

Lebanese American University

Humanitarian Intervention According To Contending
Perspectives on International Relations: The Cases of Iraq
(1991) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999)

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts in International Affairs

School of Arts and Sciences

April 2019

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Thesis Title: Humanitarian Intervention according to Contending Perspectives on IR

Program: MA in International Affairs

Department: Social Sciences

School: Arts & Sciences


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Acknowledgement

This thesis would not have been possible without the immense effort, commitment, patience and support of my advisor, Dr. Sami Baroudi. I would also like to thank the members of the committee, Dr. Bassel Salloukh and Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss for their help and guidance throughout the whole process. Finally, special thanks to my family and friends for their moral support.

Humanitarian Intervention According To Contending Perspectives on International Relations: The Cases of Iraq (1991) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999)

Sita Rama Farha

Abstract

Humanitarian intervention is a contested issue that has divided International Relations (IR) scholars and the broader public. Different schools of IR offer contending insights on humanitarian intervention: its motives, and factors behind it. Some schools endorse it, considering it an appropriate response to human rights violations, while others question its motivations. Realists and critical theorists are skeptical about the “humanitarian” rhetoric surrounding it, while liberals believe in its idealist aims. Guided by these questions, this study investigates the “No-Fly Zone” enforced in Northern Iraq in 1991 and the NATO Campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 as two case studies of humanitarian intervention. It looks at these two cases through the lenses of realism, critical theory, and liberalism. The insights of each theory regarding these two cases of humanitarian intervention will be discussed and compared in order to discern which theory best explains each case. This study concludes that no single IR theory adequately explains all cases of humanitarian intervention. Some theories, however, do a better job explaining certain situations.

Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, Realism, Liberalism, Critical Theory, Responsibility to Protect, International Community

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter | Page |
|--|-------------|
| I- Introduction..... | 1 |
| 1.1 Literature Review | 2 |
| 1.1.1 General Concepts & Definitions | 2 |
| 1.1.2 Case Studies: Brief historical backgrounds and discussion..... | 11 |
| 1.2 Methodology..... | 14 |
| II- Theoretical Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention..... | 17 |
| 2.1 Introduction..... | 17 |
| 2.2 The Skeptics: Realist and Critical Perspectives..... | 17 |
| 2.3 The Advocates: Liberal Perspective..... | 29 |
| III- Case Study 1: The No-Fly Zone in Iraq | 36 |
| 3.1 Introduction..... | 36 |
| 3.2 The Kurdish issue | 38 |
| 3.3 The Kurdish Uprising..... | 39 |
| 3.4 Saddam Hussein Reacts to Protests..... | 41 |
| 3.5 The UNSC Resolution 688 | 43 |
| 3.6 The Establishment of the No-Fly Zone..... | 47 |
| 3.7 Iraq’s No-Fly Zone from Realist and Critical Perspectives | 54 |
| 5.3 Iraq’s No-Fly Zone from a Liberal Perspective | 59 |
| IV- Case Study 2: The NATO Campaign in Serbia | 63 |
| 4.1 Introduction..... | 63 |
| 4.2 International Context..... | 64 |
| 4.3 Regional Context | 65 |
| 4.4 The Militarization of the Kosovar Resistance..... | 69 |
| 4.5 The UN Steps in..... | 74 |
| 4.6 NATO’s Use of Force | 78 |
| 4.7 NATO’s Campaign in Kosovo from the Realist and Critical Perspectives | 82 |

4.8 NATO’s Campaign in Kosovo from the Liberal Perspective92

V- Conclusion96

5.1 Introduction.....96

5.2 Summary of the Study.....96

5.3 Conclusion of the Study108

Bibliography 112-128

List of Abbreviations

FRY: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

IR: International Relations

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSCOM: United Nations Special Commission

US: United States

USA: United States of America

Chapter One

Introduction

“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend every precept of common humanity?” Kofi Annan, the then General Secretary of the UN said, in 2000 (UN 2014). Humanitarian intervention is a topic that is often discussed when it comes to international politics. This study will tackle the issue of humanitarian intervention, with the aim being to find out which International Relations perspective – among the three major perspectives -most adequately explains humanitarian intervention in the cases of Iraq in 1991 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999? The three major perspectives are realism, critical theory, and liberalism. The two cases of humanitarian intervention that have been chosen occurred within the timeframe of the twentieth century, they are the cases of the No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq in 1991 and the NATO bombing of Serbia (part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1999. These two cases were picked because in both of them, the reason – or pretext, according to some arguments- for intervention was the repression of an ethnic group by an authoritarian government (of Kurds in Iraq by Saddam Hussein, and of Albanians in Kosovo by Slobodan Milošević), and because the United States of America (USA), in both cases, played the role of "world police", surpassing the UN and intervening without its consent. The USA justified the creation of the Northern No Fly Zone in Iraq by the UN Security Council Resolution 688 (Gibbons

2002), but the mentioned resolution didn't actually contain any reference to the creation of no-fly zones like that (UN 1991), and the then-UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, deemed the No Fly Zone "illegal" (Pilger 2001). As for the intervention in Serbia, it was also done without an authorization from the UN Security Council (Roberts 1999, Charney 1999 & Walling 2013).

The significance of this study is to shed light on the intentions of humanitarian intervention, and whether it is actually “humanitarian”. In addition to academics, those who may benefit from the analysis provided in this study are activists, especially human rights activists, as well as humanitarian organizations, NGOs and civil society, so that they may assess properly whether they should support humanitarian intervention, lobby for it, and/or demand governments to apply it, or not.

1.1 Literature Review:

1.1.1 General Concepts & Definitions:

When studying humanitarian intervention, there are several concepts and variables to be defined and discussed. To begin, humanitarian intervention, according to the quote by Annan mentioned in the beginning, is done to respond to “violations of human rights”, thus the concept of “human rights” should be defined. Article 2 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the most relevant one to this study, because it states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person", and “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, or birth status” (UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights). In

other words, it is the right to live in safety and dignity, no matter the race, ethnicity, gender, religion or any other factors and identities.

Another important concept which needs to be defined is what humanitarian intervention is often accused of violating: sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined by Thomas G. Weiss (2007 p. 12) as follows: “independent and unfettered power of a state in its jurisdiction”. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), however, is viewed as a principle that transcends sovereignty. Stowell (cited in Glanville 2011) argues that "a state's enjoyment of the right to non-intervention and non-interference was conditional upon its fulfillment of sovereign obligations regarding the treatment of those within its territory". According to the UN, the concept of R2P was clarified by a report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty as follows:

“...sovereignty not only gave a State the right to ‘control affairs, it also conferred on the State primary ‘responsibility’ for protecting the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people – either through lack of ability or lack of willingness – the responsibility shifts to the broader international community” (UN 2014).

This leads to the concept of humanitarian intervention, which is the core of this study. "Humanitarian intervention" is argued to be a contradictory term in itself, because "there can be nothing humanitarian about a bomb" (Tharoor&Daws 2001), but "militarism and humanitarianism have become indistinguishable" according to Coyne (2013 p. 40). Even if it's done for a good cause - according to some arguments - there are also other arguments which state that humanitarian intervention isn't the adequate way to serve a good cause. Former Malaysian prime minister, Mohamed Mahathir,

argues: “to kill 100,000 people because you suspect that the human rights of a few have been denied seems to be a contradiction” (quoted in Bricmont 2006). As stated by the UN, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change considers that “there is a collective international responsibility exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent” (UN 2014). James W. Smith III (2007) asks the question that, once all peaceful means of condemning and sanctioning of a state that represses its own population have been exhausted, what is to be done, what action shall be undertaken? Annan provides an answer to that, which is: "Our job is to intervene...state frontiers...should no longer be seen as a watertight protection for war criminals or mass murderers" (quoted in Tharoor&Daws 2001).

Another definition of humanitarian intervention is expressed by Adam Roberts as follows: “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among inhabitants” (cited in Burgess 2002). A different definition of this term is "action by governments (or, more rarely, by organisations) to prevent or to stop governments, organisations, or factions in a foreign state from violently oppressing, persecuting, or otherwise abusing the human rights of people within that state" (Simms & Trim 2011). The latter definition differs from the former (Roberts' definition) in the way that it takes into consideration that organizations - intergovernmental or supranational, regional or international - could be the ones taking the initiative of humanitarian intervention. Baer (2011) states his own definition of

humanitarian intervention as a "military action by the soldiers of a state or group of states within the borders of another state without its permission and with the immediate aim of preventing or ending massive violations of human rights or widespread human suffering". Thomas Pogge (cited in Orosco 2010) defines it as "coercive external interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state justified by the goal of protecting large numbers of persons within this state in the enjoyment of their human rights". Chapter VII in the UN Charter states that in the case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (UN Chapter VII Article 39), the UN Security Council has the jurisdiction to solve the issue by peaceful means (Article 41), and in case those means prove to be ineffective, then "it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstration, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations" (Article 42). This is where humanitarian intervention comes into action.

In those definitions, it is either one state, or an organization, or a group of states, which takes up the mantle and intervenes. Chomsky, in a 2018 interview with TeleSUR (a pan-Latin American channel with a left-leaning ideological orientation), discusses the question of which state or organization is legally supposed to intervene in case of human rights violations against minorities, or in other words, who is supposed to carry the responsibility to protect minorities in case their own government fails to do so. He states that there are two definitions of the Responsibility to protect, the first one is the UN definition - the formal, legal definition- which is that no military intervention can be carried out without approval from the UN Security Council, otherwise it would be

illegal. This UN definition stresses on using pressures, diplomacy, and sanctions as means to make a government comply and stop committing atrocities. The second definition of R2P which Chomsky mentions is that of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which is similar to the formal definition, except in one paragraph where it states that if the UNSC doesn't approve of a military intervention, a "regional grouping" can intervene on its own. Chomsky argues that no regional grouping has the means or capabilities to intervene like that, except NATO. Thus, when NATO intervenes, it is justified according to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, but not according to the UN legal framework.

A similar argument to that of Chomsky is offered by Bricmont (2006). He states that the UN's primary goal is to prevent wars. Thus, the UN Charter doesn't allow an intervention in a country without the consent of its government, in order to avoid wars and bloodshed (Bricmont 2006). According to Bricmont (2006), the consenting government doesn't have to be liberal democratic, it just has to be in control of the armed forces of the country. Even if it is a dictatorship, its consent is still required before setting foot in its country, for the simple reason that it controls the armed forces (Bricmont 2006). Provoking those armed forces by intervention would certainly cause devastating losses and casualties (Bricmont 2006). But this is the UN's law, and as Chomsky states, the Commission's laws are being followed when a "humanitarian" intervention happens, not the UN's law. Bricmont (2006) argues that when human rights activists, intellectuals, and humanitarian NGOs in countries like the US, the UK, and France – his own country – say that "we" should intervene to save Albanians, or Kurds, or Shias, or Tutsis, or Rohingyas, it doesn't mean that those activists and intellectuals

would volunteer themselves to go to a remote country in the Middle East and be freedom fighters there against tyranny and oppression. “We” means the armies of their governments, those will be the freedom fighters (Bricmont 2006). Except that, Bricmont argues, armies – and the governments behind them – aren’t exactly suitable for the role of freedom fighters. The reason is that armies usually get attacked by guerrilla fighters in countries which the armies intervene, and the armies retaliate with means that aren’t exactly humanitarian, such as torture. This makes the supposed “freedom fighters” no different than the very same dictators they are combatting (Bricmont 2006).

Parekh (1997) gives an overview about the history of what is termed as "humanitarian intervention" among Western political thinkers and philosophers from Grotius to Marx, and differentiates "intervention" from the concepts of "war" and "conquest". He argues that this term is actually quite vague. Others consider it as "morally ambiguous" (Miller 2000). Parekh concludes by suggesting a rather "non-violent", Gandhi-style method of intervention to counter human rights violations, instead of military interventions. Ramsbotham (1997) agrees with Parekh on the vagueness of the concept. He argues in favor of a more encompassing definition, one that includes the peaceful intervention which aims to give aid, and the intervention to which the target state consents. Both of those authors look beyond the dichotomy of intervention versus sovereignty and the supposed clash between both.

Bricmont (2006) asks: “can Brazil...invade Iraq in order to install a democracy...Can Bangladesh intervene in the internal affairs of the United States...?” Archibugi (2004) offers an answer; he argues that when we discuss the contemporary "humanitarian intervention", we mean the cases in which powerful countries intervene in

third world countries, and not vice versa, for several reasons, mainly because injustice and oppression usually occurs in third world countries now, not in Western liberal democracies. Ayooob (2004) attributes this to the novelty of the sovereignty concept in post-colonial/third world countries; some violence is the usual inevitable trajectory for sovereignty to take its full place. Moreover, Western liberal countries are the ones who possess the military capabilities to undertake such an "act of power", thus, intervention in a third world country by another third world country is rare now, and when it occurs it is usually backed by a Western liberal country (Archibugi 2004).

Lu (2007) presents realist as well as idealist critiques of humanitarian intervention. According to her, from the realist point of view, "the introduction of the concept of humanitarian intervention has not disciplined great power politics; rather, great power politics seems to have disciplined the practice of humanitarian intervention". She argues that powerful states are the ones who undertake the task of humanitarian intervention because they possess more power and resources than organizations like the UN. Realists also argue that since the international order is "anarchic", third party interveners tend to follow their own rules without specific, formal contracts (Ruachhaus 2009). A critical approach to the concept of humanitarian intervention is similar to the realist one, in arguing that it is the powerful few states who undertake such an action, in the name of the "international community" which they don't represent (Ayooob 2001), despite this, some critical theorists like Habermas supported the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (Devetak 2013 p. 185). Coyne (2008, p. 11) argues that when "spreading democracy" is mentioned, it usually means Western-style liberal democracy, not just the literal meaning of democracy, which is simply holding elections.

Other criticisms to humanitarian intervention stem from the bias of interveners to one side, painting everything as either black or white. Oppression and ethnic violence are ethically wrong, but both sides could be engaging in it while interveners tend to focus on one side only. This happened in Kosovo, when the Kosovo Liberation Army (Albanian radicals) aimed to "cleanse" the region from Serbs (Terry 2002), but the only focus was on the atrocities committed by Milošević. The liberal idealist argument, on the other hand, holds that pursuing high ideals of liberty and freedom and equality through humanitarian intervention isn't "feasible", and it doesn't actually solve the root cause of the problem (Lu 2007).

The arguments for or against humanitarian intervention usually take the form of high ideals on one side, versus sovereignty as a law and a duty on the other. Henkin (1999) argues that even if he considers unilateral intervention to be "unlawful", he doesn't think that the UN Charter, the international law, and all the legal documents that assert the protection of sovereignty, should be given priority over humanitarian concerns. Similarly, Weiss (2001) states that ideas matter, and humanitarian values and ideals shift the balance against sovereignty when there is a choice to be made between those two options (humanitarian ideals and sovereignty). Donnelly (1993) offers an opposite argument from a realist perspective, stating that states have no obligation whatsoever to answer to a higher authority concerning what it does within its own borders with its own citizens, and non-intervention is a duty that comes along with the right of sovereignty. "Augustinian Realism" is skeptic about sovereignty as a form of power (contrary to Donnelly's view), but at the same time it doesn't follow internationalist ideas that are far-fetched, too idealistic and don't fit within the day-to-

day practice of politics (Elshtain 2001).

Goodman (2006) criticizes those who oppose humanitarian intervention, mainly the realist view presented above by Lu (2007). He presents a prevalent argument in academic circles which holds that legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention that takes place without the UNSC authorization would make states wage more wars under its pretext. He argues that supporters of humanitarian intervention since the days of Grotius knew that the concept can be misused and abused. Moreover, thinkers like Kant and Rousseau considered it as an obligatory duty (Gomes 2011 & Heinze 2004). Legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention won't increase wars waged under its pretext, on the contrary, "encouraging aggressive states to justify using force as an exercise of humanitarian intervention can facilitate conditions for peace between those states and their prospective targets" (Goodman 2006). Western and Goldstein (2011) agree with Goodman, they argue that thanks to norms like the R2P (Responsibility to Protect), the frequency of wars and violence is on the decline, as well as the number of casualties.

Schmitt (2011) defines a "no-fly zone" as "a three-dimensional piece of airspace, usually over another state's land or sea territory, in which aircraft may not fly. The mere launch of an aircraft from an airfield within the zone constitutes a violation". He states the purpose of the no-fly zones in general, which is usually to inhibit the military activities of the native state (Iraq in this case), or to protect civilians, or both. In the case of the Northern No-Fly Zone in Iraq, the US/UK/France airplanes aimed to block the military activities of Iraq. This kind of intervention, by the creation of No-Fly Zones, may be considered as rather "passive" or "preventive", in comparison to the "active"

NATO intervention in Serbia, however, it had the same purpose: to counter actions that were seen as threatening to minorities, leading to the flow of refugees, creating a refugee crisis, and disrupting the international peace and security. A no-fly zone is thus an "intervention from the sky" which fits into the definitions of "humanitarian intervention" discussed above.

1.1.2 Case Studies: Brief historical backgrounds and discussion:

In 1991, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm began, when USA came to fight against Iraq, on the side of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and war broke out, then, the US announced that Kuwait was liberated (USHistory.org). This was the Gulf War, which led to the defeat of Hussein, in February 1991 (adst.org 2016). Operation Desert Storm was thus over, and Iraqi forces left Kuwait. Kurdish opponents in the North of Iraq took advantage of Hussein's defeat and initiated an uprising against him (adst.org 2016). According to the UK Ministry of Defense (2009), Kurdish rebels in the North of Iraq took control of every city there. Hussein retaliated and Kurdish refugees fled (MEI 2016). Turkey refused to take those Kurdish refugees in, so they remained stuck on the borders and vulnerable to Iraqi attacks (adst.org 2016). This led the USA to respond by the creation of the No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq; this is how Operation Provide Comfort came into action (MEI 2016). The task of this operation was basically to "limit Iraqi military capabilities" (Gibbons 2002). The US, UK and France had a dilemma: if they support the Kurds, Iraq, freshly out of conflict, would degenerate into ethnic divisions, but if they do nothing, Hussein would commit further massacres against the Kurds (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Thanks to the media, information and images of suffering Kurdish refugees stuck in the mountains with no one to protect them touched

the US public opinion and tilted it towards backing the intervention (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

The UN Security Council Resolution 688, which the US cited as a reference for the creation of the Iraqi No-Fly Zone, referred to the paragraph 7 of Article 2 from Chapter I of the UN Charter, according to which "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (UN Chapter I). But the Chapter VII, as previously mentioned, states that peaceful means should be used first, then other means of intervention in case peaceful ones fail. The Resolution stressed on peaceful means, not military means, by demanding that "Iraq...immediately end this repression, and ... hope that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected" (UN 1991). Silliman (2002) argues that even if the UNSC didn't openly condemn the No-Fly Zone, silence doesn't mean consent in this case, and this case of intervention has a shaky legal justification.

As for the other case, Communist Yugoslavia, after the World War II, was fragmented into six republics, one of which is Serbia. Kosovo was a province, and later on an autonomous region, within Serbia, in which the Albanian ethnicity made up 77.5% of the population, according to 1981 statistics (Kosovo.net), and 80-90% of it in the late 90s (Kuperman 2008). There were tensions between the separatist Albanians on one side, and the Serbo-nationalists who supported Milošević on the other. Milošević revoked the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989, and as a reaction to that, Albanians of Kosovo first opted for non-violent resistance for few years, then in 1997, the radical Albanian

rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) took over the resistance (Kuperman 2008). The KLA attacked Serbian government strongholds, while Serbian paramilitaries attacked supposed KLA locations, but didn't distinguish between armed rebels and civilians (Marten 2004 p. 50). USA was "sympathetic" to the grievances of Kosovo's Albanians and their desire for independence (Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks 2006), and NATO accused the Serbian forces of being guilty of the "deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forcing 400,000 people from their homes" (NATO 1999a).

