

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition

By

MIRNA MNEIMNEH

A thesis

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs**

School of Arts and Sciences

September 2011



LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

School of Arts and Sciences - Beirut Campus

Thesis Approval Form

Project Approval Form

Student Name: Mirna Mneimneh

I.D. #: 200502712

Thesis/Project Title: Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition

Program: M.A. in International Affairs

Department: Social Sciences

School: Arts and Sciences - Beirut

Approved by:

Thesis/Project Advisor: Dr. Imad Salamey Signature

Dr. Sami Baroudi Signature

Dr. Paul Tabar Signature

Date: September 30, 2011

THESIS /PROJECT COPYRIGHT RELEASE FORM

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

By signing and submitting this license, I (the author(s) or copyright owner) grant the Lebanese American University (LAU) the non-exclusive right to reproduce, translate (as defined below), and/or distribute my submission (including the abstract) worldwide in print and electronic format and in any medium, including but not limited to audio or video. I agree that LAU may, without changing the content, translate the submission to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation. I also agree that LAU may keep more than one copy of this submission for purposes of security, backup and preservation. I represent that the submission is my original work, and that I have the right to grant the rights contained in this license. I also represent that my submission does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe upon anyone's copyright. If the submission contains material for which I do not hold copyright, I represent that I have obtained the unrestricted permission of the copyright owner to grant LAU the rights required by this license, and that such third-party owned material is clearly identified and acknowledged within the text or content of the submission. IF THE SUBMISSION IS BASED UPON WORK THAT HAS BEEN SPONSORED OR SUPPORTED BY AN AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN LAU, I REPRESENT THAT I HAVE FULFILLED ANY RIGHT OF REVIEW OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS REQUIRED BY SUCH CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT. LAU will clearly identify my name(s) as the author(s) or owner(s) of the submission, and will not make any alteration, other than as allowed by this license, to my submission.

Name:

Mirna Mneimneh

Signature



Date: 30/9/2011


PLAGIARISM POLICY COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

I certify that I have read and understood LAU's Plagiarism Policy. I understand that failure to comply with this Policy can lead to academic and disciplinary actions against me.

This work is substantially my own, and to the extent that any part of this work is not my own I have indicated that by acknowledging its sources.

Name: Mirna Mneimneh

Signature:



Date: 30/9/2011

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the help and assistance of many persons. First and foremost I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Imad Salamey, for his constant encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr. Paul Tabar and Dr. Sami Baroudi for their willingness to take part in the thesis committee.

Great thanks go to my editor and friend, Karam Wahab, for his amazing help for the completion of this thesis.

Thanks go also to my family and friends for their support.

Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition

Mirna Mneimneh

ABSTRACT

Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition

This thesis analyzes democratization models for deeply divided society undergoing political transition. It takes the federalization and consociationalization strategies as implemented in Iraq as a case study. A comparative analysis is further conducted in order to evaluate the Iraqi governing experience in contrast to alternative power-sharing strategies for ethno sectarian divided societies.

The thesis provides an assessment of the various power-sharing models and entertains the viability of majoritarian pluralism. It focuses on each model success in the attainment of four major transitional indicators: security, ethnic/sectarian pluralism, national cohesion, and social equity. These four transitional indicators are further evaluated in their foreign policy implications relevant to three neighboring countries: Iran, Syria and Turkey. The thesis demonstrates the viability and limitations of power sharing models for ethnically divided countries undergoing democratic transitions.

Keywords:

Federalism, Iraq, Security, Distribution of Wealth, Ethnicity, Sectarianism, Social Equity, Consociationalism, U.S. Operation Save Face.

Table of Contents

Chapters	Page
Chapter One.....	1
Democratic Transitional Models for Divided Societies.....	1
Chapter Two.....	8
Theoretical Framework.....	8
2.1 Imposed Democracy for Divided Society.....	8
2.2 Non-Majoritarian Models: Federalism vs. Consociationalism.....	9
2.3 Majoritarian Democratic Model.....	20
Chapter 3.....	24
Iraq Case Study.....	24
3.1 Prelude to the U.S. Invasion and the Ethnic Problem.....	24
3.2 The Baath's Secular Model.....	25
3.3 U.S. Imposition of Ethnic Democracy.....	27
3.4 Ethnic Democracy in Crisis.....	31
3.5 Iraqi Transitional Law: Federalization of Power.....	32
3.6 Elections and Constitution: Assessing Power Sharing Strategies in Transition.....	35
3.7 The change of political discourse during the 2009 Provincial Elections: the Consolidation of Power Sharing State.....	55
3.8 The Emergence of New Federalized Iraq after U.S. Pullout.....	57
Chapter 4.....	60
Iraq and Its Neighboring States' Foreign Policies.....	60
4.1 Foreign Policy in a Divided Society.....	60
4.2 Iran and Iraq Shia: A Long Awaited Foreign Relations.....	62
4.3 Syria and Secularization: De-Baathification vs. Baathification.....	66
4.4 Turkey and the Kurdish Question.....	72
4.5 Foreign Policy Assessment of Power Sharing Formulations.....	77
Chapter 5.....	79
Comparative Assessment of Power Sharing Models for Iraq.....	79
References:.....	86

List Of Tables

Table 1 : Iraq Traditional Government	35
---	----

Chapter One

Democratic Transitional Models for Divided Societies

Ever since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime (which has lasted until this day), a real and stable future for Iraq still seems blurry. The Iraqi experience has led to various disputes on which governing model would be the best for the stability of the country. The change of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world has been a real challenge for the region and the way to democracy has yet to be properly paved.

This research paper aims to analyze U.S. democratization of Iraq and its instated federal model. It examines various proposed power-sharing models that have been advanced as suitable for ethnically and religiously divided societies such as Iraq. These models have been vigorously debated in Iraq since 2003, these debates focused on the ability of each model to address four major challenges: ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, distribution of wealth, and security. Other factors affecting the agendas of the various domestic groups will also be considered in analyzing a suitable power sharing governing model. The paper examines Iraq's political culture, its historic identity crisis, and ultimately its strive for achieving ethnic consensus and political stability.

Scholars have examined transitional democratic models to authoritarian rules. This study considers four significant determinants of successful transition: security, ethnic consensus, equitable distribution of wealth, and common nationalism. It highlights the interrelations between these variables in their influence on transition. For instance, it shows how the issue of governance is significantly associated with the attainment of stability especially in deeply divided societies who have never experienced democratic governance.

Kaper and Smith demonstrate that the major threat to democratic transition in divided society lies in the momentum where “cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the strictest necessity for domination for one the cultural sections. It excludes the possibility of a consensus... and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group relationships” (Kaper and Smith 1969, 14). Such a dynamic, has since created an ongoing ethnic instabilities during transitions where the stakes of attaining equity and achieving common national identity become the focal points of disputes.

Middle Eastern states are among the remaining authoritarian regimes that have stood resilient to democratic global waves while maintaining a tradition of political repression against opposition. Perhaps, the lack of a transitional road map to the satisfaction of the various ethnic and sectarian groups in the Middle East can be held responsible for exceptional capacity of the authoritarian governments to easily abort efforts for democratic change. Diamond highlighted the lack of democracies in the Arab world, “

by then, a critical mass of democracies have existed in every major world region save one – the Middle East” (Diamond 2010, 2).

Lebanon is among the very few exceptions where consociationalism has given its sectarian groups diversified power to balance against potential authoritarian rules. Various scholars have suggested that perhaps the Lebanese and current Iraqi form of governance can very well be the suitable governing power-sharing model for ethnically divided or sectarian states. Diamond is one of the believers of this notion: “Iraq and Lebanon- for all their fractious, polarized divisions – are the two Arab countries closest to full electoral democracy today” (Diamond 2010, 4)

This is despite the fact that the Iraqi experience, and now Libya’s, transition is brought by external military intervention and has been largely viewed with suspicions. The federal governing model of Iraq has been assessed as an ingredient for ethnic division and colonial influence. Still, experts and scholars continue to debate best suitable governing model solution for the Iraq and forecast the best arrangement in which the country can achieve stability and move towards a more democratic regime.

Arendt Liphart has long established that “political culture and social structure are empirically related to political stability”. (Liphart 1969, 208) Thus the study of stability in any country must take into account both political culture and social structure of the country as the main factors responsible for enhancing political stability. In the case of

Iraq, it is evident that consensus among ethnic groups played a major role in bringing a false sense of stability to the country, despite Saddam Hussein's oppression of their political culture.

It is very important to note that Iraq is an ethnically divided country and each group has its own aspirations and vision of how Iraq's regime should be set up. Whether federalism, externally imposed or internally attained, is a suitable form of governance for a deeply divided society remains to be seen. The U.S. sponsored federalism in Iraq is still facing the major challenge of achieving stability in Iraq.

Another aim of this paper is to analyze U.S. democratization of Iraq and its instated federal model. It examines how and under what circumstances can be proposed power-sharing models for ethnically and sectarian divided societies such as Iraq achieve democratic transitions. Some of these models have been vigorously debated in Iraq since 2003, which focused on the ability to address four major challenges: ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, distribution of wealth, and security. The following sections examine Iraq's political culture, its historic identity crisis, and ultimately its striving to achieve ethnic consensus and political stability. External factor implicating domestic agendas of the various groups will also be considered in analyzing suitable power sharing governing model. Special attention will given to the suitability of the Lebanese Consociational model as it provides a comparative perspective, having both countries sharing similar cultural and political challenges.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Starting with this chapter as an introduction, Chapter two examines the various theories that have taken up the issues of power sharing formulations in divided countries. Particularly, it addresses three most important power-sharing theories: Federalism, Consociationalism, and Majoritarian-Secularism. Each theoretical view will be assessed in light of the four major challenges: security, distribution of wealth, ethnicity/sectarianism, and nationalism. The ultimate objective is to reveal the successes and the shortcomings of each of the three theories in addressing key challenges that confront governance in divided society undergoing democratic transformation and state building.

Chapter three introduces a brief background of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the proposed power-sharing models, the emerging external interventions that exacerbated domestic groups' grievances, and the experiences of power. Then, imposition of the U.S. sponsored federal model of power sharing in Iraq. It first highlights the major milestones beginning with the Iraqi Interim Government, Elections, Iraqi Constitution, and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq. The study of these key developments in Iraq provides circumstantial conditions upon which federal experience in Iraq was established. The achievements and failure of the imposed federal governing model is later assessed in light of the major challenges as previously provided.

Chapter four examines international relations of the various groups and their impact on the stabilization of Iraq. The neighboring countries' impact and relations with different ethnic groups are one of the most important factors in any study of power-sharing models. This chapter relates the Iraqi study to the three previously debated governing models in any powers-sharing governing model. Whether an alternative governing model, such as that of Lebanese Consociationalism may provide a better alternative to that of ethno-sectarian federalism in overcoming the challenges of a divided Iraqi society is assessed. The foreign policies adopted by Iran, Syria, Turkey, and the US have a direct influence on the various domestic groups in Iraq, whose cooperation is crucial to the implementation of a stable federal state in country.

Finally, chapter five provides conclusionary remarks that reflect the lessons learned from the Iraqi democratization experience amid deep internal division and external interventions. This examination provides insights as to how the Arab region undergoing deeply rooted transformation may need to undertake suitable governing models that serve democratic transition away from authoritarian rules. This model can achieve stability through providing ethnic/sectarian plurality, equity, and common national identity.

Such revelations can prove instrumental for transitional democracy in any state which has been dictated by tyrants for a long time. It will highlight the set-backs of gun barrel use in the democratization process in any multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian society. Moreover, it will stress on the underlying fears of any heterogeneous society which is

seeking to become a democracy. At the end, a suitable governing model revealed from comparative experience, particularly that of Iraq, will be suggestive in the instigation of democratic transitions and reforms.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Imposed Democracy for Divided Society

This chapter examines the relevant literature. It focuses on scholars that have taken interest in the issues of power sharing formulations in divided countries. It will stress the three most widely accepted models of power: Federalism, Consociationalism, and Majoritarian-Secularism. These models will be examined in light of the four major variables which are: security, distribution of wealth, ethnicity/sectarianism, and nationalism. The ultimate objective is to reveal the successes and the shortcomings of each of the three theories in addressing key challenges that confront governing in divided society undergoing democratic transformation and state building.

James Kurth considers that the experiences of West Germany and Japan “certainly demonstrate that military conquest and occupation can bring about successful democratization, “yet he stresses that every country or region has its own traits and cultural specifications”(Kurth 2005,207). However, we cannot apply these experiences to a different context especially in multi-ethnic societies. The homogeneity of both West Germany and Japan may have contributed to the success of democratization. Kurth goes on to explain the three major differences which might render to the success of military intervention and the imposition of democracies. The three important factors he discusses

are: a prior liberal experience, a greater foreign threat and an ethnically homogenous population. (Kurth 2005, 308-309)

The three variables Kurth mentions by do not apply to the Iraqi experience since the foreign threats may appeal to the different ethnic groups differently and its society is divided upon ethnic lines. Thus he concludes that “one can have an Iraq without a democracy or democracy without Iraq but not both”(Kurth 2005, 310).

However, this study rejects Kurth’s claim that Iraq cannot become a democratic country due to its cultural disposition. Yet as we have situated this study earlier, Kurth reconfirms our variables though in a different terminology. He speaks of security, nationalism, ethnic and sectarian divides. The additional variable taken into perspective for the achievement of democracy is distribution of wealth.

