the Israelis are continuously surprised by the information the organization reveals. In January, 2008, while negotiations occurred under United Nations auspices for the exchange of Lebanese captives with two Israeli soldiers. Nasrallah revealed in a TV interview that Hezbollah possessed the remains of IDF soldiers that were killed in the July, 2006 war: “There are body parts left behind by the Israelis of their soldiers on southern Lebanese territory. We offered during the negotiations to return them but the Israeli side was not interested in this issue.”220


The Israeli’s condemned this revelation by claiming that they had no knowledge of this information “We have no knowledge of such a thing, Ephraim Sneh, a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.”

Hezbollah has acquired through its continuous scrutiny of Israeli society far more information anyone would have predicted a non-state actor could attain. The continuous pledge of ‘surprises’ and threat that the organization would inflict massive damage in any future war, makes one wonder how factual these claims are, how powerful Hezbollah is, and to what extent their extensive ‘knowledge of Israel’ serve as a deterrence of the upcoming war.

5.6 - Military Strength

According to Ali Fayyad, a member of Hezbollah's Central Council, the movement's strategy is "not to reveal all its cards, to impose its own pace while fighting the war and to prepare for a long conflict”

Hezbollah has practiced resistance tactics since 1983. However, these tactics have been viewed or referred to as radical, terrorist ones; these have included suicide bombings, kidnappings, and they hijacking of Israeli boards. Subsequent to 1985, the group began employing guerrilla warfare in its resistance to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and presented itself as the savior of the Lebanese. As Helmer comments, “They put themselves as the protectors of the Lebanese (not just Shiite) population of southern Lebanon from the vicissitudes of Israeli occupation.”

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221 Ibid.
223 Cragin, 41.
In 1988, Hezbollah signed, with the assistance of Syria, a treaty with Amal; this provided the organization with the required time to concentrate on enhancing its tactics, especially those concerned with guerrilla and psychological warfare. “With training provided by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah's highly-motivated military wing developed into a highly effective guerrilla force... The guerrillas rigorously examine the success or failure of each operation after completion.”

Hence, by 1990, the group was able to harass Israeli targets in the security zone; this made Israel retaliate in counterterrorism maneuvers.  

Hezbollah’s military wing has studied and learned exceedingly well an assortment of strategies and tactics that it implements. In addition, it has benefited and learned valuable lessons from the incessant defeats of the Arabs against the IDF. It functions with a decentralized command structure that does not await orders from its operatives in Beirut. Its directives are taken from Hezbollah’s central council of clerics.

In February 1992, Israel assassinated one of Hezbollah’s most influential leaders, Abbas Al-Musawi. Hezbollah retaliated by bombing the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the London one in 1994. Moreover, by 1996, Hezbollah had attained a strong position whereby it was able to kidnap soldiers from the IDF and bomb Israeli zones. Accordingly, its media grew and it had the ability to broadcast farther its messages in Lebanon and throughout the region. Even though the organization suffered Israel retaliations through air strikes, Hezbollah would

225 McGregor.  
226 Cragin, 44-45.  
227 McGregor.  
228 Jorisch, 12.
directly counter by firing rockets into northern Israel; this, most probably, was one of
the main reasons for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal in May 2000.\textsuperscript{229}

After the 2000, a number of parties in Lebanon were questioning whether
Hezbollah had the legitimate right to maintain its weapons, and military might. The
response from the organization was severe, by which they claimed that their mission
consisted of a strategic defense against Israel and went beyond deliverance.
Accordingly, they refused to give up their arms and add them to those of the
Lebanese Army.\textsuperscript{230}

Hezbollah has engaged in different attempts (with Syrian and Iranian aid) to
boost its military potential, and acquire anti-tank weapons, short, medium and long
range rockets,\textsuperscript{231} in addition to Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket-propelled
grenades, designed especially for small units of guerrillas fighters, and can escape
Israel’s detection.\textsuperscript{232}

Hezbollah entangles its military tactics with psychological ones. This was
witnessed for instance when it recorded its assaults on the Israeli army, and then
broadcast them to Israel and the rest of the world; it altered the portrayal of an
undefeatable IDF\textsuperscript{233}, and spread fear and anxiety among the Israeli public. “This is
by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world," said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur,
commander of Division 162.”\textsuperscript{234}

This was especially true as of the July, 2006 War where Hezbollah through its
leader tried to reflect the ‘military might’ they enjoy. Nasrallah tried to stress the
Israeli government and public through Al-Jazeera on the 10\textsuperscript{th} day of the battle when

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\textsuperscript{229} Cragin, 46.  \\
\textsuperscript{230} Ghorayeb, 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{231} McGregor.  \\
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.  \\
\end{flushright}
he said, “I can confirm at this moment--this is not an exaggeration and not part of psychological warfare, but facts--that the command structure of Hezbollah has not been harmed…The entire command structure of Hezbollah, including the political, Jihadist, executive, and social--so far, the Zionists have not managed to kill any Hezbollah cadre or leader at any level.”