According to the NATO, the intervention in Serbia was done in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (NATO 2017). This Resolution actually did call for an "international civilian and military presence that would provide an international transitional administration and security presence that would oversee the return of refugees and the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo" (UN Peacemaker 2014). Thus, unlike the other Resolution 688 about Iraq, it called for the military presence of "boots on the ground". The only "presence on the ground" which the Resolution on Iraq called for is that of humanitarian organizations and relief agencies. Even if the Resolution on the 1999 Serbia intervention called for military presence there, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, in its "Kosovo Report", argues that the intervention by NATO is "illegal but legitimate", illegal because it wasn't approved by the UNSC, but still legitimate because peaceful means of solving that conflict were not succeeding and there was no other way to stop genocide from going on there (ReliefWeb 2000). Weiss (cited in Badescu 2007) argues that the inaction of the international community over other cases of human rights violations had far more dire consequences to international peace and security than the actual action which took place

in Kosovo without the UNSC's approval.

1.2 Methodology:

The methodology of this study will be as follows. First, a presentation of the major International Relations theories and their respective views on humanitarian intervention will take place, in one single chapter solely dedicated to theoretical perspective on humanitarian intervention in detail. It will start with realism and critical theory, because they have similar views when it comes to humanitarian intervention, then it will present the liberal view, which is the opposite of the realist and critical view. Realism and critical theory both hold skeptical views on the humanitarian motives of such interventions, while liberalism advocates those interventions as a way to protect civilians. After the theoretical chapter, the two cases of humanitarian intervention picked for this study will be presented in two following chapters, each chapter dedicated for one case, starting with the No-Fly Zone of Iraq, then proceeding to the NATO campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Each chapter will present the details of its designated case of humanitarian intervention, the factors that lead up to it, some background information about the ethnic groups involved, how these interventions came into being, and the role of the UN. In the two chapters dedicated to case studies, the reader will discover the countries that supported and/or led the interventions, the countries that showed some non-interventionist stands, the role of the media, and public opinion.

After presenting each of the two cases of Iraq and Kosovo in detail, studying the two interventions from the point of view of IR theories will follow. Each of the two

cases of humanitarian intervention – starting with the No-Fly Zone in Iraq – will be analyzed through the IR theories which were presented in the theoretical chapter. After using IR theories in order to analyze the two interventions, a conclusion will be reached about the adequate International relations theory to explain humanitarian intervention. Testing the theories of IR on those two cases will lead to discovering which theory adequately portrays the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention. By a qualitative inductive method – going from the specific two cases to general conclusions - there will be an attempt to find an explanation to humanitarian intervention as a general concept, based on analyzing the two cases of Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999. A concluding chapter will end the study and sum up what was presented through it.

Note that the term “humanitarian intervention” will be used throughout this study without quotes, even if the liberal view isn’t adopted in the study as the only correct view - liberal theorists are the only ones who view those interventions as actually motivated by humanitarianism. Even if those two interventions – in Iraq and Serbia – were motivated by power politics or materialistic interests – as realists would argue – they were still done under the pretext of human rights. That’s why the term “humanitarian intervention” will be used, and not just “intervention”. “Intervention” is a very broad term and isn’t necessarily happening for the sake of humanitarian international norms – or under their pretext, as realists and critical theorists insist. Mere “intervention” signifies one country entering another without the consent of the government of the country which it is entering. The Nazis themselves have done that (Bricmont 2006), but this doesn’t count as “humanitarian intervention”; they didn’t claim that they are saving the oppressed in other countries. While in humanitarian

intervention, the stated aim is to protect the innocent – whether this is the real aim or not is the job of IR theories to explain.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention

2.1 Introduction:

This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on humanitarian intervention, focusing on the three dominant traditions of theorizing on international relations and how they have addressed humanitarian interventions. Realists, liberals and critical theorists have all expressed their views on humanitarian intervention. Painting with broad strokes, Liberals are the only ones who are in favor of humanitarian intervention, while realists and critical theorists oppose it. However, even liberals themselves level some criticisms against humanitarian intervention, and these views will be elaborated on in the following section. The chapter devotes a section to each of the three International Relations (IR) perspectives. This introductory chapter of the study aims to present the views of the three most important theories in International Relations, followed by the presentation of the case studies of Iraq and Serbia.

2.2 The Skeptics: Realist and Critical Perspectives:

Realism is still the dominant tradition of theorizing on international relations. It views states as the primary actors, driven by security and other core interests; while interacting in an anarchic system. From the name, one can tell what this theory's stance on humanitarian intervention is all about. It is about the real world, and rational, calculated,

cold, hard facts, without idealism. Realists emphasize "realpolitik"; they look for the real motivation of a state's actions, which is - in the issue of humanitarian intervention - usually hidden behind the embellished rhetoric of saving innocent people from genocide or human rights violations.

According to realists, the concept of humanitarian intervention is quiet "morally ambitious" (Lu 2007). For realists, the states are not do-gooders, they are purely self-interested actors. As Pogge argues (quoted in Seay 2007), "there are no...humanitarian heroes out there", and as Smith states (also quoted in Seay 2007), interveners are "unable to act in other than self-interested ways". Realists argue that it is too far-fetched and wishful thinking to consider that states would actually use their military means and capabilities objectively, risk sacrificing their soldiers and maybe even facing internal domestic opposition, without considering and calculating what is beneficial to their own power (Lu 2007). Even if a UNSC-authorized intervention is carried out (which is technically legal), realists stay suspicious and skeptic over it, questioning its idealist motivations, since - for realists - state motivations are always political, never charitable (Lu 2007). Realists are usually skeptical regarding UNSC's ability to limit the powerful states' use of force and restrict it to make it exclusive to humanitarian endeavors (Lu 2007).

Realists, in their state-centric view, argue that, throughout history, the state is by default sovereign, and is the center of all political activity, and it is not obliged at all to answer to a higher authority when it comes to its own internal affairs (Donnelly 1993). The UNSC can't set itself as a higher authority over sovereign states, on the contrary, sovereign states themselves have the higher authority over the UNSC. Realists argue that

the international system is "anarchic", in which each state is left for its own devices to fend for itself, with no higher authority to dictate over it what to do and what not to do. Due to this anarchic nature of the state system, in case of humanitarian intervention, the intervener state - or group of states - act upon their own rules while intervening, with no formal or legal contracts to constrain or restrain the actions they take (Ruachhaus 2009). Legal multinational institutions like the UN can't please realists. When the UN stresses on protecting sovereignty in its laws, realists stay suspicious over the UN's motives in providing a legal framework for the consolidation of sovereignty. Morgenthau (1967) argues that this kind of legal non-interventionism seeks to "discredit" only the interventions from rival states. Proceeding from this argument, and following the realist premise of UN and UNSC being merely tools for powerful states to manipulate for their own ends, we can consider that the NATO countries like USA and UK control the UN, so when the UN argues in favor of non-interventionism, this doesn't apply to US or its allies, but to their rivals. When the USSR still existed, and when the USA addresses the protection of sovereignty, they only mean protection of sovereignty from Soviet intervention, not USA intervention.

The issue of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 serves as a strong argument in favor of the realist view: powerful states did not intervene there in order to stop the genocide that was going on right in front of them, while they intervened in other countries like Afghanistan because this served their own selfish interests (Lu 2007). This shows that the powerful states only intervene when it serves their own political ends, not whenever and wherever genocide is taking place. Also, genocide was taking place in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but there was no intervention, because the stakes

were high and the cost-benefit calculations predicted a loss for interveners-to-be (Miller 2015). This is called "selective intervention" (Seay 2007). In other words, "the introduction of the concept of humanitarian intervention has not disciplined great power politics; rather, great power politics seems to have disciplined the practice of humanitarian intervention" (Lu 2007).

Another realist explanation for "selective interventions" is that a powerful country won't intervene if there's another power to deter it and balance against it (Miller 2015). This explains why USA intervened in Libya in 2011 but not in Syria, because Russia and Iran balance against it in Syria (Miller 2015). According to realists, the practice of the so-called humanitarian intervention proliferated after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War for several reasons (Miller 2015). This is because bipolarity was over, and uni-polarity began. The US didn't have a power to balance against it anymore, thus it was able to take liberty and intervene with no Soviet threat standing in its way (Miller 2015). No other power was there to deter the USA, thus interventions all over the world - especially in the Middle East - took place. This situation changed in the issue of post-Arab Uprising Syria, where Russia balances against USA (Miller 2015). Liberals, however, grew optimistic because of the USSR collapse, since there will be no one to deter them from spreading their democratic ideals all over the world, even if realists warned from such adventures and an idealism-dominated foreign policy (Chomsky 2008).

Just like liberals - and the R2P concept in itself - consider that sovereignty comes with a responsibility - which is protection of citizens - realists believe that sovereignty comes with another responsibility: non-intervention, instead of protection (Donnelly

1993). States have a duty, thus, according to realists like Donnelly, to stay out of the internal domestic affairs of their fellow sovereign states, not to gather their armies or airplanes or drones to go on humanitarian adventures to "save" the citizens of another country from alleged genocide or oppression. Donnelly also argues that intervention doesn't just have to be violent, it can be any coercive action by one state against another - violent or non-violent, UNSC authorized or not UNSC authorized - an intervention is an intervention. Thus, the Iraqi No-Fly Zone case discussed in this paper is deemed an intervention by realists like Donnelly (1993).

Realists share with critical theorists their opposition to the liberal imposition of so-called "universal values", and humanitarian intervention supposedly promotes these values universally. According to realists, states should not only abstain from globally-imposing the so-called "universal values", they should also resist their imposition (Fiott 2013). The realist Kenneth Waltz (cited in Fiott 2013) argues that it is very dangerous to intervene abroad to achieve purposes that do not serve the national interest - and for realists, promoting liberal democratic values overseas does not serve the national interest. But what does "national interest" mean? For some liberals, promoting liberal democracy abroad is part of the national interest, because democracies don't go to war against each other, according to "democratic peace theory", and in peace, trade and prosperity increase, and everyone profits. This ignores the issue that not everyone profits from peace, instead, some parties profit from war, and this does not only mean illegal businesses, black market, drug trade networks, trafficking, underground cartels, weapon factories, and so on, but sovereign states and governments themselves - this is why they actually intervene the first place, according to the realist argument, because war brings

them profit, economically and politically, which serves their national interest. According to Tucker (cited in Fiott 2013), the national interest which realists refer to means securing a stable supply of natural resources such as oil and gas. Thus, realists can be in favor of interventions if they openly state their real purpose, which is merely serving the material interests of the sovereign state. According to Hoffman (cited in Fiott 2013), realists become skeptic when intervention is undertaken to achieve any "objectives beyond survival and security". To sum up, as Morgenthau (1967) states, "intervene we must where our national interest requires it".

"Neo-conservative realists", according to Nuruzzaman (2006), take the intervention motivated by self-interest and political benefits to a whole new level. "Neo-cons", as they are popularly known, differ from the classical realists in their "internationalist" vision. According to Nuruzzaman (2006), this new brand of realists seeks to expand the so-called "American values" globally, considering that this is actually good for the American interests. They share the interest in spreading the same values everywhere with liberal internationalists, however, this interest in global values is motivated by purely American self-interest, not by moralistic ideas and altruistic values. This is an "updated" version of realism, made to fit into the concept of American exceptionalism and the expansion of American interest, the war on terror and the war on Iraq in 2003 (Nuruzzaman 2006).

A minority of Neo-realists, however, take some moralistic ideals into consideration, unlike the classical realists (Seay 2007). Thus, they come up with a "middle ground" between the extremely grim view of human nature and state behavior advocated by classical realists, and the optimistic view that is held by liberal

internationalists. This is a "quasi-realist" attempt to reconcile moral values with selfish material interests (Seay 2007). An example of this view is the US intervention in Afghanistan, in which "national interest" and "saving strangers" were both motivations for the interventions, and this argument considers that the issue is more than either black - as classical realists insist - or white - as liberals argue (Seay 2007).

In a nutshell, the Realist perspective on intervention is that it only aims at securing material and political benefits for the intervening sovereign state. In other words, intervention doesn't seek to help an oppressed minority in a third world country and save them from a populist dictator, but it does seek to increase the wealth and power of a strong state. Realists are realistic, they consider that a state won't risk its troops, weaponry, and taxpayers' money for the sake of rescuing the innocents somewhere across the ocean; they risk them if they expect a reward in return, for example, secure oil supplies.

Moving on to the critical theorist position on humanitarian intervention, critical literally means criticizing the mainstream - and mainly Eurocentric, Western - grand theories like realism and liberalism. Critical theory has many variants, such as feminist theory and post-colonial theory. Critical theorists aim to expose the bias of those mainstream theories towards privileged groups, such as whites or males, even if many among the critical theorists themselves actually belong to these groups. They expose biases among the mainstream views which can't be spotted at the first sight, which we have grown so normalized with and we take for granted, deeming those views as "objective" while actually they're not. The way they tackle the issue of humanitarian intervention is not an exception. According to Grovogui (quoted in Mahdavi 2015), the

so-called "objectivity" of humanitarian intervention, the R2P doctrine, and the neo-liberal ideology which advocates for them, is nothing but the "rationalization of hegemony disguised as universal humanism."

The critical position on humanitarian intervention intersects with the realist one in some aspects. Chomsky - a critical theorist - in a 2018 interview with TeleSUR, argues that almost every aggressive act, undertaken by some powerful state, is justified as "humanitarian intervention". This is similar to the realist position which argues that no intervention is actually "humanitarian". Chomsky himself questions whether a concept like "humanitarian intervention" even exists (1993). He asserts in the 2018 interview that these interventions are seen as "humanitarian" only from the point of view of the intervener; the aggressor, but the victims see it as a mere aggression under the pretext of humanitarianism and universal human rights.

Chomsky, in the same interview, argues that there are two concepts of the Responsibility to Protect, one from the UN, and another from International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The UN definition stresses on the issue of the illegality of any military intervention undertaken without UNSC approval. It is the formal, legal definition of humanitarian intervention, and it insists that diplomatic, peaceful means should be used to pressure the governments and inhibit them from committing human rights violations against their citizens. The latter definition, from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty - established by Gareth Evans (whose interventionist argument was addressed in the section on the liberal perspective), is similar to the UN one, with a small difference. Chomsky argues that this small difference is that the Commission considers that if the UNSC doesn't allow an

intervention to take place, and does not authorize it, "regional groupings" can to take up the mantle themselves and intervene, and later on the UNSC will approve of this intervention, after it already took place. But which "regional groupings" actually possess the military means, weaponry, and capability to do that? Chomsky answers: NATO. Interventionists, thus, according to Chomsky, justify their own interventions by arguing that UNSC allows it, but actually their reference is the Commission's definition, not the UN definition, and this is a double standard, because their interventions can't be legal when we argue from the UN perspective.

Going from the issue of NATO and USA being a self-proclaimed world police, critical theorists question the moral authority of those "regional groupings" composed of powerful states and their smaller state proxies. According to Habermas, "the normative authority of the United States of America lies in ruins" (quoted in Devetak 2013 p. 184). Ayooob (2001) argues that those states intervene in the name of the "international community", but they don't actually represent this international community, they are the powerful few and they only represent themselves. Anti-interventionist arguments stress on the interveners' bias, giving Serbia as an example of both sides - the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as Milošević - committing atrocities, with Albanian rebels wanting to "cleanse" Kosovo from Serbs, but only Milošević was accused and later on sent to trial (Terry 2002). Mahdavi (2015) argues that the R2P doctrine enforces the "Orientalist" idea that the Middle East is not up to the task of fending for itself, thus it is in need of charity from the benevolent West, and also the idea of "Oriental Despotism", which considers that dictatorship comes from barbaric, primitive people in the Middle East, while ignoring the fact that Nazism and Fascism came from the West. Coyne (2008

p. 11) states that when Western Europe and USA say that they want to spread democracy abroad, they mean the Western-style liberal democracy, not the literal, dictionary meaning of democracy, which is holding elections. Many Arab or African or Latin American despots whom the West opposes came to power by the literal democratic way.

Critics of humanitarian intervention also argue that it doesn't serve the ideals which interventionist politicians brag about, on the contrary. Chomsky (TeleSUR 2018) argues that the NATO 1999 intervention in Serbia actually caused even more human rights violations against Albanians, and didn't prevent them, as interventionist Western politicians would lead the masses in their countries to believe. According to him, the Albanian guerrilla groups did not originate in Kosovo as the resistance of the oppressed Kosovar-Albanians against the Serbian dictatorship; instead, those groups came from Albania, and they carried out attacks in Serbia to trigger response from the Serbs, and the Serb response was tough enough to be a justification for an intervention by NATO, and the intervention caused even a harsher reaction from the Serbs against the Albanians, and the whole situation turned into a vicious cycle (TeleSUR 2018).

Third World countries' skepticism over humanitarian intervention comes out of the freshness of the "sovereignty" concept for them (Ayoob 2004). They have been colonized and gained their independence recently, some of them fought hard to have this sovereignty and independence, thus they are not willing to give it up easily, and sacrifice it for the sake of humanitarian idealistic rhetoric (Ayoob 2004). Another related argument takes into consideration that the normal process of reaching sovereignty and independence requires some violence (Ayoob 2004). In this view, violence is the

trajectory which states go through before they are fully sovereign, so humanitarian intervention - which supposedly seeks to protect civilians from violence - is actually hindering the process of sovereignty for Third World states which haven't reached that phase yet (Ayoob 2004). This view might seem critical at the first sight, but it is similar to the Eurocentric modernization theory, which considers that all countries should take the same path, moving from tradition to modernity, and "maturing" as sovereign states, but some of them - since they are "older" - get mature before the others. Moreover, in this argument, if the mature states (the Western ones) intervene in the ones that are still developing, this would hinder their maturation. In other words, "they will become like us, if we leave them be", or "they do have bad things over there, but our intervention won't solve it". This argument isn't very different from the liberal internationalist argument, except that the latter considers that Western intervention in Third World countries would "give them a push" to mature, not block the path towards the formation of the modern state. But both views apply one Eurocentric standard of modernization to the whole world, which is contrary to the relativism of the critical theory. Relativism, or "cultural relativity", in this case, is defined by Bricmont (2006 p. 2) as "the idea that there is no such thing as a moral position having universal value and in whose name one can objectively judge other societies and cultures (or our own)". This is one of the main arguments against humanitarian intervention which critical theorists use.

Bricmont - even while being a proponent of the "they do have bad things over there, but our intervention won't solve it" view - traces back the argument of the supporters of what he calls "humanitarian imperialism" back to the colonial era (2006). When European countries saw some barbaric customs in other cultures, they justified

their control over these people in Asia, Africa and the New World by a noble-cause rhetoric of fighting those customs such as human sacrifices by the tribes, burning widows in India and so on (Bricmont 2006). According to Hobson (2012 p. 25), imperialism was marketed as benign humanitarianism, not as a coercive or scary way of control, even if the latter is the truth. Actually, according to Hobson (2012 p. 25), "liberal imperialists" in the colonial era were fervent opponents of the scary, coercive, control-obsessed imperialism, so this same coercive interventionism was marketed as charitable. A "paternalistic" approach was thus adopted, and the European colonizers started to look like the heroes who will save women from practices such as foot-binding (Hobson 2012 p. 25). Cultural relativity, however, does not allow us to deem these practices as "barbaric" because, according to relativists, after all, who are we to judge (Bricmont 2006). Hobson is rather a relativist, but his argument and Bricmont's argument share the view that humanitarian intervention has implicitly other goals than humanitarianism, regardless whether the way they treat women in Muslim countries is actually barbaric or not. This is similar to Chomsky asking: does humanitarian intervention even exist?