The study will now move to the theoretical frameworks of the three power-sharing models which are Federalism, Consociational Democracy, and majority/secular rule as to reveal how each of these models addresses the challenges of stability, consensus, equity, and common identity in a divided society.

2.2 Non-Majoritarian Models: Federalism vs. Consociationalism

Ardent Lijphart is among the most prominent thinkers regarding the theories of federalism and Consociational democracies. Lijphart gives a detailed account of the variables of the theory of federalism tracing the origins of federalism to political integration.

“ Federation was labeled earlier as a particular form of integration, but according to Deutsch’s terminology it should be referred to as a special type of amalgamation, because the former merger into a sovereign state” (Lijphart 1971, 3). The question he is trying to answer is how does a federation remain integrated? The variable in this study of federal theory is nationalism. Nationalism is directly related to community’s integration under one state especially in a deeply divided society. Lijphart concentrates on the “the relationship between cultural homogeneity and political integration” (Lijphart 1971, 4) Lijphart goes on to define nationality by saying it implies “ common values, thoughts, or feelings and a common attachment to symbols—in other words , a common culture” (Liphart 1971, 4). The lesson to take from this analysis is that nationalism can be understood as being synonymous to culture in this context.

Moreover, Lijphart stresses on how the international community has considered a common culture to be fundamental for any democratic country. “ The basis of a union cannot be the desire for economic advantages, protection against danger, or peace” (Lijphart 1971, 5) Here he explains Deutsch’s perspective on the importance of culture for the unification of one nation. Yet he goes on to explain the loopholes in this theory by showing how Etzioni counters Deutsche’s argument. As Etzioni states “sharing

culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it simply has little effect on political unification.” (Lijphart 1971, 7)

Lijphart’s analysis of the two counter arguments states that “the causes and conditions of federation do not constitute the primary focus of studies of federalism” (Lijphart 1971, 8). Lijphart continues to emphasize Riker’s analysis of federalism by stating that “there are two necessary conditions for the striking of a “federal bargain”: a desire to expand territorial control and external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity” (Lijphart 1971, 8). Here the second variable for federalism is security.

In Lijphart’s comparison of federal and consociational democracies, he highlights the similarities and differences of both governing models and the feasibility of their intersection. It is not necessary for a federal state to be consociational or vice versa. He starts by considering that “federalism and Consociationalism do not coincide, although they do overlap to an important extent if we add a few characteristics to the concept of federalism, we arrive at the concept of Consociationalism” (Lijphart 1985, 3).

The counter argument is also true of federalism. The common grounds of both theories undermine majoritarian democracy. The argument starts by defining the two concepts. Consequently Lijphart points out that “Consociational democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from normative democratic theory” (Lijphart 1969, 214).

Before going into a detailed account of the features of Consociational democracy and compare it with federalism a consideration of the theoretical background of Consociationalism is necessary. “Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”(Lijphart 1969, 216). Hence, the elite should have the ability to understand and contain the different ethnic or sectarian aspirations within their communities. Liphart has also defined the different terms he used and pinpointed the important elements for the stability of Consociational democracies. “The essential characteristic of Consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilize their system” (Lijphart 1969, 213).

Here the question which poses itself is what can bring the elite cartel to work together in order to sustain the stability of the country in light of its diversity. Liphart attributes the causes behind it to three conducive characteristics which are the existence of external threats, balance of power among subcultures, and the preservation of an equilibrium within the subcultures which makes the decision making apparatus easier to attain. (Lijphart 1969, 217-219) These mark the variables this paper is studying especially security on the internal and external level and the distribution of wealth which would help in the balancing of power among the subcultures when the country is relatively rich with natural wealth.

Lijphart does not stop at defining the fundamentals of Consociational democracy. In a subsequent study, he goes on to identify the different attributes of it. Thus he pursued his study of the notion of Consociational democracy and also considered it “can be defined in terms of two primary attributes – grand coalition and segmental autonomy – and two secondary characteristics – proportionality and minority veto “ (Lijphart 1985, 4). The key element here is power sharing since Consociationalism is rooted in deeply divided societies whether they are ethnic or sectarian. This form of power sharing makes sure those minorities’ rights are preserved.

In a review of the Lebanese Consociational model, Michael Hudson refers to the main two scholars of this theory which are Ardent Lijphart and Eric Nordlinger. In addition to the above mentioned conditions that Ardent set for the Consociational model to work, Nordlinger also proposed six conflict-regulating practices which are “1. Stable coalition, 2. Proportionality, 3. Depoliticization, 4. Mutual Veto, 5. Compromise, 6. Concessions by the stronger to the weaker”(Hudson 1976, 113). He concludes that given these conditions of Consociationalism are met; the stability of the country should be guaranteed.

Yet, Lebanon is a big example of how it has failed to abide by these guidelines since the eruption of civil war. He continues to consider the main difficulty of this theory to be “intrinsically too static to accommodate the enormous social and political forces unleashed by social mobilization” (Hudson 1976, 113). In short, Hudson blames the confessional system in itself as the root of the problem.

Federalism “ can also be defined in terms of primary and secondary principles. The primary federal characteristic is a guaranteed division of power between central and regional governments” (Lijphart 1985, 4). As for the secondary characteristics he divided them into five component units which are:

“(1) a written constitution which specifies the division of power and guarantees to both the central and the regional governments that their allotted powers cannot be taken away; (2) a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large and the other the component units of the federations; (3) over-representation of the smaller component units in the federal chamber of the bicameral legislature; (4) the right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal constitution and to change their own constitutions unilaterally; and (5) decentralized government, that is the regional governments’ share of power in a federation is relatively large compared with that of regional governments in unitary states.” (Lijphart 1985, 4-5)

Lijphart explains how Consociational democracies can be federal and vice versa. Consociational democracies must thus follow the primary and secondary characteristics of the federation from the central-regional division of power, internal constitutional autonomy, decentralization, written constitution, bicameralism and minority representation. (Lijphart 1985, 5)

If a federal state seeks to become a Consociational federal democracy, then there are additional rules to be taken into consideration. To start with, a federal state is not necessarily a democracy. Thus the rule is that “ the federation must be a democracy” (Lijphart 1985, 5). Lijphart goes on to tackle the plurality of the society which is an important ingredient in the Maronite marriage between Consociational and federal democracy. Moreover, all the principles of the primary and secondary attributes should be applied. The divides of the component units should be based on the ethnic or sectarian divides of the country in a geographical way. Ethnicity/sectarianism can thus be seen to be at the heart of the concept of Consociationalism.

Brian Berry is one of the major critics of this theory especially in the case of Northern Ireland where he recommends “ cooperation without cooptation” (Lijphart 2008, 76) meaning that both the majority and the minority ethnic or sectarian groups of a country promise to behave moderately. He presupposes that this would be an ethical form of conduct when it comes to politics. However, Lijphart points out the weakness of this argument by considering that “ this is a primitive solution to ethnic tensions and extremism, and it is naïve to expect minorities condemned to permanent opposition to remain loyal, moderate, and constructive. Barry’s suggestion therefore cannot be – and in practice, has not been- a serious alternative to power sharing”(Lijphart 2008, 77).

Similarly, Donald Horowitz has developed Berry's concept by devising "a method to induce moderation called "alternative vote" or "instant run off"" (Lijphart 2008, 77). This method would supposedly encourage the election of moderate representatives.

Lijphart tries to apply these methods on the Iraqi case. Accordingly, he considered that "Horowitz's model would generate a body consisting mainly of the Shi'ite majority, with the proviso that most of these representatives would be chosen in such a way that they would be sympathetic to the interests of the Sunni and Kurdish minority" (Lijphart 2008, 77). As Lijphart notes, such a formula would only lead to failure since the security of the minorities has not been addressed properly. "In sum, power sharing has proven to be the only democratic model that appears to have much chance of being adopted in divided societies"(Lijphart 2008, 77)

Another power-sharing theory related to this study is federalism. Federalism is a very old notion though it does not imply that a federal state has to be democratic. Dimitrios Karimis and Wayne Norman defined federalism as "an arrangement in which two or more self-governing communities share the same political space" (Karimis and Norman 2005, 3). They trace back the question of why people choose federalism to the fact that "it gives a self-governing political community the best of both worlds: the advantages of being a relatively small, homogenous polity along with the advantages of being part of a stronger, more secure larger state or alliance; while at the same time avoiding some of the worst disadvantages of being either too small or too large" (Karimis and Norman 2005, 8).

They go on to spell out what they consider to be the four pillars of federalism. These are: the division of power, representation in central institutions, the integration of markets and legal systems, and the amending formula or provisions for secession. (Karimis and Norman 2005, 14). These four elements mark the most important aspects of federalism in both uninational and multinational countries, yet the particulars differ.

John Stuart Mill outlines the three necessary predispositions of federalism. “The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations” (Mill 1861). By mutual sympathy he means race, religion, language, political institutions and identity.

The second condition is “separate states be nor so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength and the third condition is “that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states”. (Mill 1861)

Franz Neumann briefly summarizes the function of federalism as follows:

- “ 1. Presidential or parliamentary democracy
2. Separation of power (checks and balances)

3. The party system;

And the social and economic factors are these:

1. The extent of the pluralistic structure of society
2. The urban-rural ratio
3. The degree of concentration of economic power” (Karimis and Norman 2005, 208)

Richard Ballamy and Dario Castiglione considered that “ the federal model seemed better adapted to conditions of cultural and linguistic diversity, or situations where for either historical or geographical reasons there was no great homogeneity within the state” (Karimis and Norman 2005, 294). They also trace back the origin of federalism and its value. Consequently, they considered that federalism was developed as a form of checks and balances as Neumann also stressed.

In a comparison by Daniel Elazar between federalism and Consociational regimes, he considered that “ the formal is usually presented as quite rigid while the latter is presented as extraordinarily flexible”(Elazar 1985, 19). Moreover, he goes on to pinpoint the mistakes several scholars of international affairs have made when trying to compare the two power sharing models. A very important critique is of those who differentiate between unity and diversity. “ Unity should be contrasted disunity and

diversity with homogeneity, emphasizing the political dimensions and implications of each”(Elazar 1985, 23).

Scholars are usually interested in the means federalism provides to attain the larger ends such as “ political unification, democracy, popular self-government, the accommodation of diversity and so on”(Elazar 1985, 28). While on the other hand, Consociationalism emancipates out of the need to reach a compromise among the different camps since “if they had their way, would seek domination or elimination of each other but which have come to recognize that the internal balance of power in the polity does not permit that to happen. Hence such regimes are means of reconciliation but cannot be ends in and of themselves” (Elazar 1985,28).

After a thorough study of federalism and Consociational regimes, Elazar concludes that “federalism is the form of a polity while Consociationalism refers to a polity’s regime” (Elazar 1985, 29). By polity he meant the institutions and constitution of the regime where he wraps up by mentioning that no federal regimes have given on it except in the cases of an external power’s invasion. Moreover, it is important to note that change does in fact happen within the federal system since it is not a static governing model unlike the Consociational model which was earlier described as “static” by Hudson. In addition to these two points he reflects on the inclination of federal Consociational regimes to survive longer than just Consociational ones (Elazar 1985, 29-30). In sum “Consociationalism appears to be a relatively transient regime arrangement. Indeed, the classic consociations seem to last for about two generations before giving way to some

other form of regime, which, coincidentally or not, is about the length of time that a majority party maintains its majority coalition intact in two party systems” (Elazar 1985, 31).

2.3 Majoritarian Democratic Model

In a comparison between Majoritarian Regimes and power-sharing regimes, Lijphart highlights the major difference between the two theories where by “the former seek to concentrate power as much as possible in the hands of the majority, whereas the latter try to include as many citizens as possible in the sharing of power” (Lijphart 2008, 126). Majoritarians’ reasoning behind this basic attribute of sharing model lies in their belief that minorities power might prevail or sharing the power with them might lead to political and institutional deadlocks. As quoted by Liphart, Alexander Hamilton stressed by giving minorities any kind of power over the majority might lead to “ tedious delays; continual negotiations and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good”. (Lijphart 2008, 127)

Liphart states the gap between the theoretical framework and practice of it since democracies “almost uniformly deviate from majoritarian decision-making rules, to adopt mechanisms more likely to rally a broad consensus”(Lijphart 2008, 111). There are two reasons behind this split; to start with, newly born democracies need to consensus democracy “because they suffer from more serious internal cleavages and face more sensitive and divisive issues”(Lijphart 2008, 111). Moreover, associating

democracy with majority rule is so prevalent which comprises a major impediment to any consideration of consensus. He notes that “ democratization means the drafting of democratic constitutions, and the careful drafting of a new or improved constitution starts badly if it takes the majoritarian definition of democracy as its only point of departure” (Lijphart 2008, 111).

Consequently, majoritarian rule does not take minorities rights into perspective by considering that the new democracies will be formed in homogenous environments. This bears on four variables for a newly-established democracy especially when it comes to nationhood and security. By dismissing the needs of the minorities, insecurities regarding their status will inevitably arise as in the case of Iraq. By concentrating power in the hands of the majority, this kind of governance does not give any kind of leverages to the other various groups, whether they were ethnic or sectarian, and only protects the interests of the majorities.