Accordingly, Nasrallah asserted that their arms have not been hit or damaged. On the contrary, he claimed that they are in control of the war and the number of launched rockets; and that is they are certain of the military strength they have. “We control the number of rockets because we are managing our battle.”

After approximately five years of the July war, we can still hear and see that Hezbollah is expanding and strengthening itself in military terms. This is obvious through the different waging of new possible wars that both sides are threatened with it. Nasrallah stresses upon the military power Hezbollah enjoys over again where as the New York Times quoted: “According to Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader, Hezbollah has increased its missile stocks to 40,000, compared with 13,000 during the 2006 war; Israeli defense officials do not dispute the estimate.” As to Guerillas and Fighters it is estimated –by Reuters- that Hezbollah has 600 fighters that are available around the clock and 3,000-4,500 veterans that are available for any emergency. Accordingly, it is also estimated that Hezbollah enjoys a back up of 15,000-30,000 reservists in other militias.

Hezbollah did not waste its time since the 2006 War, but has expanded its military capabilities and strength. The Military Battle is one of the most prominent

235 Interview with Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, by Al-Jazeera Beirut Bureau Chief Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, on 20 July.
236 Ibid.
237 Cambanis.
battles that decide on the result of the war. Hence, Hezbollah makes sure to enhance this capability and makes sure that it is a threatening source not only through its chief deputy but also through other officials such as Mahmoud Komati who claimed, “Hezbollah has adopted a self-described policy of “strategic ambiguity” about whether it has acquired anti-aircraft capacity, advanced Scud missiles or other military equipment that could change the balance of forces with Israel.”

The groups military strength is not only expanding in arms and guerillas but also by air and sea when Nasrallah claimed on May 25, 2010, which is the ‘Liberation Day’ that although in the July War, Israel inflicted a sea and air block on Lebanon to prevent the supply of weapons for the Guerillas, Hezbollah can now retaliate with the same damage Israel imposed on Lebanon in 2006. “In any future war, if you blockade our coasts and ports, all the military, civil and commercial ships heading to ports in occupied Palestine along the Mediterranean will come under Hezbollah rocket attack.”

The strength of Hezbollah’s military was thus reflected from the 1990’s until the July 2006 War where part of this strength was revealed. The waging of new wars is a psychological factor that keeps both sides reluctant from launching it. Nasrallah continuously seeks deterrence through a psychological war of the military power and the coming victories of Hezbollah by which he says: “The future victory of Hezbollah, keeping in mind the heightened martyrdom seeking spirit of the resistance combatants, would be more glorious than the previous victories, including the ones in the years 2000 and 2006.”

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239 Cambanis.
241 Islamic Republic News Agency. Hezbollah’s combat readiness superior to Zionist regime.
5.7 - Conclusion

Every rivalry, whether of a military, diplomatic, or psychological nature, employs a number of methods to implement its objectives in an advantageous and structured manner. This chapter displays the extent to which Hezbollah has used psychological strategies in order to acquire an exceptional level of deterrence. Nasrallah has become a public figure that is not only credible to the Arabs but also to Israel and its citizens; he has been able to influence or manipulate their mode of thinking and thus make them wary of a new confrontation in Lebanon. Hezbollah takes pride in its intensive scrutiny and awareness of its enemy; it has displayed a true understanding of its foes, and has repeatedly demonstrated how and when to target them. Its resolute silence regarding information leaves Israel vigilant and intrigued by Hezbollah’s true capabilities and plans, such as its desire to seek retribution for the Moughniyi assassination.

Finally, yet notably, although Hezbollah has been classified as a non-state organization backed up by a powerful social services organization that is able to recover from a war. It was astonishingly able to triple its military arsenal while concurrently rebuilding its dwellings and infrastructure.
CHAPTER SIX
FACTORS USED BY HEZBOLLAH

A number of scholars\(^\text{242}\) have substantiated that Hezbollah was primarily responsible for Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and in July 2006. Hezbollah was successfully able to ‘pause’, not end, Israel’s ambitions in Lebanon for a period of time. What were the main factors that Hezbollah employed to necessitate or cause an Israeli retreat? And to what extent did Hezbollah’s PSYWAR contribute to Israel’s pulling out from Lebanon? This section will highlight the essential features defining the driving forces behind the PSYWAR factors. The major factors that make the Psychological warfare launched by Hezbollah a successful one is the ‘organizational structure’ which makes Hezbollah a ‘disciplined’ organization although secrecy is present between its different councils, the organization and its members act as a collective group. Accordingly, the sophisticated and advance ‘Media of Hezbollah’ serves in transmitting specific messages to the enemy audience reminding them of their military strength and their broad social services that helped the organization to recover from the war in a short period of time.