The critical view on humanitarian intervention, in a nutshell, considers that "white" and "Western" countries do not seek to save the poor Muslims or Africans or women, on the contrary, they aim to subjugate and oppress them, while exploiting their land and resources. Humanitarian theatrics aren't new, they were used during the colonialist era, to portray this brutal subjugation and exploitation of people as a noble mission to "civilize" barbarians and save women for example, according to critical

theorists. The same argument applies when NATO says it wants to save ethnic/religious minorities from tyranny, autocracy and genocide.

2.3 The Advocates: Liberal Perspective:

According to liberals, if within the countries there's democracy, free and fair elections, separation of powers, government accountability, freedom of trade and market, civil liberties, absence of violent conflict, and so on, then all this can prevail in the global order too, it doesn't have to be "anarchic", like in the realist view (Burchill 2013 p. 85). Local free trade leads to global free trade, transparent, accountable and efficient governance is translated into similar global governance by institutions such as the UN (Burchill 2013 p. 85). Liberals thus emphasize on the independence of global institutions, unlike realists who consider them a mere tool in the hands of the powerful states.

Gareth Evans (2006) asks about the action that should be taken in case of intense human rights violations, and in case the state - which either is guilty of those violations or is doing absolutely nothing to actually prevent them - hides behind its so called "sovereignty" to block an intervention which aims to protect basic human rights. To answer this, we have to look into the liberal view when it comes to human rights.

For liberals, individual rights should be upheld and human rights should be respected. Any government which doesn't follow these values would no more be legitimate, and the international system should seize to protect it (Tesón 2001). In other words, protect your citizens or we won't protect you. "Human rights" is a universal

value, it transcends borders, and humanitarian intervention isn't only a right, it is duty, a universal obligation (Tesón 2001). Your rights as a human being do not depend on your nationality, culture, race, gender, religion and so on; you have rights simply because of your existence as a human being (Tesón 2001). And the rest of humanity has a duty to come to your rescue when a brutal tyrant is violating your right. Proponents of this view are not only liberal theorists but also humanitarian non-governmental organizations like "Doctors Without Borders", which one of its founders - the French politician Bernard Kouchner - argues in favor of the "right to intervene" (Evans 2006). Note that there is a difference between the "right to intervene", and the "duty" or "responsibility" to intervene - or to "protect", which became famous as "R2P" (Evans 2006). The latter is newer than the former. The R2P concept came up as an "updating" of the interventionist argument, to arm it against critics and skeptics, and to make it more about the victims of oppression and genocide themselves (Evans 2006). Rather than revolving everything around the interveners and their "right" (and in this case the interveners could abuse this "right"), interveners were supposed to humble themselves and set themselves in service of the oppressed, the marginalized, or the victims in general (Evans 2006). The "right" became that of the victims, not of the intervener; the latter has a responsibility instead (Evans 2006).

In an ideal situation, sovereignty is for the sake of humanity, and not vice versa. This is how it is supposed to be in a liberal utopia. According to liberals, states, governments and all their bureaucratic institutions are not an end in themselves, they are a mean to ensure that every human has his or her rights protected (Tesón 2001). That's why liberals - mostly - are in favor of humanitarian intervention. They would consider

that states have a "moral duty" to intervene when people are subjected to human rights violations and genocide, even if legal institutions do not approve of that, according to Nardin (cited in Seay 2007). This view became favored after there was no intervention in Rwanda in 1994 and genocide took place: inaction became the enemy, and taking action became a must, and it doesn't even matter who actually takes it, be it a state, an organization, or a group of states (Seay 2007). The era in which those two interventions discussed here (Iraq and Serbia) occurred had several problems, such as the breakdown of several nations and their degeneration into the civil wars and bloody, violent conflicts (Evans 2006). Tough choices had to be made, because when the UN takes the responsibility to intervene and fight genocide, its actions are often incompetent, inefficient, or non-existent at all (think of Rwanda), so the choice is either this - with all the human losses and the threats to peace that come with it - or a non-UNSC approved unilateral intervention (Evans 2006). Liberals definitely favor the latter outcome, and this answers Evans' question which was stated in the beginning of this section, about what to do in case a state isn't protecting its citizens while hiding behind its sovereignty - the answer is not to sit and watch people getting massacred while you hide behind the UN principles of non-intervention, on the contrary. It isn't just a matter of the lesser of two evils. If the UN isn't doing its job in protecting the principles it is supposedly founded on, someone else should do the job. The UN, after all, was founded in the first place in order to prevent violence and the repetition of the then-recently ended two World Wars (Lu 2007).

The origins of the liberal ideas of a global, democratic world and cosmopolitan justice can be traced back to thinkers like Immanuel Kant. What was later developed as

the "democratic peace theory" - the view that democratic states don't go to war against each other (Gat 2005 & Placek 2012), originates from Kant, and for this to take place, all states must uphold the values of democracy, human rights (Wilson and Monten 2011) and individuality as an end-in-itself, not a mean to anything else (Heinze 2004).

Liberals, thus, justify humanitarian intervention as a way to get the states out of the "state of nature" and - all the barbarism and bloodshed that comes with it - and drive them towards democracy and progress, so that they join the expanding global league of liberal democratic states which won't go to war against each other, and world peace will prevail. Liberals base this interventionist view on Kant, because even if Kant stressed on the respect for the sovereignty of states, by arguing that "no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state" (quoted in Hill 2009), he still considers that democratic states have a certain duty, which is to order other non-democratic states to transform into democratic ones (Wilson and Monten 2011). There are even arguments that thinkers like Rousseau were in favor of humanitarian intervention due to their belief in universal morals which transcend cultural differences (Gomes 2011).

Liberal internationalism is a sub-category of liberalism that is mainly concerned with humanitarian intervention, globalization, and universal values. According to Ikenberry (2009), "liberal ascendancy" means that liberal democratic states went from being a marginalized minority towards becoming the most powerful states at the global level. He argues that the "liberal internationalist order" has three stages, the first of which started in the early twentieth century by Wilson for example and other leaders too, it emphasized sovereignty, independence and non-intervention. The second began after

the Second World War was over and the Cold War began, and in this phase, internationalism started to manifest itself. We are now in the third stage, which started after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, according to Ikenberry (2009), and liberal internationalism in this stage is still taking shape till this day. The latter two stages, unlike the first one, recognize the interdependence between states and the decline of the concept of sovereignty (Ikenberry 2009). If the concept of "sovereignty" is thus "outdated" in the post-Cold War global order, this gave a chance for humanitarian intervention to take place, because the sovereignty of the state is no more as important as it used to be, it became subjugated to other concepts of individual and human rights. The two cases discussed in this study - Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999 - have occurred after the Cold War, and thus fit into the third stage, where sovereignty is eroded and the new global liberal system still develops.

Contrary to what some "critical theorists' " arguments claim (about "humanitarian intervention" being an ethnocentric "Western" concept and neo-colonialism in disguise), it isn't only "Western" theorists and leaders who advocate for humanitarian intervention, because, for example, when there was a UNSC Resolution for military intervention in Somalia, many representatives of African countries argued in favor of this intervention and advocated for what they called "the universal conscience" (Lu 2007).

Not all liberals argue in favor of humanitarian intervention as it would seem at the first sight. Advocating for universal morals and idealism doesn't always mean supporting military adventures in foreign countries. Unlike interventionist liberals like Gareth Evans, they differentiate between the moralistic ideals such as human rights,

individual rights, dignity, on one hand, and the actual, realistic results which the boots on the ground reap (Lu 2007). The non-interventionist liberal argument even tends to resemble the critical theorists' view on humanitarian intervention, because they consider that military intervention won't fix the situation abroad, or implant democracy and the rule of law where it is still lacking, on the contrary, it might not solve any crisis, it could even make it worse (Lu 2007). Maybe the intervention comes too late after the genocide already occurred, or in case intervention happens, it might not be able to do much to solve political crises entrenched in those systems (Lu 2007). Examples on the failures of humanitarian intervention (or the lack of it) can be found in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, and even Kosovo - as in the critical argument of Chomsky which will be explained in the next section. Interventionist liberals argue that we should have done more (in Bosnia and Rwanda for example), non-interventionist liberals would say humanitarian intervention usually has a good intention but we really can't do much; if we try to help it might not solve anything, while critical theorists would say we shouldn't have done anything at all. This would be cleared out in the next section.

To sum up, liberals believe that institutions matter, and the UN is important, but, just like a state – with all its laws and institutions and bureaucracy – is a mean to human rights and not an end in itself, this also applies to the UN - with its Charter and all its laws and institutions – it is a mean to achieve universal human values, and if it fails at that, others may play this role. The “others” could be a single state, or a group of states, or another institution, it doesn't matter, what matters is to prevent Saddam Hussein and Milošević from killing their own people, according to liberals – or most of them, at least the interventionist ones.

The next two chapters will be descriptive as well as analytical; they will elaborate on the two cases of humanitarian intervention: the No-Fly Zone in Iraq in 1991 and the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, and analyze them through the lenses of the theories. There will be one chapter dedicated to the description of the No-Fly Zone's creation in Iraq in 1991 and the circumstances surrounding it, and its analysis from a theoretical point of view, then another chapter that does the same for the NATO operation in Serbia in 1999. Each chapter will delve into the details of how each intervention came into place, with some background information about the situation of Iraq and Serbia before the interventions, the UNSC Resolutions concerning human rights violations there, and the countries that were involved. After delving into details, theoretical analysis will follow.

Chapter Three

Case Study 1: The No-Fly Zone in Iraq

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter will discuss the Northern No-Fly Zone in Iraq, which was imposed by a coalition of the US, UK and France, in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to Kurds there. It will trace the events back to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and stop prior to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, while providing some background information about the Kurdish ethnicity in general and the part of them that live in Iraq in particular. It will explain the positions of the several countries involved - not just the coalition countries - and the UNSC Resolutions that played a role. Finally, it will analyze the No-Fly Zone in Iraq from points of view of IR theories – first the skeptics (realism and critical theory), then the advocates (liberalism).

The events that led up to the creation of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq began when the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. On the eve of its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had a powerful military that while relying primarily on Soviet weapons - since the USSR was Iraq's biggest weapon supplier (Halliday 1987), Iraq still did benefit from western backing as result of Iraq's long war with Iran (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003). Kuwait supplied USA with a huge amount of oil, and so did Saudi Arabia, which was also threatened by a spillover from the invasion of its neighboring country, Kuwait (USHistory.org). The invasion of Iraq against Kuwait took place in August 2, 1990 (UK

2009). The UN Security Council passed a Resolution which demands Iraq to "withdraw all its forces". This was the Resolution 660, which also considered that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait consists a violation, or a breach, to international peace and security (Silliman 2002). But since Iraq didn't comply (and Hussein didn't withdraw his forces), another Resolution was issued – the Resolution 661 - few days later, which demands the "restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty" and "sanctions against Iraq" (UK 2009). The USSR still existed back then, it had the veto power in the UN, and Iraq was its ally, so Iraq relied on the USSR's support in the UN Security Council, against the US, however, the USSR was transforming itself internally and cozying up to the West, so it didn't side with Iraq (USHistory.org), thus the UNSC ended up condemning Iraq in its resolutions.

The USA (and the UNSC) gave Iraq a deadline - January 15th, 1991 - to withdraw all of its forces from Kuwait (and this was stated in the UNSC Resolution 678), otherwise the member states will use all the means necessary for the restoration of international peace and security (Silliman 2002). But Saddam Hussein did not comply and kept his forces in Iraq. Thus, a coalition war was waged against him, it became what's known as "Operation Desert Storm" (UK 2009). On February 15th, US president George H. W. Bush asked the Iraqi people to force Saddam Hussein to step down, and asked the Iraqi people themselves to "take the matters into their own hands" (Cockayne & Malone 2006). In that speech, which he addressed to the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, he stated: "But there's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and to comply with the UN and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations" (quoted in Koshy 1996). Operation Desert

Storm lasted until the end of February 1991 when a cessation of hostilities was declared (UK 2009). On the midnight of February 27th, the US president Bush put an end to the Operation Desert Storm (Koshy 1996), after Iraq was defeated, and Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces from Kuwait (UK 2009). On March 2, 1991, the UNSC Resolution 686 was passed; this Resolution called for a "formal ceasefire" (Cockayne & Malone 2006). After the Operation Desert Storm was over, the commander of the coalition, the American General Norman Schwarzkopf, set out the ceasefire terms, and they included the prohibition of flying for Iraqi warplanes with fixed wings (Mueller 2013). However, he gave the Iraqi helicopters a free hand, so that Iraq will be able to withdraw all of its military forces from Kuwait by helicopters (Mueller 2013). The Iraqi regime took advantage of that particular liberty which was granted for it by Schwarzkopf, and used the military helicopters to crush any opposition protests which rise, especially from groups such as Shias, whom US president Bush actually encouraged (Mueller 2013). Operation Desert Storm also resulted in the US occupying 15% of the lands of Iraq (Koshy 1996).

3.2 The Kurdish Issue:

Enter the Kurds. They are an ethnic group scattered in several countries in which they are minorities, such as Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. They also form up to 27% of the Iraqi population, and are mostly centered in the oil-rich North of that country (Malanczuk 1991). Kurds, in those several countries in which they are scattered, including Iraq, share the tribal structure of their society, and their belief that they are actually an entity, or a "nation", which never in its history became an actual independent, sovereign state in the political (or "Westphalian") definition

(Malanczuk1991). They are considered to be the most populous people in the world who lack a state of their own (Glavin 2015). After the fragmentation of the former Ottoman empire, the British and the French "redrew" the map of the area, while the British "artificially extended" the borders of Iraq to include the land in the North in order to secure their interest in oil supplies, in the early 1920s (Malanczuk 1991). Thus, any prospect of an independent Kurdish state became impossible since then, and the Kurdish hopes for a nation of their own were crushed (Malanczuk 1991). However, even if they are not an actual independent state, they have a kind of local autonomy as a "quasi state" (Wiessner et al. 2004).

3.3 The Kurdish Uprising:

As for Saddam Hussein, the defeated Iraqi leader was faced with protests at home, from the domestic opposition who tried to oust him from power. The protests took place in the North of the country - where there are the ethnic Kurds - and the South in which there is the population that belongs to the Shia confessional group. Opponents saw his weakness after the defeat and realized that this is their chance to take advantage of his vulnerability at that moment, and overthrow him. In the North, protests commenced on March 4, 1991 and Kurdish rebels tried to take over that region and succeeded to seize all its cities in March 20, including the strategic oil-rich Kirkuk (UK 2009). They also took hold of cities such as Sulaimaniya and Arbil (Koshy 1996). So Saddam Hussein retaliated. He attacked them with his helicopters and artillery in order to halt their rebellion (UK 2009). The rebels were weak in the face of Iraqi retaliation; they thought US will come to their aid but it didn't, so they were left alone at the mercy of Hussein (adst.org 2016). They expected US to come to their help due to the earlier remarks of

president Bush about the necessity of toppling the dictator, though he did not really promise the rebels any practical support, he just urged the people "to take matters into their own hands" (Koshy 1996). According to an anonymous official in the White House, the US "never made any promises to these people" (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

There are reasons why the USA didn't directly rush to intervene on the side of the rebels in the North (and the South as well), and took time before finally creating the No-Fly Zone: major powers like USA and UK were faced with a dilemma concerning the situation of Iraq and those rebellions: should they support the rebels and allow Iraq to descend and degenerate into chaos and fragmentation, along sectarian and ethnic cleavages, or do nothing, and thus allow Saddam Hussein to go on with his human rights violation, and face domestic criticism for that, because the public opinion in those countries had sympathy for the Kurds, due to the media's focus on the Kurds' suffering (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The media stressed on the plight of the Kurdish refugees who fled Hussein's persecution. Much attention was given to the Kurds fleeing for their life, whom Turkey refused to take in - due to internal ethnic problems within Turkey with its own Kurdish minorities - and thus they remained stuck in the mountains on the borders, prone to Iraqi attacks (adst.org 2016). People in the US and the world were touched by images of Kurdish refugees, unprotected, with no food, suffering while everyone watches (Cockayne & Malone 2006). At first, no one expected a US intervention. No one wanted a Vietnam-part-two, which a US intervention could possibly lead to (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Plus, a united, strong Iraqi state would benefit the US and serve it as a balance against the rising power of the neighboring Iran (Malanczuk 1991). A major US ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, was afraid of the

Shia rebellion in the South of Iraq because it might lead to an "Iranian satellite" (Cockayne & Malone 2006). But as the Kurdish refugees' issue stole the mainstream media's headlines, the balance shifted in favor of saving the Kurds. The TV images of the suffering Kurds that drew sympathy from the public were strategically damaging for the US foreign policy, because they made it look like the Iraqi regime didn't really lose, and if it did, then whatever gains which US has reaped from the Operation Desert Storm are now lost (Koshy 1996). There was also some conviction, especially in Western countries, that the UN must continue its actions against Iraq which began since 1990, and that more actions against Iraq would definitely win the support of the international community (Koshy 1996). The US thus changed its position, and declared that it will target and shoot any aircraft which flies within Iraqi borders, and it did that on March 15, in which two Iraqi aircrafts, of the Su-22 type, have been shot by the US, and a third one in March 22 (UK 2009).

3.4 Saddam Hussein Reacts to Protests:

Saddam Hussein did not hesitate to deploy his "Republican Guard" in the Kurdish North of the country in order to eliminate the rebels there (Cockayne & Malone 2006). He succeeded in retrieving his control over the areas in the North in the beginning of April (UK 2009). Refugees escaped, and according to the estimates, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds escaped aiming towards the borders of Turkey, while other Kurdish refugees - more than one million - aimed for Iran (Koshy 1996). The media made the world conscious of their plight, US citizens urged that their country protect those people (Cockayne & Malone 2006). That was one of the greatest mass-exoduses in history to

have ever taken place (Koshy 1996). On April 5th, Iraq announced "the complete crushing of acts of sedition, sabotage, and rioting in all towns of Iraq" (UK 2009).

Meanwhile, the battle reached the UN Security Council. Neighboring countries like Iran and Turkey were afraid of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, because it might inspire a similar Kurdish rebellion and cessation in those two countries as well (Cockayne & Malone 2006), even if Iran wasn't so fond of the Iraqi regime which previously invaded it. Thus, both Iran and Turkey urged the UNSC to protect them from the flow of Kurdish refugees from Iraq (Cockayne & Malone 2006), in letters addressed to the UN Secretary General (in Iran's case) and the UNSC Presidency (in Turkey's case), during the first week of April 1991 (UNSC 1991a). Iran's and Turkey's letters also stressed on the humanitarian concern over Saddam Hussein's actions (Koshy 1996). France also sent a letter expressing humanitarian concerns over the situation of the Kurds in Iraq, addressing it to the UNSC Presidency as well (UNSC 1991a). At the same time, the representative of Iraq in the UN also sent a letter, addressed to the UN Secretary-General, in which he argued that there are some states in the UN Security Council who are seeking to "disrupt the internal security" of Iraq (Koshy 1996). Obviously he means the US and its allies who are accused of encouraging rebellions in Iraq.