According to Roland Pennock’s conception of democracy, “rule by the majority is often alleged to be the very essence of democracy”.(Pennock 1979, 370) This has been refuted by Robert Dahl where he considered that “ no one has ever advocated, and no one except its enemies has ever defined democracy to mean that a majority would or should do anything it felt an impulse to do. Every advocate of democracy ... and every friendly definition of it, includes the idea of restraints on majorities”(Dahl 1971, 36).

There is a general assumption that some kind of constraint will be put on the majority once they are in rule, Dahl goes on to explain the form of these constraints which are: “(1) ethical and cultural constraints, primarily operative at the level of the individual consciences, (2) social checks and balances, or (3) legal and constitutional constraints”(Dahl 1956, 36). These constraints are either legally enforced, by the legislative, executive, or judicial or, socially imposed by the local norms and practices.

But this argument is fallacious. If these constraints are to be applied formally, the majority are the ones who will control this application. This is due to the fact that they are the ones employed in the different governmental bodies. On the other hand, if the constraints are to be enforced via social checks and boundaries, these checks will depend only on the very same individuals’ ethics, therefore, the majority’s code of conduct. But it is this very standard which is called into question.

Lijphart explores this avenue by concluding that “any limits the majority poses upon itself can also be removed by it” (Lijphart 2008, 113). Moreover, he considers that “it is wrong and dangerous to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that majority rule is the only or the only legitimate form of democracy” (Lijphart 2008, 114).

Lijphart goes into more details regarding majority rule in practice. It is very important to pinpoint the characteristics of the majoritarian regime and how the power distribution would be done. To start with, majority rule means the concentration of power in the

hands of one major group. This group should be made up of essentially one political party which dominates the legislature and the cabinet. Consequently, “ the legislature should obviously be unicameral in order to ensure that there is only one clear majority, that is, in order to avoid the possibility of competing majorities that may occur in two chambers”(Liphart 2008, 115). As for the government, its system should be unitary and centralized. In this case, the constitution should not be engineered in a way that impedes the work and legislations of this majority in any geographical or institutional way. Finally, any amendment to the constitution can be exercised by a simple majority.

These are the set rules for majoritarian regimes to succeed. Liphart added to them more characteristics which might be vital when taking an empirical perspective. A two party system which “when two major parties dominate the party system, it is highly likely that one of them will emerge as the winning or majority even in elections”(Liphart 2008, 115). This system is further augmented by a plural form of elections “ to the extent that there is only one dominant cleavage, typically socio-economic or left-right division, in a country and its party system” (Liphart 2008,115).

In conclusion, the three different governing theories which will be used in this study are Consociationalism, Federalism and Majoritarian. After this look at the literature of the theories, this paper will analyze the Iraqi case after the toppling of the Baath regime in light of the four variables under study and assessment of federalism in Iraq.

Chapter 3

Iraq Case Study

3.1 Prelude to the U.S. Invasion and the Ethnic Problem

In this chapter, the Iraqi experience will be examined in detail. In 2003 the US led intervention caused the toppling of Saddam Hussein's oppressive dictatorial regime. This necessitated a new governing model for the country. General consensus is that the federal model would be most suitable for the Iraq. The most relevant aspects for this study of the new federal governing model of Iraq are: The democratic elections of 2005, the Iraqi constitution, elections of 2009, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq and its repercussions, and the 2010 elections. Moreover, we will take a look at the federal set-up of Iraq as imposed by the United States in the past 8 years.

While we study these important events that happened to Iraq, we will be critically analyzing the governing model imposed on this multi-ethnic country and its pros and cons. The four variables (security, ethnicity, nationalism and distribution of wealth) will be closely examined in regards to the events which have happened in Iraq.

Toby Dodge considers that “ in the space of two years, because of the invasion and then state collapse, Iraq went from rogue, the first category of problematic state to the

second, collapsed” (Dodge 2005, 706). This study will test the feasibility of this theory in the following chapter by examining the different aspects of the Iraqi case.

3.2The Baath’s Secular Model

Before proceeding to the milestone that changed Iraq’s reality and discussing the different governing models, a brief look at the environment in which Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime were toppled in 2003 is in order.

Throughout the history of the Iraqis, they have been divided upon different lines. Their identity was pretty much looked at from “an individual’s regional background, family, clan, and tribal affiliations” (Sluglett 1991, 1411). The Sunnis have historically ruled Iraq since the Ottoman Empire. Though a minority, they have maintained their status in power since the Ottoman Empire, passing through the British Mandate, the Hashemite monarchy, and the Ba’ath regime.

The Ba’ath came into power in 1958 until it was overthrown by the United States’ invasion of Iraq. Though when it first came into power, the Ba’ath regime presented itself as a secular party; yet the underlying Sunnis preference was at its core. According to Tripp, Al-Bakr the first president after the Coup, was “ imbued with a keen awareness of status distinctions between different lineages and clans among the Sunni

Arabs which he, along with the greater part of the officer corps, saw as distinct from and superior to the Shi'i Arabs and Kurds of Iraq" (Tripp 2000, 195).

After the rise of Saddam Hussein to power in 1979, many changes were introduced to the regime. The security apparatus and the army were all loyal to Saddam, the top positions were held by Sunni Arabs with intimate connections to Saddam. As Tripp summarizes this period, "obedience to Saddam Hussain and proximity to him were now to be the criteria for promotion and indeed for political- and sometimes actual-survival". (Tripp 2000, 223)

The main difference between the two Ba'ath leaders was the way they conducted their rule. Thus instead of the Ba'ath party representing a secular, pan-Arab alternative to the Iraqis, it was used by Saddam Hussein to coerce power and manipulate the people the way he wanted. Therefore, the Baath was not a party that represented the Sunnis per se, since there were Sunnis who were repressed also by the party.

The Ba'ath's "patronage was not confined to the clans of the Sunni Arabs north-west, although the commanding positions in the regime and the security services without exception went to men from such backgrounds" (Tripp 2000, 227). The power of Saddam Hussein was increasing by time. After he came to power he went into two wars. The two Gulf wars initiated by Saddam represented his power in both the party's ideology and the region. Although a lot of Ba'athists have adhered to Saddam's actions;

yet, these actions can be seen as the need for survival under such a strong tyrant's will. It should not be assumed that the Ba'ath party was fully loyal to Saddam.

3.3 U.S. Imposition of Ethnic Democracy

U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 after trying to prove to the International community and to the Americans the threat of Saddam's regime. The primary reason for the invasion of Iraq, according to the Bush administration, was its threat to the U.S. national security and Iraq's production of chemical weapons. For Americans, "United States attacked Iraq after a brief warning; it would be a preemptive strike, in this context, preventing Iraq from taking military action first." (Carlise 2005, 68). Thus the invasion of Iraq was not based on concrete proof of these chemical weapons or on the assumption of an Iraqi attack on the U.S. Yet the invasion became a reality in March 2003 and the coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. Saddam Hussein and his top officials were executed and the Ba'ath party was dismembered and ousted from any participation in the political life of Iraq.

This had further implications on the Iraqi crisis. Iraq is going "through a process of reconstruction as the Shi'ites are being empowered and the Kurds are reentering the political process." (Bahgat 2005, 102) Nevertheless, the harsher reality is the insurgency, which is threatening all ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq. Most prominently, al-Qaeda has managed to infuse itself within the Sunni Iraqis as their alternative in the struggle against American intervention. Bymann gives an account on

how the invasion has helped Al-Qaeda. In his account, he considers that “the Iraqi invasion has inspired a new generation of young Muslims around the world. The War outraged Muslim militants, many of whom embraced bin Laden’s form of violence.” (Bymann 2007, 43)

According to Mohammedi and Al-Kaderi, the neo conservatives have been on advocating war on Iraq prior September 11. They claim that “neo-conservative officials—have been arguing for some time that Saddam Hussein’s regime needs to be toppled”. (Mohammedi and Alkaderi 2002, 3). The toppling of the Ba’ath regime is thus a blow in the face of its leaders and followers. Moreover, it has weakened the Sunni sect who has been the historical figures of power in Iraq. The Sunnis and especially the followers of the Ba’ath regime opposed immensely the issue of military intervention, which the neo-conservatives saw as the only possible solution for Iraq. Neo-cons have been the promoters of the military actions in Iraq since the 1991 Gulf war. (Mohammedi and Alkaderi 2002, 3)

The neo-conservatives believe that “America should use its military power to reshape the world to suit its interest” (Mearsheimer 2005, 2). The use of military power has been directed towards the heart of the Sunni rule; thus weakening their position in the country and the instigating the rise of different religious realities which have long been oppressed. Moreover, according to the neo-conservative logic, the war on Iraq would help in “bandwagoning” other rivals even allies in this case. On the other hand, the

realists believed that the United States would have to double their efforts in the region after the preemptive war on Iraq. (Mearsheimer 2005, 2)

Mearsheimer has elaborated on this point and tried to prove that the war has been unnecessary on Iraq especially using the logic Bush has used to initiate the war. He did not accept the notion of preventive war since there was no threat to begin with. He goes on to say that “Saddam thus has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies – unless his survival is threatened.” (Mearsheimer 2003, 55) Thus the propaganda used by the neo-cons and Bush himself in his rhetoric on the importance of this war is a fallacy to begin with. Saddam’s survival was not threatened by the United States or any of its allies’ since historically with all the sanctions Iraq has faced, the Baath regime did not wage any war or terrorist threat on the U.S. Saddam was only a threat to his own people, thus democratization was the most impeding issue in this case.

Though the classical realist theory of balance of power and the state as the sole actor do not adhere to the different religious and sectarian concerns, yet they all agreed on the fallacy of the argument of the attack on Iraq. For the region to enjoy a balance of power, Iraq would need to maintain rather than oust its Sunni regime. This is in order to match the Shi’ite power in Iran. Thus the balance of power in the region is not an issue that ought to concern the United States.

From the Wilsonian point of view, democracy and autonomy may adhere to the realist perspective. While the Wilsonian stand would “focus on promoting democracy, which they believe is the most powerful political ideology on the face of the earth” (Mearsheimer 2005, 4), yet the Iraqis in general are very suspicious of the imposition of such a democracy. Democracy should be done by the people and not imposed from above. Moreover, the existence of a strong civil society and a strong middle class are the cornerstones of democracy. Democracy is achieved gradually, and must be approached incrementally by all the different ethnic groups. For democracy to be legitimate, it must spring from within the different ethnic groups. Further, a country being democratic does not commit it to a particular governing model. The Wilsonian school holds that democracy cannot happen overnight through external intervention, it is an internal matter.

The U.S. intervention was seen as a tool to exploit Iraq and to once again colonize it in a new disguise as well as weakening central state authority in favor of splintering ethnic and sectarian divisions particularly along Shi’ite and Sunni perspectives. These arguments will be further highlighted while also studying the case of Iraq. It will be seen how the different ethnic and religious groups have used this argument to rally the people against the U.S. intervention. How the terrorist acts were also done under this specific alibi will also be shown. The logic behind it was their common rhetoric for their condemnation of the U.S. military operation in Iraq.

Another major issue which has weakened the cause of the U.S. mission in Iraq was the dismantling of the Iraqi Army. The Army is traditionally seen as the cornerstone state security represents a powerful neutral force in country which is invaluable in times of instability. Although the Army was created by the Baath regime, there is no good reason to assume that with the toppling of the regime the army could play no positive, stabilizing role. The army's dismantlement has led to the lack of a consistent security in Iraq thus exacerbating the acts of terror that took place and still are taking place until this day.

3.4 Ethnic Democracy in Crisis

It is evident from both the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives and the rising concerns on both sides that democracy has a long way to go. A governance model cannot be made overnight without an in-depth study of the political environment and concern in each country on its own. Salamey pithily notes "it is evident that the governance model for a specific country must take into account circumstances in the inter-ethnic demographic mix: the history of inter-ethnic tension and conflict; the extent of ethnic cross-border linkages and interventions; the degree of economic development and resource distribution; and the existing democratic tradition". (Salamey 2005, 196)

After Operation Iraqi Freedom better known as the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the “initial effort to restore political sovereignty to Iraqis began on November 15, 2003 after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi GC reached an agreement for the transfer of power and the establishment of a Transitional Iraqi Government (TG) by June 2004”(Salamey 2005, 191).

The United States advisors on the future of Iraq posed primary questions on the way forward “including determining the authority of the occupying power, balancing Shi’ite ambition, Kurdish separatism, and Sunni alienation; creating a system of checks and balances; and enshrining respect for human rights in the law” (Marr 2005, 181).

This background on the U.S. decision to invade Iraq will set up the context for further study of the federal state of Iraq. As this study aims to analyze the events which took place after the U.S. invasion and try to assess the federal model specifically in regards to the four variables which are nationalism, ethnicity/sectarianism, distribution of wealth and security, this historical information is critical to the study. The debate on whether the federal model fits the Iraqi experience can be shown through further analysis of the phases of the democratization process.

3.5Iraqi Transitional Law: Federalization of Power

The second milestone in the future of Iraq was the Transitional Administrative Law which was the work of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as a means to transfer

power to a new sovereign Iraqi interim government. “CPA and the Iraq Governing Council took a fundamental step toward this goal in March 2004, when they signed the Law of Administration for the state of Iraq for the Transitional Period (hereafter referred to as the transitional law). The transitional Law is intended to govern the affairs of Iraq until the Iraqis approve a permanent constitution and a permanent Iraqi government takes office” (GOA 2004, 1). However, it did not fully gain a complete Iraqi back up to its mission since it “fell far short of gaining the consensus of Iraqis, and instead it became an issue for exploiting the ethno-religious divide” (Salamey 2005, 192).