6.1 - Organizational Structure

In Hezbollah’s early days, its commanders refused to name it an organization since its members did not have ID cards or any obligations.\(^\text{243}\) However, later on, the group and/or organization abided by the principle of the ‘Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists’ (velayat-el-faqih) that “Concentrate[s] ... all authority and powers” in its

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\(^{242}\) Pahlavi.

religious leaders, whose decisions then “flow from the ulama down the entire community.”  

However, at the core of Hezbollah was an assembly of fundamental clerics that studied in Najaf in the 1970’s; they constitute Hezbollah’s highest religious authority referred to as ‘Majlis al-Shura,’ that is Consultative Council, which in turn is the hub of the their authenticity and authority. Thus, Hezbollah’s existing leadership and organizational structure has been shaped since 1988, with seven different boards or committees: Ideological, Financial, Military, Political, Judicial, Informational and Social Affairs, for three main Shites districts that are located in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and the south.

During this period, Lebanon’s political circumstances were constantly changing, and these made Hezbollah rationalize its authorities and include ‘Majlis al-Shura al-Tanfizi,’ which is the Executive Council that is positioned under the Majlis al-Shura, and ‘Makatab al-Siyassih, the Political Council that provides political analysis and promotes their relationships with other political parties in Lebanon. Accordingly, the Makatb al-Siyassih harmonizes the work of the committees related to Hezbollah with the Lebanese government such as Jihad al-Bina, headed by Qasem Aliq. “The Reconstruction Campaign made a substantial effort to assess the level of destruction wrought by the 2006 summer war on Shiite areas, and rebuild their damaged houses. Some four hundred architects and 4,000 volunteers reportedly have been undertaking this reconstruction project.”

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244 Ibid.
Sheikh Subhi Al-Tufeili was the first elected Secretary General of Majlis al-Shura who was then succeeded by Sheikh Abbas Al Mussawi. The latter was assassinated in 1992 by the IDF. He was replaced by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Sheikh Naim Qassem is the current person in authority and is referred to as the ‘Deputy Secretary General’. 248

Majlis Al-Shura reaches decisions on all pending issues by democratic means through its members, and if no consensus is attained, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khameneni, has the final word. Majlis Al-Shura in turn embraces Hezbollah’s Command Leadership as follows: “Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah”; “Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem”; “Secretary General Political Deputy Hussein Khalil”; “Sheikh Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed”; “Sheikh Hashem Safi al-Din”; “Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek”; “Sheikh Jawad Nour al-Din” 249.

Majlis Al-Siyassih-Political Council includes the public and informational committee that also provides analysis of external relations; its president is Sheikh Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed.

Hashem Safi al-Din is the president of the Majlis al-Tanzifiz-Executive Council that in turn organizes Hezbollah’s daily schedule, and executes the decisions of the Majlis Al-Shura.

Muhammad Yazbeck is the representative of Ayatollah Khameneni and chiefs Majlis Al-Qada-Judicial Council, which deals with issues related to the Shari’a or Islamic law.

Hezbollah deputies in the Lebanese Parliament are part of the Majlis Al-Tashrī’i- Parliamentary Council, which is headed by Muhammad Raad. It examines

248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
the proposed legislation of the parliament, and arranges the organizations relationship from within and with the government.

The resistance movement is controlled by Majlis Al-Jihadi-the Jihad Council, which is directly related to Majlis Al-Shura and possesses a ‘strategic ambiguity’ whereby no other council has knowledge of its movements and activities. This council is headed by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and is assisted, for security reasons, by an unnamed deputy. It is alleged that Imad Mughniyeh was the deputy before his 2008 assassination in Damascus.250

Hierarchy is obviously present among the organization of Hezbollah. However, this hierarchy contributed and is till contributing to the existing discipline among its members. This discipline helped in the 2006 July War and is still enhancing their psychological war against their enemy. Indeed, Hezbollah through its organization and doctrine proved to be an all for one and one for all group where approximately complete consensus is present. This ‘Iron Discipline’, as characterized by Robert Fisk, boosts Hezbollah’s psychological warfare and military warfare accordingly. “The Hizbollah is officered by men who spent 18 years fighting Israeli occupiers, and who learned the hard way that improved weaponry and iron discipline are more important than nationalist rhetoric.”251