On April 3, UNSC Resolution 687 was issued, but it did not address the Kurdish plight, even though France attempted to convince the Security Council to insert a part about the oppression against Kurds (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This Resolution welcomed the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, and dealt with territorial disputes and disputes over islands between Iraq and Kuwait, demanding that the UN Secretary-

General helps the two countries to demarcate the borders between them, and that the two countries respect the international boundaries and do not violate them (UNSC 1991b). It outlined the establishment of a total ceasefire in the Arab Gulf area, and Iraq hesitantly accepted it (Malanczuk 1991). Based on this Resolution, a UN Special Commission was created - UNSCOM - to monitor and make sure that Iraq doesn't have biological or chemical weapons at its disposition ready for use (un.org). The fact that this Resolution ignored the Kurdish issue caused the liberal human rights advocates to be disappointed, and to lose hope in the ability of those international multi-lateral institutions to be the agents of saving oppressed minorities from oppressive regimes. The French politician François Mitterand declared that the UNSC's "political and moral authority" would be highly damaged if it doesn't provide protection for Iraqi Kurds (quoted in Cockayne & Malone 2006).

3.5 The UNSC Resolution 688:

On April 5, at the UN's 298th meeting, UNSC Resolution 688 was issued (Koshy 1996). According to Byman (2000), the US - which did not commit itself to the Kurdish cause or do anything before the media and public demanded it to do so - supported UNSC Resolution 688 which urged Iraq to take into consideration the human rights of its own minorities. The No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq was actually justified based on this Resolution (Gibbons 2002). This Resolution stressed on the "maintenance of international peace and security", and expressed "grave concerns" with the assault of the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish community, which resulted in the flux of refugees, which would lead to instability in the region and thus a threat to the international peace and security (UNSC 1991a).

Resolution 688 - even though used by the US to justify the creation of the No-Fly Zone - did not even suggest a No-Fly Zone as a solution to this crisis, instead, it demanded that dialogue takes place, and that Iraq ends the repression against Kurdish communities, and that human rights for all the citizens of Iraq regardless of their religion or ethnicity shall be respected (UNSC 1991a). Moreover, the Resolution insisted on the demand for the Iraqi regime to allow the organizations of humanitarian aid to come and provide help for all those in need of it within Iraq (UNSC 1991a). This is the only kind of intervention which the Resolution 688 called for; not a military intervention and definitely not a No-Fly Zone. It stressed on the urgency of allowing aid to reach the needy among the Kurds, but did not suggest a No-Fly Zone as a method or a solution. It did not mention a "clear enforcement mechanism" against Saddam Hussein's regime, and anyway, countries like China stated that they would veto any Resolution which contains such mechanisms (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

According to Koshy (1996), the US, UK and their allies interpreted Resolution 688 in a wrong, manipulative way so that they can violate the international law, create the No-Fly Zone, and get away with their actions. The Resolution referred to the article 2(7) of the UN charter, which insists on protecting the sovereignty of the states and not intervening in their domestic issues, but the No-Fly Zone advocates tried to evade this point in the Resolution or twist it to justify the intervention (Koshy 1996). The article 2(7) states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (UN). But the coalition of the countries that enforced the No-Fly Zone and the others who supported it argued that the non-intervention principle in article 2(7) doesn't

apply to Iraq's case; they asserted that what is happening in Iraq is not a domestic issue, but an international issue, thus acting out to solve it can't be considered an infringement on the sovereignty of the state of Iraq (Koshy 1996). For example, the UK representative in the UN considered that it (the article on sovereignty protection) "does not apply to, matters which, under the charter, are not essentially domestic and we have often seen human rights - for example in South Africa - defined in that category" (Koshy 1996). France considered that "violations of human rights such as those now being observed become a matter of international interest, when they take on such proportions that they assume the dimension of a crime against humanity" (Koshy 1996). The then-Foreign Minister of France argues that we do not have a right to intervene in Iraq, instead, we have a duty to intervene there (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Also, those countries considered that reducing the military ability of the Iraqi regime will give a space for humanitarian organizations to operate and provide aid (Gibbons 2002). The then-US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, stated in 1996 that the "importance of a no-fly zone was generally agreed to be a good way to carry out UN Resolution 688" (Koshy 1996). The UK Foreign Secretary argued that the aim of the No-Fly Zone is "to create places and conditions in which refugees can feel secure" (UK 2009). This is why issuing UNSC Resolutions - such as the Resolution 688 - that are vague when it comes to the action that must be taken on the ground and the details of the methods of enforcement is very dangerous, since it causes each party to interpret it on its own (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This way, the target country - Iraq in this case - would consider that some states in the UNSC are fueling rebellion to incite chaos and division within a country that seeks to achieve sovereignty, and thus would blame the UNSC and the UN as a whole for being biased or being a tool in the hands of the few. Meanwhile, the other party - the

intervening countries that are France, UK and US in this case - would deem the UN's moral authority as dead and resort to other means than the UN - such as unilateralism - to combat human rights violations that are done by the regime. This unilateralism resulting from the absence of solid UNSC enforcement mechanisms ultimately lead to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

The Resolution 688 also "requested" that the UN Secretary General "uses all the resources at his disposal" in order to address the suffering of Iraqi Kurdish refugees, and to report, if appropriate, on a further mission to Iraq also to help the Kurds and ease their plight (UNSC 1991a). Furthermore, the Resolution "appealed" to all the member states and all the humanitarian organizations to help with the relief, and demanded the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein to be cooperative with the UN Secretary General (UNSC 1991a). Belgium and France proposed the Resolution 688, while USA and UK co-sponsored it (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This Resolution is important because - except for South Africa previously - it marked the first time in which the UN considered that human rights violations are an actual threat to international peace and security (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Though, it can still be said that the Resolution didn't exactly state that the oppression of Kurds - itself - is a threat to international peace and security; it considered its spillover to other countries by the flow of refugees as that kind of threat (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

Ten states voted in favor of the Resolution 688, Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe voted against it, while China and India abstained (UNSC 1991a). The 10 states that voted in favor of the Resolution 688 are France, UK, USA, and Soviet Union (among the permanent UNSC members), and Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Romania,

Zaire (among the non-permanent members). The Soviet Union defied expectations for the second time and voted against its old ally Saddam Hussein, just like when it voted in favor of condemning him for invading Kuwait. It was "liberalizing" itself and on the verge of collapsing, opening the door for a new era of the global spread of liberal democracy with the US, UK and France as its main advocates. Fukuyama's "End of History" was starting to become true, and human rights supposedly triumphed over populism, statism and dictatorship.

3.6 The Establishment of the No-Fly Zone:

On April 5 as well, the US president Bush stated that his government will send aircraft to Iraq - with no coordination with the UN whatsoever - in order to send aid for the Kurds, and the enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, to secure the way for aid, which comes by US aircraft, to reach the refugees and the Kurds damaged by Saddam Hussein's attacks (Cockayne & Malone 2006). France and the UK also came along to join the US in the enforcement of the No-Fly Zone (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The actual No-Fly Zone in the North was formed in April 6, 1991 (UK 2009). Of course, the Iraqi regime did not want that, but it happened against its will (Malanczuk 1991). This intervention was a "precedent" to other interventions that took place later, and the British government used it to justify NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (Åkermark 2005) which will be addressed later in this study. UK, USA and France enforced the No-Fly Zone in the location of 36° latitude in the North, with their airplanes operating from the military airbase of Incirlik in Turkey (Mueller 2013 & UK Ministry of Defense 2009). It was called "Operation Provide Comfort" at first, and later on became "Operation Northern Watch" (Mueller 2013). "Operation Provide Comfort" prevented the Iraqi military from

flying their fixed-wings airplanes as well as helicopters, unlike the case of the ceasefire terms, which were enforced after the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait, by General Schwarzkopf, in which only aircraft with fixed wings was prohibited while helicopters were allowed (Mueller 2013). From the Incirlik base, the US, UK and France launched 75,000 onsets since the beginning of the Operation Provide Comfort, until 2003 (Mueller 2013). The name "Operation Provide Comfort" shows that this No-Fly Zone actually aimed at making it easier for the Kurds to have access to aid; to "provide comfort" to them (Mueller 2013). The UK's participation in this No-Fly Zone was called "Operation HAVEN", which involved Royal Air Force aircraft as well as three Commando Brigades (UK 2009). According to Hiltermann (2010), the No-Fly Zones also aimed to stop Kurdish refugees from fleeing to Turkey, but the fact that refugees were also going to Iran was actually disregarded.

On April 8, 1991, the UK prime minister suggested that "safe zones" should be created in Iraq for the Kurdish refugees, while the US still hesitated to deploy its actual troops there, or in other words, send "boots on the ground" (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The US president as well as vice president insisted that it's undesirable to "sacrifice precious American lives" and for what, creating a civil war in Iraq, which does not actually serve the US national interests (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This changed in the same month, when US, UK and France all ended up sending actual forces on the ground for the sake of humanitarian relief efforts, and to create safe places and camps for the Kurds and refugees (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Nearly 20,000 troops from 13 countries were sent over there to Iraq to help with the humanitarian efforts and create those safe camps, with the support of 30 countries (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Ten days later, on

April 18th, the Kurdish rebels agreed to get on the negotiation table, and Saddam Hussein wanted to ensure that the camps would not turn into an independent Kurdish region in the North later on (Cockayne & Malone 2006). But this happened later, not in Iraq but in Kosovo, where another oppressed minority which NATO countries came to save were able to get their political autonomy (Cockayne & Malone 2006), and the Kosovo case will be discussed in the next chapter. Hussein also approved a Memorandum with the UN for the issues of humanitarian aid, because he wanted to replace the military presence of the US-France-UK coalition with UN presence, and some points in the Memorandum between Saddam Hussein and a UN representative were used to justify future interventions in other places (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The Memorandum states Iraq's commitment to allowing the UNSCOM an unrestricted presence and access in its territories (un.org 1998). In June, Hussein and the Kurdish rebels reached a "political settlement" (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

In July 1991, the Kurdish refugees who were trapped near the mountain were able to return to the North of Iraq, and they stayed in safety camps there, protected by the coalition of the countries that enforced the No-Fly Zone (UK 2009). Nearly 400,000 Kurdish refugees were able to return to safe places provided for them (UK 2009). The camps were set in the Dohuk province inside the area of 5,500 km² (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The UNHCR in June 1991 also took up the mantle to handle the operations for the relief of refugees (UK 2009). The camps which were created by the troops that were present became under the authority and the responsibility of the UNHCR (Cockayne & Malone 2006). In July 24th, the Operation Provide Comfort became Operation Provide Comfort II, and its aim was to ensure Saddam Hussein's

compliance with the UNSC Resolution 688 (UK 2009). The humanitarian part of the Operation Provide Comfort II was to make sure of the refugees' access to supplies (UK 2009). At the same time, in 1992, the US made the UN Security Council freeze the assets of Iraqis in foreign countries, which made it tough for Iraqis to buy humanitarian supplies (Rouleau 1995).

The US, UK and France were faced with retaliation attempts from the Iraqi military, but the US air-force were able to strike back and defeat Iraqi offenses, so the Iraqi air-force was severely damaged, and this further weakened Iraq, before the US invasion in 2003 (Mueller 2013). No Iraqi aircraft whatsoever could bring down any aircraft from US, UK, or France, but two US helicopters were attacked by an F-15 by mistake, in an accident of friendly-fire in 1994 (Mueller 2013). In 1994, the UNSC issued Resolution 949, demanding Iraq's "de-militarization", because Iraq was about to attack Kuwait again, and as a reaction to that, the US deployed 54,000 troops in the Persian Gulf (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

In 1995, the UN took full responsibility for the humanitarian issues (UK 2009), and in 1996, the name "Operation Provide Comfort II" was changed to "Operation Northern Watch" (Gibbons 2002), but this time only US and UK participated, while France was out because of "lack of a direct humanitarian element" (UK 2009), and since the UN and UNHCR took upon them the humanitarian aid tasks already, ensuring that 30% of the gains from the UN program "Oil For Food" will be reserved for Kurdish relief (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This was just the start of a US vs. France differences over Iraq, which reached their peak when France opposed the 2003 invasion against Iraq, led by the US (Cockayne & Malone 2006).

A similar No-Fly Zone was established, in 1992; a year after the beginning of the Operation Provide Comfort (UK 2009), in the South of Iraq to protect the Shia population there; it was named "Operation Southern Watch" (Mueller 2013). This No-Fly Zone in the South was created because of concerns about Saddam Hussein relocating the Shia population to separate them by force, as well as concerns about Hussein initiating attacks on these people with his helicopters, and a report about all that was sent to the UN Security Council, and based on this report, Operation Southern Watch was initiated, in the South, in the location of 32° latitude (UK 2009). Two years later, in 1994, Hussein sent his forces to the exact location of the Southern No-Fly Zone, so in reaction, coalition forces sent even more of their forces to that location, forcing Hussein's troops out (UK 2009). The US also decided to extend the Southern No-Fly Zone to the 33rd parallel (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Russia was against that decision of the US, but countries like Canada, Germany and Japan supported it, Spain considered that the US is being "hasty", while France restricted its involvement to the old location, the 32nd parallel (Cockayne & Malone 2006). The coalition used a base in Saudi Arabia to launch its air-force (UK 2009). France withdrew its forces completely from this Southern No-Fly Zone in 1998 (UK 2009).

In 1996, there was a division among Kurdish parties and rebel factions, and this division hindered the relief efforts (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Saddam Hussein became an ally of one of the two main rival parties, which is the Kurdish Democratic Party - KDP, while the other is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - PUK (UK 2009). Those two parties were previously unified back in 1992 when they - along with other smaller Kurdish parties - formed an actual Kurdish government and parliament and

promised to have an autonomous entity of Kurdistan within Iraq, after Saddam Hussein is gone (Gunter 1996). However, since 1994, conflict began to erupt between them (Gunter 1996), and later on Saddam Hussein became the KPD's ally. He came in to the North with his troops to restore the cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniya from the PUK, and he did take back Irbil, so the US retaliated with a strike against his forces with 44 Tomahawk missiles (Cockayne & Malone 2006). This retaliation was known as Operation Desert Strike (UK 2009). The No-Fly Zone was extended to 33° latitude in the North and Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces from the Kurdish North (UK 2009).

In 1997, Iraq blocked the UNSCOM inspections on its territories, and violated the two No-Fly Zones to send its air-force in order to retaliate against Iran, because the latter attacked a "terrorist camp" on the Iraqi territories (UK 2009). In 1998, the Iraqi regime stated that it will stop its cooperation with UNSCOM until the oil embargo over Iraq ends, and the UNSC issued resolutions to condemn those decisions from Hussein (UK 2009). However, even before Hussein took this decision, his cooperation with UNSCOM wasn't enough, and this shows that he thought that having chemical and biological weapons - which the UNSCOM was supposed to eradicate - would elevate him to the status of a prominent Arab leader (Moberly 1999). UK and US threatened to strike Iraq if the regime there doesn't restore its cooperation with the UNSCOM, and they didn't receive a reply from Iraq, and they were about to strike on November 14, 1998, but two hours before they actually did, Iraq announced that it will resume its cooperation with the UNSCOM (UK 2009). But, again, this cooperation wasn't sufficient, not according to the UNSCOM Chairman, so on December 16, UK and US stroke Iraq; and thus Operation Desert Fox was initiated (UK 2009). Attacks were

launched against the Iraqi Republican Guard, as well as locations that supposedly contain chemical or biological weapons (UK 2009). According to Moberly (1999), these attacks did not improve the situation of the Iraqi people who got the worst of it all, even if some of them are against Saddam Hussein, there is this view among them that if he is gone, anarchy and chaos will reign, making it even harder for them to access aid, plus, those strikes from the US and UK will not improve anything, but might make the situation worse. The UK and US air-force targeted the Iraqi radars, locations that are used for military leaderships and control, and the Iraqi Air Defense System (UK 2009). The two No-Fly Zones have been suspended during the Operation Desert Fox, but they were sent back into action after the Operation Desert Fox was over in December 19, and they resumed with only US and UK, without France (UK 2009).

After the resuming of the two No-Fly Zones into action, the Iraqi forces tried to strike the US and UK air-force and failed (UK 2009). The US and UK didn't just strike back the Iraqi air-force which attacks them, they started to strike any Iraqi air-force, following a policy of "aggressive enforcement" (Cockayne & Malone 2006). More and more attacks started to initiate, especially in the No-Fly Zone of the South (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Iraq did not consider the existence of the No-Fly Zones anymore, it completely started to ignore them and violate them constantly (UK 2009). Both sides became aggressive and lead to a vicious cycle of provocations and reactions (Cockayne & Malone 2006). Iraqi missiles targeted the military aircraft of the US and UK, and those attempts were met with the targeting of Iraq's radars and the Air Defense System (UK 2009). The two No-Fly Zones were officially ended on May 1, 2003, paving the way for the "Operation Iraqi Liberation" to begin (UK 2009).

3.7 Iraq's No-Fly Zone from Realist and Critical Perspectives:

For realists, the US, the UK and France do not care about oppressed Kurds, instead, those powerful countries are only concerned for their interest. They refuse to see humanitarian idealism as the real reason behind intervention, thus, they would argue that "saving the Kurds" was just a pretext, the interventionist states just wanted to secure themselves, and their regional interests. Critical theorists, along with realists, argue that the US was interested in securing the Iraqi oil for itself. Critical theorists see this intervention as an attempt for imposing "neo-colonialism" over Iraq (Aarnivaara 2008 & Klein 2003).

Saddam Hussein could no longer serve the US as a strong regional ally, due to his then-recent defeat after he tried to invade Kuwait and failed. According to Pardew (1991), the defeat in Kuwait "left the country (Iraq) in ruin and the Iraqi army a smoldering wreckage in the desert". Because Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he "went from being an ally to an atrocious and dangerous enemy" of the US (Aarnivaara 2008). That is the reason why they stepped in with the No-Fly Zone. He is rendered as a liability rather than an asset for them, because of his defeat.

President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) started inciting rebellions against Saddam Hussein, calling the Iraqi people to "take matters into their own hands". When Shias and Kurds rebelled, they thought that the US would come to their assistance, but it did not. The US just left them at the mercy of Saddam Hussein, so humanitarianism is definitely not the reason behind the No-Fly Zone, for realists as well as critical theorists. If the US cared about Kurds in the first place, it would have aided them from the

beginning. When they intervened, Hussein had already retaliated against the rebels and the damage was already done to the Kurds and Shias. Thus, the US weakened further its former ally who was no longer fit to serve its interest (Pardew 1991 & Aarnivaara 2008), and secured its oil supply (this will be discussed later), without having to spend a single penny in material support for Kurdish or Shia rebels, and only payed lip-service to them. A White House official sealed the whole debate while saying that the US government "never made any promise to these people" (Cockayne & Malone 2006); or in other words: no material support from the US for Kurds and Shias. The US did not even have to bring its troops as "boots on the ground" to Iraqi territories; and handle all the costs and the domestic opposition that come along when states send their troops abroad. This came later with the 2003 invasion. Material calculations, for realists, are the way in which states decide which action to take - or not to take. States - including the US, the UK and France - seek to minimize their losses and maximize their gains, and this intervention secured gains for them (Carapico 1998).