The role of the transitional law was to organize the political and federal life of the new Iraq. Accordingly, “the Iraq government will be a federal system designed to prevent concentration of power in the federal government and to encourage the exercise of local authority and participation in government affairs “(GOA 2004, 8).

In short, the role of the different 18 governorates will “name a governor and form municipal and local councils. Elections for governorate councils will take place at the same time as elections for the National Assembly (no later than January 31, 2005). Governorate councils will have the authority to impose taxes and fees, organize administration of the governorate, implement projects at the provincial level independently or with other organizations, and conduct other activities consistent with applicable laws. In addition, governorate councils will assist the federal government in coordinating federal ministry operations within their governorates, including reviewing


annual ministry plans and budgets as they relate to activities in the governorate. The transitional law also encourages the federal government to devolve other functions to lower levels of government where appropriate. “ (GOA 2004, 9)

Many Iraqis were very suspicious of the role the National Assembly and the TAL as they had complete power over all the aspects of citizens’ daily life. The most prominent opposing sect was the Sunnis as they considered the January 2005 as an affirmation of ousting them from power. (Marr 2005, 180)

Furthermore, the TAL “ also excluded important political constituencies which are not represented on the governing council, including (but not limited to) the group associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sunni Council, Arab nationalists, credible civil society groups and professional associations” (Al-Shahristani 2004, 32). This was a major setback for the TAL since it did not gain the legitimacy it had been seeking since its appointment.

The following table shows the different power structure under the Iraqi Transitional Law.

Table 1



Source: GAO analysis of the Law of Administration of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 8, 2004.

3.6 Elections and Constitution: Assessing Power Sharing Strategies in Transition

This transition led to the first post-Saddam elections on January 30, 2005, “for a 275-seat transitional Assembly; a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 seats each; 51 Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats)” (Katzman 2006, 1). They all fell under the transitional assembly which chose the “presidency council” made up of the president and two deputies, the prime minister and the cabinet. Their mission was to draft the constitution and re-run elections for a permanent government. It is very important to note that the elections were conducted based on

closed-list proportional representation with female representation in every third position. (Katzman 2006, 1)

When taking a closer look at the interest of the various groups who turned out for the elections, “those best positioned: Shi’ite Islamist Parties, the Kurds, and established secular parties” (Katzman 2006, 2). The Sunnis were dispersed between moderate and hard-line Islamists where the latter called for election boycotts due to their fears of misrepresentation. Although the Bush administration tried their best to follow the strategy of “ inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority protections”(Conetta 2005, 1), yet in December 2005 a major observation of the new elections showed that the procedures have put the Sunni Arabs of Iraq at a great disadvantage since “about 24 percent of Iraq’s population resides in Sunni Arab majority provinces – but the present elections system allots them only 20 percent of the 230 assigned seats” (Conetta 2005, 1). This is of great importance since it pinpoints the problematic aspects of power-sharing in a federal model under different ethnicities. The fears of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq were translated into violent actions against the whole governing model. When ethnicities feel their representation has been threatened in power, security will be shaken. This also leads to a shard in the nationalistic aspirations of the country as they all have different agendas and different visions of Iraq.

Conetta supports this by considering “ the incidence of terrorist violence and military operations is much higher in Sunni areas than elsewhere” (Conetta 2005, 3). Even with their boycott of elections in January 2005. The Sunni Arabs won only 17 seats. The U.S. officials observed that factions that formed the government at that time were not

“sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one of the two deputy presidents; one of the three deputy prime ministers; Defense Minister; and five other ministers”(Katzman 2006, 2). Predictably the Shi’ites and the Kurds, both of whom objected heavily to the Sunni drafted constitution, dominated all the other positions

In another study of the January 2005 Iraqi elections, Carl Conetta highlights the fact that “the problems with the Iraqi election process do not end with the Sunni community” (Conetta 2005, 2). He uses the term “bait and switch” in his attempt to explain the problems of the elections as perceived by the Iraqi population. Accordingly, “the “bait” is the promise that by casting ballots Iraqis can reclaim their government and their sovereignty” (Conetta 2005, 2). What does that mean? In other words, the Iraqis started to feel the need for a change in their country after the U.S. occupation. Their aspirations and concerns for Iraq were put into two important issues at stake. They “want the United States out and do not trust the governing authorities it has put in place”(Conetta 2005, 2).

This is one of the four variables under study: security. It has united the Shi’ites and the Sunnis on a common resentment of the U.S. occupation as shown in the polls conducted during that time. A secret poll was carried out in Iraq after January 2005’s elections showing that “ most slates in the January 2005 election -- including the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which won the election -- had in their platform the demand for a timetable for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq”(Achcar& Shalom 2005).

However, the elections might be a reassertion of the then-current status quo at the time. Conetta defines the “switch”: “Most Iraqis will go to the polls expecting to achieve one thing while actually legitimizing a different outcome”(Conetta 2005, 2). In the case of 2005 elections, it legitimized the invasion of Iraq by U.S. troops and their presence in the country. He concludes his account of the January elections: “Both the structure and context of the political process will likely frustrate the will of the people. The election as currently designed is not merely “flawed”. It is part of a counterfeit process that will impede the development of a truly sovereign and stable Iraq”. (Conetta 2005, 3).

Whereas on the other hand, the elections will be the victory of Bush’s vision in Iraq and not a real democratic practice since the features of the process has been foggy and unclear for most Iraqis. Conetta also outlines the shape of the electoral process in two major categories which are “Utter confusion will cloud the voters’ choices” and “the expatriate parties favored by the United States will enter the election contest with overwhelming advantages in resources and organization” (Conetta 2005, 4) These two important factors played a major role in the outcome of the elections.

Another objection to those elections was the fact that there was no allocation of any assembly seats to provinces. Iraq was considered as a single electoral district which counters the federal theory. The problem mainly worsened due to “the fact that ethno-religious group tend to concentrate geographically. Thus, the regional fight over basic representation takes an ethnic hue, with each group always threatening to relatively disenfranchise the other” (Conetta 2005, 4).

The Iraqi Transitional Administration Law (TAL) set the course of action for the constitution's adoption with very thorough deadlines. However, administrating a new constitution for a troubled state is not an easy process. It stated the completion of the draft constitution by the National Assembly by August 15th, 2005. Furthermore, " the referendum on the permanent constitution is to be held by October 15, 2005; if the constitution is approved, then Iraq's third elections of 2005 will be held by December 15 for whatever permanent structures are dictated by the permanent constitutional text"(Brown 2005, 4).

The constitution is one of the most important milestones of the new Iraq. As Mohamed Shaker stresses "the stability inside Iraq can only be judged when the people themselves would be allowed to elect their own representatives and agree on their new constitution in the year 2005. This would be the real test for the stability of Iraq" (Shaker 2004, 76). Furthermore, the constitution was always the real trigger for the political stability or instability in any nation or country. As Al-Sharistani explains "without a legitimate process leading to a consensus-based agreement, the political dynamics in Iraq will continue to revolve around force and survival rather than democratization and security" (Al-Shahristani 2004, 33).

So what happened after the Iraqi Transitional Law and the first elections took place in January 2005?

In April 2005, the parliament selected Jalal Talabani (Kurd) as the President and Ibrahim Jaafari (Shi'ite) as Prime Minister. The sectarian issue is one of the key issues in the Iraqi crisis. As the “war on Iraq has accentuated and dramatized the existence of the three major fabrics of the Iraqi society: the Shi'ites in the south, the Sunnis in the center and the Kurds in the North” (Shaker 2004, 76).

The issues of controversy which were mainly highlighted by Brown were religion specifically Islam, Federalism, Security, and Structures of Authority. These are the variables used in this study of Iraq in addition to the distribution of wealth.

To start with, religion and more specifically sectarian or ethnic issues were of main concern to the engineers of the Iraqi constitution. The constitution cannot exist without taking into consideration the most disputed issue in a deeply divided country such as Iraq. The key issue is Islam or appliance of the Sharia Law. According to Brown, “ the TAL introduced complicated new language – making no reference to shari'a as such, but stating that Islam would be a source of legislation and that no law could be issued that “contradicted the fixed elements of Islam that are the subject of consensus” (Brown 2005, 7). Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution states that “First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation”.

This article has created much tension in Iraq especially in the Shiaa sect over the fact that for them Islam was established as “ “a” source rather than “the” source of legislation” (Salamey 2005, 193). The implication here is that other religious or secular parties might be able to impose new legislations in the future according to the Iraqi constitution.

Another issue of great importance to consider the fears of the various groups or ethnicities in Iraq as Saddam Hussein’s rule was predominantly oppressive of the country’s minorities. Rend Rahim Frencke best summarized the two objectives of the peace-building process in Iraq that might be reflected as a start in the constitution. As a start, it is vital “to ensure that different ethnicities can coexist in peace, that no single group has an overriding power over the other, and that the interests of all groups are in balance”, while on the other hand, there is a need “ to create a strong Iraqi identity and a sense of common Iraqi citizenship”(Francke 2003). Security is the power and resources of each ethnic group and nationalism are the core of the solution of the Iraqi crises. The constitution and the governing model of Iraq have been engineered to secure these essential variables in the peace building process. An example which was disputed on different levels and which might lead to the normalization of inter-ethnic relations is Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Article 58 was used to set the outline of the pressing disputable issues in Iraq. “Article 58(A) outlines mechanisms for resolving disputes over property rights; Articles 58(B) and (C) discuss the possible mechanisms and timing for determining the status of disputed territories”(GOA 2004, 13). The engineers of the Iraqi constitution took this article into great consideration due

to its significance in aligning the different fractions of Iraq. Article 140 states the following:

“ Article 140:

First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all the subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.

Second: The responsibility taken upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and consensus and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.” (Iraqi Constitution 2005)

The issue of Kirkuk needs a thorough analysis but for the time being it remained part of the central government until a consensus is reached. The point in these two articles was to set the outlines of disputed matters and put them into a political and governing framework. They were given priority due to their resemblance of political unity between the different ethnic bodies in Iraq.

As to religious fears, the Iraqi constitution gave very important sections to the freedom of worship as included in Articles 39 and 41 whereby:

“Article 39: Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices. This shall be regulated by law.

Article 41: First: The followers of all religions and sects are free in the: A. Practice of religious rites, including the Husseinian ceremonies (Shi'ite religious ceremonies) B. Management of the endowments, its affairs and its religious institutions. The law shall regulate this. Second: The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of the places of worship” (Iraqi Constitution 2005).

Though the republic of Iraq has been declared as an Islamic republic; nonetheless, all religions have the freedom to choose and practice their own beliefs. This helps lessen the religious fears in any of the different ethnicities present in Iraq.

In a pre-evaluation of the issues concerning the problems which may arise from the imposition of federalism on Iraq, Nathan Brown considered that “the principle is not the issue – none of the major groups likely to play an active role oppose the idea. Instead, arguments will focus on substance and detail. The issue is difficult both because of the historical background and the current situation” (Brown 2005, 8). The United States is trying to create a federal state in Iraq after it has long experienced a centralized state.

The first difficulty which surfaced, as mapped by Brown, was the recognition by the TAL of three levels of government which were “central, regional and provincial. The middle category – regional government – was created only for the Kurdish region, but other regions are offered the option of emulating the Kurdish example”(Brown 2005, 9). This is the first challenge for federalism in Iraq. The Kurds have been given a greater veto power in the constitution which might prove threatening to the other two major groups, the Shi’ites and the Sunnis.

The constitution has come to assert the new identity of Iraq where the first article states “The Republic of Iraq is an independent, sovereign nation, and the system of rule in it is a democratic, federal, representative (parliamentary) republic”(Iraqi Constitution 2005)

Moreover, the constitution outlines the authority of the federal government in Article 107.“Article 107: The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the following matters: First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy;

Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and managing armed forces to secure the protection, and to guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq;”

The powers of the federal government will not be of major dispute with the regional and provincial since it will be a uniting factor between the different powers and will only deal with international affairs and security with one capital which is Baghdad. Ibrahim Al-Mashri explains the governing model outlined in the constitution. “In other words, two governorates could form their own entity or all nine can unite in this manner” (Al-Marashi 2005, 152). Moreover, he highlights the importance of the “legislation in these federations cannot contradict any of these articles of the current draft constitution, and technically, no federated unit can separate from Iraq that would violate the charter”(Al-Marashi 2005, 152).

The constitution respected the basics of the federal governing model as it guaranteed “a bicameral legislature in a parliamentary system in the making, however, membership in the upper chamber, its powers and operating principles are far from being clear” (Kalayciglu 2005, 117). The ambiguity in the Iraqi constitution of the mechanism of federalism may prove to be the greatest setbacks of the system since the Iraqis did not have any previous experience with this model.

Another very important part of the constitution lies in the distribution of wealth in the federal state especially of sharing oil revenues. Especially since “ the major initial danger of such an envisioned federation plan would be a struggle over resources between as well as within the provinces”(Salamey 2005, 197).

The following articles in the constitution reaffirm the importance of the distribution of wealth:

“Article 108: Oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.

Article 109: First: The federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields provided that it distributes oil and gas revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country with a set allotment for a set time for the damaged regions that were unjustly deprived by the former regime and the regions that were damaged later on, and in a way that assures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this will be regulated by law.