The following diagrams present Hezbollah’s Organizations and the Jihad Council Organization consecutively.252

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250 Ibid.
252 Rabil, Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker.
6.2 - Media

Media is the pillar of psychological warfare’s and “Hezbollah has been a master of propaganda and psychological warfare since it was founded in 1982.” 253 Obviously Hezbollah relies heavily on the media or more accurately it is media-oriented where it has fully acquired and practiced the skills and techniques of propaganda and effective communication. Hezbollah knows very well, how to address their target audiences and how to broadcast their messages accordingly through different media apparatuses.

It is true that Hezbollah used efficiently its political, military, and social service network tools or strategies to attract the Lebanese population to its cause. However, the exceptional tactic consisted of, and still is, its engagement with the ‘hearts and minds’, i.e. the psychological warfare that is employed to ensure or cement Lebanese support, and make Israel think twice before instigating another war on Lebanon. Hezbollah’s tactic involved the employment of a “sophisticated media capability to amplify the psychological impact of its guerrilla tactics and acted, in effect, as a counterweight to the IDF’s conventional military strength.” 254

Hezbollah’s PSYWAR involves the employment of the media in countless forms ranging from newspapers (Al-Ahed, Al Bilad, Al Wahda for instance) and magazines, to the usage of the Internet, television and radio stations. 255 The most influential source for its media campaign has so far proved to be the radio station ‘Al-Nour’ that was inaugurated in 1988, and the Al-Manar TV Channel that was launched in 1991. 256

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253 Gabriel Weimann: *Hezbollah Dot Com*.
254 Wehrey, 54.
255 Schleifer, 13-14.
256 Ibid.
Initially, Hezbollah broadcast news in Arabic to target the Arab population, and then they proceeded with a Hebrew transmission that aimed at influencing the Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon and the Jewish population back home. Hezbollah captured the attention of the Israeli intelligence analysts and media through their practical agenda and, in turn, the Israeli and foreign media broadcast the video tapes recorded by Hezbollah since they were the sole tapes of the war.\textsuperscript{257}

Al-Manar (The Beacon) was determined to infiltrate and influence Israeli attitudes and opinions, thus manipulating their expectations regarding the war. This was achieved by means of a well-defined group in Al-Manar, whose task was the maintenance of a ceaseless vigilance on the Israeli media.\textsuperscript{258} “It has become a potent instrument in what Hezbollah calls its ‘psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy’ in the Arab world, focused on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”\textsuperscript{259}

Al-Manar became an integral part of the Lebanese television-viewing community in 1996 subsequent to ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’, and not in 1991, because the Lebanese government felt jeopardized or exposed by its radical programs that were screened live.\textsuperscript{260} Hezbollah relies heavily on the media to transmit its messages and broadcast its psychological warfare and the proof is that in 2001, the station was placed under Nasrallah’s provision through a senior committee.\textsuperscript{261} Al-Manar in turn portrays itself as the “first Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy.”\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Wehrey, 66.
\textsuperscript{259} Jorisch.
\textsuperscript{260} Wehrey, 65.
\textsuperscript{261} Conway, Terror TV, 3.
Hezbollah’s psychological strategy was a successful one because it was combined with its broadcast of the ongoing military engagement. This was executed by installing a camera on each and every Hezbollah soldier to record or film the operations that were then edited and made as clips to broadcast on Al-Manar. They portrayed – even if this was not entirely true - how Hezbollah’s soldiers or guerillas were capturing or killing the IDF soldiers.

Al-Manar’s importance is elaborated in the words of Nayef Krayem who is the stations previous general manager who said: “They (Al-Manar and Hizbollah) breathe life into one another. Each provides the other with inspiration. Hizbullah uses Al-Manar to express its stands and its views, etc. Al-Manar in turn receives political support for its continuation.”