For realists and critical theorists, powerful countries intervened in Iraq also because they have an interest within Iraq itself: oil. In the north of Iraq, where the majority of the population comprises Iraqi Kurds, there is a rich oil reserve in Kirkuk. Realists and critical theorists would argue that the US wanted to secure the Iraqi oil supply. Accordingly, it could not allow Saddam Hussein to control the oil-rich north, because he is no longer the ally they hoped for, and he might not guarantee a secure supply for powerful countries. According to Al-Mehaidi (2006), oil reserves in Kirkuk alone reach around 13.5 billion barrels, and its oil reserve forms 12% of the total Iraqi oil reserve, and this is according to 2005 statistics. According to Otterman (2005), Iraq's

oil reserve is around 112.5 billion barrels. This means that Iraq possesses 10% of the global oil reserves, only second to Saudi Arabia that has one-fourth of the global oil reserve (Otterman 2005). The US, also known as the biggest oil consumer in the world, wanted to secure its oil supply because any shortage in the oil supply or disruption in the global oil market would have dire consequences on the US economy (Otterman 2005). Getting hold of the Iraqi oil - especially in the Kurdish north, and in the predominantly Shia south where there was another oil field in Rumaila (Otterman 2005) - was not an opportunity to be missed. And since there are oil fields in the Kurdish north and the Shia south, it could not be entirely a coincidence that the No-Fly Zones were set in these areas exactly.

Those arguments strengthen the realist and critical view that the US was seeking to accumulate material wealth through getting hold of the Iraqi oil. Any humanitarian talk of saving the oppressed Kurds is just theatrics, and there was no "threat to international peace and security". The realist and critical explanation for the No-Fly Zone in Iraq makes sense, because it doesn't look at it through rose-colored glasses, instead, it tends to find out the real motives behind the so-called "humanitarian intervention", stripping it of the humanitarian rhetoric, because it is just rhetoric, simple as that. Reality, however, is a different matter.

The critical theorists' view on the No-Fly Zone in Iraq is similar to the realist one. In addition to the issue of oil, critical theorists set the realist materialism in the context of an anti-colonialist criticism, arguing that powerful "Western" countries seek to exploit "third world" countries and subjugate them. The US, the UK and France want the resources of Iraq, especially oil, and that explains the No-Fly Zone according to the

critical view. Iraq used to be under the mandate of the British, and the UK participated in this operation hoping to restore the days of the mandate in one way or another, but also France and the US would definitely seek their own share and reap some of the rewards from Iraq resource exploitation. It is neo-colonialism in disguise, according to the critical view, and there's absolutely nothing "humanitarian" about it. Saddam Hussein has been cruel, but the formerly colonialist countries are not interested in the welfare and safety of the Kurdish population, they are interested in the oil under the territory in which they live. The post-colonial theorists - the term "post-colonial" is misleading because these theorists argue that colonialism isn't over, but it happens in a different way now - consider that the former colonialist countries still have greed over resources in Iraq - a former colony - and would seek to control this recently-independent country again, but this time under the text of "humanitarian intervention". Controlling Iraq's resources would open for them the door to get hold of the resources in the whole region, because Iraq's location is strategic, as realists would also argue.

Moreover, the borders that mark the Iraqi territory as we know it has been set by the European colonialists, and the Kurds were "lumped" with the Iraqi state in order that the British colonialism in Iraq benefits from the oil in the Kurdish territory (Malanczuk 1991 & Owtram 2017). That's why any ethnic tensions that arise between Kurdish Iraqis and the rest of Iraqis is the fault of colonialism in the first place, for drawing these "artificial" borders among countries in the Middle East. Neo-colonialism won't solve any problem in the Middle East because its predecessor, colonialism, caused them since the beginning, according to the critical view. Formerly colonialist countries are to blame for the oppression of Kurds more than Saddam Hussein, according to the critical

perspective.

Critical theorists would add up to the realist argument the racist justifications of the neo-colonialism of Iraq. According to the critical view, the “West” sees “Islam” as a single, radical, “monolithic” bloc which is behind the “irrational” politicians and oppression of women and minorities in the Middle East (Aarnivaara 2008). The “West” insists that there is a Manichaeian battle between “Islam” on one hand and secularism on other, with the former embodying violence, chaos, and tyranny, while the latter encompassing rationality, enlightenment, peace, and prosperity (Aarnivaara 2008). Iraq, being a Muslim-majority country, is prone to descending into a land of chaos and violence where human rights are trampled upon, if the “white savior” doesn’t come as soon as possible, and this is a biased, “racist”, and “Islamophobic” view of Iraq according to critical theorists. Saddam Hussein fits into the "white" and "Western" definition of an "oriental despot", a ruthless dictator from a "primitive" culture who has no regards for human rights or minority rights for the Kurds. It's the "white man's burden" to come to the aid of the Kurds and stop the Iraqi air-force from bombing them and the Shia as well. It was the US president George H. Bush who encouraged Kurds and Shias to rebel (Owtram 2017 & Aarnivaara 2008), which also supposes that if they are "primitive" they need someone who is "white" or “western” to "push" them to rebel, otherwise they can't resist on their own if they are oppressed. Without encouragement, they would be docile and submissive, because their “barbaric” culture emphasizes obedience and submission to the authority, no matter how that authority treats them. Racism, thus - according to the critical perspective - gets entangled with greed for oil resources and results in "humanitarian intervention". One doesn't have to be morally

relativist to agree with the critical view on the No-Fly Zone in Iraq. It is similar to the realist perspective, in addition to its criticism of the "Western" and "white" countries and their attitudes towards Iraqis, Arabs, Muslims, Kurds, and Shias.

3.8 Iraq's No-Fly Zone from a Liberal Perspective:

Liberals have their own views when it comes to the No-Fly Zone enforcement in the North of Iraq. Liberals are usually in favor of humanitarian intervention as a mean to spread the values of liberal democracy, human rights, and individuality everywhere, and Iraq is definitely no exception. Just similar to what they do with any other humanitarian intervention, liberals would justify the No-Fly Zone on humanitarian grounds, same as the Kosovo case which will also be discussed later in this chapter, from the liberal point of view.

Liberals would argue that the No-Fly Zone was preventive. Had it not been enforced, Saddam Hussein would have committed even more human rights violations against the Kurds than what he already did prior to the creation of the No-Fly Zone. Since the UNSC Resolutions discussed in the detailed chapter on Iraq did not call for any kind of military presence there in order to halt Hussein's attacks, the US, the UK, and France only did what had to be done, so that genocide against the Kurds be avoided, and "threats to international peace and security" be alleviated. The liberal disappointment with the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN began when the Resolution 687 was issued by the UNSC on April 3, 1991, without mentioning the Kurdish issue despite the French pleas to mention and address it. This disappointment was evident when then French President Francois Mitterrand announced the death of the

UNSC's "moral authority". Even Resolution 688, which was issued by the UNSC two days later - and which did address the Kurdish plight - did not call for a military intervention, it was just concerned for the access of aid. For liberals, those are useless resolutions and all they do is express concerns and urge Saddam Hussein to respect human rights - which he surely won't, because that's what dictators do, they violate human rights. Can those resolutions stop a ruthless, violent dictator from committing another massacre against Kurds like the Halabja one in 1988 - which caused the death of around 5,000 and the injury of around 10,000 people (Ali 2018& Kent 2013)? Can they hinder his potential use of weapons of mass destruction, or chemical weapons, against innocent un-armed civilians, women, and children? Liberal internationalists would definitely say no. According to the liberal perspective, this No-Fly Zone is exactly what was supposed to be done in response to a situation like that.

There is another liberal argument which states that the establishment of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq was justified based on the UNSC Resolution 688 by the intervening states, and this differs from the Kosovo intervention, because in the latter case, no intervening state even bothered to try to justify it based on a UNSC Resolution; it was only justified by humanitarian reasons (Wheeler 2000 p. 289). In other words, the No-Fly Zone was considered by the intervening parties as authorized by Resolution 688 – even if some disagree on that (Koshy 1996) – while the intervening party in Kosovo didn't justify itself by any Resolution, only the humanitarian urgency and the need for immediate action. That's why Wheeler (2000 p. 289), whose views are liberal, disagrees with the view that the No-Fly Zone was a precedent which paved the way for the Kosovo intervention to take place later. The No-Fly Zone had a legal justification from

the UNSC, the NATO campaign in Kosovo had not, but both serve humanitarian purposes according to liberals. The interveners in Iraq didn't surpass the legal basis and the UNSC, but the Kosovo interveners did. Whether liberals agree or disagree with Wheeler's argument is not decisive, what they all agree on is that at least one of the reasons for the establishment of the No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq was to hinder the Iraqi forces from committing genocide against the Kurds.

Proponents of the liberal theory would ask their contenders to imagine the horrible violent actions that Saddam Hussein could have carried out against the Kurds; had the No-Fly Zone not been enforced. Iraqi Kurds might have been totally wiped out (Cushman 2005 p. 229 & Wheeler 2000). Wheeler (2000 p. 170) argues from the liberal point of view, stating that "the plight of the Kurds constituted a supreme humanitarian emergency and without outside military intervention hundreds of thousands would have died from hypothermia and exhaustion". Even if the Kurds and Shias are the ones who initiated the rebellions against Saddam Hussein and provoked him to retaliate in the harsh manner he did, liberals would point out to the disparity of power between the rebels - even if they are armed rebels - and the Iraqi state with its heavy weaponry. Even if Saddam Hussein was freshly defeated (after his attempt to invade Kuwait), he was still dangerous and more powerful than the Kurdish and Shia rebels. He might try to make up for his former defeat by trying to show that he is powerful by crushing rebellions in a brutal way. He would have "flexed his muscles" against Kurds. It wasn't a fair fight, and in a country that is recently independent and not fully integrated into the liberal democratic values, the "law of the jungle" prevails and the strong will devour the weak, unless a military action is taken to stop the strong party. Moreover, suppose one of the

UNSC Resolutions actually called for a military action and laid out concrete details for its mechanisms, China and Russia would use the veto to block it, so either another organization or a group of countries - what Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) calls "regional groupings" - must resort to action, and that's exactly what was done, by the means of the No-Fly Zone.

For liberals, when humanitarian duty calls, action follows. This is their explanation of the No-Fly Zone in the North of Iraq: it was the only feasible solution to Saddam Hussein's ruthless actions against the Kurdish population. Liberal interventionists make a similar argument for the case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which will also be presented later in this chapter. Even if Saddam Hussein was provoked, he could have used chemical weapons and committed genocide against Kurds and Shias if this intervention didn't take place.

Chapter Four

Case Study 2: The NATO Campaign in Serbia

4.1 Introduction:

After discussing the US-led intervention in Iraq in the previous chapter, this chapter will discuss the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Following a similar organization to the previous chapter, this chapter will start with the events that led up to the intervention. In this case – the Kosovo case – those events that led up to the intervention happen to be instances in human rights violations which the international community stood helpless in front of, and one of them was in one of Kosovo's neighbors in the Balkans (Bosnia). In Bosnia and Rwanda, massacres were committed and there was fear among the international community that this scenario will be repeated in Kosovo, if no one takes action to prevent it. This is the international context within which the intervention took place. The other context is the regional context in Balkans, which addresses the break-up of communist Yugoslavia and the ethnic and religious tensions that came out of the closet. Both contexts – the international and the regional - will be introduced in the beginning of this chapter. Then, the chapter will focus on the UNSC Resolutions which dealt with the Kosovo situation. It will also present the development of the Kosovo issue before and after the intervention, up until the death of the authoritarian leader Milošević in 2006 and the declaration of the independence of Kosovo in 2008. Then, this intervention will be analyzed according to IR theories. It will state what does realism,

critical theory, and liberalism each have to say about the NATO intervention in this turbulent, ethnically diverse region.

4.2 International Context:

The events that led up to the NATO intervention in 1999 in Serbia - a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - in the war-torn region of Balkan - can be traced back to the human rights violations that took place in Bosnia in 1995. The international community did not succeed in preventing that genocide in Bosnia. There was "guilt" among the international community due to that. No one wanted a Bosnia-part-two in the Balkan region. Accordingly, they rushed to intervene in Serbia, supposedly, in order to prevent another genocide. The massacre that took place in Bosnia in 1995, specifically in the town called Srebrenica, occurred when the Serbian forces retaliated due to attacks from the Bosnian Muslims in the spring of year 1995 (Gibbs 2009 p. 160). The attacks that were initiated by Bosnian Muslims came from Srebrenica (Gibbs 2009 p. 161). Srebrenica was a part of a supposed UN "safe zone", for protection from the Bosnian war, and according to UN officials in the Balkan area, the Bosnian Muslims there in Srebrenica were misusing the safe areas; they were taking advantage of the safe areas to launch attacks against Serbs (Gibbs 2009 p. 161). Thus, the Serbs retaliated, despite the supposed protection from the UN that was provided for Srebrenica residents, and committed massacres against nearly eight-thousand Muslim males who are in the military age (Gibbs 2009). Moreover, Serbian forces took the liberty to expel Muslim women and children from Srebrenica, and investigation states that "Muslims were slaughtered like beasts" (quoted Gibbs 2009 p. 161). This is how the "worst war crime in Europe since the 1940s" occurred (Gibbs 2009 p. 161). The Serbs in the same year

launched another attack on another town in a supposed UN "safe area", and this led to the flow of thousands of refugees (Gibbs 2009 p. 161). The US actually did intervene in 1995 in the Balkan, in a NATO air campaign called Operation Deliberate Force (Western & Goldstein 2011), but it was too late, Bosnian Muslims have already been massacred (Gibbs 2009 p. 162).

These human rights violations committed by the Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims stayed fresh in the memory of the international community. Thus, years later, in 1999, the international community decided to take action against the Serbs, to stop them from committing another massacre against another Muslim group in the Balkan - not the Bosnians, this time it was the Albanians in Kosovo. The decision to intervene in Kosovo also took place against the backdrop of the massacre in Rwanda, which occurred in 1994, a year before the one in Srebrenica. The Rwanda massacre - committed by the Hutu ethnicity against the Tutsi ethnicity - caused the advocates of global human rights to see their own shortcomings. They started questioning the efficiency of global organizations like the UN, and the ability of the UN to actually take action based on the human rights values which it was founded upon. Skepticism grew over whether the UN is even capable of preventing this type of human rights violations. The supposed defender of human rights became a futile organization unable to stand up for the oppressed, according to the UN-skeptics.

4.3 Regional Context:

There is usually a lot of confusion about the Balkan region, since it was united then fragmented, hence came the term "Balkanization" which is used in political science for all the regions experiencing ethnic/sectarian divisions, and Merriam-Webster dictionary

defines it as "breaking up a region into smaller and often hostile unites" (Merriam-Webster). The names of countries overlap. For example, there's a difference between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Multiple ethnicities exist (and not necessarily coexist) in that area and countries are not homogenized, and a situation like that, combined with economic problems, would definitely degenerate into conflicts (Gibbs 2009). There is the country Albania, and the Albanian ethnicity in Kosovo, similarly, there is Serbia, and a Serb ethnicity in Bosnia and Croatia. This chapter isn't supposed to story-tell the history of Balkan, but just state the essential information and definitions which will be used in studying the intervention there which took place in 1999, which is, according to Badescu (2007), "the most controversial intervention in the 1990s".

Kosovo was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, until the First Balkan War in 1912, when Serbia annexed it from the Ottomans (US Department of State). Yugoslavia as country was established in year 1918 under the name "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" (Gibbs 2009 p. 46). It was composed of lands that previously belonged to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as Serbia, which was independent (Gibbs 2009 p. 46), including Kosovo, since it was previously annexed by Serbia (US Department of State). Later, in 1929, the name "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" was changed to simply Yugoslavia (Gibbs 2009 p. 46). During World War II, a Communist party sprung out in Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia as a whole became Communist (Gibbs 2009 p. 48). The Serbs have always been a majority in Yugoslavia (Gibbs 2009 p. 46), but the Communist party was actually multi-ethnic (Gibbs 2009 p. 48 & Hoare 2010).

Communist Yugoslavia was a federation composed of six republics, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, as well as Serbia, which contains two locally autonomous provinces, Vojvodina, and Kosovo (Gibbs 2009 p. 49), with the latter having a Muslim majority, the Albanian ethnicity. The name Kosovo literally means "the state of south Slavs", and it has many monasteries and churches that are important for the Christian Serbs, while being predominantly populated by Albanian Muslims (Judah 2000). The Albanians form from 80 to 90% of the Kosovar population according to statistics from the 1990s (Kuperman 2008), and 77.5% according to 1981 statistics (Kosovo.net).

Due to lots of ethnic tensions and clashes that started to take place - which actually were originating from economic problems (Gibbs 2009 p. 59) - the federation of Communist Yugoslavia was fragmented and elections were held in each one of the six republics on its own, including Serbia (Gibbs 2009 p. 60). Meanwhile, the figure of Slobodan Milošević started coming to light: a Serb nationalist who became the leader of Serbia through winning elections, and started decreasing Kosovo's autonomy as soon as he rose to power (Gibbs 2009 p. 62). He also provided protection for the Serb minority in Kosovo (Gibbs 2009 p. 62). He based his rhetoric on rallying his fellow ethnic Serbs in a populist manner (Gibbs 2009 p. 61), against the "others", the Muslims, the Albanians. He took some discriminatory measures against the Albanians such as removing them from government jobs (Kuperman 2008). The ethnic tensions reached kind of a deadlock: Kosovar Albanians didn't want to be a mere ethnic minority in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, and Serbs in Albania didn't want to be a minority in an Albanian-dominated state (Oberschall 2000).

Since 1989, when Milošević revoked Kosovo's autonomy, Kosovar Albanians

didn't directly start an armed rebellion (peaceinsight.org). Instead, they began with non-violent, civil resistance, thus they avoided having the tragic fate which befell their fellow Muslims, the Bosnians, who dared to provoke the Serbs and then faced genocide as a result (Kuperman 2008). Instead of violence, members of the parliamentary assembly of Kosovo (which was previously eliminated because Milošević revoked Kosovo's autonomy) declared Kosovo as a "republic" in 1990 and an "independent state" in 1991 (Judah 2000). A "parallel state" was formed, with Ibrahim Rugova - the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) - as president (Kuperman 2008). They boycotted Serb and Yugoslav elections and held their own elections in 1991, formed their own education system in their own Albanian language (because Milošević enforced the Serbo-Croat language on them and Albanian language and culture were totally wiped out from the education system), however, they still lacked an army or even a police force (Kuperman 2008). They refused to take up arms because, as the LDK leader Rugova considered, if they do that, the Serbs will use this as a pretext to attack the Albanian people in retaliation (Judah 2000). But the peaceful resistance of the Kosovar Albanians didn't amount to achieving much, and Kosovo was excluded from the Dayton Accords in 1995 which ended the war between Bosnians and Croats on one side and the Serbs on the other (Kuperman 2008). This exclusion was very telling; because it means that Kosovo is just a province, a part of Serbia, and not an independent Yugoslav republic like Serbia or Bosnia (Judah 2000). So after eight years of peaceful resistance, a turning point came in the history of Albanian resistance (Kuperman 2008). Meanwhile, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1992, which constituted of Serbia and Montenegro - which have previously been two among the six federal regions of the former Yugoslavia (uca.edu).

4.4 The Militarization of the Kosovar Resistance:

Enter the Kosovo Liberation Army. Their origins can be traced back to an "illegal party" founded in 1982 (Kuperman 2008 & Judah 2000), it was called The Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (Judah 2000), and had an "extremist" orientation which sees ethnic cleansing as the way to form a 100% Albanian independent state (Kuperman 2008 & Terry 2002). Since the 80s there has been this idea spread among the Albanians in Kosovo about a purely Albanian Kosovo, with no other ethnicity whatsoever (Gibbs 2009 p. 176). A Christian Science Monitor issue quoted a Kosovar Albanian stating that some of his fellow Kosovar Albanians "want to drive Serbs...from Kosovo. They talk of an 'ethnically clean' Kosovo" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 176). According to the American Journal of Sociology, Albanians have "the greatest intolerance towards other groups...in the former Yugoslavia" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 177). Among the media in the West, the term "ethnic cleansing" first referred to Serbs as likely victims of Albanian crimes (Gibbs 2009 p. 177). Albanians were expected to commit crimes against the Serbs as revenge, because Serbs might have mistreated Muslims and Kosovar Albanians in the past (Gibbs 2009 p. 177). In other words, the Western media used to portray the Albanians as the perpetrators and the Serbs as the victims, but this was reversed later on.