Second: The federal government with the producing regional and governorate governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encourages investment.” (Iraqi Constitution 2005)

As outlined in the articles of the constitution above, the issue of oil revenues is vital for most of the disputes between the various ethnic/sectarian groups. Furthermore, “ the Shi’a and the Kurdish factions are united on the issue that they should profit from Iraq’s oil resources. Both communities rarely benefited from the state’s largesse during the Ba’thist era”(Al-Marashi 2005, 154). Thus such a structuring of the oil revenues will

avoid the centralization of wealth in the hand of one faction and it will provide the financial security of all the three major ethnic groups in addition to the minorities' rights.

Thus distribution of wealth is a very important variable in the peace building process of any Middle Eastern or Arab state especially due to the historical dependency of the Middle Class on the state institution and particularly the Baathist regime.

Moreover, the criterion of federalism as seen in the constitution rests in the division of power between the federal and the regional governments. Kalaycioglus considers that "Article 112 of the Constitution clearly states that all of those functions not specified in the Constitution are automatically assigned to the regions and provinces. Thus, all power belongs to the regions and provinces, and only as much power as they consider appropriate are to be devolved from the regions to the Federal government of Iraq" (Kalaycioglu 2005, 120).

In addition, Iraq is a rich country in resources especially in oil, gas and water. The wealth is distributed in different provinces leaving some provinces more deprived than other. If this issue is not handled with great care, clashes will erupt over the wealth of the country and the peace process will fail in getting the different disputing parties to reconcile.

Another significant point of dispute as pointed out by the ICG report in 2003 are ethnic identities since they “are deeply ingrained, not least because of the Baathist repression. Time is needed for them to be reshaped to accommodate and be accommodated in the new Iraq”(ICG 2003, 11). Moreover, the ethno-sectarian rivalry ,if not dealt with properly, would affect the different political life of Iraq.

A brief background of Iraq shows that Iraq had a huge historical ethnic problem. Iraq is characterized by deeply rooted diversities along different dimensions, particularly ethnicity, religion, language and nationality. According to ethnic diversity it is comprised respectively of Arabs , Sunni and Shi’ites, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians and Armenians. However, the three major ethno-sectarian factions mainly involved in disputes are the Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’ites factions. Each of these groups has a different aspiration for the future of Iraq.

On August 28, the Iraqi draft constitution was ready and then it was voted upon the 15th of October 2005 where voters approved an Islamic federal democracy. “Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in two provinces but not in the three needed to defeat the constitution” (Katzman 2009, 11). Thus the Sunnis were the major group who had apparent problems with the constitution. Although they were promised a referendum to appease them six months later, which until this date has not been completed, yet violence started directly after the December 2005 elections.

Moreover, the formula designed for the elections was particularly sensitive to the Sunni representation as “each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the new “Council of Representatives”. Of the 275 – seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, and there were 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seat but gained votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election constituency been the whole nation” (Katzmann 2006, 4). This election gained popular voted and around “seventy percent of registered Iraqi voters went to the polls” (New York Times 2005). The election did not witness major violence also and it went smoothly.

The patterns and allegiances of the voters could show from the lists they chose since “the results suggest that voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular lists” (Katzman 2006, 4). This is a very important finding and it gives a wave of the Iraqi sentiment towards going back to their different ethnicities and not Iraqi nationalism as a whole.

The elections led to the appointment of Nouri El-Maliki in 2006 as prime Minister who was a Shi’ite hardliner. Maliki was the spokesman of the Dawa party and the United Iraqi Alliance which was the coalition of the Shi’ite parties in 2005. They “won the most seats in elections in December 2005”(BBC News 2010). Jalal Talabani stayed as President after the approval of the Council of Representatives with two deputy

presidents – a Shi'ites and a Sunni. Consequently, after the formation of the government and the different strategies put by the politicians to mobilize Iraq into stability, reality was not the same. Maliki's efforts to reconcile with the Sunni sect by reversing de-Baathification did not stop the insurgencies from threatening the security of Iraq. Moreover, more important issues like water and oil were the kindle of the civil war that took place in Iraq between the years 2005 and 2007. According to the International Crisis Group Report in January 2009, there were two contradictory points of view on the reasons behind the inefficiency of the governing model put into motion. The main reason behind the outbreak of the war was the illegitimacy of the parties elected as a whole. On the one hand, "the sectarian civil war of 2005-2007 was a principle reason for poor governance in mixed-population governorates"(ICG 2009, 9), while the council members tried to "defend their performance, blaming inexperience and overwhelming security challenges in 2005-2008 for deficiencies in governance" (ICG 2009, 9). Thus the argument remains that the reasons behind bad governance is combined between lack of experience and the civil war though no one tried to take a closer look at the deficiency of the governing model itself. In addition, the violence that occurred during those years was not of the same standards in all councils as some witnessed more violence than the others. In an interview done by the ICG with Nasef Jasem Ali al-Abadi, Basra provincial council deputy chairman for the Islamic Virtue Party (Fadhila) where he assessed the situation at the time, he considered that "some council members fell below their constituents' expectations"(ICG 2008). Another council member considered that the external meddling in the authorities of both the provincial and the central governments has led to the turmoil in those years. Yet, there was real criticism coming from outside the councils.

According to a local Sadrist politician “people were completely disappointed with both the local and central government. This is because in the last three or four years we have seen nothing but destruction and killing. We have seen no reconstruction, or infrastructure building, or help for the poor. In brief, we have seen nothing we did not also see during Saddam’s time” (ICG 2008).

Basically chaos was everywhere even after the elections of 2005 and the endorsement of the Iraqi constitution. There was no real plan on the division of power between the central government and the other 18 governorates. Although some of the issues were tackled in the constitution on how the power will be distributed, yet, the budgets were not as clear cut and reality did not manage to adhere to the constitution itself. The Iraqis went back to a state of chaos that was the same as in the pre 2003 invasion and regime change. The players changed but the game stayed the same with real ethnic divisions playing the major role in rallying for their security and distribution of power.

The main challenges in the years following 2005 until 2008 were the Sunni insurgencies. Katzman rendered this phenomenon to the fact that “until 2008, the duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab – led insurgency defied many expectations because it was supported by much of the Iraqi Sunni population that felt humiliated at being ruled by Shi’ites and Kurds”(Katzman 2008, 25). Although many U.S. officials

tried to underestimate the violence taking place in Iraq during those years; yet it was clearly a sectarian civil war between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites.

CBS news reported “behind the blood and chaos of the insurgents’ bombs, there is an undeclared civil war already underway in Iraq, between the Sunni minority who ruled the country under Saddam and the Shi’ite majority” (Pace, 2005). Lara Logan , correspondent of CBS News, went on to describe it as a “ruthless cleansing of the country’s towns and cities” (Pace 2005).

Another Editorial from Time by Tony Karon considered that the main person who can revert the sectarian war in Iraq is Moqtada Sadr since he had gained a lot of credibility for both sects due to his political standings. The reasons behind this are his emergence to power “ as the key broker in the Shi’ite alliance that dominated January’s elections; his primary support base is among the 3 million Shi’ites of East Baghdad, which would put his militias on the main frontline of any sectarian civil war; and his uncompromising stand against the U.S. presence – as well as his opposition to the idea of a Shi’ite autonomous region in the south favored by the largest party in his coalition- has given him unparalleled credibility (for a Shi’ite leader) among Iraq’s Sunnis”(Karon 2006). The trust in the person of Sadr was very important in alleviating the sectarian war between the two sects.

Another important milestone for the Iraqi civil war was in 2006 when the Sunni Iraqis asked for U.S. military assistance against Al-Qaeda in Anbar. This was the first signal

of the shift of Sunni politics against the insurgencies. The Sunni leaders who called for this assistance called themselves the “Awakening”. (Katzman 2006, 26)

In the meantime, the U.S. biggest fear was the threat they might be faced with during the reconstruction of the Iraqi military. Their strategy “requires the armed forces to earn the trust of the local population by providing security and by proving to be an honest broker of the internecine disputes” (Lake 2009). This was proven when the commanders of the U.S. turned over the military responsibility to the “Sons of Iraq” militants who helped in countering the attacks on the Sunni population in Anbar. This group was made up mainly of Sunni fighters with some moderate Shi’ite fighters. However, not all the Iraqi population agreed to empower the “Sons of Iraq” especially when their “program caused some tensions between Maliki and the U.S. officials”, especially when their biggest fear lay in “empowering the Sunnis particularly in the security services.

Maliki and his Shi’ite allies have resisted U.S. plans to integrate all the Sons into the Iraqi security forces (ISF), instead agreeing to allow only 20% (Katzman 2009, 26). Another major point concerning the security lies in the many divisions inside of the Iraqi army where they started to hold their allegiances to their political leaders rather than to the Iraqi central government. (Lake 2009)

Most political analysts who considered the uprising tensions between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites as a civil war saw that the bombing of Askariya Shi'ite Mosque in Samara twice during 2006 and 2007 heightened the clashes between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites though it was Al-Qaeda insurgencies who performed it. The second attack did not have the same repercussion as the first mainly due to the fact that the "political elite appealed for calm" (Katzman 2009, 29). This is important to note as it refers to the Consociational model where the political elite try to establish the balance of power in their communities.

The time period between 2005-2008 serves as the best example of the four variables set by this study of Iraqi federalism . To begin with, security was at its lowest during this period which led to various uprisings and clashes between two major groups. It was mainly an example of the survival of the fittest where even the army, the core of security, was targeted based on political/ethnic/sectarian allegiances. Here the second variable (sectarianism and ethnicity) come into play for it is the background of these religious sects that was the major reason behind the clashes and the disparity of the source of security. It interplays with nationalism as the conflicting groups did not agree on the different visions of Iraq. The only ethnicity which stayed on the sidelines were the Kurds whom had already established a semi-autonomous region for themselves inside Iraq and protected their ethnicity and security although there were still unresolved issues such as the issue of Kirkuk. According to a report by the ICG "the territorial dispute is blocking political progress in Iraq, contributing to the delay in passing a law on sharing oil revenue, and threatening to put off critical provincial elections" (Borger

2008). Kirkuk is one of the most debatable territories in Iraq since it is a very oil-rich country. The distribution of wealth comes into play here since the Iraqi constitution states that in the federal state of Iraq, the different governorates are to share the riches of the country. The engineers of the constitution were concerned with these notions though there was no clear strategy on how this would be mobilized.

3.7 The change of political discourse during the 2009 Provincial Elections: the Consolidation of Power Sharing State

The 2009 Provincial elections marked a change in the political discourse of religious candidates, especially when appealing to the Iraqi people. Elections were only held in 14 governorates basically excluding the Kurdistan regional government, which accordingly had the authority to set elections on their own time. The elections' mechanism was altered wherein it “ was the first time that a partial open-list system was used: it meant contrary to earlier elections, voters were not compelled to choose from fixed slates of party-ranked candidates, but rather voted for both a list and an individual candidate on that list”(ICG 2010, 3). The population could use their own candidates as they saw fit without reference to a whole list's priorities. This provided more choice to citizens, rendering the overall process more democratic.

These elections also witnessed a rage against the misconduct, corruption and the malfunction of the previously elected members. Voters seemed to want to choose a better alternative since they seemed to have “blamed these parties' deference to clerics

for their failure to govern” (ICG 2010, 3). One example of the change in the political discourse was Al-Maliki’s changing his formerly religious rhetoric into a more nationalistic one. Maliki swept most of the polls in Baghdad and most of the south where he was viewed as “a strong nationalist and non-sectarian leader” (ICG 2010, 5), though he comes from a religious party. People believed the party’s function was more secular in its core. Sadr lost a lot of his support due to the violence of 2005-2008 that discredited his party in Shi’ite eyes. The very interesting thing about the 2009 elections was the “resurgent and unified Sunni Arab bloc, flying the banner of Iraqi nationalism, recaptured all its lost ground. ” (ICG 2010, 5)

Nonetheless, even with the apparent shift from religious slogans to more nationalistic ones, the International Crisis Group noted that “the elections were not as sharp a defeat for religious parties as might initially have seemed” (ICG 2010,7). The winners of the elections were “Maliki’s State of Law/Dawa’a, ISCI and the Sadirists came in first” while in contrast “ the secular parties performed poorly, defeated less by their political enemies’ popularity than by the electoral system the ruling parties has crafted, by the organizational weakness and by their inability to mobilize popular support” (ICG 2010, 7). All in all, what seemed to be a shift in the political discourse of the religious parties into a more nationalistic approach was nothing more than an electoral strategy to gain popular vote. The rhetoric was the only thing that was dropped. At the heart of the matter, the Sunnis still rallied for the Sunnis and the Shi’ites still rallied for the Shi’ites. The defeat of the secular parties proves the deep ethnic/sectarian divisions which, even if disguised under rhetoric flourishes, still existed in hearts of its people.

3.8 The Emergence of New Federalized Iraq after U.S. Pullout

On the 27th of February 2009, President Obama announced the end of combat mission in Iraq by 31st of August 2010. This is a very important milestone for Iraq as the population has been viewing the military existence of the U.S. with a lot of suspicion. It targets the security of Iraq which has long been fought for by several factions of the Iraqi community. The announcement came just in time before the March 2010 elections playing a major role in the preparation for it. Another major point to be considered in the elections are the disputed areas in Iraq especially Kirkuk which was mainly used by the Kurdish political groups as a point of power to win the Iraqi elections.