With the emergence of the Internet as an essential, vital apparatus in the mass media, Hezbollah started employing it resourcefully in 1996. By 2003, they were operating four major websites that are available in English and Arabic: ‘moqaawama.org’ –which is the Islamic Resistance Support Association, and reflected momentous actions on the IDF;- ‘Hizbollah.org’-the executive website; ‘manartv.com’-the official website of Manar tv;- and last but not least ‘nasrollah.net’-the exclusive website of the Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah. The mentioned websites are the official Hezbollah ones; however, the group activates 50 other anti-Israeli websites that involve news, religion, social services, and other matters. If all this might seem astonishing or irregular for an organization that is usually described as being a terrorist one, additionally, Hezbollah

263 Schleifer, 5.
264 Ibid. 6.
265 Jorisch.
266 Conway, Cyercortical Warfare, 11.
activated a “Daily Operation” internet link that restructured itself every minute listing statistical data of its martyrs and military successes.²⁶⁸

During the 2006 War, Hezbollah focused on the use of these websites, yet a number of them were hacked, however, in July 21, 2006, the ghaliboun.net became Hezbollah’s main webpage for different purposes ranging from news to updates, psychological warfare, so on and so forth.²⁶⁹ This website focused on international news headlines and stories and even included the Israeli media commentaries. It also included links to galleries of images and video files that illustrated the result of the war by showing the civilian casualties. An example is: “a picture of a dead girl from Kafr Kana, victim of an Israeli air strike, is captioned sarcastically in English as The New Middle East, while in Arabic its title is Western Civilization.”²⁷⁰

The site was designed to target a number of audiences ranging from the Lebanese public, the Israelis, the Shiites and Muslims around the world, world public opinion, international media, etc… Ghaliboun was able to classify photos galleries accordingly to target each audience accordingly:

a. Israeli Aggression in Lebanon (152 photos)
b. Waiting for Rescue under the Ruins (13 photos)
c. Hassan Nasrallah (100 photos)
d. The Echo of Resistance (48 photos of anti-Israel demonstrations throughout the world)
e. The Refugees in Lebanon (96 photos)
f. Massacre in Kafr Kana (29-30 July 2006)

²⁶⁹ Weimann 14.
²⁷⁰ Ibid 15.
g. The Resistance (55 photos).  

It is also worth mentioning that Hezbollah’s Internet Bureau initiated a game named Special Force in which the IDF is specified as the enemy to be targeted, and the player rewarded when this objective is achieved. The game could be viewed as a subtle, symbolic reminder aimed at children to abhor Israel and its actions.

The media’s role and significance to Hezbollah was elaborated on by Hassan Ezzieddine, whose main responsibility was evaluating the media coverage of Hezbollah: “We feel that the media can be effective in creating a special climate in public opinion on the main issues of interest . . . We are heading toward a new sensitive security situation (in the region); this signifies that we need to follow events closely so that we can informatively help shape international and Arab public opinion . . . We believe that the media has a crucial role to play in the conflict, which is as important as the military wing.”

Subsequent to the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, Nabil Qaouk informed the New York Times, "The use of the media as a weapon had an effect parallel to a battle…by the use of these films, we were able to control from a long distance the morale of a lot of Israelis." (New York Times, July 14, 2000)

However, the usefulness of the media for Hezbollah is not restricted to Al-Manar. Hassan Nasrallah gave Maryam Al Bassam of New TV an interview on August 27, 2006, thanking the media for its assistance during the 2006 War. Below is a part of the interview:

“In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

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271 Weimann 15.
First, in the name of the resistance I would like to thank you as well as the television management and all workers, journalists, and media men in this establishment for the large efforts you made during the war. You, just like other institutions — to be fair to all — were our voice and the voice of the resistance men and steadfast people who want glory, dignity, and loftiness for this country. Of course, any words of thanks to you and all those who acted in solidarity with the resistance in this war fall short of what should be said but they must be said. Thank you.”

Thus, Nasrallah was thanking the Lebanese and Arab media for broadcasting the news to not only the Arab region but also the rest of the world via satellite, and thus, according to Nasrallah, revealing the true story. This was done primarily by the successful media strategy Hezbollah followed when in July 2006, “Hezbollah effectively united most of the Arab world against Israel via its media campaign, despite being blamed at first for starting the war. It portrayed the attacks perpetuated by Israel as disproportionate and indiscriminate, playing on the sympathies of all Arabs who oppose Israel. Nasrallah welcomed reporters and journalists to his country so they could see firsthand the impact of the Israeli bombing.”

6.2.1 - Media Campaigns

Hezbollah’s main emblem is its flag where it depicts a hand clutching a gun with a globe in the back and a tenet from the Koran: “Only Allah’s congregation shall be victorious.”

275 Ibid.
It was under Nasrallah’s leadership that an additional combat factor was introduced to the conflict with Israel; it was that of the Israeli public opinion. Nasrallah took pride in indicating in his speeches the weak points of the Israeli society where “the media arena became a central stage for Hezbollah’s anti-Israel activities.”