Some of the members of the illegal party defected, and joined Rugova's LDK (which follows the Gandhi-style resistance by civil disobedience), while the ones who remained in the extremist illegal party refused to belong to the LDK, because it is recognized by the Serbian state as a legal party, and thus they are "traitors" and not "real resistance" against Serbs (Judah 2000). They even accused Rugova of being a "Serbian agent", and their argument was that "Serbs only understand the language of force"

(Judah 2000). During secret meetings in 1993 they split into two militant organizations, one of them was later named KLA (Judah 2000). According to Kuperman (2008), there were other rebel groups that wanted to initiate a "grass-root" rebellion, whose methods of struggle are based on the Palestinian Intifada, but they were not as radical and violent as the KLA. Many KLA rebels actually got their training when they were in the army of the former Communist Yugoslavia - because serving in that army was mandatory (Carmichael 2010).

In 1997, the KLA began to terrorize the minorities in Kosovo who are Serb, or non-Albanian in general (peaceinsight.org). They also targeted the Serb police force (Kuperman 2008). The police retaliated and shot three KLA rebels and this is how the KLA got its first victims (Judah 2000). Actually, the Serbs haven't really started to use force in a brutal way before the KLA started attacking, there was no need for the Serbs to resort to that much violence, but the KLA made them go for that option (Nzelibe 2009). The KLA retaliated against the Serbs and they even began killing Albanians whom they suspected as Serbian agents or traitors while actually they were just civil servants (Judah 2000). In 1998, the KLA initiated their actual armed rebellion (Kuperman 2008). They also tried to lure Albanian leaders in the former army of Yugoslavia into joining the KLA, in the beginning of 1998 (Judah 2000). Most of their operations took place in the region in Kosovo called Drenica (Judah 2000). Drenica is a hilly, rural district, which was dubbed as "liberated territory" since 1997, because the KLA there forced the Serbian police force out (Judah 2000 & HRW), since they attacked the Serbian police by "ambushing" their cars (Judah 2000). The forces of Serbia retaliated against them, attacking Drenica which they suspected as the location of the

rebels, and in the process, 75 Albanian civilians were shot dead (Kuperman 2008). The Serbs actually were targeting the family of a KLA leader called AdemJashari (Judah 2000 & HRW), in a village in Drenica called DonjiPrekaz (HRW).

According to Human Rights Watch, victims amounted to fifty-eight Albanians, ten among them were children of six years old and below that, and eighteen were women, and Serb forces achieved their goal of eradicating AdemJashari's family, except an eleven years old girl. Serbia's police insisted that they were just pursuing "terrorists" who are guilty of violence against the police, and argued that the media - especially the foreign media - is lying about the Serbian police being guilty of acts of torture (HRW). The Serbs, later on, attacked two more villages in Drenica, without discriminating at all between armed rebels, civilians, women, or children (HRW). According to Human Rights Watch, the attacks of the Serb police in Drenica alone resulted in eighty-three victims including women and children, and the KLA's structure was still vague and unknown back then, but the attacks coming from the Serbs lead to even more radicalization among the Albanian rebels. This HRW narrative is similar as the NATO narrative, which considers that the KLA terrorism haven't sprung out of the blue, instead, it is a result of the systemic oppression which Milošević started against Kosovar Albanians, beginning in the moment he revoked Kosovo's autonomy (Nzelibe 2009).

According to Kuperman (2008), even if the Serbs committed these actions, they didn't resort to "ethnic cleansing" as they did with Bosnians, still, their counter-insurgency actions against the Albanians, especially in Drenica, attracted the media attention and the sympathy of the international community with Kosovar Albanians, as well as the support of the Albanians who live abroad. This is similar to the case of the

Iraqi Kurds discussed earlier, in which the media attention to the human rights violations prompted the governments of western countries to resort to intervention. Madeleine Albright, the then-US Secretary of State, declared that "we are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia" (quoted in Kuperman 2008). She also wrote a chapter in her memoirs called "Milošević is the Problem" (Gibbs 2009 p. 45). The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke stated that Milošević "wrecked the Balkans" (Gibbs 2009 p. 45). The Slovene philosopher and intellectual Slavoj Žižek declared that "Yugoslavia...was all over the moment Milošević took Serbia" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 46).

The Serbs didn't stop their raids on villages in Albania. The result was 20,000 displaced Albanians who drew much attention from the media (Judah 2000), just like the Iraqi Kurdish refugees being stuck on the borders and in the mountains attracted sympathy from all over the world. This happened in a time in which KLA decided to cease the fight (Judah 2000). Threats, condemnations, and economic sanctions began (Kuperman 2008), which is another point in common with the Iraq case discussed above, in which Iraq also faced sanctions and condemnations. According to NATO (1999a), the casualties among Albanians reached more than 1,500 and around 400,000 have been displaced.

In the end of March 1998, the UNSC issued the Resolution 1160. This Resolution condemned "the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army" (NATO 1999b). It stated that the sovereignty of the countries should be respected, and that the leaders of the Albanian people in Kosovo are actually

committed to non-violent means, demanding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seek to achieve a "political solution" to this conflict, and that the community leaders of the Kosovar Albanians condemn the KLA terrorism and use the peaceful means of resistance only (NATO 1999b). The Resolution urged the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to provide a genuinely inclusive and transparent political process for the Kosovar Albanians so that violence and terrorism would be alleviated (NATO 1999b). The Resolution also urged both sides to initiate a "meaningful dialogue" (NATO 1999b). It argued that the solution to this conflict would be in acknowledging the "territorial integrity" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the rights of the Kosovar Albanians, expressing a desire for "an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration" (NATO 1999b). Most importantly, it banned the sales of arms to the all the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - including Kosovo (NATO 1999b). This is because many Albanian KLA rebels got their weapon supply from Albania (the country); they bought cheap arms from there, each for around \$10 (Judah 2000). Fourteen countries voted in favor of this Resolution while China abstained, and no one voted against it (UN 1998a).

In May 1998, there was a meeting of the foreign ministers of the NATO countries, and there was an agreement on several points concerning the situation in Kosovo (NATO 1999a). They were, first of all, to help in reaching a peaceful resolution for that conflict by responding to it along with the international community, and second, to ensure that stability is dominant in the neighboring countries in that region (NATO 1999a). In June of the same year, NATO countries met again, this time at the level of

their defense ministers, and they studied the possible options to fix the situation of Kosovo, including options of military interventions (NATO 1999a). Also in June of that year, the NATO "practice-bombed" in some areas in neighboring countries like Macedonia and Albania, this was just a staged attack to scare Milošević into ceasing his violence against the Kosovar Albanians, but it led to opposite results (Kuperman 2008). The attacks from Albanian armed rebels intensified, and the Serbs, in retaliation, increased their attacks on Albanians in Kosovo who escaped to the mountains, running for their life (Kuperman 2008). In June 1998, according to the US Department of State, American and Russian diplomats established the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KOM), whose aim is to monitor the freedom of movement in Kosovo, as well as the situation of the security there. KOM is also concerned with non-governmental organizations in Kosovo and the issue of refugees and displaced people (US Department of State 1998).

4.5 The UN Steps in:

In September 1998, the UNSC issued the Resolution 1199 (NATO 1998a). It expressed grave concerns "at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties" (NATO 1998a). Moreover, it expressed concerns over the flow of refugees from Kosovo, as well as the large numbers of displaced people within Kosovo itself (NATO 1998a). It stated that the ban against arm sales to all the parties involved in the conflict - whether the Serb forces or the KLA fighters - which was enforced in Resolution 1160 is being continuously violated (NATO 1998a). The Resolution referred to Chapter VII, calling for a cessation of hostilities and

dialogue between the conflicting parties, and that both parties work together to improve the dire humanitarian situation (NATO 1998a). The Resolution demanded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with those measures: first, "cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression" (NATO 1998a). Second, allow a kind of intervention, not a military one - that came later, this one was about allowing monitoring missions like European Community Monitoring Mission to move freely within Kosovo (NATO 1998a). Third, to work with the UNHCR and the Red Cross on the return of refugees and displaced people (NATO 1998a). Fourth, to outline a "clear timetable" for the "meaningful dialogue" - which the UNSC Resolution 1160 demanded - between the different sides of that conflict to take place (NATO 1998a). Fourteen countries in the UNSC voted in favor of this Resolution, none voted against but China abstained from voting (UN 1998b).

In October 1998, there were attempts of conflict resolution with diplomatic methods. The negotiators who were involved in the efforts included Richard Holbrooke - who was involved in the Dayton accords (Judah 2000) - as well as the Chairman of NATO's military committee, General Klaus Naumann, along with General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana (NATO 1999a). Milošević was threatened by Holbrooke with NATO attacks on Yugoslavia if he (Milošević) doesn't declare a ceasefire and allow Albanian refugees to return to their villages in Kosovo (Kuperman 2008). The threats were issued via the NATO council which authorized military strikes, and Milošević actually complied and ceased his attacks (NATO 1999a & Kuperman 2008). The KLA, on the

other hand, condemned that agreement because it did not grant Kosovo the status of an independent state (Gibbs 2009 p. 184).

Also in October 1998, the UNSC issued the Resolution 1203 (NATO 1998b), which was a continuation to the other two Resolutions discussed above. It demanded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government to fully comply with the agreements previously reached with NATO and OSCE previously which are concerned with monitoring (UN 1998c). The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) had established a Kosovo Verification Mission, and NATO - along with other countries that are not actually members in the NATO organization - established an air verification mission in Kosovo, both aim at monitoring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's compliance with ceasefires and UNSC Resolutions (NATO 1999a, NATO 1998b & UN 1998c). Thirteen countries voted in favor of this Resolution, no one voted against while Russia and China abstained from voting (UN 1998c). China and Russia had such positions because they considered that there's an attempt to "internationalize" an issue that is strictly domestic and internal (Badescu 2007).

But those diplomatic efforts - which seemingly reaped success at first - resulted in more casualties. The KLA took advantage of the ceasefire to resume their operations, and they occupied lands again, and thus provoked Milošević to retaliate (Kuperman 2008). Milošević thus made it clear that NATO threats won't stop him from asserting the sovereignty of his country which the KLA threatened - even if he previously complied with threats, this time it's sovereignty itself that is under attack (Kuperman 2008). The OSCE mission couldn't stand anymore in the way of the assault and offensive which Milošević launched in the beginning of 1999 (NATO 1999a). Each side started

provoking the other and the situation got out of control (NATO 1999a). For this Reason, the "Contact Group" - formed of UK, Russia, France, Italy, Germany and USA - met in January 29, 1999, and agreed that dialogue should take place between both sides of the conflict with international mediation, while NATO, the next day, threatened with air strikes if hostilities do not cease (NATO 1999a). In February, there was a meeting in Rambouillet (France), and other meetings followed as well (NATO 1999a & Kuperman 2008). Those meetings ended up in the representatives of Albanians signing an agreement, but the Serbs didn't sign it (NATO 1999a & Kuperman 2008). The agreement stated that three years from then, a referendum for Kosovo's autonomy should take place, and NATO should be given the freedom to move in not just Kosovo but all the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kuperman 2008). Even officials from Western countries saw no sense in this demand. For example, a British investigation argued that this issue of NATO being free to move however and wherever they want in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement on its sovereignty" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 189). US officials have threatened that if the Serbs do not sign that agreement, they will start bombing, and this is exactly what happened (Kuperman 2008). Serbs continued their violations of the agreement for ceasefire which was previously reached in October and continued their assault on Kosovo by deploying more and more military forces in Kosovo, while more and more refugees kept fleeing (NATO 1999a). OSCE mission was withdrawn from the region due to the intensity of those actions, and Holbrooke himself tried again to threaten Milošević with NATO bombing if Milošević doesn't end the attacks on Kosovo, but Milošević still refused to comply (NATO 1999a).

4.6 NATO's Use of Force:

There was no request of an actual UNSC Resolution that allows the use of force in Kosovo for humanitarian ends; no one requested a Resolution like that in the first place because for sure Russia and China would have rejected it using their own veto power (Badescu 2007). The interventionists thus dismissed the need for a UN authorization for their actions (Valentino 2011). In 1999, Tony Blair, the then-UK Prime Minister, declared his determination "to ensure that the ... crimes against humanity committed during the Holocaust are never forgotten. The ethnic cleansing ... that has taken place in Europe in recent weeks are a stark example of the need for vigilance" (quoted in Shaw 2011). The crimes committed in "recent weeks" of course refers to the case of the Kosovar Albanians, and the need to "stay vigilant" was translated to NATO strikes in which his country was involved. Milošević was expected to directly give in when faced with NATO attacks (Goodman 2006 & Kuperman 2008).

The NATO strikes commenced on March 23, and they were dubbed as "Operation Allied Force" (NATO 1999a). To the great disappointment of the intervening states, and contrary to all expectations, Milošević didn't comply (Kuperman 2008); they weren't able to "bomb him" into signing that agreement. Eleven weeks (seventy-seven days) were the duration of the NATO air campaign Operation Allied Force (NATO 1999a & Kuperman 2008), and they didn't result into Milošević conceding, instead, he went from merely fighting KLA terrorists to resorting to ethnic cleansing against the Albanians (Kuperman 2008). According to Gibbs (2009 p. 202), the air strikes caused the Serbs to commit even worse atrocities against the Albanians than whatever they did before the air strikes. Gibbs (2009 p. 202) states that the strikes did not constrain the

Serb atrocities, instead, they lead to their intensification. The NATO air strikes resulted in civilian deaths almost equal to the ones caused by Serb persecution that took place before the strike - between five hundred and two thousand (Gibbs 2009 p. 202).

On June 9th, 1999, the termination of the NATO operation was announced (NATO 1999a). An agreement was signed between a Lieutenant General representing NATO, and two other representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia (NATO 1999a). The agreement was called "Military Technical Agreement" (NATO 1999c). According to this Agreement, international presence should be deployed in Kosovo, based on a document which then-Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari presented to Milošević on June 3, and which the Serb parliament already approved (NATO 1999a & 1999c). The agreement on that document involved also the EU and other Russian envoys (NATO 1999a). The document - approved by the Serb parliament - called for the return of refugees, the withdrawal of police forces from Kosovo, and the demobilization and disarmament of the KLA (NATO 1999a). The Military Technical Agreement stated that a Kosovo Force lead by NATO ("KFOR") would be deployed, and the governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would allow them to operate and ensure safe conditions for the Kosovar citizens (NATO 1999c). The agreement stresses on the withdrawal of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia forces from Kosovo, and none of them shall ever enter Kosovo, for the purpose of achieving a "durable cessation of hostilities" (NATO 1999c). The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is supposed to control the Kosovo borders and airspace until a UN civilian mission arrives there (NATO 1999c). It's also supposed to provide a safe space for NGOs to operate (NATO 1999c). Serb and Yugoslav forces were demanded in that agreement to hand over maps that show the

locations of all mines and traps set in Kosovo (NATO 1999c). Milošević did concede to those terms, which were less demanding than the ones previously set out in Rambouillet, to which he refused to yield (Kuperman 2008).

The next day (June 10), Javier Solana - then NATO Secretary General - announced that he commanded the suspension of NATO air strikes in Kosovo (NATO 1999a). The war thus "officially ended" on that day (Gibbs 2009 p. 200). On the same day, the UNSC issued the Resolution 1244 (NATO 1999a). This Resolution "welcomed the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces" (NATO 1999a). The Resolution stated that there will be a civil presence and security presence under the UN authority to maintain the peace (NATO 1999a). Fourteen countries voted in favor of this Resolution, no one voted against while China abstained as usual (NATO 1999a).

Based on the UNSC Resolution 1244 discussed above, "Operation Joint Guardian" began on June 12, with the first Kosovo Force, or KFOR, staff entering Kosovo (NATO 1999a & JFC Naples). They started out with 50,000 staff from NATO countries as well as non-NATO countries, but later on they were reduced due to the supposed improvement of the security situation there (JFC Naples). By June 20, the Serb police and forces have completely withdrawn from Kosovo (NATO 1999a & JFC Naples). NATO cooperated with the UNHCR on organizing humanitarian aid air flights, while refugee camps were built in Macedonia and Albania, because Kosovar Albanians previously escaped there, fleeing persecution (NATO 1999a). Macedonia and Albania lent their hands to support humanitarian relief, by helping humanitarian NGOs and

providing adequate transport for the delivery of food (NATO 1999a). According to Kuperman (2008), as soon as Albanian refugees returned, ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Serbs took place. The security situation deteriorated again, ethnic violence broke out in Kosovo again in 2004, which the NATO leadership condemned (JFC Naples).

Milošević was sent to trial for his crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which was previously established in the 90s according to its website. Milošević's trial began in 2002 and lasted until he was found dead in his own prison cell in March 2006 (Trial International 2016). Nobody from the other side of the conflict such as KLA leaders was sent to trial. Serbia became an independent state in 2006 because 56% of the people in Montenegro voted for Montenegro to become an independent state, so Serbia and Montenegro both became independent (uca.edu). Concerning the future of Kosovo, the Finnish appointee Ahtisaari came up with a "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement" in 2007 and sent it to the UN Secretary-General (Rohan 2018). This "Ahtisaari Plan" proposed limited sovereignty for Kosovo, for example, limitations on its future security force, foreign military presence, foreign supervision, and prohibition of any possible union with any other country in the future (Rohan 2018). This plan took care to appease to the Serbs by guaranteeing inclusiveness and representation for the Kosovar Serbs in the Kosovar parliament (Rohan 2018). But all the pandering to the Serbs didn't work, because Serbia rejected Ahtisaari's proposal while Kosovo welcomed it (Rohan 2018 & JFC Naples). Russia's veto did not allow the UNSC to support the proposal either (Rohan 2018). Still, on February 17, 2008, Kosovo was declared as an independent state (Rohan 2018).

4.7 NATO's Campaign in Kosovo from the Realist and Critical

Perspectives:

The explanation which realism offers concerning the NATO intervention in Kosovo is also centered around maximizing the power of the US, just like the case of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq. The US, through this intervention, was able to assert its power as a hegemon and to "show them who's the boss". The US was seeking its own benefit, so it intervened in Kosovo to augment its power, domestically, within the US itself, as well as abroad among the rest of the nations that contend for hegemony. In a Pentagon paper, US policymakers stated that "a substantial American presence in Europe...remain vital" (Tyler 1992). Taking advantage of the existing ethnic and religious conflict in that region, the US government decided that a NATO intervention is its means to militarily "flexing its muscles" and spreading its liberal ideology at the same time (Belzil 2013). Balancing against Russia was a major reason behind the intervention in Kosovo according to realists. Both realists and critical theorists argue that the US was also in competition with Russian companies over oil, and to block Russia's supply, they resorted to the NATO campaign. Realists focus more on the desire to balance against Russia, while both realists and critical theorists argue that the US' greed for oil in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea was a key motivation to this intervention.