The elections in 2010 witnessed minor changes in the electoral law of 2005, as the Kurdish fight to gain Kirkuk and add it to their regional government. Kirkuk was one of the most serious roadblocks since “ the question of Kirkuk, and whether elections in this conflicted governorate should receive special treatment, as had occurred for the provincial elections”(ICG 2010, 20). With the three weeks to reach an agreement regarding the new electoral law and the different inputs from the Kurdish parties and Sistani, an open-list system was finally agreed upon. However, it was vetoed by Vice-President Tareq al-Hashimi under pressure from Iyad Allawi and Saleh al-Muttaq who were concerned with the “so-called compensatory national seats” (ICG,2010:22) in addition to Hashimi’s belief that the election law did not represent the Iraqis abroad. (Ottaway and Kaysi 2009, 2).

The law finally adopted increased the number of parliamentary seats to “325 seats- 307 plus eight minority seats, seven compensatory seats and three extra seats for the Kurdish governorates “(ICG 2010, 25). Another factor bearing on the 2010 elections was the revitalization of the Sunni vote which had previously boycotted the elections of 2005. Nevertheless, they lacked clear tactics on how to approach the elections since “many influential Sunnis remained on the margins of the political process, either because, as former Baathists, they were shunned, or because they chose to resist the U.S. backed process. This weakened the Sunni participation” (Ottaway and Kaysi, 2009, 1).

The elections took place on the 7th of March 2010. The elections led to a narrow victory for Iyad Allawi. Former prime minister and member of Iraqiyya block over Nouri Al-Maliki, incumbent prime minister and speaker of the State of Coalition. (BBC News 2010). This is of great importance since Iyad Allawi is a secular candidate who managed to gain votes from both the Sunni and Shi’ite sects.

This paper’s timeline ends with the 2010 elections. The outcome of the elections and the formation of the new government are of little relevance to this research as until now it had established the basics of the study of the federal model in Iraq. This study focuses on the initial years of the Iraqi experience in hopes of discerning the future (if any) of federalism in the country.

This chapter has given an account of the 2 elections of 2005, the constitution, the so-called civil war of 2005-2008, 2009 provincial election, and the 2010 elections. These different milestones correspond to the four variables in the study of federalism. This research has shown the involvement of the different ethnicities in the engineering of the electoral laws and the constitution.

The different processes have respected the basic principles of federalism. Nevertheless, it had not been an easy process for the Iraqi people who have no previous experience with federalism. The main lingering issues for the state of Iraq are security, nationalism, ethnicity/sectarianism and distribution of wealth.

As previously discussed and asserted in several instances “security continues to be one of the main demands of voters” (BBC News 2010). The change of rhetoric during the 2009 provincial elections also shows the importance of nationalism. Nationalism, however, goes hand in hand with ethnic/secterian interests since after assessing the 2009 experience, the ethnic/secterian groups still held their allegiances to their own sects. Nevertheless, the winning of Iyad Allawai, a secular candidate of the 2010 parliamentary elections might be the beginning of the reconciliation process between the two competing Sunni and Shi’ite sects. As for the issue of Kirkuk and the disputed areas, they are a clear representation of the distribution of wealth variable. Once all these variables are put on the right track, the Iraqi federal experience will start to flourish.

Chapter 4

Iraq and Its Neighboring States' Foreign Policies

4.1 Foreign Policy in a Divided Society

Foreign relations of Iraq with its neighboring countries are a key aspect of establishing peace and stability inside Iraq, especially after 2003 change of regime. The different ethnic/sectarian groups in Iraq have different allegiances with foreign powers on the basis of protecting their securities against each other.

Gareth Stansfield considers “the conduct of Iraq’s foreign relations as the country emerges from occupation and civil war and embraces a still undetermined and uncertain future remains conditioned “ (Stansfield 2010, 1395). Iraq’s political and governing face changed drastically since the fall of the regime 2003. New key players have emerged and its neighboring countries have seen a lot of opportunities and challenges with them especially due to the fact of the presence of the U.S. military forces in Iraq.

The major three countries whose foreign policy tackles Iraq at its core are Iran, Syria, and Turkey. All of these countries had major roles in the years after 2003 and until today. Iraq’s newly formed elites and even the old political players have strong ties with these countries. However, these ties cannot be studied without observing the threats and possibilities of the neighboring countries themselves. Moreover, the cadres of these

foreign policies cannot be understood without a close consideration of the U.S. foreign policy in the region. This study cannot be complete without assessing the external factors primarily affecting the success of federalism in Iraq.

Iraq's imposed federal experience by foreign intervention cannot be complete without the policies of its neighboring countries. Given its geographical statue, Iraq's federalism needs external factors to be fully mobilized. Therefore, this study takes into account the foreign policies of Syria, Iran, and Turkey as major players in the Iraqi federal model. It is within this context that this study will continue the assessment of an imposed federal model by military and political intervention.

The geopolitical environment always affects the governing models in each country. This chapter will take a thorough look at the foreign policies of four major players in Iraqi politics which are Iran, Turkey and Syria in light of inputs from the U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the approach will give a detailed account of the threats and opportunities of each of these countries especially when it comes to the question of federalism in Iraq. The major questions to be answered are: What are the foreign policies of each of these countries towards Iraq? How do these foreign policies affect the federal model? And how do cross-border relations of the different political groups with these countries affect the stability or instability of the federal model?

4.2 Iran and Iraq Shia: A Long Awaited Foreign Relations

The Iranian-Iraqi relations were never on good terms during Saddam Hussein's rule. The first gulf war of 1980-1988 is an example of the rivalry between the two countries in an attempt to assert their importance as regional players. Nevertheless, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime in 2003, Iran's foreign policy was greatly affected with the events especially due to its new rivalry with the U.S. regarding nuclear weapons and the latter's presence in close proximity to Iran's borders. The military threat of Iraq no longer stems out of the Iraqi Baathi military but rather from the American troops. "Iran's security challenges in the new Iraq is the result of Iran's legitimate concerns in terms of establishing national security on the one hand and creating opportunities for it to walk out of geopolitical isolation and thus consolidate its credit and influence both regionally and internationally on the other" (Barzegar 2006, 77).

Consequently, the main issue for Iran is the security concerns which were categorized on different levels. To start with, the religious rivalries inside Iraq are direct threat for Iran especially when it comes to the enmities between the various Shi'ite political groups. Their views differ in nature when it comes to allying themselves with Iran. However, a very positive fact for Iran is that all of these Shi'ite political groups consider Iran to be the "natural ally state throughout the region" (Barzegar 2006, 70).

Iran can be a major counter balance in the inter-ethnic/ inter-secterian relation especially since the Arab region is a mostly Sunni-led region. Iran is keen on making sure that it allies itself with the various ethnic/secterian political groups in Iraq. It is not of its interest to be viewed as the sole caretaker of the Shi'ites of Iraq since “ too much support of the Shi'ite would bring about challenges in Iran's foreign policy in the long term” (Barzegar 2006, 80).

Furthermore, the rivalries pose a major threat to Iran's national security especially that if these ethnicities do not get to common grounds, it would lead to the deployment of more foreign troops on the borders of Iran. Barzegar goes on to consider that “ at the same time, Iran's rivals and enemies would be granted a chance to enforce pressure and influence on the country” (Barzegar 2006, 80). Therefore, one of the major concerns of the Iranian foreign policy is to decrease the possibility of territorial disintegration inside Iraq because whenever the Shi'ite-Sunni tensions increase, the Kurds are moving more and more towards becoming a very powerful independent Kurdish state which would affect the Kurdish communities inside Iran itself.

Therefore, “ at present, the chief aim of Iran's policy in post-invasion Iraq is to maintain Iraq's national unity”(Barzegar 2008, 49). Thus, Iran's position towards more moderate Sunnis fluctuates from enmity to cooperation in the country's attempt to establish some kind of common ground in the face of Iraqi disintegration. As for the Kurds, Iran's fear of the good relations of the Kurds with the United States and possibly with Israel has led them to take a more compromising stand towards them.

In a deeper sense, the coalition with the Iraqi Kurds serves as a deterrent to the “plausible coalition of such a government with other regional states and outside powers, particularly United States and Israel, in so far as these states pose a threat to Iran, would jeopardize Iran’s national interests and pave the way for new instability and tension on Iran’s borders” (Barzegar 2008, 53). Hence, they have tried to empower their stand with the Kurds while using their Shi’ite allies to balance their interest.

Another very important aspect of the relationship between Iraq and Iran is regional rivalry. The face of Iraq changed from a secular, minority Sunni rule, to a predominantly majority Shi’ite rule. As opposed to the previous Iran-Iraqi enmity and their habitual balance of power in the region, Iran is opting to a different political approach with Iraq. Accordingly, “the objective of Iran’s foreign policy in the last two years in accordance with geopolitical realities has been moving away from this traditional equation” (Barzegar 2006, 82). Iraq is now viewed as a potential ally for Iran in the region in the face of other Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran has been striving for a long time to get itself out of the regional isolation and play its natural role in regional politics. Iraq is a major ticket for Iran out of this strife once the realities of the countries are understood. Iraq is strategically positioning itself for Iran to be on good terms with all the different ethnic/sectarian political groups since it would allow them to raise new opportunities.

A very important challenge that comes into play for the Iranian foreign policy is the tactical advantage the US has gained by moving its troops in Iraq. Their presence geographically near the Iranian border poses a huge threat to the country's security especially with the nuclear issue at hand. Iran's suspicions of the real motives behind the U.S. presence in Iraq were translated on several occasions especially since "the new Iraq is the center stage of America's pressures and threats against Iran and as George W Bush himself has stressed on various occasions that a new different Iraq is a pressure tool against Iran in order to make this country revise its political orientation" (Bazegar 2006, 84).

In other words, if the Iranian regime does not abide by the rules of the United States, they are at a strategic disadvantage as an attack base already established in a neighboring country. The threat is just across border. What is more, the presence of the American troops in the region disrupts the natural balance of powers since the gulf regimes have been strong allies of the United States policies in the region in the face of the so-called hegemonic aspirations of Iran. The battle's likelihood is to happen on Iraqi and Lebanese grounds since these two countries' Shi'ites align themselves with Iran. The Americans have "transformed Iraq into the main ground for exercising pressure on the Islamic Republic" (Bazegar 2006, 86), whereby they have tried to distort Iran's picture within Iraq.

In conclusion, the Iraqi-Iranian relations can be a new opportunity or an ongoing threat to Iran if not well-engineered into Iran's benefit. The variables of this study especially

security, ethno-sectarianism also apply when studying the foreign policy of Iran. Although Iran has been relieved of Saddam Hussein's warmongering, yet it has acquired a new U.S. based threat across its border. Security is the most essential fear for the Iranians whereby they strategically situated themselves as the caretakers of the Shi'ite Iraqis. They have played the ethno-sectarian card in the face of the U.S. meddling to distort their connections. Iran is constantly seeking an equation which helps the country "to walk out of the geopolitical isolation and redefine its natural role in the region's security equation"(Barzegar 2006, 86).

In short, the interplay of ethnic-sectarian politics and geo-political security play a major role in shaping the new Iraqi-Iranian foreign policies whereby Iran is striving to gain Iraq as a whole as a strategic ally. Federalism in Iraq is auspicious to Iranian foreign policy since it would help this ethno-sectarian war torn neighboring country from disintegrating themselves into three different states. The stability inside Iraq is one of the major concerns for Iran whereby any major violence will lead to the long-term aspirations of the Kurds of cession from the state of Iraq or the development of another Sunni state so close to the Iranian borders.

4.3 Syria and Secularization: De-Baathification vs. Baathification

The war and the change of regime in Iraq have introduced a new era in the region for Syrian foreign policy. At many instances it seemed to Syrian politics that with the United States' presence in the region and their war against terror, their next target will

be Syria. Syria was one of the opposing countries of the war on Iraq, “Syria’s prewar support for Saddam Hussein’s regime and subsequent permissiveness in allowing foreign jihadists to enter Iraq from Syria had antagonized the United States and made Syria a potential target for regime change”(Simon 2009, 2).

It is important to note that Syria’s ties with Iraq had not been effective before the preemptive attack on Iraq’s regime, they had years of bad relations due to Saddam’s war on Iran and the relationship started to improve only after the sanctions were placed on Iraq before the 2003 war.

The war on Iraq has affected Syria negatively in different aspects as it had threatened its national security and economy in various ways. The security problem stems from the existence of American troops in close proximity to Syria, as is the case of Iran. Although both Syria and the United States had a mutual interest in the fight against Al-Qaeda and other insurgencies, Syria turned a “blind eye” on the insurgents crossing its border to Iraq. (BBC 2008)

In an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2004, Bashar Al-Assad declared his support of these insurgents was a form of legitimate resistance. This outraged the U.S. foreign policy makers and they started plotting for a similar regime change in Syria; however, “this prospect dimmed as the U.S. occupation became an increasingly problematic drain on resources”(Simon 2008, 28).

According to Michael Gerson, “Syria, however, is what one former administration official calls “lower-hanging fruit”(Gerson 2007). They have raged the American administration with their lax approach to the insurgents coming from their border. Nonetheless, Syria realized the importance of cooperation with the Americans especially in regards to Al-Qaeda. They then used their Intelligence in handing in insurgents to the Americans since it is a matter of national security for the former.