Subsequently, Hezbollah guerillas targeted the IDF and Israeli morale by placing the Hezbollah flag on different IDF positions; this achievement reflected a loss for the IDF and a triumph for Hezbollah.

It is widely held that Hezbollah’s defiance of Israel is achieved through two major practices: which are a ‘military strategy’ that is backed up by a well-defined and ‘studied psychological warfare’. “By its astute use of the video camera Hezbollah demonstrated how it was possible, with only a few simple pieces of equipment and some creative thinking, to net huge military and psychological dividends.” This psychological warfare attains its aims mainly through Al-Manar, which broadcasts a number of television programs in English and refers to itself as “the first Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy.”

Indeed, Al-Manar had an immense impact on the July 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel; the IDF intelligence corps was able to interfere with its broadcasts, and hack its affiliated websites. However, Israel’s to thwart Al-Manar’s broadcasts were overall unsuccessful. It did manage, however, to display a video of Nasrallah with the reverberation of three gunshots and a headline stating, “Your day is coming, coming, coming…the State of Israel.” Hezbollah, however, found a

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277 Ynet online: Hezbollah Chief.
278 Schleifer,10.
279 Weimann 5.
280 Ibid 16.
way to endure these attacks and safeguard its television station and websites. Fred Burton, a former US counterterrorism official, noted that “As the Israelis tighten the noose on Hezbollah in Lebanon, these communication nodes become critical.”

It is worth mentioning that in the process of hacking Hezbollah’s media, Israeli intelligence was able to censor Hezbollah training videos with the help of US high altitude cameras. Nevertheless, the IDF psychologists pressured the Israeli Cabinet not to display these videos to the IDF soldiers fearing that the images would make Israeli soldiers increasingly tentative to confront Hezbollah:

“A line of Hezbollah fighters on mountain bikes in a steep ravine south of the Litani River riding at high rates of speed. The rider must flip the bike up onto only the back wheel so the soldier’s body is facing the sky and his back flat parallel with and about two feet off the ground. The examinee must travel at close to 90 mph holding a RPG in either hand, and a cell phone in the other waiting firing instructions from a subterranean command center. The fighter must then fire the rocket thru a swinging small tire approximately 120 meters away on a tree branch. Achieving fewer than 11 bulls’ eyes out of 12 requires the arduous physical test repeated. A commander in UNIFIL, who claims to be familiar with this particular Hezbollah training exercise, commented that none of the UNIFIL soldiers from the 28 countries could even do the exercise, much less get one RPG through such a swinging tire. “I would doubt very much if any Israeli could do it either. Hezbollah fighters are probably the world’s best. I have never studied the Chinese up close but I’ve seen a whole lot of the others.”

Hezbollah members have undeniably become masters in the art of propaganda, capable of differentiating between their ranges of audiences and communicating with

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282 Lamb.
each one accordingly. Its diverse media apparatuses became the central points of the psychological war, especially Al-Manar in the July 2006 War. “Its role in the war began on the morning of July 12, when Hezbollah abducted IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. Al-Manar was the first station to report the kidnapping, approximately two hours after its occurrence. Once the fighting began, Al-Manar’s pronouncements had a major influence on other media, including the Israeli media.”

6.3 - Conclusion

Hezbollah’s objectives, its goals, ideology and organizational structure proved that discipline is one of the major factors in acquiring a successful war, especially a psychological war. Accordingly, Hezbollah’s prominent media campaign targets both the Israeli and Arab masses with a variety of programs, including speeches by Nasrallah or Hezbollah officials, warning of the consequences of novel wars. The media crusade also serves as a reminder to Hezbollah warriors and their enemies that ‘resistance’ is a sacred Shiite commitment, and that the latter community is ready and willing (not afraid) to engage in any imminent military skirmishes.

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283 Weimann 20.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined Hezbollah’s effective employment of psychological warfare as a weapon against its enemies. Nasrallah claimed in his interview with Al-Jazeera in 2006 that skillful psychological warfare is as potent as the use of military power. Undeniably, Hezbollah waged a well-defined, efficient psychological warfare campaign against Israel not only in 2006, but also since 1990. A number of factors supported Hezbollah’s psychological warfare both inside and outside Lebanon. Internally, were existent its increasing political outreach, the thriving social services network, and its expanding military strength that the group emphasized in the media and various forms of discourse. Externally, and particularly vis-à-vis Israel, a number of factors assisted this psychological warfare, ranging from the Jewish states’ strong aversion to casualties (‘Lebanese phobia’), to religious parents hesitant to entrust their children to the military. The level of deterrence Israel waged was minimal – it was unable to demonstrate clearly its red lines, and, consequently, underestimated Hezbollah’s readiness for war. Hezbollah’s psychological ploys increased and manipulated adeptly Israel’s aversion to casualties, influenced public opinion, exploited Israel’s miscalculations and mistakes (that were reflected in Winograds report), and, finally, amplified the groups’ own accomplishments in the eyes of their domestic and regional public (both Arab and Jewish).