The US was seeking to expand its power abroad, militarily speaking, and it succeeded in doing that in Kosovo. The threat of Russia was what made this expansion of power an urgent matter for the US. Through this intervention, the US expanded its "military empire"; its forces were able to secure a military base for themselves in

Kosovo (Gibbs 2009 p. 203). Their military base in Kosovo, called Camp Bondsteel, was the largest US military base established since Vietnam, and this challenges the Russian influence (Cohn 2002). Also, despite the UNSC Resolution 1160 - issued in March 1998 - which banned arm sales to any of the conflict parties in Kosovo, the weapon industry in the US benefitted from the escalation of the conflict there bolstered by the NATO intervention (Gibbs 2009 p. 203). This led to material benefits for the US government and an increase in the value of dollar - while the value of its "rival currency", the euro, decreased (Gibbs 2009 p. 203). This way, the US succeeded in asserting itself politically, militarily, and economically, over Europe (Gibbs 2009 p. 203). An article in an issue from The Irish Times confirmed that "NATO is the only military structure in the near future" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 204). US sought through this intervention to win over Europe in the race to obtain the ultimate power and hegemony, and it was able to achieve this, according to the realist perspective.

A key reason for the intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, according to the realist view is balancing against Russia. Even if the Soviet Union collapsed, there was still a risk that a huge country like the Russian Federation would re-emerge as a powerful country that could compete with the US. The US became the most powerful country after the collapse of the USSR, the liberals cheered for the triumph of the free market and liberal democracy over dictatorship, yet, for realists, there is always a threat of competition for power and this time it comes from the Russian Federation. The USSR had a history of backing populist, nationalist regimes abroad. The threat posed to the US and Western Europe was that Russia would back the populist and nationalist leader Milošević. There are cultural Slavic ties between Serbs and Russians,

and they also share a common religion, which is Orthodox Christianity. According to Roberts (2018), a former US diplomat in Belgrade stated that “Russia makes little secret of the fact that it will do what it takes to ensure the Orthodox Christian countries of former Yugoslavia do not join NATO”. While realists are materialists who don't care much for religion or ideology, they would argue that Russia might use those cultural and religious aspects to increase its influence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and US definitely wouldn't like that. According to Maria Brudenell (2008), Russia was worried about some trend of Muslim separatism starting in Kosovo and reaching Russia itself: Chechnya, specifically. The then-Russian Foreign Minister expressed this concern to then-US secretary of State - Madeleine Albright – by saying “don't you understand, we have many Kosovos in Russia?” (quoted in Maria Brudenell 2008). This is a good reason for Russia to resort to backing the Serbs. If Russia seeks to appeal to Serbo-nationalists and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) becomes a part of a Russian "sphere of influence", the power of the US and Western Europe would be threatened. In this case, balancing against the Russian threat became urgent for the US and its allies. The Finnish diplomat and the UN's special envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, stated that Russia even intended to enter the north of Kosovo, to help the Serbs retrieve it in case separatism occurs (Maria Brudenell 2008). The Russian envoy for Kosovo - Viktor Chernomyrdin - stated that Operation Allied Force (NATO's campaign in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) “clashes with international law, the Helsinki agreements and the entire world order that took shape after World War Two”(quoted in Webber 2009). The threat of Russia's backing of the Serbo-nationalists was also apparent in the UNSC in 1998 when Russia - along with China - abstained from voting in favor or against the Resolution 1203. This Resolution - as mentioned in the former chapter - demanded the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with NATO's air verification mission. Russia and China abstained because - according to them - these resolutions try to "internationalize" an issue that is domestic and internal (Badescu 2007).

Moreover, there was no request for a UNSC Resolution that clarifies detailed mechanisms of an intervention in Yugoslavia, because the US and its allies thought that there's no need for it, since Russia and China would "veto it" anyway (Badescu 2007 & Valentino 2011). They knew that Russia would oppose a US intervention in Kosovo and would block through its veto power at the UNSC any resolution that calls for a military presence there. Would Russia allow an intervention that threatens its interests in Balkans? Realists consider that it won't, and any other state in its place won't either, because Russia, the US, and all states are rational actors who are after their interest. That's why the US didn't seek Russia's approval - or the UNSC approval - to carry out the intervention. The US would oppose an intervention from Russia or China in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to support Milošević, and would accuse Russia and China of meddling in the domestic affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the US itself ended up meddling in those so-called "domestic affairs". Had there been a UNSC Resolution calling for a foreign military intervention in Kosovo to stop the Serb forces, Russia would have "veto-ed" it and claimed that the US is "internationalizing" a domestic issue, while at the same time Russia itself would "internationalize" it and back Milošević and the Serbs if this serves its interest. In short, the realist view considers that balancing against Russia was an important motive for the intervention in Kosovo (Yesson 1999 & Maria Brudenell 2008 & Gibbs 2009).

The fear of the Russian Federation and Milošević uniting to form another "anti-

Western" entity that threatens the US power and hegemony was expressed through the media in countries like the US, Canada, the UK, and Germany (Gibbs 2009 p. 65). In a German magazine, the Serbia of Milošević was labeled as "the last bastion of Leninism in Europe" and a potential "fortress of communism, out of which it would be possible one day, with the cooperation of a resurgent Soviet Union, to spread Leninism-Stalinism..." (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 65). The Cold War's language of polarization came to surface once again, as if the old rivalry for power and hegemony is resurrecting, and this fits perfectly into the realist argument on balancing and competition for power between powerful countries. Post-Soviet Russia is still a powerful country and a potential threat to US interests in Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole (Gabuev 2018, Popescu&Secrieru 2018).

According to Gibbs (2009 p. 66), the Croat leader Franjo Tudjman was as "illiberal", "populist", and "racist" towards minorities as Milošević was. Tudjman called for a pure Croatian state without ethnic minorities, such as the Serb minority in Croatia (Gibbs 2009 p. 66). However, the US and NATO did not intervene against him, according to the realist view, because he didn't threaten their interests, while Milošević did. The Croats massacred 200,000 Serbs (Cohn 2002) but there was no intervention whatsoever to protect the Serb minority in Croatia. Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) and Kuperman (2008) state that NATO's actions in that region made it worse for the Albanians by causing Serb retaliation against them. According to Kuperman (2008), as mentioned in the previous chapter, when the NATO started a maneuver of "practice bombing" in neighboring countries like Albania and Macedonia in June 1998, they provoked Milošević, who saw these actions as a threat, and he retaliated, not against

NATO, but against the Albanians themselves. The NATO strikes that began on March 23, 1999, led Milošević from targeting only the KLA rebels to targeting the whole Albanian ethnic population (Kuperman 2008 & Gibbs 2009). Hedges (1999) states that a brutal Serb retaliation against the Albanians – as a reaction to the NATO strikes – increases the Albanian radicalization and desire for separatism. The NATO campaign caused as many civilian deaths as the Serb persecution (Gibbs 2009). Even the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, in its Kosovo Report, stated that the Serb operations of ethnic cleansing against Albanians kicked off after the NATO bombing and not before (Tesón 2009). This is the same report which concluded that this intervention was “illegal but legitimate”. According to the realist and critical arguments, the US and NATO do not exactly care about ethnic minorities or diversity or liberal democracy, they just care for their own benefits and interests, that's why they intervened against Milošević and not Tudjman. That's why Milošević alone was sent to be tried at court, but no one from the Kosovo Liberation Army was tried even though they equally advocated for ethnic cleansing. That's why NATO countries allowed genocide to take place in Srebrenica, in Rwanda, in Darfur, in Democratic Republic of Congo, because intervention there would not make them gain anything, it might have even made them lose (Lu 2007 & Miller 2015). Tudjman was not likely to establish a neo-communist entity with Russia, but Milošević was a candidate. The UK media stated that Tudjman "was a monster, but he was our monster" (quoted in Gibbs 2009 p. 68). However, Milošević, the "evil, red Serb", is Russia's monster.

The US at first considered the Serbs as friends and the Albanians as foes. The media in the US and Western Europe portrayed the Serbs as victims, and the Albanians

as the aggressive terrorists with a tribal mentality who want to avenge the injustice done to them by the Serbs in the past (Gibbs 2009). This image switched later, portraying the Albanians as victims and Serbs as persecutors. Realists would argue that the US has no absolute friends or foes, it's just that Milošević turned into an obstacle for the US power expansion. Milošević switched his position a lot, he started out as a communist, but later, his economic policies were similar to the reforms advocated by the International Monetary Fund, and the US considered him as "the right kind of Eastern European leader" (Gibbs 2009 p. 60). Realists do not care about ideologies, but Milošević was a pragmatist (Gibbs 2009 p. 61); he switched his positions based on whether ethno-nationalism or communism or free-market liberalism would bring him more power (Gibbs 2009 p. 60). Pragmatist he was, and so was the US, which viewed him as a threat. Some conspiracy theories came up about Milošević being murdered during his trial, because of supposed "mysterious circumstances" surrounding his death. If those conspiracy theories turn out to be true, it would further prove the realist argument about the US "disposing" of a threat.

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo dubbed this intervention as "illegal but legitimate". This means – according to the liberal view - that it is illegal according to the UN laws, but legitimate according to "morality" and "humanitarianism". Realists, however, would argue that the UN is a mere tool controlled by the powerful states, so its so-called "rules" are obsolete and have no authority, and they are applied only when doing so serves the interests of a powerful state like the US. Accordingly, the intervention is "illegal" by an obsolete, meaningless standard, but it is legitimate, not because of "human rights", but because it benefits the intervening states.

In the realist worldview, the United States, being the most powerful state, defines what is legal and what is illegal, not the UN or the UNSC. Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) offers a similar argument about the interventions being “legal” not by the UN standard, but by the standard of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

Realism takes into consideration the material and political benefit, but even "benefit" can be defined differently. Some realists were against this intervention because they didn't see any actual benefit in it, but they are a minority. According to Bricmont (2006), few realists in his country - France - saw no gain from France's participation in this intervention except pleasing the US, which did not count as gains according to them. But those were the minority rather than the mainstream (Bricmont 2006). Neo-conservative realists would argue that USA's benefit lies in spreading "American values" everywhere, and Milošević stands against these values with all his communist and authoritarian tendencies, thus the intervention took place in order to weaken him. The realist view on the Kosovo case, in a nutshell is that by this intervention, the US established itself as a powerful country and balanced against the Russian rising power and influence in Europe.

The critical theory view on the intervention in Kosovo is also suspicious about its supposed “humanitarian” motives. The main argument is that countries like Yugoslavia – and Iraq, which is also applicable to the former case – can't be held up to the same standard as the US or the UK for example, because they are not as economically evolved and politically dominant as the US or the UK. Usually, the blame is on the formerly colonizing countries because – according to critical theorists – they accumulated their wealth by exploiting resources in the colonies, while neither Iraq nor the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia has enjoyed such a privilege (Bricmont 2006). Additionally, the US – according to the critical as well as realist perspective – was also seeking natural resources, mainly oil, which motivated this intervention.

Bricmont (2006) would most likely reject the “critical theorist” label, because he argues that the left-wing intellectuals – who supposedly have the critical perspective – were in favor of the Kosovo intervention, especially those who label themselves as Trotskyists, “Greens”, or anarchists. He himself argues against the intervention in Kosovo, but not from a right-wing point of view. He points out that the “extreme” positions on the political spectrum – both leftward and rightward – are interventionist (Bricmont 2006). He states that “if Yugoslavia or China had enjoyed a long period of modern economic development allowing them to reach a dominant position on the world scale, the situation of Kosovo or Tibet might well be similar to that of Brittany or Wales...”. The Russian politician Sergei Lavrov argues that the NATO campaign in Kosovo “transformed a humanitarian crisis into a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’” (quoted in Cohn 2002). The group of the Non-Aligned Countries and the Rio Group – formed of Latin American countries – both condemned NATO’s intervention because it “undermines the authority of the UN” (Webber 2009). This brings into light the perspective of the countries of the Southern hemisphere – many critical theorists oppose using the term “Third World Countries”. Unlike what the liberal argument – which will be presented later – states, NATO didn’t come to help a legitimate Albanian resistance movement, according to realists and critical theorists. The KLA aren’t a legitimate local revolutionary movement, they were trained by the Military Professional Resources International, which is a Pentagon-affiliated company (Cohn 2002).

Both critical and realist views point out at the US' pursuit for natural resources, not just in the case of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq but also in the case of the NATO campaign in Serbia. According to Cohn (2002), after the USSR collapsed, the oil companies from the USA and the Russian Federation started competing over the oil of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. A retired Admiral in the US Navy stated that the area surrounding Caspian Sea and the Black Sea "will become the next Persian Gulf" (quoted in Cohn 2002). Russia was seeking to have the oil pipeline pass through both seas, but the US wanted the pipelines to pass through Turkey, which is an ally of the US (Cohn 2002). Yeltsin himself stated that there's an oil war in this specific region which aims to "exclude Russia from the game and undermine its interests" (quoted in Cohn 2002). The NATO air campaign in Kosovo damaged the oil supply routes, roads and rivers, thus ensuring that Russia would not profit from the flow of oil to the market (Cohn 2002). Realists would argue that this intervention aimed to win the competition with Russia and show that the US has the upper hand in the global power politics, while critical theorists would focus on the US' greed for oil and resources. The US didn't only want to prevent Russia from benefitting from the oil because of political rivalry. The US wants the oil for itself because its economy can't function without stable oil supplies. The then-energy secretary of the US in 1998 admitted that the US getting its hands on the oil in the Caspian Sea "is about America's energy security. It's also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don't share our values." (quoted in Cohn 2002). The US was thus seeking to "hit two birds with a single stone" via NATO: balance against Russia, and at the same time secure its oil supply. This proves the realist as well as the critical argument at the same time. The realists state that it is about competition and balancing with Russia, while critical theorists consider that the US wanted to get the oil

for itself. But they both have in common their suspicion about the “humanitarian” motives of that intervention.

4.8 NATO's Campaign in Kosovo from the Liberal Perspective:

Liberal internationalists would have a different argument concerning the intervention in Kosovo. While realists advocate for interventions that serves the material and political interest of countries, liberals do not set such conditions. Liberals emphasize that the core reason for this intervention is the “inhumanity” of Milošević (Kay 2004). They argue that the prevention of genocide against Kosovar Albanians was essential, because after Srebrenica (Bosnia) and Rwanda, the international community "learned its lesson". They focus on the necessity of such an intervention in order to avoid and prevent atrocities. The liberal way to understand this intervention – or any intervention – is “not as a unilateral decision unrelated to the wishes of the victimised population, but as assistance to revolutionaries seeking freedom from tyranny” (Tesón 2009). In this case, for liberals, NATO was merely helping a legitimate local resistance movement against the Serb persecution (Tesón 2009). Peaceful resistance did not benefit the Albanians, on the contrary, it lead them further towards marginalization, so taking up arms was the only option, according to a KLA fighter interviewed by Hedges (1999 p. 29). The interventionist view states that the Albanians themselves took up the initiative, NATO was just aiding them (Tesón 2009).

According to the liberal view, Bosnia and Rwanda showed the world that if we stand by and do nothing, atrocities will happen. Skeptics like Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) and Kuperman (2008) would argue that the NATO intervention lead to more atrocities.

Liberals would answer that had NATO done nothing, the Serbs would have done worse. Had NATO done nothing, nobody else would have taken up the responsibility to hinder the forces of Milošević. Nobody else would have offered their services to save these people. Nobody even had the adequate means and capabilities to undertake such an action, except NATO. Even the skeptic Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) would agree to the fact that NATO is the only "regional grouping" equipped with proper military means for intervention. Liberals would add to Chomsky's argument that the UN and the UNSC are also not dependable because there's the threat of Russia or China blocking any UNSC Resolution that prescribes military intervention in Kosovo. China has abstained from voting on four UNSC Resolutions concerning the situation in Kosovo (1160, 1199, 1203, 1244), and none of them called for a military air campaign there. If a Resolution from the UNSC did call for that, there is a huge possibility that China would block it, especially that China itself argued against "internationalizing" this "domestic issue" (Badescu 2007). The then-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out that the human rights violations that were taking place in Europe at the time of the speech (the ones committed by the Serbs) show that we need to be "vigilant" (Shaw 2011). According to liberals, no one was vigilant, except NATO, not the UN or the UNSC or Russia or China. Therefore, according to the liberal point of view, the intervention that took place in Kosovo was the only adequate, reasonable, and suitable solution to the ethno-nationalist oppression against Kosovar Albanians. Had a similar intervention happened in Bosnia and Rwanda, genocide could have been evaded, according to the liberal argument (Evans 2015 p. 18). The same argument is used for the No-Fly Zone case as was previously mentioned; if not for the No-Fly Zone, Halabja massacre could have been repeated (Kent 2013).

According to Tesón (2009), the Kosovar Albanians were oppressed and had a legal right of resistance and self-defense. The NATO intervention can solely be interpreted as an “aid” to the local Albanian resistance against the tyranny and persecution from the Serb forces (Tesón 2009). NATO’s intervention, according to the liberal view, aimed to counteract the acts of repression against Kosovar Albanians by the Serbs (Tesón 2009). This intervention demonstrated the global triumph of the Western values of liberalism and democracy, and neither Russia nor China were able to stop this intervention from happening, no matter how much they opposed it (Cottey 2009). The norm of intervening for the sake of human rights was already emerging, but this intervention exactly showed the “un-ambiguous” application of this norm of using military force to protect human rights (Cottey 2009). Thanks to this intervention, there is a new precedent for the conditions and circumstances under which humanitarian intervention can occur: the UNSC doesn’t necessarily have to agree with the intervention or allow it, for example (Cottey 2009). The intervention will take place, with or without the UN’s approval.

Liberals argue that within a cosmopolitan, progressive, modern, globalized international system, there's no place for another Holocaust or another Srebrenica, unlike the realist view that considers the international system as permanently anarchic. But for liberals, it doesn't have to be always anarchic, and this intervention in Kosovo, with all the controversies surrounding it, paved the way for a new concept that defines the future of human rights: the "responsibility to protect/R2P". This intervention showed that the international community is responsible for protecting the Kosovar Albanians, because their own government was violating their rights and trampling over their human dignity.

According to the R2P website, this concept aims to "address the international community's failure to prevent and stop...war crimes...and crimes against humanity". In other words, failure to prevent another Srebrenica can't be tolerated anymore, and for liberals, this best explains the NATO intervention in Kosovo. (Evans 2015 p. 18)

Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction:

This final chapter in the study will sum up the discussion of the preceding chapters. It will reiterate the definition of humanitarian intervention that was presented in the introduction, and all the controversy surrounding it – since not everyone agrees that it is really humanitarian, but it is claimed to be thus by its advocates, and this claim sometimes is rightly contested in some cases. Terming the two case studies as “humanitarian intervention” in this study does not mean that the liberal approach is adopted as the correct one for all cases, it just means that this is what those cases are known as – and contested on this basis. This chapter will briefly re-introduce this controversy, the International Relations theories that participate in it, as well as the two cases of Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It will also sum up the discussion of those cases through the lens of the IR theories – beginning with the skeptics which are realism and critical theory, and ending with the advocates, the liberals. In the end of this chapter, the findings will be presented to finalize the study.

5.2 Summary of the Study:

Humanitarian intervention can be defined as such: an action – in the context of this study, a military action - by one or more states, or an organization, in another state,

against the will of the government of the latter state. Its aim – or its pretext, as realists and critical theorists would argue – is to save a certain religious/ethnic/tribal group from oppression and genocide. This definition is derived from that of Adam Roberts (cited in Burgess 2002), Simms and Trim (2011), Baer (2011), and Pogge (cited in Orosco 2010). The “true aim” of humanitarian intervention is what the different theories of International Relations disagree on. In this study, the term “humanitarian intervention” was used to represent cases of intervention which were marketed as having humanitarian goals, regardless of whether their real aim was greed for resources for example, as critical theorists would insist. Whether the theoretical perspective is realist, liberal or critical, humanitarian intervention remains a controversial topic, and that’s why it was picked as a topic for this study, to find out which International Relations perspective – among the three major perspectives - most adequately explains humanitarian intervention in the cases of Iraq in 1991 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999? Other questions debated in the field of International Relations can be, more or less, related to humanitarian intervention. For example, whether the concept of a “state” – in the Westphalian sense – has been rendered obsolete. Or whether international law applies universally, or only to certain states while the rest are “exempt” from obeying it because they are powerful. Or whether international law as a concept in itself even actually exists, or, is it just a representation of the authority of a powerful sovereign state. Humanitarian intervention as a topic can be discussed in all those debates, for it encompasses states, international law, human rights, and several other concepts.