Islamic extremism is a very serious issue for the Syrian regime especially after the 2004 attack on a diplomatic headquarters in Damascus. (MacAskil 2004). In addition, Syria had been the home of the Iraqi ex-Baathi officials who have fled the country after the U.S. military operation in 2003. Their strategy was to use these decision makers on the insurgents as a way to leverage American presence.

The U.S. then used another method of pressure on the Syrians. They “ordered the closure of the five-hundred-mile oil pipeline running between the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk and the Syrian port of Baniyas” (Simon 2009, 11). It was only then that the Syrian government decided to modify its foreign policy regarding the former cadres of Saddam’s regime.

As reported on 18 May 2003 by the daily mail “Saddam’s wife and daughters have been thrown out of Syria, it was revealed last night” (Rayner, Daily Mail, 2003). This was a strategic move on the side of Assad to stop the American economical embargo on Syria especially since the Syrians have lost a lot of oil wealth after 2003 which has cost the Syrians a lot in terms of money and wealth. This is another Syrian foreign policy concern since Syria had long enjoyed the cheap oil coming through those pipelines.

In 2007, in an attempt to control the damage control caused by the Americans to their economy Syria and Iraq “signed a deal to speed up renovation of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline”(Simon 2009, 2). Oil, trade, and commercial agreements were signed between the two countries to help each other economically. Syria has great economic interests in Iraq; thus, the stability of Iraq is of great importance to Syria. They have managed to develop economic ties with Iraq especially since the Syrians had dealt generously with the Iraqi refugee problem.

Another pressing issue for the Syrian regime in the formation of their foreign policy is the problem of Iraqi refugees. This situation has inflated the economy of Syria since the start of the 2003 war. The immigration of thousands of families of Iraqi refugees to Syria presents a very serious security problem. Moreover, there is deep fear that the refugees might bring with them deep ethnic and sectarian issues. “Iraqi refugees in Syria encompass every ethnic and sectarian background, the majority is thought to be Sunni, with 15% Shia, and 10% Christian” (Simon 2009, 7).

Syrian regime's Alwaite Shi'ite minority is afraid of the additional Sunni majority which might aid the Sunni majority in Syria to overthrow the Syrian regime. Moreover, this overcrowding comes with an economic burden to the Syrian regime which would affect their water and gas consumption and education. Therefore, the Syrian government welcomed the call of the Iraqi government for the refugees to go back to Iraq since their presence would weaken the Syrian regime in different perspectives.

A fourth factor which comes into play when considering the Syrian foreign policy in regards to Iraq is the Kurdish question. Syria is yet another neighboring country which has a significant Kurdish population. The 2003 war and the Kurdistan regional government in Iraq has posed itself as an alert to the Syrian regime for the fear of a Kurdish reawakening in Syria. Although the Syrians had changed their position in regards to the Kurdish question and re-aligned themselves with Turkey on this common issue; nevertheless Syria took a surprising role in 2007 to offer to mediate the arising problems between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkey. (Lyon 2007) The Syrians are interested in keeping the Kurdish aspirations in check as a strategy against a domino effect in Syria. They have acted as mediators and allowed their Syrian Kurds to connect with the Iraqis by keeping them under surveillance. Therefore, "the regime will continue to closely monitor Kurdish opposition activities both at home and abroad. The government appears to have taken the necessary precautions to prevent a repeat of the 2004 Qamishi riots any time soon" (Simon 2009, 14).

As this study highlights, the position of Iraq is of a great deal of importance especially to the Syrian government as it helps stabilize the region, offer economic help and keep the Kurdish problem in check. The stability of Iraq comes hand in hand with the fate of Syrian national security and wealth due to the latter's reliance on the Iraqi war and the great number of Iraqi refugees currently present in Syria. Moreover, the greatest Syrian fear as in the case of Iran, the existence of the American troops in Iraq which might be a direct threat to the Syrian regime.

As for the aspirations of the Syrian's regime regarding Iraq " the most favorable outcome in Iraq would be a relatively weak and compliant secular government, strong enough to hold the country together and protect its borders" (Simon 2009, 21). Moreover, the Syrian foreign policy sees the economic and political stability will irreversibly "lay the ground for security" (Simon 2009, 22). Thus their foreign policy is shaped by cooperation with the Iraqi government, strong ties with the various sectarian groups, mediators of the ethnic predicament, and leveraging the American presence in the region through their "under the table" facilitation of the insurgents from Syria to Iraq. This suggests that it is vital for Syria to play a constructive role in the implementing a federal solution in Iraq. A stable and flourishing Iraq is clearly in Syria's economical and security interests.

4.4 Turkey and the Kurdish Question

Ever since the U.S. toppling of the Baath regime in 2003, Turkey has been monitoring the Iraqi situation very closely due to its fear of an autonomous Kurdish state on its border which might lead its Kurdish minority to revolt against the Turkish government in an attempt to join the Kurdish state. Moreover, the PKK, has been one of the most important threats to Turkey's national security due to their terrorist attacks on Turkish land. Thus Turkey's policy towards Iraq pivot on two interests which are “ preserving that country's territorial integrity and fighting the PKK, whose rebels use remote mountain areas on the border as sanctuary and staging ground for attacks inside Turkey” (Middle East Report No 81, 2008).

In addition to these two Turkish interests, Turkey has always had an active role in promoting peace in the region. Its primary interest due to the geographical setting of Iraq is to make sure peace is established and sectarian war is avoided especially since any upheaval inside Iraq would have a negative domino effect in the region.

“As far as Iraq is concerned, the preservation of Iraq's unity and territorial integrity as well as the restoration of security and stability in the country has been the main objectives for Turkey”(Coskun 2008, 3). Turkey had made sure to establish relations with the different sectarian/ethnic groups in Iraq even with the Kurdish Regional government. They used a “proactive peace policy” since they considered that the worst-case scenario for Iraq is “the partition of Iraq is into three states: an Arab state, a Shi'ite

dominated state in southern Iraq and a Turkish state in northern Iraq” (Coskun 2008, 4). The biggest fear as mentioned earlier is the existence of a Kurdish state that would “politicize Kurds in Turkey” (Coskun 2008, 4).

According to the Middle East report recommendations of 2005, “The U.S. and EU need to do more to resolve the Kirkuk question and help Ankara protect its vital interests without resort to increasingly hollow but destabilizing threats of military intervention”(Middle East Report No 35, 2005). Turkey’s position on the Kurdish question is identical to that of Iran and Syria. It has been an issue of national security to them. Yet, it had taken further steps to deal with the issue.

In 2007, the Turkish Parliament “authorized the government Wednesday to send troops into northern Iraq to root out Kurdish rebels who have been conducting raids into Turkey” (msnbc.com news, 10/17/2007). This had produced tension with the United States who has been Turkish allies for a long time. Though the decision had been made, yet Turkey waited until February 2008 to start its military operation where according to the Turkish media “ 3000 to 10 000 troops crossed the Iraqi border on Friday in pursuit of separatist insurgents from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)” (theTrumpet.com, 25 February 2008).

Six days after the Turkish launched the military operation, the Iraqi government reacted by denouncing the incursions and asking for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish

groups from Northern Iraq. (Guardina.co.uk, 26 February 2008) The military operation has put more pressure on the Iraqi government and the U.S. to deal with the PKK and give Turkey the right assurances that the attacks will stop. On the other hand, it re-initiated collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey to deal with the Iraqi issues.

The most important was “ the understanding to eliminate the PKK as a factor in Turkey U.S. and Turkey-Iraq relations including relations with the Iraqi Kurds” (Altunsik 2009, 210). This agreement had helped the 9 day Turkish military incursion whereby the U.S. shared their intelligence on where the PKK’s militants might be present. Accordingly, “ the trilateral agreement between Turkey, Iraq and the United States was created”(Altunsik 2009, 210).

Turkey’s foreign policy has gained an upper hand in its relations with Iraq after successfully managing the PKK problem through military intervention. Thus the outcome of the operation had two impacts which were: “ on the one hand, the military operations gave Turkey an opportunity to show its resolve to deal with the PKK attacks emanating from Iraq. One the other hand, the operations created an opportunity for an opening towards the Iraqi Kurds, which was not possible before, due to supportive attitude of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) vis-à-vis the PKK” (Altunsik 2009, 210).

Turkey has managed to reach its objective through the use of military operations and re-opening channels with the Kurdish Regional Government and get their support on fighting militancy. This was even taken a step further whereby the Higher Strategic Council was created to deal with issues of energy, military, industry and politics. Another important issue that led the Kurdish Regional Government to change its cooperation policy with Turkey was the withdrawal of the U.S. troops decision. Their need to have a strong ally in the region in the face of the other ethnic/sectarian groups was of vital importance for them and Turkey would be their best ally. Nevertheless, Turkey made sure to have good and strong relations with both Sunni and Shi'ite sectarian groups to pose itself as a mediator of the ethnic/sectarian emancipating problem.

Another important interest for the Turkish foreign policy is economic interest. The root of this economic interest lies in the fear of the Kurdish independence which connects to the issue of Kirkuk. The disputes around Kirkuk lie in its important oil wealth which if added to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) would give the KRG full autonomy from the state of Iraq. The Scope of this study does not cover the Kirkuk question and other disputed areas; nonetheless, Kirkuk remains a very important question for the Iraqis, the United States, and all of Iraq's neighboring countries for it deeply ties to the issue of Kurdish autonomy.

As for Turkey's economic interest, they stem out of a strategically focal point for Turkey in preserving security across its borders. Turkey's geopolitical situation has

“impelled Turkey to reach out to Syria, Jordan, and Iran as well as to increase its participation in the economic rehabilitation of Gaza and the West Bank, the rebuilding of Iraq, and the supplying of the US and coalition occupation forces in that country” (Olson 2006, 17). The Middle Eastern politics are of great interest to Turkey; thus their strife to establish peace in the region stems from its own security concerns.

Turkey also had another vital interest in the economic ties with Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government especially since the trade will be going through the southeastern Turkish border which is “an area heavily populated with Kurds and one of the most economically depressed regions of Turkey”(Olson 2006, 18). Turkish foreign policy saw an opportunity in these economic ties since “an increase in the support of the Kurds in the region could lessen the support of the Kurds in the region for militant Kurdish nationalist groups”(Olsen 2006, 18).

Turkey’s foreign policy lies on the advocacy of economic ties and enrichment of their Kurdish inhabited areas in the face of the threat of Kurdish militants. Their ties were directly linked to the Iraqi government and to the Kurdish Regional government as preemptive measures against a possible upheaval from their Kurdish minority to follow the path of the Iraqi Kurdish population. Their investment lay in oil and gas which are also of huge value to the country’s economy as a whole.

4.5 Foreign Policy Assessment of Power Sharing Formulations

The main concern for the Turkey, Iran, and Syria were the Kurdish threat which is present in their own countries. The Kurdish question poses a threat to all of these three countries since it might have a domino effect on their own Kurdish minorities in each respective country. The three countries' foreign policies lay in establishing good relations with the different ethnics/secterian groups in Iraq as a strategy to maintain stability between them. Although each country has a more solid relation with one sect or ethnic group over the other; yet the three countries have been trying to establish good relations with all. It is not in any of these three countries interest to have three different states. Their interest lies in having one stable Iraq which provides them with security and does not stir their own inter-ethnic/inter-secterian problems.

The stability of Iraq has a lot of repercussions on the stability of its neighboring countries due to the existence of various ethnicities and sects which have built strong affiliations with the various groups in their respective countries. Nevertheless, Syria and Iran's common fear which has helped shape their foreign policies towards Iraq lay in their fear of the U.S. presence in such a close proximity to their borders based on the fact that this might threaten their national security. While Turkey saw the U.S. presence as a positive point since they have been strong allies for a long time, their fear is when the United States troops pull out of Iraq, instability will arise again and the Kurds would start asking for full autonomy. Subsequently, the Turkish government had opened its

foreign policy to Syria and Iran which are also major players in maintaining stability in Iraq and keeping it as unitary country based on a federal model.

The three countries also used economic ties a tool to strengthen their ties with the different factions of the Iraqi society and incarnated it in their foreign policy approach. Iran, Syria, and Turkey have a vested interest in the natural resources of Iraq. This plays a motivating role in efforts put forward to stabilize Iraq by these countries. The two variables which play a major role in determining these three countries foreign policy towards Iraq are security and ethnic/secterian ties.

This stability cannot be achieved without a real solution to the ethnic/sectarian problem in Iraq.

Chapter 5

Comparative Assessment of Power Sharing Models for Iraq

This paper has thoroughly taken a look at the three possible governing models for a deeply divided ethnic/sectarian country which are federalism, consociational democracy and majoritarian democracy. When applied to a country like Iraq, federalism presents itself with the strongest and most promising future for Iraq. Iraq's ethnic/sectarian set up can be truly destructive for the hope of a real stable Iraq if the majoritarian model is to be applied. As mentioned in the previous chapters, majoritarian governance would only lead to the dominance of the Shi'ite sect over the others. The Sunnis and the Kurds would definitely rebel against all-Shi'ite dominance and the country would be set on a long journey of wars. The future after such a mistake would be very bleak for the Iraqis.

As for consociationalism, it would surely hinge upon the sectarian problem more and more. As previously discussed by Hudson, the parties in Iraq have not yet been able to have stable coalitions. Concessions and compromises seem to be a far-fetched notion for the Iraqis. These factors are enough to have a failed consociational model if tried in Iraq. Lebanon is the most prominent example of this model, where the different sects are still fighting, even if only, politically leaving the country in a stalemate.