Hezbollah’s usage of psychological warfare increased from 1990 onwards when Israel attempted to abolish any asymmetric threat with Hezbollah. It accomplished this by augmenting its conventional usage of artillery and air strikes.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁴ Bar.
and limited the ground forces. Israel often retaliated to Hezbollah’s guerilla warfare with intensive air strikes that resulted usually in collateral damage. Accordingly, Hezbollah’s psychological stratagem operated through the media to emphasize Israel’s aggression against civilians, especially women and children; which resulted in augmenting the number of Lebanese and regional supporters to Hezbollah’s cause. Through its shrewd practice of psychological warfare, Hezbollah was able to portray its personal struggle with Israel as a national endeavor.

Hezbollah displayed its psychological adeptness with the Israeli public through a number of tactics. The group highlighted particularly its guerilla warfare campaign as a major factor in its psychological tactics. The ratio (according to a UN report) of Hezbollah to IDF soldiers dropped from 5:1 in 1990 to 2:1 in 1997; this was elaborated on and emphasized in videos of slain IDF soldiers broadcasted on TV or the Internet to demoralize the Israeli public. It was apparent that the level of deterrence against Hezbollah was decreasing, and northern Israel was now within the range of Hezbollah rockets; this eventually led to the un-justification of the IDF presence in southern Lebanon since they were unable to protect Israel from such attacks, and consequently resulted in Israel’s decision to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in 2000.

Israel’s level of deterrence decreased because of the 2000 unilateral withdrawal, which was regarded as a loss to Israel and strategic victory for Hezbollah. This was followed by the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005; an action viewed as implying that Israel was reluctant or had lost its combat

285Helmer.
286Conway, Terror TV?
287Wehrey, 63.
288Helmer, 70.
289Waxman.
capability.290 ‘Red Lines’ were not stated or apparent anymore, and the level of deterrence Israel presented was continuously decreasing.291 This led to the inflated, disproportionate military reaction to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers in 2006 and its resultant war. Nasrallah, in person, admitted the extent of his astonishment; had he known or predicted Israel’s lopsided, heavy-handed reaction, he would have acted differently.292

Israel attempted in the July 2006 War to achieve what it had been unable to in its 18 years of occupation in southern Lebanon293. It wanted to primarily reinstate deterrence, abolish Hezbollah’s ‘state within a state’ status in accordance to the groups’ rocket arsenal, establish a security zone at Lebanon’s southern border, and obtain the release of the two abducted IDF soldiers.294 Israel; however, failed to account for the level of public support Hezbollah had acquired in Lebanon through its different activities ranging from its social services network, to its political outreach which different factions of the Lebanese society supported the organization. And, evidently, Israel had paid insufficient attention to Hezbollah’s significant usage of psychological warfare.

Accordingly, Hezbollah secretive nature also played a major role in enhancing the psychological warfare because Israel was unaware of where and how to target the weapons caches, leader hideouts, and launch sites, which were intentionally entrenched within the civilian population making them difficult to hit without causing significant collateral damage.295

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290 Ibid, 28.  
291 Bar.  
292 Blanford, Voice of Hezbollah.  
293 Pahlavi, 15.  
294 Faykutin.  
295 Kreps.
“Hezbollah fighters live in their houses, in their schools, in their churches, in their fields, in their farms and in their factories. You can’t destroy them in the same way you would destroy an army.”

Hezbollah had scrutinized Israel’s mode of thinking, culture and motives extremely carefully and was conscious that Israel “has always been more concerned with its internal affairs and its public perceptions more than that of the external perceptions when it comes to war.” Hence, Israel wanted to achieve minimal economic loses, and casualties – this caused it to switch to air strikes rather than employ ground forces. Thus, Hezbollah took advantage of these two factors through military and psychological warfare strategies: it launched approximately 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, resulting in considerable economic damage, and displacing approximately half a million Israeli civilian.

Hezbollah’s official TV station, Al-Manar, played a pivotal role in reflecting the righteousness of their actions, sponsoring their leaders, demonizing Israel, and encouraging more members to join them. Al-Manar and other media sources affiliated with Hezbollah relayed a number of messages stating that if Israel were to continue with its military operations, Hezbollah would retaliate against its civilian population to pressure Israel to a ceasefire. A truce was obtained through the UNSCR 1701, but Israel’s primary objective of disarming Hezbollah was never satisfied.