Realists and critical theorists emphasize the “intervention” part in humanitarian intervention, while liberals stress on the “humanitarian” identifier. The skeptical IR

theories (realism and critical theory) are suspicious about everything concerning the concept of “humanitarian intervention”, beginning with the name itself – because, according to them, no intervention can be “humanitarian”. According to realists, states are not benevolent philanthropists, they are rational actors who pursue their own interests, and all their actions have one purpose, which is to expand their power, including “humanitarian” intervention (Lu 2007). The realist perspective considers that states seek to increase their material wealth and assert their own power against their rival states, and the so-called “humanitarian” intervention is a way for them to do so. Realists are in favor of an intervention which benefits the wealth and/or political power of a state. However, they get suspicious over the “human rights” rhetoric which the liberal theorists advocate. For realists, neither the international law, nor the UN, nor the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine can serve a humanitarian cause, because they were all created by powerful states, and for powerful states, so that they secure their own interests. According to the realist perspective, the intervening states seek to get their hands on natural resources abroad, or assert their power against a rival, or any other motivation that would benefit them materially or politically. If for liberals sovereignty comes with the “responsibility to protect” – and sovereignty can be taken away anytime this responsibility isn’t met – then for realists sovereignty comes with another responsibility, which is the responsibility for each state not to intervene in the affairs of another state, and to “mind its own business” instead.

Critical theorists point out contradictions and the “hypocrisy” in “going to war for the sake of peace”. They share with realists the view that intervening states are after their own benefits. They argue that formerly imperialist countries still seek to exploit

their former colonies under the pretext of human rights. As in the era of colonialism the colonialist states were taking material advantage of the colonized lands abroad in the “Global South”, the formerly colonialist states in the so-called “post-colonial” era still have the same greed over the natural wealth and resources in the “Global South”, and will do anything to possess it – including coming with their tanks and drones under the text of “saving the oppressed” (Aarnivaara 2008). “Humanitarian intervention” is nothing more than colonialism disguised as a righteous cause, according critical theorists (Chomsky 1993 & 2018). Moral relativists – who also fall under the critical theorist umbrella - state that humanitarian intervention seeks to globally enforce a certain set of values that comes from the “white” and “western” culture. For critical theorists, there is “racism” in the “western” mindset which considers that Middle Eastern/Asian/African countries can’t progress on their own; they need help from other countries (Mahdavi 2015). Realists and critical theorists are thus skeptical about the concept of humanitarian intervention itself. For them, intervention by one state in another state can’t be humanitarian, and will never be. Critical theorists differ from realists in adding the context of neo-colonialism and racism.

Liberals hold the opposite view, they are not suspicious of the humanitarianism claim in humanitarian intervention, on the contrary, for them, peace and human rights can be the goal for using armies and weapons; the end justifies the means. They argue that the states have no “right” to intervene abroad, but a duty to intervene (Tesón 2001), if and only if that serves the purpose of protecting the innocent and defending human rights. The “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine considers that if a state fails to protect its own citizens, the responsibility to protect those citizens becomes that of the international

community, and any state that does not abide by the “responsibility to protect” causes its sovereignty to become null and void. For liberals, the sovereignty of the states is not sacred and unquestionable like the realists insist; instead, human rights matter more than borders. “Democratic peace theorists” view that intervening to turn states into international law-abiding democracies would prevent wars in the future, because democracies don’t fight each other – and also democracies do not oppress their minorities, and thus there would be neither a humanitarian crisis nor a refugee crisis that would threaten “the international peace and security” in the future. According to liberals, a state or a group of states can, and should, intervene to stop human rights violations in case the UN and the UNSC aren’t doing their duty and fighting for human rights. If Russia and China would seek to veto a UNSC Resolution that would allow a humanitarian intervention, then, other means than the UN should be employed for humanitarian causes, according to the liberal perspective.

The two incidents of the supposed humanitarian intervention of Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999 were chosen for this study for the simple reason that they perfectly fit into the definition of humanitarian intervention mentioned above, and both of these interventions were unilateral and unauthorized by the UNSC. Both were advertised as having a humanitarian aim by their liberal advocates but questioned for having some hidden goal by realists and critical theorists. But as mentioned before, both were termed “humanitarian intervention” in this study regardless whether they are actually “humanitarian”, just for the mere fact that they were claimed to be humanitarian by their advocates. In both cases, foreign countries sent their military forces abroad in order to rescue – or allegedly rescue, according to realists and critical theorists – an oppressed

religious/ethnic group – the Kurds in Iraq and the Albanians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, both of those cases generate debates about the UN’s power over countries – or the lack of it, since in both cases the UN was overridden and interventions took place due to decisions from the intervening countries themselves. In both cases, the UN was not responsible for the intervention. Instead, groups of allied countries were the ones who took the initiative. It wasn’t a supra-national international organization like the UN who resumed the task, it was what Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) calls a “regional grouping”. For the realist view, the UN’s authority – as an organization – is non-existent. The authority of the powerful states who control the UN is never challenged. Critical theorists might not annul the UN as an organization altogether like realists, but they would argue that, unfortunately, it is at the mercy of few powerful, formerly colonialist, “imperialist”, “greedy” states like the US. On the other hand, liberals argue that the UN does have an authority, but it is weak nevertheless, and no longer fit for the task which it was created to undertake in the first place: protecting human rights. That’s why those “regional groupings” took that task upon themselves and rushed to prevent the Kurds and Albanians from being massacred by the Iraqi regime and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regime, respectively, based on the liberal view.

The events that led up to the creation of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq began when Saddam Hussein was weakened after his defeat – when he attempted to invade Kuwait. His opponents among ethnic Kurds took advantage of that weakness and attempted to incite a rebellion against his rule. The US president encouraged the rebels (Cockayne & Malone 2006), and thus the rebels expected that the US would come to their aid, but it didn’t (adst.org 2016). Hussein’s retaliation against them was harsh, and it generated a

refugee crisis that attracted media attention and sympathy from the population in the US and Europe. The creation of the No-Fly Zone in the Kurdish area in Northern Iraq – whose aim was to secure passage for aid to the Kurdish victims and refugees – was justified based on the Resolution 688 (Gibbons 2002), issued on April 5th, 1991, by the UNSC. Note that this Resolution didn't exactly call for the enforcement of a No-Fly Zone like that (Koshy 1996). This UNSC Resolution called for the resolving this conflict by peaceful methods such as dialogue, urging the Iraqi regime to allow the victims to access the aid coming from humanitarian organizations and NGOs (UNSC 1991a). The Resolution 688 referred to the article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which is vocal about respecting the sovereignty of countries and non-intervention (Koshy 1996). However, representatives of the intervening countries argued that the principles of non-intervention and respecting sovereignty do not apply in this issue, because it's an international issue like the apartheid in South Africa, not a domestic issue (Koshy 1996). Thus, on April 6, 1991, a No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq was created (UK 2009). This intervention was a precedent; it paved the way for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999. A year later, another No-Fly Zone was enforced in the South of Iraq, this time to protect the Shia population there. The two No-Fly Zones paved the way for the US invasion of Iraq later on in 2003.

What prompted the intervention in Kosovo – at least according to the liberal view, because realists and critical theorists point out to totally different reasons – was the desire to prevent the Serbs from committing another massacre against the Albanians like the one committed against the Bosnians in 1995. When the populist Serb leader Milošević rose to power, he revoked the local autonomy of Kosovo (peaceinsight.org).

First, peaceful resistance was the Albanians' reaction to that, then came the armed rebels, the Kosovo Liberation Army, who attacked the Serb police. The Serb police retaliated and attacked civilians while claiming that it is fighting against terrorism. Even if the actions of the Serb police didn't reach the level of a genocide like the one that occurred in Srebrenica in 1995 (Kuperman 2008), they still attracted condemnation from the media and the populations in US and Europe, just like the Kurdish refugee issue in the other case of intervention discussed above. There were some attempts at first to solve this conflict by diplomatic means. Milošević was threatened with the NATO attacks if he doesn't ceasefire and allow the return of Albanian refugees, and he complied (Kuperman 2008). While Milošević complied and stopped the attacks, the Kosovo Liberation Army took advantage and attacked, then Serbs retaliated (Kuperman 2008), and a vicious cycle of action and reaction took place, with civilians being the victims of it all and leading to more and more refugee flow. Meetings in Rambouillet, France and other places resulted in an agreement which would allow the NATO's presence without restrictions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Serbs refused to sign that agreement, and this led to the NATO air campaign on their territory (Kuperman 2008). This is how the "Operation Allied Force" came into action.

There are two perspectives that question the supposed "humanitarian" motives of the Iraq intervention. These are the realist perspective and the critical theorist perspective. Realist and critical theorists are thus the skeptics, while the liberals are the advocates who supported this intervention and viewed it as the way to rescue the Kurdish victims of the oppression by the Iraqi regime. The US was also seeking to weaken Saddam Hussein, its defeated, former ally who can no longer serve as a

powerful ally in the region, according to the realist perspective. The US thus found no other way than the No-Fly Zone. The realist and critical perspective share the view about the US pursuing the Iraqi oil through this intervention, since Iraq has a huge oil supply. The US needs a stable oil supply, otherwise its economy would not thrive. If Saddam Hussein is no longer the adequate, useful US ally he used to be, then it is of the US' interest to stop him from securing the oil for himself. Both the realist and critical view question whether the US actually cared about the Kurds and Shias, since the US itself encouraged them to rebel (Owtram 2017 & Aarnivaara 2008), but didn't come to aid them and left them to be massacred by the Iraqi forces.

The critical view states that since Iraq is a former colony, the intervening countries wanted to exploit its resources (especially oil) and return it to its former status as a colony – through neocolonialism, with justifications about the inferiority of the Iraqi/Middle Eastern culture to the “Western” culture. Critical theorists do not believe that the countries which formerly colonized that region would come back there with their armies to Iraq this time in order to fight for a “noble cause”, instead, they are coming for the Iraqi oil supply. Colonialism, after all, along with the division of the Middle East across those “artificial borders” by colonialist countries, is what caused those ethnic tensions between the Arabs and Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shias, and so on, according to the critical view. If colonialism caused it in the first place, then neo-colonialism won't fix it. The critical perspective considers that the leaders of the intervening countries have a “racist” and biased view of the Iraqi culture, and according to this view, the Kurds and Shias in Iraq can't have their rights as Iraqi citizens and humans with dignity, unless those leaders of the “free and liberal West” intervene using

their armed forces. According to critical theory, Saddam Hussein – for “the West” – is the typical military totalitarian figure who is a product of his own “barbaric” culture. Moreover, the “biased” view of Iraqi culture considers that Kurds or Shias won’t rebel against a dictatorship that oppresses them unless someone from the “civilized West” encourages them to, because their culture teaches them obedience and submissiveness. Critical theorists do not justify the actions of dictators like Saddam Hussein or Milošević, they just consider that fighting those dictators is just a pretext for other ends. They also would argue against the “Western” intervention in Iraq by stating that Saddam Hussein is definitely bad, but neo-colonialism is much worse.

The liberal view however is very supportive of the No-Fly Zone. Liberals argue that Saddam Hussein’s regime has a history of committing human rights violations against the ethnic Kurds (for example the Halabja massacre), and if not for the No-Fly Zones, the Iraqi Kurds could have been wiped out by now (Kent 2013). According to liberals, even if the establishment of the No-Fly Zone wasn’t authorized by the UNSC, we still have to support it because there was simply no other way to stop Saddam Hussein and his forces from creating a massive refugee crisis and thus threatening the international peace and security. The interventionist states did claim that the UNSC authorized the intervention through the Resolution 688 (Gibbons 2002), but this claim can be also contested (Koshy 1996). However, suppose it is true that this Resolution didn’t authorize such an intervention; for liberals it doesn’t matter, the cause of the Kurdish people justifies it. The Kurdish rebels fighting for their basic rights against a ruthless autocrat with his forces armed-to-teeth justify it. There’s no need for any UNSC Resolution. The liberal view considers that the No-Fly Zone was naturally how a

progressive international community should react in case there is a despot who thinks he has the right to send his army to kill his own people, and Saddam Hussein fits exactly into this description.

According to the realist view, the intervention in Kosovo occurred because the US and its allies were seeking to balance against their new rival: the post-Soviet Russian Federation. After the USSR collapse, Russia remained a threat to US interest in Eastern Europe, and it disagreed, along with China, with the US in the Security Council when it comes to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issues. Giving Russia time to create a neo-communist system in Europe again – starting with the formerly-communist Yugoslavia – is not a risk the US was willing to take, according to the realist perspective. The Cold War polarization was coming at the surface of global politics again, and competition over power in the Balkan region lead to this intervention, and also competition over oil in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea (Cohn 2002). The Cold War competition between two powerful countries over power and resources re-emerged, and in this context, the US wanted to block Russia's access to the oil of the Caspian Sea and Black Sea, so it bombed the access routes during its campaign in Kosovo to achieve this goal (Cohn 2002). This intervention allowed the US to gain power over Russia, since it lead to the creation of the largest US military base since Vietnam (Cohn 2002), and it strengthened the US economically too (Gibbs 2009).

According to critical theorists like Chomsky (TeleSUR2018) and Kuperman(2008), the Operation Allied Force in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to more retaliation from the Serbs and more civilian victims on both sides. The NATO strikes lead to retaliation from Serbs but not against the NATO itself, instead,

against Albanian civilians themselves (TeleSUR 2018). “Operation Allied Force” resulted in increased ethnic tensions there. The critical view on this intervention considers that there were other rulers in other countries in that region - such as Croatia - who were authoritarian and exclusionist against minorities, and called for “racial purity” in their countries as much as Milošević did, but the NATO air-force didn’t target them, and that was “hypocritical” according to critical theorists. Critical theorists explain the international community’s silence over other authoritarian regimes in Balkan by stating that the US wasn’t actually seeking to help Albanians, but it was seeking to get access to oil that comes from the Caspian Sea and Black Sea (Cohn 2002); serving its own material interests since its economy would collapse without oil. A common critical argument against this intervention – and against the Iraq intervention, and any “humanitarian” intervention in general – is that we should not hold a country like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – or Iraq – up to the same standard as we do with the US or the UK, because the former countries do not have a history of colonialism and resource-exploitation abroad (Bricmont 2006).

According to the liberal perspective, the intention of this intervention was to prevent Serbs – who have a history of committing massacres against other groups in that region like Bosnians – from wiping out the Kosovar Albanian population. Even if the result wasn’t perfect, the international system keeps evolving, and the international community would learn some lessons from mistakes in the Kosovo intervention, so as to avoid them in any future humanitarian intervention. Moreover, had the intervention not taken place, there would have been even more Albanian victims. It is true that the actions of the Serb forces against Albanians didn’t reach the level of genocide as those

against Bosnians in 1995, however, they could have reached the level of a genocide like the Bosnia one in case no one lifted a finger against Milošević. No Resolution from the UNSC was necessary in order to stop Serb forces, it would have been useless because China or Russia would have used the veto against such a Resolution. Surpassing the UN doesn't have to become a norm, but in that case alone, ignoring the UN and deciding to intervene was the "necessary evil" to serve a good cause, and in this case, the end justifies the means, according to the liberal perspective. This intervention "opened the door" for other future interventions of this kind to take place in the future later. Even Pilger (2017) – whose view on this intervention is skeptic/realist/critical – argues that the NATO campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 "was the template for other 'humanitarian' wars – in Iraq, Libya and now Syria". Just like the No-Fly Zone in Iraq, liberals consider that this intervention was the only rational decision that could be taken in order to stop Milošević from killing his own people: Albanians.

5.3 Conclusion of the Study:

The above analysis of the cases of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq and the NATO intervention in Kosovo through realist, critical and liberal perspectives leads us to the unsurprising conclusion that there isn't a single explanation that applies to all cases of humanitarian intervention across time and space. In each instance of humanitarian intervention, there can be a different explanation. Each case has its own specificity, its own global and national context, and what's at stake and what's not at stake. In other words, each case of humanitarian intervention has a different International Relation theory (or theories) to explain it. Humanitarian intervention is, indeed, a complex topic that can't be explained in a single way or by single motivations. Humanitarian intervention in Iraq is different

from humanitarian intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Some factors in each case can cause one or more countries to carry out a humanitarian intervention, or to refrain from carrying it out.

The realist and critical views best explain the case of the No-Fly Zones in Iraq, while the liberal view is better suited for the NATO campaign in Kosovo. Even if the Caspian Sea and Black Sea are rich in oil, Iraq possesses 10% of global oil reserves, so if we have to agree with the realist and critical view about the US' need for material wealth, then seeking Iraq's resources is the starkest example. The critical view also explains the Iraqi case better than liberalism, because Iraq is a former colony, and its culture is often viewed as "barbaric", moreover, the former colonizers will not hesitate to exploit the resources in former colonies simply to boost their own economy. On the other hand, liberalism best explains the NATO campaign in Kosovo. Serbs are white and European, they do not belong to a culture that is deemed "barbaric", which weakens a full critical theorist explanation, even if the critical argument about the US pursuing oil in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea is well-grounded. Balancing against Russia might have been a reason for this intervention, but liberals would argue that, after all, Russia was backing a dictator who massacred his own people, and if stopping that dictator from committing genocide means that Russia's power will be weakened, then so be it. Not every single conflict has to be viewed through the dynamics of outdated polarities and rivalries; Russia, after all, took part in the NATO's Kosovo Force (Maria Brudenell 2008). What mostly strengthens the liberal view on the Kosovo case is that this intervention particularly paved the way for a more progressive view on human rights, which is the "Responsibility to Protect". Had this intervention never happened, other

interventions that occurred later on, such as the US intervention in Libya in 2011, wouldn't have been accepted by the international community. This intervention was a necessary turning point in the trajectory of declining state sovereignty and evolution of methods to enforce the cosmopolitan values of human rights.

As an answer to the question “which International Relations perspective – among the three major perspectives - most adequately explains humanitarian intervention in the cases of Iraq in 1991 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999”, different theories offer logical explanations to the occurrence of different interventions. Based on what is stated above, what motivated the intervention in Iraq was seeking natural resources and neocolonialism, while what motivated the intervention in Kosovo was the prevention of another genocide committed by the Serbs. Thus, these motivational factors are not static and constant, they depend on the case, context, and target country. There is no single, general explanation offered by one IR theory for all the cases of humanitarian intervention.

The conclusion of this study is that there is no single IR approach that universally explains all cases of humanitarian intervention. Each incident of humanitarian intervention has its own interpretation. There is not a single theory of International Relations that captures, in their entirety, the factors and circumstances under which all cases of humanitarian intervention in general take place, and the motivations of the interveners. All the major theories of International Relations contribute something into the debate on humanitarian intervention – whether it even exists, like Chomsky questions (1993), or how this legitimate practice that serves idealist ends has evolved on the way of becoming an adequate method to avoid genocide and

ethnic cleansing, thus preserving international peace and security. Each case of humanitarian intervention has a different IR theory (or theories) to explain it. Whether one is supportive of humanitarian intervention like liberals, or skeptical about its true motives like realists, or even denying its mere existence like critical theorists, it is, has been, and will most likely be for a long time to come, a controversial topic that occupies political scientists all over the world.

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