As for federalism, the case study of Iraq has shown that step by step, it might prove to be the solution for all the turmoil Iraq is going through. The checks and balances

embedded in the federal model are perfect for the ethnicities/sects to guarantee their rights in the face of each other. The bicameralism of the federal model is also very important for this process since the different groups will make sure their rights are being preserved. As long as the different ethnic and sectarian fears are satisfied, the way to democracy in peace in Iraq will have a bright future. Their fears should be dealt with the four variables in this study as highlighted.

The four variables under study for the stability of Iraq are security, nationalism, ethnicity/sectarianism and distribution of wealth. These variables are important in examining the federal governing model of Iraq since it has been a formerly authoritarian country repressed by one hegemon. The fears of the different ethnic groups can only be viewed from the four variables at hand for the stability of the country will be at stake if any of them is missing.

Security has different branches since it tackles the security of the country against various insurgencies or the security of the different groups against each other.

While nationalism on the other hand would unite the different ethnic groups on the basis of the importance of having an Iraq where they will all live side by side, the ethnic/sectarian problem poses itself as a counter to it. Ethnicities should be protected against each other by catering to their different needs.

Distribution of wealth is also interrelated to all the other three since the wealth of Iraq is concentrated in various geographical places. This is not engineered correctly would leave some governorates wealthier than the others and it would lead to instability or even a civil war.

Federalism is the basis of this protection since it is the theory of integration where it might be the solution to channel the ethnic/secterian problem to a nationalistic approach. The guaranteed division of power can help decrease the posed problem since the power structure will not centralized in the hand of one government.

This paper has also underlines the challenges facing federalism in Iraq. The first challenge as discussed earlier is the fact that the Kurds have more veto power than the others. If this problem is not leveraged in a better way, it will create greater tensions than the ones already existing. Furthermore, the ambiguity of the constitution set for Iraq can be a great challenge for the Iraqis since they have not been exposed to any kind of democracy prior to 2003.

Bicameralism of this model, however, protects the various groups as it would be a dual representation. As, also, mentioned earlier in this chapter, the political and social structures of any country are a direct link to stability. (Lijphart 1969, 208)

The election outcomes between 2005 and 2010 prove the need for Iraq to find their common grounds. The change of rhetoric is very important since it has shown Iraqi's belief in a secular candidate "Iyad Allawi" in the face of other more religious candidates. After the mini-civil war of 2005-2007, the Iraqis have all shifted towards a more neutral position, though it might only be on the surface. This is all due to the ability of the federal model in trying to undermine the religious and ethnic differences by protecting all parties in its components. As highlighted earlier, the system was not the reason behind the tensions; the main cause is Iraqi's inexperience with such a system.

The foreign policies of the three countries this study has tackled are also very important in tackling the future of Iraq. Iraq does not exist in vacuum and it has a big role in Middle Eastern affairs. If the Iraqis succeed in gaining and keeping of good relations with Iran, Syria and Turkey, it will be helping itself towards a peaceful Iraq. These four countries share common interests in regards to security and their ethnic/secterian problems. A final solution would indefinitely involve the four countries together. It is of interest to all Iran, Syria and Turkey to maintain a stable and unified, even if federal, Iraq. Iraq's stability has a huge effect on its neighboring countries.

After studying different aspects of the federal model in regards to the four variables of this study (ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, security and distribution of wealth), in

addition to the foreign policies of its three neighbors, federalism is the most viable solution for the multi-ethnic/ multi-sectarian deeply divided country like Iraq. Given their lack of experience with the concept of democracy, federalism can be the ideology which can organize the political like in Iraq due to its fluctuating traits and especially integration of various groups into the political system. If any other governing models studied in this paper are applied, secession seems to be gleaming from afar for a Iraq. The creation of three countries instead of one would not be in the interest of the Iraqis themselves and to all their neighboring countries.

The path to democracy is very hard and bloody road. It cannot be achieved over-night and it has an ugly face. The bloodshed in Iraq has been decreasing with the years and the insurgency is losing their grounds. The positivity of the case of Iraq is the existence of a basis which might present the solution. The common belief that democracy should be done by the people and not imposed can be seen in the Arab Spring invading Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. Though these countries people have started the revolution against their oppressors, it did not exclude bloodshed and until this day, no real governance model has been proposed to organize the political and social life of the countries that have toppled their regimes.

As discussed, the domino effect in Iraq's struggle towards organizing their political life and maintaining peace has spread towards moving beyond authoritarian regimes and achieving more democratic regimes that serve their populations. However, the case of

Iraq has pushed the other countries to seek democracy without the meddling of any other foreign country in their internal affairs.

The future map of the Middle East is redrawing itself while ethnicities and sects are trying to unite themselves along the whole Middle Eastern lines. Nationalism has changed its original meaning to become the patriotism towards one's ethnicity or sect and not towards a country by itself. Iraq's future can only be a fruitful one if nationalism is reintroduced and is the base of the formation of one Iraq under which all the ethnicities have equal rights. History is being made with all the changes happening around the Arabs at the moment. The end of it does not seem clear though a lot of speculations have been made.

References:

- Al-Khafaji, Isam. 1992. "State Terror and Degradation of Politics in Iraq." *Middle East Report* 176:15-21.
- Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. 2003. "Iraq's Constitutional Debate." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9,3:139-175.
- Alterman, Jon B. 2003. "Not in My Backyard: Iraq's Neighbors' Interests." *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer.
- Bahgat, Gawdat. 2005. "Saddam Hussein's Legacy: A Preliminary Assessment and Future Implications." *SAIS Review* Summer-Fall:12-20.
- Baram, Amazia. 1989. "The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi Iraq, 1968-1986: The changing Features of a Collective Profile". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21,4:447-493 .
- Barzegar, Kayhan. Winter 2007-2008. "Iran, New Iraq and the Persian Gulf Political-Security Architecture." *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs* 20,1:93-110.
- Barzegar, Kayhan. 2008. "Iran's Foreign Policy in Post-Invasion Iraq." *Middle East Policy Council* 15,4:47-58.
- Barzegar, Kayhan. 2006. "Iran and the new Iraq: Security Challenges and Foreign Powers." *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* 5,3:77-88.
- Bengio, Ofra. 1998. *Saddam's Word*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Beehner, Lionel. 2006. "Iraq's Meddlesome Neighbors." *Council on Foreign Relations* 14.6:24-32.
- Boyton, G.R. and Kwon W.H. 1978. "An Analysis of Consociational Democracy." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3,1: 11-25.
- Brancati, Dawn. 2004. "Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?" *The Washington Quarterly* 3-21.
- Brown, Carl L. 2007 "Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 86, 5: 180.
- Brown, Nathan J. 2005 "Post-Election Iraq: Facing the Constitutional Challenge." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* February:1-11.

- Byman, Daniel. 2003 "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities." *International Security* 12:74-87.
- Chalabi, Ahmad. 1991. "Iraq: The Past as Prologue?" *Foreign Policy* 83: 20-29.
- Cockburn, Andrew and Cockburn, Patrick .2002. *Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession*. London: Verso.
- Conetta, Carl. 2005. "Masque of Democracy: Iraqi Election System Still Disfavors Sunni Arabs, Favors Kurds." *Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo # 35*. Washington D.C., USA.
- Conetta, Carl. 2005. "The Iraqi Election "bait and switch": Faulty Poll will not Bring Peace or U.S. Withdrawal." *Defense Alternatives Briefing* 17, Washington D.C.USA.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. 2010. "The Real Results of the Iraqi Elections: By July 2010, in Early 2011, or Years Later?" *Center for Strategies & International Studies* 1-10.
- Coskun, Bezen.2008. "Turkey's Iraq Policy on the Brink of Civil War." *Peace and Conflict Review* 2,1:1-8.
- Dawisha, Adeer I. 1980-1981. "Iraq: The West's Opportunity." *Foreign Policy* 41:134-153.
- Dawisha, Adeer. 2005. "The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities." *Third World Quarterly* 26,4/5:723-737.
- Dawisha, Adeer and Karen.2003. "How to Build a Democratic Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* 82,3:36-50.
- Derby, Elena and Cordesman Anthony.2010. "The Uncertain Politics Behind Iraq's Election: Political Controversies and the Formation of a Viable Government." *Center For Strategic & International Studies* 7,12: 68-101.
- Diamond, Larry.2004. "What Went Wrong in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* 83,5:34-56.
- Dodge, Toby.2003. *Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dodge, Toby. 2005. "Iraqi Transitions: From Regime Change to State Collapse." *Third World Quarterly* 26,4/5: 705-721.
- Dryzek, John S. 2005. "Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia." *Political Theory* 33, 2:218-242.

- Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 2003. "Iran-Iraq Relations After Saddam." *The Washington Quarterly* 26 4:115-129.
- Elazar, Daniel. 1985. "Federalism and Consociational Regimes" *Punlius*.152:17-34.
- Galbraith, Peter. 2004. "Operation Save Face. The American Prospect." <http://uslaboragainstawar.org/article.php?id=727>
- Gresh, Geoffrey.2006. "Instigating Instability :Iran's Support of Non-State Armed Groups in Iraq." *Al Nakhlah*, Spring.
- Hegghammer, Thomas. 2006. "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War." *Middle East Journal* 60 1:11-32.
- Heydemann, Steven.2006. "In the Shadow of Democracy." *Middle East Journal* 60,1:146-157.
- Hunt Courtney.2005. *The History of Iraq*. London: Greenwood Press.
- International Crisis Group.2006. "Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk." *Middle East Report* 56:1-38.
- International Crisis Group. 2009. "Iraq's Provincial Elections : The Stakes." *Middle East Report* 92.
- International Crisis Group.2010. "Iraq's Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond" *Middle East Report* 94:1-44.
- Kalaycioglus, Ersin.2005. "Iraqi Constitution: A Federal Democratic Heaven or Hell?" *Perceptions* 113- 125.
- Ed. Karmis Dimitrios and Norman Wayne.2005. *Theories of Federalism: A Reader*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Katzman, Kenneth.2006. "Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution." *Congressional Research Service* 1-6.
- Katzman, Kenneth.2011. "Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Right." *Congressional Research Service* 1-20.
- Katzman, Kenneth.2009. " Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security." *Congressional Research Service* 1-17.
- Kugler, Jacek, Tammen Ronald L., Efrid Brian.2004. "Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq." *International Studies Review* 6, 4:163-179.

- Lijphart, Ardent.1981. "Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects. A Reply." *Comparative Politics* 13,3:355-360.
- Lijphart, Ardent.1978. "Powers and Emergency Regimes: A Commentary." *Asian Survey* 18, 4:401-407.
- Lijphart, Ardent.1969. "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* 21,2:207-225.
- Lijphart, Ardent.1985. "Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories." *Publius* 15, 2:3-15.
- Lijphart, Ardent. 1971. "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 4,1:1-14.
- Mearsheimer, J. and Walt S.2003. "An Unnecessary War". *Foreign Policy* 134:50-59.
- Mohemeidi, F. and Alkaderi, R.2002. "Washington Makes Its Case for war". *Middle East Report* 224:2-5.
- Olson, Robert.2006. "Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1-24.
- Ottaway, Marina.2005. "Back from the Brink: A Strategy for Iraq." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 43:1-8.
- Ottaway, Marina and Kaysi Anas Danial.2011. "Iraq, Protest, Democracy, and Autocracy." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 43:1-8.
- Pennock, J. Roland. 1979. *Democratic Political Theory*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rubin, Barry.2005. "Reality Bites: The Impending Logic of Withdrawal from Iraq." *The Washington Quarterly* 3,14:23-44.
- Sartoni, Giovanni.1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Slugett, Peter.2006. " Iraq Since Saddam." *Middle East Journal* 60, 2:361-368.
- Simeon, Richard.2009. "Constitutional Design and Change in Federal Systems: Issues and Questions." *The Journal of Federalism* 39, 2:241-261.
- Simons, Geoff.2002. *Targeting Iraq*. London: Saqi Books.

- Simon, Steven. 2009. "Wont You Be My Neighbor: Syria, Iraq and the Changing Strategic Context in the Middle East." *United States Institute of Peace* 1-39.
- Smith, Tony and Diamond Larry.2004. A Deal with the Devil. *Foreign Affairs* 83,6:130-133.
- Spitz, Eliane.1984. *Majority Rule*. Chatham NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. 1989. "Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, 1:1-30.
- Sluggett, Marion and Peter.1991. "The Historiography of Modern Iraq". *The American Historical Review* 96,5:1408-1421.
- Salamey, Imad. 2005. "The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq". *International Studies Perspective* 6:190-207.
- Stansfield, Gareth. 2010. "The reformation of Iraq's foreign relations: new elites and enduring legacies." *International Affairs* 86,6:1395-1409.
- Toesing, Chris.2005. "Iraqi Elections." *Middle East Report* 234: 8-9.
- Tripp, Charles.2000. *A History of Iraq*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ulgen, Sinan. 2010. "Turkey' Shifting Foreign Policy: What Next?" *Carnegie Middle East Center* 53:1-12.
- Wong, Edward. 2005. "Turnout in the Iraqi Elections is Reported at 70 Percent." *New York Times*, December.
- Wright, Robin. 2005. "Experts Cautious in Assessing Iraq Election." *The Washington Post*, December.
- Zisser, Eyal.2005. "Syria, the United States, and Iraq- Two Years after the Downfall of Saddam Hussein." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6,1:60-8