Hence, when the July 2006 War ended through the UN 1701 resolution, Hezbollah’s military infrastructure had been wrecked extensively, and the ceasefire

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296 Friedman, Psychological Operations.
297 Cordesman.
298 Kreps, 76.
299 Waxman, 31.
300 Jorish.
301 Conway, Cybercortical Warfare, 15.
302 Fayutkin, 214.
stated that international forces would prevent Hezbollah from returning to southern Lebanon. However, Nasrallah proclaimed openly, “We won a strategic and historic Victory, without any exaggeration.”

This thesis concludes that for the past five years, we have witnessed a new form or portrayal of aggression between Hezbollah and Israel, where the seminal factor is the psychological warfare implemented by both sides. A cold war undoubtedly exists between the two sides, and their willful pursuit of military supremacy and preparedness for combat, testifies that hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel is a strong possibility.

However, the psychological warfare between them is currently increasing the level of deterrence and a balanced apprehension exists, which apparently prevents an outbreak of fighting. Both sides are keenly aware that any upcoming war will not be similar to previous conflicts. It is currently clear that another outbreak of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel would immediately imply combat between Israel and Lebanon as a whole. Israel states continuously that a future war would result in Lebanon’s utter destruction, justifying this deed on the grounds of Hezbollah being a part of the government. Giyora Eiland, the former head of Israel’s National Security contends, “Israel does not know how to beat Hezbollah…If we want to win, the war should instead be waged against the Lebanese government and its infrastructure of which Hezbollah has become a part.”

Accordingly, it is generally recognized that any new belligerency would escalate swiftly into a regional war that includes Syria and Iran. Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official claimed, “A clash between Hezbollah

303 Weimann.
and Israel is likely to be more destructive than the 2006 conflict and that it could rapidly escalate to draw in Syria or Iran.”

This thesis has demonstrably made evident the efficacy of psychological warfare between Hezbollah and Israel. This tool has proved to be a considerable force in deterring either side by triggering a new war. Nevertheless, earnest preparations for a new war are a visible of this psychological warfare strategy that threatens to involve the entire region. What then will be the effects on the area? For what length of time will psychological warfare deter any possible future war? Subsequently, how does psychological warfare lend support to the current situation?

Confronted with the inevitability of another round of warfare, all these questions should surely be raised. This war is unavoidable because there are unresolved matters still enduring after 18 years of Israeli occupation and the July 2006 war. The Arab-Israeli conflict has become an existential affair for the inhabitants of the area. Arabs perceive Israel as having a Greater Israel vision as its primary objective, and Hezbollah, genuinely considering itself a legitimate part of the Arab resistance, refuses to endorse Israel’s schemes and territorial ambitions. In consequence, one cannot avoid wondering the extent to which mutual psychological strategies and schemes executed or envisaged by Hezbollah and Israel is capable of postponing a future war.

A question has been raised today about the influence of the uprisings in the Arab world, and the events that are taking place in Syria on the position of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Israel. Certainly, these events will have effects on Hezbollah nevertheless so far, the deterrence Hezbollah acquired after the July 2006 War with the support of their allies is still maintained. Its yet

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305 Cambanis.
unclear to what the events in Syria will lead to, furthermore Hezbollah is aware to what might happen if an unfriendly regime comes to Syria. Moreover, Iran one if the main source of support to Hezbollah is still unaffected by these waves of protest and the pro-Hezbollah regime in Iran is still intact. Thus, this means that Hezbollah and Iran might be working on another route that they could use to transfer weapons from Iran to Lebanon. Even with the events in Syria, Israel is continuing in taking its precautions and this was elaborated by the words of Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Gilad when he claimed: “What lies ahead could turn out to be very dangerous for us in light of the unprecedented developments Arab governments have had to face.” In addition, the level of deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel seem to increase not only vis-à-vis the Arab Spring but also with the increase in Hezbollah’s missile stock. Hezbollah-Israel deterrence ability is maintaining its power where the IDF northern commander Maj. Gen. Yair Golan says: “the Lebanon theater is comparatively stable. Israeli deterrence established after the second Lebanon War is very effective vis a vis Hezbollah and has delivered a quiet that hasn't existed for decades… On the other hand, the unabated Iranian buildup of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile force now covers all of Israel. This is a threat that is extremely significant when considering any broad-based operation we may have to undertake in the future.”


